Triangle of Network and Influence: Indigenous NGOs, Civil Society and the State as Strategic Development Actors in Sudan: 1983 – 2003

By

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the Sudanese people in the first place. My dedication further goes to my mother (Fatma), brothers (Malik, Hasan, Yousif, Moneim) and to my wife (Samia), daughter (Ruaa) and sons (Mohamed), (Hassan) and (Khalid). Without their endless sacrifices it would not have been possible to go on with this long process of learning. My dedication finally goes to the souls of the great Sophi 'Darwish' (Khogali), my father (Mohamed) and my brother (Hussein) whom spirits had influenced my education process.
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ABSTRACT

(English)

Sudan witnessed a surge in the growth of NGOs and civil society organizations during the period of 1983 and 2003. A number of factors were behind the growth and expanding role of NGOs and civil society into development. This thesis explores the interlink between Indigenous NGOs, Civil Society and the State as strategic development actors in Sudan. It is also about how poor people use, own social capital to link with other influential actors from within NGOs and civil society to exert pressure and influence mainstream policies affecting them.

The study takes a holistic approach to address challenges of poverty and development, arguing that NGOs and people social capital are keys to people-centered development. In the course of collecting research material, the thesis adopted participatory research methods, using field survey where stakeholders played a role in data collection, a questionnaire covering a sample of projects and interventions by NGOs and civil society organizations, and unpublished reports. In addition, secondary sources also provided rich information of the policy objective and performance of NGOs, civil society and the state in delivering developmental goods.

Following the analysis of the research material, the candidate arrived at a number of findings, the important one of which confirms the significance of NGOs and civil society as vehicles for political development and promotion of participatory governance and development. It is found out that people could influence mainstream politics and policies only if they opted for investing in social capital and
connectedness with other viable actors in alliances, networks of influence
and engage with state and governance institutions at all levels. Empirical

findings confirm that the state can no longer ignore NGOs and civil
society role in development, hence the thesis recommended enabling
policy environment to energize already existing triangle of network and
influence, and to tap on the joint resources of the tripartite partners in
pursuit of development.
Abstract (Arabic)
ملخص البحث
شهد السودان فيضاً منهما في نمو التنظيمات غير الحكومية وتنظيمات المجتمع المدني خلال الفترة 1983 و حتى 2003م. هناك عوامل عدة لهذا النمو والتوسع في دور هذه التنظيمات في التنمية.
تبحث هذه الدراسة منهجيا شموليا لمواجهة تحديات الفقر والتنمية و يجادل الباحث أن التنظيمات غير الحكومية ورأس المال الاجتماعي هي عواصم أساسية للتنمية المرتكزة على الإنسان. كما أنه يبحث طيلة مرحلة جمع مادة البحث والمعلومات على مناهج البحث السريع بالمشاركة التي يلعب الشركاء فيها دورا اساسيا في جمع المعلومات والتحليل. استخدم الباحث الدراسة الميدانية ودراسات الحالة حول المشروخات و التدخلات التنموية للمنظمة غير الحكومية وتنظيمات المجتمع المدني و كذلك الاستبان لجمع المعلومات الميدانية كما استخدمت التقارير غير المشروعة والمصادر الثانوية من المعلومات حول أهداف و اداء التنظيمات و الدولة في تقديم الخدمات التنموية. ومن تحليل المعلومات توصل الباحث عدد من النتائج إذ تؤكد أهمها على تعاظم دور التنظيمات غير الحكومية المحلية وتنظيمات المجتمع المدني الأخرى كمحرك اساسي للتنمية السياسية و تشجيع الحكم والتنمية بالمشاركة.
كما خلص البحث أيضا إلى ان الناس يمكن ان تؤثر على السياسة والسياسات فقط اذا تم الاستثمار في رأس المال الاجتماعي و الترابط مع فينات الفاعلة الأخرى في تحالفات و شبكات تأثير و التداخل و التلامح مع مؤسسات الدولة و الحكم على كافة المستويات.
كما أكدت نتائج البحت ان الدولة لايمكن لها بعد الآن ان تتجاوز دور التنظيمات غير الحكومية المحلية وتنظيمات المجتمع المدني في التنمية و على توسيع الدراسة بضرورة ايجاد بينة سياسات داعمة و منشطة لمثله التشبيك و التأثير الموجود اصلا و الاستفادة القصوى من القدرات و الموارد في هذه الشراكة الثلاثية لإنجاز مهام التنمية.
INTRODUCTION

1: Research Topic

Despite a century of global modernization, most of Sudan’s vast areas of approximately one million square kilometers remain rural in social, economic and cultural background with the majority of the population living in rural areas and depending on traditional farming and pastoralism as the main livelihood and income-generating economic activities. Sudan socioeconomic infrastructure, however, reveals that the people of Sudan today are poorer and hungrier than ever before since independence.

The current socio-economic status characterized by low standards of living, widespread poverty, and prolonged civil conflict of almost 40 years in Southern Sudan, along with the recent revolt in Eastern Sudan as well as the ongoing civil war in Western Sudan, have contributed to the current fragile situation of affairs in the country. Since 1985, frequent droughts in certain parts of Sudan have caused severe shortages of food, social disruption and widespread health and nutritional problems. Heavy rains provoke flooding along the Nile and its tributaries, as well as other seasonal rivers such as Gash in Eastern Sudan, causing large-scale displacement of communities, loss of crops, and damage to infrastructure.

Outbreaks of disease often accompany flooding, and armed conflict further exacerbates the situation and leads to the deteriorating of the socio-economic life in the rural areas. In addition, all indicators suggest the prevalence rate of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sudan is awfully increasing. Declining per capita income and real wages, rising unemployment, increasing poverty and inequalities are existent realities of the everyday lives of the Sudanese, especially in the rural areas. According to Ali (1994)
around 93% of rural families are under poverty line and that the poor rural families have increased from 78% to 91% between the years 1986 to 1993. This has been reflected in numerous social ills inflicting Sudan at present and manifested in increased social differentiation and widening of the gap between the poor and the rich, human insecurity and conflicts, population mobility, family disintegration and dislocation, erosion of the extended family familial ties and a general collapse of livelihood systems. Women destitution and marginalization, which significantly accelerated the problem of environmental degradation, has reached alarming stages.

This situation indicates the failure of governance and government policies to address the issue of economic poverty at both micro and macro levels. The failure to address the recovery of the present poverty and bring about the planned development policies and change in power relations was unarguably placed on the vicious circle of totalitarian and democratic regimes, which assumed power in Sudan since independence.

The situation has been compounded by inability of the government to provide needed services and economic opportunities and the shift of its policies and priorities towards quick earning and appealing investment projects that contributed to the deepening of poverty and marginality of the majority of the people.

Accordingly, the question of how to help alleviate poverty becomes a real challenge for almost the majority of Sudanese population who have become increasingly realizing the fact that it is the people responsibilities to map out their own development plans. This inescapable reality has created the emergence of NGOs and civil society as an urgent developmental need, an alternative development and safety havens for the poor.
This study assesses and analyzes the social capital’s nature and roles of the Sudanese civil society and indigenous NGOs in development, poverty alleviation and promotion of participatory governance at local levels. It further attempts to explore the role and influence of the networks among the corner stones of the triangle of indigenous NGOs, social capital, broader civil society and the state as strategic development actors in Sudan.

2: Justifications for the selection of the topic

In Sudan though NGOs began to place themselves into direct socio-economic and political agenda, literature remained meager with apparent knowledge gaps. Available literature is limited in scope and theoretical groundings and usually takes the form of NGOs-focused few cases of projects and programmes. This has created the justified need for enriching the theoretical and intellectual discussions on the civil society and its relationship to the state and its role in the reform and democratization of the development process. Moreover, development policies have been focusing on elements of socio-economic and environment, ignoring political and organizational development which is crucial to assure sustainable positive changes in poor people livelihood. There is need, therefore to bring issues of political development, organizational civil society’s role into the heart of a conceptualized development programming.

3: Statement of Research Problem

Having the failure of the state as service and development provider and in pursuit for social development welfare demands at national and local levels, a variety of formal voluntary organizations emerged. Formally registered under the Voluntary Acts since 1957, these organizations consist of wide
range of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and numerous urban-based migration associations. These grassroots community-based organizations (CBOs) constitute the broader base of the civil society and the voluntary organizations sector in Sudan. The mid 1980s, the peak of socio-economic crisis in Sudan, marks the emergence of many voluntary organizations (NGOs).

Besides being a development need, NGOs approaches as argued in this study have a comparative advantage over the mainstream development programs and strategies. Partnerships, interaction and coordination with governments and donor organizations is more likely to link micro level projects and grassroots organization with macro level policies to deal with the underlying causes of poverty than just addressing its symptoms. Although rated small in scale and coverage, the efforts to realize people-led, people centered, participatory development approaches are arguably valuable in empowering local communities, reducing poverty and promoting just participatory local governance.

The on-going debate on the civil society and its relationship with the state, the revival of discussion on civil society, especially after the collapse of the Eastern Block, created an intellectual need to review the nature and dynamics of the civil society. Moreover, current discussion seems limited and confused regarding the place of the NGOs within the civil sector. This is besides, as this research seeks to demonstrate, the focus on the NGOs immediate humanitarian role rather than envisaging its role as strategic social organizations.
4: Research Hypothesis

The following hypothesis has been put forward to be empirically explored and analyzed:

1. Awareness among the masses, especially the poor, to organize themselves in indigenous NGOs, nation wide, indicates that the social capital and NGOs sector is becoming a corner stone in the civil society.
2. The indigenous social capital and informal people organization are historically rooted in Sudanese communities.
3. The modern formal NGOs sector has expanded dramatically since the mid 1980s and become an effective development sector, side by side with the public and private sectors.
4. NGOs are vehicles for democratic culture, good governance and popular participation and therefore, hold the tendency of serving both socio-economic and political interests of their constituencies
5. Sudan national NGOs and civil society are under extreme pressure of internal and external nature.

5: Research Questions

The research raises the following main questions to be addressed:

- What is the nature and genesis of Sudan civil society and NGO sector?
- What are the main forces and processes that help to transfer the poor, low-income communities into dynamic and functioning structures with substantial involvement in the NGO sector?
- What is the place of the national NGOs within the national civil society?
- To what extent do NGOs manage to bring improvement in the quality of life of the poor and marginalized population?
- How the indigenous voluntary organizations interact with government, other civil society organizations and what are their comparative advantages and disadvantages?
- What are the internal and external factors that influence the NGO sector in Sudan?

6: Research Objectives
1. To explore the nature, genesis, typology, coverage, emergence and growth of Sudan NGO and civil society sector
2. To provide a comparative analysis of some specific cases of NGO and government project
3. To investigate and explore the performance, effectiveness and developmental impacts of NGOs
4. To investigate and analyze the internal and external factors influencing NGO growth, functioning and qualitative change
5. To provide a theoretical contribution to the on-going debate regarding NGOs and civil society and their envisaged socio-economic and political roles as agents of change influencing the mainstream development policies and local level of governance.

7: Research Methodology
The core focus of the research has been the analysis of NGOs as social movement and their effectiveness and impact. Investigation of NGOs as social movement will involve investigations along:

- participation of people and democratization of development
- representation of poor people interests and aspirations
- Fostering populist political systems.
• Potential contributions to the social change process
• Contributions to strengthening civil society and the democratization process.

Investigations of effectiveness and impact analysis will be in relation to:
• concrete results, success or failures and performance indicators
• improvement in quality of life of poor and marginalized constituents
• socio-economic and political empowerment of constituents
• Development approaches and models as demonstrated on the ground, comparable to mainstream ones.
• Challenges and constraints to NGOs in polices on basis of socio-economic and political differentiation.

Following the above, the study involves both quantitative and qualitative primary and secondary data. For that purpose a multiplicity of relevant and recognized social science tools and techniques were employed.

8: Primary data

8.1: Field work

The field work constituted the main source of primary data. To serve the objectives of the study field work was intended to cover geographically and ethnically diverse population in the peri-urban setting of Wau Nur displaced community in Kassala city and rural settings of El Gash Delta project. The selection of sites was to help compare the different research indicators between two different settings and different livelihood and other diversity dimensions. The sampling procedure was also carefully delineated to care for representation of the varying types of organization and their concerns to
reflect the diversity of social organizations considering regional, cultural and gender representation.

A number of participatory rapid appraisal techniques were used as participatory methodology tools. There were group discussions, semi-structure interviews (SSI) interviews using check list of questions covering the various community groups in both communities. The researcher had extensively used the social capital assessment tools developed by the World Bank. The participatory methodology and tools were applied to generate information and qualitative data mainly on social capital and people own understanding of their situation and development. More over, for purposes of quantitative data and some focused questions at household level, a questionnaire covering different issues of focus was used. The sampling technique based on random sampling procedures was used. The size of the sample was 10% of the total number of households within the strata identified in each of the two communities. The 100 cases were divided equally between urban and rural areas. It is seen as advantageous to sample each population independently for purposes of representing various groupings. Within the stratum I used the random sampling for the questionnaire to assure no population element is excluded. This can produce a weighted mean that has less variability than arithmetic mean of a simple random of population (http:en.wikipedia.org). The questionnaire, therefore, was used as a supportive tool to come up with some empirical comparisons which cannot be secured by PRA and group discussions. The urban setting is predominantly inhabited by Nuba IDPs and other IDPs from Southern Sudan, and Eastern Sudan. El Gash Rural area is predominately inhabited by the Hadandawa and Hausa. The rural area of El Gash Delta in Kassala state is predominantly agro-pastoralism community. The field survey had covered
the villages of Metataib, Masjid, Hadalya, Tambi and Glosset. This community has two distinct ethnic groups namely the Hadandawa and Hausa, yet, ethnicity here is not the major focus of the research.

Stratified sampling was used focusing on urban – rural livelihood systems and social capital parameters. The Delta was divided into 3 Zones (Upper zone, middle zone and lower zone) on basis of settlement pattern and representation of different livelihood systems and ethnic groups. The tools participatory approaches and tools are to involve the various and different levels (traditional leaders, NGOs staff, local government staff, women groups, farmers' union grass root organizations and NGOS leaders. Moreover, questionnaire had targeted household level to generate situation and opinions of ordinary people.

8.2: Participatory methods

A wide range of participatory rapid appraisal tools were used to generate required data. These include individual interviews and group discussions, community profile and asset mapping, and checklist recording.

8.3: Individual interviews and group discussions

These tools were used to provide required information on NGOs functioning and future challenges in relation to social development and roles in social movement. Check lists and open ended questions (Annex (1) was used to help guide and focus the discussions. Group interviews were conducted in each community investigated where each group consulted and interviewed consisted of 10–15 participants. Two group interviews were carried out with women and men separately. Groups were stratified on some socio demographic characteristics that are important within the community
context including age and ethnicity. Mixed group interviews were also conducted to assess levels of consensus. The researcher played the moderator's role to facilitate the discussion, probe on key issues, elicit comments from all participants, and focus the discussion on the issues of interest without interrupting or ignoring comments from participants. The observers’ role was played by research assistants who took notes on the content of the discussion and process of group dynamics. Interviews were also carried out with leaders of community institutions identified and solicited through community interviews and household questionnaire as key organizations that have impact or influence on community development.

8.4: Community Profile and Asset Mapping

This method: is elicited through a series of group interviews conducted in the community to be familiar with community characteristics and issues relating to social structure and dynamics. There were also group interviews to establish a consensus over some issues. Several participatory methods were used to develop the community profile. The primary data source material generated by these interviews, mapping, observational notes of group process characteristics, community assets and services were proved useful in the analysis and conclusions reached.

8.5: Check list data sheet:

It was used to collect information on NGOs profile, typology, effectiveness and impact assessment of case studies, using Semi-structure interviews (SSI) guide and checklists that were prepared in advance and used to dig into people’s perception, knowledge and experiences. The
institutional and organizational profile defining the relationships, networks, partnerships and linkages that exists among formal and informal institutions operating in the community were carefully investigated. The profile was also intended to assess the organizations’ origins and development quality of membership; institutional capacity (quality of leadership, participation, organizational culture, and organizational capacity); and institutional linkages.

8.6: Secondary data:
Key research methods included literature review and a comprehensive field survey. Critical review and assessment of literature, published and unpublished deemed necessary to enrich the analytical framework and furnish the necessary secondary data base. To avail the necessary primary data, participatory learning methods were mainly be used to ensure comprehensive coverage of relevant resource persons’ perceptions and views (from within or outside NGOs). Oral testimonies are useful tools to trace the history, emergence and growth of the NGOs and to document varying experiences of same civil society organization.

8.7; Data analysis
The data analysis was carried out along carefully selected indicators, worked out in relation to the specific research objectives. SPSS is used for statistical analysis.
9. Organization of Research

The research is organized around an introduction and nine chapters. The introductions consist of the research topic; statement of research problem; research objectives and methods and organization of the study.

Chapter one focuses on the models, theories and issues in current envelopment and civil society debate. The chapter focuses on the theoretical construction of development and paradigm and social capital and social civil society. The Chapter also covers contemporary debate on social capital, development and civil society-state discourse. The literature review also touched on the discourse from African perspective and the crisis of African state’s development. Also the account tried to review most relevant literature addressing the restructuring of state, discussing the development and models of states.

Chapter Two sheds lights on development agents and strategies. The chapter brings to the front the literature and debate on anatomy of African crisis; the developmental state; civil society and NGOs as development agents and the society intersections with State. There is also an attempt to explore a framework of analysis.

Chapter Three is briefly shedding light on the Sudan Economy and Society. The account only introduces partially the people and resources; the social and cultural structures and a picture on the current status of economic development in Sudan.

Chapter Four explores the State and Civil Society in Sudan. It covers the Sudanese Civil Society emergence, growth and dynamism. Also the account looks into the civil society and Sudanese state relationship. The emphasis is given to placing the Sudanese indigenous and modern NGOs
within the civil society sector. The Chapter traces and elaborates on the history, emergence and growth of the Sudanese civil society and relates it to the State and politics affecting people livelihood and development. The typology, viability and dynamics within civil society are exposed.

Chapter Five, building on the previous chapter, this one ties to lay failure in the past to bridge the development gap between down increasingly impoverished rural areas and peri-urban centers. The account is an attempt to shed light on development impasse and need to rethink modalities and relationships between NGOs, civil society and state, particularly on development. The chapter tries to bring under light a review of development impasse as far as the Sudanese case. Some of the Sudanese crisis was also briefly featured in this chapter.

Chapter Six shed light on civil society resources, modalities and impact on development. Flowing from the previous chapter, here documentation is given for how the civil society mustered its forces, capacities, modalities etc to deal with development failures identified earlier. The emphasis is on some cases and experiences of civil society and international support organization. The focus is mainly reviewing issues of performance; capacity issues and trials of developing workable modalities of civil society and local state structures. In all cases, there is a degree of critical review different types of civil society organizations using much of the parameters indicated in the part of methods and tools.

Chapter Seven explores the social capital and NGOs developmental roles and impact at local community level. This chapter continues the documentation of first hand research material on social capital as coming from the field survey. The account, therefore, is exclusively on analysis of field survey and research findings in relation to key research problem and
hypothesis. This chapter is rich with data and information generated from the two urban and rural communities of Kassala state chosen for the field survey. The chapter also includes specific findings from the community and organizational profiles and the household survey. It ties to generate and file people and local leaders’ opinion on the situation, their communities and future aspirations. People social capital and their organizational capacity and how they relate to government and other civil society organization formal or external is the heart of this account. For further details there are annexes of a number of tables and graphs that illustrate more the situation.

Chapter eight focuses on the development impact of civil Society and NGOs highlights the missing link of the State. This account shed light on poverty diagnostic and the politics of poverty and its related socio-economic structures of Sudan. The account elaborates on government approaches and programmes and it’s failing attempts to develop the IPRSP, indicating the exclusion of civil society in the process and the anticipated product. This account while shedding light on poverty realizes that a tripartite partnership between the state, civil society and NGOs is required in order to effectively stem underdevelopment, decay and initiate a process of development that meets international standards, and the success and failure in reshaping the tripartite relationship.

Chapter nine is a search for a triangle of network and influence. It briefly concluded on key research findings and suggests specific conclusions. The chapter focuses on the possibility of developing a sound, participatory development model that bring together various stakeholders of indigenous civil society, NGOs and state structures (at various levels) for mutual support and influence, particularly on issues that directly relate to people livelihood and development aspirations.
CHAPTER ONE:

MODELS, THEORIES AND CURRENT
ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT

1.1: Models and Theories: Modernization and Dependency Paradigm

In the traditional development theories, economic development stands in the forefront development: growth, assessed only according to per capita income as indicator. For the economists, the assumption was if economic growth occurred, political and social problems were solved (trickle down effect). This had dominated the 1950s. The concept of development was then (1960s) expanded to include growth and change, i.e. change in the value systems and attitudes of the population (cultural change), more efficient political systems and more equitable distribution. The dependency theory was then formulated (1960s and 1970s) stating that development in the periphery depends on the centre. But, in the (1980s) issues related to ecology were increasingly included in the context of development theories,

As the developing countries distorted economy cannot be improved without a certain degree of independence.

1.1.1 Modernization Paradigm

Modernization theory: attributes underdevelopment to the internal factors in developing countries. Industrial countries are considered the best model for economy and society to be followed. Development is seen as the growth of production and efficiency and as increase of the per capita income. On the other hand, the dualism theory emphasizes the economic,
technological and regional dualism which is often the consequence of social
dualism, the absence of relations between people of the different races,
religions and languages. The vicious circle of underdevelopment, according
to strategy theory, is generally attributed to the scarcity of capital. As a
consequence, there is low labour productivity, low real income, poor saving
capacity and accordingly poor investment. This theory emphasized the need
for balanced growth, whereby investment planning is crucial. This implies
widening of markets and expanding production.

The bottleneck is lack of entrepreneurial abilities, institutional factors,
incentives, domination of selfish attitude, curtailing investment and
productivity expansion. There is accordingly strong claim to enhance growth
and its related political, social and institutional framework. The social
change dimension had influenced development thinking and lead to opting for
social change theories.

The modernization theories are many:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1 Dualism theories (Boeke)</th>
<th>Other modernization theories</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 strategy theories</td>
<td>Rosenstein; Rodan;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Balanced growth theory</td>
<td>Big Bush theory;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Nurske)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Unbalanced growth theory</td>
<td>Dev. Poles theory (Perraux)</td>
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<td>(Hirschman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Growth phases theory</td>
<td>Social change theory</td>
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<td>(Rostaw)</td>
<td>(Hagen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Circular causation theory</td>
<td>(Myrdal)</td>
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According to modernization theories: internal factors are responsible for underdevelopment and the industrial countries are the model for developing countries and society and propose certain measures including: modernization of production apparatus; capital aid and transfer of knowledge. The development is seen as growth of production and efficiency and as increase in per captia income.

Dualism (Boeke) differentiates between two sectors: modern and traditional. Each sector develops according to its own pattern, little interaction or relationship between economic; social; technological and regional. Dualism strategy proposes reduction of traditional sector, trickle down expansion of modern sector.

The period between (1492 -1950) was characterized by colonization exercising key approaches of slave trade, expansion of Europe through colonial trade patterns. The development approach therefore was based on promoting cash- crops and direct exploitation of colonized states.

The 1950s, were, generally, known as Golden Years of modernization and industrialization era. This era of the neo-colonization generates the World Bank, IMF and GATT as important tools for the neo-colonialism.

The 1960s, though had seen the independence of many colonized countries, they produced dependency development theories displayed mainly in the development dream of export-oriented growth theory and the transnational corporations.

The 1970s witnessed the emergence of the dominant growth theory dominating the international economy. This led to the OPEC monopoly of the oil prices, the high borrowing increase of interest rates of debt and the emergence of the (NICs) newly industrialized countries.
The 1980s was famous as 'the lost Decade' as it was characterized by the debt trap of the IMF conditionality, but its main phenomena were the collapse of USSR and Eastern Europe.

The 1990s was simply the era of people participation (at least as lip say). It was the Booming era whereby there was rise of people movements represented in the RIO summit on environment and the Beijing Summit on women participation. There was steady growth of NGO work and predominance of claims for participation, rights, and good governance.

“Ekins 1992 development” means nothing but social transformation that does not occur without hacking the existing power structures and that transformation of powerless should articulate their strategic change objectives and provide much more basic needs.

1.1.2; Dependency Syndrome:

The modernization school that dominated development studies in the 1950s and 1960s, was usually assumed that, once colonialism had shaken, underdeveloped countries, would embark on a process of modernization that would make them traverse certain "stages" — as spelt out by W.W. Roust in his famous "anti-Communist manifesto", Stages of Economic Growth (Rowstaw, 1960) — towards a full-fledged capitalist system.

"Traditional society" might set up barriers but these would be overcome by modernizing élites, aid and foreign capital. The first generation of post-colonial "development plans" were couched in a language that suggested conscious efforts to move economies from one "stage" — usually the "pre-take off" stage towards the "take-off" stage. In all this, the centre stage was occupied by "modernizing élites" guided by the aspirations of nation-building and development. The "developmental state" was seen as
not only desirable but possible and able to be facilitated by training programmes, aid, military support, etc. (Gendzier, 1985).

By the mid-1970s, this linear view of capitalist development began to lose its dominance largely due to the onslaught of the Dependence School that generally denied that capitalism in the periphery could play its historical progressive role (in the Leninists sense of leading to an increase in the productive forces of social labour and in the socialization of labour). Instead it argued for a processes of "development of underdevelopment".

This point of departure, in turn, led to the mistaken view that, because capitalism in the periphery was different and produced a series of social, political and economic contradictions that were specific to it, it ceased to be capitalist or, worse, it led to stagnation. More significant was the fact that this perspective ruled out the possibility of developmental states in Africa that were either led by a national bourgeoisie or capable of nurturing one. This of course meant that either trans-nationalization processes had obviated the need for such a national bourgeoisie or the asymmetric nature of centre-periphery relations tended to produce class structures that were not conducive to dynamic accumulation and, more specifically, produced a bourgeoisie that was historically condemned to be no more than a "comprador bourgeoisie" subservient to the interests of foreign capital (Leys, 1975; Nabudere, 1981; Shivji, 1980).

By the 1970s and 1980s most of these arguments had begun to lose their force partly due to what Cardoso and Faletto (1979) termed "associated dependent development" occurrence in some Asian, African and Latin American experience and to ideological among key social movements that increasingly sought internal reform. The "associated dependent development" allowed for capitalist development in the periphery
and in many ways and provided the intellectual tools necessary for conceptualizing the possibilities and dynamics of "dependent development". The prerequisites for such development were, inter alia, that they create a progressive national alliance between the national bourgeoisie and labour which constitutes a "developmental bloc" capable and willing to pursue a strategy of national industrial development over the long term. All this presupposed a "developmental state".

Similarly, those of "classical" Marxist persuasion asserted that capitalist accumulation was taking place in the developing countries in the "normal way" both during colonialism (that "pioneered" capitalist industrialization) and, more obviously, after independence (Warren, 1980). Warren’s thesis was applied in its unadulterated form to Africa by Sender and Smith (1986), whose book was a polemical attack on the "nationalists" dependence viewing that colonialism and imperialism had bred underdevelopment. Arguments that capitalism had been stunted by, either it was evidence of "guilt and shame" or was lumped together with the literature of the "masochistic modern version of the White Man’s Burden" (Warren, 1980) or nationalist "scapegoat-ism" aimed at shifting the blame for post-independence policy’s failure on imperialism (Sender and Smith, 1986: 132).

1.1.3: Sustainable and Social Development:

On the other hand, there are arguments on a different path to development. These arguments indicate that there is conflict between the economic and social development goals; stressing that development should not be reduced to economic factors only, but it should be considered as a system of interdependent social change.
Sustainable development, as a concept allows for permanent satisfaction of human needs and the improvement of the quality of life and does not harm the environment. The production system should then care for rational use of ecology. Equitable and equality growth of development became dominant claims for economic systems in terms of effective political participation and sound systems for capital investment. Development should pay care for social justice of oppressed and marginalized groupings as main demand.

Within this process, employment opportunities secure more than a source of income, hence directly addressing unemployment and poverty. Consequently, undernourishment or malnutrition issues are better addressed. Some argued for production by masses, not mass production hence contributing to mass purchasing power. There is no way than to directly address the social, political marginalization of masses, which shall guarantee unswerving momentum of sustainable development as holistic interdependent social change process.

Participation, within such a participatory process means sharing Conflicts between growth and the social dimensions of development should be managed towards more inclusion, participation, autonomy, and self confidence of the masses.

Hagen argues that motivation for performance differs between societies and their classes and strata, pointing out that in traditional and hierarchical society system, all social relations are static. Children learn according to norms, and deviations (initiatives) are, generally, punished. Hagen, however, argued that the uncertainty and frustration lead to behavioral changes. Dissatisfaction among marginal groups and minorities
lead them to accept new values and in the course of time become impulses for social change and economic progress.

New Development Theories also emerged to capitalize on previous conceptualization of self-centered development and its connection with analysis of local obstacles to development. However, there were concerns that local development models have failed as a result of high economic, social and ecological costs. The arguments, therefore, focused on the need for efficient institutional environment and social macro-policy framework in a bid to bring about enabling environment, shared analysis of situation involving stakeholders and even partnership to carry out development initiatives.

The Meta level was to focus on the development of a social structure. This is mainly to increase ability of various groups of actors to voice their interests and to cope in common with the demands of society. Here there are serious issues of ecology, technological organization and international economy. The social transformation initiate pressures of cross learning, communication and dialogue among different actors viz. government, business or market and intermediary organizations.

The macro-level initiatives were to address efficient resource allocation and government management ability. The meso-level reflects the local policy and institutional building of social organizations. This pattern allows rapid flow of information and articulates demands and joint actions. The political participation, in all cases, is a decisive condition which can cause the ruling powers to constantly reformulate their policy on the basis of achievement of former polices.

The above debate on development theories lead to legitimate questions as follows:-Does development has same meaning for every one?
Do theories of social science / economics offer the right instruments for beneficiary groups?

The capitalist development concept comprises four normative objectives of participatory democracy; free market economy; modern state monopoly of supremacy and human rights and legal commitment of policy. This is generally a Western model of democratic, constitutional state. This model has been emphasizing the institutionalization and a pluralistic regulation of the market economy. Yet, this model is generally criticized for broadening the gap between those who have and others who have not. Political Development implies changes in the organization of public life, especially of the government. This is also linked with social and economic development. The traditional development theories, as presented by economists equated development with growth. Development was generally measured using the per capita income as indicator. The assumption was, if economic growth took place, political and social problems could also be solved. Structural change was considered to be the necessary consequence of economic growth. However, since social improvement were not connected with progress in growth, the concept of development was expanded (in the 1960s) to include growth and change in the value systems and attitudes of people (cultural change). This was also associated with modernization of political institutions towards greater efficiency of political systems and a more equitable distribution.

1.2: Issues in Current Debate on Development

This account focuses on the debate and literature review on the development impasse from both theoretical and practical dimensions. The emphasis on this account is the discourse from African perspective and the
crisis of African states’ development. The chapter also tried to review most relevant literature addressing the restructuring of state, discussing the development and models of states

1.2.1 The Development Impasse: An African Perspective

B.J. Germandze captured the fact that ‘development’ has come to an impasse or dead end in developing countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. He referred to the ‘demise of the development project/theory’ (McMichael, 1996), the ‘myth of Development’ (Rivero, 2001); the failure of the ‘development industry’ (Rihani, 2002) as well as numerous reports/studies (World Bank, 1989; Asante, 1991). He pointed out that alternative strategies, however, had been proposed to transcend the development impasse from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, referring to numerous contributions: (Sen & Grown, 1986; Sklair, 11988; Asante, 1991; Cornia et al., 1992; Schuurman, 1993; Stewart et al., 1993; Himmelstrand et al., 1994; Ake, 1996; Yansane, 1996; Rivero, 2001; Belshaw & Livingstone, 2002; Fatou, 2002; Chang & Gabriel, 2004). Schuurman (1993) was concerned with new directions in development theory. Belshaw and Livingstone (2002), on the other hand, considered strategies for ‘Renewing Development’ in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Germandze quoted Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1998), viewing alternative development as "a loosely interconnected series of alternative proposals and methodologies; or as an alternative development paradigm, implying a definite theoretical break with mainstream development" (Nederveen, 1998:345). He also recalled Rapley (1996) who noted that "if the political and economic prospects for some countries are growing bleaker all the time, a serious reconsideration of what development is and should entail may be in
order, the time for another paradigm shift may be drawing near" (Rapley, 1996:158).

Reviewing literature on the developmental state (Doornbos, 1990; Rapley, 1996; Amundsen, 1999; Leftwich, 2000), affirmed the fact that the post-colonial African state had been a futile instrument for development. Citing (Amundsen, 1999:459) he stated that the African state was characterized by a general failure to plan and implement efficient and effective policies to solve Africa’s dilemma. There was consensus that the main reason was bad governance, according to World Bank (1992) and UNDP (1997).

Leftwich (2000) and Ake (1996), according to Gemandze argued there was absence of development on the agenda for the African state and attributed that to the nature of the African state, as they deviated from fundamental respects of either the Marxist or Weberian conceptions of the state. (Leftwich, 2000) was quoted as stating that "the African state is variously referred to as: ‘patrimonial’; ‘neo-patrimonial’ (Medard, 1991); ‘soft’; ‘weak’; ‘predatory; ‘overdeveloped’ characteristics which greatly limits its capacity for socio-economic development/transformation." However, today there is general acknowledgement that the state has a crucial role to play in any development/transformation process (Green, 1974; Evans et al., 1985; Killick, 1989; Whitaker, 1992; World Bank, 1997; Leftwich, 2000).

Gemandze used the concept of ‘developmental state’, (Huff, 1995; Johnson, 1999; Woo-Commings, 1999), and more distinctively cited the ‘democratic developmental state’, as the most appropriate state model for effective and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Rapley (1996), on the other hand, argued that advocacy for the developmental state in the Third World is an unrealistic option. Rapley (1996:138-154) identifies the factors conducive to the institutionalization of the development state. Rapley paper mentioned below explanatory quotes:

Firstly 'the state strength': To effectively guide socio-economic development a state must enjoy the power to direct society and lead it through traumatic changes. According to developmental state theory, the state requires to be relatively insulated against society, and give a highly skilled technocratic bureaucracy the autonomy it needs to impose discipline on the private sector (Rapley, 1996: 138-139). Moreover, governments may have to impose harsh policies to repress the discontent these policies provoke (Rapley, 1996:139).

Secondly, authoritarianism: There is need for an authoritarian regime which can ignore demands from society and repress the population if it becomes too vociferous (Rapley, 1996:140).

Thirdly, class politics: asserts that a developmental state depends not only on a productive bourgeoisie, but a local one. (Rapley, 1996: 148).

Yet, Gemandze’s review of the literature on alternative conceptions of the state, Krasner (1984), asserts that Nordlinger (1981) identified state autonomy under different relationships between the preferences of state and societal actors (Krasner, 1984:230-231). He brought in the typology of state autonomy as follows:

Type 1: state autonomy: refers to a situation which the state actors translate their preferences into authoritative action despite divergent societal preferences. (Krasner, 1984:231).
Type 11 state autonomy refers to situations in which state action changes divergent societal preferences to convergent ones, using four general strategies to effect such changes. (Krasner, 1984:231).

Finally Type 111 state autonomy refers to situations in which there is non-divergence between the preferences of the state and society. (Krasner, 1984:231).

(Rapley, 1996:140) concedes authoritarian regimes may have naked power but lack intelligence or enlightenment. (Ake, 1996:126-129) stresses that political authoritarianism is an important reason why the development project in Africa has not been able to take off.

It is argued that capitalism forms the lifeblood of the modern state and that capitalism and patrimonialism are incompatible. Yet African states are patrimonial/neo-patrimonial. The emphasis on the importance of the capitalist class reflects a euro-centric/Western Conception of development (Sachs, 1992; McMichael, 1996): Development is a long-standing European idea, woven from two related strands of thought. Furthermore, reference to the absence of a capitalist/bourgeois class betrays a lack of awareness of the nature of class dynamics (Sklar, 1979; Beckman, 1989), as well as social movements (Mamdani & Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1995) and grassroots organizations in the African context.

Pre-occupation with inefficiency, corruption, misappropriation, nepotism, and other ‘aberrations’, tends to substitute for an analysis of the forces that determine the dynamics and direction of the process (Beckman, 1989:29). Advocacy for the institutionalization of the developmental state in Sub-Saharan African politics is not actually an unrealistic option as (Rapley, 1996) suggests. What is needed is a strong civil society (Osaghae, 1998), as well as appropriate strategies to enhance the capacity of civil society (Blair,
1997), to contribute to the transformation of authoritarian states in the sub region into developmental states.

Gemandze, while discussing the transcending impasse he stated that the post-colonial state has pursued a development policy that has contributed to the development impasse. (Ake, 1996). Unlike the East Asian ‘developmental state’, the postcolonial state in Sub-Saharan Africa has almost completely neglected the rural sector. He distinguished the characteristic between the East Asia and the rest of the developing world whereby the East Asian nations had chosen to develop the rural sector (Grabowski, 1998:114). In fact the rural sector is of strategic importance for the poorer nations of the world. It is the source of primary products (agricultural produce and minerals) for export to the advanced industrial countries and of foodstuffs and labour for the national urban and industrial centers (Long, 1977:1). Jaycox refers to the rural sector as the ‘central sector’ and asserts that it produces 50 percent on average in Africa. The rural sector is the location of 70 percent of the poor people living on less than one dollar a day (Jaycox, 1997:30). A classic statement on the importance of the rural sector is that of Guy who 35 years ago asserted that, "It is in the rural sector in many developing countries that indigenous resources of men and land are underused.

The importance of rural development has been reiterated (World Bank, 1997). According the World Bank (1997) sustainable rural development can make a powerful contribution to four critical goals of poverty reduction; growth; food security; and sustainable natural resource management. To overcome the development impasse a strategic approach was seen to involve ‘strategizing’ or ‘mainstreaming’ rural development (Weitz, 1971; Waterston, 1074; Haque et al., 1977; Harris, 1984; Ake, 1996;
Shepherd, 1998) in national development policy and planning. In fact in the
African context, development must first be conceived as rural development
(Ake, 1996). Furthermore, the crucial contribution of rural development to
overall macro-economic/socio-economic development, and environmental
protection (Long, 1977; Jaycox, 1996; World Bank, 1997) is now well
established.

It is noted that rural development policies/programmes have so far
been a failure throughout Africa (Heyer et al., 1981:1). Various attempts
have been made to account for the failure of rural development. The lack of
political will/commitment (Bryant & White, 1981; Jaycox, 1996; World
Bank, 1997) has been identified as one of the factors. According to Heyer et
al., (1981), rural development as practice has failed as a result of the
incompatibility both between the different goals and the means which are
almost universally promoted as the ways to achieve rural development. This
incompatibility is concealed by a rhetoric, which asserts the mutual interests
of rural development agencies, governments, and rural population en masse
(Heyer et al., 1981; Williams, 1981).

Gemandze affirmed that, in fact, the fundamental reason for the
failure of rural development in Africa is the adoption of an inappropriate
development paradigm (Potter, 1971; Mabogunje, 1980; Mackenzie, 1992;
Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Rihani, 2002). (Potter, 1971, 359) rightly asserts
that the classical model of development based on the experience of the
developed countries of the West and Japan is the one usually followed by
most developing countries.

The new development paradigm must adopt a broader concept of rural
development which takes into account the nature of power relations in rural
society (Bengtsson, 1979:61-66), also addresses the issue of democratization
and empowerment therein, citing linkage between rural development policy and environmental issues as main factor for improving sustainable long-term wellbeing (Cleaver, 1997:79).

Gemandze, Shephered (1998) proposed a paradigm that constitutes a comprehensive or holistic approach, ambivalent about both state- and market-led versions of development. The state has often been the chief exploiter and repressors of rural people and their organizations (Shepherd, 1998:22). It was argued that rural development policy must be legitimated by an appropriate development ideology. According to Germandze, Pottar had emphasized the importance of ideology because social forces are needed to overcome social resistance. (Potter, 1971:58).

Germandze firmly stated that the ‘end of ideology’ may be appropriate/true in the context of Western/capitalist politics; however, ideology is relevant or crucial in the context of African post-colonial polities.

Citing (Barraclough, 1977; Williams, 1981; Sachs, 1992; Ake, 1996) he added that development has been pursued traditionally within specific ideological guidelines. Contrasting approaches based on capitalism or socialism were the norm until recently, but the capitalist camp has emerged as the victor and development prescriptions now follow the dictates of that philosophy (Rihani, 2002:241).

Despite, there is no general consensus on the nature of the ideology that sustains rural development in the context postcolonial/neo-patrimonial polities, Potter (1977:358) has suggested nationalism plus some form of socialism as a usual doctrine in most developing countries. Haque et al., (1977) propose a development philosophy and objectives for Asia which could be adopted and adapted to a rural development ideology in the African
context. He asserts that human mobilization for the conversion of surplus labour into means of production. This mobilization implies (a) collectivist relations of production (b) choice of appropriate technology and (c) self-reliance. (Haque et al., 1977:13). Mabogunje asserts that the mobilization of the total population is the most critical factor in the construction of a more social framework (Mabogunje, 1980:335).

According to Haque et al., (1977) mobilization as an accumulation strategy requires the adoption of collectivist relations of production. This concept of collectivity rules out the pursuit of the ‘animal’ spirit of self-interest - (characteristic of capitalism, - McMichael, 1996) – whereby one tries to take as much from society as one can without submitting to a collective evaluation of one’s share in the give and take (Haque et al., 1977:16).

Quoting (Haque et al., 1977:16-18) Gemandze explained that participatory democracy is conceived as active participation of the people, whereby the individual would belong organically, hence the collective and participatory democracy is inseparable concepts.

Development then must mean a process of de-alienation that is liberation from inhibitions derived from the structure and superstructure of society that thus dehumanizes its broad masses and prevents them from consummating their fullest potentials (Haque et al., 1977:18).

Gemandze concluded his thesis by pointing out that rural development is the key to the whole process of development (Haque et al., 1977; Weitz, 1977; Ake, 1996). The way out of the current development impasse in Africa as a whole and Sub-Saharan in particular lies in the institutionalization of the developmental state and the adoption of a development policy based on the promotion of the rural sector.
1.2.2 : Civil Society-State Discourse

As back as Aristotle time (1750) there were intensive discussions about the state and society. Aristotle called for a political society (parliament) to achieve justice and equality through people free expression of opinions and roles in legislation making. John Locke (1963) called for political society and the need for conflict management with executive authorities.

Civil society is much talked about, but rarely understood. Civil society nature as fluid term continued till the time of Hegel (1827) who became the main summarizer of the concept. Hegel located 'civil society' between the sphere of the family and the state and substituted the tripartite division of civil, economic and political society for the classical republican dichotomy between domestic and political society (oikos and polis). From Hegel perspective, civil society is a society outside the state and mediates with state through civic engagement. Hegel, stated "The irony of civil society is that the individuals who compose it think of themselves as free and independent agents, while they are, in fact, caught up in a 'system of all-round interdependence', in which 'the subsistence and welfare of the individual ... are interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence, welfare and rights of all'."(Ibid, 2004). Hegel placed civil society between the state and the profit-making commercial market sector. The idea was to maintain the balance and enhance the organizational capacity of the society in relation to the state and market forces. According to Hegel "Civil Society, as a historically produced space of ethical life, combines economy, social clans, private sector, institutions responsible for welfare administration and the law of citizenry that are not necessarily in harmony/ or common identity. Modern Civil Society was seen as a restless battlefield where interests meet".
Marx, although following Hegel's ideas in conceiving 'civil society' as the historical product of capitalist developments, ultimately saw the state dominated by 'civil society'. The latter was in turn dominated by the bourgeoisie due to its material, socio-economic status. Thus, for Marx, "[t]he anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy". Bushara (1998) indicated that some of the Marxists writings conceive civil society as "a central lightening and a theatre for history, yet, it is an effective moment in the historical progress"; it is therefore, distinct from the state. (Ibid, 2004)

Another important 19th century development was de Tocqueville contribution to the 'civil society’s' idea by emphasizing the independence of associations in a democracy to effectively limit the actions of government (Ibid, 2004)

Gramsci (1891-1937), along the lines of Hegel, describes Civil Society as a tool or phase to reach the classless and regulated society. 'Civil society' then received a crucial modification in the 20th century through Gramsci's work. Gramsci, contrary to Marx, views 'civil society' ideologies and cultural values as recognizing forces that can shape, disrupt, or even redistribute power.(Ibid 2004)

Gramsci (1971) called for the formation of social and professional associations and multi-party political system to link the super structure and the infra-structure development and thus establishing a process of live, dynamic and sustainable societal interaction. Robert Putnam, the Italian thinker (1995) states that "wherever there are civil society institutions which performed their roles, democracy is effective and powerful and vise versa". After hundred years, the concept was buried at the time of industrial revolution and it took another hundred years for the concept to be born
again. John Keene (1998) divides the renaissance of Civil Society into three phases:-

1. 1950s; Japanese school, which used the concept in neo-Gramscian sense as Gramsci did his writings about Civil Society during the Second World War while in prison.ii.

2. 1970s and 1980s: The concept, is back again in the debate of Western politic theory, especially with the Solidarity Movement of Poland against state socialism (Bushara 1998).

3. 1990s: Globalization of the concept and widening of its context where the concept of international/global Civil Society becomes a popular concept.

Bushara (1998) emphasizes that civil society without politics and outside the struggle for democracy 'is an abortion process'. (Ibid, p10). The concept, according to Tomas Hops, as indicated by Bushara is not separate from the state. In this case it exists in isolation of the state. Montesquieu (1748) and Alex de Tocqueville added that the social institutions or civil society organizations stand to balance the state and decrease its influence on individuals (Bushara, 1998: p11). They described it as representing the “social direct sphere” or the “ethical sphere lying between the family and the state”. John Locke (1963) assumption was that civil society lies outside the state, which in the liberal theory means the market. The market hence became a symbol of society, therefore, no need for the concept of civil society (Ibid, 1998: p12). In brief, there is a situation of having individuals' human being and society which is simply a reciprocal (social relationship) between individuals and state which is different and unique from the individual and the society (Ibid, 1998: P12).
John Locke (1970) brought about each of the state and Civil Society separately stating that "Civil Society was mainly a political society"; it is civil, peaceful and civilized society where conditions are controlled by law. Gordon White (1994) a British scholar perceives civil Society as "An intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their interests or values”.

Michael Edwards\textsuperscript{iii} says civil society is simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means to achieve it, and a framework for engaging with each-other about ends and means. Civil society for Edwards is essentially “collective action – in associations, as creative action, and as values-based action.

Bushara (1998) further indicated that a public sphere was established, not governed by the state mechanisms or even the market (profit) mechanisms, but exiting on dialectical relationship with both. Bushara (1998) put three main reasons to reassure the political dimension of the civil society: (Ibid, P.19)

a) The civil society cannot exist except in the space of its relationship with the state.

b) The bond that link the process of establishment of a nation and that of civil society, i.e. based on citizenship not blood or religious basis

c) The battle for democracy is a political struggle, a battle on power structures first and last.

The historical factors for emergence of the concept of civil society according to Bushara (Ibid, P.33) include:
1. The separation between society and the state... each had its own institutions and the consciousness of this separation.
2. The difference between the state mechanisms and the mechanism of economic (market) activity.
3. The distinctive nature of the individual as an ethnical identity.
4. The differences between the social institutions work mechanism in relation to those of market or economic activity or even its objectives.
5. The difference between the free associational mechanisms (of individuals) and their activities and objectives and those of birth related context or relations (family).
6. The differences between the representative democracy in liberal state and the direct, (face –to –face) participatory democracy.

There was also general disagreement in the scholars' debate on the relationship of Civil Society to political society. The majority consider political parties and other groups that explicitly seek to gain political control of the state, as separate from Civil Society. Michael Foley and Bob Edwardsiv (1998) argue that social movements and other explicitly political groups effectively play the pro democratic role that Civil Society is thought to perform. These debates bring the dimension of partisan and impartial involvements of civil society organizations. This tries to establish two distinct societies: one political and the other civil one. An alternative conception focuses more on roles of fostering norms of reciprocity and trust or what Robert Putnam v(2000) calls: 'social capital'.

Quoting Robert Putnam (2000: 19) on social capital and civic community, the idea of social capital: “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals,
social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.”

According to Wikipedia.org, Robert Putnam (2000) has argued that even non-political organizations in civil society are vital for democracy. This is because they build social capital, trust and shared values and facilitate an understanding of the interconnectedness of society. And interests within it. Global Civil Society 2001 argues that multiple meanings of civil society can provide a space for dialogue (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 12).vi

1.2.3: Social Capital: Paradigm and Debates
The forthcoming account concentrates on civil-society-state discourse and the theoretical construction of social capital debate. Also the account tries to explore the most relevant literature and debate issues and the analytical aspects of social capital.

1.2.4: Theoretical Categorization of Social Capital:
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) categorized research on social capital and economic development into four distinct perspectives: the communitarian view, the networks view, the institutional view, and the synergy view.

1.2.5: Social Capital Theory: The Communitarian View
The communitarian perspective equates social capital with such local organizations as clubs, associations, and civic groups. This perspective has
stressed the importance and centrality of social ties to address poverty by helping them to manage risk and vulnerability.

At the same time, communitarian perspectives stressed the inherent benefits and self-sufficiency of local communities but underestimated the negative aspects of communal obligations, overestimated the virtues of isolationism and self-sufficiency, and neglected the importance of social relations as formal institutions.

Many benefits certainly are associated with being a member of a highly integrated community, but there are also significant costs, and for some, the costs may greatly outweigh the benefits. Social capital can be a blessing or a plight, as cited by Woolcock from Portes (1998).

The communitarian perspective also implicitly assumes that communities are homogenous entities that automatically include and benefit all members. But the extensive literature on caste inequality, ethnic exclusion, and gender discrimination, maintained by community pressures, suggests otherwise Narayan and Shah 1999).

Woolcock referred to cases from Kenya and Latin America. A participatory poverty assessment, in Kenya, recorded more than 200,000 community groups active in rural areas, but most was unconnected to outside resources and was unable to improve the lot of the poor (Narayan and Nyamwaya 1996). On the other hand, in many Latin American countries, indigenous groups are often marked by high levels of social solidarity, but they remain excluded economically because they lack the resources and access to power that are necessary to shift the rules of the game in their favor(Narayan 1999).
He added that this is also the case in Haiti, where social capital, “rich at the local level,” is employed by peasant groups to “meet labor requirements, yet these groups cannot overcome the crippling effects of colonialism, corruption, “geographical isolation, political exclusion, and social polarization” (all quotations, as cited by Woolcock, from White and Smucker 1998:1–3).

1.2.6: Social Capital Theory: Network View

Michael Woolock and Deepa Narayan (2000, pp: 225-249) indicated that the concept of social capital defined as “the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively.” Woolcock and Narayan (2000) identified that the network approach takes into account both social capitals upside and its downside (see benefits and disadvantages section). This approach stresses the importance of vertical as well as horizontal associations between people’s relations. (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p. 230).

Sandefur and Laumann (1998, p. 484) provided a useful description of the network approach on individual's potential stock of social capital saying it consists of the collection and pattern of relationships in which it is involved and to which it has access. Building on the work of Granovetter (1973) on network theories, authors such as Burt (1992, 1997, 1998); Lin (1999, 2001); Portes (1995, 1997, 1998); and Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) have added to work taking this perspective. This approach focuses on the importance of what has been termed bonding and bridging social capital in recent literature. These terms are associated with the network theories of structural holes and network closure (Adler and Kwon 2002). The closure argument is that a network of strongly interconnected elements creates social capital. The structural hole argument is that social capital is created by a
network in which people can broker connections between otherwise disconnected segments (Burt 2001). For Ronald Burt, the structural whole theory gives concrete meaning to the social capital metaphor as he believes that social capital is more a function of brokerage across structural holes than closure within a network (Burt 2000; Schmidt 2003). Burt (2000, p. 351) identified that network closure as facilitating sanctions that make it less risky for people in the network to trust one another’. The approach has made a considerable contribution to our understanding of social capital.

Woolcock (2000:p232-233) showed the transitions of social capital and poverty, indicating from the network view the diversity of social networks and the processes of bonding and bridging. The network perspective, on social capital, stresses the importance of vertical as well as horizontal associations between people and of relations within and among such organizational entities as community groups and firms, building on work by Granovetter (1973).

According to Woolcock (2000) the network recognizes that strong intra-community ties give families and communities a sense of identity and common purpose (Astone and others 1999). This view also stresses, however, that without weak intercommunity ties, such as those that cross various social divides based on religion, class, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status, strong horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests. Woolcock brought here the terms of “bonding” and “bridging” as important roles of social capital (Gittell and Vidal 1998).

and Sensenbrenner (1993). He characterized that by two key propositions. First, social capital is a double-edged sword i.e. it can provide a range of valuable services for community members, ranging from baby-sitting and house-minding to job referrals and emergency cash. However, it can place considerable non-economic claims on members’ sense of obligation and commitment, with negative economic consequences.

One of the apparent negative aspects dominant in the literature on social capital is that group loyalties may be so strong to the extent that they isolate members from information about employment opportunities. Second, the sources of social capital need to be distinguished from the consequences derived from them. Imputing only desirable outcomes to social capital, or equating them with it, ignores the possibility that these outcomes may be attained at another group’s expense.

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) argue that economic development takes place through a mechanism that allows individuals to draw initially on the benefits of close community membership but that also enables them to acquire the skills and resources to participate in networks that transcend their community, thereby progressively joining the economic mainstream.

The social capital residing in a given network can be leveraged or used more efficiently, which is essentially the genius of group-based credit programs such as the well-known Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (van Bastelaer 1999).

Woolcock highlighted cases from India showing that the networks view has been employed in the analysis of poor communities in rural areas of northern India. The example, cited was Kozel and Parker (2000) report indicating that social groups among poor villagers serve vitally important protection, risk management, and solidarity functions.
Barr (1998), on the other hand, taking the experience of business networks and enterprise performance in Africa reports that the primary function of these networks is to reduce risk and uncertainty. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) further affirmed that the networks view in effect recognizes that these groups can both help and hinder economic advancement and that the clear challenge to social capital theory, research, and policy from the networks perspective is thus to identify the conditions under which many positive aspects of bonding social capital in poor communities can be harnessed and its integrity retained.

1.2.7: Social Capital Theory: Institutional View

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) identified that proponents of the institutional view argue that the vitality of community networks and civil society is largely the product of the political, legal and institutional environment.' The approach views social capital as a independent variable.

(Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Authors include Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997); Collier and Gunning (1999); Collier (1998, 2002); Roderick (1998, 1999) and Easterly (2000). Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 235) identified that the very strength of the institutional view in addressing macroeconomic policy concerns, however, is also a weakness in that it lacks a microeconomic component.

The institutional view, as explained by Woolcock argues that the vitality of community networks and civil society is largely the product of the political, legal, and institutional environment. Contrary to the communitarian and networks perspectives it largely treats social capital as an independent variable giving rise to various positive or negative outcomes, the institutional view realizes social capital as a dependent variable.
The basic argument here is that the very capacity of social groups to act in their collective interest depends on the quality of the formal institutions under which they reside (North 1990).

Woolcock brought the description of Skocpol (1995, 1996) case studies based on comparative history and contends that it is wrong to argue that firms and communities thrive to the extent that governments retreat. On the contrary, Skocpol shows, civil society thrives to the extent that the state actively encourages it. Tendler’s (1997) research on the political economy of decentralization in Brazil similarly stresses the importance of good government for making local programs work.

Moreover, Woolcock referred to another approach that relies on quantitative cross national studies of the effects of government performance and social divisions on economic performance. This approach, according to Woolcock was pioneered by Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), who equated social capital with the quality of a society’s political, legal, and economic institutions. These studies show that items such as “generalized trust,” “rule of law,” “civil liberties,” and “bureaucratic quality” are positively associated with economic growth.

Using a recent review of literature, Knack (1999:28) concludes that “social capital reduces poverty rates and improves, or at a minimum does not worsen, income inequality.

Rodrik (1998, 1999) made a similar argument, demonstrating that economies with divided societies and weak institutions for managing conflict respond sluggishly to shocks. Societies, as reported by Easterly (2000) according to Woolcock that are able to generate and sustain a middleclass consensus are those most likely to produce stable and positive rates of growth.
Woolcock (2000) referred to an aggregate message which is loud and clear in the literature on social capabilities and development (Hall and Jones 1999; Temple and Johnson 1998). "Rampant corruption, frustrating bureaucratic delays, suppressed civil liberties, vast inequality, divisive ethnic tensions, and failure to safeguard property rights (to the extent that they exist at all) is major impediments to prosperity."

Woolcock (1998) stated that there is little to show for well-intentioned efforts, in such countries, to build schools, hospitals, roads, and communications infrastructure or to encourage foreign investment (World Bank (1998).

1.2.8: Social Capital Theory: Synergy View

This view attempts to integrate the compelling work emerging from the networks and institutional approaches (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Authors include Fox (1992); Evans (1992, 1995, 1996); Rose (1998); Woolcock (1998); Narayan (1999); and Fox and Brown (1998). Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 236) identified that the three central key tasks for synergy view theorists, researchers and policymakers is to 'identify the nature and extent of a community's social relationships and formal institutions, and the interaction between them; develop institutional strategies based on these social relations, particularly the extent of bonding and bridging social capital; and to determine how the positive manifestations of social capital cooperation, trust and institutional efficiency can offset sectarianism, isolationism and corruption'.

A number of scholars have proposed what Woolcock called synergy view, recognizing the disconnection between the macroeconomic and microeconomic components. He referred to the contributions of political economy and anthropology, particularly the research published in a special
issue of *World Development* (1996). The contributors to this volume examined cases, according to Woolcock, from Brazil, India, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Russia in search of the conditions that foster developmental synergies.

Citing Woolcock, there are three broad conclusions that emerged from these studies: First neither the state nor societies are inherently good or bad; governments, corporations, and civic groups are variable in the impact they can have on the attainment of collective goals; Second they alone do not possess the resources needed to promote broad-based, sustainable development; complementarities and partnerships forged both within and across these different sectors. Third, of these different sectors, the state’s role in facilitating positive developmental outcomes is the most important and problematic. This is so because the state is not only the ultimate provider of public services and enforcer of the rule of law.

Communities and firms, on the other hand, also have an important role to play in creating good governance. Institutional environments, community leaders who are able to identify and engage what Fox (1992) calls “pockets of efficiency within the state” become also agents of more general reform.

As indicated by Woolcock (2000) Evans (1992, 1995, 1996), concludes that synergy between government and citizen action is based on *complimentarily* and *embedded-nests*. Complimentarily refers to mutually supportive relations between public and private actors. Embedded-ness, on the other hand, refers to the nature and extent of the ties connecting citizens and public officials.

Woolcock (2000) showed that a range of development outcomes flows from different types and combinations of community capacity and state
functioning. He added that Narayan (1999) integrates the core ideas of bridging social capital and state-society relations and suggests that different interventions are needed for different combinations of governance and bridging social capital in a group, community, or society.

In societies (or communities) with good governance and high levels of bridging social capital, there is complementarily between state and society, and economic prosperity and social order are likely, contrary to social disconnected groups whereas the more powerful groups dominate the state. Such societies, which include countries in Latin America with large excluded indigenous populations, are characterized by latent conflict. In these circumstances, a key task for subordinate groups and activists is to forge broad, coherent coalitions (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and nurture relations with allies in positions of power (Fox and Brown 1998); should they be successful, weak groups may begin to accrue rights and resources previously denied them.

The state which opens up and explicitly builds bridges to excluded groups increases the likelihood that the poor be able to gain access to their entitlement of resources and services. Alternatively, a patron-client type of state-society relations may degenerate into conflict, violence, war or anarchy—a breakdown that allows warlords, local mafias, and guerrilla movements to take over the power and authority of the state. The cases of Sudanese conflict enrich discussions with valid evidences.

Often, when citizens are deprived of services and benefits, informal networks substitute the failed state and form the basis of coping strategies. This is the case in Benin and Togo, where women, denied access to formal credit, established informal revolving credit societies. In Tanzania the
absence of police protection has led some villages to rely on their own system of security guards (Narayan and others 2000).

When representatives of the state, the corporate sector, and civil society establish common forums through which they can pursue common goals, development can proceed. In these circumstances social capital has a role as a mediating variable that is shaped by public and private institutions.

This shaping is an inherently contentious and political process, one in which the role of the state is crucial. Moreover, the fundamental social transformation of economic development from traditional kinship-based community life to societies organized by formal institutions alters the calculus of costs and benefits associated with social capital. (Berry 1993). Although development struggles are inherently political, they are not always won by the most powerful, nor do challenges to authority always entail violent conflict. This is typical advocate for the possibility of peaceful means of struggle for change in power structures and hegemonies of culture and super structures.

Efforts to establish partnerships between associations of the poor and outsiders can reap significant dividends (Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett 1995). As Uphoff (1992:273) points out, paradoxical though it may seem, “top-down” efforts are usually needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalize “bottom-up” development. Fusion of the bottom-up and top down, similarly to linking macro to micro level issues in development theory, practice and the related policy planning are of crucial necessity to assure a sound model for just and participatory development on the ground and accountable governance, democratic and developmental state apparatus.
1.3: The NGOs - State Relationship: Competitors or Partners

Cross (1997) indicated that the role of NGOs in the development of Third World has grown since 1970s. Accordingly, the literature focused on the relationship between NGOs and the state and the relationship between NGOs and the expansion of donor agencies that fund them. The questions of crucial importance are whether NGOs should be competitors or partners with the state i.e. whether NGOs maintain a distance so as to retain autonomy or work hand in hand with the state? There were serious concerns also about the state roles in repression of NGOs and the relative politicization of NGOs. Other concerns, according to Cross (1997) are whether such NGOs are accountable to the poor they serve or their donors that fund their service? He cited (Ellis 1987); to indicate that the debate usually focuses on shared assumptions about NGOs and their role in society in particular. The key terms as "civil society" participatory development "efficiency" "sustainability", "democratization" reaching the poor of the poor". However, these terms were questioned on basis of how they occur and which of them are more important.

Cross (1997) adopted a different approach to the question between NGOs, the donors and the state, in relation to why NGOs became so popular. While many addressed the question in relation to practical issues that have led to this growth, he focused on the ideological basis of this growth. He stated that the growth of the NGO sector has been the result of a double hijacking in which both left-wing and right-wing ideological streams

http://www.openad.org/cross/NGOs.htm
Development NGOs, the state and NGO- liberalism: Competition, partnership or conspiracy , By John C. Cross, Published in proceeding of the fourth annual AUC research conference, office of graduate studies and research, the American University in Cairo, July 1997)
have focused on NGOs as a solution to problems within their practical strategies "the goal for the left–wing in building up their organizational capacity for resistance and power, while for the right-wing to change the direction of NGOs without necessarily changing the personnel involved. NGOs are generally regulated and to some extent supervised by the state. The state argued that they prevent corruption in NGOs and improve coordination. On the other hand, NGOs argued that this implies state control and limitation of NGO activity.

Cross (1997) referred to Edwards and Hulme (1996) when asking how NGO to engage in the political process in order to achieve fundamental changes in the distribution of power and resources without becoming embroiled in partisan politics. Elliot (1987) argued for need for more advocacy role in NGO sector noting that "empowerment is not something that can be delivered or bought. It cannot be reduced to a project"

John Clark (1995) as in Cross (1997) argues that developing NGOs can contribute to good governance particularly at the local level which "the poor are normally much more concerned with, and affected by (594). (Cohen 1996)- as cited by Cross (1997) assures that "NGOs may in some cases be dominated by elite groups, or tended to state interests, on the whole they provide the possibility of an alternative route of popular expression that help to balance the state, which is assumed to be dominated by elite interests" develop political institutions in civil society (liberals) or take over the welfare role of the state (conservatives).

John Clark argues that NGOs may best be placed for the task of fostering popular participation which includes articulating the needs of the weak, working in remote areas, changing attitudes and practices of local officials, and nurturing the productive capacity of the most vulnerable such
as the disabled and the land less (Cross 1997). The more local the NGOs, the more authentically, participatory, accountable and legitimate could be. Kajese (1987) argued that the burden of responsibility for development "in the South lies ultimately with Southern countries and their indigenous NGOs" He goes to compare the "partnership" between NNGOs and INGOs like that between colonial powers and their native subjects. INGOs exercise complete control over the purse strings and always trying to avoid political involvement".

The challenges are how to promote indigenous and sustainable forms of democracy and how to promote the legitimacy and accountability to the poor? Edwards and Hulme (1996) rewriting of social contract between the state and citizens had indicated that NGOs are substituting some of state functions. Freeing the state from accountability and NGOs become more accountable. Even issue of maintenance, adaptation or expansion of a project "donor-funded- are difficult to claim from governments. On the other hand, how communities can put pressure on an NGO. With states they can organize, vote against (democratic regimes); rebel (autocratic ones). Rigg (1991) argued that "participation" usually involves working within village patron-client systems and this, village-level development activities which are claimed to be in the popular participation model are invariably better characterized as more –mass mobilization' while self reliance has often tended to be seen as, and to become a form of forced labor (203). NGOs are more efficient, innovative and flexible than the public sector in responding to development needs.

John Clark (1995) argues that this flexibility and innovation is a by-product of their independence from local governments, thus providing
services that governments do not want to provide or cannot provide. They can also stimulate innovative methods of service provision.
The government responds under political influence, while the market responds only to specific demands, backed up under consumer purchasing power. NGO generally responds to the needs of some groups that all between the gaps of the state and market. Others argue that NGOs are more flexible because they can be easier to be manipulated by international donors. Supervision is much easier over NGOs than public sector (politically). NGOs popularity with donors stems from a number of other reasons e.g. "discard able" according to Edwards and Hulme (1996).

1.4: Civil society and the State: An African Perspective
The role of Civil Society vis-à-vis the state has gone through a number of changes since independence of African States. Since 1984 droughts and famine crisis, there were newly emerging NGOs supported by international, foreign CSOs. These are most visible and active actors in emergency and development. Fowler (1993) indicated that democratic changes has gone hand in hand with a more active interest in local formal civil society, as agents for political change. However, associational life is a function of the state, social incoherence and economic decline. CSO moreover, is becoming a mirror of the predatory state (Falton 1995). Through civil society, people strived for alternative economic opportunities and an alternative just society, evading from the current main stream.

NGOs are democratic, participatory and self reliant centers of powers and greatly influenced by ordinary people. This is the only way to claim empowering agenda. “As strategic institutions, they need to be involved in policy making, create alliances to work for structural changes and develop
NGOs leaders who leave the NGO sector for government. Ernestood Garilao in World Vol15, P.113)

Civil Society is not a magic want that creates or reinforces democratic institutions overnight and cannot replace the state. Yet, it can undermine or reinforce democratization knowing that the rural – urban poor people, in Africa, have their own enduring political system. They are comprised of multiple linkages and networks which run vertically and horizontally. This is the only way people have been able to sustain their livelihoods (Bayart 1993). These informal indigenous organizations were more or less ignored by international actors during authoritarian regimes and in the run up to democratization. Despite, destruction of informal traditional institutions and organizations, these as grass rooted social capital, remain the most influential part of civil society for the majority of rural and peri-urban poor. As informal civil society they continued to be excluded from democratization processes. They were seen as irrelevant; undemocratic under the influences and pre-occupations with (NGOs) formal professional civil society. In the Sudanese case it is rarely to find formal indigenous organizations, while informal popular ones are truly indigenous.

The state – CSO relationship fluctuates from opposition to close alliance depending on the nature of governing regime. However, antagonistic relationship is reflected in direct challenge of the state on the social inequality policies. Institutions matter because they define the differing domains of control in state – society- community relations. The formal (state) and informal (customary) relationship depends on the system which governs them. The change in the regime type may lead to a more supportive environment for non-state actors or the state may actively seek to co-opt CSO to carry out certain functions with public action. Conversely in
the absence of effective state action, the civil society may step in to fill the gap or may have to revise or create rules in the absence of an effective external institutional framework. (p.12).

The Indian model, according to de Waal (1996) had been efficiently functioning due to the strong political will and political accountability. The democratic system legitimacy depends on the functioning pillars of political freedom; free press and media and the timely development plans made, financed and activated. The system depends on the social contract that governs the State-Society relationship.

Cohen and Lewis 1987, Teklu 1994 had thoroughly discussed the Botswana and Kenya Models. The Botswana case was built on open decision – making processes whereby the policy makers are open and listen to people and civil society organizations. Yet, again the political commitment of the regime was the main guarantee for the soundness of that model.

In all cases lack of state and public action creates a gap that opens avenues and is needed to be filled by other actors. The grass-roots social action and civic groups directly representing the interests of the poor are much less frequent in the African content. The inefficient state and relatively weak indigenous formal civil society, in Africa had led to comparatively highly developed role of informal civil society in provision of social and economic services and social insurance of people particularly in rural communities. However, the informal civil society capacity had been weakened by media and sometimes by absence of alliance with modern civil society as an effective public action.
CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENT: AGENTS AND STRATEGIES

2.1 Anatomy of African Crisis:

According to Howard Stein (2005) Africa is mired in development crises of a more profound and protracted nature. These crises are simply due the generalized incapacity to generate the conditions necessary for a sustained improvement in the standard of living (Stein 2000). He attributed that to the rationality and ineffective policies adopted under the neo-classical economic theory, ruling out consistent evidence that would improve conditions in Africa. In his anatomy of the colonial legacy, he argues that the colonial regimes only trained few of local population for minor jobs. He summed up the common legacy from colonialism along the following points (PP.6):

1. A lack of the infrastructure created did little to encourage internal exchange of development
2. Rarity of educational investment among the local population, leaving the newly independent government with huge social expenditure requirements
3. A wide antipathy for local commerce limiting business opportunities among the indigenous population.
4. Incorporation of agriculture into world agricultural markets which subjected them to the pressures of global markets

5. Extensive state control of commerce including agriculture market boards due to the pressures on colonized states to be financial self-sufficient.

6. Absence of industry

Stein (2000) argued correctly the tie between this static state and the dynamic world of development, which involves the transformation of the polity, economy and society and cannot be properly, addressed using neo-classical micro-foundations. Stein (2000:PP20) attempting to develop the agenda to go beyond the African developmental crises, which are very diverse and challenging.

Stein (2000) summed up them as follows:

1. Using a broader array of economic tools (beyond narrow neo-classical models) including institutional economics, to generate a strong theoretical basis for new policies.

2. Improving the capacity of African states to mount development strategies, which put in place operational medium and long-term policy frameworks.

3. Drawing on lessons of policy, liberalization and technology development from other regions.

4. Building and fostering private sector development in Africa, with a particular emphasis on promoting competitive industrial development and encouraging modern SMEs.

5. Revitalizing agricultural growth.

6. Developing a modern service economy, including information-based activities.

7. Promoting infrastructure investment.
8. Attracting FDI into not only extractive activities but more productive activities.
9. Investigating mechanisms to extend communications between the state and businesses including private-state joint committees in priority sectors.
10. Examining alternative approaches to improving technical education.

Nkrumah (1998) stated that Africa is the place of human kind, the cradle of civilization and with enormous endowment (human and natural), yet the least developed region in the world. Fonchingong trying to answer what hindered development in Africa indicated that the modernization literature attributed the failure largely to domestic; internal policy environment (World Bank 1981:9; 1996:125); the inability of the national bourgeoisie (Amen 1990:152). Other factors highlighted include the authoritarianism (Joseph 2003:10); the inappropriate State structures (Edigheji 2004; Lumumbe – Kasonose 202). Edigheji argued that "the institutional nature and perspectives of the African states since independence primarily accounts for the continents poor social and economic performance".

The external factors, however, were considered as of only marginal importance. These include the foreign technical advisors and foreign economic interests (Nisin 2000). To overcome under development, there is need to establish state and society institutions to successfully engineer social and economic transformation. Yet, the crucial question remains is how to shape powers and roles of political elites and bureaucrats over policy-making?

Lumumba-kasongo (2004) had examined also the problem from an institutional perspective. He advocates a reinvention of raw state forms that
can effectively address issues related to poverty, gender inequalities. He called for re-conceptualization of the Africa state proposing four options namely: recapturing and appropriating the state by gaining access to the state’s resources, managing the state’s affairs according to people’s objectives, owning the state apparatuses and participating in its decision making; renaming the state by adopting a social or popular revolution of radical change of the structures of the African economies. Edigheji adopting Lumumba concept of recapturing and appropriating the state, he argued that the colonial legacies embodied in the post colonial state and sustained by foreign aid constitute the main obstacle to development in Africa. He further argued for repudiation of foreign aid, the restructuring of territorial boundaries, and the establishment of continental government. He described the authoritarian rule, corruption and political instability as domestic constraints hindering development in Africa. He emphasized the foreign aid and its role in sustaining and reinforcing colonial legacies, proposing the three stage way forward for Africa.

On the other hand, as quoted by Edigheji: Goblet (1983;620) rightly points out, “the best model of development is one that any society fashions for itself on the anvil of its specific conditions” Whatever development entails, and it entails many things, in-fact numerous abstract and concrete components, I agree with Ake (1996;125) that is “the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own choices and values. Ibn Khaldun (1969) quoted in Ibn Battuta as explaining that historically Africa experienced the bottom- up decision – making approaches; the autonomous economic base and complete insecurity. Pre- colonial Africa was characterized by autonomous, stable aid, democratically governed and
with political systems devoid of dishonesty and corruption. These institutions were destroyed by colonialism replacing them with authoritarianism, corruption, and political instability. President J.F Kennedy, for instance, was unambiguous about aid as being “a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse or pass into the communist bloc” (as quoted by Edighiei in Hater 1981;83). The African state is thus a predatory rather than a developmental state (Edigheiji 2004).

Charles Kenny (2007) in his article: Is Africa a failure? Referred to Robert Kaplan’s The Ends of the Earth argues that Africa suffers from ‘new age primitivism,’ Keith Richburg (Out of Africa), Michel Wrong (In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz) and Bill Berkeley (The Graves are Not Yet Full) all echoed this sentiment. Samir Amin, on the other hand, describes the continents' experience as mal-development. One may agree with much of these statements but the question is who is to blame? What kind of failure? Some blame both as outcome of exercise of Western control "new imperialism" of IMF and World Bank. Isn't it both new imperialism and their allies of national new elitism? Some see the problem as miscombination of the state – private sector and civil society.

The economic growth rates, population growth and GDP growth rates are faster than per capita income growth in Africa, with exception of Botswana and Mauritius. Africa's per capita income growth rate have always been very low in the world. He indicated that Sachs, Kofi Annan advisor who used to believe that governments played the overarching role in determining the rate of growth, but later changed that notion for factors such as distance from major markets and sea transport, low population density,
tropical climates and high rate of infection diseases" as slowing down Africa's economic development.

Kenny was supporting an explanation that downplays the positive (or negative) effects of government policies on long term growth as compared to longer-term problems.

"If the right kind of government was really the key to fast growth in Africa, one would expect that Ghana –interventionist in the 1960s and 1970s, liberal-reform oriented in the 1980s and 1990s—would have seen significant growth in at least one of the two periods.

Economic policies continued a colonial pattern of swinging from ‘interventionist development’ to ‘liberal economy’ and none of them appeared to make much difference to long-term economic performance.

The generation of Africans that emerged from colonialism in the 1960s certainly had broader concerns than economic growth alone e.g. celebrating the glories of pre-colonial African achievement, legitimacy and nation building and expanding access to health and education, for example. According to Charles (2007) former President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere sums up his country’s successes in elements of this broader agenda: “The British Empire left us a country with 85 percent illiterates, two engineers and twelve doctors. When I left office, we had nine per cent illiterates and thousands of engineers and doctors.”

The African performance had showed impressive statistics on literacy, expectancy with unprecedented improvement of living standards at low level of income. In 1960 life expectancy average 40 years in Africa, rising to 50 in 1992 and falling back (under the impact of the AIDS epidemic) to 47 in 1999. In proportional terms over the 1960-99 periods, Africa’s life expectancy has still risen from 57 percent of the life expectancy of wealthy
countries to 60 percent of their life expectancy. Low income-high quality performance is partly due to strong government commitment to health and education or due to global availability of drugs that counteract infectious diseases? But again if so, they are availed at local level with support of governments to basic health programmes. Also government sponsored education was also very crucial for improved health. Evidence from around the world suggests that children born to mothers with a higher level of education see far lower mortality.

Charles Kenny stated that, progress in government-sponsored education was also very important for improved health showing that evidence from around the world suggests that children born to mothers with a higher level of education see far lower mortality. In 1995 Mali, for example, he stated, more than a quarter of children born to mothers with no education died before the age of five as compared to one in ten whose mothers had secondary education.

2.2: Developmental State:

Africa record includes significant fracture, war, famine, state-sponsored violence and environment degradation and many other human tragedies; AIDS, etc. In terms of policy, Charles Kenny (2007) stated that we are not clear as to the record or reasons of Africa's success or failure. Secondly he stated that out view of African states should not be one of disrespect for their failure and finally we should be realistic in the goals that we set. Many scholars agree that after four and a half decade of independence all countries in Africa except Botswana and Mauritius and South Africa are characterized by underdevelopment. Their economies are characterized by low domestic capital formation and declining direct foreign investment and
dominance of primary agricultural sector; oil and minerals. The African economies, as well, are characterized by high dependency on foreign aid and heavy indebtedness. The high unemployment rate was accompanied by majority of population within informal economies. People live in extreme poverty. The majority of African countries lack basic and physical infrastructure and hence people suffer from poor access to safe drinking water, health care, good sanitation roads and electricity. There is also high illiteracy rate participatory among women. The situation was further exacerbated with the advent of the HIV/AIDs epidemic. All above is attributed by Omano Edigheji (2005) to the absence of social safety net to cushion the effects of the harsh socio-economic realities experienced by most Africans. This situation of under development is due to poor governance marked by exclusion of the people from governance and lack of transparency in decision making. He indicated that the question of democratic developmental state is not sufficiently on the agenda in Africa.

Omano had indicated that the concept of democracy has received far reaching discussion in the social sciences literature. A classical definition in this regard is that offered by Huntington who conceives a political system as being democratic, “to the extent that it’s most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote”.

However, he cited, among others, citizen participation equality; political tolerance; accountability; transparency; free and fair elections; economic freedom; the separation of the powers, respect of human rights; a multiparty system and the rule of law as principles of democracy.
Citizens make democracy: - There is a global trend to replace citizens’ democracy by consumers’ democracy; citizens are conceived as consumers, customers and users of services. There is a trend towards declining public interest in elections, increasing citizen disengagement from public affairs and distrust of governments. This limited the scope of people working in collaboration or in partnership with governments for common social goods.

Democracy is also conceived only in terms of a struggle over the distribution of wealth and private accumulation rather than the creation of commonwealth. There is, however, one of the leading US political theorists, Harry Boyte, aptly captured the adverse implications for citizens. According to him, as quoted by Mano (2005) “when politics becomes the property of professional elites, bureaucrats and consultants, most people are marginalized in the serious work of public affairs. Citizens are reduced to, at most, secondary roles as demanding consumers or altruistic volunteers. Moreover, with the transformation of mediating institutions, such as civil society think-tanks, [which] became technical service providers - citizens lost all stake and standing in the public world? Consequently, the question of democracy has largely neglected issues of economic justice - basic needs. In the absence of equal opportunity for all citizens to these essentials for human existence, the equality being stressed in liberal democracy is defeated. ”

Democracy neglected economic justice; basic needs (liberal democracy basic principles) are detected. Glaring inequalities, according to Mano, undermine democracy in two basic ways; first by fueling social discontent and political instability and second, through the persistence of poverty and hence excluding many from the political process and its fruits.

Democracy and development should go hand-in hand, in the words of Omono Edigheji, they are mutually reinforcing and thus socio-economic
development is at the heart of democracy. Democratic governance aimed at improving socio-economic conditions of the masses: poverty; ignorance etc. as major constraints to their freedom and equality. How participatory democracy 'complements' representative democracy' Omono Edigheji argued that where elite groups dominate the consultative arena, it reinforces inequality: It needs to be stressed that the democratic developmental state is one that can also foster economic growth and development. This means that not only is the state able to transform its economic base by promoting productive, income generating economic activities but must ensure that economic growth has the resultant effect of improving the living conditions of the majority of its population.

White puts this succinctly: “development includes a process of economic change involving the construction of more complex and productive economies capable of generating higher material standards of living” . In line with the above, a democratic developmental state requires to have active state interventions with clearly defined socio-economic objectives represented in alleviation of absolute and relative poverty; the removing of social inequalities; provision for personal safety and security; coping with the threat of environmental degradation. Democratic politics can be described as instrumental and developmentally successful in organizing socio-economic progress along these lines.

The African Charter for Popular Participation’ identified some of the characteristics of such people’s organisations. The organisations should be, grassroots-based, voluntary, democratically administered, self-reliant and rooted in the tradition and culture of the society.

According to Mano, this moves away from the anti-state conceptions of participation and developmentalism “that completely circumvent or
marginalize the state as non-governmental organisations, the private sector and local communities proceed almost surreptitiously with addressing issues of poverty and development without the encumbrance of the state”.

2.2.1: Organizational Features of Developmental State:

Omano had come up with the following which he believes as important organizational features of the developmental state: autonomy of the state institutions (coherent, collective actor); strategic developmental goal; state forming alliances with key social groups in society and coherent networks within the state.

Coherent 'not as East Asian' case whereby the state imposing its will over society and suppressing civil society, it is rather a cooperative dynamism developmental state of central importance. It is the state's ability to use its autonomy to consult, negotiate and elicit consensus and cooperation from its social partners in the task of economic reforms and adjustment. Maintenance of strategic relations with wider civil society, inclusive approach for public policy – making: In this regard, White, has coined the concept of ‘inclusive embedded ness’, meaning that “the social basis and range of accountability goes beyond a narrow band of elites to embrace broader sections of society” This becomes the basis of the state infrastructural capacity that is, to penetrate society to elicit cooperation and consensus from its social partners in its developmental endeavors. The social base of the political party is likely to significantly determine the development agenda.

A political system that accommodate diverse political interests a climate that allows other political parties to thrive and enable citizens to voice their interests and concerns is an ideal paradigm of a developmental state. Voter
apathy occurs when one party is likely to dominate (outcome already predetermined) but, contrary to the electoral system that promotes accountability and inclusiveness, broad participation of grass roots in the democratic process.

The anticipated role of Developmental State should at least include the following areas:-

- Infrastructure to encourage exchange internally and externally. (Roads, railway; electricity communication).
- Investment in local population, specially health and education (both quality and quantity)
- Business opportunities and local commerce boosting.
- Investment in 'Modern' –large scale agriculture and livestock production.
- Marketing, cooperatives and private sector encouragement and removal of state control.
- Industry based on rural production.
- Capital accumulation.
- Paucity of social investment: (development of skills for entrepreneurship.
- Anti-commercial sentiment… is protected from the world of commerce.
- Access to finance, credit
- Produce something more that the crop of local food still i.e. more than sustenance of himself and family (Cameron, 1925)... Wide resistance to growth of cash crops.
2.2.2: A Model of developmental, democratic State:

To carry out the above roles there is crucial need to complement participatory democracy with representative democracy. Such a state should be cooperative, dynamic that is inclusive particularly in public policy formulation and the fruits of those policies. There is of course need to consult, negotiate and reach consensus with all societal actors, particularly the bureaucracy, the civil society and business sectors. Such a state should be built, among others, on a number of important pillars namely: shared strategic goals; coherent networks; strategic alliance with civil society and business organizations; formation of autonomous institutions; maintenance of strategic relations by linking macro and micro level actors.

CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos tried to address the questions of how would Africans meet the challenges of survival with the resources that we have today? What are the resources we have not tapped on as a result of our fascination with the achievement of the first industrializing nations? In the 1980s and 1990s, the post-colonial African state had earned itself a reputation for corruption, gross mismanagement of national resources, tendencies to use coercion, and a variety of other ills that generally led to its loss of legitimacy and moral authority among its citizenry, and eventually even to incapacity to sustain authoritarian rule under diminishing resources and economic collapse. The overarching power of the authoritarian African state was downsized by the sudden end of the Cold War, the ensuing loss of strategic importance to superpower rivalry and the loss of supporting funds. This has therefore brought to reality an opportunity for African societies to renegotiate new state–society relations and build the capacity of society to make demands on the state and hold it to account. The shape and content of the future development of Africa will thus be determined by both the nature
of the interests that compete to influence the state, the content of their
demands in relation to competing demands from the world outside, and the
institutions that grow out of these negotiations.

Although East Asia’s trajectory from that of post-war reconstruction to
Tiger status has often been attributed in part to the region’s construction of
‘developmental states, yet the dominant discourse regarding development is
more or less defined by the idea that the market is the be-all and end-all of
discussions pertaining to economic progress and that, concomitant with this
line of thinking, the role of the state must be curtailed regarding involvement
in economic planning and management. This view negates any active role
for the public sector in promoting development, except perhaps as a
minimalist regulator.

There are needs and means to increase capacity to make rational use of
one’s natural and human resources for social ends. Truly the privatization is
increasing, not least in the realm of welfare provision, public goods or even,
security, however, the potential role of the state in fostering development, is
even more of a prerequisite to address citizen’s interests. The state’s role in
promoting social and economic development, the so-called ‘developmental
states’ that have the most impressive track records vis-à-vis growth and
economic progress. This as (Jean Bernard Rasera, et.al) asked Can Africa
Produce Developmental States? A state that alters incentives within markets
reduces risks and offers entrepreneurial vision for the broader economy and
society. They noted that Adrian Leftwich has asserted that developmental
states may be defined as states whose politics have concentrated enough
power, autonomy and capacity on the centre to shape, pursue and encourage
the attainment of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing
and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, by organizing them directly, or at a varying combination of both.

President Kennedy expressed clearly the importance of our visions of the future in social transformation when he said: “Those who anticipate the future are empowered by creating it”. Visions provide power, confidence and trust that drives us to create a new reality.

The importance of visions was succinctly expressed by Martin Luther King in the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960's: “If you want to move people, it has to be towards a vision that is positive for them, that taps important values, that gets them something they desire, and it has to be presented in a compelling way that they feel inspired to follow”.

Is it possible to have a state that is purposefully driven to promote development that utilizes the offices of the state in order to facilitate improvement, alongside other actors such as the private sector and civil society that can emerge and prosper? It is not as if the developmental state has been tried across Africa and has failed. Sure, many states in the 1970s (i.e. before the lost decade of debt peonage) had developmental agendas (Ujamaa, Afro- Marxism etc), but the developmental state model as is widely regarded, was not efficiently executed. In most states on the continent, due to a weak local bourgeoisie, there was very little or even no involvement by the capitalist class in formulating policy.

In essence as advocated by Pierre et.al., the idea of developmental state is not impossibility nor is it something that should be sidelined in favor of the tune of liberalization and other familiar consensus ingredients, mostly emanating from the developed world. In fact, the goal of crafting developmental states might also serve as a rallying call to energies and direct
the peoples into making their leaders more accountable. In this sense, advancing the argument for developmental states might serve the dual role of both enlisting external support and drumming up internal consent.

Many experts and scholars highlighted the challenges of increased international competition, at a time when many African governments are ill-equipped to manage these new demands. Dr. Ernest Aryeetey of the University of Ghana, reporting on behalf of a UNU-AERC experts group said that "liberalization must be done with care." Since the private sector alone cannot build up the infrastructure that Africa needs to develop and compete, public-private partnerships are essential. But this requires strengthening Africa's state institutions, he stressed. "We need governments with the capacity to intervene where they are needed.

Mr. Thandika Mkandawire, Director of the UN Research Institute for Social Development, reviewed the changing conceptions of the state's developmental role, from the early post-independence assumption that the state was the primary agency of modernization to the view inherent in structural adjustment programmes that the state is a "nuisance" standing in the way of the market.

Democracy has made major advances in Africa during this decade, Mr. Mkandawire noted, but often this is a "choice less democracy," in which elected governments have no right to determine their own budgets, given the conditionality imposed by external financing agreements. If such constraints persist, he feared, "this will discredit democracy as an option."

Mr. Mkandawire argued forcefully that enhancing state capacities is essential for Africa’s overall development, not only in the economic sphere, but also for nation-building and improving democratic interaction with society. African governments must be in a position to manage their
economies' competitiveness and make integration into the global economy "a deliberate process." Building up Africa's institutions is vital, Mr. Mkandawire stated, "even if that means slower growth," otherwise fast growth may lead to chaos within a few years.

Developmental State in Africa: Thinking about Developmental States in Africa: by Thandika Mkandawire “States whose capacity to pursue any national project is denied at one level (theoretical or diagnostic). At the prescriptive level, to assume roles that is, beyond their capacity or political will. Such states are urged to "delink", to reduce themselves, to stabilize the economy, to privatize the economy, to engage in "good governance", to democratize themselves and society, to create an "enabling environment" for the private sector, etc. In other words, to do what they cannot do”. Thandika then, have paraphrased Gramci, the pessimism of the diagnosis and the optimism of the prescription. Obviously such a contradictory position is unsatisfactory. To attain some congruence between diagnosis and prescription, we need to retrace our steps back to the diagnosis. He argued that neither Africa’s post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful "developmental states" ruling out the possibility of African "developmental states" capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto.

If the state was given a central role in earlier views of the process of development in Africa, the situation changed dramatically in the late 1970s and 1980s. The African state is today the most demonized social institution in Africa, with its weaknesses, interference in the smooth functioning of the markets, repressive character, dependence on foreign powers and its ubiquity.
Early criticism of the state in Africa came from the neo-Marxists whose own epithets to describe the pathological condition of the African state included the "petty bourgeois state", the "neo-colonial state" and the "dependent state". It is now argued that not only has the state become dysfunctional in terms of the management of larger societal issues, but, as evidenced by the "withdrawal" from state-dominated economic and social spaces (Chazan, 1988a; Chazan, 1988b; Rothchild, 1994).

Some even go so far as to conceive of the developmental schemes that completely circumvent or marginalize the state as non-governmental organizations, the private sector and local communities proceed almost surreptitiously with addressing issues of poverty and development without the encumbrance of the state.

The shift in attitudes is attributable not only to the dismal performance of African states during the current social and economic crisis, but also to a number of ideological, paradigmatic and structural shifts in both the domestic and international spheres. First, on the ideological level there has been the dramatic ascendancy of neo-liberalism — partly as a result of the rise and political triumph of the neo-conservative movements riding on the discontent with welfare state and the inflationary impact of Keynesian solutions. To the extent that perceptions of welfar-ism and state interventionism spilled over into the aid business, it is not surprising that the aid discourse has embraced some of the anti-statism of neo-liberalism. Second, at the structural level, the process of globalization has forced all governments to rethink and restructure the state-market relationships in their respective countries and to pay greater homage to "market forces".

The "Developmental State" in the literature, has two components: one ideological, one structural. It is this ideology-structure nexus that
distinguishes developmental states from other forms of states. In terms of ideology, such a state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is "develop mentalist" in that it conceives its mission" as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialization. Such a state "establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained development, understanding by development the steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy" (Castells, 1992: 55). At this ideational level, the élite must be able to establish an "ideological hegemony", so that its developmental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a "hegemonic" project to which key actors in the nation adhere voluntarily. The state’s structural side of the definition of the developmental state emphasizes capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively. It is usually assumed that such a state should, in some sense, be "strong" and enjoy "relative autonomy" from key social actors.

Such a state was contrasted to what Myrdal (1968) referred to as the "soft state" that had neither the administrative capacity nor the political wherewithal to push through its developmental project. And, finally, the state must have some social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner and enables it to gain adhesion of key social actors.

If the definition is brought from the economic performance, he produces a definition of a state as developmental if the economy is developing, and equates economic success to state strength while measuring the latter by the presumed outcomes of its policies. It has led to myopic concentration of analysis around success to the neglect of the "trial and
error" nature of policy-making even in the most successful cases. If a developmental state is not be deified into some kind of omnipotent and omniscient leviathan that always gets what it wants, then the definition must include situations in which exogenous structural dynamic and unforeseen factors can torpedo genuine developmental commitments and efforts by the state.

This allows room for poor performance due to exogenous factors, miscalculation or plain bad luck. At times, a government’s political will and technical capacity may simply prove inadequate to fend off exogenous forces. In Africa, we have many examples of states whose performance until the mid-1970s would have qualified them as "developmental states" in the sense conveyed by current definitions, but which now seem anti-developmental because the hard times brought the economic expansion of their countries to a halt. Recognition of episodes and possibilities of failure leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development. Proxies such as "tax efforts" and public expenditure patterns can be used to measure such "seriousness". The main force behind the developmentalist ideology has usually been nationalism, inducing nations to seek to "catch up" with countries considered as more developed, to firm the resource base for national defense and security, etc. It is essential to stress these ideological underpinnings of state policies as they provide the rationale for some of the "policies" and give legitimacy to otherwise unpalatable "sacrifices", not only because they serve as the "opium of the masses", but also because they lead together the ruling class. The centrality of ideology also points to the naïveté of the de-politicized quest for
technocratic "governance", now pushed by international financial institutions (IFIs), in which a technocracy is supposed to carry out policies that are good for the nation for no apparent reason, not even self-serving ones. Learning the wrong lessons of Africa not only has the spectacular success of the East Asian "Four Tigers" led to a re-reading of the role of the state in the development process, but it has also raised the question of replicability of their policies and experiences in other developing countries. The lessons drawn from the experiences of the East Asian Tiger are more specifically, reliance on market forces and the adoption of market-driven export-oriented development strategies was said to have led to efficient exploitation of the comparative advantage of these countries in cheap labour (Balassa, 1971; Little et al., 1970).

African policy-making between state and market in which these appeared as rival forms thus reviving Manichean discourse that had for years vitiated "development planning" in Africa. In the African case, the failure of structural adjustment programmes has compelled even the most dogmatic institutions to recognize the positive role the state can play in the process of development, beyond acting as a "night watchman".

In its book, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, the World Bank (1989) acknowledged the importance of the state in managing and developing the social change, bringing back on the agenda the pro-active role of the state in development. However, the return of the state was now premised upon a whole series of proposals about "good governance". In Adjustment in Africa (World Bank, 1994) and Bureaucrats in Business (World Bank, 1995), the World Bank retreated to its more familiar ideological terrain in which a developmental state borders on an oxymoron.
The lesson drawn from Africa by the World Bank was that, in the best of cases, development strategies or, more precisely, industrial policy was either superfluous or, where useful, merely simulated the market, which, in the opinion of some, would have done better without the interventions anyway.

While it is now admitted that the state has played a central role in the development of Asian countries, it is suggested that replication of the Asian experience is somehow impossible for Africa. The reasons include the (a) dependence, (b) lack of ideology, (c) "softness" of the African state and its proneness to "capture" by special interest groups, (d) lack of technical and analytical capacity, (e) the changed international environment that did not permit protection of industrial policies, and (f) past poor record of performance. For instance, Peter Lewis, discussing the replicability of the Asian model, states: "While some aspects of this model (for instance, greater political insulation of economic policy makers) could reasonably be achieved in African countries, the extensive coordinated economic interventions of the East Asian states are well beyond the administrative faculties of most African governments" (1996).

Similar sentiments are explicitly expressed by Callaghy (1993), who argues that African states lack the capacity to pursue the statist model of Asia. One argument often advanced by Africans themselves, anchored the lack of an ideology of development in some form of nationalist project. This is a recurring theme in political discourse in Africa. Onimode talks of the "ideological vacuum" that he attributes to petty bourgeois commitment to their class interests and their fear of "revolutionary pressures", to the obscurantism of imperialist powers and to mass illiteracy "which imposes a culture of silence and passivity and inhibits popular demand for ideological
discourse" (1988). Thus Claude Ake states: "The ideology of development was exploited as a means of reproducing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation" (1996).

For some, the lack of ideology is inherent to personal rule under which loyalty is not to some overriding societal goals but to individuals. (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Sandbrook, 1986). Consequently, such leaders are said to have no moral basis on which they could demand enthusiastic and internalized compliance to whatever "national project" they launched. However, as argued elsewhere by (Mkandawire, 1997), for most of the first generation of African leaders "development" was certainly a central preoccupation.

In conclusion, one should note that, if the first generation of African leaders concentrated their energies on the politics of nation building, there are signs of a new leadership whose focus is on the economics of nation building. These new leaders swear by economic growth and seem to view good growth indicators as the main source of their legitimacy. They have embraced privatization and attraction of foreign capital as centre pieces of their policy initiatives. Ominously, these leaders are more attentive to the apprehensions and appreciation of international organizations than to their domestic capitalists.

2.3: Societies Intersections with the State

One major set of recent "impossibility theorems" are derived from a focus on the internal conditions of African countries and are largely informed by neo-Weberian accounts of state-society relations or by public choice formulations on how the rational pursuit by individuals of their
interests has led rather to lack of autonomy of the state and African malaise due to capture by societal interests.

The neo-Weberian critique has focused on the failure of African states to establish themselves as rational-legal institutions and to rise above the "patrimonialism" that affects all of them, regardless of their ideological claims and the moral rectitude of individual leaders. Going back to the functions that modernization had assigned to the state, the neo-Weberian highlights the flawed nature of the performance of the post-independence state, especially in its relationship with a society at large from which it has not been able to distance itself adequately so as to perform efficiently. Termite-like, Africa’s primordial and patrimonial relationship (Hyden refers to as the "economy of affection") has eaten into the very core of the edifice of modern administration rendering it both weak and incoherent. In Hyden’s words:

"... The economy of affection is an underestimated threat to the macro-economic ambitions of either capitalism or socialism in Africa. Derived from a mode of production in which the structural interdependence of the various production units is minimal or nil it has no provision from a systemic superstructure to keep it together. Instead the economy of affection is a myriad of invisible micro-economic networks which, if allowed to penetrate society, gradually wear down the macro-economic structures, and eventually the whole system. The threat of the affective networks stems from their invisibility and intractability" (1983: 21)

So mired in patron-clientelist relationships, and so lacking in "stateness" it cannot pursue the collective task of development, which demands insulation from such redistributive demands. It is these relationships that constitute what Bayart (1993) terms the "politics of the
belly" that has paralyzed African economy. Of the "governability" (i.e. mode of governance) produced by this "eating", Bayart states: "... it has crushed most of the strategies and institutions, in particular the Christian churches, the nationalist parties and the civil services, which have worked for the advent of a modern Africa. The experiences of governments which attempted to break free from their grip have either not lasted a long time or have in their turn been absorbed by its practices" (1993: 268).

The World Bank observes that "formal institutions that facilitate communication and co-operation between the private and public sectors aimed primarily at winning the support and co-operation of business elites" (1993: 181). The "isolation" of these states was not from all particularistic interests but from those of some particular interests or classes. More specifically what most of the "state autonomists" imply an economic bureaucracy beyond the reach of populist pressures (Felix, 1994) — a point that has unwarrantedly led to the view that "autonomous" states must be authoritarian.

The lack of "policy-ownership" is not a new thing in Africa and not a thing of the past either. Second, key economic policies, especially those surrounding import substitutions, were not the result of lobbying by rent seekers or "capture" of the state of these policies. Synthesizing the results of a number of studies on the interaction between the economics and politics in several developing countries, Robert Bates and Anne Krueger, who have contributed richly to the public choice school, state: "One of the most surprising findings in our case studies is the degree to which the intervention of interest groups fails to account for the initiation or lack of initiation of policy reforms" (1993:455).
There were many historical reasons for the weakness of the African capitalist class vis-à-vis the state. For one, colonialism had suppressed the emergence of such a class so that, unlike the case in India, for instance, the national bourgeoisie played a marginal role in the liberation struggle and could easily be marginalized in policy making. The absence of a group of large indigenous capitalists with sizeable capital, organizational resources and entrepreneurial skills, obviated the need for the new states to form an alliance with such classes for its development project. It also limited the capacity of indigenous capitalists to "capture" state policies. In addition, only in rare cases have the domestic capitalist classes constituted an important base of state revenue.

African development strategies were not looking in a simplistic "hostile-to-trade" manner. Nor was the failure to pursue labour-intensive, export-oriented strategies a failure to respect comparative advantage. Most development strategies were based on the assumption that, by using the comparative advantage in "land", African countries would industrialize by export minerals or other primary products to earn the necessary foreign exchange for industrialization, which would eventually allow diversification of their export bases. For these "land rich" economies revealed comparative advantage lay in these "land-intensive" exports rather than in the labour-intensive ones associated with Asia. Such a choice has had enormous implication on the stability, flexibility and social structures of African economies.

Finally, the assumption by the state of an active role in economic affairs was not always the result of hostility to private investment putatively caused by visceral anti-capitalist reaction induced by colonial experience. The fact of the matter is that in the immediate post-independence period
most African governments pursued what was known as "industrialization-by-invitation" strategies in which the attraction of foreign capital played a central role. Protective measures for industry were often part of the package of incentives demanded by or intended to attract foreign capitalists.

To avoid clienteles and rent seeking, the state is squeezed fiscally and even politically. This weakened state then exhibits incapacity to carry out its basic functions (partly because of demoralization, moonlighting by the civil servants, corruption, etc.). This is then used to argue that the state in Africa is not capable of being developmental and therefore needs to be stripped down further and be buffeted by legions of foreign experts. And so we witness in Africa the reinforcement of policies that continue to erode the economic and political capacity of the state even as considerable noise is made about "good governance" and "capacity building".

Undermining State Capacity: One central tenet of adjustment has involved "rolling back the state"). While it is true that any kind of response to the fiscal crisis of the state may have justified drastic reductions in state expenditure, both the cognitive framework through which the problem was based and the actual solutions proposed led not so much to the "rolling back of the state" but to a drastic erosion of its capacity as a state. The intention was to create what Johnson (1987) characterized as a "soft authoritarian" state whose main task was to create an "enabling environment" for the private sector by augmenting market rationality, reducing risks and uncertainty but not engaging in "market distorting" interventions that characterized policies of Asian developmental states.

Writing on Mozambique, Marc Wuyts (1996) speaks of two processes that weakened the state under adjustment: the squeezing of the state through fiscal constraints and the splitting of the state from increased
fragmentation of control over public money between state institutions and multitude of donor initiatives. One could add here the pillage of the state through the stripping of assets and "fire sales" through privatization.

No wonder "capacity building" is now a major buzzword in the donor community. It derives partly from the view that Africa’s institutions of governance are weak or inappropriate in some sense or other, and that, where the institutions are appropriate, the personnel managing them are poorly trained. This leads to a significant role of technical assistance in aid packages and "capacity building" programmes for individual African states. The "capacity building" project is the new justification of technical assistance even as international organizations bemoan their own preponderance in the formulation and implementation of policies in Africa. The brain drain afflicting many African countries is evidence of the fact that low morale and poor pay, rather than technical competence, are the main problem of the civil service in Africa today — itself the consequence of an anti-state ideology. Rather than on "capacity building", focus in Africa should first and foremost be on valorization of existing capacities through better "capacity utilization" and "retooling" of the civil service, reversing the brain drain and repairing the main institutions of training that have been starved to death even as donors set up new ones to produce parochial skills required in their new projects.

While the need for curbing authoritarian states is understandable, the incapacitation of the state has been extended to democratically elected ones largely the anti-state ideology rarely distinguishes between democratic and authoritarian ones. We noted how much of the writing on African states bemoans their lack of autonomy. Both the invidious comparisons of African capitalists with idealized capitalists elsewhere and the fear of capture by rent
seekers or patron-client networks have led to a negative and naïve view of the interrelation between public power and private interests, a view that pre-empts or precludes the possibility of building positive coalitions between the state and the business community.

The presumption is simply that state-capitalist relationship in Africa can only be collusive and not synergistically and mutually reinforcing or benignly co-operative and collaborative. As a consequence, in the African case the call for state autonomy has been tantamount to a call for "isolation" by delinking of the state from its social roots while subjecting it to external "agents of restraints" through a battery of conditionality and technical assistance. The BWIs have sought to free the state from the "capture" by distancing it from local vested interests. This alienation of the state is supposed to provide the necessary autonomy to ensure decisions that enhance national interests.

Compounding matters has been the "hijacking" of key state functions by international financial institutions further distancing the state from local capitalists. Indeed, contrary to their self-perception as the guarantors of private capital, the Britain Woods Institute (BWIs) is a source of extreme insecurity among local capitalists. Wanton liberalization of markets without careful consultation with business classes, privatization that provides no special privilege to local capitalists, cessation of directed credit or "development finance", high interest rates, all these underscore the distancing of the state from local capitalist interests and the pre-eminent position of International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) interests and perceptions in policy-making.

The point here is that capitalist accumulation will be largely national or much of Africa. Indeed, given Africa’s very tarnished image, confidence by
Africans in the continent’s future will be of prime value in resuscitating investment. Or, in the words of Michael Chege:

"... In circumstances such as these it is unrealistic to expect a turnabout in private foreign capital inflows, even with reforms. African governments must first cultivate the confidence of their own domestic investors, as with good governance, sensible economics begins at home" (1992: 159).

Or those of Kennedy:

"In the final analysis, only powerful and capable local interests, public as well as private, possess a degree of permanent, all-profound commitment to national need sufficient to generate the momentum required for a successful onslaught against the condition of dependent, distorted and restricted development" (1988: 191).

We have contended elsewhere (Mkandawire 1994) that if capitalism is to be politically viable in Africa, it will have to have some national anchoring based partly on the capacity of the indigenous capitalist classes to direct state policy toward their gaining access to labour, land and capital, toward limiting the role of foreign capital, and toward nurturing indigenous capitalist investment by facilitating institutions of stabilizing capital-labour relations and supplying technical services and physical infrastructure.

One feature of the debate on the national bourgeoisie is that, while the literature has in some way or another suggested its desirability, it has always run short of presenting the strategy for the creation and strengthening of such a bourgeoisie. One thing stands out clearly i.e. the emergence of a bourgeoisie is not facilitated by laissez-faire régimes that international financial institutions have sought to impose everywhere in
Africa. Evidence from a wide range of experiences with capitalist accumulation suggests that the emergence of a national bourgeoisie is fostered or even planned by the state or nurtured by it in a "hothouse fashion" (Marx 1962). The creation of a national bourgeoisie will pose innumerable political, ideological and even ethical questions.

2.3.1: Reconstructing the State Apparatus:

In virtually all the writing on the "developmental state" in Asia, great emphasis is placed on the need for a competent administrative apparatus. We argued above that the jaundiced view of the BWIs towards the state has allowed policies and practices that have stripped state structures to their bare bones. Reconstructing the administrative apparatus is therefore a central task. Here again we have to contend, on the one hand, with mystification of how Asian bureaucracies came about, suggesting that they somehow either come from or are based on some Confucian bureaucratic sense and, on the other, the wanton denigration of the African civil services as irredeemable cesspools of corruption and incompetence. As students of Asia remind us, building these bureaucracies has been a hard fought battle. Both the Asian and African experiences clearly suggest that it is not some cultural-ethnic attribute or some deeply rooted historicity that explains Asian administrative performance, but specific institutional arrangements between states and different classes that have underpinned the high accumulation model. In the words of Evans, "East Asian bureaucracies are neither gift from the past nor easy outgrowths of surrounding social organisation. The way forward does not lie in the wholesale neglect of existing capacities in the quest for "new" ones, but in the utilization, retooling and reinvigorating of existing capacities, including reversing the brain drain, and in the
rebuilding the educational and training institutions in light of long-term developmental needs rather than the ad hoc manner encouraged by new "capacity-building" thinking.

We have maintained that most arguments raised on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa are not firmly founded either in African historical experience or in the trajectories of the more successful "developmental states". The ultimate result of the misreading of experiences in Africa and elsewhere is that Myrdal’s notion of the "soft state", once applied to Asia, is now presented as an almost exclusively African characteristic (Sangmpam 1993).

Having presented key actors as irredeemably greedy, corrupt and captured by rent seekers and economies of affection, the misreading denies us the opportunity to think creatively of modes of social organization at both macro and micro level that can extricate African countries from the crises they confront.

It also leaves the door wide open for unlimited intervention in African affairs and ultimately dissipates whatever enthusiasm the locals may have had for development. Lessons from other parts of the world clearly suggest that appropriate institutional structures did not always exist, but that they could be socially engineered.

The aprioristic dismissal of possibilities of developmental states can only be attributed to prejudice or "mood". The experience elsewhere is that developmental states are social constructs consciously brought about by states and societies. As difficult as the political and economic task of establishing such states may be, it is within the reach of many countries struggling against the ravages of poverty and underdevelopment.
2.4 Towards Analytical Framework

2.4.1 The Concepts Revolving in the Research

The key concepts revolving in this research are poverty, development, state, civil society and NGOs.

i) Concept of Poverty

Poverty is defined simply as a political condition as well as an economic one (Bratton 1990). It manifests itself commonly as shortage of property assets, low and fluctuating cash or real incomes and meager living standards. In fact poverty characterizes people who have no access to power, that is, the capacity to do what they want or win compliance from theirs (Ibid, 1990). Poor people, therefore, have little or no control over the material and institutional conditions under which they exist (Ibid, 1990). In short, the poor lack the political ‘clout’ to make their own preferences ‘stick’ (Ibid, 1990).

The Oxfam Poverty Report (1995) concludes “despite advances in human welfare and technology, there is today a growing polarization between rich and poor. One in four of the world’s people live in absolute poverty, unable to meet their basic needs; armed conflict is affecting millions of people; and the global environment is under threat. Yet, there is a failure of political will to address the silent emergency of poverty”. Poverty is not apolitical, therefore difficult to address without a political will of both governments and civil society organizations.

Same report (p. 188) indicated that aid is exaggerated because human welfare in poor countries is influenced, far more, by the external trade environment, debt, and domestic policies than by international development assistance. The un-equal power relationship between donor recipients can
distort local priorities and undermine local capacities. Therefore, there is vital need for assured commitment to poverty reduction and sustainable development. However, these are sometimes declared policies but may be shaped with donor interests and commercial considerations.

ii) Concept of Development

Development is not apolitical. The process of organizing and empowering communities and poverty group is in itself a political act. (E.D. Garilao, Development, vol 15: p119). It is unavoidably a political act that involves exercising of power (Smith, et.al, 1981:15).

The classical definition of development is the generation and distribution of material and cultural wealth, meaning of classical neoclassical economists both liberal and Marxists (Temo Rudi Frantz: p121). Yet development is not just a statistical concept of inputs and outputs, nor is it a mechanical process, which has only to be put in motion. Rather, it is a matter of organic growth, a process of allowing and encouraging people to achieve their own aspirations. There are prominent scholars in development thinking like Sen Marty, to mention samples, his valuable contribution: “Development Thinking at the beginning of the 21st Century”. Moreover, there are Moore and Schmitz contributions in “debating development Discourse” (1995) and other prominent scholars. B. Sen (1987:p161) had indicated that NGOs represent the nucleus of experimentation in grass roots development and mobilizes work with poor communities. Sen had developed a self evaluation framework relating NGO type to types of programme etc (Ibid: p164).

T. R. Frantz (1987:p 121-127) uses the term development to imply a concrete phenomena related to generation and distribution of material and
cultural wealth. The concept of development signifies a process of continuous improvement of the state of being an advancements in quality of life. As such development is a relative concept that implies progressive changes both qualitatively and quantitatively, El Hardalu etal. (1996). Oxfam UK's report (1995) indicates the multi-dimensional nature of development to cover improvements in livelihood through access to basic material needs, opportunities and choices leading to self respect, dignity, self-actualization and decent life. Basic human and citizen rights, justice and political rights are important entitlements to be covered by the development process.

The purpose of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP Human Development Report 1990). According to this report, development is a process of social change geared towards the rational use of society resources to achieve social objectives grounded in participation, self realization, and amicable coexistence and fostering of social integration. The UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) promotes the concept of participation as “the organized efforts to increase control over the resources and regulative institutions, in given social situation, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control (Dillon and Sticefet, 1987).

iii) Concept of State

According to Lenin, the state is a political apparatus ruling over a given territorial order, whose authority is backed by law and ability to use force. The state formal organizational structure comprises the various agencies or branches of government, conventionally classified as the
executive, legislative and judiciary. It includes also administration of civil service, police and the military. Engels in the family, private property and the state, showed that the sequence of the state marks a distinctive transition in human history because the centralization of power involved in state formation introduces new dynamics into processes of social change.

The Marxists position on the state is nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. However, neo-marxists recognize the state-economy-society relationship (Tayseer 1978). The corporate theory of the state indicates it as a coalition of existence of large and powerful corporate groups seeking state power to articulate their influence. Power is dispersed, according to this theory, but not considering the fluid term of the pluralists when interpreting the compromising relationships between power structures. Reflecting on Sudan, Tayseer (1978:p 59) remarks that the Sudanese state is not an instrument of one class or simple category of super structure but rather a condensation of social relations, constituted through a long process of struggle and negotiations by socio-economic forces aspiring to achieve domination. The state, thus, is not just an institution or a structure; it is a complex form of relations created by the variations and struggles of social relations and the corresponding forms of social organizations. The state, moreover, not just manifests conflicts and interests but also facilitates and ensures the reproduction of dominant social relations. This reflects the transition from the pre-capitalist to capitalist relations of production. Yet, the buarcratic and coercive power of the state, gives it its institutional autonomy.

The classical liberal democratic theory indicates that the state represents the general will of electorates and, therefore represents the sum of interests of its constituencies (Ibid, 1978). The modern functionalism theory
emphasizes that the state is essential for maintenance of the social system and realization of social goals. The pluralists on the other hand emphasize the state mediation role between sectional interests by compromising between the demands of the various associations and classes; power is thus dispersed between different interests (Ibid, 1978).

iv) Concept of Civil Society

The civil society concept is not new; it emerged since the seventeenth century. (Ushar1997) John lock and J. Runo had discussed the concept of civil society in the seventeenth century. They had emphasized the human need to form a society to realize its natural needs which were identified as justice, freedom and ownership rights. Accordingly, the social contract developed by Jean Jacques Rousseau had emerged as a constitution for the civil society. The state legitimacy emerges from the legitimacy of this contract and its key role is to safeguard these natural rights. However, influences from the state and its mechanism are, in most instances, enormous. Being a variety of organizations, reflecting varying and sometimes conflicting interests of their members and constituencies, they vary in the degree of democratic practices, visions, objectives and commitments towards socio-political and cultural changes. Yet, with the changing role of state and recess in some of its functions the role of civil society organizations became apparent in all life aspects.

The civil society concept reemerged in the 1980s with the crisis in the Eastern Block, especially in Poland. Since then discussion has heated about civil society and its relationship to state.
“Civil society is composed of the totality of voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state (regardless of that state's political system) and commercial institutions. More recently, Robert Putnam has argued that even non-political organisations in civil society are vital for democracy. This is because they build social capital, trust and shared values, which are transferred into the political sphere and help to hold society together, facilitating an understanding of the interconnectedness of society and interests within it”

In the Arab world a variety of institutions did contribute in the discussions of civil society and its relationship to the state. Of these the Arab Unity Center, Ibn Khaldon Center and the Sudanese Studies Center, had published some rich studies. In this respect scholars like H. Ibrahim (1996); Azmi Bushara (1997 and 1998); Saad eldien Ibrahim (1995) have contributed significantly to the redefinition of the concept and how civil society relates to the state, its role in the democratization process.

The socialist thought consider civil society as a political twin of the state (Bushara A., 1998) and that it shall varnish with the dissolution of the state. Contrary to that is the classical liberal thought which considers civil society is a private sphere (Ibid, 1998)

Antonio Gramsci (1971) seeks the concept of modern civil society as an alternative to the civil society under capitalism. He indicates the need for hegemony of the new social justice culture i.e. the working class culture. Unlike classical Marxists, Gramsci advocates the ‘cultural domination’ and claims that the labour class could seize power, only after achieving ‘cultural hegemony’. It is the hegemony of the new social justice over society
without economic power or state control. (Bushara, 1998: p 203). Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, according to Bushara (1998), stems out of the social sphere that develops within capitalism but not the market sphere. It is a kind of a super structure but again not the state (Ibid, 1998:p 203). The civil society accordingly is a contractual union on basis of shared ideology and interest (Ibid, 1989: p204).

Considering the state–civil society relationship and the discussions about the fate of both, one legitimate question is whether it is possible to replace the state with a free voluntary social association ‘between the individuals’? In other words is it more likely that the state represents a wider coalition of a number of free voluntary social associations. (Ibid, 1998: p 157).

The dynamism of civil society in terms of its socio-economic and political role has been apparent in the capitalist countries since 1960s manifested in the comprehensive cultural Revolution in the production process, leading to expansion in the middle class, technocrats, technical labourers (Bushara 1997:p14).

Bushara (1997) argued that even the Christian, charity organizations were revolutionized towards more political and public society causes. He added that they gained a unique position of a political and social public sphere, functioning outside the state and market mechanisms. In this respect, there is need to study the interrelationship between civil society and democracy. Some theories like Rossue, John Stewart Mill and Tockphil had brought their ‘populism’ role. It is then, essential to understand whether the democratization process was initiated by the civil society. I.e. to reach a democratic situation there is a need to build civil society first. On the other hand, one might believe that without democracy, it is difficult to build and
strengthen civil society itself. Bushara (1998) raises the question of whether the civil society is democracy itself or is it part of the democratization process?

G. Schopflin (1997) had argued for the link between civil society, the state and ethnicity. He indicated that “traditionally civil society is conceptualized as a necessary condition of democracy. Indeed, some arguments come close to seeing civil society and citizenship as the sole defining condition of democracy.”

In all cases, civil society is conceptualized for the purpose of this research, as a kind of direct democracy that allows individuals and groups to fully participate in addressing direct issues concerning their livelihood. It is a democracy closer to people, different from the representative democracy which specialized mainly in struggle for power structures at state level. Marxists see the civil society as ‘the market’ and the state as its oppression apparatus used by the bourgeois class. They therefore call for abolishing both (Bushara, 1998: p47).

v) Concept of NGOs

NGOs are formal organizations. Indigenous NGOs are those which are not foreign and grass roots and local constituencies. They emerge when a group of people organize themselves into a social unit with the explicit objective of achieving certain ends and formulating rules to govern the relations among the members of the organization and the duties of each member (Blau and Scott 1970). This implies that for an organization to be an NGO, it should be autonomous in the sense that it is neither dependent on government for its funds nor being held in pursuit of its objectives. They generally emerge from a group of people who organize themselves into a social unit “that was established with explicit objective of achieving certain
ends. . . formulating rules to govern the relations among members of the organization and duties of each member” (Frantz (1987) quoting Blau and Scio, 1970 in ibid, p122). They explicitly attempt to differentiate themselves from government.

In discussing the role of NGOs in strengthening of civil society Rude Frantz (1987: p121) identified two forms:

1. The supportive NGOs to social movements and or initiatives of development. These are the groups formed to address essential questions of life e.g. common needs and common aspirations.

2. NGOs which are expressions of certain social movements. These are expressions of civil society’s capacity for free organizations and of its validity in its different historical perspectives.

Frantz (1987) had argued that formal supportive NGOs have important roles in strengthening other civil society organizations. Frantz (1987) differentiated between two types of NGOs, which their objectives and methodology are fundamentally concerned with supporting social movements, groups that are formed to confront common needs, common goals (essentials of life) . They try to build collective society. Second, the NGOs which are expressions of certain social movements, emerge from them or represent a certain degree of their institutionalization. In this sense they are expression of civil society capacity for free organization and its vitality in its historical perspectives (ibid p.123)

For the purpose of this research, NGOs supportive role to the civil society organizations, expressed through representation of excluded groups, support to direct democracy, democratic governance and popular participation will be the focus. Saad eldein linked civil society directly with
democratic transformation, stating that: “the civil society structures are the best channels for popular participation in governance” (Hayder, 1996, P:11). Robert Maichel stated that: “organization is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong”. Garilao E. D. (1987: p 119) indicated that the process of organizing and empowering communities and poverty groups is in itself a political act. However, experiences indicate that even democratic organizations intended to champion the interests of the poor tend to be taken over by influential leaders. They articulate interests, create power centers and advocate with and on behalf of voice less groups. Yet, Huntington’s analysis of political institutionalization shows that society without strong political institutions lacks the means to define and realize its common interests. Korten D.C. (1987: p 145) indicated that NGOs are key to people centered development and they face challenges of democratization.

By their methods and objectives NGOs are basically concerned with initiatives of development and/or social movements in varying forms. In this respect they have distinct socio-economic and political functions. NGOs, hence, are expressions of certain social movements and are, therefore, popular movements at a certain stage that occurs outside the relation of political parties and expresses themselves in one or various collective demands that are defined on the basis of legitimate community needs and rights (Durham 1984).

In organizational theories the organization is a group of individuals, involving a definite set of authority relations. NGOs are also strategic groups consisting of persons with common interests (Garilao, E.D. 1987: p 113). This common interest leads to a strategic action that means the realization of a long-term programme for implementation. Within this course of actions, political ideas emerge to be transformed into concrete political
and socio-economic demands, plans and decisions within specific political system (Ibid 1987).

The NGOs sector indicates the heterogeneous nature of this grouping and suggests that they collectively started to play unique and influential role viz-a-viz the public and private sector. They are generally regrouped and classified as in (Garilao, E.D. 1987: p115) into the following categories:

- Grassroots NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs) or peoples organizations (POs) established at local levels; their beneficiaries are at the same time their members and constituents.

- Professional or intermediate NGOs: have specific area of interest or experience, work with and for beneficiary communities but mark their effectiveness by their abilities to phase out and leave behind viable organizations and institutions.

- Grant making NGOs: are organizations able to mobilize local and foreign resources and channel them down through intermediate or grass-root NGOs.

- Support NGOs: have specific support expertise which is extended to other NGOs towards upgrading and capacity building i.e. research, training, communication or education.

- Horizontal growth of NGOs: as power centers in the form of local bodies, regional and national confederated federations through networking, forming of alliances etc.

According to Leilahlandim (1987), the basic structure of NGOs is that their actions are very much based on the social, political and economic context of their communities/ countries. As channels and conduits of development assistance, are not alternative to government actors. NGOs should relate to the permanent structures of society, government and the
private sector. This should happen, despite the differences in values, ideologies and priorities between government and NGOs. However, as Sheldus Annis (ibid, p 129) the small scale development become large scale policy. Ngos could really make the state actions more effectively. The NGO complementarily with government could only be under democratic governments which are socially accountable for the poor segments of the community, being the targets of socially accountable NGOs.

2.4.2: Concept of Social Capital: an analytical tool

Social capital is a term that is commonly used; however, the concept is often poorly defined and conceptualized. The concept is also old but has only been coined fairly recently (Bankston and Zhou 2002; Labonte 1999; Lazega and Pattison 2001; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Putnam 1995 and 2000). Social capital is linked to concepts such as civil society and social connectedness (Adam and Roncevic 2003). It is linked to historical authors such as Durkheim, Simmel, Marx and Max Weber, among others. The concept is also linked to theories such as social exchange theory and psychological contract theory (Watson and Papamarcos 2002). Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam with many other authors contributing to the current multidisciplinary theory had contributed to the development of the modern concept. Very broadly, social capital refers to the social relationships between people that enable productive outcomes (Szreter 2000).

The intellectual history of the concept of social capital has deep and diverse roots which could be traced to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Adam and Roncevic 2003). The social capital concept is

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3 Cited from an internet source: http://gnudung.com/literature/problems.html
connected with thinkers such as Tocqueville, J.S. Mill, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, Locke, Rousseau and Simmel (Bankston and Zhou 2002; Brewer 2003; Lazega and Pattison 2001; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Putnam 1995). Bankston and Zhou (2002) made a particular reference to the connections between Durkheimian normative sociology and Coleman's thinking on the topic. This is supported by Portes and Landolt (1996) who believed that the origins of the concept lie in the nineteenth century classics of sociology. Portes pointed out Durkheims' emphasis on group life as an antidote to anomie and self-destruction, and to Marx's distinction between an atomized class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-itself (Portes 1998). Heffron (2000) made a tenuous link to the earliest human societies which attempted to accumulate productive assets, thereby creating social capital. Brewer (2003) identified the link between the discussions of Aristotle and other early Greek philosophers on civic society and social capital theory (Isham, Kelly et al. 2002).

Although authors seem to agree on the historical origins of the concept, there is a disagreement on its first uses. Most authors agree that the first use was by Hanifan in 1916. Others like (Felkins 2002), Loury (1977) (Lappe et al. 1997; Leeder and Dominello 1999), and the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (Schuller et al. 2000) identify Jacobs (1961). L.J. Hanifan, a social reformer, in 1916 chose the term social capital to refer to 'goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy, and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families' (McGillivray and Walker 2000; Smith and Kulynych 2002; Winter 2000a; Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

In trying to trace the intellectual history of the spirit of social capital, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) stated that the sense in which the term is used today dates back more than 80 years to the writings of Lyda J.
Hanifan, then the superintendent of West Virginia, explain the importance of community participation in enhancing school performance. He added that Hanifan (1916:130) invoked the concept of social capital, describing it as those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit. If [an individual comes] into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community.(Ibid, 2002).

In the 1950s and 1960s, as claimed by Woolcock and Narayan (2000) traditional social relationships and ways of life were viewed as impediments to development. When modernization theorists explained “the absence or failure of capitalism,” Moore (1997:289) correctly notes, “the focus [was] on social relations as obstacles.” As an influential United Nations (1951) document put it: for development to proceed, “ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated” (cited in Escobar 1995:3).

Routledge and Amsberg (2003) argue that Hanifan used the term 'capital' specifically to highlight the importance of the social structure to people with a business and economics perspective. Woolcock (2000) stated that the conceptualization of the role of social relationships in development represents an important departure from earlier theoretical approaches and therefore has important implications for contemporary development research and policy.
For their part, neoclassical and public choice theorists whose voices were the most influential in the 1980s and early 1990s assigned no distinctive properties to social relations. Their perspectives, which focused on the strategic choices of rational individuals interacting under various time, budgetary, and legal constraints, held that groups (including firms) existed primarily to lower the transaction costs of exchange; given undistorted market signals, the optimal size and combination of groups would duly emerge.

2.4.3: Measuring Social capital and implications

Much of the recent literature and intellectual contributions rely on the writings of Woolcock and Narayan since late 1990\(^4\). The social capital surveys covered a various dimensions and came up with the important findings on the following:

- Identify density and characteristics of informal and formal groups and networks.
- Review the nature and forms of social capital change over time
- Unpack the literature on social capital and development
- Compile indexes: measures of trust, confidence in government, social mobility
- Measure membership in informal and formal associations and networks.
- Quantify social capital and its contribution to economic development

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\(^4\) Michael Woolcock is a social scientist with the World Bank's Development Research Group and a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University. Deepa Narayan is a lead social development
• Qualitative service delivery and contribution to household welfare, and that social capital is the capital of the poor.
• Arrive at concrete policy recommendations for using social capital as a tool for development
• Examine its role in poverty reduction, conflict management, governance performance and economic growth.
• Indicate shifts between informal organizations and formal institutions
• Investigate heterogeneity of membership, group functioning; contributions to groups; participation in decision-making.
• Extent of encouraging collective management of resources
• Identify the nature of the relationships between social variables and development
• Survey civic engagement: community engagement, charitable involvement, the spirit of voluntarism, and active citizenship and role of inter communal networks.

2.4.4: Implications for Development Theory and Policy

Woolcock and Narayan (2001) indicated that the concept of social capital offers a way to bridge sociological and economic perspectives and to provide potentially richer and better explanations of economic development. The best way to achieve is to display the nature and extent of social interactions between communities and institutions that shape economic performance. It is useful to better understand the poor communities, not only focusing on the economic dimension, but the other greatest challenges for poverty reduction and development. Each individual in the social capital is constituted by the following factors: participation in the local community; proactive in a social context; feelings of trust and safety; neighborhood
connections; connections with family and friends; tolerance of diversity; value of life and work connections.

Six broad recommendations were offered by Woolcock and Narayan for incorporating the concept of social capital into development policy:

First, for development interventions, social institutional analysis should be applied to identify correctly the range of stakeholders and their interrelations and understanding political interests of the stakeholders.

Second, it is critical to invest in the organizational capacity of the poor and to help build bridges between communities and social groups.

Third, a social capital perspective adds its voice to those calling for information disclosure on policies at all levels to encourage informed citizenship and accountability of both private and public actors who purport to serve the public good.

Fourth, improvements in physical access and modern communications technology that can foster information exchange across social groups should be emphasized to complement social interaction based on face-to-face interchange.

Fifth, development interventions should be viewed through a social capital lens, and assessments of their impact should include the potential effects of the intervention on the social capital of poor communities.

Finally, social capital should be seen as a component of orthodox development projects, from dams and irrigation systems to local schools and health clinics. (Quoting Esman and Uphoff 1984).

2.4.5: The importance of social relations in development:

1. Social relations provide opportunities for mobilizing other growth-enhancing resources,
2. Social capital does not exist in a political vacuum, and

3. The interactions between communities and institutions are a key factor to understanding the prospects for development in a given society.

The case studies are important for understanding the mechanisms through which social capital works, and understanding the determinants of social capital itself. It also implies that practical lessons emerging from development projects can themselves be used to inform social capital theory.

2.4.6: Basic Assumptions about Development Model:

1. The social capital perspective stresses that technical and financial soundness is a necessary but insufficient condition for acceptance of a project by poor communities.

2. The social networks of the poor are one of the primary resources they have for managing risk and vulnerability, and therefore there is need to find ways to complement these resources.

3. Conflict is anticipated and dissipated since everyday interactions are frequent.

4. In the absence of formal insurance mechanisms and financial instruments, the poor use social capital connections to protect themselves against risk and vulnerability.

Development programmes represent conflicting interest at a group of actors. Thus, Decision making on development process is dominated by government or economic market actors, because NGOs and Civil Society are still in the making and only play a minor role in D.M. There is little room for the indigenous social capital in the process. The core issue is the public participation in decision making, particularly in development planning. The decision making is controlled by the state
apparatus where tensions are always apparent. On the other hand the civil society claims sustainable livelihood improvements. At the level of technology, the business sector goes for efficiency, while civil groups work for effectiveness (equity and radical changes). The government on the other hand is under pressures of concerns about efficiency, effectiveness or the just access, control and use of these resources. On the organizational level, the tensions are even more where the business sector concern is corporate management; the civil society calls for self-management and participatory management mechanisms, the government at its end is under huge pressures of either going for control or representative management structures. The relationship with the holder of political and economic power is therefore characterized by tensions that occur among the three social actors along:

- Vision – conception..(cosmological) assumptions
- material /technological (production + consumption)
- Organizational level (How / ideas translated into practical activities)

In Sudan, following the western development paradigm based on expansion of individual economic, i.e. pro-growth, exploiting resources and market advocated by business and state.

2.4.7: Overall Assessment of Social Capital

The theoretical account tries to shed light on the discourse related to civil society, social capital and their implications on development theory and practice. Civil society although widely used from old times but is a fluid and rarely understood term. The account tried to trace the historical discourse contributions since Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx and up to the modern scholars viz Gramsci etc. “Modern Civil Society was seen as a restless battlefield where interests meet”. Azmi Bushara, a Palestinian scholar (1998)
emphasizes that “civil society without politics and outside the struggle for democracy 'is an abortion process'. In the 1990s the concept of social capital, had also gained much of the attention in development discourse. Maichel Woolcock and Deepa Narayan (2000) had defined social capital as “the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively.” Both concepts had enjoyed remarkable rise to prominence across all social science disciplines.

The most successful theoretical work on social capital is that which, following Dasgupta (2002), models ‘social capital as a form of social network structure and uses the presence of that structure to understand how individual outcomes are affected in equilibrium’.

Much of the interest in social capital stems from the view that the absence of social capital represents one of the major impediments to economic development; Woolcock (1998) provides a wide ranging conceptual analysis of the role of social capital for developing societies and economies; a range of applications of social capital to economic development are collected in Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) and Grootaert and van Bastelear (2002). In fact, much of the current interest in social capital stems from the now classic book by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) which argues that Northern Italy developed faster than Southern Italy because the former was better endowed in social capital, measured by membership in groups and clubs. One of the major claims in the literature is that social capital can facilitate the solution of collective action problems.

George Hegel, the founder of the concept, stated that; "Civil Society as a historically produced space of ethical life, which combined economy, social clans, private sector, institutions responsible for welfare administration and the law of citizenry. Not necessarily in harmony/ or
common identity. Therefore, modern Civil Society was seen as a restless battlefield where interests meet"

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), following the steps of Hegel, called for formation of social and professional associations and multi-party political system to link the super structure and the infra-structure development and thus establishing a process of live; dynamic and sustainable societal interaction. Gramsci did his writings about Civil Society during the Second World War in prison. For him "Civil Society was a tool or phase to reach a classless and regulated society and thus an active Civil Society was not an aim in itself."

The Italian thinker, Robert Putnam, on the other hand, stated that:-" wherever there are civil society institutions which performed their roles, democracy is effective and powerful and vise versa". Moreover, some Marxists writings indicated that civil society is " a central lightening and a theatre for history, yet, it is an effective moment in the historical progress". It is therefore, distinct from the state.

More recently, Azmi Bushara (p.10-19) emphasized that civil society without politics and outside the struggle for democracy 'is an abortion process'. Bushara further indicated that a public sphere was established, not governed by the state mechanisms or even the market (profit) mechanisms, but exiting on basis of dialectical relationship with both. He put three main reasons to reassure the political dimension of the civil society: 1) The civil society cannot exist except in the space of its relationship with the state; 2) the bond that link the process of establishment of a nation and that of civil society, i.e. based on citizenship not blood or religious basis and that 3) the battle for democracy is a political struggle, a battle on power structures first and last.
The civil society organizations (should not be) the representative organizations (at the expense of the representative councils), therefore considered not necessary inclusive. Their power is the degree of alliance, networking around issues and decisions (political, policies or legislations). As NGOs have own contributions in the battle for democracy, they do not substitute the roles of political parties or the popular unions and associations. The diverse use of the concept is justified by the aspirations of many for equality, more participation or more justice and representation. Participation is mainly the social participation to enjoy these rights i.e. decentralized decision-making, self-management (face to face democracy).

Modernization theory (1950s and 1960s) had considered social relations as obstacles for development to proceed and that ancient philosophy has to be scrapped and old institutions have to disintegrate. The dependency theorists (1970s) had seen social relations among corporate and political elites, and were primary mechanism for capitalist exploitations. There was little mention made to possibility of mutuality, beneficial relationship between workers and owners. Later on the Neoclassical and public choice theorists (1980s and 1990s) had assigned no distinctive properties to social relations. The strategic choices of rational individuals interacting under certain circumstances with lower transaction costs of exchange and hence a combination of groups would duly emerge, but a burden; exploitative or irrelevant.

Interest in social capital is derived from concerns about the persistence of social exclusion and poverty in affluent societies. Social capital is perceived by many development scholars as a mechanism to ameliorate society-wide problems. Social capital is the social relationships between people that enable productive outcomes. It refers to stocks of social
trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems: poverty; economic under development and inefficient government. This definition is the essence from a number of intellectual inputs.

John Clark (p 563) noted that NGOs contribute to fostering popular participations; articulating the needs of the weak. Voluntary people organizations have the capacity of working in remote areas, therefore, effective in changing attitudes and practices of the local officials and local people. Moreover, according to Clark, they are nurturing the productive capacity of the most vulnerable, land less and disabled groups etc. His argument stressed the point that the more local NGO, the more authentically participatory, accountable and legitimate. They promote endogenous and sustainable forms of democracy.

On the other hand, the most crucial questions within the debate are whether NGOs should be competitors or partners with the state i.e. whether NGOs maintain a distance so as to retain autonomy or work hand in hand with the state?

The State-Civil society relationship was not a one way road. The relationship showed a weak state versus strong community in most instances. The state has no full control over the society, whereas according to Al Bathani (2001) a popular system of governance always work parallel to the official system using social networks. Accordingly, government structures at all levels cannot work in isolation from the web of sectarian, regional, tribal and patrimonial relationships.

State – civil society is relationship is complex require rethinking to assure addressing the needed change. There is need to shift to more participatory development, however, implies reinforcing longer term
partnership on long term interventions. The state is perceived as a patron, top – down, undemocratic and authoritarian apparatus for coercion rather than developmental political organization. No single model to explain the theoretical optimum balance between state and societal actors in relation to people livelihoods and development aspirations.

Civil society, on the other hand, generally perceived as the darling for development practitioners, an apparently offering an alternative and acceptable approach (bottom cap). Illogically, though, in certain cases the formal type of civil society (NGOs) is often itself external to local communities. The indigenous civil society, however, is historically rooted as informal social capital norms and organizations but suffer from legal legitimacy and recognition or support by state authorities.

Participatory development is impossible without understanding the underlying institutions or rules of the game between different stakeholders’ Poor people suffer from sense of marginalization, widespread underdevelopment and poverty. The vulnerability and short term shocks require poor people enabling to address challenges of a lasting reduction in vulnerability and poverty.

Men and women separation is noticeable in Kassala state particularly among the Beja. In the Hadandawa community women interaction with outsiders is difficult to occur. Women participation in public life is rare even among urban women. However there was real breakthrough in some per urban communities of establishing women training canters by international NGOs: The ITDG, ACORD experience were examples to cite as forming women organizations and women credit and business groups in Kassala state.
The relationship of poor people and excluded groups is characterized by various differentiations on basis of gender, ethnicity, asset base and other diversity factors. Political development of the poor through investment in their organizational development and enhancing their bargaining capacity and extent of networks, alliances and pressure groups activism is a must to address mainstream politics and development policies.

Generally these communities being directly or indirectly affected by conflicts suffer also from poor existent or weakened public institutions, mainly the service institutions. The legitimacy of local governance and is openly contested by local people. No doubt some politicized local elites and local community leaders sometimes play a role in fueling crisis or living on the vulnerability of their people.

Need for different modes of programming for service delivery with high degree of participatory approaches. Institutional (local) implications are to be faced with more representative ones offering rooms for engagement and claims. Social and conflict and environment sensitivity appraisal and planning have to be carried out professionally with independent institutions, yet, with full participation of stakeholders. They generally maintain ethnic and tribal ties as important social safety nets. Their traditional tribal leaders system is as well as protection strategy.

The Native administration structure was historically a viable system settling tribal conflict, disputes over resources and representation to tribal groups. Over time, the traditional systems and customary laws were degraded (abolished by law 1970) and same year the land act (1970) deprived them from land ownership and control. The 1970s, 1980s and 1990s had seen a number of local governance acts community structures supported by the government e.g. development committees, popular
committees local elites etc. contributing to disempowering tribal leaders and strengthen the politicized local government structures. A wide sense of mistrust prevails between ordinary people and local leaders and authorities. Therefore, to be effective and sustainable, effective governance and civil society mechanisms should be built and strengthened.

Evidences from current Sudanese experiences and the usefulness were used. Proposed approaches, modalities were highlighted throughout the account. One could call for the direct dealing with own people organizations i.e. CBOs that is formed by them and they directly benefiting from it, to plan, execute and run the public infrastructure of services, in particular, water and sanitation, health and basic education. Within this move, there is need for a systematic support and engagement of local governments, NGOS and private sector organizations.

The government responds under political influence while the market responds only to specific demands, backed up under consumer purchasing power. NGO generally responds to the needs of some groups that all within the gaps between the state and market.

There was clear divorce between the concepts of economic growth and sustainable, just development. To achieve both economic and non-economic goals, there is need to change the structures of society government relationship. Such a model is basically to sustain change and progress.

It is true that no development can occur without growth but also true it could not happen automatically from economic growth. It is also true that no development can yield without accumulation of wealth to be reinvested to achieve both economic growth and development and consequently improved quality of life and livelihood systems for masses of people (not just reduction of income gap for some social groups). People have to have
opportunities to improve capacities and widen space for participation in
decision-making. The claimed participatory democracy cannot occur in a
vacuum; therefore a civic democratic state is a legitimate claim. It is truly
argued that there is no social change without democracy and no democratic
achievement without social progress.

Understanding the relationship between the state and civil society is of
central importance in identifying ways in which policy could be reformed to
support poor people's own development capacities. Indigenous civil society
with its independent action, often in alliance with state, is hardly traced in
the Sudanese case. Sudanese societies although enjoying strong family and
community ties reflected in strong social structure of Kinship, extended
family and friendship, but again suffer from using that as discriminative
tools. Through civil society, people strived for alternative economic
opportunities and an alternative just society, evading from the current main
stream. Civil Society is not a magic want that create or reinforce democratic
institutions overnight and cannot replace the state.

Multiple linkages and networks which run vertically and horizontally
are the only way through which people have been able to sustain their
livelihoods (Bayart 1993). These informal indigenous organizations were
more or less ignored by international actors during authoritarian regimes and
in the run up to democratization. They were also undermined by state
authorities and autocratic regimes.

The Botswana case was built on open decision – making processes
whereby the policy makers are open and listen to people and civil society
organizations (Cohen and Lewis 1987). There are competencies in
administrative coordination and information system, using the existing local
government and commercial system. However, the political commitment of the regime was the main guarantee for the soundness of that model. Moreover, whatever model that claims democratization and social equity should answer the legitimate question of how the socially excluded groups (women, minorities, ethnic groups etc) could really be included and have a workable model to enjoy political and economic rights and feasible interaction with the state?.

The long way ahead (if possible) is to build on indigenous capacity and civil social action to contest the inappropriate state structures, policies and activities with long term political and socio-economic changes agenda. Any viable future model should be built on knowing properly our local social structures and our analysis of own experience with democracy, development and Civil Society? The experiences with development cooperation and Civil Society had recently been claiming for vivid Civil Society as a tool for democratization. Realization of a wider socio-political change requires scaling up of the civil society.

Development for Ekins (1992) means nothing but social transformation that does not occur without attacking the existing power structures. Transformation of powerless should emphasize their strategic organization that does not only move more than achieve their basic needs but that articulates their strategic change objectives. Political Development implies changes in the organization of public life, especially of the government. This is also linked with social and economic development. Table (2.1) tries to link the holistic approach to issues of growth, welfare, equity and organizational development. Within a holistic approached,
equitable growth, just development and welfare and participation are important ai

**Table (2.1): Theoretical model that tries to link growth and welfare Within a Holistic Approach along Goals, Community role and Performance Indicators.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Holistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Goal:</td>
<td>Increased value of productivity and production</td>
<td>Improved physical social-infrastructure and wellbeing</td>
<td>Community self management and self determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Role:</td>
<td>Large scale enterprise and hired labor. And at community level entrepreneurship are wide spread</td>
<td>Dependent, passive recipient, provide free labor</td>
<td>Independent initiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Indicators:</td>
<td>Profit, foreign exchange, production quantity and value. Improved incomes at household level by distribution policies.</td>
<td>Labor and Goods delivered and services rendered</td>
<td>Participants Benefiting, community participation and controlled Development and investment activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CHAPTER THREE

SUDAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

3.1 People and Resources

Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the ninth largest in the world. The country is characterized by its evident diversity (ethnicity, culture, religion, ecological zones and modes of living etc.). However, and despite its well endowment, the economic performance is below its potential. According to EU report (2001) GDP in Sudan was 10.3 billion US$ in (1998); 10 billion US$ (1999) and 11.9 billion US$ (2000). The population was 28.3 million, 28.9 million and 29.5 million and the GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent, 5.3 percent and 7.2 percent for the consecutive years of 1998, 1999 and 2000. The origin of GDP is mainly agriculture contributing with 39.3 percent of GDP, trade 27.3 percent, other services 15.2 percent and industry 9.2 percent. The principal exports include in million US$: crude oil 276, sesame 127, livestock 114, cotton 45, gum Arabic 26 and sugar 15.
The total debt of Sudan by the end of 1999 was US $ 27 billion. By end of 2003, the stock of debt amounted to US$ 21.1 billion most of it in arrears. The debt service doubled 12 times over 20 years i.e. from US $ 117 million (1979) to US $1,369 million (1998). Arrears by end of the year (2000) reached in million US$: IMF (1,474); WB (236); ADB (65), OPEC (26) and the European Investment Bank (65). The Total government foreign obligations were US$ 23.62 billion by 31st December, 2002 (MoF, 2003).

Sudan has a strategic location that makes it a potential gateway for Africa. Sudan was administratively divided (February 1994) into 26 States. (See Sudan Map). The States were divided into different into Local Councils (Mahaliat), which were also further divided into administrative units. Each State has a Wali (Governor) who is the overall head of the State, while the localities headed by and assisted by an Executive Director.

The total estimated population is 41.2M (World Bank, 2006). There are 132 tribes and sub-tribes groups, 550 ethnic groups. The UNDP (2006) report indicated that GDP Per Capita: $374. The demographics read that Africans 52%, Arabs 39%, Beja 6%, other 3%. Same source indicated that 50% of the population is below the age of 15 (43% <14). The people of African origin dominate the South, Western and Eastern Sudan, while those claiming being of Arab origin are predominant in the North.

Like many African countries, Sudan has been prone to internal conflicts, ethnic strife and socio-political and economic crisis. The political and economic power has been centralized in the hands of sectarian and tribal chiefs, the urban and mainly Islamist elites. Irrespective of the type of political regimes, there were protracted governance crisis and political unrest and consequently limited social accountability to people needs and concerns. Access to basic entitlements e.g. security, food, shelter, health, water,
education etc, became serious problems for the vast majority of population. The sufferings of people stricken by recurrent wars and natural calamities are outstanding. At the same time the socio-economic phenomena of rural-urban migration was accelerated.

The country is large and characterized by enormous range of climatic and ecological zones. The climatic zones range from high rainfall Savannah (South) to low rainfall Savannah (centre) to semi-desert and desert (North). The soil types comprise iron soil (South) clay (Centre) sands (North) and hilly (east). The Nile is 2258km extending from South to North with various tributaries. The Rainfall is 1200 mm/pa in southern Savannah (4(N) decreasing to zero in the Northern desert (22( N).

The total Arable land is 36 million ha (85 m sedans). Only 38% of land is cultivated. The grazing land pasture is estimated by 100 m ha (240 m feddans) while the natural forest cover 17.6ha (42 m feddans). The land under cultivation by farming type, as in Suleiman (2001) is 4.5 m feddans (irrigated) 18.0 m feddans (Mechanized Farming MF, 10.0 m feddans (traditional cultivation. The total land utilized is 32.5-m feddans i.e. 38 % of total arable land. The Sudanese livestock population is 27.7m Animal unit.

3.2.:Urbanization Processes in Sudan:

Sudan has the highest rate of urbanization in the African Sahelian countries. The 1993 census indicates the total population by 25,587,000 people. Out of this 35% inhabit Khartoum and central parts of the country. The annual growth rate estimate is 2.6%. The urbanization rate reported to be tripled in the last two decades (1980s-1990s) from 11% in 1956, 24% (1983) to 32% (1993) while the rate of growth of rural population is estimated by 23%. According to Global IDP Project, (2004) Sudan has 5.4
million internally displaced people, the highest in the world. Urban poverty Situation in Sudan is highly correlated to the continuum of migration and displacement. The urbanization was not accompanied by positive change in the economy e.g. industrial sector makes only 15% to the GNP.

However a distinction between the spatial and socio-economic connotation should be made. “For the displacement, the movement from one area to another is characterized by dispossession of the displaced of their basic objects, values, norms and means of subsistence on which they formerly used to survive and are central to their identity and existence, El Bathani 1997.” One could say that displacement is traumatic, painful, causes hopeless and helpless while; migration is more or less prepared, hopeful and full of wishful thinking for the better. Sudan has the highest record for IDPs worldwide. Mortality rate among children is 115 per 1000 live birth in the North and 180 per 1000 in the South. There is an increase in child mortality rate from 145 to 200 per 1000. Malnutrition among children is 10.5% in the north and 43% in the south.

The displacement mainly caused by the ongoing civil war and the pattern of repeated drought manifested in famine that resulted in effecting rural urban exodus. Yet macroeconomic policies (liberalization, privatization and lift of subsidies from basic services) and political instability, poor programming and lack of accountability have exacerbated rural urban exodus. This has led to a state of absolute poverty expressed in lack of common basic needs, food, shelters, clothing, education etc.

The text on Sudan poverty and the Sudan Urban population is mainly from a previous research report on IDPs Livelihood strategies (January 2001) by Abu Sin, et.al.
The population of Khartoum as obtained from national censuses shows that the highest increase in the population of Greater Khartoum took place for the period 1983-1993. This period coincided with the climax of ongoing civil war and the famous Sahelian drought which are the major causes of massive displacement. The trend of population growth is 100% (1983) with peak influxes due to droughts and civil war, 227% (1993) coinciding with peak displacement due to civil war in the South, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile and moderate 18% (2000) due to the depopulated sources of IDPs and stability in some parts of conflict areas.

The Capital State (Greater Khartoum) population is reported to be 7,000,000 (2001). Out of this number 4,000,000 are rural-urban migrants, which are classified into two groups: The IDPs whose number is estimated at 1,800,000 persons out of which between 250,000-400,000 are residing at camps and the rest (1,400,000) are resettled in various locations. Ordinary rural urban migrants who live in squatters, poorer residential area, unfinished buildings all over the three towns’ etc. are estimated to be 2.2 million people. It could be observed that IDPs and squatter population constitutes 57% of the total population of Greater Khartoum.

The urban bias of mainstream policies on development and service infrastructure are not uncommon. Khartoum, the biggest centre in Sudan, contains 73% of the industry, 75% of the labor force and monopolizes the administrative and political functions, social services and education establishments. The Ministry of health indicated in a conference on public health improvement, that 75% of health services in Sudan are in Khartoum and Geziera States and that almost 56% of that lies in Khartoum alone. (Al Ayam, 1st November 2000). This service infrastructure functions as pull factors for attracting rural migrants and displaced. The fact that every
Sudanese extended family is partially for one reason or another is residing in the capital state functioning as temporary recipient of migrants contributed to rural and urban migration.

### 3.3: Social and Cultural Structures

Sudan has the highest rate of urbanization in the African Sahelian countries. The 1993 census indicates the total population by 25,587,000 people. 75% of the Sudanese population lives in rural areas. Out of this 35% inhabit Khartoum and central parts of the country. The annual population growth rate estimate is 2.6%. The Muslims are 85% and the rest are Christians, Animists, Hindu and Jewish. According to 1955/56 census the Sudanese ethnic composition was 39% a mix of Semitic migrants and indigenous Negroid Arabs, 36% Nilo Hematic and Sudanese Negroid, 6% indigenous Negroid with some Semitic and Hematic elements (Nuba and Nubians) and the rest are indigenous Negroid Funj (1.7%) and West African migrants (7%)( Sahl, et.al 2000).xiv

Social differentiation, population mobility and family dislocation and difficult access to subsistence means, were apparent socio-economic consequences since late 1983. Moreover women destitution and marginalized position within the society had been significantly accelerated. The natural environment degradation problems, on the other hand, are evident i.e. soil erosion, deforestation, overgrazing and desertification. The outcome as revealed by various researches and studies (UNDP, 1996), that almost 92% of the Sudanese population lies under poverty line. The trend of poverty is apparently increasing, quoting Abd-el Ati, 1999, comparing estimates percentages of population living under poverty line, of 85% (1994) and 92% (1998) referring to the UNDP Human Resource Development
Report 1994) and National Human Development Report (1998) respectively. Sudan is rated 57th out of 78 poorest countries according to the UNDP Human Development Report (1997). A report of Committee on Eradication of Poverty, in Al-Ayam daily newspaper (5 September 2000) indicated that:- 48% of population die before the age of 40, 30% have no access to health services, 60% have no access to healthy drinking water and 34% of children under 5 years are under normal weight.

The British colonial political economy was based on a semi-articulated pattern of colonial capitalism with pre-capitalist modes and forms of production that, to a large extent, left little room for fundamental changes in the structures of Sudanese society. (UNDP, November 2006). Colonial capitalism integrated both urban and rural sectors into wider national and international political-economic structures. Urban centers saw rapid growth in population, expansion in light industries, commercial networks, and social services and above all they were the seats of political power. On the other hand, in the rural areas, (in Southern and Western Sudan) after a long and intermittent resistance, the peasants had lapsed into two decades of political apathy. (Ibid, 2006: 15). Within the political and administrative organization of the countryside, religious and tribal leaders continued to assume important functions and constituted an alliance with sections of middle class educated elites (affendiyya) assisting colonial domination. Thus, it was an alliance between the middle class intelligentsia in alliance with rural aristocracy and/or urban-based, jallaba merchants, which constituted the leadership of this movement. (Ibid, 2006: 15). The urban growth and the decaying rural economies are becoming unprecedented challenges for governments and civil society in Sudan.
3.4: Status of Sudan Economy

Sudan was ranked 59 out of 103 developing countries tracked in the 2005 Human Poverty Index. The UNDP’s 2005 human development report ranked Sudan 141st out of 177 countries. In 2006 Sudan the Failed States Index, is ahead of even DRC, Iraq and Afghanistan (Ibid, 2006). The US government has imposed economic sanctions on the Sudan since 1999. On the other hand, Sudan belongs to the group of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s—set up by the IMF & World bank to help the poorest nations—but has yet to qualify for debt relief. It continues to meet its IMF repayment/restructuring obligations.

3.4.1: Macro-Economic Indicators:
Below are some macro-economic indicators as indicated by UNDP report (2006) referring to various sources:-

• Nominal GDP: $36 billion (IMF, 2006)

• Nominal GDP growth: Accelerated to reach an average of 7.3 percent and 7.7 percent in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In 2006 GDP growth is forecast at 9 percent

• 2005 Unemployment: 18.7% (CIA) (Youth Unemployment: 28%)

• 2005 Inflation Rate: 7.5% (IMF, Forecasted CAGR of 4%)

• Size of the informal economy: >60%. Primary source of income for certain ethnic groups and women
• Current Account Balance: Largely due to oil exports, the current account is expected to move to a surplus position in 2006, for the first time since 1985. The surplus is projected to amount to $310 million (0.8 percent of GDP) in ‘06, as compared to a deficit of about $720 million (2.6 percent of GDP) in ‘05.

• External Debt: 140% of GDP, 2005. Sudan belongs to the group of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC's) launched by the IMF and WB. It has yet to qualify for support.

• Gross investments as % of GDP: 25% (IMF, 2006. Forecasted CAGR of 4%)

• FDI: has risen from approximately $500 million in 2002 to over $2.4 billion in 2005.

• Pro-poor spending: Is expected to almost double, passing 5% of GDP (Oslo Donors Conference, 2005). Mostly on health, water and sanitation projects). Pro-poor spending in the South is estimated at >50% of GDP.

Poverty data for Sudan is a bi-product of various surveys that were not poverty-specific in either focus or design. The table below (3.1) was constructed by triangulating data from various sources, and using income, healthcare and education levels as proxies for poverty. (UNDP, 2006).
Table (3.1): Proxies for Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sudan, All</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Rest of Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCOME INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income, 2001</td>
<td>$374</td>
<td>$460</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(growing at 3% since 1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of People Earning Less Than US$1 Per Day</td>
<td>40%-60%</td>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>&gt;90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEALTH INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) Rate, 2001</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>Eastern Sudan, particularly Red Sea State, has long suffered from chronic poverty &amp; food insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a rate above 15% is globally considered an emergency situation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (before the age of 5), 2003</td>
<td>134 per 1,000</td>
<td>68 per 1,000</td>
<td>250 per 1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Malnutrition (FAO), 2005</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td>21% (One of the worst in the world)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polio Immunization Rate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18% rural areas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATION INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Enrollment Rate, 2012</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>Worst in the world (WFP)</td>
<td>~24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children Reaching Grade 5, 2002</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.4% in South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy Rate (above 15%), 2002</td>
<td>49.3% (68% for men &amp; 41% for women) MOE</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>24% (Lowest in the world)</td>
<td>20.4% in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lowest in the world)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These surveys include a 1992 Household and CBS surveys, a 1999 Safe Motherhood and UNFPA Survey (1999), and a 2000 MICS and UNICEF survey. The focus of the surveys was on northern Sudan. Government data is unreliable and outdated. The latest population census dates back to 1993, the latest agricultural census was taken in 1983, and the latest household income survey was conducted in 1978.

The Sudan suffers seriously from widespread poverty, skewed income distribution, and inadequate delivery of social services. The hardest hit are internally displaced people (IDPs, ~15% of population, highest globally),
mostly women and people from rural areas. The most deprived areas are mainly the Blue Nile, N & W Kordofan, Western Darfur, and the Red Sea areas. UNDP (2006) referring to IFAD surveys indicating that 85% of the population is below the National Poverty Line and 87% of the rural population is below the National Poverty Line. Same report stated that this is the fastest rate of increase in absolute numbers.

87.4% of Sudan’s rural population does not have access to electricity (a staggering 99.6% in Western Kordofan), and 53% do not have clean drinking water (92.3% in the Blue Nile state, compared to 3% in Khartoum). (UNDP, 2006). Here the dominant notion of unbalanced regional development and marginalization is verified. The government of Sudan states, according to same report illustrates better the situation that in the South 50% of the poor are illiterate; only 25% reach first grade (compared to 88% for the North), and only 4% reach secondary education. (Ibid, 2006).

Urban poverty is on the rise in provincial capitals, but especially in Khartoum (fastest rate of poverty increase). A large proportion of the internally displaced have settled in camps, therefore, the most deprived are in the Khartoum State (Ibid, 2006). The Table further explains the situation along number Human Development Index indicators. Using the World Bank data, the UNDP (2006) report stated that there is uneven spending in favor of rural areas, the highest in the world.

According to the various surveys, and reports on poverty diagnostic the main causes of poverty include: war, civil strife, corruption, restrictions on political inclusion, misconceived structural and economic development policies, a vast geography and poor infrastructure, droughts, mismanagement of natural resources, environmental degradation, displacement and migration.
It is also important to note that the infrastructure (roads, river traffic, railways power, water, telecommunications, as well as irrigation facilities) is either non-existent or underdeveloped and inadequate across the country. Moreover, one of the key drivers of poverty also seems to be a clear pro-urban bias, ill-conceived development policies and neglect of the agriculture sector, and consequently conflict over power and resources. (UNDP, 2006). In 1999 Sudan's spending on education amounted to 1 per cent of GDP, compared to 4.6 per cent for African countries, 4.8 per cent for Middle East North Africa countries, and 4.6 per cent average for developing countries, with reference to IMF data (Ibid, 2006).

There is considerable deterioration in the quality and effectiveness of Sudan’s development capabilities, attributed partially to large migrations of trained and skilled Sudanese to the oil-rich Gulf countries since the early 1970s. Since mid 1980s and all over the 1990s and 200s the external assistance has been mostly of a humanitarian nature (with food aid representing over 50 percent of the total value).

The Sudan is way off on all targets, in terms of MDGs, especially in the South. For example, poverty prevalence has to be cut from 90% to 45% by 2015, youth literacy rate has to go up from 31% to 100%, and access to improved sanitation has to go up from 15% to 58% (UNDP, 2006). Land has become an important cause of poverty and conflict due to the fact that it become a commodity, a mechanism if socio-economic differentiation. It is also important to refer to the potentialities of the agricultural sector, highlighting that the World Bank estimated that Sudan could feed the whole of Africa. Also it is indicated that the Arab League sees Sudan as the key to closing the Middle East’s widening food gap, estimated at $17.5 billion annually. (UNDP, 2006).
The UNDP report (2006) indicated that the oil exports (2003) were ~10% of the GDP & ~57% of government revenues. The discovery of 2 new oilfields is expected to increase oil production to 500K bbd, while oil production is ~ 400,000 bpd. Same report showed that the industry has grown by 70% from June 2005 to June 2006. Growth in the oil industry will stabilize at about 9%/yr until 2010. Same report stated that Sudan provides 6% of China’s oil, which is 50% of Sudan’s production. (Ibid, 2006).

The informal sector according to some estimates is over 60% of GDP. Rural –urban migration and displacement create an acute urban poverty situation, leading to almost 3millions live on the informal sector. This sector is mainly dominated by women and children. The main occupations in this sector include food and drink services, handicrafts, cleaning and construction services, using unskilled labour. Tea selling is a booming business; however, suffer from frequent harassment from state and locality authorities.

The major governance challenges continue to question extent of becoming more transparent, committed to increase pro-poor spending and equitable investment in basic infrastructure. Moreover, there is apparent untapped and under utilization of natural resources. There are also huge potentialities for agro-industrial investment. Yet, again very little is done on improving infrastructure, especially electricity, transportation and IT. The financial sector, markets and whole business sector require thorough reform to enhance efficiency and social accountability.

3.5: The Sudanese Context and Space for Civil Society

The Sudanese context is hampered by a turbid political economy of exclusion and marginalization. The armed conflicts attributed to war atrocity
and the consequent of influx of huge internally displaced people. The pro-rich policies, the poor governance and withdrawal of government responsibilities towards citizens interests creates a huge challenge for INGOs who endeavor to fill the gaps in education, health, water and other services in poor areas in both rural and urban areas. This socio-economic situation managed by an ideologically oriented Islamic regime had been under the leadership of military powerful groups, the NIF. Accordingly the dominant strategy of governance is security and policing mentality for NGOs and CBOs work in the urban areas. The fact that the history of political influence in Sudan is led by the urban people is not uncommon. The macroeconomic policy environment is favoring the ruling elites, in particular the Islamic bourgeois and curtailing the capacities of the poor to access social services or the needed bargaining civil society power. Denial of strategic spheres of banking trade, production and education institutions, affected the majority of the Sudanese population. Consequently the current class structure is as follows:

- Extremely marginalized and war affected population who are mainly internally displaced in Khartoum and other towns of North Sudan.
- Those dependant on the subsistence farming / informal economy sector, petty traders, pastoralists in rural areas fuel urban poverty through rural urban migration (marginalized west, east, and central Sudan).
- The traditional bourgeois who depend on remittance from abroad and or civil service, army etc.

The leading Islamic elites class controlling the strategic sectors of ideology, education, banking, investment and trade while the two middle
classes lost power of organizing influence and became both economically and politically excluded.

The intermediate antagonism was between the first (powerless) and the last (powerful) classes. Deprivation from citizen rights, in particular to say and to be heard was the first tool of policy mix for coercion. Having a constituency of INGOs and CSOs activists, advocating their case was subjected to further restrictive legal and administrative laws, policies and procedures.

CHAPTER FOUR
SUDANESE CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

4.1 Introduction

Contemporary Sudan is witnessing remarkable growth in civil society organizations, in both urban and rural settings. The role of civil society vis-à-vis the state has gone through considerable changes during the 20th Century. This chapter explores the nature, emergence and genesis of Sudanese civil society and its historical relationship to the Sudanese State.

4.2 Emergence of Sudanese Civil Society

Civil Society refers to non-state, non-family actors that span socio-cultural, economic and political space that is distinct from government and family. This is what Al Bathani (2001) refers to as “self- initiating and self regulating associations that mediate between individuals and the state”. Civil Society encompasses considerable groups that played important historical as well as contemporary roles within the Sudanese society.
A full-fledged NGO sector (support organizations) regardless of ethnicity and geographical biases is relatively considered as recent phenomena in Sudan. This goes back to the early 1920s and 1930s of the national movement history. By that time numerous associations and societies and socio-cultural clubs were formed by the national pioneers of the educated graduates and elite and also their claims for universal education and health services. The movement, however, is more part of the political struggle for independence.

The emergence of Sudanese civil society could be traced back to the establishment of Sudanese Union Society in 1920 around arts and politics. This was followed by the Omdurman Graduates Club and The White Flag Society (1924) (Hayder, 1996, P: 126). Then there were El Fagr and Abu Rouf Societies 1944. This has created students movement and women organizational attempts as important events in the emergence of the Sudanese civil society. The syndicates, labor and farmers associations date back to the early 1920s (Ibid, 1996, P: 126) and go hand in hand with the establishment of the railways, the commercial farming projects and related industry. The claims for laborers’ unions had been booming organizationally by 1934 in Atbara and by 1935 in Khartoum (Ibid, P:126). The Laborers Affairs Organization was on a famous strike in 1946 which consequently resulted in the recognition of the Union in 1947 (Ibid, P:126). In the Geziera Scheme the farmers established the Farmers Representative Organization in (1944) which then transformed into the Farmers Union in (1953). However, the first farmers unions were reported in the Northern part of Gezeira scheme (1952) and Nuba Mountains Corporation (1951). (Ibid, P:126)

On the other hand the youth, students and women associations and organizations started to emerge. There was the Students Conference in 1949,
for the secondary schools students’ affair. Since then the students’ organization resulted in the political split into the Democratic Front, the Muslim Brothers and the Independent Students organizations (Ibid, P:127). The women organizations, according to Abdel Hamid M. Ahmed (2001) started with the British Women who established the Women Scout Organization in (1927). This was the first formal women organization in Sudan from women of foreign consulate (Abdel Hamid, 2001 xvi). The membership of the scout organization continued with foreign women till 1947, later opened for the Sudanese women. The Adult Female Association, established in 1948, and headed by Khalda Zahir El Sadat, was usually recognized as the first Sudanese women organization (Ibid: 5). The association’s focus was mainly literacy education and awareness about the women cause and issues (Ibid :5). The move was replicated in a number of cities whereby women started to establish women-focused organizations. Fatma Babiker (1996)xvii highlighted that a Women Club was established in Medani, the Women Charity Society and the Women Development Society established in El Obeid, the latter headed by Rahma Gad Alla (Fatma Babiker 1996). The first women syndicate "Cultural Union of Women Teachers" established and registered 1952 was headed by Nafisa El Milaik, (Ibid 1996). Same period (1952), according to Fatma Babiker (1996), had witnessed the expansion of the Women Adult Association, then transformed into the Sudanese Women Union in 1952 (Ibid 1996). Also in Sudan there were historically non-graduate women who had been very instrumental and active in the cultural and political Sudanese life. As in Hamid, referring to Fatma Babiker (1995) these pioneer women include: Foz; Nafisa Sarour and Al Azza M. Abdulla. The latter was the wife of the Sudanese hero Ali Abd Ellatif, the leader of 1924 White Flag Revolution.
In Eastern Sudan civil society groups also started to emerge during the 1940s, especially among the Beja. The Beja self help Society emerged in late 1946 and in 1949 the Beja Development Committee was established as an officially recognized and registered indigenous organization for the first time in the area with the objectives of combating the impacts of the late 1940s famine and reducing the vulnerability of the Beja society to such disasters in the future (Egemi 1994) (Table 4.1). The two organizations crystallized into the Beja political party, the Beja Congress, declared in 1958.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (4.1)</th>
<th>Objectives of the Beja Self Help Society and Beja Development Committee</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Beja self help Society</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beja Development Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Helping distress members of the Beja community</td>
<td>1. Alleviation of famine and hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assistance to intelligent Beja schoolboys whose fathers are poor and needy</td>
<td>2. Combating unemployment to avoid the occurrence of famine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Promotion of civic feelings among people</td>
<td>3. Combating illiteracy through non-government schools and assistance to poor pupils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Promotion of social and friendly relations</td>
<td>4. Encouragement of morality and religious education</td>
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Source: Egemi (1994)

The 1970s and 1980s, a period of severe drought and famine in the African Sahel and Sudan in particular witnessed the acceleration in emergence of NGOs. Generally these were relief and local rehabilitation
organizations. This had coincided with the influx of Northern international NGOs coming with new approaches, concepts and work strategies that greatly shared the organizational and functioning methods of the Sudanese organizations. The majority of these organizations were addressing the emergency needs of drought affected communities and the internally displaced people (IDPs) from drought and war affected zones. This period, however, witnessed a remarkable shift in trends, from the dominant urban – based organizational process to a more rural and peri urban community focus interventions.

By 1985, the government records of NGOs registrar in Sudan indicated, 200 organizations during the famine period. According to Hamid (2001) quoting Widad (1996) the number of voluntary organizations had increased from 193 in 1983 to 205 in 1987. This growth coincided with the democratic space offered by April Up rise (Intifada) in 1985 and also the growing need for civil society to meet the challenges of the 1984/85 famine and drought crisis.

The 1990s decade was generally known to be the decade of the third generation of NGOs. They are mainly focusing on addressing structural causes of poverty, under development and inequalities. Contrary to previsions generations, they are either curing symptoms of the crisis or at best functional, service provision organization; the latter were generally rights based organization. Women, children and local and general human rights were major issues of concern.

Available data, however, show that number of registered organization reached 262 (1991) and increased to 640 (2002). It was estimated that 60% of these organizations work in Khartoum. Moreover, as indicated below
73% work in emergency, 6.4 % environment, 5.5% in conflict and peace building and 2.8% on rights and 2.5% on training activities.

By mid 1990s, the national voluntary organizations were very active with internally displaced people (IDPs) and communities affected by droughts and civil war. There was antagonism between government authorities and independent NGOs, and continued trials to control growth of voluntary organizations. Same period had witnessed systematic encouragement by national and international NGOs for emergence, growth and strengthening of community based organizations in both rural and urban settings. In addition, there were records within this period for emergence of the phenomena of Government supported NGOs (GONGOs). Here, there were processes of politicization, polarization and labeling like opposition or government pro-NGOs.

4.3: Nature and Genesis of Sudanese Civil Society

The voluntary sector in Sudan is extremely fluid and characterized by a broad range of self help mechanisms and organizational structures with the dividing line between governmental and non-governmental organization often blurred. Local development and community welfare issues generally contributed to the formation of wide range of community structures including associations, economic groupings, professional unions and associations, trade unions, socio-cultural religious of ethnic and tribal nature, clubs and societies and sofi ‘tariga’ groups. Villages – based and self –help committees are numerous. Religious institutions such as Zakat, mosque, church and ‘khalawa’ associations are common. Formation of geographically, ethnically and tribally focused groups flourished since the late 1980s and become a dominant feature characterizing Sudanese civil
society since the mid 1990s. This follows the Limuru declaration of (1987) which highlighted the distinction between support organization (NGOs which channel assistance to non-member communities) and CBOs whose members organize to improve their situations. Al Fanar and SOS Sahel, 1995).

This is in addition to the historically deep rooted, self-help structures and mutual social support systems organizations that evolved as traditional, indigenous self-help mechanisms revolving around the extended family or neighborhood community. Structures based on sharing of labour (nafir) and resources are culturally embedded institutions. Self-help' rather than "helping others" is a characteristic feature of such organizations.

More structured formal NGOs, however, were established after independence (1956), mainly charitable and social welfare support. This generation of NGOs includes Salama Benevolent Foundation and the Haggar Benevolent Company. The generation of the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by the establishment of social clubs, the popular quazi-political organizations of women, youth and the environment conservation society. The emergency of numerous non-governmental sector mainly emergency and development is largely confined to the 1980s localized interventions for relief and development, particularly. In the wake of 1984/5 famine that created huge needs for organizing local and national level groups. The most prominent example of such organizations is the expansion of Sudanese Red Crescent and Sudan Council of Church. The period had also witnessed remarkable growth of religious-based NGO sector following the implementation of Islamic Shariaa laws in 1984 and the associated islamization of the banking system. The Church based ones were supported by the Catholic Church and were accelerated in response to the impacts of
civil war in the South. Networks, common for linking urban-based organization were umbrella organizations of migrants’ associations across towns.

Taking into account traditional social capital processes, issues of geography, religious and tribal affiliation and identity links, whether to family or state apparatus, the spectrum of Sudanese civil society will be narrowed down greatly. El Hardallo (1998) emphasizes the duality of the Sudanese society, modern vs. traditional social structures that contributed to the weakening of the growth and progress of civil society in Sudan. The weakened civil society consequently contributed to the weakening of the state.

4.3.1 Role of Civil Society

The history of emergence, growth and functioning of the Sudanese civil society, however, indicates the civil society role in civic activism as follows:

1. Social activism and civic movement in fields of charitable works and support to community self-reliance
2. Role in promoting social and economic development.
3. Advocacy and lobbying for democratic governance, equity, access to power, popular participation and human rights, especially women rights.

The roles of CSO, especially the period from the mid 1980s to mid 1990s were mainly emergency, social service and development work. Since mid 1990s to 2005 the CSO in Sudan had been vocal in advocating for political participation and institutional reforms at various levels. They were active on
advocates on rights (gender, development, and environment) and tried to play the watch dog role on state functioning for good governance.

The traditional sector, on the other hand, was based on territorial land, customary tenure systems which were interrupted with modern investment / commercial projects. No doubt the traditional social capital was built on: kinship, blood and tribal relationship; the subsistence economy (the producer is he himself the consumer) using traditional technology. It used to be the front line for sufferings from (wars ; ) floods, droughts and pests etc. Also no one could deny the apparent and proven competencies and niche of the traditional CSO, being impeded in the Fazaa (security); Nafir (communal work), Judia (compromise for conflict management) informal voluntary work) developed into village development committees, self –help groups developed.

Since the mid 1980s many of informal organizations were registered as formal CBOs and NGOs. On the other hand, the modern civil society organization had benefited much of those principles of voluntary work. There were numerous organizations formed to defend and claim for the interest of their constituency members viz: syndicates; unions and associations; cooperatives; NGOs; cultural organizations (cultural groups, sports etc) and the professional associations.

Some CSO functions as tools for political activism constituting an alternative political struggle for human rights and good governance. In this respect the Sudanese political parties, the Islamists in particular created numerous quazi political NGOs under "voluntary" work umbrella, to serve their strategic objective in social activism. They have also been privileged by access to huge concessions, funding and political support from the dominant political parties and the state apparatus. The Sufi Islam, on the other hand,
was still important as a dynamic sector within the indigenous Sudanese voluntary sector.

In describing the functional role of Sudanese civil society Abel Hameed (2001) argues that in Sudan, as in other similar Third World contexts whereby the political parties suffer from banning and restrictions by autocratic regimes or they have weak organizational base, the civil society is founded to play part of the role of these political parties including development of political alternatives, pressurizing on decision-making structures and advocating programmes for democratic good governance. Consequently, civil society organizations become a battle field for competition between parties for control and management hegemony. Because of that Sudanese civil society has been usually conceived as being opposite to the state, political parties and the traditional social structures. In this respect it is also observable that the growth and dynamism of Sudanese civil society is partially attributed to the inherent weakness and deteriorating capacity and responsiveness of political parties to citizens' interests. In this connection Abdel Hameed (2001) argues that the emergence and nature of Sudanese civil society is a reflection of the role and function of the society towards the political, social, economic and cultural issues of concern in the country and its role is therefore, to achieve the balance between society and the state power and authority.

Traditionally the CSOs have been known for charity/service-delivery work. Understanding the dynamics of CSO in North Sudan entails how CSO are engaged on challenging issues to Sudanese context such as conflicts, poverty, social infrastructure and cross cutting issues of gender, environment and HIV/AIDS. But this role is currently moving towards policy and rights based approach to social development. Other roles include:
Local level activity on social infrastructure; environment; minority groups; gender and children/youth groups and Disabled and advocacy work.

Over time, other structures that represent various groupings (women, youth, farmers, pastoralists etc) were established to serve each of its constituency or community. Yet, experiences indicated the high degree of viability and vitality, especially when networks of social clubs or cooperatives and solidarity acts emerged around an issue or a cause. There is wide range of activities in service provision, protection of members from abuses to socio-cultural and sometimes political rights.

Bilal (1998) argued that there is complete failure of top-down development approaches. The State coercion and poor responsiveness to citizens needs, lead to formation of independent own people organizations and lobby groups. The market economy, growing parasitic capitalism contributed to environment degradations, increased inequality and deepening impoverishment of producers. Growth of urban poverty (wars, droughts etc) and lack of state commitment and plans on poverty alleviation and social change were key determinants for the growth of Sudanese Civil Society sector. Within that context there was systematic growth of regional and tribal associations growth, (Urban –based migrants, mainly indicating the urban –rural linkages (solidarity, mutual support, development in rural end). Poverty-related issues, according to Bilal are major contributors to the growth of the sector where the number of registered organizations reached 121 in Khartoum State by 1997.

4.3.2 Factors Contributing to Emergence and Growth Of Civil Society:
There are number of factors contributing to the emergence and growth of the voluntary association sector in Sudan. These factors include the diverse nature of the Sudanese society across culture; religion; ecology and geography. Moreover, other factors of age, gender and the development of social forces linked with socio-economic progress had been crucial in the richness and the growth of the sector. The social capital role in support of the weak, the needy and the poor are common and characteristic features of the Sudanese communities. There were rooted systems of mutual support, mutual help and solidarity in the social occasions (marriage; funeral and circumcision) and the solidarity and alliance in times of stress, wars and other man-made or natural catastrophes.

The colonial era had witnessed the influx of foreigners living in Sudan (Europeans; Egyptians etc) and the Christian missions which have had great influence on the emergence and growth of the voluntary associations in Sudan. The traditional social fabric, social capital and cultural behavior were accordingly subjected to continuous changes. There had been tendencies for modern associational life, as mentioned earlier (Women scouts etc). The Sudanese elites were also exposed to the Egyptian civil society and the British liberal democracy and society, hence acquired over time the courage; the skills and legitimate concerns to organize themselves to serve some crucial claims of their constituencies.

The establishment of the first Intermediate School of Omdurman in 1926) initiated the establishment of cultural and social societies. These were perceived by the colonial power as endangering their rule because of involvement in politics. This consequently led to the first law (1924), the Law of Illegal Societies. Up until the independence, this law prevailed curtailing the emergence and growth and in turn the civil society
involvement in politics. In 1957, a new law organizing the voluntary organizations was enforced by the first national elected Sudanese government. Despite the space created by this law, the law was again a trial to disengage the voluntary civil society from politics on the assumption that there are active political parties and free liberal democratic space. The May Regime (1969-1985) although encouraged the self-help groups and initiatives and launching important popular campaigns (Campaign against Thirst) tried to co-opt the free associational spirit and linked people organizations with the dominant regime political organizations. The self help groups were active on self-help projects, but the Local Government Act (1971) curtailed them through a must of working within the political party grass roots units and imposition of taxes (sugar taxes called self-help support tax). This is of course financially supported the service provision projects but contrary to the voluntary spirit it encouraged government withdrawal from its accountability towards its citizens and at the same time contributed to the distortion of voluntary work image.

During the period 1975-1989 there was a generous and supportive legislation for national NGOs in Sudan. To establish an NGO, any group of over 7 persons had the right to form an NGO for any purpose. Trade unions and business firms were governed by another different law. NGOs were just asked to report annually to the director of National voluntary work and provide audited annual accounts. By 1989 all NGOs were dissolved and required to re-register under tighter control and made registration a difficult task; donations have to be declared and reported. Security screening was not uncommon making life almost impossible except for the pro-regime organizations.
Sudan failed to prevent the famine of mid 1980s, the worst famine in Sudan during the 20th Century. This is partly attributed to the magnitude of the crisis and partly to lack of state capacity and appropriate bureaucratic structures. However, lack of political stability and accountability were held responsible for being crucial to govern other aspects. There were also allegations that the African state, the international donors and foreign civil society, all conspire against constructive state-society relations to support livelihoods in times of stocks (Smith and Davies (1995).

In all cases lack of state and public action creates a gap that opens avenues and need to be filled by international actors. The grass-roots social action and civic groups directly representing the interests of the poor are much less frequent in the African content. The inefficient state and relatively weak indigenous formal civil society, in Africa had lead to comparatively highly developed role of informal civil society in provision of social and economic services and social insurance of people particularly in rural communities. However, the informal civil society capacity had been weakened by media as an effective public action and sometimes in alliance between modern civil society and allies from within the informal indigenous organizations.

The post 1980s drought and famine period, reaching its peak by the 1989 coup, there were clear sign of government withdrawal from services, creating apparent gap. Both INGOs and the emerging Sudanese civil society organizations were challenged by these widening gaps. The escalation of wars, the harsh conditions created by the ad hoc SAP programmes in the 1990s, increased people sufferings and needs and in turn, own organizations and CBOs engagement with INGOs, donors and authorities were escalated. By time, CBOs built social constituencies, using the rich history of
volunteerism to legitimize representation of own people. The cultures of self-help, nafr, Mujib, Sandouk, Khatta, Kashif, and Maniha etc were historically proven social safety net mechanisms and tools for get together and solidarity, hence employed within newly established, formal CBOs. The CBOs were challenged to improve procedures, systems for more functioning and accountable structures with systematic involvement and working with INGOs,. Yet, it becomes increasingly recognized by people as grassroots organizations currently available at almost all villages and neighborhoods or social groupings. They operate as welfare actors at village and neighborhood level while doing emergency or development functions when focusing on certain population groups (farmers, women etc).

Aspects of common identity and common interest were crucial for mobilization of people and their contributions. Moreover, there was maintenance of fruitful working partnership with government authorities, whereby there were contributions from the state. These include financial contributions from development fund budgets and securing staffing and running costs, same as the Hrambee system⁶.

4.4 State - Civil Society Relationship

The state – civil society relationship fluctuates from opposition to close alliance depending on the nature of governing regime. However, antagonistic relationship is reflected in direct challenge of the state on the social inequality policies. Institutions matter because they determine who is included or excluded and because they define the differing domains of

⁶ Barkan, Dr Holomquist,F.1989"Peasant –State Relation and the social Base of self-help: Kenya" World Politics Vol.4 No.3 pp. 359-380
Thomas 1985 B.p Politics Participation and Poverty: Development through self-helps in Kenya
control in state – society- community relations. The formal (state) and informal (customary) relationship depend on the rule which governs them. The change in the regime type may lead to a more supportive environment for non-state actors or the state may actively seek to co-opt CSO to carry out certain functions with public action. Conversely, and in the absence of effective state action, the civil society may step in to fill the gap or may have to revise or create rules in the absence of an effective external institutional framework. (p.12).

Traditionally in Sudan rural areas local communities depend wholly on their indigenous organizations to preserve own identity, secure the basic requirements, therefore, keep apart from the political authority in their daily concerns. Yet, these social traditional structures were subjected to continuous degradation and a process of replacement with new types of social networks occurred over of time. The emergence of modern civil society organizations in Sudan dated back to early 1920s within colonial era i.e. the need for political participation increases during the struggle against colonial rule, especially in the period of world war (1918-1939). This clearly indicates that the modern Sudanese civil society organization, though emerged under colonial occupation, but directly linked with the struggle for political participation and independence movement.

In Sudan, as in many others Arab countries the State-civil society relationship varies with the type of regimes. There were active organizations in times of liberal democracy, whereby with autocratic regimes the civil society suffers from co-option or banning with laws and coercion. However, under the autocratic regimes there was a clear trend of growth of new social organizations apparently apolitical and necessitated by withdrawal of the state from its roles in service provision. Moreover, the oppression policies
and solidarity with global civil society encouraged the establishment of organization focusing on development, environment and human rights issues. The droughts, civil war and other human and manmade catastrophes had triggered growth and activation of modern, formal NGOs and CBOs in Sudan.

Hayder (1996) traced Sudan political regimes through which he managed to read the emergence, growth and viability of the Sudanese civil society as follows:–.

- 1955-1969 multi-party system
- 1969-1985 one party system
- 1985-1989 multi–party system
- 1989- controlled, one party dominated system

The Sudanese recent political experience witnessed the revival of ethnicity, homeland belonging and the Islamic ideology shaping the state. Religion had been used widely in politics in different forms.

The Sudan, as a modern State stared with the Egyptian–Turkish invasions of Mohamed Ali Basha (1981). The State, before that, was no more than autonomous kingdoms, Sheikdoms built on tribal basis. These territorial lands are some sort of Feudal systems, taking the example of Fung Kingdom (1504-1821). The Turko-Egyptian era (1821-1885) was ended by the Success of the Mahdsit revolution. The Turkish state was a period which witnessed tribal and native administration and central systems. As in Hayder (1996, pp:43) it was a continuation of tribal units within modern administration systems.

The Mahdist state (1884-1885) was an era of 'Jihad' and complete instability. The Sudanese society was in an upheaval. Continuous migration, displacements and heavy taxation on agriculture were the dominant
phenomena. Despite wars, the Khalifa tried to establish a strong central state, however, through violence and coercion. Again, despite the claimed Islamic state, it was actually controlled by one dominant tribe of the Khalifa i.e. Taishi. As Hadison, indicated (Ibid, pp:44) all these historical developments of the upcoming Sudanese state formation, there were three dominant factors: religion, the tribe and ethnic affiliation.

The Anglo- Egyptian invasion (1896) was the first direct contacts with the western culture and western administration systems. The British adopted a number of modernization project at various fronts. There was formal education and cash crop production through establishment of cotton scheme, the railway, river transport and the commercial centers. These projects are key contributors to the establishment of modern social and economic structures and groupings. Moreover, the British, administration, sensitive towards the key issues of religion, tribal and ethnic affiliations it relied heavily on the role of tribal chiefs, religion elite and sofi sects leaders. They become very loyal to authority while enjoying privileges and stake in leading social, justice and administrative systems.

The period also simultaneously witnessed a counter move of emerging new civil society organizations in the form of unions, syndicates and socio-cultural clubs. The civil society, therefore witnessed the co-existence of traditional (mostly tribal and religious) and modern socio-cultural and economic structures of civil society organizations. Both are heavily involved in issues of public domain and they were either involved or claiming role in political participation and political influence. The emergence of educated elite i.e. graduates tried to plays the role of linking the traditional with modern civil society organization; playing a political role against the occupation.
Hayder (1996:p48-49) indicated that the elite lost contact with their rural ends while the religions and tribal leaders had established strong economic and social bases that are close to people. The only option left for elite, was to establish direct links with the traditional leaders to assure some influence at both levels of grass roots and the top level of British administration. This had been clearly reflected in the emergence of political parties, where one can depict the duality of 'modern' and traditional elements of in all aspects of party i.e. leadership; manifest; internal structures and democracy functioning etc. In the two historically dominate political parties e.g. Umma and NDP it was even a kind of patron-client relationship, whereby the religious sects control all party agenda and actors (both elites and tribal leaders). It is important here to look into the political role of the "Khatmia" and "Ansar" sects.

The "Khatmia" and "Ansar sects define themselves as religious-related civil society organizations. On the other hand, and due to the emergence and growth of modern organizations e.g. the labour movement, the professional and the dynamics within the elite's socio-cultural clubs and the apparent influence of the left, there was vivid activity of civil society organizations (both traditional and modern) at all level and different spaces e.g.' elections, opposition etc. The first dictatorship (1958-1964) had witnessed the struggle for democracy and the success of 1964 civic revolution. The Communist Party Report (October 1967) clearly indicated the need for direct democracy as a tool needed to widen the base of encouraging large sectors of people into the arena of political activity.(Hayder, 1996, p51). This was clearly advocated as a tool to address the imbalances of weak social basis for democratic functioning of western parliamentary democracy. It was and still not logical and impossible to
uproot either the traditional or ‘modern' civil society forces, the matter that necessitate the need for duality systems to assure responsible political participation of people i.e. representative and direct democracy structures. It is impossible to talk about strong bourgeoisie or middle class, same as difficulty to assure viability of strong labour movement to claim cultural hegemony or control of the Sudanese States. The battle is mainly in the arena of civil society whereby the modern forces should struggle to occupy more space and political influence.

The 1960s slogans of Sudanese left (popular programme, youth movements) were appealing to a large group of the people, in both urban and rural areas. However, these slogans were not reflected in the political space and state structures (parliament).

The periods following autocratic regimes e.g. October revolution and the Intifada (1985) had witnessed claims for representation of ‘modern’ forces, meaning closed seats for graduates, laborers, professionals etc. Also, the same periods witnessed claims for more political representations for the marginalized regions and groupings. The modern forces and left groups vocal after the 1964 revolution had demanded a democratic constitution and local governance systems to solve the regional/national cause, and direct call for dissolution of native administration.

The post 1965 elections came up with eleven representatives for Communist Party; 14 independent and 10 Beja Congress. Same period had been vivid organizations in Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Eastern Sudan. The strategic move was mainly opening more space for the modern democratic and popular forces within civil society and more focus on rural and marginalized areas. The problem, thus, was the short analysis which think of the backward traditional; structure as native administration only leaving out
the traditional, religion-based sects. While keeping tribal influence a target for social change (correct stand) - the other important political actors from within the traditional forces, the Katina and Ansar and later the Muslim Brothers were not addressed within a clear call for separation of Politics from religion. The later were taken as de-facto actors.

Mansur Khalid as in (Hayder 1996, P:54) explained the reason of failure of modern forces to sustain influence by the inability to transform ideas into change agenda specifically issues of national unity, democracy and development and the failure to establish an optimum organizational framework to encompass the change forces, hence trapped into the multi-party liberal political game.

The emergence of Sudanese political parties was generally attributed to emergence of the White Flag Society (educated and military wing ) 1924 and the High School Graduates, the bureaucracy etc forming socio-cultural clubs then formation of Graduate Conference (1938). They had been Addressing people needs, claiming self rule and improvement of people wellbeing they then initiated the political parties but depending on sectarian leaders financial popular support. The famous conflict within the conference and the split in two blocks was mainly due to manipulation of the two conflicting sects.

Below are the main political party formation events:-

- Ashigaa Groups (with Ali El Mirgani) (1942-1943)
- Unity of Nile Valley 1946
- Unionists Wing Aburouf society 1944)
- Umma Party Nationalist (independence El Fagr groups 1944.
Anti-Colonialism Hastu (Sudanese movement for Freedom (1944)

Anti-colonialism Hadatu Democratic Movement for National Freedom Front (1946)

Islamic Freedom movement (1953)
Committee for Muslim Brother (1946)
Islamic Charter (1964)
National Islamic Front (1985)

In general, it is extremely difficult to demarcate between civil society organization and the political society, the latter is generally perceived as arena of partisan political. The ideological and political affiliations at least colored the civil society elected leaders –who, generally, stand elections by or with backing from political parties. As Hayder (1996, P:53) indicated that the leaders of the ‘modern’ civil society forces represented in ‘Jabhat EL Hayaat’ had governed Sudan, the period October 1964-October 1965. During late 1950 and throughout the 1960s there were the phenomena of regional –based political organizations viz. Nuba Mountains Union; Darfur Development Front and the Beja Congress. Same period had witnessed the emergence of South Sudan Party, SANU and the Liberal Southerners parties. The tension of whether are democratic or undemocratic organizations is generally attributed to understanding the concept of civil society within the Sudanese context and historical emergence and development of social organizations in Sudan.

4.5 The Changing Role of CSOs:
The State-civil society relationship was not a one way road. The relationship showed a weak state versus strong community in most instances. The state has no full control over the society, whereas according to Al Bathani (2001) a popular system of governance always work parallel to the official system using social networks. Accordingly, government structures at all levels cannot work in isolation from the web of sectarian, regional, tribal and patrimonial relationships.

The current dynamics of civil society is influenced by the regulatory and repressive legal framework. Friendly quasi government NGOs (currently booming) dominating the allowed space and strategically well prepared for the forthcoming donor funding opportunity. CBOs try their best to shy away from direct political issues but do not mean they never confronted certain policies or politics. However, still non-partisanship has to be maintained at least of not becoming party affiliates.

CHAPTER FIVE

RURAL URBAN DIVIDE AND DEVELOPMENT IMPASSE

5.1 Environment, population and Economy

5.1.1 Natural Resources

Kassala State falls wholly within Sudan dry lands and therefore constitutes and ecologically marginal environment. Average annual rainfall varies from 150 mm in the northern parts to over 300 mm in its southern parts. Effectiveness of this little amount of rainfall is reduced by its short
duration, uneven distribution and the high evaporation rates. Drought is a defining feature of climate and has been internalized as existential reality affecting livelihood systems in the State. A trend of progressively declining rainfall, estimated at 2.6 mm per annum, has been observed since the late 1940s.

The Gash River, seasonal stream flowing down the Eritrean highlands, drains into the state about 560 million cubic meters / year. It normally flows for 2-4 months. The River Atbara which crosses part of the State also drains some 12 Milliard cubic meters annually; the river provides irrigation water for the New Halfa Scheme (500,000 feddans).

The state is poor in ground water due to the underlying basement complex formations. Small aquifers are, however, found such as the Gash basin north of Kassala Town with a storage estimated to be 600 million cubic meters. The area of natural pastures in the state is estimated to be over 7 million feddans supporting about 3 million heads of livestock in the state and large herds from the neighboring states. Forests cover some 300,000 feddans (3% of the State total area) of which reserve reaches about 21,625 feddans are reserved areas.

5.1.2 Population

Kassala State has a total population of 1.5 millions about 20 % of them is living in Kassala town, the state capital. The annual growth rate of population is 2.51%, with a relatively large average household size of 6.2 persons. The great influx of population from the surrounding regions as well as distant areas pushed by insecurity and the armed conflicts and the long migration trend to the town from northern and central Sudan in pursuit of jobs and income sources.
As a result of the long history and high intensity of migration to the region, the population is characterized by visible cultural and ethnic diversities. The indigenous ethnic group in the town is the Beja, which compromises the Hadendowa as the largest of the Beja tribe, the Beni Amir as the border tribe that stretches along the Sudan-Eritrea boarders, and the Halanga tribe, which is believed to be the first Beja group to have settled in Kassala town.

The state experienced a number of migration waves starting in the 1820s with the arrival of the Rashaida from the Arabian peninsula, the resettlement of about 40,000 Nubians from Halfa area after their area was submerged by the Aswan High Dam in the early 1960s and the influx of internally displaced population from western Sudan during the drought of the 1980s and those displaced by war from southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains during the 1990s. In addition to normal migration that has been primarily from Northern and Central Sudan. As a border region, the state also received large numbers of Ethiopians and Eritrean since the early 1960s as a result of war and droughts. Kassala State also houses the Fellata and Hawsa groups from West Africa.

According to WFP (Feb 2001), Kassala was estimated to have accommodated about 42,000 refugee persons, living in eight camps, seven of which are inside Kassala Province and the other one is in Sitit Province. Besides, Kassala state has been the main destination point for the refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia throughout the last 30 years. Recently, the year 2000 has seen the outbreak of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which resulted in a large number of refugees estimated to have exceeded 95,000 individuals (20,000 families). Although some refugees managed to integrate and live with the local population in the town, they are usually settled in
three main reception camps in Wad Shariefai, Gulsa, and Laffa. The ethnic
groups of refugees are mainly Beni Amir, A’leet, Maria, Jaberta, Baria and
Baza. (Ibid, p. 12)

5.1.3 The Displaced People (IDPs):

There are permanent villages and neighborhoods in Kassala State for
the settlement of IDPs. The assumptions about return to home land and
original areas proved false after two years of the Comprehensive Peace
agreement (CPA). In Hadalia the IDPs from Hameshkoreb still live at the
camp and have no intention to return to their former dars after ESPA.

Life in IDP villages near Kassala is in fact comparatively far better off
than some long standing villages of rural Kassala. IDPs life had have
significantly changed to the better, recalling some signs of access to social
services and exposure to urban life. Burning of charcoal in Khor Alega and
at Al Laffa and adjacent areas, constitutes the main source of livelihood for
the Beni Amir settled in the camps or other villages near Kassala Unlike,
those of southern and western Sudan women, the Hadendowa and Beni Amir
women are not working in tea selling despite the extreme poverty. The
tribes of the East perceive such a livelihood system as degrading the
integrity of the household. Charcoal making is the most predominant income
source for men working near the border with Eritrea. The average income
per month per person reached 150 US$ which is spent mainly on food for
the family, guaranteeing a subsistence level.

Other IDPs areas e.g. Gulsa residents have moved to new location
from the old Gulsa to a new site near the border. People here live on
farming, wood cutting and as manual laborers. Manual labor in the
production of limestone at Giria guarantees a daily income of at least seven
dollar. The regional politics and policies of opening and closing the border
directly have impact on the people livelihood systems positively or negatively. IDPs and Refugees suffer scarcity in potable water, poor sanitation, and rise of STD including HIV/AIDS, poor (MCH) services and high malnutrition among children (40% among IDPs and 32% among Refugees).

5.2 War and Political Instability

Over the past years (1960s-1990s) Kassala was a host for refugees from Eritrea due to the protracted Eritrea-Ethiopian regional war. The independence of Ethiopian and The deposal of Ethiopian President Mengist in (1991), a new era in the horn of Africa was in place. Pressures on SPLA in the Sudanese Ethiopian boarder and the emergence of the NDA, from both the Northern Parties and SPLM brought about changes in political alliance. The government of Sudan was declared by the Eritreans (1994) as supporting Islamic opposition. Once Asmara Declaration (1995) was in place, the Eastern boarders were immediately declared as a war zone. The conflict situation was created and Kassala State became a theatre for military operations, coupled with the occurrences of natural disasters i.e. drought, Gash river floods, collapse of the Gash Agricultural scheme. The influxes of displaced caused a serious stress on the already fragile town service infrastructure. The vulnerability situations even worsened by the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998-2000) increasing the refugee’s population in Kassala. Same time insecurity, land mines, Gash river floods decreased land under cultivation in both irrigated and mechanized rainfed farming. The nomadic movement, boarder trade with Eritrea dramatically deteriorated.
The above mentioned factors led to the drop of overall crop production by 70%. The statistics (ibid.) indicated that:

- The revenues from the mechanized farming in Sitit province decreased to 30% due to land mines problems. The investors in MF decreased from 30 external investors (1996) to zero (1999).
- The hotel business booking, which is considered as a major characteristic of Kassala town, decreased to 35% over the period 1996-1999.
- The expenditure of the pre-war era on health decreased from 83% (1996) to 53% (2000) of the state budget and shifted for security and defense purposes.
- The education services, on the other hand, suffered as 4872 pupils (boys) and 1135 (girls) lost education opportunities.
- Social problems among Beja ethnic groups (crimes, STD, etc) were reported due to poverty.

Over the period (1996-1999) the land mines explosion cases reached 122 incidents, resulting in 327 victims. 93% of the victims are civilians. The Death cases reached 42 of whom 86% are civilians. 60% of (149) reported physical disabled due to land mines are in the productive age group (20-50 years). 21% of the victims of land mines are female. These victims include self-employed (38%); wage labour (50%) and 14% students (Hussain 2000). In Kassala, the most recent conflict zone (1996), though relatively on small scale compared to the war in the south, huge losses did occur on land used to be under cultivation. The mechanized farming, the Gash Delta rich clay lands were severely reduced due to insecurity, land mines, and shortage of
lobar lowered the overall productivity by 30%. The economic cost of war, as demonstrated by the case of Kassala is reflected in:

- Decreased local revenues from farming
- Hotel business dropped down due to tourists fees
- Expenses on defense and security at the expenses of basic services increased.
- Expenditure on public health, education …etc decreased
- Public utilities' infrastructure destroyed.

The main reason of conflict is due to politics that determine access and control over resources. However, the regional and international dimension related to control over water and oil resources, play the major role in the current war and the related efforts for peaceful settlement. At the sometime the war zones in the South, East, and Central – East and the West, share the characteristic of unbalanced regional development. These areas claim to be marginalized by decision – making elites in the center holding them responsible of the root causes of the civil unrest in Sudan.

5.3 The State Economy:

Kassala State is an important centre for agriculture and border-trade in Sudan. As a border State in a politically unstable region, the State economy is frequently affected by border tensions. However, ethnic background tends to shape the means of livelihoods and local economy of Kassala. Tribes from northern Sudan, mainly Ja’aliyeen, Shaigiya, and Manaseer, are dominating the local economy through their heavy involvement in large-scale trading and horticultural activities. During the last few years, the Beni Amir has started to emerge as new competing
economic power through their involvement in the boarder-trade. While the Halanga and Rashida who managed to survive the drought through their diversification of their economy (engaging in agriculture, trade, smuggling etc..), tribesmen like the Hadendawa who were hit hard by the drought of the 1980s and lost their livestock, have moved into towns working as manual laborers, petty traders, watchmen, and seasonal agricultural workers. The IDPs dominate the informal sector in areas of food processing, handicraft, tea and coffee selling, household attendants, etc. and many of the IDPs women are engaged in the traditional brewing of liquor.

In a sample survey (2003) about one third of the randomly selected population were born outside the state. Western, Northern and central Sudan are the leading home regions of migrants, although migrants from all states, as well as foreigners (refugees) appeared in the sample. The heterogeneity of the population is also indicated by the numerous numbers of tribal groups reported: 33 tribal groups appeared in the sample, 3 are originally from the region, 5 groups were foreigners and 25 tribes are originally from other parts of Sudan. However, as ‘historically’ migrant attractive centres, many of these groups were actually born within the Kassala State. Foreigners constituted 8.5% of the sample population in the states. Ethiopian and Eritrean Refugees constitute respectively about 91% of the foreign population in the State. The rest are mainly of West African origin (Abdel Ati 2000).

Most of the population used to work in the traditional sector, farming and agro-pastoralist. Because of drought and insecurity during the last five years, several tribal conflicts broke out over pasture and water in the areas where nomads were squeezed, particularly in the eastern part of the State and large numbers of IDP from within the area moved into Kassala town to
work in Swagi gardens as agricultural labor, in the informal sector or as cheap manual labor. As a result of the poor urban skills of these local IDPs and the heavy presence of other IDPs and refugees in town, the level of poverty and food insecurity have risen sharply among these groups. The influx of IDPs also increased pressure on the already strained social services in town.

5.3.1 The Farming Economy

The state economy could generally be characterized as being an extractive one predominated by traditional farming, pastoralist and irrigated farming as the main economic engagements and livelihood systems in the State. Agriculture is the mainstay of rural economy where the total cultivable area in the State is about 4 million feddans (40.5% of the State area) but the actually cultivated is about 1.58 million feddans (38.8%). Table 5.1 shows the arable and cultivated land area by type of irrigation. Irrigated areas constitute about 50% of the cultivated area, rain-fed cultivation 42%. About 60% of farmers in the state are in the traditional rain-fed sector where productivity is 16% of that in the irrigated sector (2 sacks/ feddans compared to 12 in irrigated areas). According to official State reports, Kassala State is producing only 20% of its food needs. The remaining 80% (6737 metric tons in 2003) is covered through internal (from Gedaref area) and external imports, WFP and international NGOs support.

Table (5.1): Arable and Cultivated land by Type of Irrigation in Kassala State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of irrigation</th>
<th>Scheme / Area</th>
<th>Total Cultivable (feddans)</th>
<th>Area within rotation</th>
<th>Area actually utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artificial irrigation</td>
<td>Halfa agric corporation</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Halfa Sugar scheme</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seed production farm</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horticulture /Investment</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood Irrigation</td>
<td>Gash Scheme</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gashdai</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalahot</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>River Atbara – Gerif</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gash horticultural gardens</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain fed</td>
<td>Mechanized farming</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,080,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional rain fed</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrus , wadis</td>
<td>156,200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumps</td>
<td>Kassala gardens</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wells east of river Atbara</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,017,200</td>
<td>689,000</td>
<td>1,583,480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.2 The Livestock Economy

Pastoralist constitutes the second pillar of the rural economy where an estimated 7 million feddans are considered as natural pastures supporting about 3 million heads of livestock in the state and large herds from the neighboring states. Livestock is an integral part of the activities of almost all rural households. The grazing land in the State is decreasing progressively due to the expansion of cultivation leading to overgrazing and severe land degradation. Water supply provision based on poorly informed environmental policies and planning procedures is another important contributor to pasture degradation particularly around irrigation schemes and around hafirs along the asphalt.

It is estimated that 6% of the total population are nomads but most of livestock belongs to this system which accounts for about 3% of total Sudan cattle, 6% of sheep and goats and 20% of camels. During the last three decades the system exposed to eight drought cycles and the worst one was 1984-85 where majority of pastoralist lost their herd completely or their herd size depleted less than the number required for the practice of pastoralist. As a result large scores of them have been transformed to poor sedentary farmers or jobless groups. The expansion of farming, in both the rainfed and irrigated sectors, has seriously alienated pastoralists through blocking of their transhumance routes and annexation of their traditional grazing areas.

The increase in livestock numbers in recent years is attributed, by officials, to the decline in soil fertility in southern sagias of Kassala state which made investment in animals rather than agriculture a better
alternative. Declining yields in the traditional farming sector, estimated to be less than a sack of sorghum per feddans, has also created a shift towards investment in animal rearing. Contrary to that trend of livestock rearing, the Rashaida nomads show a trend of growing concerns with agriculture rather than being completely dependent on livestock herding as they used to be till very recent. River Atbara also provides economic opportunities to an increasing number of populations through fishing activities that result in an annual fish production of 200,000-400,000 tons.

Table (5.2): Kassala State: Livestock Population by Locality 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Camels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>92,339</td>
<td>228,817</td>
<td>248,323</td>
<td>186,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atbara River</td>
<td>172,733</td>
<td>435,409</td>
<td>238,241</td>
<td>134,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gash</td>
<td>160,783</td>
<td>294,115</td>
<td>187,834</td>
<td>106,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setit</td>
<td>155,151</td>
<td>188,010</td>
<td>237,711</td>
<td>127,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hameshkoreb</td>
<td>68441</td>
<td>176,368</td>
<td>232,405</td>
<td>37,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>649,447</td>
<td>1,322,719</td>
<td>1,144,514</td>
<td>592,207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the records of the Department of Range and Pastures, Kassala State, 2006.

5.4 Poverty in Kassala State

The poverty rate is estimated by 93% for the rural area and 84% for the urban and the annual income per household for rural area is about 2500(US$ 560per capita) which far below the international poverty line. Concerning the human capital the mortality rate of infant is 101 per 10000 while it is 68 for the whole country and for children under 5 is about 148 while it is 104 for the whole country and most health services confined to
the urban area. For the education illiteracy rate is about 65 % and enrollment is estimated 31 % of children at School age. The water consumption is about 12 little per day per person which is only about 50 % of the recommended quantity and 65 % of the urban population have access to safe water compared to about 36 % for rural area.

Poverty in the state is the result of a complex set of interrelated structural and environmental factors reflected in the collapse of local economy under conditions of increased population and heavy influx of refugees. Table 5.3 below shows the systemic problems affecting the agricultural and pastoral livelihood systems.

**Table 5.3: problems affecting agro-pastoral systems in Kassala State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanized and traditional farming</th>
<th>Irrigated projects</th>
<th>Pastoralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Declining yields</td>
<td>• Investment of huge capital (to earn foreign exchange through export crops) and settle and employ large number of people.</td>
<td>• Shrinking of grazing lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Input supply constraints</td>
<td>• Poor organizational capacity</td>
<td>• Closure of routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Output marketing constraints</td>
<td>• Crop rotation, optimal water distribution, weed infestation labour</td>
<td>• land ownership disputes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor management</td>
<td>• High cost of production</td>
<td>• Over taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of access to institutional credit</td>
<td>• Ecological</td>
<td>• Over grazing and land degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ecological</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unequal exchange due to Markey imperfections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
deterioration  
- Inappropriate farming technology  
shortage etc are common problems.  
- Lack of access to institutional credit  
- Lack of access to services  
- Lack of access to institutional credit

5.4.1 A Case of Rural Poor-
5.4.1.1 Gash Scheme: An Impasse of Market-oriented Development

El Gash basin and delta make a real oasis between the semi desert, dry land from the West and hilly area, from the east (Map -). The Gash River is artillery for the livelihood of all Kassala and Gash area where people depend on pastoralist and farming. The River is source for post basin irrigation and wells. The latter are scattered in the horticultural land North and South Sawogi of Kassala area. The River takes (at its banks) mid of 5-5.5 Kg./m3 on average, annual making one of the most fertile soils in the world, as stated in a number of soil surveys and other climatic factors, are conducive to agricultural production of number of factors, beside the area of high comparative for agricultural production in Sudan. Low pests infestation, low need for fertilizers and the heterogeneous demographic makeup availing a reasonable degree of human labour.

The Hadaendawa makes about 75% of the populations together with a mix of Fellata and the northern Sudan tribes: shaigia, Jaaleen, Rubatab etc.. The tribe is the basic socio –political element in the area based on the
The historical dominance of the Hadaendawa Nazarate. However, over time this power degraded due to a number of reasons to mention some:

- The social mobilization and dynamism linked with rural-Urban migration and rural-urban linkages.
- The demographic changes due to high settlement of Eritrean refugees and widening of Beni Amir social base.
- The emergence of new modern organization e.g. farmer union of El Gash, the Beja congress etc.
- The huge influx of West Africa tribes, dominating. The economic activity
- The labor force in both Urban and rural settings.

The Gash area, on other, hand, when was the major economic power, lost its value due to dwindling tenancies and in turn productivity and economic returns, at household level and the Hadaendawa Nazairate in general. Land i.e. Productivity decreases the main productive and source of socio-economic and political power, decreases annually, consequently, the influence at both local and upper political level. The political of the area, then focused on the emerging socio-cultural power of the Beni Amir and the active human labour source, the Fellata, as alternative tribal-base for the dominant political parties in the 1990s, particularly the National Islamic Front (NIF).

The deterioration of the Gash Scheme, by time, and the other factors e.g. urban-bias, ethnicity politics and the prevalence of cyclic droughts, had contributed to the historical impoverishment and marginalization processes of the people of the area. They become jobless, losing their asset base,
particularly livestock and fertile land. The socio-economic structure of the area categorizes them within the marginalized informal sector of the poverty, peri-urban zone of the Kassala city and other big towns of the area. The glorious, golden years of abundance and cash economy of El Gash Scheme (1926 – 1970s) are becoming history. The people of the area are currently under a situation of absolute poverty, hunger and predominance of epidemic disease Tuberculosis (TB).

The limited organizational capacities and poor awareness among the majority of the population, together with the dominant outdated taboos and the related behavioral practices, were key element to be addressed in order to reverse the trend of such socio-economic and political exclusion. This leads to a number of important questions: to what extent the available cadre both in urban and rural areas, could really voice people interest and bring it into the political debate? Moreover, within the dynamic of the socio –economic and political situation, what prospects of linking the traditional and Modern organizational and institutional capacities to serve the people interests?

The scheme, no doubt has socio-economic effects; despite its original objective of cotton production to serve the colonials home industry in Lancashire. These effects include: increased farmed area; improved irrigation systems; increased number of farmers; introduction of new crops in addition to staple food crops and availing new job and employment opportunities, seasonally.

That occurred irrespective of the numerous constraints:- the irrigated area decrease from season to another; the inequity in irrigated land plots (disparity); decreased productivity due to poor extension work, weeding and land preparation; farmer's returns decrease annually either due to decrease in
irrigated farm land or quality of lands itself and irrigation water annual
decrease due to poor drainage system.

The people of the area practice the basin irrigation long ago before the
project started to establish the earth embankment (sudud). The other
important occupation was livestock keeping and subsistence cultivation. The
main products were Dura and the forest and pasture besides camel, sheep
and goats. By 1926, the scheme administration was established with main
functions of improvement and management of irrigation system; land
distribution and registration and establishment of farmers union.

While the Cash Delta scheme area was 250,000 feddans due to limitation
in irrigation water, the area under cropping was limited to only 40,000 at the
start of the project 1926. number of reason contributed to that the Khur
control was difficult the annual fluctuations of rain and flood water and
limited capacity of drainage system and canalization on the other hand the
silt clay soil, similar to Gezeira soil (porous and good drainage soil) is
known as Badoba land i.e. excellent, water. According to (1984 /85) census
the population in Gash Delta was approximately 125,000 person. This did
not include nomadic groups which are available during the rainy season
practicing cultivation and livestock herding. Knowing density is up to 24.7
per sq. km. There are almost 40 settled villages in the project area, including
the big towns of Aroma (the project head Quarter) and Wager. The
settlement pattern follows the availability of water. The Hadendawa is the
most dominant, greater tribe in the project area. There are Fellata which
makes a sizable minority among the population. The official estimates show
that the population growth rates were 2.89 annually. The area was also
subjected to droughts (1983 -1985) whereby 40,000 of the population (out of
130,000 in 1984) was relief target. The area was also a host of non-
indigenous inhabitants by the time which made more than half of its indigenous population (70,000). The population density had increased, while the scheme capacity remained the same, even deteriorating annually. The Hadendawa, are predominantly pastoralists. They settle in established villages, however they practice seasonal migration north and South, to South Kassala area and the boarders with Eritrea. They are then back in the rainy season to practice traditional farming, besides livestock keeping.

The cropping pattern in El Gash Delta follows the three year round systems. Land is distributed by luck (coin) system on the irrigated area. You may find yourself away from your settlement area, leading to either exchange with others or renting it Even you may be in an area without water or other essential service. Generally, the families depend on family labour including School age children, therefore, contributing to the problem of School dropout.

The irrigation differs from an area to another; more- over some land areas may need more effort for clearance, land preparation and weeding. Hired labour demands. Accordingly, poor farmers suffer much and depend on male children as main source of labour. Women and female children are not major source of farm labour, for the Hadandawa of the area. This was contrary to the fellata whose women contribute significantly to all farm operations. Furthermore, as completely settled families, and some have capital, they have had a comparative advantage to give more time and farm management to their farms, therefore, benefit most compared to the indigenous Hadendawa population.

The management system (1995) includes the scheme administration, the state and federal authority and the farmers union. Each has a well defined
role, while the day to day running is the administration responsibility; the authorities just appoint the Scheme director and board of directors. The Farmers union is the channel (link) between farmers and the project management. The farmer and Farmers union participation in decision making was very limited and usually feel marginalized. The follow up is very poor for the administration performance and the rehabilitation task.

The total Delta area is 700,000 the total potential farmland 250,000 i.e.(%) the average area under farming varies from 40,000 to 60,000 annually, it is only 20% potential farming area. The total number of farmer varies from 12,000 to 41,000 due to variation land under irrigation, annually. The farm size in average is 1.6 feddans per farmer. 5% of it is reserved for a forestation. The Forest land is 24,000 feddans. The cropping pattern i.e. the package includes: Dura, Cotton, Khirwi and then Dura.

The socio- economic structure of the Gash Delta area is determines by agricultural activity, both farming and livestock. Have more than 60,000 farming families, huge numbers of seasonal workers linked with farm activities and other permanent jobs in the Scheme administration, irrigation and agricultural activities.

The agriculture in the area, therefore make the corner stone in building the social structures in the region. The illiteracy, diseases and other issues are predominant; therefore, rural development is a pre-requisite to make a breakthrough in the area. People feel historical processes of marginalization, balance the centre and the policies favoring the urban settings. There were also historical processes, externally i.e. the international cotton market that contributed to sequencing the farming community. The internal factors, as well, contributed to the improvement of the people of the
area e.g. droughts, floods and the civil wars. The farmer’s leaders, attributed their destitution to police in agriculture, irrigation and the weak organizational capacity of the farmers and the population of the area, in general.

5.4.1.2 The Rural Community of El Gash: The Limited Impact:

- Community Characteristics

People of El Gash generally exist within community since birth. Even the migrants to the area, the Fellata community dates back to the 1940s and even earlier. Their influxes were linked with El Gash Scheme and the need for agricultural laborers. The households range from 100 to 250 household within the surveyed rural area. People of this rural community feel change to the worse over the past 20 years, mainly due to the collapse of el Gash Scheme. The main reasons that contribute to this negative trend of change as stated by the respondents' birth rates i.e. population density and the influxes of displaced due to the war in the east and other parts of Sudan. On the other hand, the respondents indicated that still there was positive change, particularly in access to clean drinking water. The Khalwa education increased and awareness about agricultural practices and even availability of agricultural in puts. The two principal economic activities are still agricultural farming (80%) of population and (20%) animal production;
however, they are mixed in most cases. These as well make the sole men activities, despite the fact that women are as well economically active in these modes of living, but highly under estimated by the community leader the dominant other women activities are generally handicrafts, however, many men see women as idle and have no other economic activities. Availability of employment opportunities is rated as worsened by 40% of respondents, remained same by 405 and improved by only 20% of respondents. Accessibility of these rural communities was seen as a problem by itself, indicating the dirt roads and foot path as only means of accessibility, as applied in both rainy and dry seasons.

There is a consensus that the roads leading to these communities are worse (60%) or at least remained the same 40%. On the other hand, unlike urban communities, people feel the housing generally adequate. 80% indicated a change. The main reasons behind housing improvements were stability; availability of water and to some extent availability of education and house planning in certain communities. As far as the quality of living of people of this rural community (60%) said there is improvement and (40%) indicate it as worsened. Those who see the worse side of the coin indicated crop failure (40%) is a main reason. Those who saw the filled part of the cup highlighted the change in education levels, the availability of clean drinking water and recent improvements in the situation of El Gash Scheme. In a nutshell El Gash for people is the limiting factor for their livelihood and quality of life. The decrease in animal wealth is also seen as an important livelihood factor. Other communities, where there are NGOs activities like plan Sudan; showed that improvement of housing and quality of life is linked with sedentarization and decreased livestock herding/movement activity. In addition NGOs contributed to availability of services i.e. water, Schools etc.
Also the increase in irrigation activity of El Gash scheme was an important factor. In overall, the respondents characterized the level of living in the surveyed rural community as well-to do (20%); poor (40%), very poor (40%).

In this rural community, despite the poverty rate as indicated by (80%) of respondents above, still feel there is trust in borrowing and lending as an important livelihood mechanism among people. However, while 60% feel that the level of trust changed over the past few years, 40% feel it remained the same. Strikingly, 80% see that the level of trust within their village does not differ from that of a neighboring village, yet, 20% indicate that it is more with them than other villages. 60% of the respondents, moreover, strongly agree that people in their village care only for their own welfare while 40% as well disagree on that statement.

5.4.1.3. Principal Services:

- Communication and Transport

The telephone services are available within 20% of the rural community of El Gash, mainly public telephones. Some communities need to work 15-30 Km to reach a public telephone point. However, the public telephone has improved over the past three years. Yet, still 60% feel it is very poor, 20% rated it as poor and only 20% rate it as average. People complain from the distance and costs. The post office service is collapsing as indicated by 80% of respondents. People access as very poor. It is even difficult for them identify the problem. Till now this community did not here about internet service, and have idea of what is it or where.

There are public markets in the area, twice a week. For some communities it is just a 10 minutes walking distance, while for others it
reaches four hours walk. While the majority 60% does not see improvement in the public markets over the last 3 years, 40% of respondents indicated that there is improvement. The men of the entire community use these public markets, with no visibility of the women of the Hadendawa community. 60% of respondents agree that there is reasonable transport facility to markets. Some indicated that they need to walk at least 10 Km to access public transport. People differ in their assessment to public transport availability. Only 20% said it is available daily. Very few observed any improvement in transport over the past 3 years. 40% indicated that the entire community use public transport while 60% indicated that very few use public transport. They generally walk on foot. People claimed construction of paved roads as a solution for the transport problem. In addition, people courses and the need to connect and share with other means of transport are walking, practiced by the majority and some people have donkeys or camels. In the rainy season and El Gash flood boats are sometimes used for transport. Private cars are quite few, mainly by merchants and chief tribal leaders.

As far as recreation facilities 80%, indicated that there is no recreation facility this situation as agreed by respondents did not change over the past 3 years. However, the rest 20% indicated the play grounds for the village youth, who play foot ball i.e. 'Dafory' in at least two communities of the surveyed area. These are generally influenced by the presence of schools. Also two of these communities have access to nearer police stations. They indicated that the police even support the community services. There is a general feeling that there are adequate security services, provided by the police, apart from some personal robberies. Public sewage services are pot part of the concerns of these communities. They generally use open area for
feces. However, they indicated problems of water drainage in rainy season, around the villages.

The electricity service is limited to private generators in few shops. Even these were seen as recent changes over the past few years. There is of course no public light service, same as complete lack of piped water. Rural electrification and piped water were seen as important future development agenda within this rural community.

Education:

The pre-schooling is limited to Khalwa, i.e. religions education and complete lack of 'Rawda' i.e. Kindergarten. Children need to walk long distances, sometimes (10-30) Km for the nearest school. The main reasons behind not attending of Rawda or schooling by children are the lack of first and long distances of the other. Three communities out of the five surveyed respondents agree that the number of schools and the teachers is below average. There is almost 80% deficiency in teachers in the on-going basic education schools. The physical conditions of Schools are very poor and lack any facility of decent drinking water; latrines or play yards, let alone furniture, roofing or seating. The children size and age indicate a low percentage of young children attending primary schools. Reasons behind children not attending Schooling include remote distances; poverty and the wide spread negative attitude towards education. Moreover, the education environment and the language (Arabic) were indicated as initial barriers.

Environment and Public Health:

The current ecological environment condition is seem by respondents as very good (80%), average 20% and 40% as very poor. Moreover, 40% see it as remained the same while same percentages indicated that it is worsened.
People do not have garbage disposal service, although seen as a problem in some of these rural, populated communities. They throw on own lots or others lots. People call immediate actions on public health; combat of desertification, slaughtering houses and dumping points for garbage and stop cutting trees. The main problems related to environment within El Gash rural community as indicated by community respondents are lack of pit latrines; scarcity of water; dumping of water and the irrigation system breakages.

**Principal Livelihood Systems**

- **Labour Migration:**

  The rural community members practice seasonal as indicated by 80% of respondents. There are generally men who migrate women never leave their homestead to work in other places. It is said that majority of migrants leave to nearest cities and very few to cities in other regions. Migrants seek daily casual labour in towns and agricultural labour in farming areas. The respondents indicated that there are other people coming to their communities to work in agricultural labour market. People of rural community practice rural-urban migration as important livelihood activity. The Figures below show the seasonal labour migration to urban settings.
Fig 5.1 % members who migrate

Fig 5.2 % to where migrants go to work
**Agriculture and Livestock**

The agricultural activities are combinations of that link to ethnicity in the Gash area. The Hadendawa showed attachment to gash scheme farming and animal production and terrace cultivation. The Fellata as well are very active on Gash scheme farming and terrace cultivation.

People of this rural community indicated lack of technical extension and training m used to be provided by El Gash scheme. The marketing problems are generally transport and the middle men and lack of cooperation. It is different to trace credit institutions over the past 10 years, however, the IFAD project to be implemented in El Gash is generally perceived as an institution that will provide credit. Still traditional lending and 'Sheil' system was said to be prevalent. The main leaders are wealthiest community leaders and merchants. Generally people complain from lack of loans, poor harvest (both terrace and El Gash) cultivation systems 80% of community respondents indicated that they have no surplus farm products to sell and they generally consume what they produce. Those who access neighboring markets suffer from long distances and shortage of drinking water on the way to markets especially for livestock. The animal herders also complain from the lack of veterinary services, stratagem of drinking water and bad roads. The main providers of services, if any, are the NGOs and the agricultural extension department 80% indicated that the community has credit institutions while 20% indicated availability. The latter are referring to the agricultural park and the private individuals; particularly serving wealthiest segments of the community 80% of farmers do not receive loans which is simply not available for many 80%. If available loans suffer from small size; poor people repay capacity and the complicated procedures.
The poor institutional and organizational situation is widely believed to be responsible for the underdevelopment of the area. The historical leadership of the farmers union of EL Gash attributes their weaknesses to:

- Poor awareness about the institutional and organizational aspects among the farmers.
- The prevalence of illiteracy among the population of the area and their tribal and geographical affiliations contributing to tensions and duality of types of leadership.
- The democratic system, historically, adopted into electing leadership was generally of 'consensus' i.e. the personality’s tribal influence and difficulty openly challenge historical, traditional leaders at the expense of modern democratic and associational life and practices.
- The limited union and syndicate cadre and the poor awareness and capacity to voice the farmer's interests and claims.
- The farmers union lacks the economic recourses, and asset base and its reliance on the administration support, therefore, handicapped to address seasonal challenges e.g. transport, marketing and securing some essential inputs.
- The dependency on state curtails the union independent decision making.
- There was no training in leadership, organization, or analysis of policies or negotiation skills.
- The politicization of the institution and farmer’s union leading to co-option and the push and 'pull' factors of the political parties and the social groupings and powerful tribal and religious leaders.
• Delinking the union leadership from their constituency by career ing them to perform some administrative and funding roles e.g. Diesel
• The Scheme contributed to building a new socio-economic fabric at the expense of the traditional tribal system.
• The state privatization and free market economic and encouragement of private expenses at the expense of public development, contributed to the emergence of a 'parasitic' middle men groups at the expenses of the real producers and farmers organizations

The socio-economic consequences could be summarized as follows:
1. Change in livelihood pattern of a number of framers to either jobless, urban migrants or seasonal laborers with these new social class
2. The emergence of new institutions controlled by urban –based middle men who became the pioneers in inputs and output marketing, expensive informal lending for direct large scale production.
3. The state policies of 'Jibaya' i.e. taxation of agricultural and marketing services and other religious taxes (zakat) etc and the local councils fees, one contributing to more impoverishment.
4. The bureaucracy of the project administration role, had changed to focusing on the infrastructure services (as officially declared) but in reality they became the guardians of the government political and administrative grip to ensure the privatization and impoverishment policies of the farmers of the area.
5. The Farmers unions, losing its constituency due to co-option of its leaders, losing of historical significance as a claiming (Syndicate organizations, became itself a channel between farmers and the
administration and playing the Judia role in addressing farmers concerns.

5.4.2 : A Case of Urban Poor: Kassala Slums and NGOs Interventions:

The survey which was conducted in Kassala town in the Eastern State shows the huge slums of diverse nature e.g. Ethnicity, religion, origins etc. Over the past years (1960s-1990s) Kassala was a host for refugees from Eritrea due to the protracted Eritrea-Ethiopian regional war. Mechanized and irrigated farming characterize the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. With the independence of Eritrea and fall of Magneto of Ethiopia (1991), a new era in the horn of Africa was in place. The conflict situation built up and Kassala State became a theatre for occurrence of civil war. This coupled with the occurrences of natural disasters i.e. drought, Gash river floods, collapse of the Gash Agricultural scheme. The influxes of displaced caused a serious stress on the already fragile town service infrastructure. The vulnerability situation worsened because of border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998-2000) adding up to the refugee’s population in Kassala. Same time insecurity, land mines, Gash river floods decreased land under cultivation in both irrigated and mechanized rainfed farming. The nomadic movement, boarder trade with Eritrea dramatically deteriorated.

Kassala town population increased rapidly by early IDPs (1984/85) and the Refugees (1965-1990s). But there are serious problems namely dwindling employment opportunities; deficiency in food and sky rocketing food prices and deteriorating basic health, education services etc. Despite the reception camps’ service provided by the international humanitarian organizations, IDPs and Refugees suffer from scarcity in potable water, poor
sanitation, rise of STD including HIV/AIDS, poor Mother and Child Care (MCH) services and high malnutrition among children (40% among IDPs and 32% among Refugees.

5.4.2.1 **Wau Nur Displaced Neighborhood:**

Wau Nur is residential area in the suburbs of Kassala town and is regarded as most poor. The settlement of Wau Nur slum started during the drought of 1984. Residents were displaced from west and south Sudan as the result of the civil war and natural disasters there. In 1988 when IDPs from Nuba Mountain and people of southern of Sudan reached Kassala state the settlement grew rapidly due to civil war. The second phase of growth started in 1995 as result of intensification of war around rich oil location in south of the Sudan and the total population reached 900 households. The last increase of population of the camp was in 2001 as result of expansion of war from south to eastern Sudan. This development affected many of endogenous population (Beni Amir & Hadandawa) who migrated from their traditional rural areas to Kassala town and Wau Nur. By that time the population reached 1500 household while total population at present is estimated to be 1800 household.

Wau Nur is a planned area and people houses are built of perishable local materials lacking basic services such as electricity and tap water. Women are self-employed in marginalized works such as brewing alcohol, selling tea, food and handicrafts products. Alcohol making brings them into conflicts with Shariaa law, which prohibits and jail alcohol promoter. Most men work as daily paid labor for wealthy merchants in brick production and some work in construction industry within Kassala town. Government employers a smaller number, in most cases as wage labor.
Christian’s forms 54% of the camp population compared to Muslims who constitute 45.6% of the population and closely mirrors ethnic composition and geographic origin. Most households are monogamous though polygamy is not entirely non-existent. In Wau Nour the mean number of wives per home is 1.6.

5.4.2.2: Atla Berra slum:

The establishment of the slum started in 1988 when about 100 families from pastoralists who lost their herds settled at the outskirts of Kassala town. Following that many IDPs from NUBA Mountain who did not find space in Wau Nur joined the camp. At that time the houses were constructed from perishable materials (Nuba IDPs) and tents (Beni Amir & Hadandawa). The maximum growth for the camp occurred in 1993 when considerable number of IDPs reached Kassala as a result of the intensification of war in South and Nuba Mountain. In 2001 the population of camp reached 500 households (2800 people) as result of arrival of new IDPs from Kassala state. The slum is located on flood prone areas and it has been destroyed three times (2001, 2002 & 2003). The worst flood destruction was of 2003 and destroyed about 300 plots (75% of the total house plots). The process of legalization of the slum started in 1992 when the dwellers formed a committee.

The area population is heavily concentrated in the 3rd and 5th age groups making 32.1% and 38.6% respectively. The first and second age groups make 16.3% of the population. In other words age groups 1 to 5 make 94.9% of the population with the first four age groups constituting 56% of the population. The figures would seem to suggest that there has a
drop in fertility in the 4th age group and a more recent drop in the 2nd age group.

5.4.2.3: NGOs operations and approaches:

Understanding the dynamics of NGOs in Sudan require in depth review of how NGOs are engaged in handling issues within Sudanese context which is characterized by conflicts, vulnerability, poverty and other livelihoods constraints. Sudan has been for decades a country at civil war that negatively impacted livelihoods of millions. Displacement affected livelihoods of host urban communities putting pressure on already eroding services.

Sudan has the highest rate of urbanization in the African Sahelian countries. The 1993 census indicates a total population of 25,587,000 people. Out of this 35% inhabit Khartoum and central parts of the country. The annual growth rate estimate is 2.6%. The urbanization rate reported to be tripled in the last two decades (1980s-1990s) from 11% in 1956, 24% (1983) to 32% (1993) while the rate of growth of rural population is estimated at 23% per annum. A recent paper by a Doctor in the Ministry of health showed that Khartoum receive daily about 1,000 IDPs and accordingly, its annual growth rate is 7%, (according to Al Ayam daily, 1st November 2000). This urbanization was not accompanied by positive change in the economy e.g. industrial sector makes only 15% to the GNP.

Migration and displacement lie in a continuum. However a distinction between the spatial and socio-economic connotation should be made. “For the displacement, the movement from one area to another is characterized by dispossession of the displaced of their basic objects, values, norms and means of subsistence on which they formerly used to survive and are central
to their identity and existence (El Bathani 1997). One could say that displacement is traumatic, painful, causes hopelessness and helplessness while migration is more or less prepared, hopeful and full of wishful thinking for the better. Sudan has the highest record for IDPs worldwide. Mortality rate among children is 115 per 1000 live birth in the North and 180 per 1000 in the South. There is an increase in child mortality rate from 145 to 200 per 1000. Malnutrition among children is 10.5% in the north and 43% in the south.

The structural causes of the vicious circle of civil war, displacement, destitution are mainly poor and unjust governance. The displacement mainly caused by the ongoing civil war and the pattern of repeated drought manifested in famine that resulted in effecting rural urban exodus. Yet the rural urban exodus had been exacerbated by macroeconomic policies (liberalization, privatization and lift of subsidies from basic services) and political instability, poor programming and lack of accountability. This has lead to a state of absolute poverty expressed in lack of common basic needs, food, shelters, clothing, education etc.

The rapid growth of the urban population in the last two decades of the twentieth century, rural urban migration, the war and the collapse of the peasant farming economy in the Sudan. Consequently famines led to the emergence of the slum settlements in which inhabitants often live under appalling poverty due to low incomes and the lack of income generating activities. Within that situation of the urban poor, in particular IDPs, challenges were to address poor access to social infrastructure (education, health, water etc.) and basic skills necessary for acquiring capital and income.
NGOs are active since mid eighties in a very hostile policy environment with many government restrictions on movement and security related problems that hinder access to the needy. NGO programs focus is on emergency relief to development interchangeably but mainly on emergency operations. Such an operation was focused on IDPs camps, later squatters without considering the neighboring urban slums or host communities.

Many projects implemented by NGOs constitute a lifesaver and opens up new dimensions of social actions. Although most of NGO interventions are in the form of small scale projects and those tend to ameliorate poverty and teach new methods to enhance the degree of community participation and make government structures less illusive creating long term awareness of rights and responsibilities. Because of this long-term effect, the impact of interventions by NGOs could not always be gauged in terms of statistical indicators.

It is evident that interventions by NGOs and because of their size, could not hope to restructure or shape the labor market. However they are probably the only lifeline available to many of the poor and destitute in Sudan and the only means by which IDPs acquire the knowledge and awareness necessary for dealing in an urban setting.

While in early interventions, the satisfaction of basic need was the primary objective as the aim was to ensure the bare survival of the community and the individual. Most of the poor community has moved beyond this stage by time and due to NGOs interventions. That incomes have risen, new skills, jobs and awareness is itself the product of the success of those early interventions that paved the way for sustainable development and positive difference on the community livelihoods.
NGOs development work is distinct from that of the government. They make a wide range of actors. Categories of NGOs in Sudan vary in relation to institutionalization, themes, levels of operation and interventions with communities. The International NGOs had been working directly with IDPs communities. This work approach has changed in mid 1990s towards working with IDPs CBOs established and strengthened over time. The Sudanese national NGOs throughout these interventions by INGOs with displaced were rated as lacking capacity to address emergency challenges. Only very few ones (e.g. SRC, DAWA) were encouraged and supported by the government and the INGO sector. Many did not benefit from the wider base on NNGOs or significantly supported their capacities and involvement. Yet again NNGOs continued to suffer in:

- Human resource i.e. wider base of committed volunteers and knowledgeable professional cadre.
- Limited material resources, small size and limited scope of operations.
- The limited alliance and networking capacity to initiate and launch advocacy campaigns.

The approach therefore is more of a patron-client relationship between INGOs and NNGOs. The donor led dependency on international funding was the dominant approach. By time some were encouraged to build competence in saving and credit management, informal training, vocational training and income generation activities.

The shift from direct emergency and relief support towards enhancing peoples livelihood capacities, credit, skill upgrading etc. and the service infrastructure require efforts towards engaging government authorities
(localities) and working on IDPs citizenship rights. It also requires working towards creating enabling policy environment and rights based approaches.

5.4.3 NGOs Interventions in Wau Nur:

The CBOs capacity building and micro finance inputs provided by ITGD and ACORD are highly valued. Their role was mainly in income sustenance and organizing communities and women to interact with other support organizations. The NGOS devoted considerable effort to develop the skills of IDPS and their knowledge by training and literacy classes specially the youth and the women. Despite the low enrollment (50%) and the high drop out the only one school in the camp. Significant NGOs intervention in Wau Nur (Table 5.4) started since 1992. Key interventions were by ITDG

Table (5.4): INOGs Interventions in Wau Nur (Kassala):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of NGO</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Type of intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ITDG</td>
<td>Women empowerment contributes to poverty alleviation.</td>
<td>- Capacity building, Micro finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Income generating activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Introduction of technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ockenden International</td>
<td>Aim to encourage &amp; help people affected by displacement to achieve self-reliance &amp; self-sufficiency</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building capacity of CBOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>To address immediate emergency relief needs &amp; lay foundations for longer</td>
<td>Shelter, Sanitation &amp; water. Health education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
term recovery for conflict & disaster

| 4 | ACORD | To reduce poverty & marginalizing & exclusion of poor communities. | Micro finance (credit & training). Food security, Capacity building. |

| 5 | Goal | To provide emergency health & sanitation assistance to the affected population | Emergency health care & sanitation, Training of volunteers on health awareness. Provision of shelter package. |

| 1 | Sudanese Red Crescent | Assist & relief the affected population. Introduce the health services through rural health center | Health (training course in PHC). |

are in the areas of CBOs capacity building and micro finance while ACORD interventions are microfinance. ITDG have also assisted displaced people in Wau Nur by empowering women through skill promotion and creation of job opportunities. The two above interventions have been supported recently by Ockenden International vocational training inputs.

**5.4.4: Impact of NGOs on Slums Livelihoods:**

There is a clear positive impact on people health and physical ability, yet a little difference was evident in relation to people knowledge and skills. Moreover in the intervention sites, there was evident positive impact on
people on people wellbeing, in particular access to education, health and housing. The host community on the other hand, indicated that they were not targeted by any of the NGOs interventions and feel that IDPs impacted negatively on their services infrastructure.

**5.4.4.1: Food and Nutrition:**

In Wau Nur food is the food basket is made of sorghum / millet, bread, lentils plus tea and coffee. 97% of all families purchased bread on daily basis. Lentils were a regular consumption item for 69% of the households and sorghum / millet for 19% of households. Mean consumption of milk of 2 pounds per day compares favorably with other urban areas. Similarly the mean egg consumption of 2.7 egg per day indicate a significant improvement in the quality of food particularly for children as milk and eggs are looked as children food items and are purchased when their kids in the family. There is a significant improvement in the quality of food as a result of past interventions, increasing awareness and better living conditions; however bulky foods are still dominant. It is evident that Wau Nur households have benefited from previous interventions. Lentils for example are not a traditional diet in rural Sudan. In the aftermath of the 1984/85 famine and the food crises in Kassala and the Red Sea and the Western Sudan between 1990/95 NGOs introduced lentils to combat protein deficiency and have since become a staple food item

**5.4.4.2: Health**

There is a health center that provides services in Wau Nur. Medical care is available to pregnant women through regular visits to the pregnancy
unit. Medical checks and regular visits to the pregnancy unit were reported in the case of 95.9% of women. However 4.1% attempt no such medical consultation. Similarly 92% of all pregnant women were vaccinated against tetanus and only 8% were not so immunized. Delivery by a trained midwife accounted for 94% of all women. However in 6% of the cases the services of a midwife were not used. Of these 6% half had delivery in the hospital. In the remaining cases, a midwife was not available. Most patient use the public transport as is the case in 56.3% of the patients or walk to the health center, clinic or hospital. The quality of health services is generally thought to be low. Only 11% described it as good. The majority or 72.6% said the quality of health service is fair and 16.4% stated the quality of health service they get as bad.

There are various reasons for the low quality of health service. The main reason is the lack of medical supplies. The non-availability of technical cadres and equipment account each for 12.5%. The community has a more positive perception of its role in the building and equipping of clinics: 44.4% were willing to provide financial support, 33.3% would contribute labor and 22.2% were to share in the fees. However the main stakeholders in the construction of clinics and the provision of medical equipment and facilities are Ministry of Health (70%), NGOs (20%) and the locality the contribution of which is limited to 10%. There is no health center or dispensary in Atla Berra and they have to travel a distance to access such services. Given low incomes that restrict their access many rely on traditional medicines and treatment.

5.4.4.3: Education:
Wau Nur has a primary school for boys and girls. Illiterates were found to be 28.3% of the respondents. Those with basic education represented 36.7% while those with Khalwa, secondary and university schooling represented 5%, 28.3% and 1.7%. This reflects increased awareness, financial ability of the households while maintaining better future for young generations.

There are no primary or secondary school in Atla Berra. The population is mostly young and illiterates. Those with basic education make 40% of the population. Illiterates and those without formal or khalwa Quran education make 45.9% of the population. University education does not exceed 0.9%. The young population dominated by single men and women who make up 70.8% of the population. Major reasons for high rates of dropout in addition to distant school locations are high school fees that accounts for 73% of school leavers, customs and traditions account for 4.8% while 6.3% leave school because of early marriage. A significant 11.1% were unwilling to go to school because of cultural or other factors and only 1.6% cited indifference or carelessness as the reason for leaving school. It must be noted that dropout rates are often a consequence of low incomes and the need to make use of child labor in order to eke out a living. Income and awareness are the primary determinants of school attendance and the quality of life

5.4.4.4: Natural capital:
The land was squatter before the attack on Kassala and a process of land demarcation was stopped. This was attributed to the fact that the rebel entered Kassala through Wau Nur and attacked the military area. The State cabinet was changed. Lobbies with a state minister who was a southerner started and an agreement reached to allocate land but the cabinet was not pro
the idea of allotting same area as becoming very valuable resource for the state. They proposed another site. They then contacted the Presidency through a community committee lobbying with federal ministers from the South. The president issued a presidential decree to have Wau Nur as a residential area. The state cabinet was reluctant to implement the decision for a year. The cabinet was again changed and a new southern minister succeeded to push within the state cabinet (2002) and demarcation started again. Now they have a most valuable, legal land asset. Processes of land market, rents are becoming an important income source.

5.4.4.5: Financial capital:

Livelihoods of most poor people in the Wau Nur (mainly) ITDG project area, especially vulnerable and marginalized groups are depending on informal sector and tools, equipment and technologies of small-scale production. About 40% of the economically active population is self-employed either in formal or informal sector, while 38% are working in small businesses that employ less than 10 employees. The remainders are working in medium (11-25 employees) or large (greater than 25 employees) enterprises usually in the formal sector. The mean for economically active population is 1.7 for boys and 1.00 for girls. The average family earns an income considerably above the minimum wage. The mean income at Wau Nur and among the poor in Kassala is estimated to be SD26889.2 slightly more than $100 per month.

Formal income earned averages SD25664.8 compared to the minimum wage of SD7500 per month in the public sector and SD 11300 with allowances. Informal sector employment generates an average income of SD21243 in Kassala and Wau Nour. Contributions by the church are
small estimated to equal SD 3000. Relatives contribute on average SD 15000. Only 1.97 % have received donations or remittances from family and relatives out of the total households' heads in Wau Nur. The labor market is the primary source of their incomes.

On average they earn an income that compares favorably to middle level government employees even if it seems low at first glance. Extreme poverty does not exist and so are restitutes. This is far from the situation in the mid 1990s when the only source of income was donations from NGOs and Zakat. However the slow meticulous interventions and work by NGOs have been fruitful and have created viable self-sustaining coping strategies.

Income expenditure analysis in Wau Nur shows that clothing and food is the main spending item. Average monthly expenditure on clothes is equal to SD 9428.57. Food is the next main item. Monthly expenditures on food amount to SD5500 almost double the spending on clothes. Water vendors come third accounting for SD4575 followed by health (SD 2602 per month) and transport (SD 2580). Consumption of energy is also limited. Average spending on fuel and is estimated at SD 71.3 per day.

53.3% of female’s population of Wau Nur work as street vendors or market women. Employment as teacher account for 13.3%, females soldiers 6.7%. Tea making accounts for 20% of female employment. Females form 57.5% of the population with males making the remainder 42.5%. In Atla Bara 15.8% of women are wives, sons 32.2%, daughters 27.7% while mothers and fathers make 4.6%. The nuclear family appears to be dominant. For examples other members of the household such as nephews and nieces, brothers and sisters in law, uncles and aunts make only 5.1% of the population. Fathers and mothers make only 4.6% of the population, which is
consistent with the composition of the population. Males’ main type of employment is also trade in the informal sector accounting for 44.4%. Soldier’s account for 22.2%, 7.4% work as laborers, 3.7% are farmers, tailors 3.7% and 1.9% in catering while 9.3% are employed in welding.

During last three years many families in Wau Nur have had access to loan from NGOs (ACORD, Ockenden International & ITDG) and in particular the women groups through their saving and lending organization also the saving and social development bank provided loans to the to the groups which linked to it. All women involved in informal sector mainly tea, food seller, petty traders, handcraft, nutrition, food processing & working in houses. ITDG food processing training is valued as an important skill building opportunity. Men are involved in construction of building as labour or petty trader or soldiers. On average they earn an income that compares favorably to middle level government employees even if it seems low at first glance. Extreme poverty does not exist and so there are no destitute in Wau Nur. This a far cry from the situation in the mid 1990s when the source of income was donations from NGOs and Zakat.

In Atla Bara young population are dominated by single men and women who make up 70.8 % of the population. The percent of married individuals barely exceed a quarter of the population (25.1%). Divorce and widows account for 1.5% and 2.6% respectively.

The principal occupation of most households is housewife and other economically unproductive job classifications. Employees make only 2%, drivers 0.2%, soldiers 3.1% and merchants 2.1%, laborers 4.3%. In all, these occupations make a total of 11.4% of the economically active population. Children and students constitute 16.2% and 36.1% respectively. Retirees and
unemployed make 17.3% of the population of Atla Bara. In the short run, the predicament of Atla Bara is clear enough and it would take a decade before there is improvement in their standard of living given their choice of high school enrolment.

5.4.4.6 Physical capital:

Water infra structure:

Water constitute an important item in household budget in poor urban settlement. Because of the prevalence of water born diseases, improvement in water quality and source is vital for any improvement in living standards. In Kassala and Wau Nur 64.9% of households have tap water and get water supplies through a pipeline. Hand pumps account for 11.7% of water supplies and water yards provide 23% of the consumption of water. In Atla Bara there is no water or drainage system & latrine. The water brought by donkey cart, on barrel cost 1500 –3000 More than one third of the population (34.5%) has to fetch water or purchase it from water vendors.

Housing and Shelter:

In Wau Nur the majority are homeowners (76.3%). Rent account for 18.4% of house occupancy. 5.3% live in houses given to them for free. 60% of homeowners have been allotted land by the government. Purchased land account for 20% of home ownership. The remaining 20% have received house plots as a gift or a donation. Concerning the housing more than 80% of the families constructed their houses from permanent materials (mainly mud) with poor sanitation.
The community contributes labor to environmental campaigns (93.9%) and supervisory duties (6.1%). In Wau Nur environmental campaigns have helped maintain a healthy environment, 44.3% have participated in environmental improvement campaigns. In Wau Nur CBOs are the main organizers of environmental campaigns and account for 41.1% of all campaigns. Both the community and NGOs organized 6.9% each of the campaigns. The participation of members of households whose head took part is considerable amounting to 67% of all household members. Access to Wau Nur camp during rainy season is difficult and no direct transport services to area. During last two year no of the household have electricity from private generators and about the same figure have access to energy as a result of NGOs (ITDG) interventions.

5.4.47 Social capital:

Slums that have had a significant contribution by NGOs generally have CBOs where as those camps that did not experience interventions by NGOs lack such organizations. In Kassala Wau Nur which saw extensive interventions in the field of health, sanitation and education and CBOs. In Kassala, there are two formally registered CBOs: Wau Nur Development Association, Women development committee and Church youth association. In addition there are tribal organizations. The Nuba have the Katla Association. The Dinka and the Equatorians all have their own associations. Wau Nur has active engagement with the government. There is a popular committee at the camp with 15-17 members, which is the lowest rung in the local government system. Every tribe has its own Sultan. At the camp there is a traditional court that looks into family and personal affairs but not in criminal cases. All the sultans are represented in this court.
NGOs provided support for these CBOs and provided the basic service such as health, education. The government mostly provides water. In Contrast Atla Bara there are no CBOs and consequently it lacks these services.

NGOs shouldered whole responsibility for projects working parallel to the government and underestimated the role of CBOs. The research did not take for granted the presumption that NGOs help in the development of countries. Wau Nur a site of NGO intervention has registered CBOs providing a number of services none of which exists in Atla Bara. This led to better coping mechanism rather than sustainable.

Intervention led to the development of social capital and to better organizational. The allocation of land to Wau Nur itself was made by a presidential decree which abrogated the decision of governor Kassala to move Wau Nur from this area which was originally demarcated as a first class quarter of Kassala town. This was the product of advocacy work by Wau Nur residents.

The building of social capital began with user committees in the emergency phase. These interventions built the ground for the creation of a bargaining power. The new CBOs also drew on historical and cultural social institutions like the nafir, kinship groups (collective labor). The women daily calendar reveals interest and enthusiasm in attending training courses. Unlike men, women are better organized in CBOS and shoulder both household and community functions.

5.5 Limited Impact on the Slums
The findings point to limited impact of NGOs with regard to long-term sustainability for the Sudan. Impact of NGOs is evident in Wau Nur for example houses are made from permanent materials compared to thatched huts in Atla Bara. With regard to water sources most of Wau Nur has piped water. There is none in Atla Bara and water has to be fetched from some distance.

**Water**

Access to water from the main water source is free in both sites. However, it is evident that water vending is common in both but particularly in Wau Nur where there is better access to income source; the majority does not fetch water and purchase it from vendors, i.e., 65.5% as compared to 42.9% in Atla Bara.

**House Type**

Both observation and figures confirm that the intervention sites have better housing in terms of construction material (Table 5.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Atla Bara</th>
<th>Wau Nur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mud Bricks</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straw / tents</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both types</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey 2006
Garbage Collection:
Wau Nur use trucks for the collection of garbage and has frequent public health and cleaning campaigns.

Immunization:

Table 5.6- % children immunization status by community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Atla Bara</th>
<th>Wau Nur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Immunized</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Immunization</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Immunization</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey 2006

Children immunization is higher in Wau Nur than in Atla Bara, due to NGOs interventions. there was also higher percentage of pregnant women visiting health units / centers in Wau Nur compared to Atla Barra.
5.6: Lessons learnt and Future Challenges:

The main drawback of NGOs interventions were the sectoral, sporadic nature of their interventions. NGOs focused on vulnerability and treated them sectorally rather than within a holistic approach. INGOs fall short when addressing IDP full citizenship rights. The main weaknesses are the neglect and the underestimation of the capabilities of own civil society. The work of NGOs with CBOs suffers from a patron client approach. CBOs are expected to do perform the mandate of NGOs since these created them. The contribution of NGOs is in the areas of creating the preconditions for survival and satisfaction of basic human needs. This in turn led to better diet, higher school enrolment and better health condition and eventually to better income and new survival strategies. Neglect of host community contributes to a latent conflict with IDPs, deficiency and tension due to lack of emphasis on host community. However this did not mean that there are no terms of trade between the two communities. IDPs as compared to host community
are in better situation. The majority of the youth is semi urbanized and is unlikely to return. There is a likelihood that a remittance economy will develop. There is a need for a study of this. IDPs with a growing market for their skills are unlikely to leave as in Kassala.

The main findings therefore are mainly that the strong belief among poor people and the NGOs supporting them that investment in people organizations and institutions outweigh in importance the service provision strategy. It is also clear that suffering from social exclusion, poverty and powerlessness is directly linked with poor/autocratic governance structures that is reflected in denial to service infrastructure, denial of cultural and full citizenship rights. Issues of legislations, laws, e.t. and access to resources e.g. land and job opportunities were not addressed as seriously livelihoods policy related options.

Although there were instances and institutions where people start to raise voice, e.g. harassment, relocation of settlements, land acquisition criteria etc but support organizations was far behind to help people articulate interests in advocacy campaigns. INGOs over estimated their role in shouldering the whole challenge while the government structures at local and State and National levels, showing limited commitment, the result was isolated sporadic activities, resulting in very limited benefits to a few of the community.

The wide range of community needs was generally addressed in isolated manner, leading to a high degree of sectionalism without a common vision or a coordinated strategy to make a sound sustainable difference in people livelihood. Such a case educates us about a need for sound partnership involving government and civil society organizations and a need for
sustainable livelihoods methodology. Knowing that the IDPs have no asset base, and the interventions in Kassala for a decade focusing on emergency response, the assets building (land, household furniture, etc) were only recent and fragmented in nature. Linking policy and household concerns within INGOs interventions is demanded and increased community participation require a prior strategy to involve people own organizations. This institutional arrangement is a pre-requisite for resource allocation and policy change claims. This depicts explicitly the political dimension for sustainable livelihood.

The case tells that, even within emergency situations, response to pressing needs without better holistic understanding of the policy and institutional environment strategy, the anticipated change in people livelihood cannot be realized. The IDP case indicates a number of interrelated issues: power relations, local governance and public service delivery, the socio-cultural aspect (gender, age, ethnicity, religion etc). There are important factors that relates directly to operational laws (formal/customary), access to markets and job opportunities, and access to land (for agriculture or settlement plots). The fact that power structures at community level are influenced or sometimes manipulated by upper level political and power structures, degraded mush of people capacity to access resources and turn affecting-their livelihood systems. In brief democratization and rule of law should become the major incentive for voluntary repatriation. The fact remains that much of the IDP communities are now either fully or semi urbanized requires a strategy that call for idening of the livelihood int in both urban and rural settings.
CHAPTER SIX

CIVIL SOCIETY MODALITIES
AND DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT

This chapter focuses on some cases and experiences of civil society and international support organization. It focuses mainly on reviewing of performance and capacity issues as well as attempts to develop workable modalities of civil society and local state structures.

6.1: Overview on Performance of Sudanese CSO:

The historical experience of Sudanese civil society reveals that almost all sustained social service infrastructure were initiated by people self-help groups and popular CBOs since the 1940s. Local communities' initiatives were step-by-step, planned and executed. The pattern of projects was mainly water, educational and health services at neighborhood or village level. In case of services, the local community in simple defined as people who share a common residency area and hence share the service facility, therefore local popular organizations at village (rural) or neighborhood (urban) e.g. school parents' councils, water committees and health service committees were common in Sudan.

6.1.1: CBOs General Assessment:

Investigations research and close participatory assessment exercises revealed many strengths and weaknesses of CBOs.
Table (6.1): (SWOT) Analysis of CBOs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of officially registered and recognized village development committees.</td>
<td>• Weak funding for projects. • No existence of a central body or a union for coordination and joint work across village structures. • Disperse areas and lack of communication means between villages. • Some village training that has been conducted</td>
<td>• Expected peace agreement and expected of local and international funding for poverty reduction and development in the area. • The agreement on the central body establishment will strengthen village development</td>
<td>• Recurrent drought • War. • Displacement • Instability of government policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Varying levels of organizational structures / setup and effectiveness for those committees.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Existing revolving funds in some of the villages.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Training that has been conducted</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
for most of these committees in project cycle management.

- Coordination between government, project and beneficiaries.
- Ability of the beneficiaries in priority setting.
- Ability of the leadership to mobilize and activate participation.
- Availability of qualified community development leaderships at the level of the villages.
- Strong linkages development committees have not yet developed constitutions.
- Low level of awareness about voluntary community work.
- Local traditions and norms constrain women participation.
- Inadequacy of training and managerial skills.
- Some village lack cadre with minimum committees, flow and access to information and fund raising efforts.
- Potential natural (sea and land) available for tapping within the area.
- National projects including the currently implanted Haya, Atbara asphalt road will generate employment in the area.
between project management and beneficiaries.

- Participation of women cadre in the leadership of the project.
- Weakness in the flow of information between the top (leadership) and grass root in some cases.
- No permanent space for committees.
- Weak fund raising capacity.
- Concentration of decision powers of the committees in the hands of few.

- Technical management capacities.

- Existence of oil export facilities in the area contributes to service provision in these areas.
- New mineral resource discoveries are also expected to improve employment opportunities.
6.1.2 Capacity Building: A Strategic Need

Capacity building is generally the development of the potentialities of an organization to improve its performance. Organizational building, on the other hand, is a learning process directed towards improvement of the whole organization. Here the organization is defined as (set of objectives) within a certain (environment) to be achieved through certain resources (human, physical, financial, etc). Furthermore, effective organizations have a reasonable degree of strategic competence to realize their well defined objectives. They should have own mission (reason of existence) and vision (long term objectives). Moreover, efficient management process within the organization is a pre-requisite for its effectiveness. Planning, budgeting, monitoring and assessment systems have to be sound and linked to the organization objectives and activities.

Above weaknesses reflects part of the capacity needs of CBOs:

1. Participatory Program Planning:
2. situation analysis
3. problem/need and priority setting
4. objective setting and project design
5. action and implementation planning
6. Planning for M&E
7. M&E action plans
8. Exit strategies and sustainability
9. impact reviews
10. Budgeting and Financial management
11. CBO organizational and management
12. Local trainers base (TOT)
13. Community extension and technical training: PHC; nutrition; literacy; community facilitation and animation

6.2: A Case from an Urban Context

6.2.1 An Overview of Context
This account concentrates on outcome from participants of CBOs. The participants of the participatory planning workshop came up with the main signs of poverty in Kassala, as follows:
1. Many households have one poor meal a day.
2. Situation of children (torn clothes; malnutrition, not at schools).
3. Children labour (observation in Kassala markets).
4. Ignorance: manifested in illiteracy; perceptions to importance productive work and attitudes towards education and women...etc.
5. Harmful traditional practices e.g. FGM, the economic roles of livestock being just a social prestige.
6. Population mobility e.g. displacement, rural-urban migration.
7. Deterioration of service; health; education, water.
8. Poor skills i.e. Low productivity.
9. Unemployment and lack of job opportunities.
10. streetism, especially among children (boys & sister)
12. Weak social capital i.e. civil society organizations e.g. unions, societies; clubs, associations, CBOs...etc.
13. Dependency of Kassala state on central support and over burden by expenditures on security and local governance structures.
Priority setting of major causes of poverty in Kassala state according to the participatory planning workshop, Participants:

Voters
1. Governance system and government policies 12
2. Poor service infrastructure 6
3. Poor income sources and job opportunities 5
4. People customs and traditional 2
5. Weak capacities of society organizations 1
6. Natural environment drought...Etc. 0

There was an interesting discussion, led by the voter for the weak society. His argument was that he fully agrees with the role of governance and government policies as a major case of poverty. But that might not happen if people organizations and popular movements were strong enough to influence governance and policies. On the other hand, the negative role of man-male discoveries i.e. wars, misuse of resources outweigh the negative effects of drought. Table (6.2) details the root causes of poverty in Kassala State and indicated some strategies to address them.

Table (6.2) : Root Causes of Poverty in Kassala State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Problem</th>
<th>Root Causes</th>
<th>Main Strategies proposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)Limited job opportunities</td>
<td>1)Limited skill training.</td>
<td>1)Increased access to skills training.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2)Limited capital for staff employment.</td>
<td>2)Credit and saving projects.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3)High rates of school dropout.</td>
<td>3) Encourage children education and review education policies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4) Education concentrate on</td>
<td>systems, especially technical</td>
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<tr>
<td>academics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) High illiteracy rates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Limited exposure to other experience.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7) Poor man feeding opportunities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>education and girl education.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Gender awareness and opening market chances for women.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Weak base of civil society organization</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Limited awareness about need for organizations.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Limited management and organizational capacity of existing organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Weak capacity and systems of effective accountability, institutional and transparency practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Poor representation of women.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5) The discouraging laws and administrative practices operational are people voluntary organizations.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Encouragement of democratic functioning of people and community organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Coordination, networking and encouragement of lobby groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Systematic practical training in organization and management of grass-roots organizations.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Encourage and support own women organizations and assure representation and influence in community organization.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on civil society Organizations and role in Development.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Deteriorating Service Infrastructure.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Government withdrawal of support to services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Commercialization and cost effectiveness policies. (SAP, Privatization, self-reliance Policies for states, etc..</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Displacement and rural-urban Migration and pressures on Limited capacity of towns.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Dominance of relief mentality And dependency or governments and INGOs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Research on SAP and social Impact of privatization/commercialization of services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Priority setting of state expenditure e.g. services vs security and The burden of local administration And federal governance system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Address rural people problems Casing migration nd displacement e.g Decaying livelihood systems (Agro-pastoralism); instability due To civil war, etc….</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Low awareness and people Traditional and customs</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Tribalism and closed societies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Lack of awareness about need And value of education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Gender awareness and development work with both women and Men.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Illiteracy rates are very high.</td>
<td>2) Used of various awarenesss and Extension service possibilities At village llevel (VDC); local Extension cadre, mass media (radio) And using local langugel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Historical role of civil native Administration leadership Discouraging education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) The determination on resource Base land water resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) The society (men &amp; women) View on women and women Exclusion from society life.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) The language barrier attributin To closed society lacking exposure and interaction with other social groups, particularly women.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 5) Governance system and Policies. | 1) Resources directed towards Non-development purposes. |
| 2) Boarder instability and Related boarder trade. | 2) Development programmes gain Priority in government expenditure |
| 3) Top-down decision-making And limited people participation in governance and policy Issues. | 2) Boarder relations be built on People and civil organizations Interaction rather than governments Policies. |
| 4) People lack awareness about Constitutional rights. | 3) Capacity building of civil societyu Organizations and support to lobby For rights and participation in Policy issues. |
| 5) Civil society organization Suffers from disencouraging And curtailing laws, policies And administrative decision. | 4) Environmental awareness and Alternative energy options to Reduce burden over forest Resources. |
| 6) Lack of environmental Awareness mong policy Makers contributing to Mal-management and misuse Of resources. | |

### 6.2.7; Roles and Status of Local Structures

Table (6.3) shed light on the local CBOs in Kassala Town. Local structures available and working with Kassala programme could be classified into:

1- Community activists at the previously legally established four CBOs, (1995) and a recently established office in Khatmia community.
2- Newly emerging women groups as informal saving and credit women groups, known generally as saving & credit committees “SCCs” by ACORD staff. While Wau Nur was established with support of ITDG, Quarter (8) group was encouraged and supported by ACORD.

3- NGO- like CBOs, formed to serve the interest of special groups. These are legal formal organizations that have wider base of membership all over Kassala State. This category includes the Disabled People's Organization, (DPOs) and the Women Development Society (WDS). The latter were established with the support of ITDG to organize women who benefited from the food processing training.

Most of these organizations, which suffer from a number of weaknesses, however, have strong constituencies and a high degree of volunteerism and they were perceived as playing a positive role within the surveyed communities. The increase outreach with decreased over head costs were reported, however, there were difficulties due to the need for the guarantees deposit and markup; the cheque for guarantees; wide geographical coverage over quarters, neighborhoods and the needed almost daily personal responsibility for delays and default.

214-217 - Table 6.3
On the other hand, the other organizations, labeled as modern ones, have their own niche in terms of strengths, and they still suffer from a number of weaknesses. These include the Wau Nur, Quarter 8 etc.

Table (6.4) Strength and Weakness of Modern Women CBOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Gender/women organization.</td>
<td>1- Not registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Members and leaders from within women groups of same community.</td>
<td>2- No by-law or constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Men support to the women activities and groups in the other community.</td>
<td>3- No activity beside credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- Exposure to <em>ACORD</em> experience in credit policy, procedures and follow-up systems</td>
<td>4- Have no control over credit policy or procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5- Lack of interaction with other organizations in Kassala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6- Limited contact with <em>ACORD</em> staff or other volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7- Lack of basic training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8- Accountability system is lacking to members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wau Nur is an example of a potential, viable women organization. The membership increased from 30 to 60 in 2001. The weekly Sanduk
meeting is attractive and many women would like to join it, but the membership is not open for all. The restriction of being trained in a business is a real problem. That is due to being conceived by the women development society as their group is members of the mother organization. On the other hand, the Wau Nur women organization is trying to have its own identity, open up for other members and would like to become an independent organization. They have interesting activities beyond their vicinity: including exhibition of women products; independent meetings with Intermediate Technology Group to improve marketing; access the Zakat chamber for goods but rate it as a failure exercise. They extend credit to men with guarantees from the women organization and they contribute financially to community work e.g. a school class building.

On the other hand, Wau Nur Women organization has serious problems; handicapping women get together and training. They have no place and use the church for meetings. They need training and system support to become capable for growth. Moreover, they have no bank account leading to limitations in guarantees for members, insecurity of funds (with members). They also had no constitution coping regulations and were confused whether to register as an independent organization or continue as a remote group within Kassala Women Society Organization.

6.2.3: NGO- Like CBOs: DPOs & WDS:-

The table also shows the status of Disabled Peoples Organizations (DPOs) and Women Development Society (WDS). These organizations have even more of an advanced advantage in terms of vision, strategic competencies,
systems and procedures and even the type and approach of community services.

Values and Purposes:-

The DPOs and Women Development Society (WDS) have clear purposes and values stipulated in their constitutions. Empowering DPOs by the first and women by the latter are values that justify their recognition by their members. The CBOs constitutions were forms, filled by ACORD staff and office of MS welfare, the women groups (Wau Nur and Beja through informal but have clear vision to support their constituency).

Strategic competence:-

Both DPOs and WDS started to develop their own strategic plans. This move, to think strategically; is essential to adapt to the changing environment and come up with realistic, flexible and operational plans. Saving and credit groups have started to think strategically as potential women organizations.

Identity:

Autonomous organizations are few e.g. DPOs and The Women Development Society. Most are influenced by ACORD (idea /functioning) most CBOs /SCCs. Membership was based on all community, credit – oriented i.e. clients groups, thus excluding those who were not benefiting or interested to benefit from credit and more seriously individual apathetic due to issues related to collateral (cheque ...Etc). It is difficult to identify a common objective – rather based on individual objective to be channeled.
Leadership:--

The link with constituency is identification and processing of applications for credit and further follow-up credit installment repayments, collection, disbursement and reporting. Activists perceive themselves as belonging to ACORD sub-office and ACORD delegates within the community - same perception applies for their constituencies whose members try to avoid them for fear of follow up of credit repayments. Even not the right term, except in few cases e.g. (quarter) perceive themselves as group leaders.

Leaders are accountable to ACORD, which control their incentives, without any social accountability system. There are well-defined responsibilities within the credit policy, procedures as facilitators to ACORD volunteers/staff i.e. loan officers. Verbal communication predominates and written reporting is sometimes available in brief notes

Popular committees (PCs) dominated selection of leaders. Accountability-poor/ how to be improved/ and lacking, planning and conceptual framework, capacity to do it. Credit is a need for poor individuals within a context of other essential community needs.

The poor lack ownership of resources. The crucial questions are how to motivate (loan collectors) (loan activists) without creating dependency on ACORD and how financial sustainability and institutional development coexist without contradiction?

External capacity:

Social institutions, associations and networks include popular neighborhood committees, Women Sandouks and Women get-together on coffee gatherings and revolving products. etc. Solidarity and social
networks are not clearly functioning even when default clients are subject to court cases. Recognition by community members is rudimentary, people recognition for groups e.g. Wau Nur establishes to the extent of asking them to contribute to class’s construction. Difficult to trace concern or thinking about community problems; needs, other than credit, hence difficult to identify actions related to lobbying for community concerns, beyond credit. There is also learning from neighboring experiences (is very limited, citing a case of an individual (Wau Nur – women union) who attended a workshop with Soriba women society. Exchanges within a sub-office are completely lacking.

Programme and resource base:-

The diversified programme components planned and executed by DPOs, matches with own members needs. Accordingly they gain high recognition of DPs. The broader base of donor organizations enhanced their capacity to respond to members needs. However, the dependency mentality did undermine their competence in relation to financial sustainability of programme activities. On the other hand, (WDS) is curtailed by the one-way programmed activity i.e. food processing training. Their own assessment was that the city is already saturated from trainees in this field, therefore serious to widen their scope and activity within other women empowerment strategies. Dependency on IT support is decreasing. At the same time, they have a good experience in own financing. The trials of cafeteria monthly subscriptions of member and the exhibitions did contribute significantly to cover the expense of the EC incomes from training in other Sudanese cities secured an income for trainers and covered at least 20% of the WDS
expenses. Financial autonomy, in all cases needs to be approached and practical strategies and control system however, still need to be strengthened

**Accountability systems:**

Accountability to members’ i.e. social accountability seems high within DPOs; Members have close presence and participation in planning, monitoring and evaluation. The social accountability within DPOs is practically pursued through annual general assembly to discuss plans elect EC and practice the right to say and be heard. Some leaders lost their positions due to this conduct and inefficient performance. Monthly gatherings to discuss issues and reports are usual. Besides, there is high degree of social interaction, social events and awareness symposiums...Etc facilitates members’ participation in running activities and consultation processes. The member’s share in decision-making is reasonably guaranteed through participatory planning practices and a transparent reasonable functioning of their lead bodies. Moreover, the systematic monitoring and evaluation extended by ADD, contributes significantly to financial accountability. On the other hand, WDS suffer from limited member’s participation in the general assembly, where the EC is elected. Even this now changed to 3 years term of office instead of an annual meeting. The women groups scattered in Kassala town have poor links with the EC. The relationship was based on need for training or food processing inputs e.g. ITDG.

**Leadership and staff:**

The WDS is directly run by the elected EC. The DPOs have clear division between leadership (guidance, policymaking, and supervision etc)
by the EC and the management and administration by salaried staff. Sometimes there are conflicts due to duplication of roles between leadership and the senior staff. This generally was resolved by get-together to share decision-making. Elected bodies cannot achieve stability and efficiency of program and activities only, according to a DPO leader. She added that a degree of professionalism is needed e.g. credit. The motivation system is bleak in the two organizations, especially for the EC members who argue that volunteering could be with time and effort but not to pay for transport breakfast, Etc.

Despite the financial management training, still the two organizations claim for control system and procedures. The lack of training in credit management systems, make them dependent on ACORD inputs in this field. Poor reporting hampers flow of information and undermine control system. Practical participation is still limited to few active members. While the majority of members participate in benefits, they were only consulted and perform the role of resource persons in planning and monitoring of programs. Participatory planning methods and PRA tools deemed necessary to strengthen members' participatory systems.

On the other hand, quite few i.e. lead executive committee members and key senior staff (the case of DPOs) dominates decision-making processes. They can easily meet and agree on important decisions. However, members opinion on programme activities e.g. credit policies are generally not taken into considerations. However, the ad-hoc meetings and social gatherings, help much to shape key decisions. Training in effective meetings and decision-making processes is important to address this weakness.
Both organizations suffer from premature financial management systems and procedures. Financial recording and reporting is an area, which require special attention. They lack technical support in systems, procedures and training in financial management. They believe in having democratic leadership through elected ECs. However, delegation of authorities is rarely practiced. While few are said to control power, some active members feel they are sometimes not consulted in decisions related to their activities. Team building is generally taken seriously by DPOs, where staff and elected members share decisions and follow up of executions. Democratic functions and participatory decision-making process require practical on job training. Fund raising capabilities are limited to low quality proposal writing. Attempts to mobilize locally available resources are generally poor. Member’s subscriptions not collected and human resource capabilities were not fully utilized. Issues of resource mobilization (material and immaterial) and the human resources e.g. singer, artists of DPOs are to be strategically addressed.

6.2.4: Major Problems of CBOs & SCOs

CBOs and SCOs suffer from a number of problems: Teamwork is difficult, due to the individualistic nature of credit and the quota system of volunteers; Difficulty in pure voluntary work i.e. at expense of own livelihood activities; Perceptions of community towards members as credit collectors; Work performed verbally, no meetings, no agenda or records; Member’s roles not defined. All doing the same activity e.g. clients identification, channel credit money and follow-up repayment and that CBOs have no focal point (place) to meet and community members suffer to contact them.
Despite that, the active members of CBOs played a crucial role in: linking ACORD sub-offices with clients; marketing of credit and cinderling outreach within neighborhoods; decrease the burden on ACORD staff in credit distribution, repayment and daily follow-up; increased outreach of credit to women and men clients.

Table (6.5) Status of DPOs and WDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>DPOs</th>
<th>WDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Nature of society</td>
<td>- Voluntary NGO of disabled persons forming a union of the blind, Deaf and Physically disabled organizations.</td>
<td>- A women NGO focusing on women trained in food processing with support of ITDG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Key Objective</td>
<td>- Integration of DPs in the society</td>
<td>- Improved socio-economic status of women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- constitutional arrangements</td>
<td>- Constitution- by-laws on finance etc.</td>
<td>-Constitution-decision by EC directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- Structure</td>
<td>- General Assembly – Elected Executive committee- specialized Committees and Admin Unit.</td>
<td>- General Assembly (Registered members); women groups at neighborhood level; elected Executive Committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The assumption was that it is difficult to sustain a project or activity without addressing the various factors affecting it. The analysis concentrated
on the PEST (political, economic, social and technical) factors related to sustaining credit.
1. Political Factors: insecurity and clients in stability; local leader’s political power and laws governing CBOs/NGOs
2. Economic: commercial projects prohibited for NGOs and inflation
3. Social: Beja culture curtaining women outdoor activities; gender in balances within CBOs; men saving groups is limited and high illiteracy rates.
4. Technical: poor technology in business options and technical know-how is mainly traditional.
5. Financial: capital size and sources and Islamic modes of finance may favor the rich
6. Organizational: civil society support, networks and motivated staff or volunteers for financial control and financial audit
7. Management: Self-management at different level grassroots, state NGO level and backup system at national and international level.
8. Ownership: Donor ownership of funds, monitoring and control; organizations owned by members including own resources and grant and control and manage own projects and decisions

6.3 Trials of Building a Tripartite Model

6.3.1 Gedarif: A multi-actors Community Development (CD) Node:

Gedarif state represents an important experiment featuring close collaborative work between an enlightened locality, international NGOs, and local intermediary NGOs (SDA and Water Association) in implementing projects benefiting the local communities. Local CBOs have implemented
several projects with donor support, such as the rest house of the women’s development centre, which is under the Ministry of Finance and was built with the support of ITDG.

The twin project with the Einthoven municipality has created one of the most successful waste disposal projects. CBOs are very active in Gedarif locality and are present in most villages. To coordinate their work, SDA has created an umbrella for the CBOs particularly those working in the areas of micro-credit, assistance to the handicapped and protection of legal rights of children in custody. Their task is to build on these achievements and to scale up their work. These local CBOs aim to implement larger development projects in water, health and sanitation and possibly in the construction of rural roads.

Service delivery to the rural areas could be enhanced by scaling up the activities of CBOs currently operating under the Sudan development association (SDA) umbrella and in collaboration with the locality and its Legislative Assembly. The Chairman of the Legislative Assembly has expressed strong support for Community Development as the type of development that they want.

An independent SWOT analysis conducted in eastern Sudan in relation to CBO capabilities, suggests a significant capacity for community-driven initiatives. The assessment addresses three important attributes of Sudanese community organizations:

1. The existence of conditions that drive their operations and create demand for their work, i.e. responding to the deterioration and increasing cost of basic services, and dysfunctional local government;
2. Proliferation of primary civic organizations, evolving horizontally (networks), and vertically (unions); and

3. Diversified moral and ideological values.

Box 1: Tri-partite Arrangement for Community Development

Sudan Development Association (SDA) had an experience with water projects in the River Nile State. Gurashap Village was not an uncommon case of villages suffer from access to safe drinking water although situated on the River Nile Bank, Abu Hamad Locality. They used to suffer from cases of abortion of pregnant women, drowning of girls, bilharzias and other water born diseases etc. SDA learnt the lesson that it is not just enough water but also safe access and safe hygiene. SDA model was a kind of Community Initiative Projects whereby there is a Public-Private Partnership. The Public dimension was both of civil society and local governance institutions. The civil society organizations in the case of Gurashap Water Project include: SDA (NNGO) as intermediate facilitating partner; Roots (Urban –Based Migrant Association concerned about own rural end development) and OXFAM Canada (a donor organization) and the Village Development Committee (VDC). The Government involvement was through the locality and the State Water Corporation. On the private sector side, there is Suga (a water Company). These partner organizations shared planning and execution of the project adopting specific individual tasks and shared roles. The latter were mainly planning, monitoring, review and shared decisions on issues related to project financing and management. Almost all partner organizations contributed to financing the project. Some e.g. State and locality contributed with material and in kind equipments: Tanks etc.
Taking the contributions we can indicate the following:

The locality contributed with water tank and basins and water pipe line between them of total value (US$ 21,154). The Gurashap Community contributes with local material sand, cement, gravel and unskilled labour, which value was (US$ 7,000). ROOTS, Khartoum-based Migrant Association, paid the costs incurred by the private Suga Company equating (US$ 7,808). SDA program of capacity building, facilitation and community work (US$ 5,000) in addition to fund secured from OXFAM Canada for other direct project costs (pipes, pumps etc) of US$ 20,000.

The approach was simple:

People defined a felt need Organized themselves with support of SDA
Starts to lobby and knock doors of authorities: Mahalia (locality) or State (Wilaya) Genuine start to mobilize own resources: material (e.g. bricks); labour (nafirs, unskilled labour etc) and possible financial resources (poor and rich people contributions). Engagement with VDC and ordinary people to discuss details on needs, gaps, future running of facility and the anticipated roles of community organizations including youth and women. Engagement with private and government technical institutions to finalize technical aspects with participation of people and acceptance of commitments of various partners: CBOs, NGOs, donors and government Establishment of management and monitoring structures on basis of partners involvement in decision making. SDA facilitation and capacity building program for the CBO coincided with the project execution.
6.4.2 Putting Relations into Action

Map all stakeholders and linkages and session two analyzed the situation of these stakeholders. These are presented below: Mapping of stakeholders in Tadamon Neighborhood:

The stakeholders operating at Tadamon neighborhood are the followings:

1. The locality- Government Authority
2. The Administrative Council- Government Authority
3. Popular Authority for Water (PAW)
4. Sudanese Development association (SDA- National NGO )
5. Popular Committee for Schools Rehabilitation and Teachers Training (PC for SR).
6. Azza Association (Azza Association- National NGO )
7. Women Development Organization (WDO)
8. Home Visitors (Activists)
9. Women Umbrella Organization (WAO) - a network of ROSCAs

The stakeholder analysis with regards to strength and weaknesses is given below:

Table (6.6) Analysis of Tri-partner Stakeholders: Government-CBOs and NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Weakness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>- Neighborhoods represented in the locality council</td>
<td>- lack of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provides room for community representatives to participate in community development</td>
<td>- ineffective laws of local governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- lack of updated statistical information on the IDPs population and locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Council</td>
<td>- Entertain people participation and representation</td>
<td>- Denied resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Handicapped by 2003 locality laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Authority for Water Resource Development</td>
<td>- Community focused which put all decisions under the control of the commissioner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- locality laws provide room for financial resource development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diversified development services extended.</td>
<td>- Lack of coordination with other organizations operational at community levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese Development Association</td>
<td>- Has a well developed strategy for capacity building program and reduction of school dropout.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Its program is linked with the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>- Dependence on external funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of coordination with other committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Committee for Schools rehabilitation and teachers training</td>
<td>- encouraging participation of beneficiaries in the development process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- stabilized external support</td>
<td>- Weak in promoting awareness among beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- training of teachers</td>
<td>- Lack of local fundraising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- lack of representation of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azza Association</td>
<td>- Utilization of advanced and updated curriculum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Stability and continuity of the program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of adequate facilities and resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inability to develop own premises to grantee future operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Development Organization</td>
<td>- Ability to raise nutrition awareness among poor households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Enabling women gain skills and access resources to operate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Enabled women to make use of locally available resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Poor marketing for inability to compete (quality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Repeat ion of training modules and lack of innovation and diversification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Poor quality produce and lack of protection to local produce (globalization)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home visitors</td>
<td>- Ability to communicate a great deal of health information to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inability to generate cadre to expand the work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of permanent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>households in IDPs areas</td>
<td>premises to run its activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ability to easily deal with women issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Umbrella Organization</td>
<td>- Target groups acquired skills and access resources to access IGAs.</td>
<td>- some difficulties in loan settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Member organization are registered and have legal identities</td>
<td>- Inadequate funding resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Linking member organizations with financial institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.3.3 Possibility of a More Workable Model:

To make it work, the following points should be taken seriously: issuing of legislations and law in support of civil society organizations and rewriting of the local government law of 2003 to support popular participation. There is also immediate need to strengthen and support the cooperation of formal and informal organizations and empowering the cadre under local governance to assume their roles and responsibilities.

IDPs and their representatives as well as poor neighborhoods dwellers require systematic training to well understand the local government, administrative councils and native administration laws to know their rights.
and limits. There is crucial need for open space for popular forces to be active participants in the local governance and attracting Attract foreign and local funding for projects implementation.

It is a prerequisite to develop an integrated development plan for the poor neighborhoods in which the locality, the Civil Society Organizations and concern partners collaborate and coordination with organization working with IDPs and periphery settlements in Urban Gedarif.

Involving targeted groups (IDPs and poor community members to identify and prioritize own problems and according to own needs and help building the capacities of the popular organizations and people representatives to be able define own needs. Also intensify the public, the community and NGOs and donors efforts to extend basic services to the needy communities including IDPs and peripheries of the urban areas could help the process of integration in the urban society.

There are inputs that are essential to assure a workable and sustained tri-partner model encompassing a number of activities: awareness education and training to the community leaders in the peripheral areas; facilitate and ease the collaboration of the civil society and the locality; activate the popular committees at community level to assume their roles and facilitate networks formulation of CBOs. Moreover, the model should rest on: a program for building the capacities of the local government apparatus and members of the CS to get engaged in joint planning and project design; a statistical record for community activities and variables and lunching of more workshops for mutual benefits and understanding among and between the locality and other stakeholders.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN AN URBAN_RURAL DIVIDE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter is based exclusively on field survey data and research findings of information generated from the two (urban and rural) communities of Kassala state chosen for the field survey. The Chapter covers two main parts: One giving an organizational profile on each of the rural and urban communities separately and the other comparing them along specific indicators selected in light of key research hypothesis and questions. The account tries to generate local leaders' opinion on the situation, their communities and future aspirations. People social capital and their organizational capacity and how they relate to government and other civil formal or external society organizations is the heart of this account. This part is supported by lengthy details of appendices including tables and graphs that illustrate more the situation.

7.1: Urban and Rural Organizational Profile:

7.1.1: The Rural Community of El Gash

Leadership Type, Rotation and Quality:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (7.1): Rural Community Leadership Rotation</th>
<th>Yes%</th>
<th>No%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Leadership rotation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- enough leadership time</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- frequent reelection of leadership</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Few leadership in the community</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Some /adequate # put forward for leadership</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The community leaders interviewed showed that there is however, limited trend of leadership rotation. 40% of respondents indicate that the leaders give enough time for their leadership roles, while 60% of respondents did not agree on that statement. Yes 100% feel there is frequent re-election of very few leaders and only 20% feel that there is adequate number of emerging leaders put forward for leadership tasks within the community. The figure () indicates that 40% of rural community leaders feel there is adequate leadership quality and 20 % see it as deficient. Fig (7.1) below shows leadership quality.

**Fig (7.1) leadership qualit**

![Pie chart showing leadership quality](image)

In a response to extent of participation of previous leaders, 60% feel there is no previous leader – indicating limited, rotation and 40% indicated some participation of previous leaders. Leadership, especially for the popular committees or service committees or development work comes from the various dominant groups, mainly ethnicity inclusiveness. While 80% indicated that women participation is 10% and the rest see it as complete
lack of participation in community organizations. Fig (7.2) shows high
degree of participation in organizations.

![Household degree of participation in organizations](image)

**Fig. 7.2 Degree of HH Participation in Org by Rural and Urban**

In all cases, women participation in these community organizations
was limited to few women being school teachers and generally, do not
belong to the community i.e. outsiders. In a nut shell women representation
or participation was nil by 100% exclusion from active community
organizations. There was huge disparity among respondents rating the
quality of leadership in terms of education ranging from deficient (20%);
adequate (40%), well (20%) and excellent (20%). However, the quality of
leadership in terms of vision was rated as adequate (40%); deficient (49%)
and good (20%). The quality of leadership in terms of skills to lobby for community interests and in terms of honesty one generally rated high. The leaders were generally seen as socially legitimate, and recognized by the authorities as, however, informal legal positions.

**Degree of participation**

In their rural villages there were emerging cooperatives shops, youth associations and the various committees for services e.g. health etc. People identified support organizations as a whole, then NGOs and lastly the local government authorities. Table (7.2) shows the organizations support to people in the community. The main contributors were NGOS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Organization</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community as a Whole</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organization leaders' meetings are usually carried out in school (seen as community centre,), in personal homes of the leaders which were mainly the tribal chiefs' houses. The participants in these meetings were 100% men. Women were totally excluded. The social status of men is crucial in problem solving due to wide respect by the communities, especially the tribal leaders. People over the last years were mobilized and organized in various meetings. The main issues were involving education;
drinking water and livelihood system i.e. farming, livestock etc. People meetings and social gatherings viewed by 60% that these meetings were successful to follow up some issues, especially services. People feel that agricultural production; provision of drinking water and establishment of primary schools, still need to be addressed. 80% indicated that there were no programmes addressing these problems. Other problems facing the community are the robbery, especially for livestock. Community participation in solving problems is dominated by men, especially the eldest and adults. Those who are unemployed have no role in solving problem as they are socially excluded. This situation applies to poor people and women who are voiceless. In all case, the only close government organizations to this rural community are the agricultural extension department technicians and education authority in the locality and the police station. Very few (8%) members and almost all non members know little about the organization tasks. However, the members proved high willingness to be confronted by the problems and rules from the organization. The majority then indicated that they know little about the rules of the organizations and some were subjected to application of rules.

Organizational Capacity

Group discussions on the organizations' capacities showed the capacity of their indigenous organizations.
## Table (7.3)  Capacity Assessment by Task

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Deficient</th>
<th>Adequate</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- carry out tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- supervise actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Financial records</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- respond to changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- develop plans or projects</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Learn / reflect</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- solve problems within organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- resolve conflicts with other organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- clearly defined process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mew petitions for membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formal ways for members to express demands</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- capacity to address members demands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Decision-making and consultation

The rural community suffers from other problems e.g. deficient and low frequently of meetings with community members (general meetings) or even the committee meetings. There are few important decisions and there was complete absence of prior dissemination of information before these decisions, there are of course informal dissuasions but on very ad hoc and hardly considered within the decision making process. It is difficult to tale
open position or ways of consultation that pave the way for such a position. Yet, some individuals within the community are generally perceived as opposition for the popular committee are generally attached to the rural organization i.e. service committees or popular committee to use their within capabilities, if any. Fig (7.3) compares urban and rural by mode of decision-making.

![Mode of decision taking by Urban & Rural community](image)

**Fig (7.3) Decision-making by group by rural and urban**

### 7.1.2 The Urban Community of Wau Nur: An Organizational Profile

**Organization Capacity**

In Wau Nur community there is the popular committee which is almost the government of the community and the Wau Nur development society. The latter is a voluntary modern organization. The forthcoming account compare
between the two organizations along a number of parameters, as revealed by the organizational profile score sheet survey. The community leaders indicate that there is change in the leadership and there is a possibility of re-electing the leaders of the two organizations. However, as far as the amount of time remaining in leadership is larger in the popular committee compared to the community development society. The latter has a workable election system and clear terms of reference stated in the constitution. The good quality of leadership within the popular committee is limited to a few (1 to 3) while people see this kind of leadership is many in the development society (more than six), Yet both organizations is said to put forward only a few who are ready to be leaders. The issues of potential leaders, is not taken forward by current people in leadership positions. Former leaders of both organizations are said to have some participation by former leaders. A striking is that the popular committee leaders tend to come from almost all the groups within the community, representing neighborhoods and in turn ethnic groups. On the other hand, the development committee leaders come from various groups within the community, but not necessarily an inclusion process. The latter is explained by need of activities and the democratic process of election within the organization, limited by the general assembly. Another main difference is the women representation in leadership which is 10% in the popular committee according to local act, while women representation in the development society is more than 25%. The latter is highly influence by the gender activities and support of international NGOs. The table (7.4) below compares the quality of leadership of the two organizations of Wau Nur community: the Development Committee (DC) and Popular Committee (PC). The main difference is the degree of honesty
and transparency which was rated as excellent in the development committee compared to good in the popular committee.

Table (7.4): Leadership Quality of DC and PC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>adequate</th>
<th>Deficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DC  PC</td>
<td>DC  PC</td>
<td>DC  PC</td>
<td>DC  PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/training</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic/vision</td>
<td></td>
<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills/professionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty/transparency</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table (7.4) above indicates the assessment of leaders of the community to own organizations. There is a tendency of critical assessment among the development society, compared to the popular committee members. The latter are highly politicized and show little tendency to criticize self. As far as the relationship with community, the popular committee witness occasional rivalries, while people rate the relationship of development committee leaders with their constituency as harmonious relations without major problems. Yet, legitimacy and recognition of the leaders of two organizations is generally accepted but the majority of community members as stated in group meetings.

Decision-making and consultation

The two organizations, when compared using some parameters of participation, the frequency of meetings were less in popular committees and greater in development society. The types of decisions taken over the last year showed a clear disparity between the two organizations. The most
important decisions taken by Wau Nur development society leaders are: 'Sawa Sawa' to be a branch in Wau Nur Development Society and the decision of water pipeline project for Wau Nur community. The popular committee, on the other hand, decided the sale of the community sorghum Quota (relief supply) said to be for use in the water project and the second important decision by them is 'stop prostitution'. In both cases. The responses of leaders' process of decision-making showed a disparity between the responses of the two organizations' leaders and the community members meetings. The responses of leaders showed a 'Yes' answer while community members indicated a big 'No' for the following statements: dissemination of information prior decisions; leaders give opportunity for informal discussions before taking decisions; usually have consultations with grass roots on community issues and decisions; wide spread debate, opposing opinions, transparent discussions; and dissemination of results.

**Degree of Participation**

In response to whether there is inclusiveness of meetings, the development society committee had indicated high activism with women and the poor and only moderate participation by youth. They even felt that the level of participation of women and the poor was more than earlier meetings while the youth participation remained the same. The popular committee leaders rated participation of women, youth and the poor as active and they were sharing with development committee's leaders the statement that the participation of women and the poor is increasing while that of youth remains the same. The community meetings, however, felt that poor people participation in meetings of popular committee was higher than that of development committee, mainly due to immediate gains or expectations.
about relief items. It was rated that the popular committee was highly representative to its community members, the development committee, on the other hand, was seen as somewhat representative. The later was labeled as dominated by 'elitism' and community 'activist' linked with INGOs and donor organizations.

The community meeting estimated the percentage of population of Wau Nur who thought that their interests were represented by each of the organization by 51% and 75% for the popular committee and development committee respectively. Strikingly, the leaders and community members agreed that prosperous families were active in attending meetings of popular committee compared to little or none participation in the meetings of the development society. The prosperous families were seen as a resource to count on, sympathetic and supportive to the popular committee, but were seen as indifferent to the development society and generally demonstrated no interest. The organizational culture of the two organizations did not show significant difference. Both viewed that the majority of their members know the procedures, norms and tasks of the organization. They also realized that the organization was willing to confront damaging behavior on the part of its members. They even saw the possibility of applying rules in case of serious cases. The organizational records of both did not give evidence of all the above regarding organizational culture. People and leaders were apathetic in attending meetings, many avoid some tasks and there were rumors of corruption, particularly in popular committees, yet, there were neither confrontations nor application of penalties.
Organizational Capacity

As far as the organizational capacity and sustainability own self assessment of leaders for their organizations, there is clear tendency among popular committee leaders to rate themselves as excellent along various indicators. As an example when asked about whether they have specific plans, the answer is yes, but when asking for a document or even 'verbal summary' you find nothing. On the other hand, you find a degree of self criticism, among the development society leaders. While the popular committee leaders see it as self imaging, the development committees' members see the opportunities for capacity building. The table (7.5) below using specific indicators sums up some self assessment of capacity by organization.

The collective action and formulation of demands as seen by the leaders is that they have clearly defined process of identifying community needs and priorities of the members. The difference is clear as popular committees depend on general consensus or 'Ijmaa Sakkoti' i.e. silent consensus in general meetings (informal) gathering not necessarily Quorum and there is ad-hoc discussions. On the contrary, the development society meetings used modern approaches and techniques of Participatory Rural appraisal (PRA) for community needs identification. While the community put some petition on the popular committee, none was reported by the development committee. While processes are informal in the popular committee, they are more or less formal in the development committee. People generally perceive the popular committee as a government of the community, yet, there is consensus among people that the two organizations promote their demands.
Table (7.5): Capacity Assessment of DC and PC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>adequate</th>
<th>Deficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to carry out tasks</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision capacity</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond to changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have specific plans</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning from experience</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve problems or conflicts within org.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve conflicts with other org</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2 Rural and Urban Divergence: A Comparative Analysis

7.2.1 Housing Characteristics

The following account tries to draw a picture and compare the rural and urban housing characteristic along a number of parameters: type of house; material of construction of roof and floor construction material; number of steeping rooms; type of sanitary services; water sources; garbage disposal services and the type of electrification and lightening. Table (7.6) details the description of settlement by rural and urban. The data indicates the significance of extended settlements in rural area compared to the urban community.
It also explains better the problem of sanitation especially in the urban community where almost 30% has no latrines, despite the fact that almost latrines are lacking in rural community (90%) but the vast area does not indicate a major problem of sanitation.

Data also shows clearly the sources of water indicating the public well as main source of water in rural areas (70%) and tap is a main source (90%) for the urban community. The piped water source is insignificant in both communities (12%) in each. Garbage collection is mainly burning or burying in both rural sides are indifferent whether they throw at or do nothing to it. Throwing garbage is normal behavior (42%) in rural areas while 30% urban respondents indicate the public garbage services. There is also significance of gas and candles as main sources of light and energy in both rural (80%) and urban (50%) communities' private electricity generator (24%) is services important sources in urban 44%. Table (7.7) shows the type of house in relation to whether a separate individual one, a room within a house or other of extended family settlement.

**Table (7.6): % of households by some housing characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural mean</th>
<th>Urban mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of sleeping rooms</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family size</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nucleus Family</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of head of household</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period living within the</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>15.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (7.7): Description of settlement by Urban and Rural.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural=50</th>
<th>Urban=50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room within house</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straw</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no wall</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipe</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open tape</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throw</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burn\bury</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gas\candle</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled labour</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Khalwa & 4 & 8 \\
not complete primary & 4 & 36 \\
complete primary & 4 & 14 \\
Above prim & 8 & 18 \\

Female education \\
Illiterate & 92 & 40 \\
Khalwa & 6 & 6 \\
not complete primary & 2 & 24 \\
complete primary & 0 & 14 \\
Above primary & 0 & 16 \\
average age of head & 42.9 & 43.46 \\
how long & 42.7 & 15.8 \\
Family size & 5.5 & 6.3 \\
# of sleeping rooms & 1.66 & 1.14 \\

**House ownership**

The majority of surveyed population live in individually owned house by the family, almost 88% of their. The rented houses make only 6%, especially in the urban community. The housing in terms of primary and space is better in rural areas (1.66 (urban) compared to (1.14) rural mean of sleeping rooms. The family size is higher in urban areas 6.3 compared to 5.5 in rural areas. While there is no major difference in average age of heads of households, there is apparent difference in time living within current communities, indicating clearly the phenomena of IDPs in the urban community where the mean period is 15 years.

**Sanitation**

Individual house per family irrespective of material is 81% of total population in both rural and urban population. Cerement is only limited to 1% of total population and 60% of the house have no wall at all even in the
urban settlement of the peri–urban community. Straw is the main roof construction material of 52% of the house while wood, make 35 of the houses. Metal roof is only available within 2% of the house of the surveyed sample as for as sanitation is concerned, there is only 1% of the house which has septic tank, mainly in the urban community. There are 60% of the respondents who don’t have pituitaries. Only 35% have latrine facility. Only 35% has latrine facility. Indicate serous public health problems, particularly in the peri-urban and squatter community of Wau Nur.

**House services:**

There are only 11% of the total populations of the surveyed communities, have access to piped water. 46% have access to water from open tap, especially in the urban community, while 34% use public well as main sources of water. In Rural areas, Khors and hafirs' are used by 9% of the households. Only in the urban community, where there is public garbage services but only for 17% of households 25% reported that they throw garbage in vacant areas. 52% of household indicated that they burn or bury the garbage, especially in the urban community. A public electricity service is accessible to only 2% while 22% indicated that they use generators. The majority in both urban and rural poor communities i.e. 66% of households use gas and candles for lightening.

**Household Roster**

**Demographic characteristics**

The population of study area shows nucleus vs. extended family, shows predominance of extended family among 89% of respondents. The active members of household (51%) lie in the active age of (18-50 years).
The occupation of women heads of household is (79%) housewives, showing extent of gender gap in the poor communities of Kassala state. The occupation of head of house hold male (44%) farmers of total sample, dominating rural areas and (27%) unskilled labour dominating the urban area. The head of house hold employment: 71% indicated that they are employed, who are mainly the rural respondents. The rest of respondents indicated that they are not (idle) i.e. unemployed, making the majority of urban respondents. The level of education shows 52% illiterate and 20% did not complete primary education. Female head of house hold, on the other hand, indicates a poor education level of high illiteracy rate among women (66%)

**The family Size:**

Family size (1-3) is 4% of population while those of family size "between" (3-7) make 60% of the households. Those who have family size "between" (7-12) make about 46%. This indicates the phenomena of extended family in both rural and urban communities of the surveyed area.

Table (7.8) % head of household occupation by rural and urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural (%)</th>
<th>Urban (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labour</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled labour</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 44% of the urban community who worked on farms indicate the significance of the urban farming in a town like Kassala unskilled labour is significant in the urban community where 27% of the household depend on it for income.

**Education level**

Table (7.9) below compares the education level by gender by rural and urban. Illiteracy rates are higher for rural people and females.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Male rural %</th>
<th>Male urban %</th>
<th>Female rural</th>
<th>Female urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalwa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete primary education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete primary education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above primary</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that high illiteracy rates predominates in rural communities (80%) compared to the urban community (24%) However, there is a clear trend to dropout in the urban community where 36% did not complete their primary education. Again, the urban community have highest rate of above primary education 18% urban while only 8% of the rural households. On the other hand, the female in both rural and urban households show higher illiteracy rates compared to men of same community. The striking fact is that
illiteracy is 92% and 40% among females in rural and urban areas respectively.

7.2.2 Social Exclusion

Access to Basic Services:-

Despite the fact that both urban and rural communities are poor in access to basic services, the survey data clearly reflect the huge gap in accessibility to basic services between rural and urban areas. Most of rural population explained this situation as exclusion from public services. Table (7.10) shows % of rural and urban community accessing different services.

Table (7.10): % Households access by service type by rural and urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Yes) have access %</td>
<td>(No) lack access %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table above shows clearly the extent of feeding of exclusion from basic services, particularly among the poor urban IDP community of Wau Nur Neighborhood. Despite the fact that there is high % of education male heads of households who are literate compared to rural areas, as explained before, but their children access to education facility is rated as high as 82% indicate they have no access to education almost all services scored above 80% among urban population that is difficult to access, even if available. The main explanation is the market and commercial economy. The urban community also shows highest rates of unemployment as only 6% indicated access to secured employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>education services</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment 35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit services</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport services</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water services</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation services</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural extension</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and security</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table (7.12) below indicates households’ respondents’ perceptions on others from within the community who have problems of access and totally excluded

Table (7.12): % Respondents Perceptions on Access of others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- have no access</td>
<td>Yes%</td>
<td>No%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problem</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- have access problem</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 4% of the urban respondents think –that there are other households that have access problems i.e. excluded from services. This could be explained by the high degree of self centrism or individualistic culture other interpretation may be become of availability of the service whereby total exclusion is not the case. On the other hand, the rural community respondents, indicator by 63.2% of respondent that is totally excluded. Table (7.13) shows % any member of family denied access by services (Exclusion).

Table (7.13): % of family members denied access by service type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes %</td>
<td>No%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education services</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The feeling of denial of services is very high among rural respondents compared to urban ones. The fact that is availability of services, of whatever quality in urban setting might be behind this perception. In responding to the percentage (in their opinion to those) excluded from education, the results also show a clear variation between urban and rural respondents.

Table (7.14): % of Excluded Population by Rural and Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excluded population from (house hold)</th>
<th>Rural (%)</th>
<th>Urban (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50%</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-75%</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78-99%</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rural respondents (54.5%) of them indicate that 100% are totally excluded from education. While in urban there is only 6% who responded that exclusion from education is 25%.

Perceptions towards Exclusion

Perceptions towards exclusion by urban and rural respondents try to estimate from within the community percentage of excluded households by urban respondents do not perceive that there is higher (%) of excluded from health, contrary to rural
The Table (7.15) shows that in the urban community there were 44% reporting non exclusion from water and 40% for health. However, the urban 96% reported non exclusion from both services

Table (7.15): % of respondents of perceived excluded from water and health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Less than 25%</th>
<th>25-50%</th>
<th>51-75%</th>
<th>75-99%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of respondents view it that none of them or their family members are excluded from above. Services a range of (58%-72%) almost a third of the population is viewed as there is exclusion in almost all above (in both urban and rural) However, intensity of exclusion differ from urban to rural on specific services. Yet, the respondents (42%) view denial of access to health and education while (32%-36%) indicated exclusion from water; housing and employment opportunities. The fact that (35%) of respondents validate their position on movement 30% from all above services (explaining the extreme destitute) or vulnerability situation was followed up by looking into extent of exclusion by %.

Table (7.16) % excluded from population by type of services. The highest values 100% are given for denial to access employment and credit services, mainly dominating the urban respondents. On the other hand, the rural respondent's views were dominated by agriculture extension; transport; water and health and security. Some make the concerns of both urban and rural communities.
7.2.3 Overall Socio-economic Exclusion

This is from within those who feel there is exclusion a population of 35% of households. As far as respondents perception on exclusion the following illustrate the situation that help develop a criteria for exclusion among whole respondents of both rural and urban poor communities. The majority of respondents indicated that income level (78%) and education level (67) are two most crucial exclusion factors. Future on, comes gender (23%); occupation and social status (20%) and age (17%) are other important factors to show the criteria for exclusion within the community under study. Lower scores were placed for religion (9%) and 11% for each of ethnicity; language and political affiliation. The above tell us if we did not address incomes and education within an economic and human development package, no way to address this vicious circle of exclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Credit</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>Agric.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>51-75</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>76-100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.17):  % of respondents excluded by exclusion indicator
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Yes</th>
<th>%No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3 Structural Social Capital

7.3.1 Organizational Density and characteristics

Affiliation and activism in community organizations

Household memberships in organizations show that 43% of household are not member in any organization. Table (7.18) shows the variations between rural and urban membership of different organizations. Active in organizations those who are members (55%) see themselves as active in their organizations. Type of organization 7% farmers; 8% credit, 10% village or neighborhood associations, religious, cultural (11%) political groups (4%) NGOs 12% and women groups 2% and kinship is only 1%. This indicates the growth of modern civil society and NGO organizations compared to organizations built on tribal or kinship basis. Also shows 6 very
limited women organizational affiliation. Those who are not affiliated to any organization are 43% of household.

Membership is only 56% of respondents indicating that 36% are nonmembers in organizations. Degree of participation (at what level) only 1% are involved in leadership positions of the households. Out of the 56% who participate in organizations the respondents that 28% are in active and 29% very active. As far as ranking of organizations (although) no formal affiliation as organization (scaring 1%); 95% put kinship as of highest importance and 3% next highest to the village or neighborhood organization. There is also clear overlap in membership of at least three organizations within the community 61% indicated little overlap; 24% some overlap and 14%, much overlap among the members of organizations. The group members of affiliated organizations are 50% of same extended family (mainly in rural areas) and 50% not one extended family (but a tribe) in the urban community. 56% of group members same religion while only 42% of different religions from whole population, However, the rural organizations are almost 100% same religions while those in urban setting include both Christians and Muslims, as the case of Wau Nur. This phenomenon of mixed gender in the organizations is only within the urban community of limited Beja population whose
Table (7.18): % Respondents Belonging by type of organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Health Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations (Farmers, etc..)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic group (religious Cultural or political group)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.19) indicate the high degree of non-associational life, informal organizations 46% in rural areas and 52% in urban. The civic groups (cultural or khalwa) are available with a higher degree together with self-help groups but still informal structures. On the other hand, the modern organizational life is apparent in the urban community where you find 16% belong to credit groups, 20% to neighborhood associations and 4% women groups. In rural areas there are non who belong to women organization. The Table and Fig below shows clearly the situation in rural community.
Fig (7.4) membership by type of org

b-type of organisation to which hh member belong (Q

- nonmember
- health committee
- political group
- professional associa
- civic group (religio
- NGO
- NGO
Table (7.19): Household belonging by type of organization by rural and Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit coop</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood village association</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic group (religious/cultural)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (self–help)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School/other service committee</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No affiliation</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.20) Degree of Participation of Households in the Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid leader</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very active</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig (7.5) degree of participation of households’ member in an org

degree of hhm participation in the organisation -for org

- nonmember
- leader
- active
- very active
- inactive
Fig 7.6 Usefulness of being a member in an organisation

Fig (7.6) above reflects clearly the households’ membership by type of organization whereby the village association membership is clear in the rural area while self help organizations are apparent (30%). Moreover the non-membership is crystal clear in both rural and urban communities reaching 44% urban and 40% rural. The women groups are available, however, small (194%) in the urban community while are nil in the rural community. Again the civic groups (cultural, religion) have more significance in the rural community (18%) compared to the urban are (4%) according to the survey. The table (7.21) below and graph indicates the situation in urban communities as far as organization membership by type of organization to which house hold member belongs.
Fig (7.6) Type of org by household membership

b-type of organisation to which hh memeber belong (Q

- nonmember
- village association
- credit cooperative
- political group
- womens’ group
- civic group (religio
- kinship
- school or other seri
- professional associa
Table (7.21): % Distribution of House hold by Type of Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of org</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Professional association (farmers...etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School or other services committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kinship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic group (religious, cultural or political group)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s' group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit cooperative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village association</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig (7.7) Same Gender by Group membership

Table (7.22) Group members of the same gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherwise</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing system</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is dominance of farmer occupation 90% among male respondent household of the rural community and the unskilled labour among the household male respondents (50%). Petty trade as an income activity is higher in urban compared to rural community. Moreover, the urban community is having a reasonable degree of skilled labour (24%) while the rural community lacks these skills (2%). The high percentage (20%) of other occupation among the urban male respondents is explained as casual and unemployment which again lie within the category of unskilled labour.
Data clearly reflect predominance of literacy among female heads of households (90%) rural community and 40% urban community. The phenomenon of not completing primary education is crystal clear in the urban community 24%. While there is (16%) who reporting themselves within women heads of households as above primary, you find this category nil in the rural sector. Also shows the predominance of house wife as prime occupation among female households in both communities (80%) the other main category in rural is farming 8% and 12% unskilled labour while unskilled labour 10% and petty trade 6% in the urban community Doming women of both communities there is skilled labour.

Data analysis shows the education level among male head of household indicating predominance of illiteracy mainly within rural communities (80%) compared to (30%) within urban community respondents. Unlike female, these are few among male head of household in rural areas who completed primary education and above (4%) and (2%) did not complete the primary education. However, these rates are lower to the urban where completion of primary school make (16%) and not completed reaches 40% among male heads of households the religious (Khalwa) and Church) 2% rural and 4% urban respectively.

7.3.2 Factors Contributing to Dividing and Belonging among People

Family affiliation, gender; politics; age groups and education level and occupation contribute to dividing people in rural areas. Religion is not a dividing factor as community is predominantly Muslim. On the other hand,
education is taken as not a dividing factor in urban poor community, indicating homogeneity of community in access to education.

Table (7.23): Factor Dividing People by Rural and Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes%</td>
<td>No%</td>
<td>Yes%</td>
<td>No%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same family</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same religion</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same gender</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same political party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same age group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same occupation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same education level</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.24) Other Factors dividing people by urban rural (4C.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Urban (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Rural (%)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Some what</td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land holdings</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old /new inhabitants</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other differences</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The urban household respondents indicated sufficient roles of wealth status (42%); land holdings 962%) and (52%) old or new inhabitants to
divide people of same community. Yet only very few in rural community indicate that these factors could divide people, except (18%) for land holding and (12%) for wealth that could bring somewhat divides.

The Urban community is highly heterogamous in rural areas people indicate possibility of disputes even if sharing all above but in the urban community these indicators as shown by above indicators.

Degree of a Group Belonging:
Table (7.25) compares Rural and Urban Communities by factors contributing to group belonging.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (7.25) Factor Contributing to Group Belonging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same extended family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same religions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same age group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same education level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Above table indicate the degree of relationships among the people and extent to which organizations that serves the community interests. They bring people across kinship, gender, occupation, education level, religion and political divide.
7.4 Decision-making about Developments

**Decision making process**

Table (7.26) indicates that decisions about development are generally involving whole village in rural areas (60%) while dominated by the community leaders in peri-urban community (52%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Community leader</th>
<th>Whole village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30% indicated that the group decide together while the majority 61% indicate that decisions are either taken by the leader alone (12%) or in consultation with the group 940%). The data indicates the community trust in leaders whereby 63% indicated that their leaders are very effective, meaning in most cases as are very influential (not measured as outcome). Fig (7.11 & 7.12) shows rural people assessment to effectiveness of their leadership. Out the households who are affiliated to organizations more than 75% see the value of being a member of the group. Only 25% who view a member is not useful. Table (7.4.2) show that the parents (26%), village or neighborhood association (22%) and local government (19%) one the most important actors who get together to solve a problem in a school, in absence of school teacher. More over data shows the value of the local community leaders (59%), the popular committee (24%) and the village or community
development committees as important actors in the decision-making process at community level.

**Leadership effectiveness**

- **Nonmember**: 36.0%
  - Very effective: 34.0%
  - Somewhat effective: 24.0%
  - Not effective at all: 6.0%

**Fig (7.9-a) Degree of Effectiveness of Leadership - Urban**

- **Nonmember**: 46.0%
  - Very effective: 42.0%
  - Somewhat effective: 8.0%
  - Not effective at all: 4.0%
The analysis further indicates the importance of community leaders (56%); the local government and neighbors (9%) in case of violence; crop failure or any others bigger problem at household and community level the value of indigenous social capital is immense in such crisis situations. However, in case of action on services provision again higher percentage (70%) respondents suggest the leaders, 23% the popular committee and only 6% for other community. The non membership is 44% urban and 40% rural. It also reflects that while community leaders' role in decision-making is higher (50%) urban and lower in rural (36%). The rural people generally decide together 20% compared to 16% urban. Below is an illustration of who really decide in rural community.
How the group makes decision

Fig (7.10-a) Decision-making by Groups- urban
In rural areas, there is limited capacity / attempts to respond to the various questions by community or local governance. Confirm, to that in the urban community, people or government are not apathetic and try to react. The local government to reported by 26% of respondents sometimes get together to help solve a problem. The neighborhood associations and parents' councils are referred to by 28% and 42% respectively by urban households. The traditional tribal leaders as stated by 24% rural indicate significance of this type of social capital to help solve community problems.

Only in the urban community where some respondents 20% indicated that differences in education level play a role in diving people, showing tendency of elitism. Community leadership role while 76% of rural
respondents had indicated the village leader, the urban highlighted the significant role of the development committee as indicate by 80% of urban households. Again 48% of the urban community members indicated that, the leadership role is played by ‘Lajna shaabia’ i.e. popular committee while none in rural area respondents mentioned the popular committees.

Previous Collective Action:

Participation over past 3 years in collective decisions is explained by table (7.27). People claims or talk about a problem voicing concerns is generally higher among the urban community (70%) indicated yes, compared to only 35% of the urban community respondents. Both communities, however, as shown by table 65% rural and 30% urban did not talk about a problem. As far as visiting government offices to claim or complain it is higher among urban community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (7.27): Participation in problem solving by rural and urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk with people about a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness campaign about a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visit a government office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Joint Petition to Address a Common Issue

Table (7.28) shows past year petition or joined together to address a common issue.
Table (7.28)  Degree of Get Together for Petition or Discussion of Common Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Met to petition official for development</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Once</th>
<th>Twice</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People among rural (64%) indicated frequent meetings indicate higher for frequent get together around an issue but compared to urban respondent. Same time urban respondents show higher tendency compared to rural community to raise a petition for government officials (58%) indicated meeting frequently for that.

Involvement in campaign or actions:
A part from voluntary work 58% almost all other issues indicate low participants in rural areas; compared to urban communities. Issues of awareness, lobby groups and the spirit of protection and influencing politics, politicians and policy maker is higher among urban people. Table (7.29) shows clearly the low (10%) of rural population compared to high (70%) of urban population involved in election campaigns. Other dimensions of community actions: a protest; donations; awareness campaigns and voluntary work are higher in urban setting compared to rural communities.
Table (7.29): Involvement in campaign or actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in election campaign</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached to take in a protest</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached to make a donation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote in election</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in awareness campaign</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary work</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spirit of solidarity and Participation:

Table (7.30) ties to ranking family members; neighbors; friends; community leaders or religious groups by who come first in case of an unfortunate event by rural and urban. 74% pick neighbours and (10%) community leaders while in urban areas indicated families (44%) and neighbours (24%).

Table (7.30) First Comers in Case of Unfortunate Event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th>Religion group</th>
<th>Community leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The spirit of participation is clearly higher in rural (70%) said very high compared to urban community whose only 20% indicated that it very high- this reflect the degree of heterogametic which is higher in urban communities compared to the rural one and the spirit of individualism as a tendency in urban setting. In the rural area the spirit and history of nafir shows the (high) and (very high) participation rates as overall measurement according to the respondents opinions. Table (7.31) shows overall assessment of spirit of participation.

Table (7.31): Overall Assessment of Spirit of Participation by Rural and Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mutual Economic Support**

The economic support sources by family (16%) and neighbors (80%) are higher in rural community compared to urban where family (12%) and neighbor (26%). Friends are important in urban (56%) compared to rural areas (none). They also indicates that rural emotional support is mainly social, rather than economic due to urban poverty. On the other hand, the data indicates the need for economic support from a wider base including neighbor, friends etc. Table (7.32) shows first comers in case of unfortunate economic event.

Table (7.32): First Comers in Case of unfortunate Economic Event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th>Religion group</th>
<th>Community leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dividing Factors in Decision-making Process

Table (7.33) People divisions by differences along a number of factors within decision-making process:-

Table (7.33): Dividing factors in Decision-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Not at all</th>
<th>% Some what</th>
<th>% Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth status</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land holding</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (old or young)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old in habitant/new</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic back ground</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most important dividing factors are (52%) gender; 4% land holdings, 30% age; wealth status 28% and although above table indicate a bright picture of tolerance, homogeneity in group decision-making process (closer to consensus) irrespective of the different factors but going deeper into respondents who indicated the possibility of (somewhat) or (very much) are generally the younger respondents, women or of educated. Yet, this does not deny the fact that the respondents believe that the eldest, social/tribal community leaders, the wealthiest of those who have land or livestock pre
dominates the decision-making process together with those who are affiliates to the government political party. The least factors contributing to differences over decision-making are religion (9%), ethnicity (3%) and political divide (35%).

**Problem Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes%</th>
<th>No%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differences cause a problem</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing social exclusion (possibility)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How? Family intervention</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors intervention</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders intervention</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders interventions</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government leaders intervention</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of problem leading to violence</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows clearly that respondents do not fear the divide among themselves (81%) or fear of a problem leading to violence (62%). Moreover, they place an important value for the intervention of the community leaders (96%); the religious leaders (78%) and local courts (67%) and neighbors (62%). These actors are the resort in case of protection and vulnerability crisis. Problem solving decision-making is generally made by community leaders alone in both rural (50%) and urban (60%) while the entire village (10%) dealing with a problem together is clear in rural areas. It is little (2%)
in the urban community the local government role in solving a problem is apparently higher in urban (26%) compared to rural (16%).

7.5 Networks and Mutual Support Organization

People generally meet and join together on common issues or develop a petition for government on a developmental goal as indicated by (70%) - 73%) of the total respondents.

Table (7.35): Participation in Lobbying and Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Yes</th>
<th>% No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vote in election</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participate in association</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Contact an influential person</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Influence media to focus on a problem</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Participate in a campaign (access)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Participate in election campaign</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Part in a protest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Contacted elected representative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Disruption of government offices</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Talk with people of community about a problem</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Notification for police or court</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Made a donation</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Volunteer for charitable organ.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Approached by someone to vote</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Approached by someone to participate in an association</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participation takes one very low in voting, influence or participation in protests, campaigns etc. or indicated by more than 80% of respondents. The other hand, respondents show a reasonable degree of talking about problems within the community and volunteering in charitable organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (7.36):</th>
<th>Joint Petition and Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not to petition (GOS) for a development goal</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action (joined) an common issue</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, these meetings and these petitions range from once (10%) to frequent as indicated by (34% -36%). As indicated in table (10- ) these collective actions is viewed by (71%) as successful. However, 12% see it as all successful 59% view it is as somewhere successful. Again there are a significant percentage of respondents (29%) who feel that these meetings, petitions and joint effort are not successful.

Again, their voice and influence or claims with their elected representatives or through participation in elections or awareness and information campaigns is very limited not exceeding (25%) in all cases. Also the table shows very little influence on people themselves by others like activist to encourage them to vote; participate in an association; contact
and influential person or influence the media by a problem. These attempts of approaching households did not exceed (33%) in the best cases. Moreover a number of activities need some degree of activism to approach household members to enhance their capacities to participate and influence influential actors. This capacity to approach people for more participation is apparently very low as indicated below in table (7.37). On the other hand, the analysis shows that 43% indicate the community leaders are who make decision about development project, while 56% indicate that whole village makes the decision on development project. The spirit of participation among community members on community issues rang from average (17%); high (33%) to very high (45%).

Table (7.37): Extent of being Approached to Participate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>% No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to participate intellection campaign</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to take part in a protest</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to contact elected representative</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to take part in disruption of</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to take with people about a problem</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to notify a court or police about a problem</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to make a donation problem</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached by someone to volunteer for charitable org.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.6: Trust and Support:

Table (7.38 & 7.39) shows first comers for support in case of need. Family (75%) in case of death event and (53%) in case of loss of asset; neighbors (49%) in case of fine; friends (49%) in case of denial of services and neighbors (11%) in case of loan are highest scores.
Table (7.38)  First comers for support in case of loss of properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family member</td>
<td>Neighbor</td>
<td>Anyone</td>
<td>Community Leader</td>
<td>Family member</td>
<td>Neighbor</td>
<td>Anyone</td>
<td>c. Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical properties</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.39) First comers for support in case of social and economic need

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Death event</th>
<th>Fine</th>
<th>Denial of social services</th>
<th>Loss of asset</th>
<th>Livelihood</th>
<th>Credit or loan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant organ.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents while ranking first comers for support in case of need in social or economic event varies significantly between social and economic ones. The family (57%) and neighbors (2%) come first for support
in case of a sad event e.g. death of father and in case of house fine (26%) family and 49% neighbors. The again the family members and neighbors are crucial support vulnerable livelihood situation. However in case of support for access to social services and credit or a loan, the respondents 49% indicated the friends and 47% for credit or loan by friends as well. Strikingly, the highest rate for assistance organization (32%) was mentioned as second alternative in case of access to services. It is also interesting to observe the highest was (14%) in case of loss of assets. This indicates individual and community support is mainly for risk management; vulnerability, denial to access basic services or livelihood requirements but not to compensate for lost assets. Trust is the most important factor even for economic interaction among poor communities of study area. 92% indicated that there is trust in borrowing and bungling among people. As far as level of trust (within own community) change overtime compared to trust within other communities. Table (7.40) shows that the level of trust changed to the better (59%) in own community and worse (58%) in neighboring community and remained the same as indicated by (23%) in own community and (39%) in the neighboring community. Change in level of trust to which level. The level of trust is reported as getting worse in urban setting while improving in rural areas.
Table (7.40): Level of Change of Trust Within Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level of change (own community)</th>
<th>level of change (neighboring communities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To better</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other community here refers to most close and neighboring village or peri-urban neighborhood. 59% respondents feel that trust for borrowing in their community change to the better, they (58%) perceived that it change to the worse in other community.

Table (7.41) shows that when one leaves a house they generally leave properties either with family members or neighbors. Other properties like production tools are left with neighbors.
Table (7.41): Who will be in charge of properties (in case of leaving house)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No one</th>
<th>Other family member</th>
<th>Other one from village</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(in change) trust to care for physical care</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in change) trust to care for human (children)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in change) trust to care for economic prosperities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in change) trust to care for production tools</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Private or common shared ownership perceptions showed that the majority tend for private ownership (84%) for land 79% for house area. These cases even of shared ownership add more of the assets and value.

Table (7.420): Perceptions on private or shared ownership of assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Private ownership for less</th>
<th>Shared ownership with another (more)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership rural cultivable land</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of urban plot of house</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (7.43): Private and shared Ownership of Assets by Rural and Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership of assets</th>
<th>Private ownership</th>
<th>sharing with a person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A- 10 Feddans alone or 25 Feddans shared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B- Urban land area more for shared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.44) indicates the spirit of participation among rural and urban communities. Spirit of participation is very high 68% among rural people. Tribal democracy participation in rural areas is close to people unlike that of urban community.

Table (7.44): Spirit of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.45) shows the degree of influence made by households. Both communities feel that they have very much influence (42%) urban and
(52%) rural while (28%) of rural and (30%) of urban feel that they have none or little influence.

Table (7.45): Degree of Influence made by Household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot very much</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much (little)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trust in borrowing and lending is very high in both urban and rural communities as indicated by rural (90%) and urban (92%) respondents, table (7.46).

Table (7.46) Trust in Borrowing and Lending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do Trust</th>
<th>No Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, the urban community reports 100% spirit of private ownership for rural land area and low tendency for sharing urban land area. In Rural areas people trust family members 92% for physical property and neighbors 92% for children while urban community members prefer neighbors 58% for physical property and family members for children 50%. Extent of contribution of this community (Time and money) towards a common goal compared to another community or village.
Table (7.47) shows own assessment and position as to whether respondents agree or not or level of agreement on certain community members' behavior. Rural people (59%) are more trustworthy than others while (76%) indicated that most urban people are honest can be trusted. (68%) strongly agree that people in both communities are willing to help each other.

**Table (7.47): Level of Assessment of Trust Level by Rural and Urban**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Urban) people care only for their own welfare</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Urban) most people are honest can be trusted</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural people are more trustworthy than others</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural people care only for themselves</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of exploitation (likely to take advantage)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always of someone to help</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not pay attention to opinions of others</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people willing to help</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.48) assesses progress in communities over the past five years. (67%) strongly agree that their communities have prospered in the last 5 years and (87%) feel more accepted by the community.
Table (7.48):  Assessment of Progress and Mutual Support Spirit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The community has prospered in fast 5 years</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel accepted by the members of the community</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to a common goal

The table (7.49) shows the contribution to a common goal by time and money. (92 %) indicate a very much contribution of people to a common goal; (60%) also indicates a very much an extent of contribution of own communities compared to others and that (58%) indicated that there are more or less conflicts compared to other villages.

Table (7.49):  Level of Contribution to a common goal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nothing</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>A lot (very much)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People contribute to a common goal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>More</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of contribution compared to other village –common goal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More or less conflicts compared to other village / community</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (7.50) indicates the contributions to projects not of direct benefit to the community. (99%) indicate that yes, will contribute to projects that make the community more peaceful and (53%) to projects benefiting other communities.

Table (7.50): Extent of Willingness to Contribute to A project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Yes will contribute</th>
<th>Otherwise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You contribute to project benefit other neighbor but not you</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor contribute to a project that does not benefit him directly</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community is quite peaceful</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis also tries to assess the change in harmony within the community indicating that there is a trend of change as 6% indicates that there is less harmony among people of the community, still there is a very high degree of harmony as 75% indicated. The conflict resolution mechanisms within the community depend on higher degree on family members (26%); community leaders (29%) very little is left for the religious leaders and the judiciary system.

7.6 Degree of household Activism, Participation and Influence:-
Table (7.51) shows the degree of household activism, participation and influence. The urban community shows highest records in making donations (90%); volunteering for charity (66%) and talk with people about a problem (70%). In rural community only (18%) indicated making donations; (40%) contributing to charity organisation and only (34%) talk with people on a
problem. Both communities do not notify courts and police (60%) rural and (70%) urban. Much striking in both communities that (80%) urban and (86%) rural did not contact elected individuals on a problem, indicating low confidence in elected leaders.

Table (7.51)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Activism and Contact</th>
<th>% rural</th>
<th></th>
<th>% urban</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted elected representative about a problem</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk with people about a problem</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notified court or police</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made a donation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteered for charitable org</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.52) shows the degree of influence by participation in awareness campaigns; voting in elections; taking part in a protest or talk with people about a problem. The rural population indicate sky rocketing figures indicating a NO for being approached to participate in awareness campaigns (90%); approached to vote in elections (80%); take part in a protest (90%) while lower in urban setting but still ranging from (62%) to (64%) in the three indicators.
Table (7.52):  Degree of Being Approached and Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% rural</th>
<th></th>
<th>% urban</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to participate in awareness</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to vote in elections</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To take part in a protest</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To talk with people about a problem</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To notify a court or police about a problem</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To make a donation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To volunteer for charitable org.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (7.53):  Problem solving and acting as Leader:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Who will get together to solve a problem?</th>
<th>Who will act as a leader?</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Population Committee</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development committee</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (7.53) above shows who act as leader and who get together to solve a problem in rural and urban communities. While in rural community (38%) indicate none who get together to solve the problem; (12%) say local government; (24%) community leaders and (16%) development committees, in urban community (26%) indicated the local government; (4%) the popular committee and (28%) the Development Committee. In relation to who really take action (76%) in rural areas say the community leaders while (48%) in urban community say the popular committee and (42%) the community leaders.

Fig (7.11) Who Get together to solve a problem (e.g. no school)

7.8 Summary of Findings and Analysis
7.8.1 Organizational Density and characteristics

- Chi square test (43.2) proved a significant variation between rural and urban to which organizations it belong to. The results illustrated that there are strong evidence rural community belongs to (farmers associations and NGO’s) and urban community belongs to (Credit Cooperative). P=.000

- Chi square test (26.8) proved a wide variation of group members of the same extended family available with rural families rather than urban families. P=.000

- Chi square test (26.8) proved a significant difference of group members of the same religion living with families in rural community which is a much greater than in families of urban community. P=.000

- Chi square test (11.1) proved a significant difference of gender of the group members living with families in rural community which is of a difference with respect to group members of urban community. P=.000

- Chi square test (29.6) proved a significant difference of political party belonged by the group members of families in rural community which is highly difference to group members of urban community. P=.000

- Chi square test (32.8) gave strong evidence that rural community occupation is much difference from occupations of urban community. P=.000

- Chi square test (27.6) proved a variation of age groups between rural and urban communities, in which rural community is of much difference age groups as urban community age groups, is of different characteristics. P=.000

- Chi square test (25.2) proved strong evidence that there are significant differences of group members who are of different educational level which is most available among rural community. P=.000
7.8.2 Networks and Mutual Support Organization

Table (7.54) Rural or urban who will get together to solve a problem (e.g. no school teachers in the village). The parents, then village association and government at last who really contribute to solving the problems of a school? Here the network of relevant associations together with the local government is the most set up to which people and community resort.

Table (7.54): Rural and Urban to solve a Problem together:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village association</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Chi square test (40.2) gave strong evidence that urban community problems are solved by (local government and parents associations such as school problems), and while rural community does not know who solves these problems. P=.000
-Chi square test (37.9) proved strong evidence that ‘Lajan Shaabia’ members act as leaders in urban community, and while in rural community village leaders’ act as leaders in most time. P=.000

7.8.3 Exclusion:
- Chi square test (12.2) proved a significant variation of education value which is (very much) divided people in the village according to urban community suggestion. P=.002
- Chi square test (11.1) proved a significant variation of health status which is (very much) divided people in the village according to urban community suggestion. P=.002
- Chi square test (25.0) proved a significant variation of landholding which is (very much) divided people in the village according to urban community suggestion. P=.002
- Chi square test (25.0) proved a significant variation of differences between old inhabitants and new comers which does not tend to divide people (not at all) as suggested by rural community. P=.000
- Chi square test (11.4) proved strong differences between rural and urban communities in suggestion of other differences which can divide people in the village. Urban community confirmed there is a somewhat difference that could divide people. P=.003
- Chi square test (11.0) proved strong differences between rural and urban communities in suggestion of other differences which can divide people in the village. Urban community strongly suggested that difference can cause problem to people. P=.001
- Chi square test (6.3) proved wide variation between rural and urban communities in differences between communities which can lead people in
the village to violence. Urban community strongly supported that difference can lead to violence... P=.012

- Chi square test (23.6) proved a significant variation toward rural community who had been excluded from education which is due to the lack of school facility, besides high school fees and neglect of the education values at villages. P<.000

- Chi square test (21.2) indicated a true statistical variation between rural/urban communities benefiting from health services. The analysis showed a significant difference in health services which is bad in rural area comparative to urban. P<.000

- Chi Square (25.6) confirmed a difference in quality of housing between rural and urban in which rural community is living in a bad quality of housing besides some community of non houses owners. P<.000

- Chi square test (36.3) proved the difference of employment opportunities in rural and urban areas, rural community have less chance to join any types of employment because of illiteracy prevailing among all of them. P<.000

- Chi square (28.6) test proved a significant difference which is statistically true that could be attributed to the ignorant of rural communities to the financial institutions policies, in addition to rural community does not own real estate’s properties to deal with the institutes. P<.000

- Chi square test (38.3) gave a significant difference of transport facility which is far better in urban. Rural community suffers of difficulty of transport in particular at rainy season. P <.000

- Chi square (15.4) proved a high level of water exclusion toward rural community members who complains of bad quality of water and non availability of water facilities at villages. P<.000
- Chi square (38.6) proved statistical difference of sanitary service available in both rural and urban areas, where the former is lacking healthy latrines, hygienic water sources and bad water vessel handling. P<.000

- Chi square test (40.2) showed a significant difference of agricultural extension service provided to both rural and urban households. The table does not include any urban community members complaining of services offered because all urban household are not farmers or does not own agricultural plots.

- Chi square test (24.6) indicated an exclusion of justice toward rural community who complains of fair justices in their villages, on the other hand there is no any problem (urban), which is due to courts availability and the working offices of lawyers which are easily to be reached. P<.000

- Chi square (28.5) proved a difference of security in both which is of good quality in town and while in rural the households are complaining because of the animal looting and the frequent tribal disputes. P<.000

- Chi square test (36.7) proved that many households in rural area have access problem to benefit from services when is related to urban community who is of less suffering if compare to rural peoples. P<.00

- Chi square (12.5) proved a significant difference of percentage excluded from education in rural and urban, rural community had mentioned a high percentage of the exclusion (100%) which is true variation with respect to urban community who is of a minimum exclusion percentage. This analysis indicated reasonable chances of education for urban community to enroll schools. P<.000

- Chi square (12.1) proved a significant difference of percentage excluded from health in rural and urban, rural community had mentioned a high percentage of the exclusion (100%) which is true variation with respect
to urban community who is of a minimum exclusion percentage. This analysis indicated a bad status of health facilities at villages.

-Chi Square (19.9) proved a significant difference of percentage excluded from education in rural and urban, rural community had mentioned a high percentage of the exclusion (100%) which is true variation with respect to urban community who is of a minimum exclusion percentage. This analysis indicated the fragile water facilities at villages which are lack of water maintenances, contaminated surface wells water and non hygienic Hafir water, P<.000.

7.8.4 Previous Collective Actions

- Chi square test (34.6) revealed a significant difference toward a rural community whose frequently is joined meeting address development goals, but urban community participates in a couple of times manner. The result is justifiable because rural areas are witnessing intensive working NGOs which directly deals with community. P<.000

- Chi square test (49.6) proved statistical variation that rural community concerns with meeting to other to address common issues most frequently. Urban community has no interest (never) to meet each others to address common issues. The analysis described the solid social relation prevailing in rural areas. P<.000

- Chi square test (5.4) proved a significant difference between rural/urban communities in the election voting which being witnessed in urban and is rarely found at rural community. The analysis indicated to awareness and mobilization available in urban community. P<.02
- Chi square test (19.5) proved a significant difference in the interest of urban community towards owning 10 feddans on a private mode. On the other hands rural preferred to share land with other. P<.00

- Chi square test (4.8) proved a significant difference in the interest of urban/rural community towards owning 10 m2 on a private mode which is desirably shown on urban community rather than rural. P<.02

- Chi square test (41.3) proved the significant difference of rural community who would trust (other family member) to be in charge or to look after his/her children when traveling, while urban households trust neighbors when on traveling. P<.00

- Chi square test (40.2) proved a significant variation regarding communities of urban and rural in matter of trust who caring human properties, rural community prefer (neighbors) and while urban community is interested in (other family members). The analysis confirmed that rural community is of great social relation value as neighbors are considering family members. P<.000

- Chi square test (37.7) illustrated that there is a true variation of rural/urban community view on care welfare responsibility. The result described that rural community is strongly agree the assumption of care only for their own welfare, while urban community is on a contrary (strongly disagree). P<.000

- Chi square test (14) illustrated that there is a true variation of rural/urban community suggestion on degree of value of honesty. The analysis have come up with positive response of rural community (strongly agree), while urban community response is (strongly disagree). P<.003

- Chi square test (31.1) illustrated a significant difference of both communities urban/rural interest in value degree of altruism which are agree
and disagree suggestion of urban community, and while rural community is frankly disagree. P<.000

- Chi square test (19) proved a significant difference statistically true, in which rural community strongly agree and while urban is less agree on the assumption.

- Chi square test (12.9) proved a significant variation of exploitation which is of (strongly agree) mode in rural and it is of strongly (disagree mode) in urban. The analysis revealed a prevailing exploitation at villages, because people sharing land, food and most income sources activities besides an exploitation of power by tribal leaders. P=.005

- Chi square test (30.7) proved a significant variation of help level which is of (strongly agree) mode in rural and it is of an agree mode in urban. The result confirmed the strong social relation at villages, because people are relatives. P=.000

- Chi square test (48.8) proved a significant variation of respecting or pay attention to opinions of others which is of (strongly agree) mode in urban and it is of a (strongly disagree) mode in rural. The result indicated urban community awareness in listening to and respecting other person point of views regarding any issues. P=.000

- Chi square test (42.8) proved a significant variation of community willingness to help others which is of (strongly agree) in urban and it is of a just agree mode in rural. Rural community is used to work communally in farms and they are cooperative in social events.

- Chi square test (12.6) proved a significant variation of community value degree of prosperity which is of (strongly agree) in urban and it is of less proportion (strongly agree) mode in rural. Both communities are
strongly agreed on the level of value degree of prosperity but with a variation towards urban community.
- Chi square test (47.2) proved a significant variation of help level such as searching a lost item (goat) which is of (strongly agree) mode in rural and it is of strongly disagree mode in urban. The result confirmed the strong social relation at villages, because people are relatives. P=.000

7.9: Overall Concluding Remarks:-

The account gave brief concluding remarks on the field survey findings on social capital and people organizations and their roles in people livelihood and development:
- Social capital and people own organizations had contributed to coping with stress and improved welfare of poor households and poor communities
- Social interaction between people and communities and institutions for purposes of poverty alleviation and address challenges of socio-economic development.
- The organizational density of both rural and urban cases indicate density associational life, heterogeneity of membership and high degrees of active participation in community concerns and mutual support tasks.

The communities were characterized by rich social capital norms and value, exchange and trust in absence of formal contracts etc, It is difficult to trace transactions costs, in such a community interaction, information exchange or mutual support mechanisms. There are important areas where people experienced get together and still proved to be essential pillars for future cohesive, systematic community work and civic engagement: natural resource use, particularly land, water, livestock etc; meager economic
resources of informal borrowing; remittances and financial support for social occasions; spirit of charitable involvement and volunteerism and in kind contributions and other various social networks and mutual support systems.

The question remains here, is it feasible to invest in these areas and people organizational capacities and bring this richness into the heart of debate on development theory and practice. People connectedness and exposure and linkages to wider arena of other social and political organizations and structures (at various level) is the only option to assure that social capital and civil society is really the social and economic capital of the poor and excluded people and communities. The viability and change impact of such a capital would never be realized in absence of a social participatory development model, which is difficult to happen in absence of a democratic, development states.

Finally development and related social capital and civil society do not exist in a political vacuum. Therefore, interactions between communities' networks and government and market institutions are vital to better understand the prospects development and democratization in a given society.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOs:
THE MISSING LINK WITH THE STATE

This chapter explores the politics of poverty and its related socio-economic structures in Sudan. The account elaborates on government approaches and programmes and it’s failing attempts to develop the IPRSP. This account highlights the government attempts on poverty, namely PRSP, MDGs etc, trying to realize that a tripartite partnership between the state, civil society and NGOs is required in order to effectively address poverty. This could also contribute effectively to challenge underdevelopment, decay and initiate a process of development that meets international standards, and the success and failure in reshaping the tripartite relationship.

8.1 Poverty Profile

Sudan ranks among the 25 poorest countries in the world. The statistics on the number of people living below the poverty line vary greatly: The Centre for Strategic Studies and the Ministry of Social Planning respectively gave the figures of 96.4 percent and 37 percent. Poverty is no doubt widespread in urban Sudan. However, the urban population does not account for more than 30 percent of the total population.

Poverty is on the increase in Sudan as indicated by decline of the average per capita income from over US$500 in late 1970s to around US$290 in 1998 and the per capita daily supply of calories estimated to be 1840. Life expectancy at birth is at an average of 52 years. The infant mortality rate is high at 99 thousands live birth. Maternal mortality rate is also high at
655 hundred thousand live births. Adult illiteracy is high at 73 percent. It is even higher for women at 88 percent. Enrolment rates at primary and secondary schools are estimated to be about 50 and 22 percent respectively (World Bank Report, 2000) (Adam, 2002:3).

Various surveys showed the increasing trend of poverty and increase in rural poverty in relation to the urban despite variations between the different states in the magnitude of poverty. There are many factors contributing to poverty in Sudan such as drought, desertification, floods and the long lasting civil wars and ethnic tensions. The cost of war in the ever-longest civil war in the world is enormously high. It is estimated that 2 million died since 1983 due to the war in the south. Population movements and disability, orphanage, traumatized cases are innumerable. UNHCR estimates indicate 500,000 sought refuge in neighboring African countries.

Rural infrastructure and mode of living in war zones were completely destroyed. Absolute loss of resource endowment in rural areas of war zones is explained by loss of 6.6 million cattle; 2 million sheep and 1.5 million goats due to war in the south, according to the figures of the National Conference on Peace (1998). Expenditure on military as percent of GDP increased from 3.8 percent (1970-1975) to 4.1 percent (1985-1990) and to 13.1 percent (1990-1995).

UNDP 1998 estimated IDPs to be around 3,527,500 people. 45 percent of IDPs reside in the slum area of Greater Khartoum. 70 percent of IDPs depend mainly on female incomes generated within marginal informal job sector. The vast majority of them originate from agro-pastoral rural areas. High illiteracy rates, lacks of skills are common among them and together with socio-cultural factors undermined their integration within the urban economy.
The growing female-headed households are not restricted to IDPs, but escalate due to the male migration and unemployment, widowhood and family disintegration. Poverty compels many females to work for low pay, often in illegal jobs and sometimes vulnerable to economic exploitation and physical abuse. Child labor (6-14 years) is roughly estimated by 10 percent of labor force in Sudan. The number of street children (boys and girls) is estimated to be 100,000 almost double the figure ten years ago. While poverty and war are held as main abusers of children rights, education policies since 1993 (charging fees) had driven many children out of schools. Finally, for an appealing I-PRSP to develop gender poverty indicators must be used to address gender disparities.

8.2 Poverty Diagnostic:

According to Nur (2003) background paper for the I-PRS, there are some important findings, despite the fact that the data used for analysis is out dated. Rural poverty remained high and a new form of urban poverty emerged. The period (1978-1986) was characterized by the Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) and also characterized by a wide spread poverty in the country. Ali Abdel Gadir (1994) and (2000) had investigated poverty situation and growth in Sudan and how it relates to structural Adjustment programmes.

Generally, the results as worked out by Nur (2003) showed that the three main poverty indicators, namely, the Head Count Index (HC), the Income Gap Index (I-U/Z), and the Poverty Gap Index H (I-U/z), had been increasing at increasing rates over the period (1986-1992). This indicates that poverty had been intensified all over the country, particularly rural
areas. This is explained by a number of interrelated factors: the social cost of Structural Adjustment Programme; the urban bias and policies favoring the modern commercial farming at the expense of small-scale rural producer; the influxes of forced migration due to famines, drought, civil strife and war in the south and the withdrawal of public expenditure on essential health, education services (Ibid, 2003).

The destitute situation in rural Sudan has made Sudan a country with the highest urban growth rate in the African Sahelian countries. The population census data show that the urban population was 11 percent (1965); 24 percent (1983) and 32 percent (1993). The average growth rate was 6 percent for the urban and 2.3 percent for the rural population in the period (1983-1993). There is no sharp increase in industry, which contributes only 15 percent of GDP. This high urbanization is explained by huge influxes of forced migration due to the drought and famine (1984/85) and the escalation of civil war in the south. While this contributed to the urban poor, serious destructions occurred in the rural economy, in areas of origin of these migrants (Ibid, 2003). The high inflation up to 1996 contributed to the urban poverty situation. The categories that make the majority of urban poor are the IDPs, slums, unskilled wage laborers, the retrenched public service employees and other wage earners and government employees. Within these categories, women and children are those who suffer more.

At the same time, there were the policies favoring the mechanized rain fed farming and irrigated schemes. The result was the blocking of livestock routes and diminishing small-scale agricultural land resources, pushing pastoralists and subsistence farmers to lands of annual average rainfall below 600 mm. This again contributed to impoverishment of rural producers and
put more pressure on urban poor whose food depends on these rural producers.

The poverty analysis experts admitting that poverty is more than lack of income, opted for evaluating development from two perspectives of advancement made in enlarging human choices and reduced degree of deprivation as measured by the HDI. This entitlement approach was considered to fill gap in the deficient poverty-specific data and to adhere to the guidelines of targeting according to MDGs. In absence of high quality data collected by means of poverty-specific surveys and urgency to contribute to Sudan I-PRSP, the planning team borrowed data from non-poverty specific surveys. These surveys include: 1992 household budget survey, 1999- Safe Motherhood Survey (SMS) and 2000-Multiple Cluster Survey (MICS). There is highly relevant data availed by UNDP Human Development Report (1979), but was not used since it was not officially accepted by the government. The specific data sources were already identified within the set guidelines for preparing the I-PRSP.

Nevertheless, the identified deprivation indicators, in Northern Sudan include: deprivation in survival, knowledge and economic provisioning. Poverty maps were developed to show spatial disparities and compare the states with a national average. It is difficult to agree on having the Red Sea area in green (as is clear from the map) both in comparison to the national average and again green in the comparison to the average urban population. Probably there were problems related to population figures and limited attention to the effects of occurrence of drought, famine and consequently the displacement from rural to urban cities in the Red Sea area. Still there is much debate on the accuracy of the maps and the team was in (November, 2003) making the necessary amendments. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 as reflected in
the first IPRSP draft, explain the status in relation to some selected survival and knowledge indicators.

**Table (8.1): The Survival Indicators by Rural and Urban Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Rural (%)</th>
<th>Urban (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of death rate before age of 40 years</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate before age of 5 yrs</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The states reported to suffer more from knowledge deprivation are the Blue Nile, Northern and Western Kordofan States. Gender disparity with regards to gross basic education is 39.4 for females and 49.8 for males. The situation is more serious when looking at the percentages of deprivation from education for some states. The percentages of children at school age who are deprived from basic education are 83.1 percent, 81.1 percent, 76.9 percent and 70.6 percent in the Red Sea, Blue Nile, West Kordofan and...
South Darfur, respectively. When comparing this situation with the percent of children deprived from basic education in Khartoum States, (36.4 percent) the spatial disparities and center-periphery injustice become evident.

Decent life: Equates to deprivation from attaining decent standard of living for overall economic provisioning (adequate food intake, decent shelter, access to education, health services, to information, technology and recreational facilities.). Disparities of insufficient economic provisioning for rural and urban areas estimated to be 86.5 percent and 39.5 percent respectively. The disparities for insufficient economic provisioning for rural West Darfur, West Kordofan and Blue Nile are estimated at 99.8 percent, 99.4 percent and 97.8 percent. As far as the economic provisioning indicator, the average number of people unable to access electricity, safe drinking water, public health facility and those under poverty lines are 78.4 percent, 53 percent, 53.3 percent and 65.2 percent respectively. The most deprived regions are the Blue Nile, North Kordofan, West Darfur, Red Sea and Western Kordofan.

On the whole, the poverty diagnostic for the Sudanese Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) suffered from some major shortcomings: Official as well as research and academic community agreed upon no single workable definition for poverty and the poor. They waver between conceptions of poverty understood as: ‘inability to attain a minimum standard of living’ and ‘having a sense of decent life’. This is the same as ‘minimum subsistence’, which relates to the socio-cultural factors surrounding the social group. At the macro –level ‘poverty is failure to meet basic economic needs’ a concept which partially explains the criteria of poverty in the Sudanese context, indicating ‘insufficiency in economic, socio-cultural and political needs’. However, in its absolute term
vulnerability to being homeless, hungry or prone to famine is not uncommon. It is therefore important to decide whether we are using the absolute notion of poverty or the relative notion. The latter is related to relative standard that explains relative deprivation in relation to income and wealth and has much to do with inequality in distribution and social injustice. The absolute notion explains better the absolute deprivation. Moreover, vulnerability in the Sudanese context is where the cycle of absolute poverty, conflict, drought and resource-less-ness interact.

On the other hand the capability ‘resource endowment’ approach explains inability to access resources to have basic essential needs ‘absolute poverty’ or perceived needs ‘relative poverty’. In both cases it is a question of the resources available in rural or urban settings. It is important to dig for what linkages that exist between rural and urban. The capabilities in rural setting are mainly means to produce agricultural and livestock products, essential for subsistence and survival for urban dwellers. On the other hand the urban endowment links directly to the skills in services, technology and industry which are the backbone of the product and by-products of rural areas.

The way ahead to address poverty should then be immediate in the short term in case of (vulnerability) and (absolute deprivation); and long term for unjust distribution of (relative deprivation). Yet, the two strategies are inseparable whereby basis for the equity: spatially and socio-economic groupings should be built within the short-term strategies.

Measurable poverty issues such as the proportion and the spatial location of the poor, their poverty depth, and inequality among them, are very crucial for a comprehensive poverty assessment needed for setting objectives, targets and directions/policies for IPRSP/PRSP. This can only be
empirically fully addressed if high quality data are collected by means of poverty-specific surveys. The absence of this type of data together with the urgency to finalize the I-PRSP, data was borrowed from non-specific poverty surveys. The second and last household budget survey (the monetary approach to poverty) was carried out in 1978. Data and information sources are mainly being provided through relevant official channels at both federal and state level. Information and data at the community (grass-root) level, as mentioned earlier, was collected through the meetings of the working groups, who visited the States and few selected localities.

Data and information collected covered some selected poverty-related issues and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), e.g. state of poverty, level, depth magnitude and Human Development Index (HDI) to set objectives, priorities and targets. The poverty diagnostic relied on data accepted by the government on political grounds. Important data sources, as those of independent research work, the UNDP (NHDR, 1997) etc. were completely ignored by IPRSP consultants and planners. At least, independent sources should have been consulted to enrich discussion and degree of consensus on estimated rates of poor people.

As a result of the aforementioned constraints, data was borrowed from three different national surveys carried out for different purposes in different points of time. These surveys include 1992 household budget survey, which is de facto, called poverty survey, 1999 Safe Motherhood Survey (SMS) carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with UNFPA, and the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) in collaboration with UNICEF. The results from these available and borrowed data were utilized to map out income and Human Poverty in Northern Sudan in terms of deprivation in three dimensions: survival, knowledge and decent life.
From the above, it is evident there was an important attempt recognizes the importance of empirical analysis of the trends of poverty in the Sudan. By so doing it built essential grounds for the PRSP perspective that guides the overall policies and strategies related to income poverty. It is no doubt verifying the non-controversial magnitude on poverty and the wide agreement on its increasing trend. Yet, the concept of income poverty or the capability resource approach (HDI) does not fully explain the process and dynamism of poverty multifaceted nature in Sudan. Much of data and knowledge furnished through Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) was not used in the poverty diagnostic for the preparation of the I-PRSP. This is attributed possibly to the main officially accepted and identified reference sources within the guiding principles for I-PRSP preparation. If wider consultations occurred, there would be a possibility to reach widely agreed upon national poverty indicators. There were rich information and data on both urban and rural poor and at individual, household and community levels generated by national and international CSOs. The PPA approach could have generated more in-depth information and analysis on vulnerability, gender disparities in priorities and within household incomes. Moreover, poor people own analysis could help reduce biases in information, analysis and help shape the future policies. Of particular importance, are poor people own perceptions of poverty and voicing their own priorities. What is worth special mention is the area of common suffering share by both urban and rural poor such as safe drinking water and access to health facilities and drugs. That shared concern was missed in the poverty diagnostic, however realized in I-PRSP targets opting for MDGs.
Moreover, the income poverty trend analysis included a rural bias, in favor of the subsistence rural producers. While that is a legitimate recommendation, policy makers may opt for halting urban poverty reduction programmes. The rural-urban linkages and the dynamics of processes where not fully explored. It is no doubt the rural producers need the urban-based skills and purchasing power to increase productivity. On the other hand, the urban poor depend on rural producers for food and marketing. The fact that poverty is mentioned in the MDGs targets, without referring to clear policies on skills or access to capital or job opportunities yields that assumption. In addition, the notion itself of ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ within the Sudanese context is sometimes ambiguous taking note of ‘ruralization of urban settings’.

It is very difficult to trace in-depth analysis of the causes of poverty within the I-PRSP process. Within this complexity, identifying the key causes of poverty is a precondition for formulating an effective anti-poverty strategy. There were always some phrases that cite the war, natural catastrophes etc. as main causes of poverty. Independent analytical inputs stressed that causes human deprivation and poverty vary in nature and impact. They could be natural or man-made and could be local, regional or global. In the final analysis poor governance, which manifest itself at all levels, is to be held responsible for this destitute situation and for extreme poverty. Crises of war, famine, desertification and inappropriate, urban biased policies are attributed to poor governance. The persistent bias in favour of the centre, and in particular the interests of the political elite, explains better the state limited socially accountable governance.

Furthermore, power relations (from household to international governance levels) contributed significantly to the situation. Power relations
at household level explain the gender dimension of poverty, which could hardly be traced within the poverty diagnostic in the Sudanese case. There is essential need to develop national gender–poverty and gender development indicators to help develop gender sensitive policies to close the gaps in knowledge, basic capabilities and head for gender empowerment. Compounded by the burden of natural disasters and civil war, this failure has manifested itself in limited and inequitable access to all forms of capital: human, physical, financial and social. Deprivation from capital inevitably leads to lack of remunerative employment and low social welfare.

In absence of poverty-focused surveys and data, the I-PRSP secretariat, admitted that there were no options than to borrow data from non-poverty focused surveys. The aim was to come up with some indicators with the intention to be amended later after carrying households' budget surveys within the forthcoming preparatory phase of PRSP. Accordingly, the I-PRSP economic expert relied heavily on the data availed by the HHS (1992), SMS (1999) and MICS (2000). They were meant to measure poverty and develop poverty indicators for the North. They were not designed for poverty surveys. Despite, coverage of the MICS for three major towns in Southern Sudan, it excluded rural southern Sudan that was not reflected in poverty analysis and maps. Moreover, the data and analysis suffer from shortcomings in relation to causes of poverty, the socio-economic characteristics of the poor and experiences of the poor in coping with stress. This limitation would have been surmounted had there been a political will to consult poor people through participatory analysis workshops at community levels. The fact that the exercise was limited to intellectual inputs, deskwork by officials, the quality of data and analysis will continue to suffer from lack of consensus. Official recognition of deficiency in
poverty related data is by itself a step forward. Emphasis on launching population census and household budget surveys within the I-PRSP period would be a major achievement. However, the contents would have benefited immensely if shared analysis of existing data occurred. Research centers, universities and both INGOs and NGOs (though of limited coverage) had furnished useful knowledge about the extent, magnitude and perceptions of poverty at grass roots level.

8.3 The Macro-economic Framework:

Economic reform packages have been implemented since late 1970s. However, growth was negative up to 1990s. Substantial reforms were undertaken during the 1990s. In early 1992 stabilization policies began to yield encouraging results. From 1997 onwards reforms were further deepened and speeded up, with the assistance of the IMF. Macro-economic imbalances and inflation were curbed and space was paved for the private sector. These reforms were accompanied by revival of economic growth and increases in average per capita income. Annual average per capita income accelerated from 1.2 percent during 1990-1995 to more than 4 percent during 1996-2001. But, the poor were not able to catch up, because there were no definite policies favoring them.

State-controlled development policies suppressed economic growth and hence undermined efficiency. The type of structural adjustment undertaken in the Sudan had resulted in cuts in social spending, deterioration of basic service infrastructure and consequently exacerbated poverty. Privatization of public enterprises did not clearly impact positively on improvement in efficiency. It was a hasty and shaky attempt that contributed
to private monopolies and retrenchment in public service sector. The public sector, which was the main source of employment completely collapsed due to politicization and cuts in public expenditure. As a consequence the middle class significantly squeezed, civil service collapsed and safety nets based on social linkages were lost. Under such a situation of macroeconomic performance and inflationary conditions, unemployment rose and real wages fell inevitably, poverty mounted.

In Sudan, there are certain imbalances that call for economic growth and economic structure within a framework of development. Clear indicators should be developed on the impact of above policies on poverty, impact on services and their impact on economic growth. How positive growth rates trickle down on the poor and the essential services should be spelt out in the policy matrix. Regional disparities, gender disparities and people and regions affected by war should be top on the agenda of a clearly spelt out and committed distribution policy.

There has been high growth but distorted distribution. Expenditure on social services was cut by more than 50 percent relative to gross domestic product (GDP) between 1992-1998 causing considerable reduction in social services and infrastructure. It is therefore, questionable whether this growth is accompanied by pro-poor structural reforms. Atabani paper contributed much to developing a pro-poor policy framework for the I-PRSP.

Official records of the draft IPRSP material, October 2003, indicate the following macro-economic performance indicators: annual Average National Growth is −1.2 percent; Public Expenditure exceeds revenue, recording a budget deficit of 9.8 percent of GDP in (1989/90); Inflation was 72 percent due to increased money stock by 156 percent by the end of the
year 1990 and the Balance of Trade deficit jumped from US$ 362 million in (1980) to US$ 848 million in (1998). However, same official sources reported positive performance attributed to the midterm economic salvation programme (1990-1993). A programme that established economic liberalization policies, in pricing; internal and external trade systems; privatization and controlled role of public sector institutions and revision of the legal framework and by-laws that restricts the role of the private sector.

Official sources indicated annual growth rate of (+ 1.2 percent) in (1990/91 which reached afterwards (8.9 percent) in (1994/95). Currently the officially recorded average growth rate is (6 percent). The oil industry presumably aided the economic growth recovery process. Despite the fact that there is a positive growth rates, according to official sources, it is difficult to trace any positive trickledown effect on the poor. At same time, this did not stop the growth in liquidity, increased inflation rate and deterioration of the exchange rates. Inflation rate reached (130 percent) in (1996). The excuse, as usual, was the gulf war, civil war and decreased external development support and expatriates remittances, in Gulf region. The liberalization policies were reinforced in the period (1997-2003) through improved monetary policies and reforming the banking systems. The aim was to decrease the inflation rate, perceived as main reason behind economic instability.

The Macro-policy Framework, however, was believed to generate positive changes as follows: stability of exchange rates; Economic Growth Rate increased to more than double of population growth rate; Budget deficit decreased from 4 percent in 1992/93 to 1 percent by 1999; Currency annual average exposure decreased from 83 percent for the period 1990-1995 to 25 percent for the period 1997-2001; the deficit in current account is reported as
0.2 percent of the GNP and the inflation rate is stable at less than 10 percent. Moreover, a number of measures were introduced to address poverty situation including:

1. Macro-economic policies targeting agriculture and rural areas. However it is difficult to record changes in investment e.g. in subsistence farming or pastoralist communities, where 70 percent of population is recorded. The same period coincides with the jailing of farmers, especially in mechanized farming schemes, due to default in agricultural loan repayments.

2. Increased salaries of civil service sector. Same time, huge number of civil service employees and laborers lost their jobs. What used to be the middle class almost disappeared.

3. Support states in order to provide essential social services: education, health and water).

4. Laws and bi-laws for production, marketing and distribution of products. The collapse of the social service infrastructure, quality and quantity of service are recorded, at all official levels. At the same time, despite talk about center support to state, there is wide perception among locality officials and people that it is just load shedding policies.

5. National Funds (Sanduk): Zakat Chamber, Takaful (social support), Social Development Saving Bank (SDF) which support poor families has a limited coverage, is sometimes politicized and selectively target communities and individuals.

The I-PRSP macro-economic objective, as indicated in the draft IPRSP (October 2003) is to achieve sustainable economic growth rate within a
range of 6 to 7 percent, and decrease inflation rate to 5 to 6 percent (on average) annually, and achieve stability in exchange rate. On the other hand the policy directions to achieve these objectives comprises: development of traditional farming and livestock sector; public investments; increased productivity in the irrigated farming sector; motivation of the private sector, and investment in infrastructure.

On the other hand the monetary policy objective is to decrease the overall budget deficit to one percent of the GDP, through increased revenues from real resources. However, there are fears of increased expenditure on rehabilitation and development of war-affected areas. The option might then be increased revenues from customs, oil pricing and widening the direct tax base. If there is huge increase international flow of funds once a peace agreement is signed, this could compensate for the added expenditures. Moreover, the HIPC initiative, activation of donor roles and financing institution, is a source on which the government does count.

The past macro economic performance as is clear in the I-PRSP, highlights the high increase in the rate of growth of GDP in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. However, it is admitted that efforts in poverty reduction fall behind. These efforts were sporadic and not pursued as a coherent strategy supported with appropriate distribution policies and programmes. The increase in the rate of GNP is expected to reflect positively on incomes and consequently ability to access goods and services. Increased incomes supposedly lead to increase in the supply of goods and services, which increases production and thus opening new employment opportunities. Increased employment, leading to increased wages and salaries is expected to increase government revenues, which could be used in investment on project and services. This remained as theoretical assumptions
that lead to skepticism about whether the growth is real, in the sense that it is not linked with production. Moreover, the role of oil in the economic stability and increased growth rate remains obscure. Oil exports same year account for about 75% of total exports. In all cases, the information on oil revenues and its role in financing the reduction of poverty is not shared by the public and is treated with limited transparency. The poor people and CSO organizations count much on the role of oil in addressing people sufferings.

The I-PRSP has yet to clarify how the growth strategy would be translated into welfare improvements for the poor. For the policies are not clear on how growth is distributed fairly and how is it going to reach the poor. There is vital need for clearly stated distribution policies and commitment of the government translated into just public allocations, financing basic services and closing gaps in regional and gender disparities.

There is need for improved understanding and analysis of the links between growth, development and poverty reduction. Income distribution policies are central to assure this linkage. Growth requires sound macro-economic and structural policies while development and poverty reduction require sound social and distributional policies. Therefore pro-poor growth is necessary for poverty reduction and could only happen if facilitated by pro-poor macro-economic and distributional policies. It is generally acknowledged that economic growth does not necessarily trickle down on poorer sections of the society. The Sudanese case better illustrates this statement, particularly since 1996 where an annual growth rate is positive and stable reaching 6 percent per annum.
8.4 Governance: Institutions and Structures

Good governance is advocated on basis of creation of new institutions and reforming and strengthening of existing ones to enhance transparency and accountability. Effectiveness of Audit General Office, financial and fiscal allocation and monitoring commissions, review of procurement rules and abolishing Government monopolies, enacting Anti-poverty trust was envisioned. There is also need to establish Lands Claim Commission, enhanced independence of the Judiciary, an Electoral, Human Rights and Public Service Commissions.

A Federal system had been created in 1992. Many functions were devolved to the States for management. The constitution reserves six sources of revenue for the States (business profit tax, excise duties and fees, profits of State’s projects and internal grants, loans and credit facilities). In addition, the states get their share of revenues from taxes imposed on their behalf by the Federal Government (e.g. part of VAT) and taxes and fees levied by their own legislature. But the tax rates are being set by the Federal Government and the states could alter the total amounts received. The National Fund for State Support (NFSS) was created to administer the grant system. The followings make some of the recommended policies in this respect:

- Adopting policies designed to bring about more devolution of rights and obligations to State and local levels. It is essential that these rights be identified and spelt out in legislation. Rights to access public funding in relation to own resource base and historical injustices have to be transparently stated.
• Enable states to generate and control its own revenues and be responsible for service delivery. The current debate on agricultural taxes is a good example that does not advocate such a policy of ‘own resources’. There is wide complaint that collected taxes and revenues do not show up in the form of services. Transparency and accountability is only guaranteed by social policies and representation of people in decision-making institutions at the respective governance level.

• Improve service delivery mechanisms and institutions at state and locality levels. The civil service and the related training and promotion system together with work environment and work facility specifically, require special attention.

• Enhanced capacities of civil society organizations to effectively participate in poverty alleviation programmes. It is essential to review the laws governing CSOs to have more space and acquire a legitimate position in policy and decision-making institutions e.g. I-PRSP policy review and implementation and monitoring institutions.

• There are immense difficulties in capacities, good governance issues and limited democratization, even at Federal level. This might be an appealing policy in the long run, provided that there are revisions of the governance structures, at all levels, particularly with the peace process.

8.5 Current Status of MDGs

The table below indicates the status in Sudan compared with Arab countries, LDCs and Developing countries. Sudan reads lowest in rates of enrollment to basic education (60 percent) and rate of people accessing safe
drinking water (60 percent). The HIV/AIDS is highest compared to Arab countries.

### Table (8.3) Poverty Related indicators compared to LDCs and Arab Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>LDCs</th>
<th>Arab Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment in B. education</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy rate</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>68/1000</td>
<td>104/1000</td>
<td>55/1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate of children under 5</td>
<td>103/1000</td>
<td>161/1000</td>
<td>72/1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality rate</td>
<td>509/1000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to safe D. water</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage with public health facility</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is worth mentioning that all the identified forms of deprivation are spread all over the Sudan, though with marked disparities within and among States. Addressing all forms of deprivation simultaneously and in all states would require levels of social spending that might not be forthcoming from government and donors within the foreseen future.

Sectoral prioritization was pursued within the I-PRSP with a view to meeting MDGs targets. This was intended to help overall geographical
prioritization for the sectoral interventions, while the intra-state disparities may be addressed by compiling indicators at locality level.

On top of above targets, acute poverty due to conflicts, drought and floods remains the main challenge for the Sudanese people. Unjust wealth transfer and aggressive market mechanism always worsen vulnerable masses situation. This normally results in socio economic injustices and consolidation of pauperization. There is therefore need to define clear directions and priority strategies and programmes focusing on extreme poverty. The focus on incidence and intensity of poverty distracted the attentions away from the underlying causes of poverty to be worked upon. It is worth noting that participatory poverty assessment studies carried by independent researchers and CSOs (Nur1990s and 2003) and Oxfam (1998) generally came up with shared priorities in both urban and rural setting: enrollment in basic, quality education and dropout of children at school age; safe drinking water as a primary health component. Despite the fact that there is a marked rural - urban gap in access to safe drinking water, only 59.8 percent in Khartoum use water from pipes. The rest who have access to drinking water from public tap suffer from affordability ‘water vendors’ and or ‘health hazards’ and the drudgery of water fetching by female children and communicable diseases viz. malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB make serious threats to the livelihood of both urban and rural poor.

8.6 Engendering Poverty and Development

Women according to 1993 census constitute 50 % of the population. Literate women in northern Sudan were 42.4% while literate men were 66.6 % (1993). Female enrolment at pre-primary level is 47%, primary level 40% and 46% at secondary level, according to Arab Human Development Report,
Gender gap in education is quite apparent when comparing male/female enrolment. The Human Development Report, 1999 indicated that 87% of women in Sudan work in traditional agro-pastoralist sector where work in underestimated. The Sudan Demographic Health Survey (1999) estimated maternal mortality rate by 509/100,000 live birth and total fertility rate was 5.9. On the other hand, women who use modern family planning methods make 12% in urban and only 2% in rural areas.

The women in workforce constitute 26% of total workforce in Sudan (census 1993). The percentage of top female managers is 3.3% out of total top management level; however, women in professional and technical jobs make 44% in public sector, according to human Development Report, 1999. Moreover, women, in particular in rural areas are more affected by poverty than others in terms of displacement, and the increasing phenomenon of female-headed households. According to some research findings female-headed households account for 24-26 percent of all households especially in some rural areas stricken by factors of war, drought, and male migration in search of income opportunities. The poverty of the displaced women staying in the host community, mostly urban, is perpetuated by their lack of education and vocational skills compatible with urban labour market. In addition to inaccessibility to urban skilled labour markets, women’s economic empowerment has also been severely constrained by unequal access to and control over the means of production, particularly land and credit and productive assets.

The I-PRSP is deficient in sufficient gender analysis. Illiteracy among women is 64 percent, which is higher than among men (42 percent). A wide variation does exist within and between different states and between rural
and urban areas. School dropout rates are also higher among girls, particularly in internally displaced communities and in rural areas.

Compared to men, women are more vulnerable to health problems particularly during their reproductive age. Pregnancy and child bearing within absolute poverty situations are more hazardous to women and children. Health services, e.g. primary health units and/or trained midwives, are either lacking or not functioning. In absence of government support to health services, access to health care service is getting expensive and consequently hardly accessible to many people. However, the targets of health and education focused on gender disparities. Taking the proportion of women in the population and evident gender gaps in the reproductive, productive and socio-political roles, mainstreaming in relation to further in-depth gender analysis is paramount to test effectiveness of the plan. Addressing gender-poverty related indicators should be the over-riding policy and programme guidelines, in light of the complex situation of Sudan, where women suffer more even within the poor. To be more focused, effectiveness of the I-PRSP could be high if it only addressed gender disparities along the identified poverty indicators.

8.7 Environmental Sensitivity

War and environmental degradation in rural areas caused the destruction of production base and led to the displacement of about six million persons (almost 25 percent of the population). Most of the IDPs, due to drought, moved into towns ending up unemployed or at best underemployed in the informal sector.

The dominant agreement within the environmentalists groups is that there is a generic relationship between environmental deterioration and
poverty. Poverty is believed to be a consequence of environmental deterioration more than a cause for deterioration of the natural environment. Poor public health and sanitation contribute significantly to decreasing people capacities for production, access to income and basic needs. A variety of essential activities in industry, modern farming and expansion of rain fed-mechanized farming, land mining, fuel wood trade, silting and salinity in agricultural lands are held responsible for the wide range of manmade environmental hazards.

The distribution of wealth and power within communities, and at state or regional levels, and the mode of living tend to escalate the disparity between the rich and poor, causing conflicts. This has increased pressure on poor people who in turn put pressure on marginal resources for their survival, a process that is contributing to the aggravation of environmental problems. Therefore a balanced and sustained utilization of natural resources require the mainstreaming of environment in any kind of human activity that takes place. While working on to improve poor people livelihood, and reduce exhaustive use of resources, alternative approaches should be introduced such as for improving access to cheap energy.

Environmental awareness and environment sensitive attitudes and practices have to be incorporated in basic education curricula, and health and agro pastoral programs. Policies contributing environmental deteriorations and conflict over resources should be improved. Environmental monitoring, evaluation and impact indicators should be in-built for any development program.
8.8 HIV/ AIDS: Magnitude of the Plight

HIV/AIDS is spreading in Sudan at alarming rates. According to HIV/AIDS surveillance reports of Sudan National Aids Control Program (SNAP) of the Federal Ministry of Health, the first reported two cases were in 1986, in Juba, Southern Sudan. From 1987 to June 2002 a total of 8918 had been officially recorded. These include 4351 AIDS cases and 4567 symptomatic cases. There are 600,000 cases reported to date and the prevalence rate is 1.6 percent. The estimated number of adults and children living with HIV/AIDS, end of 2001 (UNAIDS/WHO, 2002) were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adults (15-49)</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (15-49)</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (0-15)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimated number of deaths due to AIDS in 2001 was 23,000 and the estimated number of children orphans who lost parents due to AIDS were 62,000. Moreover, the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, 2000 indicated clearly the gender dimension of HIV/AIDS. Women aged (15-45) who have knowledge about the disease were estimated in table (8.4)
Table (8.4): Women knowledge about HIV/AIDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Heard of AIDS (%)</th>
<th>Know 2 ways to prevent transmission (%)</th>
<th>Have sufficient knowledge (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban S Sudan</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban N Sudan</td>
<td>8421</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural No Sudan</td>
<td>14526</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to work out the potential threat and forecast the negative impact of the disease on socio-economic development especially that the highest range affected is those in the economically active age group (15-49 years). The prevailing conditions of large scale poverty and continuous population movements of mainly refugees, IDPs, soldiers, traders and others make HIV/AIDS a real threat. The general rate of spread of the disease is 1 percent (Al-Ray Al-Aam, 2002:15). While most states have no record on prevalence of HIV/AIDS records show high prevalence rates in Bahr El Gebel (Equatoria), Khartoum, Kassala, Gedarif, Nahr El Nil and Port Sudan. It is clear that the disease is spreading all over the country. Sudan faces a serious threat from its spread from neighboring countries. Targeting HIV/AIDS within the IPRSP is not explicit. Therefore, mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS should be explicit in the plan policies and programmes. Policy options to be opted to should care for prevention through developing a national plan to combat HIV/AIDS. There is vital need to establish a national council for coordination and implementation of that
plan. While being addressed within a holistic approach to PHC, and as spreading epidemic, the other socio-economic measures to improve well being of people shall help diminish the potential dangers of HIV/AIDS.

HIV/AIDS undermine economic growth, poverty reduction and human development goals in Africa. Same time the poor are at high risk of infection. The Sudanese case clearly shows the relationship between conflicts and HIV/AIDS. The issue of governance in Sudan, at all levels, is held directly responsible from the vicious circle of conflicts and the related poverty, HIV/AIDS and poor development and growth.

8.9 The Failed attempt of PRSP: The missing link and inclusion

Approved comprehensive and country owned poverty strategy (PRSP) was an integral part of illegibility of Sudan for international development assistance and debt relief. For approval Sudan must comply with a prescriptive process, which is accepted by the Joint Staff Assessment team of IMF/WB. The prescriptive process demanded that PRSP process should be a consultative process involving wider popular participations, good governance and serious steps forwards. The Government (2000 –2002) focused on preparation of a PRSP. By end of 2002, the aim was changed to focus on preparation of I-PRSP after the failing attempt to prepare the PRSP. The PRSP process ceased because of its limited coverage (focusing only on Northern Sudan), absence of data (last Household Budget Survey, 1978) and weak capacities for in-depth analysis and the anticipated changes in the political environment.

Government or people ownership, who is to be empowered poor people or government leaders? are issues of high importance to the I-PRSP process. Also there were the unresolved issue of partnership or patron client
relationships between governments and donors. Some of these issues were voiced strongly by the CSOs representatives.

Despite the fact that the number of civil society organizations has tremendously increased during the past few years, yet the contribution to IPRSP was minimal due to lack or insufficient information about these organizations, low capacity of the majority of these organizations, lack of clear vision of the definition and conceptual understanding of poverty besides the fact that the overall political environment demerits real and effective participation of all actors of the society in decision-making process. The main factors hindered the effective are lack of involvement of civil society organizations and private sector. There is also failing political will and commitment to respect and deal with diversity; absence of formulation and achievement of an integrated country-wide I-PRSP. The constraints of diversities in ecosystem, ethnicities, cultural and demographic features characterizing each and every state, locality and community; together with protracted droughts and conflicts hindered even claims to put poverty top of the agenda in civil society and government work. The civil war in some parts of the country, displacement, migration, in addition to uneven development and poor services delivery across almost all sectoral and spectrum of People. This required empowerment and motivation of People at state and localities level to effectively participate in the I-PRSP processes. Furthermore there is the limitations of the Federal System, in terms of capacity and social accountability, to effectively respond to the real needs of local population e.g. adequate devolution to the people of the states and localities to exercise power and demand accountability, promotion of fiscal discipline and responsibility...etc. Above
all there is the unfavorable and disabling environment for meaningful involvement of civil society organizations, including the private sector and the organizations officially labeled as opposition i.e. political parties and NGOs. Capacities of existing civil society organizations, in terms of bargaining power and influence capacities are rudimentary. In some instances, stakeholders are suffering from lack of capacities at all levels (Federal line Ministries, State, localities) in information and data on poverty, and ability to participate in building the capacities of civil society organization and help enable them to participate in the I-PRSP processes.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION: EMERGING TRIANGLE OF NETWORK AND INFLUENCE

This chapter is trying to bring for conclusion the key research concepts and research findings and suggest specific concluding statements on future strategic thinking on development model and anticipated roles of state and civil society organizations. The chapter focuses on the possibility of developing a sound, participatory development model that bring together various stakeholders of indigenous civil society, NGOs and state structures (at various levels) for mutual support and influence, particularly on issues that directly relate to people livelihood and development aspirations.

9.1 Rethinking Relations: State- Civil Society and Development

As explained by many scholars, civil Society as a historically produced Civil society being a space of ethical life, which combined economy, social clans, private sector, has been a battlefield where interests meet. Formation of social and professional associations and multi-party political system was an option to link the super structure and the infra-structure development. A process of live; dynamic and sustainable societal interaction was then founded.

Democracy is effective and powerful wherever there are civil society institutions performed its anticipated roles and vise versa. Moreover, society was becoming distinct from the state. A public sphere was established, not governed by the state mechanisms or even the market (profit) mechanisms.
Civil society was subjected to many tensions as to whether it is apolitical (without politics) or has political roles without being playing partisan politics. In all cases the struggle for democracy without a role of civil society is difficult to imagine.

It is argued here that civil society organizations (should not be) the representative organizations (at the expense of the representative councils), whereby there is important role for state institutions. The power of civil society and indigenous NGOs power is measured by the degree of alliance, networking around actions and decisions shaping politics, policies or legislations for the benefit of majority of citizens. NGOs have own contributions in the battle for democracy, but do not substitute the roles of political parties or the popular unions and associations.

The diverse use of the concept is justified by the aspirations of many for equality, more participation or more justice and representation. Participation is mainly the social participation to enjoy these rights i.e. decentralized decision-making, self–management (face to face democracy).

Interest in social capital is derived from concerns about the persistence of social exclusion and poverty in affluent societies. Social capital is the social relationships between people that enable productive outcomes. It refers to stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems: poverty; economic under development and inefficient government. The indigenous civil society, however, is historically rooted as informal social capital norms and organizations but suffer from legal legitimacy and recognition or support by state authorities.
NGOs contribute to fostering popular participations; articulating the needs of the weak. Voluntary people organizations have the capacity of working in remote areas, therefore, effective in changing attitudes and practices of the local officials and local people. Local indigenous NGOs are more authentically participatory, accountable and legitimate; hence essential to promote endogenous and sustainable forms of democracy. It is therefore essential that all strategic actors become partners rather than competitors. NGOs and CSOs should work hand in hand with the state.

The state is perceived as a patron, top – down, undemocratic and authoritarian apparatus for coercion rather than developmental political organization. There is need to reverse the main stream that popular system of governance always work parallel to the official system using social networks. State – civil society is relationship is complex require rethinking to assure addressing the needed change. There is need to shift to more participatory development, however, implies reinforcing longer term partnership on long term interventions.

Participatory development is impossible without understanding the underlying institutions or rules of the game between different stakeholders’ Poor people suffer from sense of marginalization, wide spread underdevelopment and poverty. The vulnerability and short term shocks require poor people enabling to address challenges of a lasting reduction in vulnerability and poverty.

The relationship of poor people and excluded groups is characterized by various differentiations on basis of gender, ethnicity, asset base and other diversity factors. Political development of the poor through investment in their organizational development and enhancing their bargaining capacity
and extent of networks, alliances and pressure groups activism is a must to address main stream politics and development policies.

Evidences from current Sudanese experiences showed need to deal directly with own people organizations i.e. CBOs that is formed by them and they directly benefiting from it, to plan, execute and run the public infrastructure of services, in particular, water and sanitation, health and basic education. Within this move, there is need for a systematic support and engagement of local governments, NGOS and private sector organizations.

To achieve both economic and non-economic goals, there is need to change the structures of society government relationship. Such a model is basically to sustain change and progress.

It is true that no development can occur without growth but also true it could not happen automatically from economic growth. It is also true that no development can yield without accumulation of wealth to be reinvested to achieve both economic growth and development and consequently improved quality of life and livelihood systems for masses of people.

People have to have opportunities to improve capacities and widen space for participation in decision –making. The claimed participatory democracy cannot occur in a vacuum; therefore a civic democratic state is a legitimate claim. It is truly argued that there is no social change without democracy and no democratic achievement without social progress.

Multiple linkages and networks which run vertically and horizontally are the only way through which people could improve and sustain their livelihood. The informal indigenous organizations were more or less ignored by authoritarian regimes and in the run up to democratization.
There is vital need that for open decision and policy making processes whereby the policy makers are open and listen to people and civil society organizations. The political commitment of the regime is a main guarantee for the soundness of that participatory development and change model. Moreover, whatever model that claims democratization and social equity should answer the legitimate question of how the socially excluded groups (women, minorities, ethnic groups etc) could really be included and have a workable model to enjoy political and economic rights and feasible interaction with the state?.

Any viable future model should be built on knowing properly our local social structures and our analysis of own experience with democracy, development and Civil Society. The latter within context limited democratization in political parties, could be a tool for vivid Civil society and a tool for democratization, provided that it becomes part of civic movement struggling for democracy and developmental state. Social transformation does not occur without attacking the existing power structures which require political development. Political Development implies changes in the organization of public life, especially of the government.

Organizations are keys for socio-economic and political development, especially if they work on basis of networks and federations and act on: broadening constituency and social activities; state – CSO engagement and partnership; local legitimacy, self reliance and autonomous functioning. Also there is need for alliance building with 'Similar same mind organizations including political parties. The history of emergence, growth and functioning of the Sudanese civil society, on the other hand, indicates better the CSO role and civic activism in relation to the State, as independent
actors throughout the historical process of social change. It shows also the development of democratic change as strongly linked with role of CSO and NGOs in improving governance and fostering popular participation. Social activism, civic movements and charitable and self-reliant voluntary are gaining grounds as shown by many cases. They had played significant roles in political development and: democratic governance, claiming equity, popular participation and just access to power and resource structures. Over time, the Sudanese indigenous organizations and modern civil society organizations became reliable vehicles and supportive to participation, good governance and playing significant role in promoting more social and economic development.

Accordingly, any sound development model is to be based on supporting own people organization, own development initiatives, to assure sustainable improvement of people welfare, livelihood and achievement of their aspirations. The corner stone of the model should include more space for political, democratic participation and enabling people to articulate and voice aspirations and participate in decision-making structures. This requires greater self-confidence and own people organizations and initiative support, within an enabling environment that is open, with transparent government institutions. The only viable option is to act as partners in engagement forums, socio-economic development institutions and policy debate forums.

The model calls for just, democratic socio-economic and political development that link micro-with macro levels of governance structures (both government and CSO). This holistic development approach should address the challenges of: poverty; inequality, democratic participation and social justice. It is true this cannot happen without economic surplus through equitable economic growth and development. Equity should be addressed
through targeting poor sectors of the community to assure equitable access to basic services; access to, control and use of means production (capital, labour, natural resources etc) and break factors of isolation, marginalization, oppression, exploitation and exclusion. Gender and environment sensitivity and alert to violent conflicts are prerequisites for success of such a development model. Most crucial, moreover, are the state level policies that deal with economic and natural resources e.g. investment; minerals; oil and investment in infrastructure and human resources.

NGOs and CBOs together with informal indigenous groupings and social capital norms give sole opportunity to independently organize the marginalized, disadvantaged, poor people of the rural and urban (unorganized) poor communities and groups who make the vast majority of the Sudanese population. These own people organizations should be the guardians for sound development models – that help transform the poor, low income communities and groups. These organizations and development model (a holistic one) is a pre-requisite for social change for the majority of Sudanese people.

9.2 The State-Social Capital Synergy: A Development Model

The social capital and traditional trust and reciprocity structures help building strong intra community ties and developed a sense of identity and common purpose as showed by the surveyed Sudanese rural and urban communities of Kassala state in Eastern Sudan. The value of organizing together within modern organization, cases of development CBOs and NGOs, had encouraged inter-community ties across diversity viz. religion; ethnicity, gender and socio-economic class. People strongly indicated the values shared and in turn the shared socio-economic gains and outcomes of
working together around common issues and concerns. No doubt there was a wide range of services and jointly addressing disaster and negative economic consequences. Within that, people solidarity and people joint actions had developed (as in both rural and urban cases) and accordingly strong sense of commitment and obligations towards the common goal and community concerned are apparent.

Participation in wider networks and relations, though remained highly limited and informal, but recent moves of linking with other established forms of national and international actors of NGOs and United Nations organizations helped leaders of poor communities to acquire skills of modern organizations, development thinking and envisioning the future and also accessing more resources and joining the main stream socio-economic and political spheres. People had access to diverse welfare due to linking with diverse groups and organizations e.g. access to services, loans, small business and other means of livelihood in both rural and urban areas. People clearly indicated that belonging to organized groups and use of social capital i.e. trust, solidarity and reciprocity helped and protected them and their communities and proved to be effective as a risk management tool. Contrary to traditional tribal democracy which rests on informal consultations and decision-making based on direct inputs of influential community leaders, the modern development organizations proved a clear trend towards more of inclusive direct democratic practices with people at grass roots level, encouraging marginalized groupings e.g. women case of urban setting.

On the other hand, people of these poor communities share the wide skepticism about the role of state and state structures. They rarely mention any positive role played by the government to help the address their periods of crisis, stress or the extreme poverty situation. There was general
consensus that the government over the past ten years did not support any welfare or socio-economic development programme of both communities. They mention limited services of the police, the local education authorities and agricultural extension staff. On the contrary, people feel highly indebted to their own social connectedness and the NGO community (being local, national or foreign). This question the macro-micro level linkages and the policy environment and institutional framework that help build systematic interaction between people and the state structures.

A democratic, developmental state is the most appealing model that could make the state-civil society synergy and guarantee an acceptable degree of just, inclusive socio-economic and political change. This model has to be built on an institutional arrangement that collectively bring people interest and establish credible governance structures of proven social accountability. Developmental synergy between various actors (on the ground at micro level) and the policy level (state macro level) require mutually supportive mechanisms.

9.3. Likelihood for a Sound Development Model:

Development is not apolitical it represent conflicting interest of groups. Development addresses or creates conflict between various actors. The business, Government and civil society i.e. conflict of interest but dynamic interaction that affects the political decision process. Decision making on development process is, dominated by government or economic market actors, because NGOs and Civil Society are still in the making and only play a minor role in decision-making.
There is little room for the indigenous social capital in the process of policy making. The core issue, here, is the public participation in decision making, particularly, in development planning and policy formulation. The decision making is controlled by the state apparatus where tensions are always apparent. The model below shows the relationship between the state government; the business sector and civil society relationship along few selected strategic indicators of vision; resource use and organizational aspects. The arrows explain the tensions related to the vicious circles of: a) visions of Growth-Development and Poverty; b) Resource use in relation to Efficiency-Justice and Competition and c) organizational dimension in relation to representative organization- state control and genuine partnership. While the dimensions in both (a) and (b) cannot be escaped, however needed; and realizing of the needed roles and inputs of the state and civil society, there is no option than to work out a genuine partnership involving the state; business and civil society.

The government is main holder of political and economic power. Tensions occur among the three social actors: the government, the business and civil society along the three parameters of vision i.e. their conceptions and future anticipated achievements; the material and technological use for purposes of production and consumption and the organizational dimension whereby ideas are translated into practical achievements. Knowing the limitation of this research, as working towards a network of influence between civil society, indigenous NGOs and the state; the business sector is a research gap that requires further research.
Figure (9.1): The Model and Business-Government and Civil Society Tensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Management Indicator</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Government Tensions</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (vision)</td>
<td>Economic Growth (profit)</td>
<td>Sustainable livelihood (decent and progressing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of technology and of resources</td>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>Access to and control over resources (Radical and effective use)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Corporate business management</td>
<td>Public participation or community mgt. and networking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is generally accepted that private entrepreneur development stimulate science and technology and develop own people investment capacity, use labour; skills and resources efficiently. In most cases, the state dominated models 'socialist' or 'market oriented' did not work, particularly those similar to the Sudanese context. There is always need for public scrutinizing to what the state or private sector investment.

Moreover, there are three important factors that shape the civil society –state relationship:- These are a- mainly the ideology or ethics e.g. justice and the other values dominating civil society; b- participatory management vs. the governments bureaucracy and c- democratic governance and alliance building and power relations. It is a legitimate concern to what extent these people organizations i.e. Indigenous social capital, formal modern society organizations could build a viable democratic alliance to better interact with the government.

People democratic organizations and alliance foster freedom and democratic associational life on basis of interests and right to a say. Values of social justice; equity and cultural respect and claims for environment and gender sensitivity and claims for peace lie in the heart of the missions of these democratic civil society organizations.

In order to integrate social – economic and environmental concerns into the state policy and programme agenda, the development model should work towards promote pluralism; diversification; and participatory mechanisms. It should also establish programmes that ensure social equity and quality of life improvements.

Other pillars of sound development model should assure use of modern technology; social capital and governance system without rejecting
traditional technology or traditional organizations or even traditional governance structures. Established networks and alliances and engagement forums are necessary to guarantee a workable relationship between state, citizens and business. Finally, the objectives of such a model should be strategic and long term change objective, not only meeting immediate wants.

The endeavor is own development path with use and support of (modern) and (traditional); local and national; 'external' and 'endogenous' knowledge and institutions. The decisive factors are establishing own endogenous social capital; own capacity to identify needs and formulate specific tasks to be implemented. Selecting the right appropriate technologies (inside or outside) and access and use of such a technology will be a challenge. Same is the establishment of own capacity to institutionalize and work out the needed alliances and mechanisms for policy formulation and the necessary social forces.

Citizens' livelihood and role of citizens as participants in the development process; 'right to know'; 'right to a say'; right to be heard and the right for association to form interest group or a pressure group are prerequisites for direct participation in development i.e. direct democracy. These are basics for developing sound, sustainable development networks and alliances. Moreover, the cases from Sudanese urban and rural areas, illustrate clearly that social capital is the final resort and safety net for the majority of poor community members. The family, parents, friends, religion and social or tribal ethnic connectedness and volunteering and mutual support mechanisms contribute for individuals, families and community projects. These together with the support of modern organizations, particularly Development NGOs, proved to be the most viable tool to face the reality of government withdrawal from its social accountability and
responsiveness to people needs. People used to call upon social capital and the leverage of community organizations and external support civil society actors in both crisis situations and initiatives to address challenges ahead facing livelihood improvement. Social ties became a liability well as an asset, therefore, have significant implications on coping with stress, poverty reduction and economic development. This clearly indicates the importance of social capital and people own organizations as essential tools in the participatory development process and becoming the real capital of the poor.

Addressing the challenges with a socially and politically sensitive context, like the Sudanese situation, sound development models should take into consideration the following points of entries viz. stakeholder mapping and in-depth stakeholder interest analysis to assure social and conflict sensitive interventions and Encouraging people to organize and voice interest and come together to claim for wants and strategic needs and assured democratic and participatory environment and systematic support of organizational capacities, particularly for excluded and marginalized poor communities and groups.

There is crucial need for simple and accessible tools and means for information and communication within and with other social actors of society, state and business sectors to assure discourse on policies and engagement in policy formation. Furthermore there is need for promotion and investment in social capital and people organizations as core component of development work and the starter capital of the poor.

Above all, a pre-requisite is to link of stakeholders within a chain of networks, alliances and engagement forums for mutual influence on the state and business to hold them socially accountable. There is a vital need for a complementarily of actors –state- civil society- business, rather than one
substituting the other. This does not underestimate tensions or conflicts but encourage means to confront them with transparent and peaceful means.

People need to work efficiently and effectively to accumulate productive assets and form the necessary social forces. There is also need to establish social structures with business and economic perspectives and establishing strong networks, alliances and lobby groups. The micro-economic component should be linked to the macro-economic framework, therefore fostering development synergy. A dynamic interaction between state bureaucracies and civil society is a prerequisite to assure a collective good for people. Here a broad based, holistic sustainable development requires complementarities and solid grounds of partnership arrangements. Mutually supportive relations, mechanisms and frameworks between civil society- state and firms reinforce people and state roles in facilitating sound development models.

The key Pillars for this model are mainly developmental participatory state structures /policies at both micro and macro-levels; mutual recognition of CSO and the State and engagement and linkages within networks of mutual interest inter and intra society organizations and with state structures and sound, long term plans and programmes with shared vision and joint implementation and monitoring and evaluation mechanics.

The dichotomy and richness of formal and informal civil society etc. social capital and modern NGOs could play an important role as strategic actors as political development component that guarantee influence, claims and etc. Investment in informal and formal markets and investment in organizational dimension of people could create entrepreneurship and facilitate other modes of living, hence help link poverty, growth and development objectives. On the other hand, the state structures be
reorganized and mandated roles of mediation consensus building and sensitive to just wealth distribution.

Therefore, in order to develop the tri-partnership modality of network and influence, we have to seriously take into consideration:

- Defining the range of stakeholders and their interrelations and understanding political interests and power structures of the stakeholders.
- Encouraging poor communities to have own capacities and building bridges and alliances with support NGOs and other advocacy groups including political parties working for social justice.
- Systematic encouragement for open, transparent dealings and information disclosure and sharing promoting social accountability of private and public institutions.
- Make full use of modern communication technology to link socially excluded groups with various support networks for more influence and complementing the face-to-face interactions.
- The organizational capacity, being the main empowering tool beside other social capital norms, should be taken by itself as important grass roots political development agenda, integrated with other development dimensions.
- Social capital is the sole capital of the poor. The poor use social connections to protect themselves against risk and vulnerability and have to use it in a more systematic and informed manner to build viable networks and exert articulated influence.

Finally, there is no way than to foster and use own people social connectedness, help organize them around own interests and encourage their
engagement with government and business sectors for dialogue, claims or even confrontation. It is a question of how people effectively organize self and establishes viable and dynamic social structures and movements to exert the necessary influence. On the other hand, there is apparent research gap to address the state and market relationship, hence informing the strategic needs of establishing state-market and civil society partnership.


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