BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SUDAN

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One of the most important and rich contributions of the Institute of Public Administration to the scientific literature of Public Administration in the Sudan will be found in the several dissertations written by its staff members in partial fulfillment of the requirements for their graduate degrees of Master of Public Administration.

The following titles of some of these dissertations set down below might be a good evidence to illustrate the names of pride felt by the Institute of Public Administration in this respect:

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6. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES - by Olofo Hassan Rial
7. PATTERNS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN - by Galibawi Mohamed Salih
8. THE MANAGEMENT-TERRITORY RELATIONS IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME - by Kamal Hussain Ahmed
9. MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SUDAN - by Merghani Abdel Aal Haroun
10. THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PROBLEM OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HERBERT SIMON - by Osman Kheiri

In the paper, under reference, Syd. Hassan Abbasah El-Rayeb, Public Administration Specialist at the Institute of Public Administration, is handling one of the most vital problems to the Sudan in particular and in the developing countries in general.
The topic "Bureaucracy and Political Development" is both timely and pressing. In this paper the author analyses "in the light of the available data, the relationship between the admin- 
istrative sub-system and the political system. The analysis will investigate the defects and shortcomings of these 
relationships in an attempt to suggest some modifications which 
may attain more healthy interaction" (p.3)

Hassan is to be warmly congratulated for a generous and 
original contribution to the field of comparative administration. 
The fact that the whole thesis is done with special reference to 
the Sudan within the general framework of modern theories of bureau-
cracy brings the paper home to the indigenous problems of this 
country.

I am so pleased to have the privilege of introducing and 
exposing this paper in this monographed edition to more readers 
from the Sudanese leading intellectuals and public administrators 
—a generous gift from this Institute to the students of public 
administration and to the seekers of administrative adjustments 
and reform in this country.

Khartoum, 
February, 1968
Acknowledgement is difficult because I owe so much to so many. I owe my greatest debt to Professor William Brinkloe—my academic advisor—for his direction and constructive criticisms, which were an invaluable influence in appreciating the construction and content of this paper. His patient and sympathetic guidance during my course work were of inestimable value. I am also indebted to Professor Jay Daubeleday with whom I had my initial excitement about this area in his two courses—"Comparative Public Administration" and "The Administrator in Society." His help, interest and encouragement have aided me substantially in my studies. I am grateful to my colleagues in Sudan—Kasal Hussein and Ahmed Abu Sin—who extended their cooperation by sending some valuable official documents.

To the United Nations Technical Assistance and the Director of the Institute of Public Administration in Khartoum, I express my gratitude and appreciation for availing me with this opportunity to expose myself to modern concepts of administration.

My thanks also go to Mrs. Helen Lewis who patiently typed this thesis in the most organized manner, obvious to the reader.

To the entire faculty and staff of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, whose friendly and sincere attitude was of much help in my study, I am greatly obligated.

Pittsburgh
June 1967

Hasaan A. El Tayob
TO

Awatif and Tensir

My wife and daughter

Who genuinely shared the experience
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INTRODUCTION

A Statement of the Problem

Public bureaucracy in the transitional societies is viewed by both the governing elites and the Western advisors as a tool for socio-economic development. Its tasks and functions are increased and strengthened and the bureaucrats are trained locally and abroad. It has also been regarded as a neutral instrument of change which can passively serve or could be induced to serve the political authorities.

While the bureaucracy is expanding, no corresponding development of the political system occurs. Perhaps that is due to the fact that "...those sectors in which technology, the purely instrumental means, predominate are able to change more rapidly than those in which social and personal values are implicated .... techniques change more easily than techniques." To provide an example which supports this proposition one would mention that while the bureaucrats are trained to provide more expert knowledge we find in most democratic societies "the channels for recruiting and training politicians are far less well defined than those of administrators. The myth about the

the spontaneity of popular leadership is a powerful component of most versions of democracy, the representatives of the people should be of the people, and not consciously under the influence of specialized knowledge. Leaders "arise", "emerge", "appear", they are not trained, educated or produced.²

The relative weakness of the political organs means that the political functions tend to be taken by the expanding bureaucracy. Perrel Heady believes that "one of the indications for which evidence is growing is that the political role of developing bureaucracies is often crucially involved in shaping political development in the emerging countries."³ Bureaucracies become involved not only on "output" functions or rule application but also in other functions of "input" nature. "To use Almond's terminology the bureaucracy in the transitional societies became involved in political socialization, interest articulation and interest aggregation.

Recently Fred Riggs in his paper *Bureaucracy and Political Development: A Paradoxical View* alerted students of public administration to the fact that the expansion and the strengthening of the bureaucracy might not always be a desirable thing to do. He states that: "premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective politics."⁴ Riggs advanced some propositions to

³Perrel Heady: *Bureaucracies in Developing Countries: Internal Roles and External Assistance* (Mimeographed), April, 1965, p.3
⁴Fred W. Riggs *Politics*, p.126
support his thesis among which we mention the adverse effect of the bureaucracy merit system on the solidarity of the party system, the effect of the tight bureaucratic centralization on the electorate, the way the bureaucracy paralyzes the activities of the interest groups and how it creates its own.

It will be the purpose of this paper to show the validity of the thesis forwarded by Niggs in a transitional society, namely, the Sudan. I will first test the propositions formulated by Niggs. Then I will test other propositions which I have thought of to support the above stated thesis. The propositions I intend to address: how bureaucratic secrecy hampers the growth of public opinion, the situation of the bureaucracy in a poor society gives it wide powers to the educated elite because they view it as a secured career and as political leaders will be deprived of independent sources of information. Also we will test how the expertise, knowledge and power can be institutionalized and to what extent does this discrimination absorb the political powers.

The writer will also extend the argument by questioning the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. "Partly because so long as the governing elites and western advisers focus their attention on bureaucratic instruments of action rather than on generating the political foundations of motivation and policy, good administration can scarcely be institutionalized."5 Also, partly because the writer believes that quite a number of irrationalities, dysfunctions will predominate the Sudanese bureaucracy. In our analysis we see

dysfunctions we will investigate how they are initiated and institutionalised. The major dysfunctions we intend to analyse are: the lack of Sound Plans and Programmes, Personallised Behavior and Formalism, Excessive Centralisation, and Overlapping and Lack of Coordination.

Decision Role and Post

This paper will be concerned with two hypotheses. The major hypothesis states that: Premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy tends to inhibit the development of effective politics. To examine the validity of this hypothesis, the writer will examine the effect of the Sudanese bureaucracy on the following major aspects of the political system: electorate, legislature, party system and interest groups. Three other variables which seemingly support the above stated hypothesis will also be evaluated. These are: Bureaucratic secrecy and how it affects public opinion, the discretion given to the bureaucrats and to what extent it absorbs political functions, the situation of the bureaucracy as a secured career in a poor society.

In the light of the available documents, government publications, books, journals which deal with the subject and beside the speculative remarks of the writer each of the above variables will be tested separately. If the analysis of each variable supports the hypothesis then the thesis will be valid, but if they do not comply it will be a mere assumption.

The minor hypothesis states that: Political weaknesses have a direct effect on the public bureaucracy. To examine the validity of this hypothesis, four major dysfunctions of the Sudanese
Public bureaucracy will be investigated. These dysfunctions are lack of sound plans and programmes, excessive centralization, personalized behavior and formalism, overlapping and lack of effective coordination.

Again in the light of the available documents, government publications, books, journals and speculative remarks of the writer each of the above-mentioned dysfunctions will be tested separately. If the analysis proves that each of the four dysfunctions is initiated by the political institution's incompetence then the thesis will be valid, but if all of the four do not support it, then it will be only an assumption.

Purpose of the Study

The writer intends to analyze, in the light of the available data, the relationship between the administrative sub-system and the political system. The analysis will investigate the deficiencies and shortcomings of these relationships in an attempt to suggest some modifications which may attain a more healthy interaction that ensures both nation-building and socio-economic development.

On the other hand the writer hopes that this paper will be a contribution in the field of comparative administration. Not only in showing how the bureaucracy functions in a transitional society, namely, the Sudan, but also in evaluating the bureaucratic role in developing political systems. Examples will be cited from other transitional societies whenever it is necessary.
AN OUTLINE OF THE PAPER

Chapter I - The Sudan: The Land and the People

This part of the paper is intended to be a background chapter which gives major highlights about the Republic of the Sudan concerning its land, population, social structure, the structure of the economy, culture and a brief review of its history.

Chapter II. The Relationship Between the Political System and the Administrative Subsystem

This chapter will carefully examine the evolution of the Sudan bureaucracy and its relationship with the political system during the period of colonization and the early two years of democratic experience. The military rule from 1955-64 due to its special characteristics will deserve special attention.

Chapter III. The Effects of the Public Bureaucracy on Political Development

The writer will critically approach the manifest and latent power of the Sudanese public bureaucracy. The investigation is mainly directed to show the effects of the public bureaucracy on the party system, interest groups, legislature and public opinion. Other variables which will be investigated are the effects of excessive centralization of the bureaucracy in controlling the electorate; to what extent do the bureaucratic discretion absorb political functions.

Chapter IV. The Major Dysfunctions of the Bureaucracy

It is an attempt to show the effects of the political ineffectiveness on bureaucratic effectiveness. Four major dysfunctions will be examined. These are: lack of sound plans and programmes, excessive centralization, personalized behavior and formalism, overlapping and lack of effective coordination.
Chapter V. The Road Ahead

This last chapter will include a summary of the findings. It will also include proposals for improving the administrative structure, and suggestions for a more healthy relationship between the political system and the administrative subsystem.

The writer does not claim that this paper is exhaustive; some aspects in the subject still wait to be explored. Some guidelines will be suggested at the end of this chapter for those who would like to pursue further studies in the same field.

Definitions

The following terms will be used in this paper as here defined.

Developing Nations:

It is true that the terminology describing the developing nations is developing more than the rate of actual development. Many terms are used: "emergent", "underdeveloped", "undeveloped", "transitional", "developing", etc. For the purpose of this paper, the term developing nations will be used as defined by Eugene Staley:

"Characterized by acute poverty which is chronic and not the result of some temporary misfortune, and by obsolete methods of production and social organization, which means that the poverty is not entirely due to poor natural resources and hence could presumably be lessened by methods already proved in other countries."

Bureaucracy: Webster's New International Dictionary defines bureaucracy as "a system of carrying on the business of a government by means of departments or bureaus, each controlled

by a chief who is apt to place emphasis upon routine and
conservative action." In modern theories, the term bureaucracy,
apply not only to governments but to any organization that
bears such characteristics as hierarchy, specialization, rules,
impersonality, etc. There is no agreement among authors7
(Weber, Parsons, Norten, Litvak, Frederick, Way, Heady, and
Burger) as to which are the ideal characteristics.

Bureaucrat: The terms bureaucrat and administrator will be used
interchangeably. The administrator, in this context, is the
public, normally 'career' official at the top or next to the
top of his organization. In developing societies like the
Sudan, Nigeria, or Brazil, he is the permanent secretary of a
ministry or his deputy; the director-general of a department
or his deputy.

Role: It is commonly defined as a set of behaviors which is
expected of everyone in a particular position, regardless of
who he is. These behaviors are of course socially ordained,
and the role therefore sets a kind of a limit on the types of
personality expressions possible in any given situation.8

Culture: Culture is viewed in this paper as the totality of
learned behavior patterns where component elements are shared
and transmitted by the members of a particular society. "We
mean these historically created definitions of the situation
which individuals acquire by virtue of participation in or
contact with groups that tend to share ways of life that are
in particular respects and in their total configuration
distinctive."9

7Richard S. Hall: Intra-Organizational Structure Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model, Administrative Science
8John R. Piffner and Frank P. Sherwood: Administrative
9Richard Kluckhohn (ed) Culture and Behavior collected
Essays of Clyde Kluckhohn (New York, the Free Press of Glencoe,
Building and Socio-economic Progress: The former is defined as the deliberate fashioning of an integrated political community with fixed geographic boundaries with the nation state as the dominant political institution; the latter simply means improvement in social and material welfare.  

Chairman: It is the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace, the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership.

The Intellectuals: are the educated, forward looking, politically conscious, articulate, elite minority of business society.

Interest Groups: We shall employ it to describe any collection of persons with common objectives who seek their realization through political action to influence public policy. Still more simply, an interest group is any that wants something from government. The term "pressure group" is used sometimes as a synonym for "interest group". Yet it is not as neutral a term, and suggests methods which are not always employed; groups may persuade as well as pressure.

Revolution: It means a legal deposit of powers to discharge specified or residual functions with formally constituted state (or province) and local authorities. This type of arrangement has a political as well as administrative character. Authority for making final decisions is vested in a provincial, state of local legislature or council. It is an actual transfer rather than merely a delegation of functions and powers, even when the power is limited or circumscribed by national regulations.

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13Hilliard Sirk: Patterns of Decentralization in Sudan (mimeographed), Khartoum, 1962, p.6
Discipline: It is the emphasis upon the officials area of free
judgment and personal initiative, the willingness to accept
responsibility and to exercise the full measure of discretion-
ary power permitted by the regulation.  

Planning: It is a deliberate, rational, continuous effort by
government to accelerate the process of development and to
channel it into desired directions by means of comprehensive
and detailed choices of objectives and the determination and
allocation of the resources necessary for their achievement.  

Coordination: It is the orderly synchronization of efforts to
provide the proper amount, timing and directing of execution
resulting in harmonious and unified actions to a stated
objective.  

Institution: An institution is an organization which incorporates,
fosters and protects normative relationships and action patterns
and performs functions and services which are valued in the
environment. Thus, while all institutions are organizations of
some type, not all organizations are institutions. Institutional-
zation is the process by which normative relationships
and action patterns are established. 

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14Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt*
15Gerhard Cohn and Theodore Geiger, "Country Programming as
a Guide to Development," *Development of the Emerging Countries: An
16George R. Terry, *Principles of Management* (Homewood,
17Milton J. Eiser and Fred C. Barshes, *Institution Building in National Development*, Inter-University Research Program in
Institutions Building, University of Pittsburgh, 1965, p. 5 (mimeo.)
I. THE SUDAN: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Of all the countries of Africa, the Sudan is one of the most difficult about which to make generalization.¹

Helen A. Kitchen

In area, the Sudan is the largest country on the African continent. Extending over approximately one million square miles (2.5 million square kilometres), it is about one-third the size of the continental United States. The Sudan, characterized by considerable diversity, both geographical and cultural, is actually a microcosm of all Africa and so becomes very difficult to generalize about. Due to its situation as a bridge between the Mediterranean and African Africa, it serves as a vioduct between the two cultures.

The vast plain of the Sudan, descends northward from the highland of west and central Africa to the Egyptian border and beyond. The Nile, which flows the length of the country, with its tributaries is the source of life for most Sudanese. The White Nile flowing from Lake Victoria enters the Sudan over rapids; after


¹Helen A. Kitchen: This is the Sudan, Africa Special Report, Vol. IV, No. 1, January 1959, p.12.
Running through a flat savannah country it flows for several hundred miles through the swamps of the Sudd (Arabic Sadd, block), then through the poor savannah and semi-desert plain until its junction with the Blue Nile at Khartoum. The Blue Nile and the Atbara collect their waters from the Abyeiinian mountains and cause the Nile flood which produces some 80 per cent of the total Nile discharge. They bring with them also the mud which forms the cultivable land on the Nile banks.

In the triangular, heavily populated Gezira between the White and Blue Niles immediately to the south of the capital, the cotton and vegetable crops depend more on irrigation than on the uncertain rainfall. In the southern provinces, though heavier rainfall reduces that exclusive dependence on the river, yet it continues to play an important economic role in the life of the people.

In the northern third of the country the deserts on both sides of the Nile offer only the rarest living to a sparse population of nomads. Cultivation away from the Nile is a precarious practice, and the cultivated area is only the gareef (strips) on the river valley.

The Sudan has a tropical continental climate except for a narrow fringe along the Red Sea coast which has a maritime climate. In the desert, north of about 19° N. the Sudan is under the seasonal effect of rain-bearing southerly winds. In midsummer the winds attain their northermost limit and deposit the rains so anxiously awaited by the Kababish and Shukria nomads. In midwinter the southerlies do not extend beyond southern Sudan. The season of
The heaviest rain is therefore in the south and of shortest rain in the north. Such a rain pattern has had profound effects on the vegetation of the country and on the lives of its inhabitants.

**1. Population**

The last official census of the Sudan (1955-56) showed a population of 10.26 million. In 1961 it just reached 13 million. The Sudan has an exceptionally large proportion of young people, as a result of a birth rate estimated to range from 45 to 54 per thousand. The estimate of the death rate ranges from 20 to 25 per thousand, so that the rate of natural increase lies between 2.5 and 3 per cent per annum.

With 5 inhabitants to the square kilometre, population density in the Sudan is considerably below the average for Africa (3 persons per square kilometre). The distribution of the population is extremely uneven. While fifty per cent of the population is concentrated in less than 15 per cent of the area, we find the large expanses of desert in the northwest and northeast have extremely sparse population. The northeastern corner of the country is almost uninhabited. In the northern part of the country, population is mainly concentrated along the Nile and its major tributaries. In the southern part a more uniform distribution is found due to the highest and most reliable rainfall which covers the whole area. This advantage is partly counterbalanced, however, by floods on the southern plains, where a large area is permanent swamp. This swampliness of the population over the greater part of the country puts heavy demands on transportation, communications
and public services.  

About 78 per cent of the population is rural, while only 6 per cent is urban. Perhaps 14 per cent of the population is nomadic; but an accurate figure is impossible to arrive at because of the variable degree of nomadism. Mr. Krotki is among those who doubted the correctness of this figure (14%) and he believes that the percentage "is between 15% and 40%".

Industrialization is still limited and has not yet provided any major incentive for population relocation. However, population pressure is now felt in the capital where many of the youngsters are attracted by the partially westernized city.

1.2 Structure of the Economy

The economic activities in Sudan are based mainly upon agriculture. Over 90 per cent of the population is engaged in cultivation or animal husbandry and about 90 per cent of the value of foreign exports is made up of agricultural products, with cotton at the top of the list.

The government both participates in and supervises the Sudan's developing agriculture. Its participation is best seen in the Gezira Scheme which covers an area of about 5 million acres, of which 3 million are irrigable. Also one of the government's big experimental projects is the Sane Scheme. This scheme is practically aiming to convert primitive agriculturalists who practice shifting


3 Karl J. Krotki: Zi Photos about the Sudan (Khartoum: Ministry of Social Affairs, 1956), p.39
cultivation into modern farming. On the other hand the land in both Gash and Tokar deltas are government owned and the profits gained from the cotton crop are shared among the farmers, the board which govern each scheme and the government. Moreover, the government supervisory role includes every aspect of agriculture. This shown in the major role of the government in the management of forests, soil conservation, experimental farming, the registration of land and cooperatives. Added to this are the government loans given to both the cooperative schemes and farmers through the agricultural bank.

Since cotton forms about 70 per cent of exports and about 40 per cent of the government revenue, the economy is at the mercy of poor harvests and changes in world market. Some might suggest that the government should diversify, to some extent at least as a cushion against inevitable bad years. But as Helen Kjolen observed in her article *This is the Sudan* there are not many chances that would produce foreign exchange in anything approximating the amounts derived from cotton. Although the Sudan produces 80 per cent of the world supply of gum arabic, the actual amount of revenue earned is rarely above 18 million dollars. The prospects for industrialization are as far not bright. To date only manganese, salt, lime and gypsum are exploited on a profitable commercial scale. Also coal is mined west of Khartoum in Northern Province. Copper and iron were reportedly discovered in 1957, but whether or not in commercial quantities is not yet certain. The search for oil is still in full swing with no results yet.
Modern secondary industries are only of recent origin, and
comprise mostly plants for processing or manufacturing consumer
goods. Among these we mention, the Albara Cement Plant, Khartoum
Brewery, Khartoum North Gingin and Spinning Cotton Factory, the
mechanized mills for pressing oils from sesame seeds and ground
nuts (peanuts) which are found in Sennel, Ar-Rabi and El Obeid.
Most of these factories have been established principally with
the aid of foreign investments, although local capital has been
of growing importance.

Based on the agricultural potentialities of Sudan we feel
that quite a number of agricultural industries could be developed.
But such industrial growth is still inhibited by a shortage of
capital, poor communications, lack of skilled labour and the
inadequate supply of electric power. The government is now
engaged in different programmes which hopefully might lessen these
acute problems. Training institutes are created for both manage-
ment personnel and labour, and adequate supply of electric power
will soon be possible through the new hydro-electric power stations
at Roseira. The railway lines are extended to 4730 kilometres,
thus being the fourth longest railway system in Africa. Yet much
waits to be adopted along this line so as to insure a wide network
of communications in such a vast country as Sudan. Still remains
the shortage of capital.

1.3 Social Structure

Broadly speaking the Sudan's population could be divided
into seven groups which reflect a heterogeneity of ethnic origins.

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Richard Hill: Sudan Transport (London, Oxford University
These groups are: the Arabs, Nuba, Beja, Habiln, Nilotic, Hamitic-Nilotic and Sudanic. Table I below shows the number of each of these ethnic groups and its percentage of the total population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number in 000's</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nubian</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beja</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habr al-Majlisi</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Southern (mainly Nilotic)</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Southern (mainly Nilotic-Hamitic)</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Southern (mainly Sudanic)</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerner</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners with Sudanese Status</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners with non-Sudanese Status</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Karol Josef Krotki: 21 Facts about the Sudanese (Khartoum, Ministry of Social Affairs 1958), p. 23

These broad groupings are further divided into small tribal units. There are nearly six hundred tribes in the Sudan and it is reported in the official census of 1955/56 that only one percent of the total population declared any tribal origin.

McLaughlin in his book *Language Switching as an Index of Socialization in the Republic of Sudan*, suggested that these six hundred tribes speak more than 115 main languages. This excludes the numerous European, Oriental and non-Sudan African language also in constant use by some groups, as well as the many local dialects. This situation suggests to us that there is a problem of communication...
between the Sudanese themselves. This might be true in the very remote rural areas, but in general, Arabic is widely spoken by most of the Sudanese. As McLoughlin put it:

Arabic has gradually become the main language of an increasing percentage of the Sudan's people. Conversion to Islam, a steady process, usually carries with it the adoption of Arabic. More persons are being taught Arabic in the schools. More are entering wage markets where Arabic is the main language ... The longer this socializing process has been going on, especially among some non-Arab groups in central and western Sudan, the more pronounced the difference between the number of Arabs and the number of Arabic speakers. 5

McLoughlin also believes that most of the languages used by the Sudanese are pre-industrial in the sense that they reflect societies, values and thought systems geared to traditional and simple technologies. He states:

These languages used to express lucidly, even beautifully, the economic and cultural relationship of rain-land farming, camel-nomadic, shifting forest agriculturist, and other societies, but they cannot automatically, express, convey, or absorb the thoughts and values attending more efficient economic techniques. Such people can and do absorb industrial words as the need arises, but the incorporation of such peoples into an industrializing society usually also entails a more qualitative revision of their language if not the actual adoption of the lingua franca of the cities and factories. Such a revision requires almost simultaneous acquisition, or knowledge of the more efficient skills and tools that accompany industrial technology. 6

The tribe in Sudan constitutes the greater social, political, and economic unit, especially among the rural people. Within the tribe cooperation between local groups is formalized genealogically:

6Ibid., p.37
as though the sections of the tribe were members of a family. Each tribe has its own customs and mode of behavior which it respects as a sacred tradition. Although these tribes lived independently for a long time, yet a great degree of interaction prevailed through the course of time. This interaction is clearly observed in the great degree of intermarriage which would hopefully lead in the near future to the diffusion of the tribal system. Other channels of interaction are also progressing in both the field of education and in trade.

From time immemorial the head of the tribe (Sheikh El Gabella) in all parts of Sudan has been the one who decides upon all the problems that concern members of his tribe, as well as those that occur between it and other tribes. His orders are respected and obeyed by all members of the tribe.

During the Anglo-Egyptian regime this tribal system was preserved under the name of Native Administration. Paradoxically enough, still the Sudanese stick to the same name; the writer understands that it might have been native to the British, but for Sudanese is it also native? In a sense all the government in native administration why should there be the distinction for such a group? It seems to me that the title "local administration" might be more reasonable and applicable.

The Anglo-Egyptian regime preserved this system of the so-called native administration because they realized that it could be helpful in different tasks. The chiefs of these tribes could help in keeping law and order, tax collection, the execution of all administrative work delegated to them, the solution of all the
problems that occur between the tribes or within one tribe, and also helpful in the execution of all orders and judgment, coming from the different governmental organs. Table II below shows the number of tribal chiefs recognized by the Anglo-Egyptian regime, in the different parts of the country, so as to help in keeping law and order and other delegated functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Province</th>
<th>The Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahr El Obeid</td>
<td>554 Sultan and agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>430 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>358 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>444 Omda and Nasir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>345 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>281 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>175 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>138 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>40 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is clear from the above schedule that the number of tribal chiefs in the southern provinces (sultans) are more than those in the North (Nasir and Omda), though the population number in the northern provinces exceed the southern provinces. The reason why the number of sultans increased in the south is due to the diversity and complexity of tribes which exist in this part of the country.

Moreover, the Anglo-Egyptian regime had delegated judicial powers to these tribal chiefs. Two types of courts were created: a court of a chief sitting alone and a court of a chief sitting with
members. These courts were to apply the native law and custom prevailing in the area over which the court exercised its jurisdiction, provided that such law and custom was not contrary to justice, morality or order. In cases of conviction they had powers to impose fine or imprisonment or both; and in the case of males flogging or whipping.

Both the administrative and judicial powers of the so-called native administration are still preserved. But lately and since the October revolution in Sudan (1964) a lot of discussion has taken place, questioning this tribal system. Some suggested that reformation of Native Administration should take place sooner, others ask for elimination of its authority, and some go so far as to rule out the whole tribal system. Sayed Mahgoub, a former Prime Minister declared in his address to the constituent assembly in June 1965 the following:

In response to a wish expressed by many citizens in the different provinces of the Sudan, my Government has formed a committee to consider the liquidation of native administration. The committee has assumed its duties and will visit various regional areas to find facts and submit its recommendations. In the light of these recommendations my Government will not to organize and develop local administration in such a way as will realize public interests and justice, tranquilize the citizens and ensure the efficiency of administration.7

The discussion is still going on while this committee is still touring the vast regions of Sudan, interviewing the people concerned and searching for facts to support its argument. The Government on the other side preferred to be

Mohamed I. Mahgoub, Constituent Assembly Session Address (Khartoum: Ministry of Information and Labour 1965), p.3
neutral to the whole issue, waiting for the recommendations of its appointed committee. Any evaluation of the work of this committee at this point will be premature. All the same, an important question lies at the heart of this exercise: could we expect the Sheiks and Ommas to support the liquidation of their own positions?

Art. Culture

Generally speaking, the Sudanese culture is an Islamic culture. Although some minority groups of Christians and pagans do exist especially in the southern provinces, yet the major dominant group are the Muslims. Mosques are prominent in the towns and most villages have one. Often the mosque in the village is also a Khalea (Islamic School) conducted by a faki (teacher) who is also the resident Imam. The highest institution of religious learning in Sudan is the Naahad El'Islam in Omdurman, founded in 1901; and lately in 1956 reorganized to be the Islamic University of Sudan.

Despite the apparently secular structure of the government, Islam and its relation to national development are important in the formation of government policy. At least it could be stated that the two major parties which now and since independence have great influence in the policy of the country represent religious organizations — The Khartoum and the Omma. On the other hand it has been reported in March 1967 that the newly appointed committee which is composed to draft the permanent constitution of Sudan has declared that it still do its job within the Islamic framework.

The writer believes that the rural people in Sudan are more strong adherents to the teachings of Islam than those living mainly in the urban areas. This is clearly shown in the adherence of the
villagers to the main concepts which constitute the disciplines of Islam, e.g., prayer, fasting, etc. Moreover, among the rural people we find a tendency to stick to their religious fraternities which are called the tariqas (paths). There are considerable differences between the organizations of the various tariqas, for the terminology, powers, and authority of the functionaries vary considerably. At the head of each tariqa there is the Sheikh (sometimes known as Sheikh al-Nijaba) who is the spiritual leader. The people have an unquestioning veneration for the Sheikh because he is considered the inheritor of the Baraka (holiness) which has descended upon him from the prophet. Among these major tariqas in Sudan we mention: Qairiya, Mirghaniya, Amsar, Tiganiya and Shahliliya.

While the rural people are strong adherents to Islamic discipline, we find the urban areas which are mainly inhabited by the educated classes stick to the same categorization made by Tringham in 1949 in which he classified the intellectuals into three types:

1. Those who reject modern ideas and ways of life and become hard fanatical Muslims;
2. Those few who become secret unbelievers, who stick to the secular system, but over whose lives religion has no influence;
3. The majority who keep their modern ideas and religion in separate watertight compartments, which result in split-personality.8

The fact that the Sudanese culture is predominantly Islamic does not rule out the effects of the neighbouring civilisations. Egypt has always had some connections with the Sudan since the

Pharoan civilization. Some of the Egyptian influences had penetrated very deeply in the Sudanese culture. The pharomic circumcision which is still practiced in Sudan despite the resistance of the medical doctors is a case in point. Also both the Abyssinian and African cultures have their marks on the Sudanese culture.

An important aspect which characterises the Sudanese society is the existence of the extended families as a basis of loyalty. Everybody in the village because every individual knows to which family he belongs. Although this system of the extended family is deteriorating in the urban areas, yet still the inhabitants maintain close ties that could undermine the growth of a class society, as Duncan has observed:

In the towns there was no social hierarchy, no rigid boundaries between different income or culture levels. Everybody who was not 'rebelle' knew everybody else, and important private events were often like a public function in which everybody participated.  

An important question still remains to be answered. Could we classify the Sudanese culture as traditional or modern? We have indicated earlier, the emergence of the educated elites has infused the society with new modern values, but still there remain the villagers who are struggling to perpetuate their traditional customs. So there are two forces in the Sudanese culture, seemingly contradictory, but not necessarily so. The first is taking the role of the innovator, while the second is the village conservative who is striving to perpetuate his traditional culture. As Harold B. Barclay observed in his study to a small Sudanese suburban village,

the villager will soon find himself compelled to alter his behavior due to change which occurs in the economy. Barclays puts it this way:

The alteration of the economy from one based on agriculture to one largely dependent on city wage labour, independent of family ties, has tended to free the sons from dependence on their fathers and has reduced the authority of the father role... The traditional practice of mutual aid is gradually being replaced by payment for services rendered. This trend, it would appear, has it genesis in the diffusion of secular attitudes coupled with the prevailing multiplicity of occupations among villagers.10

The writer tends to believe that the Sudanese society is neither traditional nor modern. The traditional values are not yet fully eradicated and the modern values are not yet fully institutionalized. It is a transitional society or to use Riny terminology we can call it a prismatic society which is characterized by heterogeneity and overlapping.

Despite the ideological differences between the modern educated elites and the traditional conservative villager, the typical Sudanese remains to be, as described by Theobald in his book The Mahdiya:

But however different in their ways of life and thought, the people of the Sudan have in common great qualities of character—courage, courtesy, patience and humor—which give them remarkable personal charm. They are hospitable to strangers, kind to the weak and afflicted, loyal to friends, and, among themselves, are bound together by family ties of devotion and self-sacrifice that are indeed an example to western society.11

1.5 The Nation

As early as 2800 B.C. the land south of Egypt was known to the Egyptians as Tu-Nebesu, which, like the Arabic name Bilad as-
Sudan given by the Moavites - 600 A.D., means the 'Land of the Blacks'.

In its ancient history quite a number of kingdoms like Cush, Kerse, flourished in the area. By 1504 the Fung Sultanate was established. It was formed by an alliance of two tribes known as the Janaj and the Qarama. Its system of administration constituted of the Sultan as the Supreme Lord who was helped by a number of (Mazira) ministers. It is noted by many historians that its influence was mainly in the capital (Bennar) but as one leaves the centre, one finds the tribes enjoying complete independence.

Until the Turko-Egyptian conquest in 1821 the term Sudan represented neither a definite people nor a distinct geographical area. Changes in economic and social life under Turko-Egyptian rule occurred primarily among the town people, who increased in number as administrative centres developed. Outside the towns the role of the Turkish official was mainly to collect taxes by force; an act which brought the resentment of the indigenous population.

By 1860 the resentment of corruption and exploitation reached its highest peak and prepared the people for a revolution. The leadership was found in Mohamed Ahmed El Mahdi (the Guided one) who had a compelling personality which convinced the people to follow his cause of creating a new Muslim community. By 1882 the Mahdi had found political support from both the White Nile
and El Obeid areas. In January 22, 1885 Khartoum fell, and General Gordon — the Governor General at that time — was killed. By the end of 1895 the Mahdist forces controlled the entire Sudan and established a religious law. Six months after the battle of Khartoum, the Mahdi died and Khalifa Abdullah came to power as his successor. Although the Mahdi suppressed the tariqs which had existed during the Turkish rule and seriously weakened the traditional tribal authorities, yet after his death, the same rivalry came again and led to the weakness of the newly created national government. Motivated by their own interests and induced by the weakness of Khalifa regime the British and the Egyptians found an easy way to conquer the Sudan in 1898. The early days of the reconquest will be the subject and the beginning of our second chapter.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUBSYSTEM

2.1 The Condominium Government

From 1899 to 1953 the Sudan was governed by the unique political device of a Condominium Agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt. The Condominium Agreement was not a constitution for the Sudan; it was simply an instrument giving formal recognition to the existing situation on the morrow of the conquest. Lord Cromer, who was a British Consul-General in Egypt at that time, described the Agreement as "a hybrid form of government, hitherto unknown to international jurisprudence."¹ A remarkable historian even goes further and suggests that the name is misleading:

The agreement did not in any real sense create a true condominium, a conjoint sovereignty over the Sudan, but merely gave a nominal recognition to the historical claims of the Khedive of Egypt, whilst reserving almost complete autonomy to an official nominated by the British government. It was not seriously questioned by the European powers. It never satisfied the Egyptians who felt with a sullen resentment, that they had been jockeyed out of their rights.

According to the terms of the Agreement which are attached to this paper as Appendix A, Lord Kitchener was appointed Governor


General of the Sudan in January 1899. He had legislative, judicial and executive functions. His senior assistants were four, namely, the Civil Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the Legal Secretary and the Inspector General who was the overseer of provincial administration.

The country is divided into five provinces: Dongola, Berber, Sennar, Fashoda, and Khartoum. In these provinces a wide discretion was left to the scattered band of British Inspectors — District Commissioners — who found themselves entrusted with the care of huge districts with no trained staff, administrative, technical, or clerical. The general policy followed by the District Commissioners was laid down by the Governor-General in form of memoranda to the "Minire of provinces." A copy of the first memorandum issued in this respect is included as Appendix 9 to this paper. In the course of time these officials became the actual administrators of the provinces, and the Egyptian (later Sudanese) district officers were relegated to a subordinate position. "The administrative machine was thus British in its higher, and Egyptian in its lower ranks. It was not until about fifteen years later that Sudanese began to replace Egyptian officials. Valuable service was also rendered for many years by a group of Lebanese, who formed, in some ways, a bridge between the British ruling group and the Sudanese. Arabic-speaking, but fluent in English, more western in outlook than the Egyptians, they had a unique role to play."

Ibid., p. 117
On the other hand nine departments were created. These were: General Administration, Financial Administration, Legal Department, Sudan Railways, Survey Department, Post and Telegraphs, Steamers and Boats, Stores and Ordinance and Forests and Game Departments. The first three departments were headed by the Civil Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Legal Secretary respectively while the other six departments were headed by army officers in the rank of colonel or Brigadier. These army officers continued to be the heads of departments until 1900 when the British Consul in Egypt - Lord Cromer - decided to recruit civilians to replace the military men. Lord Cromer did not doubt the efficiency of the military officers but he believed that they gave no guarantee to the continuity of the services.

I know of only one disadvantage in employing military officers, and that is, they are liable to be removed for service elsewhere, more especially in times of national emergency. A civil service, therefore, should be composed of young men taken from British Universities. These will gradually take the place of the military officers now employed. 1

In 1901 six civilians were appointed, and in 1905 the number of civil administrators reached 15. By 1933 the figure jumped to 140 excluding 26 serving on contract basis.

For the first 12 years the Governor-General ruled alone; after 1910 he ruled with the advice of an appointed council of Englishmen and Sudanese. A further development came in 1921 when a commission was formed to study the possibility of the devolution of judicial and executive powers to the tribal chiefs and their elders. The commission—which is now known as Milner Commission

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after the name of its chairman — made this recommendation:

...having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision ... Decentralization and the employment, wherever possible of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for economy and efficiency."

Subsequent to this recommendation of the Wilner Commission, an Ordinance entitled The Powers of Rumi and Sheikhs Ordinance was passed by the Governor-General’s Council in 1922. This ordinance recognized and regularized judicial powers which had from time immemorial been exercised by the chiefs of certain nomad tribes. By 1923 some three hundred sheikhs had received recognition for these purposes. This policy for the devolution of the legal and executive powers to the tribal chiefs was further accelerated by the enactment of The Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance in 1928 which provided for courts presided over by a sheikh and composed of the tribal elders. In this last ordinance the powers of the sheikhs were purposely increased "to enhance or strengthen the tribal chiefs’ authority so as to be strong administrative and executive heads of their tribe or district."

This policy of "native administration" or "indirect rule" was widely advocated by the British colonial philosophers like Lord Lugard in Nigeria, but from the side of the elites of the country or countries concerned, it is viewed with suspicion and fear. To the Sudanese elites the creation of native administration

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was no more than an attempt to restore the traditional tribalism
which is rigid and not suitable for the changing conditions. The
writer tends to agree with the indigenous elites' view in this
respect because the enhancement of tribalism shatters the possibility
of the unity of the whole nation. In the words of Mr. Posbrooke:

Indirect rule was a system which looked at the
problems and interests of each given area or tribe.
It was not conceived in the framework of building
up a state or a nation; still less and this is very
natural—did it take into account the tendencies and
pressures appearing in the world at large, which at
a later stage were to affect Tropical Africa.

The experiment of native administration, which was criticized
by the emerging elites as an attempt to create a client class of
subservient local authorities, was also criticized by James Currie
(formerly the first Director of Education in the Sudan) who wrote
in 1935:

Administrators (in Sudan) are diligently searching
for lost tribes and vanished chiefs, and trying to
resurrect a social system that had passed away forever.

He also suggested that:

Unless all responsible are made to understand that
the employment of educated Sudanese is a cardinal
plank in Government policy, no real progress will
be made before a narrow nationalism comes triumphantly
into existence, and western advisers—good and bad
elites—are swept away together.

Such bitter criticism from both national elites and British
scholars forced the government to change its policy. A series of
new ordinances started in 1937 were geared to end the previous

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H.A. Posbrooke: The Introduction of Bureaucracy into African

J.M. Holt: Sudanese Nationalism and Self Determination in
Walter Z. Lacquar (ed.) The Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger
1956), p. 117.

Sir James Currie: The Educational Experiment in the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan, 1900-35', II Journal of the African Society (London
1935) XXXIV, p. 49
orientation of native administration and to direct efforts to build a local government system. The difference between the two systems is clear: while the first system forces the individual to identify with his tribe, the new system makes the identification according to the place he lives in. A step further was taken in 1949 when the Anglo-Egyptian Government of the Sudan invited a British expert in local government — Dr. A.H. Marshall, City Treasurer of Coventry to "enquire into and report on the policy and practices of Sudan Government in respect of local government and to make recommendations." The recommendations of Dr. Marshall were implemented in 1950 in the one comprehensive Local Government Ordinance of 1951. The existing local government system in the Sudan, which is composed of Municipalities, Townships and Rural Councils, is still working under the same legislation.

To link the provincial administration with the central government, an advisory council of Sudanese provincial representatives was formed in 1944. It consisted of the Governor-General as president, the civil, financial and legal secretaries and twenty-eight Sudanese members. The establishment of the Advisory Council was considered by some as a development in the policy of the Condominium government to cope with the Sudanese nationalism. Yet quite a number of the indigenous elites criticized it severely on three grounds:

... its functions, its composition and its limitation to the northern provinces... its deliberations were not binding on the government, and its opponents could represent it as a mere debating place.

society. Its composition was criticized since tribal chiefs composed a large proportion of the Sudanese members. Although the unbalanced enthusiasm of the administration for this social group had declined in the previous decade, they were still regarded influential, and as a useful counterweight to the nationalist politicians. The latter continued to view them, with the antagonism born in the days of 'native administration' as ignorant and backward representatives of an obsolete social order, and tools of the British. The exclusion of the southern Sudan from representation and scope of discussion of the advisory council brought to the surface misgivings which had long been felt by the northerners.

Despite its major limitations the advisory council had succeeded in raising a number of important political and social issues, such as Sudanese nationality and the future of the Gerera Scheme. It might also be considered as a step forward in the constitutional development of the Sudan.

The Evolution of the Bureaucracy during the Condominium

At the outset the administrative personnel was almost entirely military, being composed of British and Egyptian officers of the Egyptian army. As Mr. Karamalla Awd pointed out:

The system of administration started just after the reoccupation of the Sudan in 1899 and it was therefore an army occupation and administration. This military tradition still exists in the uniforms and badges used by administrative officers.

As we have mentioned earlier, Lord Cromer started the recruitment of civilian administrators in order to maintain the

12 Karamalla Awd: The Administration of the Sudan Since 1898, Khartoum 1957 (unpublished)
continuity of the service. From this recruitment emerged the upper echelons of the Sudan civil service which came to be known as the Political Service. The top cadres remained to be dominated by the British while the lower cadres were devoted to the Egyptians, Syrians and Lebanese. No qualified Sudanese were available at the beginning to work in the civil service because no schools worthy of the name existed before the conquest.

In 1900, Sir James Currie came to the Sudan to be the Director of Education. There was nothing on which to build, and in the whole country there were only two tiny primary schools—one at Kudi Halfa and the other at Sukkari—which had been set up on the Egyptian model for the small Egyptian communities there. Currie decided to move slowly, and he stated in his policy memorandum that the immediate needs he was working for were:

(i) the creation of a native artisan class (there were no skilled Sudanese labourers and costs of Egyptian and other imported workers were excessive),
(ii) the diffusion among the masses of sufficient people of education to enable them to understand the essential elements of the machinery of Government,
(iii) the creation of a small native administrative class who will ultimately fill many minor posts.\(^1\)

Consequently, all the educated Sudanese who started to graduate from the intermediate schools and the Gordon College (which was created in 1903), were absorbed into the administrative or other services. Education became synonymous with the attainment of a government post. As Timringham put it, "The development of education was a purely administrative necessity to provide Sudanese

The number of the graduates from Gordon Memorial College increased from one year to another. This no doubt gave the chance to the bureaucracy to expand rapidly. The figures shown in Table No. III show how the number of the civil servants jumped from 3,980 in 1920 to 12,127 at the eve of independence in 1956. Table IV shows the number of the Sudanese civil servants as compared with the Egyptians and the British.

### Table III

**NUMBER OF CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES 1920-1956**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>7,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>5,918</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>10,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6,076</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>12,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sudan Almanac 1957

### Table IV

**NATIONALITIES OF ESTABLISHED PUBLIC SERVANTS 1920-1956**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>7,860</td>
<td>8,774</td>
<td>9,007</td>
<td>11,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total       | 3,960| 5,430| 9,218| 10,049| 9,885| 12,127|


Two landmarks concerning the evolution of the Bureaucracy during the Condominium deserve special attention. The first came in 1924 when Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of the Sudan, was murdered in Cairo. His death provided the chance for the consul-general of Britain in Egypt to seek an end to the situation which became intolerable. The consul-general, acting without the consent of his government, presented to the prime minister of Egypt two communications which demanded that:

...the Egyptian government should order within twenty-four hours the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and the purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army, with such resulting changes as (should) be hereafter specified, and sanction an increase in the area to be irrigated in the Sennar to an unlimited figure as novel might arise.\textsuperscript{15}

This ultimatum produced a crisis in Egypt and repercussions in the Sudan. In the Sudan the reaction which followed Stack's death was felt in two fields: education and administration. The Education Department lost a group of its best teachers who were forced back to their country—Egypt. \textsuperscript{16} Also, the Gordon Memorial College, the head of the educational system, stagnated, it was viewed with suspicion as a breeding ground of discontented youths. Also, the School of Public Administration, which was organized in 1916, and the military school were closed. On the other hand a rapid expansion in the number of intermediate schools was a result because they were the only source to satisfy the demands of the civil service after the evacuation of Egyptian military and civilian employees.

The other landmark in the evolution of the Condominium bureaucracy also had its roots in the suspicion which was established at the murder of Sir Lee Stack. This suspicion which had been building up between the emerging elites and the Anglo-Egyptian Government was revealed in 1931 in an apparently trivial incident. The government notified all the new graduates of the Gordon Memorial College that their starting salaries would be reduced, because of the economic depression, but the students felt the reduction was used mainly for the Sudanese and not the British. All the students felt threatened. They went on strike and also elected a committee to mediate with the government. Although the government reduced the proposed reduction, yet this incident was not at all forgotten as a threat. This policy was criticized by Currie, the first Director of Education, who revisited the Sudan in the following year. He stated that:

The sphere of employment open to educated natives of the country had been materially reduced. The terrible economic crisis of 1930 aggravated the situation and rendered considerable quantitative reduction a necessity for reasons of economy. If all the inhabitants had been persuaded that there was no change of policy, it would have been well. Curtailment of opportunity was the real grievance."  

Owing to the great upheaval of nationalism in the forties — which will be discussed later — the condominium government accelerated the Sudanization of administration. An Anglo-Sudanese committee, which consisted of three British government officers and three Sudanese officials under the chairmanship of the Director of

27 Sir James Currie, op. cit., p. 53
Establishment, was appointed in 1946. Reporting in 1948, the committee recommended that 62.9% of the posts held by non-Sudanese should be Sudanised by the end of 1952. But the country's independence came in 1956 — earlier than expected. "Political development upset the time table for a completely orderly replacement plan and left the job unfinished. Self-government came in 1954. Rapid Sudanisation took place between January 1954 and June 1955."^{18}

2.2 The Nexus of the Sudanese Political Parties

In the political arena the first symptoms of nationalism began among the emerging elites after the first world war. Between 1921 and 1924 a number of leagues and organisations were formed claiming either independence for the Sudan or a form of unity with Egypt. Among these leagues, the White Flag League deserves special reference because it attracted the attention of both the Sudanese and the Egyptians and annoyed the British. It lodged protests and staged demonstrations in the big towns asking the British to withdraw in order to give a chance for the unity of the Nile Valley. The Governor-General in his annual report of 1925 refers to these demonstrations saying:

The even tenor of administrative progress and peaceful development chronicled in these reports from year to year was rudely interrupted during the latter half of 1924 by political agitation which threatened public security for the first time in the history of the Condominium."^{19}

^{18}Norman C. Angus and Richard O. Mitchell, *Sudan*, p. 7

^{19}Governor-General Annual Report, 1925, p. 4. (Aegean.

1925, (min).)
After the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 the educated Sudanese' resentment that their future should be decided by negotiations between two foreign countries found an outlet in the formation of the Graduates General Congress. The membership of the Congress was confined to the graduates of all schools at the beginning, but was later extended to all literate Sudanese.

Following its formation, the Congress Secretary addressed the Civil Secretary with the letter attached as Appendix C, in which he stated that the goal of the Congress is 'to promote the general welfare of the country and its graduates.' The 'general welfare of the country,' vague as it is, was, received with reservation from the Civil Secretary as his letter attached as Appendix D shows.

The motive behind the Congress as one of its earliest members put it:

... was political, but, since almost all the graduates of Gordon College and most of the graduates of the lower grade schools were civil servants, congress men, in order to secure permission from the Government to set up the organisation, worked their sin in a very vague term. When the Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government approved the formation of Congress he did so on the understanding that it was not political and that it represented only the views of its members. control

In the early years of its formation, the Congress devoted most of its energies to the advancement of education and social work. Ali Zahir Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, visit to Sudan in 1940 was a turning point in the history of the Congress. The Congress obtained permission to entertain the Premier at a tea party which was attended by about 800 graduates. Excited by the success.

20 Helki Abbay. The Indian Question (Am.ock, Fraeger 1976) P.108
of this tea party, Congress submitted a memorandum to Mr Hāfir for financial help. "From that day relations with the Sudan Government became steadily more and more strained and the Egyptian Government became more and more convinced that the Congress was the embryo of a genuine Sudanese nationalist movement in which Egypt should take sympathetic interest."

The Congress unveiled its political intentions in April, 1942 when its president submitted a memorandum to the Governor-General, on behalf of the Sudanese people. The memorandum contained twelve demands, the most remarkable among which were: the issue, on the first possible opportunity, by British and Egyptian Governments of a joint declaration guaranteeing the Sudan, in the geographical boundaries, the right of self-determination directly after the war; the proclamation of a Sudanese nationality law; and the creation of a representative body to approve the budget and the ordinances.

The reply of the government, which was a complete refusal, resulted in a conflict within the congress. Some informal contacts were made with the civil secretary in which he promised good will but no official measurable reply was received. Some congress members were prepared to accept the informal assurances of the civil secretary, while the other group refused to accept anything less than a formal acceptance. The result was split. Those who trusted the Civil Secretary formed an independence party, while the other group thought the best way was to seek the policy of unity with Egypt.

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In most Islamic countries, in the words of Jackson, "faith dominates the lives of the mass of the population while politics hold little interest for the peasant cultivator or Arab nomad. Thus, in order to gain support, a newly formed political party must associate itself from the outset with an established religious body. Following a good strategy to gain the confidence of the indigenous people made the two new wings of the congress seek the help of the two rival religious leaders. The independence group returned to Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahadi, while the unity group wanted to Sayed Ali El Winghadi who gave them his blessing.

The experiences gained from the advisory council, which was formed in 1942, and the continuous pressure of the congress forced the Sudan Government to enhance the constitutional development. In 1947 a Legislative Assembly for the Sudan, including the Southern provinces, was formed. Though it was considered by its opponents as a tool to serve British interests yet it played a great role in both the executive and administrative functions of the government.

The years from 1942 to 1952 witnessed continuous negotiations, both inside and outside the country in which both the British and Egyptians participated beside the Sudanese to shape the future constitutional developments of the Sudan. In January 1952 suggestions for a self-government constitution were published. This constitution of 1952 provided for a wholly elected House of Representatives and a Senate partly elected and partly appointed.

Elections were held and the first elected Parliament met in January 1956.

The elected Parliament declared the right of self-determination for the whole of the Sudan. After the agreement of the British and the Egyptian governments, the Sudan was declared an independent nation in 1956.

2.3 The First Democratic Experiment 1956-1958

Understandingly the primary concern of the British administrators during the period of colonization in Sudan was the maintenance of law and order. "Force and fear were the only instruments for establishing supremacy, hence the image that government officers passed on to the public was one of fearful superiority." 23

Since the Sudan attained its independence in 1956, there has been a growing consensus among both the politicians and the bureaucrats that nation-building and socio-economic development are goals towards which they must strive. The former concept of "police" state is abandoned and both ideological commitments and political strategies are directed for the creation of a welfare state: "In consequence, the state is called upon to perform five different kinds of functions. First, it has to be a Projector, secondly, it had to be a Dispenser of social services, thirdly, it had to be an Industrial manager; fourthly, it had to be an Economic Controller and lastly, it had to act as Arbitrator." 24

The nature of the political movements which preceded independence and the indigenous traditions, as Eward Wilks observed, in many underdeveloped countries, forced political life into charismatic channels. "Status is in large part a matter of ascription, based on the inheritance of holiness or BABAカリ. The emphasis is on charisma. Consequently the political activity revolves around issues of power and personality rather than the alternative national policies.

The conflict in the Graduates' congress — as we have mentioned earlier in this chapter — resulted in parties. The first is the Uma party which returned to Sayed Abdal Rahman El Mahadi and the second is the Asshiga (Brothers) which went to Sayed Ali El Minghani. But strain appeared when colonial rule came to an end and the national forum became the scene of competing interests: traditional versus modern; regional versus national; conservative versus radicals. The result was a diversity of parties. Among these parties we mention the Peoples Democratic Party and the Itihadien (Unionists) which originated after a conflict within the Asshiga Party. Also other small parties like the Muslim Brothers, Socialist Republican, Gabha Muslim El Istiham (Liberation Front) came into being.

Due to this emerging party system which has no deep ideological roots different coalitions, big and small, formal and informal were formed. This situation created an element of instability because no coalition however strong will be sure that it

will be in the government for a long period. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, who is supposed to choose the ministers, has always a limited choice because every region claims that as a reward for their support in the general elections, they should have a minister in the cabinet. If the Prime Minister fails to satisfy a certain group or region the result might be dissatisfaction from the part of the region or group which might lead it to form a coalition with another centre of power to undermine the existing government. The ultimate result was that in the period from 1954 to 1966 Sudan experienced over one hundred ministers and seven governments. And it not been for this multi-party system, the ministers would have had the chance to be more experienced in their tasks. Added to this the tendency for the second generation of intellectuals trained as professionals to reject politics and seek protected careers in expanding industrial governmental bureaucracy. The result is that the intellectual made good civil servants while the party cadres remained in most cases in the hands of the tribal sheikhs and charismatic leaders with their broad and earlier vague programs.

The previous discussion reveals the fact that the Prime Minister lacks the machinery for creating realistic sound policies because of the nature of his party which is based mainly on religious and regional backing more than doctrine. Added to this is the continuous pressure which he faces from both the electorate and the legislature.

The electorate expects him to take steps to ensure the advantage (he promised), and the members of the legislature will want him to enable them to

carry out their election pledges so that they can
get re-elected at the next election. Ambitious
development plans are politically inevitable. One
need not be a hide-bound conservative to realise
that all development plans contain an element of
imagination, prophecy, guesswork and therefore an
element of risk.21

Sayyd Imam Ahmad ibn Abni— the first Prime Ministe of the Sudan
put it this way:

I knew nothing about economics and congresses.
I followed the policies recommended by my advisers.
Unfortunately they, too, were swept off their feet
by the fever of independence and by the excessive
self assurance which nationalism induces.22

These inadequacies of the political system are no doubt
reflected in the administrative system: "The administrator often
finds himself carrying on his functions in an atmosphere of
intrigues, clashes of personalities, and shifting policies."23
Also due to the incompetence of the political institutions to
create sound policies, the policies came to be among the main
roles the top bureaucrats do. Although the bureaucrat's role in
the Sudan is framed to be mainly advisory:

The main purpose of a civil service is to be
an organization for the presentation to the
ministry of the product of organized thought and
collective experience. This purpose cannot be
achieved unless the civil service is composed of
men and women of complete integrity and able to
give advice without fear, favour, partiality and
prejudice.30

27 Sir Ivor Jennings: Democracy in Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge
28 Pieter Lessing: The African Kaleidoscope (New York, McElderry
29 Husain Mirghadri: Public Administration in Developing
Countries—The Multilateral Approach, in Burton L. Baker (ed) Public
Administration: A Key to Development (U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington 1964), p. 31
30 Report of the Terms of Service Commission Sudan, Government
Yet by mere necessity the bureaucrats found themselves framing the policy of the country. The fact that they are the most educated group in the society will lead them to strive genuinely to create realistic policies for their nation. They are not only playing the role of the bureaucrat who should perform his duties to the best of his ability, but also they are playing the role of the intellectual who is looking for better prospects for his society.

This political role of framing the policies, although it is considered by some scholars as undesirable to be done by the bureaucrats, but it seems inevitable due to the inadequacies of the political institutions. This political role does not seem strange to the top bureaucrats themselves because they used to see in the pre-independence days of the country:

... the division between policy making and policy execution was not clearly marked. Officials like the Civil Secretary combined both functions, being both a member of the Governor General's Council and the head of the civil service.11

I do not only feel it impractical to separate politics and administration especially in developing countries, but even I feel this lack of separation has been very beneficial to the India in its early years of democratic experience. It is the period which is characterized by instability and confusion in the political system. But the bureaucracy in the words of a Singapore scholar: "rose to the occasion and could keep the machinery of

administration functioning with a reasonable degree of efficiency. 32

Unavoidably, the fact that the top bureaucrat plays a great part in framing the policy of the nation leads to frequent clashes between the politicians and the bureaucrats. Such clashes are not only peculiar in the Sudan, but they are also noticed in both other developing and developed nations. The difference is only a matter of degree. As an example from a developing country we can take Ghana where "higher bureaucrats and the party leadership have clashed several times and an open split, directly attributable to differences in education and social backgrounds, has occurred." 33

Although the Sudanese bureaucracy is highly politicised as the above analysis reveals — yet the neutrality of the civil service is an accepted notion by both the politicians and the bureaucrats. Although the bureaucrats actually are the main body framing the policies of the whole nation, yet they do not interfere or participate in partisan politics, and as a reporter for London Times has stated, "the officials paid by the State are allowed to stand as parliamentary candidates except Khedas, Sheikhs and local judges. The Sudan administration remains sensibly aloof from electioneering." 34

The neutrality of the civil service in the Sudan is a heritage of the British rule. It was the British, who as far back

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32 Mohri Shibaikat, The Independent Sudan (New York, Robert Upaller and Sons, 1959), p. 491
34 Where Poets Dominate Politics, The Times London, March 5, 1958, p. 9
as 1953 created the Sudan’s Public Service Commission in order to ensure fair and equitable treatment for the service. The terms of the Civil Service Commission were amended during the years of independence and the current terms are attached to this paper as Appendix B. This neutrality insured stability and continuity in the service. Had it not been for this accepted notion of neutrality, many purging committees might have been formed to eliminate the rivals whenever a succeeding party came to power. In a case like the Sudan where the political system is characterized by instability, this might have created a catastrophe, because both the political and administrative systems would be unstable. This notion of neutrality, which is greatly accepted by the Sudanese, is also accepted by many other developing countries like India, Pakistan and Nigeria. But other governing élites like Julius Nyerere went to the other extreme. Nyerere declared that their new republican constitution, rules out the theory that public services ought to be politically impartial.

He states that:

Civil servants are human beings, they do have political views and this must affect their work. Policies they like are executed with enthusiasm, those of which they disapprove are implemented reluctantly or may even be slowed down. We cannot afford the luxury of administrators who are neutral.15

No sane human being desires that the bureaucrats are human beings and that they have their own feelings and ideas. But we do not

believe in the extreme to which Nyere has gone, though even we
do not still know which neutrality he meant. Is it the progress of
the party neutrality? Yet both are connected. We believe that the
bureaucrats who are entrusted to serve the public equally should
not be allowed to participate in partisan politics because this
will increase nepotism and bias on the other extreme. Whether we
are right or Nyere and his like are to be a value judgement until
the future reveals which of the two bureaucracies—the impartial or
the non-neutral—remains more efficient.

The Evolution of the Bureaucracy Between 1956-1968

The Anglo-Sudanese committee, which was appointed in 1966 to
calculate the Sudanization of the civil service, reported in 1948
that it estimated that 62% of the posts held by non-Sudanese should
be Sudanized by the end of 1968. The schedule which was framed by
this committee is shown below as Table No. V.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges and Law Officers</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officers</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foresters</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorologists</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O & N Office, Establishment Branch, Report on the Civil
Service of the Sudan Government, 1958, p.15 (mimeographed)
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953, which recognized the right of the Sudanese for self-determination, however, hastened the process of Sudanization. A new committee was appointed for the purpose of providing the free and neutral atmosphere requisite for self-determination. The Committee was empowered to suggest the Sudanization of the Administration, the Police and the Sudan Defence Force and "any other government post that may affect the freedom of the Sudanese at a time of self-determination."

This committee consisted of three Sudanese members, an Egyptian and a British member. Under the pressure of its Sudanese majority the terms of reference were sweepingly interpreted. In the course of 1954 it dismissed with compensation all the British administrative officials who amount to 140. Also, eight police officers and about 30 officers in the Sudan Defence Force were compensated and replaced by Sudanese officers.

With the departure of the British and Egyptian administrators all posts were filled by Sudanese. Other technical vacancies which resulted from Sudanization were filled by expatriates who had been recruited from countries other than Britain or Egypt.

In some departments there were not even enough Sudanese in subordinate posts to fill the administrative posts. As an example, we take the Ministry of Interior where we find 148 British administrators in 1954 while the lowest echelons of administrative posts were filled by 112 Sudanese. As a result of this accelerated policy

of Sudanization we see that:

...most of the highest administrative burdens of the Sudan Government are carried either by younger men who are well trained academically but are relatively new to government, or by older men who have had many years of association with expatriates who occupied the major administrative positions. Both are overworked and do not have an adequate supply of trained subordinates.\textsuperscript{37}

It is a truism that the manner in which Sudanization was carried out helped in most cases to preserve the spirit of conservatism inherited from the colonial administration. One of the symptoms of this conservatism is marked in the preference of in-the-job-training — through apprenticeship, as some scholars would like to call it. Due to this trend of thinking which might be appealing to the British and the Sudanese civil servants who worked with them during the colonial period, we find that no new methods of training were developed. It remained on an ad hoc nature, without systematic planning and supervised execution. With the exception of some random seminars run by the local government department for its officials, nothing of significance prevailed.

\textbf{The Beginning of the Crisis}

The condition of instability which characterized the early years after independence in the Sudan are a real testimony to the idea of the Arab ancient philosopher Ibn Khaldun who said:

...every Arab regards himself as worthy to rule, and it is rare to find one of them submitting willingly to another, be it his father or his brother or the head of his clan, but only grudgingly and for fear of public opinion.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{37}Norman C. Angus and Richard O. Neffoff, \textit{Op. cit.}, p. 7

\textsuperscript{38}An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunisia 1332-1406 translated by Charles Issawi (London, John Murray 1950), p. 37
Coalitions big and small, formal and informal continued to weaken the power of every succeeding government. Party conflict reached intolerable situation in the early 1950s when the Umma party, which was dominating the government, was continuously criticized and threatened by the Iltihabiya (Unionist) Party.

Sayid Abdullah Khalil, who was the last Prime Minister before the military rule, told Lessing in a recent interview, that due to the situation of shifting politics and instability he saw that:

...the Parliament had to be suspended. What was most urgent was time to sort out the mess and time to draft a new constitution which would strengthen the hands of the government. 39

Khalil in his words to Lessing, confessed that he had drafted a new constitution. But to carry out his plan he needed the support of the Army, whose duty it would be to maintain law and order while he and his government ruled by decree until the new constitution could be introduced and fresh elections held. According to this plan, he approached the army and was pledged the support he asked for. But at the given moment the Army double-crossed him, with Aboub the General-Commander of the Army taking the control of the government.

There has been much speculation about the events of 17 November 1958 which brought the country under the military rule. Though Khalil still emphasizes that he was double-crossed by the army, yet many people take it as a plain fact that Khalil invited

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the military to take over in order to prevent a defeat of his coalition government in Parliament which was expected to take place on the 17 of November 1958.

Still an important question remains to be answered. Why did the democratic experience fail in the two years after independance? Was it due to the absence of national and linguistic homogeneity which constitutes a serious obstacle to the working of democratic government? We need not dwell on this aspect at length because it deserves a complete paper. It suffices for the purpose of this paper to give two reasons. The first is a general one and is applicable to most of the emerging new nations;

Political instability comes not alone from the uncertain and jarring changes in the social and economic underpinnings of the political sphere. The people themselves, out of a turmoil of change that is more drastic and more constant than that which is normal between generations, reflect an extraordinary diversity in their understanding and appreciation of political action. The lack of a common elementary orientation to the goals and the means of political action reduces the effectiveness of all. There are some people who still adhere to traditional views and conceive of politics as primarily providing opportunities for realizing status, prestige and honor... Other people, taking their cues from colonial period, equate government with the security of office and the dignity of clerks in the civil service. Still others in transitional societies first came to an appreciation of politics out of the excitement of independence movements. They continue to expect politics to be the drama of group emotions and to despise those who would give in to the humdrum calculation of relative costs and risks.40

This above mentioned reason reveals the diversity in thinking and the heterogeneity in outlook which results in conflicts and

struggle for power between the different parties. The situation of the Sudan is a case in point.

The other reason is peculiar to the Sudan. The writer tends to agree fully with Abdullah Khalil—the last prime minister before the military rule—in his honest statement:

Before 1956 independence had for us boosted the answer to everything. It was the only thought in our minds and beyond it we thought of nothing. We had developed no political philosophy, no economic philosophy, not even a philosophy of government... The one thing that saved us from absolute collapse was the excellence and efficiency of the civil service which was trained and built by Britain during the years of the Condominium... We made mistakes, and by the time we discovered our mistakes we found that the constitution which we had borrowed from Britain did not give the government sufficient power to correct mistakes. The constitution we had would have worked well in a country like Britain where there are centuries of tradition and precedent to guide not only political action but political thought. In Britain certain action is taken by instinct whereas with us everything has to be a deliberate act.41

Be it for the first reason or the second or both, the Military Junta found a paved way to come to power.

2.4 The Military Rule: 1958-1964

On the morning of 17 November 1958 General Abboud, in a broadcast to the nation, told the citizens that the Army had waited patiently for a sign of improvement but now, seeing the country was brought to the brink of disaster, it had stepped in to restore order in the interests of the people. He went on to say that the bitter strife between the political parties which were only interested in their own advantage threatened the future of the country and brought instability and chaos. As for the objective of his new regime, he said that they would restore stability and

41Pieter Lessing: op. cit., p. 130
clean administration. Accordingly, he announced the dissolution of all political parties, the prohibition of assemblies and demonstrations and the temporary suspension of all newspapers. A series of decrees were declared to set up a supreme council of the Armed Forces, proclaimed a state of emergency in all the country, suspended the Sudanese Constitution and dissolved the Parliament.

The following day, 18 November saw further evocation of power. The new Council of the Armed Forces, which is composed of twelve officers under Abboud as the president, was announced to be the supreme constitutional authority in the Sudan. This supreme council formally delegated its legislative, judicial and executive powers as well as the command of the armed forces to the President. Below the supreme council was the Council of Ministers with Abboud at the Prime Minister, with seven members of the Senate, Council and five civilian ministers.

Even the military was not without its difficulties. There were basic ideological differences between the officers. As Emwity puts it:

A more persistent source of tension in the Sudanese army is the gap between two age groups of officers. One group, the older, was commissioned and had its formative experiences under the colonial regime, particularly during the expansion period of World War II. The second group, the younger, was rapidly commissioned in the crash program of 1952-1953 when the nation became independent and required a large military force. After the military assumed power, the younger officer group, stationed mainly in the provinces repeatedly sought to launch counter-coups with radical objectives.42

42 Morris Emwity: The Military in the Political Development of Few Nations. (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press 1964), p. 69
The previous political struggle between the parties was brought this time to a struggle between the military officers. A senior officer, who was the commander of the Eastern Area, who had not been appointed to the Supreme Council, resented his exclusion. He agreed with the commander of the Northern Area—who was in the same situation—to bring troops to Khartoum to threaten the new regime. The military junta was forced to compromise and the troops withdrew. Another attempt for a counter-coup, which originated at the Infantry School at Omdurman in November, 1959, was suppressed, and the leaders were sentenced to death. If these counter-coups proved anything they would show a conflict which was apparent between the military officers.

Military officers are often assumed to be by the merit of their training not politically oriented. As soldiers, they are repulsed by compromise; they believe in direct solutions which might not always be practical. Lucian Pye even goes further and believes that:

Armies always stand at some distance from their civilian societies and are even expected to have ways of their own, including attitudes and judgments, that are remote if not completely apart from those of civilian life. Thus again armies of the newly emerging countries can feel somewhat divorced from the realities of a transitional society and focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world. In consequence they are often unaware of the difficulties inherent in modernizing other segments of their society. With their tradition all problems can be overcome if the right orders are given.\(^\text{43}\)

The Officer, by virtue of his training, requires a combination of heroic leadership and military management. All his professional goals are based on military calculus, and he is not concerned about profit-making. "Political leaders are men who specialize in verbal skills and in mass appeals. In contrast to military officers, they are men who are socialized early into the technique and process of negotiation and bargaining. In particular the military profession operated in an organizational environment that has limited contact with outside client, and this in turn decreases the transferability of a skill from a military to a political career."44 Along the same lines the strong tendency in the military to obey orders does not necessarily give the chance to think about the implications of these orders. They are mostly taken for granted. The man who gives the orders is always in the position of the one who knows best. As Alan Horton stated about the case of the military in the Sudan:

What seems to distinguish the military elite is not its lack of intelligence but its discipline and its conservative 'father-knows-best' attitude about government. Army officers accept military rank and seniority as the proper measures of a man's right to be in authority. When the army took control in 1956, it was not an unhappy colonel but the Commander in Chief, Ibrahim Abboud, who gave the orders to do so, and President Abboud's rank and seniority are today of more importance to his position than his ability, which is not remarkable.45

The point is that the military orders do not lend themselves to controversy - which is mostly favourable in expecting different aspirations and different alternatives which might be favourable in

44 Morris Janowitz: op. cit., p. 43
reaching a certain goal. The military orders are no doubt very practical within the military operations but they lose their significance and value and even become harmful if they are used for the whole society because they limit the expression of alternative ways. Added to this is the limited experience of the military officers, who are generally not sophisticated economists. Their economic programs therefore are more likely to be more inspirational rather than depending on political, sociological and economical surveys. This is revealed in the Sudan case where since 1958 the government has become almost incapable of any kind of planning; and the army authorities, un schooled except in military matters, believe in the use of force to impose measures whose only chance of success would be the use of governmental persuasion and compromise. This situation has resulted in economic drawbacks leading to complete frustration for both the educated elite and the laymen. Convincing of their capabilities for the job of guiding the country to a far more reasonable situation, the intellectuals are daily faced with justified evidence of clumsy government but deprived of self-expression to influence policy. The only way through which the educated elites can save the policy of the nation is the bureaucracy where most of them work. They did their best.

The inescapable fact is that the Sudan is reasonably efficiently run in spite of the incompetence of the military ministers and the constant attempts to interfere with the normal work of the departments. It is to the credit of many senior civil servants that they have

46 Alan W. Horton, CR. 511, p. 11
refused to be intimidated by their military heads, and that they have somehow contrived not to become blind, overbearing bureaucrats.\footnote{\textit{Dieter Lassinger}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 137}

Even though the military junta have never lent their confidence to the Sudanese bureaucracy, questions of policy and even minor decisions are centralized in the hands of the military ministers and their supreme council while the five civilian ministers are a little more than heads of departments. \textquote{The Generals concentrated so much administrative detail in their hands that the machinery of government suffered as a result. The supreme council occupied itself with hundreds of decisions which should have remained within the realm of the civil service. Even the award of scholarships and attendance at conferences had to be approved by the supreme council. With each succeeding year, the role of the soldiers became more centralized and personal, as it permeated department after department of the government.}\footnote{Mohamed O. Bashir; The Sudan: A Military Burgandy, \textit{AFRICA REPORT}, Vol. No. 9, No. 11, Dec. 1968, p. 4}

On the other hand the constant succession of ministers due to the conflict between military officers and their struggle to attain ministerial positions has resulted in two deficiencies. First, most of them had so sufficient time to understand the ropes of administration. Secondly, those who had the chance to be more experienced did not devote all their time to their assigned jobs because they were always interrupted by place-seekers who tried to convince them that they could do something to strengthen their weakened positions:

One department had had six ministers in two years. \textquote{We used to watch the files accumulate on the Minister's...}
desk' said one Undersecretary, 'while he gossiped with endless place seekers for whose proteges we were then instructed to find jobs.'

What aggravated the opposition to the military rule was also the appointment of military governors in the provincial administration. These military governors had overall authority but no clear functions were specified for them. For the provincial civil administrators 'to be subordinated to an inexperienced military governor was more than many of them could stomach. Resignations at the top were numerous, and meant the loss of valuable and experienced men, known to the people and understanding them.'

Despite all hatred from both the military officers on the one side and the bureaucrats and intellectuals on the other, the bureaucrats continued to do their assigned jobs effectively and honestly with the exception of a small minority. But no bureaucracy, however efficient, can administer a country indefinitely without help from the Government. Policy continued to be on a hit and miss basis; overall decisions were sometimes delayed or neglected, or in the best cases taken at random until the drift produced mass discontent and complete frustration.

As Attempt for Basic Democracy

The absence of 'sound democratic institutions' at the provincial level had been the main cause for the failure of parliamentary institution—so claimed General Abboud in his address to the nation on the first anniversary of the coup. It seems he was quite

48 Ibid., p. 131
fascinated by the basic democracy of Ayyoub Khan in Pakistan. So, along the same lines, he suggested that the Sudan should seek for a system which emerge from the indigenous needs so as to suit the Sudanese way of life.

To pursue his philosophy Aboud appointed an interdepartmental commission in the middle of 1959. The committee under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice (Abu Rannat) was given unsolicited terms of reference:

...make recommendations on the best ways for the citizens to take part in the government of the country and to play an effective role in the development of their own affairs. It is hoped that this will ultimately pave the way for the constitutional framework which is suited to the Sudanese way of life and will avoid the evils arising from the unthinking importation and mechanical application of systems from abroad.\(^1\)

The Abu Rannat Commission finished its work in 1960 and submitted a comprehensive report in which it recommended a devolution of the authority from the centre to representative bodies at both provincial and local levels. It suggested that in each province there should be a Government Representative who was to be appointed by the Supreme Council and who should be responsible for the administration in his province. The (GR) should also be the Chairman of the proposed Province Council. The Commission goes on to recommend the creation of the Province Authority which was to be composed of the head representatives of the ministries and departments serving in the province under the chairmanship of the representatives of the Ministry of Local Government. The members

\(^{1}\text{Republic of the Sudan: Report of the Commission on Coordination Between the Central and Local Government (Khartoum, Govt. Printing Press, 1961), p.7}
of the Province Authority should be responsible individually and jointly for the execution of the decisions of the Province Council. At the end of its recommendations Abu Ramat Commission suggested the abolition of the Office of the District Commissioner (the Verkaz) and the earlier form of the provincial administration.

The recommendations of Abu Ramat Commission were accepted in toto by General Abboud and his junta and were accordingly implemented.

A further step came in July 1961 when Abboud announced that the next step would be "the creation of a Central Council... in a pyramid with the local councils as a base. After the inauguration of this Central Council, a national committee would draw up a new constitution embodying all the principles and fundamental rights as a prelude to a sound parliamentary system by universal election." To pursue this new goal another commission, under the same chairman (Abu Ramat) was appointed in January 1962. In compliance with the recommendations of this new commission, a Central Council was opened in 17 November 1963.

The Central Council together with the President of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces constituted the legislature. The Council is composed of seventy-five members excluding the ministers. Fifty-four members have been elected by provincial councils, each council electing six from among its members; the rest have been nominated by the President. The Council has the right to make legislation and approve the budget and also to question ministers on public matters. However, it has no power to elect the Prime Minister.

The duration of the Council is two years.52


* A chart showing the structure of the government during the military rule is attached to this paper as Appendix C
The Central Council was received with severe criticisms from the public. It was claimed that most patriotic citizens refused to serve and that those who actually participated were no more than puppets who served the military junta interests. To be if this Council had any virtue, it would be its insistence for a Commission of Inquiry into the Southern problem which set the end of the military rule.

2.5 October Revolution and the Surrender of the Military Junta

The University of Khartoum always remained the centre of opposition during the military rule. The Generals had tried to tighten control over it by appointing the Minister of Education as the Chairman of its governing body but due to loud criticism from the students and staff members, they were forced to adjourn the matter.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, which invited the public to give proposed solutions for the Southern problem, the students did. The students declared that the only solution will be the end of the military rule and the return to democracy, because the Junta had aggravated the situation in the South by its arbitrary decisions. When the Minister of Interior heard their proposed solution he forbade further discussion. The students decided to defy him, and they held another meeting. The police came to disperse the meeting, but they failed. They used firearms without the legal approval of a magistrate, and as a result, one student was killed and nine were wounded.

On the next day, 22 of October 1964, demonstrations continued and virtually the entire working population of the Capital—including
the judiciary and the civil service—joined in a general protest
strike against the regime.

President Abboud appealed to the populace by radio to
return to work but he received no attention. Finding the whole
country in great opposition he dissolved the Supreme Council, the
Council of Ministers and the Central Council marking the end of
his regime, thereby proving the prophecy of the London Times
reporter who said early in 1958: "They are there because they
claim they can do better... If they fall they may be in all
likelihood pushed out by somebody more extreme." That body is the
whole nation, and they succeeded.

After the end of the military rule, a caretaker government
ruled until a Constituent Assembly was elected in April 1965. The
elections were held only in the Northern part of the country while
delayed until 1967 in the Southern part because of its disturbed
condition.

At this time a coalition government which is composed of
the National Unionist Party and the Umma Party is ruling. The
writer does not think that he is in a position to evaluate in
details what is going on now; no fresh information is available
and the Sudan is too far—nine thousand miles away. Some major
issues concerning this period will be stated in the other chapters.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE BUREAUCRATIC
ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In fact, excessive concentration on strengthening
the administrative services may be self-defeating
because it may lead only to a greater imbalance
between the administrative and the political and
hence to a greater need of the leaders to exploit
politically the administrative services. 1

Lucian W. Pye

An exaggerated building-up of the administrative
arms of government can produce a situation analogous
to colonial rule, in which the people feel that they
are being dominated by the authoritative aspects of
government. 2

Max F. Willikkan & Donald L.W. Blackmer

Certainly the First Problem of Politics in
democracies today is how to maintain effective
citizen control over the growing apparatus of
government. Not only the size and scope of govern-
ment activity but improvements in social technology
as well have brought about a concentration of power
in the government bureaucracy which some fear may
be able to pursue an autonomous course armed with
its special information, expertise and indispens-
ability. 3

James F. Guyot

Where the bureaucracy is overpowering, as in some
Asian ex-colonial areas, or where the political
parties are extremely weak and not really plugged
into the power grid, as in many Latin American

1Lucian W. Pye: The Political Context of National Development
in Irving Swedlow (ed), Development and Administration: Concept
and Problems (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press 1960), p. 33

2Max F. Willikkan and Donald L.W. Blackmer (ed), The Emerging
Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co., 1961), p. 75

3James F. Guyot: Government Bureaucrats Are Different,
Public Administration Review, Vol. XXII, No.4, Dec. 1962, p. 201
countries, the bureaucracy can operate pretty much as it chooses, thus running the risk of intensifying centrifugal tendencies.\footnote{Joseph La Palocbara: Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations. \textit{Comparative Administration Group: Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Indiana 1965)}, mimeographed, p. 74}

Joseph La Palocbara

The above quotations are extracted from the works of eminent writers in the field of development administration. They have alerted students of public administration to the fact that strengthening administrative systems may not always be a desirable thing to do. This issue remained a puzzle without enough analysis until recently when Fred W. Riggs, in a most interesting and thought-provoking essay, tried to pinpoint the consequences of the excessive concentration of strengthening the bureaucracy in transitional societies. His paper—\textit{Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View}—deals mainly with the relationship between the bureaucrats and political development.

Riggs believes that bureaucrats probably always have some influence in politics, but the extent of such influences vary from precious little to a great deal. He goes further and suggests that the lack of balance between political-seeking institutions and bureaucratic policy—implementing structures in transitional societies, resulted in making the bureaucrats involvement in politics exceptionally high. In an attempt to explore the reasons which led to the premature, or too rapid, expansion of the bureaucracy while the political system lag behind, Riggs advanced the following:

1. Those sectors in which technology, the purely instrumental means, predominate are able to change more rapidly than those in which social and personal
values are implicated. In the governmental sphere, this principle means that development in public administration, bureaucratic change, takes place more readily than counterpart changes in politics; techniques change more easily than techniques.

2. In the countries under colonial rule, we find the colonial administration created a bureaucratic apparatus not subject to political control within the dependent territory, so that administrative institutions proliferated while political structures remained embryonic and largely extra-legal, hence unable to relate themselves effectively to control over the bureaucracy.

3. In the contemporary era of large-scale technical assistance under international and bi-national programmes, we see a continued infusion of external pressure and assistance in the expansion and proliferation of bureaucratic organs, with relatively little attention to the growth of strictly political institutions. The reasons are quite evident. Administration is regarded as a technical matter (technics) subject to foreign, "expert" advice, whereas politics is a closely linked with fundamental values and social norms (techniques) that aid would be construed as "intervention".

Due to these reasons forwarded by Biggs, we find in transitional societies a condition in which non-bureaucratic groups are unable to exercise any coherent or effective control over an established bureaucracy. It is a situation in which the bureaucracy becomes through default, the main political force. The bureaucracy becomes more politicized than the case in Western bureaucracies.

and such a situation inhibits political development. Rigg put it this way:

*My general thesis is that premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective politics. A corollary thesis holds that separate political institutions have a better chance to grow if bureaucratic institutions are relatively weak.*

Rigg advanced some propositions to support his thesis among which we mention the adverse effect of the bureaucracy merit system on the solidarity of the party system, the effect of the tight bureaucratic centralization on the electorate, the way the bureaucracy paralyzes the activities of the interest groups and how it creates its own; how the bureaucracy usurps the powers of the legislature. I agree with these propositions fully but I think his assumption that the courts lack social backing does not seem convincing.

It will be the purpose of this chapter to show the validity of the thesis forwarded by Rigg in the case of Sudan. I will first test Rigg's propositions, then I will test other propositions which I have thought of to support the same thesis. The propositions which I intend to add are: how the bureaucratic secrecy hampers the growth of public opinion; how the "expertise" knowledge of the bureaucracy interpreted discretion so widely to absorb the political powers. Last but not least is the situation in developing countries where the bureaucracy is viewed as a secured career and so absorbs educated elites who should not by the definition of their positions participate in partisan politics.

*Told., P. 126*
1.1 Bureaucracy and the Party System

There may be extremely few commonly shared values in transitional societies which are more frequently composed of highly westernized intelligensia at one extreme and illiterate tribal members at the other extreme. Such a situation in which the traditional values are not yet fully eradicated and the modern values are not yet fully institutionalized is marked with lack of consensus. The writer assumes that there are two factors which aggravate the matter and make political consensus unattainable in the near future. The first factor is related to the colonial era when the bureaucracy is regarded as an instrument for the foreigner to exploit the indigenous citizen. The bureaucracy is viewed with suspicion and fear and regarded as an alien tool. Although the colonial era had ended in Sudan in 1956, but still the same belief dominates the thinking of the nomads and the tribal groups. This situation shows that an element of confidence is lost, and so the possibility of communication and agreement on new values is lacking. The second factor is created by the concept of the neutrality of the civil service which denies the bureaucrats the chance to participate in partisan politics. If they have a chance to participate in partisan politics, they may be able to offer new ideas and rational means to strengthen the party system. At least in offering new approaches, they can communicate with the rest of the citizens and infuse new values. But this is not the case; the educated elite still remain to be neutral civil servants while the political system is dominated by charismatic leaders with their traditional approaches.
Charismatic leaders and those who believe in their power have a greater submission to the voice of personalities than the system. Zelleke believes that this recognition of the voice of personalities in Africa is due to a legacy of its own past:

It is a legacy of the past prior to colonization. Africa has a legacy of its own; a long tradition of paternalistic government, a tradition of one man rule with an all-pervading influence, a tradition where the chief or king was, to speak in modern terms, the supreme law maker, the supreme judge and the supreme administrator. The legacy still dominates as a sacred tradition resulting in a situation in which power revolves around personalities and not doctrines or policies. As Millikan put it:

The allegiance of followers does not usually depend upon policy objectives or programs, for the people identify with the group, not with its accoutant policies. Consequently, leaders in transitional societies usually have great freedom of choice in matters of tactics and strategy. This freedom, however, is more apparent than real, for the leaders generally lack realistic guides for making policy decisions and easily become the captives of their own imagination.

So is the case in Sudan; while the bureaucrats are forced out of politics due to the concept of neutrality, the political institutions remained in the hands of religious sects and traditional tribal leaders. As William Zartman observed:

In Sudan such voting was done simply on the basis of personalities or religious sects. There was little appeal to the population in terms of programs. 

6Max F. Millikan and Donald L.N. Blackmer (ed), O.A.R.I., p.73
As we see it, the conflict is no more than a struggle for regional and parochial interests, and it is not a conflict of ideologies and new alternative means of reaching national goals. It is a conflict between personalities who are only popular in their own sects or tribes. In a country like the Sudan where about 500 tribes live side by side, this conflict between personalities ultimately created a multi-party system. Consequently we find the country divided into various small parties which have either regional or sect backing, and none of them is powerful enough to rule. Due to this situation we find the Sudan is always governed by coalitions (with the exception of the military period) which do not last long because of the threat of other growing parties or coalitions. The writer believes that the existing conflict between personalities and the formation of coalitions will continue to exist, until the bureaucracy becomes over-staffed and the future educated elite find places in growing private enterprises. By that time at least a considerable number of educated elites could participate in partisan politics because private enterprises do not believe in the concept of neutrality. They will be, hopefully, more insistent on large-scale state action offering realistic programs which might gain the backing of large groups. At least they could offer new alternatives and possible means and infuse the political system with national strategies.

Perhaps more significant is the concept of the merit system which is adopted by many of the transitional societies. The merit system necessitates that bureaucrats ought to be selected on the basis of universalistic, achievement criteria and that the employment
should be for a career. This concept in the words of Riggs "cuts at the root of one of the strongest props of an ancient political party system. Certainly, if American history can be taken as suggestive, the spoils system played an important part in galvanizing the parties into action." The writer believes that spoils system could have two major benefits if adopted: First, it could be used as a lever to gain control over administration. The bureaucrats, however neutral they may be, have special interests of their own and if they did not find tight control from the ruling party, they might substitute their own values which might conflict with the values of the party. Secondly the spoils system gives a chance for some of the members of the party to be in a few of the top offices of the bureaucracy. This has a dual benefit: On the one hand it will keep the party informed about what is occurring as far as the implementation of their decisions is concerned and in such a case they can make rapid adjustments easily. On the other hand it keeps the solidarity of the party because those who are enthusiastic to find such places in the bureaucracy will strive willingly and work hard to gain the success of the party in the election. But in a system of merit there is no reason for the loyalty to the party because it gives them no hope of rewards—as Riggs has stated.

A word of caution ought to be stated. Our inclination to the spoils system does not mean that such senior positions in the bureaucracy should be left to the discretion of the ruling party because nobody could guarantee that such a system would not be abused. It is even more likely to be abused if no limits or conditions are specified in the laws and procedures. Levitan summarized
The decision to appoint non-careerists should be made boldly and unashamedly. If conscientiously carried out, it needs no apology. If abused and then hypocritically justified by resort to democratic rationalizing, it is for the electorate to demonstrate its disgust. A positively announced policy to supplement careerists with non-careerists, and to limit the range of positions normally to be staffed with regular civil servants, will go far towards breaking down such of the cliquishness that permeates the bureaucracy... The inclusion of non-career administrative officials will contribute to making the bureaucracy more responsible.16

In conclusion to this part of the paper we can say that the bureaucracy undermines the party system in two ways: First, through the concept of neutrality it deprives the parties of the benefit of new alternatives which could be offered by the educated elite who are mostly national in their outlook. Secondly, through the concept of the merit system the party will have limited channels to control the bureaucracy; besides, it might not be well informed about the consequences of its plans and so it cannot make the adjustments needed.

1.2 Bureaucracy and the Electorate

According to the last population census of Sudan which was conducted in the years 1955-1956 we find 92% of the population live in the rural areas, while only 8% live in the urban areas. Paradoxically enough only the bureaucrat living in one of these urban areas—Khartoum—have the power to determine the rate of development in the rural areas.

As we have stated earlier in the first chapter of this paper and in accordance with the Marshall Plan, a system of local government was adopted in Sudan in 1953. Until the end of 1966, 68

rural councils and 20 municipalities were created. To all these
councils powers concerning the development of their areas are
delegated. But unfortunately this only remains in theory and in the
laws of the ministry of local government while the practice is
different. Although the system appears to be decentralized, but in
reality it is very centralized and controlled by the bureaucracy at
the headquarters of the ministry of local government. As Professor
Huxley has said: "a decentralized administration is one in which
the greatest number of decisions are made on the spot." But in
no one of the councils of local government in Sudan, can a major
decision be made on the spot; they must always be approved by the
headquarters. The writer recalls a statement made by one of the
town clerks, which is quite possibly imaginary but it reveals the
frustration created by tight centralization. He said: "If the
municipality in Port Sudan happened to need salt, this accordingly
should be ordered from the headquarters though Port Sudan is just on
the shore of the Red Sea."

The reasons behind this system of centralization are:
First, most of the rural councils depend for a greater portion of
their local budgets on the central government which insists upon
supervising all the incurred obligations. Secondly, there is an
assumption that most of the rural people are illiterate and could
hardly create realistic plans for their areas. Thirdly, the
ministry of local government acting as a coordinator would like to
give equal chances for development to all regions.

11Michael Langley: No Woman's Country: Travels in the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (New York, The Philosophical Library 1931),
p. 145.
No doubt the reasoning behind centralization has its brighter sides but its negative implications are greater. The writer believes that development is not merely an increase in size or shift in income. Development by definition requires alterations in the customary behavior patterns. The climate of development is the climate of innovation, modification, and alteration of personal attitudes and none of these could be achieved without the actual participation of the group for whom the development is intended. Perhaps more important is the fact that when all decisions are centralized in the bureaucracy, the elected councils are powerless. As Riggs put it:

Insofar as effective control of developmental programs are retained—because financed—by field agents of the central bureaucracy, elected local officials lack significant powers of decision-making. Their function becomes primarily ceremonial. Electoral contests then determine relative prestige ratings, not program or policy issues.\(^\text{12}\)

This tight centralization by the ministry of local government means that the bulk of the citizenry are denied meaningful participation in modern-style politics. This situation will exist as long as the local councils depend upon the loans of the central government. But if these councils tried to do without loans from the central government, the local self-government could be a significant training ground for national politics. The writer tends to agree with the suggestion of Riggs that local government could be a significant training ground for national politics, if it involves electoral choices between alternative programs for which the voters themselves must pay. Only in this way can both

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\(^{12}\text{Fred V. Riggs: Op. cit., p. 133}\)
politician and voter learn the meaning of political choice instead of agitation and demagogy. 13

Besides the excessive centralization which is a barrier to training the citizens in the electorate in modern style politics, the bureaucracy, by absorbing the most energetic and educated people, deprives the electorate of its best potential leadership, "leaving a residue of partially educated men and women whose level of aspiration has risen more rapidly than their capabilities. Hence the bitterness and frustration of local politics increases without compensating successes in self-realization and achievement. "14

Perhaps, the challenge posed by the excessive centralization of the bureaucracy could only be met if all citizens were motivated to devote a considerable portion of their time, energy and money to their local political institutions. This might prove to be a good way to diminish the centralized control. In the words of Eisenstadt:

Insofar as other groups tend to participate more actively in political life, the monopoly of power and prestige breaks down, and the bureaucracy may then become only one among a number of status groups, deriving many of its symbols from other groups and strata in the society.15

14.3 Bureaucracy and the Interest Groups

One of the pillars of political action in advanced countries is the "association", through which functionally specific interests

15 S.N. Eisenstadt: Political Struggle in Bureaucratic Societies, World Politics, Vol. 9, Oct. 1956, p.95
are articulated and communicated to decision-making centres. In the process of development the citizenry becomes progressively involved in matters of state, i.e. politicised. The primary vehicle or "transmission belt"—to use Joseph Stalin’s colorful phrase—for such politicisation is the interest group. 16 However, the case in developing countries is different. As Hillikan and Blackmer observed in their book (The Emerging Nations), groups that do exist in developing countries represent total ways of life; they are most frequently communal groups based on language, ethnic, religious or regional considerations. Or they tend to represent intensely personal associations and loyalties. To give examples from Sudan we would suggest among the groups which have religious considerations, the different FAHIS花卉 (ways) like the Hadoria, Ahmadia and Khaditía. Interest groups which are based on regional grounds are as many as the regions of the Sudan, among which we mention the Beja and the Fur groups.

In contemporary developing countries and the Sudan is no exception, we find the public sector monopolises all economic and social aspects of life. It dominates the resources, experience and decides the direction of development. To carry all these functions effectively the bureaucracy initiates special interest groups who can help to motivate their fellow citizens for the new concepts of development. Among these we mention how the Gezira Scheme in Sudan, which is an extension of the bureaucracy created its own interest groups. As the reporter of the Arab World Magazine

16 Ibid. p. 139
The Desira Scheme has created a proud, cooperative spirit among the inhabitants. Village and 'Block' councils have been established to train the population in the responsibilities of self-government. Social services are provided by the Desira Board and the Ministry of Education. Adult education officers attend village council meetings, offering advice and conducting courses on construction, health, literacy and civics. Teams of female welfare workers educate the women in domestic science and hygiene, and recreational board encourages sports.

We do not question the utility of such programs and activities initiated by the bureaucracy, but what we question is the adverse effect of such activities on the political development. The writer agrees with Riggs that much interest groups which follow bureaucratic initiative are not a spontaneous product of citizen demand. They only extend the reach of the bureaucracy, providing it with transmission belts through which total mobilization can, potentially, be achieved. Hence the growth of state-sponsored interest groups augments bureaucratic control, without necessarily strengthening any centres of autonomous political power capable of bringing bureaucratic machines under popular control.

Our statement that the interest groups in the rural areas are initiated by the bureaucracy does not mean that there are no autonomous groups. But these autonomous interest groups are weak because they depend upon the bureaucracy for financial help, and as a source of leadership. The cost of maintaining voluntary organization can scarcely be obtained from the members, so they are forced...

\[17\] The Sudan, Arab World, Vol. IV, Nos. 2-5, Feb.-March, April 1958, p. 39
\[18\] Fred W. Riggs: op. cit., p. 140
by their need to ask for loans from the bureaucracy which consequently deters any control of these funds. The cooperative scheme in the northern part of Sudan which obtains loans from the government are a case in point. On the other hand the leadership for most of such autonomous groups comes predominantly from the intelligentsia. This leadership as we have indicated earlier are by the virtue of their positions bureaucrats, because the civil service still holds the most prestigious status. We quite frequently find the town-clerks and the representatives of the central government the leaders of such groups. The result, quite generally, as Bigga emphasized it, is that in rural areas the bureaucratic leaders of interest groups usually dominate by relative superiority of talent and training the private citizens with whom they deal.

As for the urban areas in Sudan, we find the businessmen constitute the main interest group. Houli. Hashim estimated that 85% of our external trade is monopolized by the foreigners.\(^{19}\) This significantly indicates that a major portion of the businessmen cannot stand against the bureaucracy's policies because above all they are foreigners and should not interfere in the national place. The second type of businessmen are Sudanese entrepreneurs. They have developed what is called by Bigga a symbiotic relationship of antagonistic cooperation with the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy provides special facilities for their growing industries.

It conducts special research which estimates the chances of success and the owners of these industries are advised on these basis. Also the government gives loans to these industries through the Industrial Bank. With respect to such facilities the private entrepreneur's potential power to stand against the control of the bureaucracy is paralysed. If he tries to defy some of the bureaucracy's procedures, he will find himself threatened by the reduction of some of the facilities offered. Another bureaucratic tactic to counter the threat of growing power in an entrepreneurial community is to establish a public sector which is often run at a loss but serves to controlling the private business.

To do justice to the situation of interest groups in the Sudan one should mention that there are strong groups like the Labour Union and Students' Union which are capable and beyond bureaucratic control. But the majority, as the above discussion indicates, are controlled by the bureaucracy and so their political role is insignificant.

1.4 Bureaucracy and the Legislature

Parliamentary life in Sudan did not succeed so far in attracting the best talents of the nation because elitistcreening is still based on religious and regional bases. Naturally the tribe would like to elect its own Omda or Sheikh and the religious sects would like to be represented by their enthusiastic believers. The Parliament of 1954–1957 is a clear testimony of our argument: 26 of the legislators were either Omdas or Sheikhs, 30 were farmers
and small private entrepreneurs, while only 19 were retired civil servants. On the other hand the bureaucracy is composed of the graduates of high schools and the universities in its top echelons, and the graduates of elementary and intermediate schools in its lower echelons. So I think we are quite justified to state that the bureaucracy, potentially, is more likely to usurp the powers of the legislature through its expertise knowledge.

In the first place the process of nation-building in Sudan began with the establishment of the administrative structures of modern government, but with little attention to how these might relate to political processes. Perhaps in the colonial period a great effort was made to isolate them from any potential political process. After independence the bureaucracy continued to function under the same procedures which do not lend it to legislative control. This case is not only peculiar to Sudan, but as Asu observed it is characteristic of most bureaucracies in emergent African States.

The civil service in the pre-independence period was responsible for both the formulation and the execution of policies. From where there are legislatures, the initiative for political decisions rested with the Governor and his civil service advisers. The new governments of the independent states took over the public service virtually intact and overnight ... Its role was converted from one of being the servant of the political government and the people. But procedures and regulations affecting all aspects of Government Administration were based on the principle ofuest control from the Colonial Office. These procedures and regulations have not changed in basic characteristics although amendments have been introduced to make them more applicable to the present situation.40

The gravest shortcoming of administration through regulations is that once established they tend to perpetuate themselves and remain in force even though they proved inadequate. So the writer believes that the procedures and rules of the civil service which were first created by the colonial powers, and were never drastically changed by the indigenous elites, constitute an institutional limitation to the powers of the Sudanese Parliament. To mention but one part of the problems created by such institutional procedures we would mention that it is the right of the bureaucracy to initiate legislation. No doubt the bureaucracy in proposing legislation will frame it in their own value preferences. We do not mean to imply that the value preferences of the bureaucracy are invalid or impractical. On the contrary they might even be more practical than a compromised decision by the legislatures. What we want to emphasize is that when the bureaucracy initiates legislation it limits the initiative and the controversies which might arise in the Parliament if the framework is set by the bureaucracy. Such controversies might bring up new alternatives and means which might be more feasible. Also there is the possibility that the bureaucracy when proposing a certain legislation, might seek legislative authorization to further its own interests. Riggs believes that "if such legislation is adopted it does not represent political control over the bureaucracy as much as bureaucratic manipulation of the symbols of legitimacy."\(^2\)

Even in the rare cases when the legislation is initiated by the legislature, they still leave loopholes for the access of

\(^{2}\) Fred V. Riggs: op. cit., p. 151
the bureaucracy. Legislation in such cases incorporates vague and
ambiguous phrases, precisely because it is sometimes impossible
to reach agreement among people who represent a diversity of
regional interests. In such cases it is difficult for the
bureaucrat to discover clearly the legislative intent, and so he
will have wide discretion to interpret it as he wishes.

It might be suggested that since the legislature has the
right to approve the annual budget for the government, there will
be considerable power to check and control the bureaucracy. This
right appears theoretically convincing, but it is not practically
happening. Due to the fact that the bureaucracy is setting its
net so wide, providing most of the services to the public, it
always faces a limitation of time in the submission of the current
budget to the legislature. So it happens sometimes that some
departments incure obligations even before the general budget is
approved. Another problem limiting the power of the legislature
in approving the budget is that most of the legislators are not
familiar with the terminology the bureaucracy use. This situation
is not only peculiar in Sudan, but is also faced by the legislators
in other developing and developed countries. William Royer set
forth a similar case in U.S.A.:

Legislatures are often battled in their
perennial attempts to control the administrative
process because no two administrative agencies
make policies in precisely the same manner. All
the vagaries and vagaries of human behavior
are reflected in the procedural heterogeneity of
modern bureaucracy.

22William W. Royer: Bureaucracy on Trial (New York, The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), p.17
Another medium for the legislature to control the bureaucracy is through the questions which can be addressed to the ministers who are responsible for certain departments. But again due to the secrecy which dominates the actions of most government dealings, we find such questions are phrased in a very general way and are answered in a general manner. Sometimes, quite a number of such questions could be disregarded on the assumption that they are against the public interest. The public interest, vague as it is, gives the chance for the bureaucracy to dominate the information. The opponents of the bureaucratic control even go further and suggest that some of the questions asked by some legislators are initiated by the bureaucracy, to give it a chance to make a certain announcement or declare and publicize a certain action. Such tendency is reported by different writers in other developed and developing countries.

If the above stated arguments reveal anything they will reveal that the bureaucracy, through its inherited procedures and refined tactics, is able to dominate the legislative powers.

1.5 Bureaucratic Secrecy and Public Opinions

President Woodrow Wilson was reputed to have stated: "I for one, have the conviction that government ought to be all outside and no inside. Government must, if it is to be pure and correct in its processes, be absolutely public in everything that affects it."21

Although this observation by President Wilson might have been quite valid for his time, it could hardly be stated that any government in our time could afford to be absolutely public. There are delicate questions in both military and diplomatic affairs which could hardly lend themselves to public scrutiny. So our argument in this section of the paper is not for making everything public, but it is a criticism of the broad rights given to the bureaucrats to withhold any information they do not like to publicize. If this question of secrecy is taken to a great extent it will no doubt impede the free growth of democracy. As Bourke put it:

...insofar as secrecy in government seriously impedes the free flow of communications among citizens, it constitutes a real threat to the informed public discussion that is at the core of democracy.24

It seems to me such formulas as: "Secret", "Top Secret", "Confidential", "Restricted", are among the values inherited from the colonial period. It had been recognizable during the Anglo-Egyptian rule which feared the threat for some of its interests. Above all it was an alien government. Yet I could not see at all the point behind such formulas in a national bureaucracy which is supposed to share its successes and problems with the public.

The writer believes that what maintains solid ground for the bureaucratic secrecy is the fact that the bureaucracy monopolizes most of the mass media apparatus. So the bureaucracy is the source of the information upon which the community's political opinions are ultimately based.

24 Ibid., p. 226
The radio has been, since the colonial period, a government monopoly, and so is the television station which started its transmission during the military rule. As such, both the radio and the television were hardly the places to look to for controversy on political or economic issues.

As far as the local press is concerned there are about two dozen newspapers, but illiteracy limits their circulation and the government limits their freedom. In addition, they face other inherent problems such as the case in other developing countries as Edward Shils observed:

The poverty of the newspapers, the slowness of the tradition of news gathering journalism, the low status of the newspaper correspondent in comparison with those into whose public he would inquire, all tend to hamper the press in its performance of an important function. 23

The Sudanese journalists have been struggling since the early years of independence to be released from the bureaucratic control under the Ministry of Interior; but due to the personal conflicts among politicians the problem still remains unsolved. There still exists a committee in the Ministry of Interior which is supposed to advise the Minister of Interior on the different procedures which regulate the press. During the military rule these powers were really abused, and as a result quite a number of the newspapers were banned.

Due to their limited sources the newspapers depended on the bulletin published by the Ministry of Information which is understandably very conservative. This kind of information is rightly

23 Edward Shils: Political Development in the New States (Netherlands, H.V.D. Biedel 1968), p.43
called by Feld, a bureaucratic communication which concentrates on
the means for rendering public office rational and impersonal. They
differ from political communication which concentrates on the processes
for acquiring and retaining public office. The bureaucrats would
like to play it safe and so they will not offer controversial
arguments which might endanger their positions.

In conclusion we can say that due to the inherited rules
which favour secrecy, and also due to the dominance of the
bureaucracy in both the radio and television; and limitation of
the freedom of the press, the public is lacking the high-quality
information the bureaucrats have at their disposal. So we find the
public unattached to any standards of judgment other than those
provided by passion, ethnicity and regionalism will lack the
capacity to pass judgment on the merits of policies.

The writer believes that the bureaucratic monopolization of
information cannot be solved unless the inherited bureaucratic
colonial procedures are abolished and new laws which suit a
democratic government are adopted. Both the radio and television
should be disconnected from the close link with the bureaucracy, a
situation like the BBC might be ideal. On the other hand the laws
which regulate the newspapers should be revised and restated in a
manner which would give the chance for the journalists to keep the
public informed; provided also they insure a responsible journalism.

26 R. D. Feld: Political Policy and Persuasion: The Role of
Communication from political leaders, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*,
Vol. 2, 1958, p.40
1.6 Bureaucratic Expertise, Knowledge and Discretion

Undoubtedly, if the public sector covers almost the entire range of social activities, then the scope of bureaucratic influence will be equally wide. In a case like the Sudan where the bureaucracy monopolizes not only all the services rendered to the public, but also monopolizes most of the educated class, it will definitely have great power which can hardly be challenged by the political institutions. As Gaffar Bakheit put it:

"The power of the civil service in Sudan is due to two reasons: First, the public sector monopolizes all the economic and social aspects. It dominates the resources, experience and decides the direction of development. Secondly, the civil service is composed of the cream of the educated class who are specialized in different disciplines, and these are the groups who will decide the future of the country."

As we have indicated earlier, the bureaucrats represent the educated elite of the country. They also have at their disposal various sources of information. Such a strategic position gives them a wide discretion to act as they wish because the uneducated class cannot comprehend their terminology and do not have access to information which could help in factual judgment. Knowledge itself expands power, and as Horton Long suggested, "such a fund of power could be used for good or for ill."

It might be suggested that if the public could not check the bureaucracy, the cabinet of ministers who are the representatives...

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27Gaffar H. Bakheit: Objectivity and Neutrality of the Civil Service, Khartoum Magazine, No. 9, June 1966, p. 15 (In Arabic)

of the people should use their powers to limit its discretion. But as Max Weber said:

Such control is possible only in a very limited degree to persons who are not technical specialists. Generally speaking, the trained permanent official is more likely to get his way in the long run than his nominal supervisor, the cabinet minister, who is not a specialist. 29

Added to this is the fact that most ministers in Sudan do not stay in office for a long period due to the instability of the political system which was described earlier. Consequently they are not experienced in the ropes of government and this makes it easier for the bureaucracy to get their way.

It is suggested by some scholars, that in order to limit the discretion of the bureaucracy, political decisions should be separated from administrative decisions. The writer believes that such a suggestion is not practical or operational. In the first place facts cannot be separated from values and even Herbert Simon goes further and suggests that some facts are intermediate values. On the other hand, decisions, whether political or administrative are unavoidably enmeshed intricately in the surrounding tissue of culture. As Ralph Braibanti puts it:

Decision-making is far less autonomous as a mode of behavior than is a procedure. Decision-making is enmeshed so intricately and so deeply in the surrounding tissue of culture that it cannot be extracted as an autonomous behavior and transplanted. The greater the value judgment sector of decision-making, the more this is true. Since the value judgment sector is typically greater in emerging states than it is in older states, a decision—

making science has even less applicability to the newer states. The physical and attitudinal apparatus needed to optimize decision-making is not presently or in the near future available to emerging states.  

The writer believes that administrative discretion could hardly be limited unless the private enterprise flourishes and shares with the bureaucracy the task of rendering services to the public; consequently the bureaucrats' powers will be limited to certain aspects. On the other hand both the discretion and expertise knowledge will dominate until educated people in the Sudan find positions which are not inhibited by bureaucratic control, and so they can criticize and check the actions of the bureaucracy. Last, but not least, is the fact that unless the political system becomes more stable and the ministers have more time to be acquainted with their tasks, the discretion given to the bureaucracy could hardly be limited.

3.7 Bureaucracy as the Secured Career

As we have indicated in the first chapter, secular education in Sudan was associated since its beginning with government posts. The schools were created by the British, mainly to supply the bureaucracy with clerks.

In the course of time government positions gained a prestigious status, because lacking a competition with private enterprise, the bureaucracy offered the most attractive career to the literate. As

Horace Berger has observed in many developing countries:

In countries with relatively little private industrial enterprise a government job has been the goal of a large proportion of the educated youth. With fewer outlets for their talents than are found in areas that are more advanced technologically, young people have looked to the government to provide both the income and the prestige or status they expect as the reward for their educational achievement.\(^{31}\)

The bureaucracy is not only the place for a secured career, but moreover it is a place where one can demonstrate power. The second reason makes it—as Berger assumes—more prestigious than the case in Western bureaucracies, where private economic power and the political system have built up competing power groups.\(^{32}\)

The writer believes that, as long as the bureaucracy remains the most prestigious career, offering the best positions for the educated elites; it deprives the political sources from the ideas of an important sector of the society. In the words of Victor Ferkiss:

This bureaucratic monopolization of expertise deprives the political leaders of independent sources of information and makes them dependent on the expert judgment of the bureaucracy to a degree not possible elsewhere.\(^{33}\)

No prompt solution could be suggested to this problem, but we feel that in the long run when the bureaucracy cannot afford to take anymore, or when its prestigious position diminishes due to


\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 92

the rise of competing private enterprises this problem could be resolved.

Conclusion

Our previous discussion shows how the power of the Sudanese bureaucracy expanded and nearly controlled all the political aspects while the political institutions are lagging behind. A number of questions still remain to be answered. Is such a situation peculiar only to Sudan? Does it make any difference whether the bureaucracy is more powerful or the political institutions are, since in both are indigenous elites? What about the probability that the bureaucrats might abuse their power and use it for their own interests? Does the great power of the bureaucracy undermine political development?

To begin with, the case of a powerful bureaucracy as compared with the political institutions is not only peculiar to Sudan but it is a characteristic of most transitional societies. The differences between them is only a question of degree. Perhaps this is due to the fact that bureaucracies were introduced earlier, in the colonial period, while the political institutions were not in existence or in an embryonic stage. The bureaucracy developed faster because being a technical instrument, it could borrow and install the concepts of the developed western bureaucracies; the political institutions are supposed to spring from the indigenous needs, and foreign aid in this respect is considered an intervention.

As regards our second question, I believe that bureaucratic control creates inequalities of power. It leads more to the authoritarian than the democratic type of government. At least it
violates the democratic principles that sovereignty rests with all, because in a case of bureaucratic control, only a few have the loud voice. It might be regarded by some that the rule of a few bureaucrats might accomplish more than political institutions which are not based on political doctrines. This may or may not be true, but the basic issue still remains in the values of the society concerned. Does it lie to sacrifice democratic rights for economic development which might come easily through a small authoritarian rule? The answer remains with the people and attempts might be mere speculation.

Fred W. Ries believes that in transitional societies where there is unbalanced development in the case of the bureaucracy and political institutions, that the bureaucracy tends to abuse its power. He said:

Bureaucrats entrusted to officials as a public trust, as means for public service, may be utilized as weapons for power, so stakes for private gain. Bureaucrats, especially those in the top echelons, become ensnared in a complex, ambiguous game. The angry 'head' of the coin is the official role of public administration, but its dark tail is the secret struggle for power. 34

The writer does not agree with such an extreme stand. The bureaucrats above all are indigenous citizens who share the aspirations of their fellow-countrymen. They may advocate different means to further development but this does not imply a conspiracy. The fact that they are the most educated group in the society will just...
them to strive genuinely to create realistic policies for their nation. They are not only playing the role of the bureaucrat who should perform his duties to the best of his ability, but also they are playing the role of the intellectual who is looking for better prospects for his society. Some scholars like Edward Shils assume that even such educated elites are corrupt, their corruption has its virtue:

A great civil service, such as that of India or such as the Sudanese Civil Service is on the way to becoming, enhances the dignity of its country, and increases its respect for probity and devotion to the common good. Yet, there are other things in life, and a little reputation for corruption in a civil service, painful though it is to contemplate, probably has some advantages in making the populace less awe-struck before its ruling group and less inclined to believe in its monopoly of virtue and of charisma. 35

Based on our previous analysis in this chapter, we feel that the bureaucracy in Sudan is powerful. We tend to agree with Riggs that it retards political development. A word of caution ought to be stated. The fact that the bureaucracy retards political development does not imply that the political system is static. On the contrary our previous analysis in Chapter II has shown that it is developing, but very slowly.

The writer tends to believe that the development in the political institutions will still remain to be very slow unless some measures, as we have already suggested, are taken.

The Indonesian bureaucracy is comparatively non-powerful than the political institutions. This does not imply that the bureaucracy is functioning so effectively without any inherent limitations. The bureaucracy suffers quite a number of limitations, but the bureaucrats are not the only group to be blamed for it, because most of these dysfunctions are originally initiated by the political instability and ineffectiveness. Naturally the political weaknesses are reflected in the bureaucratic decisions. As Blackmer has suggested:

"Political incoherence and instability are often matched in the sphere of public administration by ineffectiveness in action and paralysis in decisions." 1

It is the purpose of this chapter to explore four major dysfunctions of the Indonesian bureaucracy. These are namely: lack of sound plans and programs, excessive centralization, personalized behavior and formalism, overlapping and lack of coordination. Our analysis will investigate these four dysfunctions separately, in an attempt to show how they are initiated by the political weaknesses and how the bureaucracy institutionalized them. Proposed remedies to resolve these dysfunctions will be stated at the end of every part.


(96)
4.1 Lack of Sound Plans and Programs

The writer does not intend to delve into an economic analysis and evaluation of the Sudan plan, because such a topic is beyond the limits and scope of this paper. We would like only to emphasize planning as a managerial tool for effective administration.

We have stated earlier that political power in Sudan revolves around personalities and not doctrines. Political parties are based on religious and regional backing more than on specific programs. Consequently, such a situation will not provide adequate favourable chances for effective policies. Added to this is the enthusiasm of a new nationalism which favours ambitious planning.

The citizenry, unacquainted with the difficulties involved, expects the Government to work miracles, and the politicians, who want to win their support in the coming elections, engage in formulating ambitious plans to gain their confidence. On the other hand the insubility of the political system does not give a chance for the ruling party or parties to be experienced in the robes of government which might lead them to more operational and realistic targets. Such a situation does not provide the bureaucracy with a sound policy which might guide their plans and programs and thereby necessarily they find themselves forced to propose certain policies which are more likely than not to be obstructed by political interests. As Edvard Shils has observed in many developing countries:

The flowering among civil servants of an economising attitude with all its flexibility and willingness to take risks is further obstructed by the incapacity of the politicians, parliamentary or oligarchical, to make economising decisions for a
whole society, as well as by the frequency of considerations of local advantage and of symbolic importance in political calculations. 2

The first two years after independence which were characterized by political instability and shifting policies ended without even setting specific targets for social and economic development. As a United Nations' expert stated:

The precise overall targets of development expenditure remained unstated. It follows that there were no systematic attempts to derive sector targets from overall targets, or overall targets from sector targets. Nor had there been an attempt to set targets for the private sector or to make arrangements whereby the Government could ensure that the private sector would achieve such targets in coordination with the public sector.3

Paradoxically enough the first major attempt for systematic planning came during the military rule when a Planning Organization was set up in February 1961. It was authorized to coordinate all development affairs, draw up a comprehensive plan, and supervise its execution. Since 1961 major and minor modifications were made in the formal planning structure, but the writer tends to believe that all these modifications are no more than a formal intent which lacks the sources for effective planning. In the first place planning still remains at the top without the participation of the people for whom the development is intended. The public is even denied basic information which might give it a conceptual idea about the future projects. The writer tends to believe that the dissemination of information is an essential requirement for the

success of the plans. A United Nations expert put it this way:

It is not enough that the ruling classes realize the need for planned development, but it is necessary, and perhaps most important, for the people for whom the projects are designed to participate in their achievement. Therefore, they must be made aware of the importance and aim of the various programmes.4

Our argument is basically for adequate information as a means of communication which will give a chance for the citizens to be acquainted with future programmes and will also give a chance for both the politicians and the bureaucrats to know other alternatives which might not be available to them. Above all the citizens will be more enthusiastic about the plans in which they have participated than the plans which are imposed from above.

Milton Herman in a similar argument has said:

One of the tasks of nation-building and of development is to bring members of the national community into a network of relationships and institutions which enable them to participate actively in decisions affecting their individual and group welfare. It is a goal worth pursuing for its own sake, yet it is also a key indicator of the progress of development programs. Instrumentally, widespread participation is essential to the effective planning and implementation of development programs. Nation-building cannot be achieved by elites alone, nor can development activities be carried out exclusively by administrators or technicians. To provide opportunities and mechanisms for relevant and widespread popular participation thus becomes an important development priority.5


The writer assumes that the public is denied participation because the plan is conceived only in terms of economics. Social values and norms are given lip-service or no consideration. Planning units are made up of economists, without much consideration given to the gains which may be achieved through inter-professional teams of anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, educators and others. This negligence of inter-professional teams frequently leads to unforeseen disturbances when the plans come to be implemented. We are not only arguing for the participation of the inter-professional teams but we are for the involvement of the different public institutions because only through their participation can we make sure of their cooperation during the implementation process. On the other hand, the participation of the indigenous people (at the local and regional level) in planning will provide a good chance to expose them to other values—the values of the experts and specialists who provide expertise knowledge. This may lead to revaluation and adjustment in ways not apt to occur if programs are imposed on them from "outside". In this sense the participation of the local communities in planning will serve as an educational medium. The view that one's own values are the only correct and reasonable ones can most readily be changed by—being exposed to other's views and values. Donald Stone in his article Public Administration and Nation-Building, suggests that plans are nonfunctional in many developing countries because they are conceived only in terms of economics:

The assumption has been that development is primarily a matter of economics, and that economists therefore are the ones to formulate plans. Most strategies for development overlook the human values
political realities, social factors and cultural
determinants as crucial to social change and
modernisation. Plans are expressed in macro
terms, with micro elements missing or only vaguely
defined. They fail to incorporate the administra-
tive instruments for policy and program implemen-
tation, including discrete projects, essential to
achievement. The result too often has been
frustration and disappointment over slow develop-
ment progress.\(^6\)

Donald Stone goes further and suggests in another article that the participation of the public is indispensable:

Since development is a process of interacting
individual and social action and change, it should
be related as directly as possible to the communi-
ties in which people live. Wide participation of
individuals and groups at all levels in development
is indispensable... Thus organization for develop-
ment must encompass the institutions needed at the
village, the city, the district, and the province
or state levels as well as the national level.

The writer believes that what prevents the public
participation in the planning process is due not only to the
bureaucratic secrecy, but also to the fact that the budget of
the nation is viewed only as a fiscal process and not as an
administrative process. It is viewed as an arithmetic book for
accounting more than a policy formulation and program decision-
making instrument. Added to this is the centralizing trend
existing in the Ministry of Finance where the budget is located.

We believe that no favourable change is apt to occur unless the

\(^6\)Donald C. Stone: Public Administration and Nation-
Building in Socioc C. Martin (ed) Public Administration and Democracy,
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), p. 221

\(^7\)Donald C. Stone: Government Machinery Necessary for
Development in Martin Kriesberg (ed) Public Administration in
Developing Countries, (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution,
1965), p.35
budget is removed from the Ministry of Finance and attached to the Prime Minister's office. This latter situation will be more advantageous for different reasons. First, it insures the integration of the budget with the planning units so that the traditional eminence between the two will dissolve. Secondly, it gives both planning and budgeting a prestigious situation more than the previous case in the Ministry of Finance. Thirdly, it will be much easier to coordinate the work of the different ministries in a central agency attached to the Prime Minister's Office, more than the case of the Ministry of Finance which has the same status as the rest of the other ministries. Fourthly, it will be a good step to limit ambitious policies because the politicians will be more exposed to the operational facts. Last but not least is the fact that more decentralized procedures to involve the regional level, are more likely to originate from the Prime Minister's Office than in the case of the Ministry of Finance which already institutionalized centrally controlled regulations.

Another major limitation which faces the planning process in Sudan is the shortage of technicians and qualified intermediate cadre who can help in implementing the required projects and programs. This problem was initiated in the past by the anti-vocational bias of the university graduates. It is a case which is not only peculiar to Sudan but it is a characteristic in many Middle East countries. Robert Prethus states:

Middle East youth prefer to become white-collar rather than blue-collar workers. This opposite value has an immediate impact on technical and economic development, since it becomes difficult to build up the required force of skilled technicians...
Such beliefs deny the demands of modern bureaucratic organization for precision, specialization and scientific method.

Recently this anti-vocational bias started to diminish and more students specialized in different disciplines started to graduate from the University of Khartoum. (The number of students graduating from different faculties from 1956 to 1965 is attached to this paper as Appendix F). Added to this are quite a number of technicians who graduate annually from the Khartoum Technical Institute.

On the other hand, a serious attempt is made to further the training of the civil servants which is provided at the Institute of Public Administration. This Institute, established in 1960, has already held seven refresher courses of six months' duration, which have been attended by 558 civil servants of intermediate rank, in addition to eight seminars attended by 249 specialists. The courses of the Institute cover development techniques such as administration, staff, budget, statistics and programming.

In view of this progress in the field of training and the increase of the technicians, we hope that the urgent need for specialists to carry out the implementation of the plans will be met.

It is also our hope that the planning agencies in Sudan will adopt new modern techniques which favour systematic planning. The "Planning Programming, Budgeting System" with all its administrative potentialities, deserves special attention because

it gives more insights into the planning process. At least viewed as a system, it will insure the integration and interdependence of planning and budgeting.

4.2 Excessive Centralization

There is a general inclination among developing nations for a high degree of centralization. This may be due to two reasons: First, there is an assumption that without a centralized system of government national unity cannot be attained, because the diversity of regions may lead to diversity in approaches. Consequently, in a centralized system, it is assumed, a degree of homogeneity could easily be reached. Secondly, in many countries, the centralized system is an inherited pattern from the colonial period and no serious attempt is made to alter it in a way which suits a democratic government.

In the case of Sudan, the great degree of centralization is created by the politicians who made no effort to provide basic alterations in the system which they have inherited from the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period. Added to this is the general belief among a number of them, that centralized procedures are the only meaningful way to enforce discipline. Abdullah Khalil—a former Prime Minister—suggested that:

The only constitution which can work with us in our present stage of political development is the one which gives to the central government adequate power to enforce the otherwise almost discipline. The only alternative to self-discipline is after all, enforced discipline.9

The writer believes that this tendency which favours imposing the discipline from above, sacrifices many advantages which could be gained through a decentralized system, besides creating a heavy burden for both the political institutions and the public bureaucracy. No matter how seemingly open to rational procedures, a centralized system delays the work which is supposed to be processed at the regional and local level. On the other hand, it denies the public their right to participate in the formulation of the rules and regulations which govern them. Moreover, it limits the initiative because the people will be always depending on the central government—as if it were a house of wisdom—to provide alternatives and solutions.

In the department level this political philosophy of centralization is further aggravated by the bureaucratic taint. Delegation of authority is scarcely practiced. There are some bureaucrats to whom authority means a symbol of their eliteness. To delegate part of his authority to subordinates is to give part of his eliteness, an act which he refrains from taking. This group is rightly described by Ahmed Abu Sin as those who "through a misconception of their role, seem to love big burdens of work and to believe that personal reputation and social status are always measured by the degree as to how busy they are."(10) The fact that the career of senior bureaucrats is rooted in the only one ministry in which they work induced them further in building their empires by concentrating all the work in their hands. The position becomes

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so personalizes more than being public. It seems, one part of the solution for this problem is through the establishment of new procedures which provide for the transfer of the top bureaus from one ministry to the other.

At the middle echelons, the bureaucrats refrain from using their initiative in taking a certain decision because they lack clear and specific job description which specifies the sort of issue in which they can take a decision. Most of them tend to play it safe and transfer both minor and major decisions to the top seniors. This tendency no doubt strengthened the philosophy of centralization. Such a case is not only peculiar to Sudan but it is observed in many developing nations. A similar case is reported by Morris Berger in Egypt:

The lack of job descriptions and codes, for example, discourages the government official from using his initiative even if he is able to overcome other powerful interests. Since he is not certain where his authority and functions begin and end, the civil servant has one more reason to play everything safely by assuming that the responsibility lies elsewhere than upon himself.\(^1\)

In the regional and local level we find a mostly patterned decentralized system which only remains in theory while in practice the "control over the municipalities by the central government is extensive and is exercised by the provincial governor and by the Ministry of Local Government."\(^2\) The different rural and municipal...

\(^{11}\) Morris Berger: Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 56

\(^{12}\) Samuel Hume and Bileen M. Martin: The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 402
councils refer to minor and major decisions to the headquarter for approval. To use Selznick terminology, they still remain as "organizations" which did not come yet to the degree of infusion of values as the "institutions". A high degree of institutionalization—Selznick believes—cannot be gained unless there is:

...much leeway for personal and group interaction. The more precise an organization goals, and the more specialized and technical its operations, the less opportunity will there be for social forces to affect its development.

We are not arguing for the generalization of goals or the removal of specialized and technical operations, but we are arguing for more flexible rules which give the representatives of the people more discretion to decide about their own case. Without flexible regulations these rural and municipal councils can hardly be changed to responsive and adaptive organs.

Among the reasons mentioned by Henry Maddick in his paper, Decentralization for Development, for the creation of local government bodies are: the local government organs can serve to educate the people, produce and legitimize modern leaders to substitute for the traditional chiefs of the decaying tribal society, to spread the burden of detailed execution of development programs and to encourage the growth of widespread policy initiation at the local and provincial levels. 14


The writer strongly believes that none of the privileges of local institutions mentioned by Naddick could be gained unless the regulations which govern the local councils are revised and reformulated by the politicians in a manner which provide meaningful participation for the local representatives.

In conclusion to this question of centralization we suggest that the government should establish new regulations which provide for the transfer of the senior bureaucrats from one department to the other, so as to break the tendency for empire-building. On the other hand the civil servants in the middle echelon should be provided with a job-description, so as to encourage them to take decisions which lie within their responsibilities.

At the local level, flexible rules should be established which give a chance for the representatives of the locality to take decisions affecting their area. Only in this way can the participation of the people be meaningful.

4.3 Personalized Behavior and Formalism

In many developing countries the concept of the family is more elaborate than the concept of the nuclear family known in western societies. The family, in developing countries has a wider connotation, frequently including cousins and distant relatives. As Cockson observed in the case of the Sudan:

Family connections and obligations are much further elaborated in the Sudan than in western countries, and regulate many social activities that in more complex societies are the function of other institutions. Generally speaking, the Sudanese family, work group, social neighbourhood
and political unit are identical.\textsuperscript{15}

Undoubtedly, the civil servants are not an abstract unit. Everyone has commitments and responsibilities to his extended family. It is true that they are comparatively more sophisticated and universal in their outlook than the rest of the citizens, but no one of them can easily escape his obligations to his family.

As Tringham described them:

The Sudan is a country in which a degree of westernisation has resulted in the formation of an “intellectual proletariat” (the effendiyya). It is not correct to call the effendiyya a class. They are rather a “tendency”, for they have no place in the traditional social scheme, and cut across all the natural classes... The effendi has not broken away from the family... The effendi may show pride and arrogance, but he is still one with the family.\textsuperscript{16}

Inevitably, this situation of the extended family creates undue pressure on the bureaucrat to favour his relatives more than the rest of the citizens. To do justice to quite a number of the Sudanese bureaucrats, we should mention that some of them keep continuously requesting that they should be posted far from their home districts in order to avoid the demands of their relatives which might lead them consciously or unconsciously to make their decisions on the basis of loyalties.

During the Anglo-Egyptian rule strict measures were taken to forbid nepotism. Above all the boss is a stranger and nobody could easily approach him. Visits during office hours were strictly prohibited. After the independence in 1956 the whole situation has


\textsuperscript{16}J. Spencer Tringham: \emph{Islam in the Sudan} (London, Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 237
been reversed. The political institutions being very personalized, according to their regional backing, initiated the same personalized behavior in the bureaucracy. It is true that cultural and kinship ties between the people are very strong by the nature of their culture, but the politicians have aggravated it. This personalized behavior could easily be shown in the behavior of some ministers who have direct contact with the citizens dealing with their ministries. Hashim Daifallah put it this way:

Whereas in the past (colonial period), a man doing business with a government department started with a letter which first came to the head clerk, now no longer does he do that. Now the order of things has been reversed. A man with a real grievance or a fictitious one, now starts with the minister himself and works his way downwards. In seventy-nine cases out of a hundred these people are coming to ask for a favour.17

Such behavior is severely criticized by many Egyptian scholars, but no sign of decrease in favouritism is observed.

Nobi, Hashim in his book *Egyptian and Corruption in the Civil Government* has listed quite a number of questions asked by different legislators in the Parliament, which direct attention to this trend. But these questions are always answered in a vague manner and rarely a serious investigation is undertaken. With all fairness we should state that some of the politicians stood against this drift and pointed out its grave consequences. Mohamed A. Mahgoub—a former Prime Minister states:

...it is however, admitted that in societies like ours, particular kinds of nepotism dominate the minds of all. The grip of social relations and

stray emotional attachment to the local home, family and friends make us feel bound to keep our family members, friends and colleagues in some way or another. This is virtuous according to our social moral code. Conscious or unconsciously we carry this virtue with us into the service. This can be dangerous and destructive to the morale of the civil servants: charity on government expense is a sin that must be checked.10

The writer believes that the exclusion of personal considerations from official business is a prerequisite for efficiency. The personalized behavior does not only increase the degree of suspicion, but also creates an element of mistrust among the rest of the citizens. It leads on the other hand to a delay of work which usually does not happen if impersonal procedures are followed. To support this argument we mention that quite a number of citizens disregarded mailing a letter to the bureaucracy on the basis that they can go themselves to see the bureaucrat. They have already acquired an assumption that a written letter or form will be easily ignored and the only possible way to get a solution is through a face to face interview with the bureaucrat. Due to this tendency, the issue which is supposed to be dealt with in some minutes takes long hours. So actually the delay of work in the Sudanese bureaucracy is not due to routine procedures as some people might claim in western bureaucracies, but it is due to the personalized behavior. This situation has created what a Sudanese scholar calls "El Reintegratia El Baladis" or the typical bureaucracy of Sudan.

On the other hand we find "much more than in the West, people in the Near East seem to feel there is always a way to get around a regulation or to find one that helps instead of hurts your case." Having such an assumption the average man will go to his friend or relative who is holding a public office hoping to induce him to get around the official regulation. The situation is strengthened by the lack of specified regulations which could be a base for judgment in many cases. The "Personnel Regulations" of the Sudan Government which were originally formulated by the British political service in May 1938, are still the binding rules. Such regulations which were framed mainly to guide the decision of some 5,000 civil servants in 1938, are still expected to guide the behavior of 11,000 civil servants in 1967 when the work has grown and expanded and the issues have become more complicated. No attempt is made to review these regulations or to make basic alterations. They are only supported by circulars which are issued on an ad hoc basis. Regrettably, even the inherited regulations of 1938 were not available to most of the civil servants until recently when the Institute of Public Administration, published them in a small handy manual.

This lack of up-to-date and available procedures not only increases the temptation to act on the basis of loyalty and favouritism but also initiates formalism which in the words of Biggs, results in a substantial divorce between the formal and the effective, between theory and practice, between the law and its implementation and between authority and control. Legislation

12 Morrey Berger, op. cit., p. 15
(III)
At least the imposition of the Constitutions, if it is
transplanted to Sudan will meet the challenge of the oligarchs
which question the honesty of persons in high authority. Also
it will impose justice to the management whenever any occasion
still remains to be explained. In the context of today,
will involve discipline to the management whenever any occasion
will remain to be explained. In the context of today,
or coalition. As an example to support this argument we would mention that after independence a ministry of Social Affairs was created, the succeeding government changed it to be the Ministry of Information and Labour, very recently it has been reorganized to be the Ministry of Information and Social Affairs. No reason is mentioned to support these successive modifications, but one is tempted to feel that they were made to suit the needs of the ruling party or coalition.

Unavoidably these successive changes and the frequency with which they are made leads to a great degree of overlapping in the functions of the different ministries. The hurried manner in which these changes are made does not give a chance for both the politicians and administrators to define the task of each ministry or department. The continuous conflicts between the Ministry of Works on the one hand and the Ministry of Mineral Resources on the other is a case in point. Unavoidably, such conflicts do not occur only between separate ministries, but they also occur frequently between the departments which constitute one ministry.

Moreover, this overlapping situation is further strengthened by the bureaucracy. Some departments embark upon new programmes without previous consultation or coordination with other ministries which have programmes of a similar nature. The case of the newly created programme of community development which is stretched between the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Education provides a clear example. The writer does not deny that such programmes as community development need the services of
both the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Education and probably the help of the Ministry of Health; but the success lies in the coordination of these different activities. The whole programme should be the responsibility of one ministry and other related ministries should perform staff services to facilitate its success.

There are three formal devices to coordinate the work of the different ministries and departments. The first device is the annual budget which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Economics. But as we have indicated earlier the Ministry of Finance and Economics regards the budget only as a fiscal tool more than an administrative device. The task of the Ministry of Finance and Economics is a review of accounts more than a development approach of administrative techniques.

The second mode of coordination is through getting two ministries under the authority of one minister. This device has two major limitations. First, due to the unstable political situation, no minister will have the reasonable time to establish effective rules and procedures which ensure for a long period. Secondly, the nature of the task of the two ministries being completely different, similar rules and procedures for both at the top level will prove ineffective.

The third device followed to ensure coordination is through committees. Large and small, formal and informal, police and frivolous, departmental and interdepartmental committees are continuously formed.
It is stated by Carl Friedrich that "charismatic leadership is clearly affected by the doctrines of the particular religion from which it springs,"22 and so is the case in Sudan. It is our belief that both the politicians and the bureaucrats have the concept of the Shura in their mind when they engage in this pattern of committees. "Shura" in Sudan means mutual consultation. This means when a certain problem has a problem, he will call to a group of molesmen to discuss his case in the hope that they will lead him to the right solution. In this sense the committees, I assume are the real picture of the Shura. It might also be suggested that the British who are known for their preferences to committees as a means for coordination might have initiated this practice first during the colonial period.

Recently, in a Sudanese newspaper, a short report by one of the journalists showed in a few words how the average Sudanese is totally tired of this unfinished pattern of committees. He said

"We hear these days that Mr. Z meets with Mr. Y and Z and F. And Mr. Y meets with Mr. X and Z and Mr. F. And Mr. X meets with Mr. Z. And Mr. Y meets with Mr. Z. And Mr. Z meets with Mr. Z. And yet nothing has been accomplished, though the meetings are still in session and the committees are continuous."

"We are" said Sir Winston Churchill some time ago about the over-run committees in Britain, "overrun by them, like the Australians were by Rabbits."23 The same holds true in Sudan.


23 The names are reserved and they are substituted with letters.
A word of caution ought to be stated. The writer is not against the concept of committees in principle, but he is against their over-use. Above all it is not the sheer number of committees that result in effective coordination, but it is the acceptance of effective procedures that change the committees from a gathering of individuals to a social group that can accept quick, reliable and compromise decisions. There are no ideal types of committees which we can suggest to all cases because the composition and procedures differ from one case to the other, but we agree with Dale that at least four requirements are essential for successful operation of any committee:

1. Work of committees should justify their costs.
2. The principle of effective group action should be applied.
3. Committee mechanics should be arranged so that meetings will not be hampered by procedural difficulties.
4. Only subjects that can be handled better by groups than by individuals should be selected for committee discussion.24

The writer believes that all devices used now in the business bureaucracy to achieve coordination, will prove ineffective unless a major step is taken to review the existing structure of the different ministries. It could also be stated with confidence that inter-departmental coordination could hardly be secured without

internal coordination within the departments. If the planning, organizing, actuating and controlling functions are performed properly and adequately inside the different departments then the result will be an interrelated, well-balanced and coordinated effort. On the other hand an effective system of communication to link the different departments should be institutionalized. Such a system will not only insure periodical coordination such as the case of most committees, but will also insure a close relationship in the day to day work.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD

Politically the Sudan is, I think, the most exciting country we saw in all Africa with the possible exception of Nigeria. It has the intense virility of something newly born and its vibrant will to live derives from sound old roots. The Sudan sounds a note unlike any we have heard in Africa so full of animation, confidence, and spontaneity. It is crowded with neat to get ahead; it boils and sparkles with euphoria.¹

John Gunther

Exciting as it is, the Sudan's political system is characterized by instability and shifting policies. The period from October 1964 to May 1967 in which the Sudanese experienced five governments is a clear testimony.

Our discussion in the previous four chapters is an attempt to explore the underlying factors behind this instability of the political system and to see its consequences and effects on the administrative subsystem. The findings of our analysis could be summarized briefly as follows:

5.1 Findings

The Sudanese bureaucracy came into existence during the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period. In the course of time it has institutionalized certain procedures and regulations which are not subject to political control because indigenous political institutions were non-existent at the time that such

regulations were drafted. Added to this is the fact that in "the colonial period the political system and the administrative subsystem were completely fused. Legitimate political activity was identified with or defined by the administrative process." This situation directs our attention to the fact that the bureaucrats are not conditioned by the virtues of their work during the colonial era to accept a division between the political and the administrative decisions. After independence, the bureaucracy being viewed as a mere instrument, received large-scale technical assistance under international and bi-national programs which helped in infusing new values and rational means through expertise knowledge. No corresponding assistance could be provided to the political institutions because of two reasons: first, it is generally regarded that political leaders "emerge" and "arise" and they are not supposed to be educated in a certain discipline or trained in a certain art. Secondly, since the political institutions are closely linked with fundamental values, any attempt to give an aid to such institutions will be considered as "intervention". Moreover, the fact that the public bureaucracy is regarded by the intelligentsia as a secured career, deprives the political institutions from the views of the educated elite who are supposed by the definition of their profession to adhere to political neutrality. This situation not only deprives the political leaders of independent sources of information but also make them dependent on the expert judgment of the bureaucrats.

On the basis of these arguments we feel that the Swazian bureaucracy became comparatively more powerful than the political institutions. In an attempt to see the consequences of this unbalanced growth we have examined in chapter three the effects of the bureaucracy on the different political institutions. Our analysis revealed that the political parties still remain under the guidance of charismatic leaders and they are lacking specified ideologies and doctrines which could induce the creation of realistic policies. These parties depend totally upon religious and social backing, a situation which does not attract the educated elite who are more national in their outlook. Added to this is the fact that these political parties are poor and not stable enough to provide new avenues for ambitious educated elite who would like to play it safe and keep to a secured career where they can have a monthly salary. Also the fact that the bureaucracy is based on the concept of the merit system without any leeway for apoplexy deprives the party system from gaining a group of educated elite who might aspire to positions in the higher cadres of the bureaucracy, and also deprives the party from gaining control over the actions of the bureaucrats.

Through the bureaucratic excessive centralization which is partly initiated by the politicians and later institutionalized by the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy retards the activities of the electorate. This tight centralization means that the bulk of the citizenry are denied meaningful participation in modern-style politics. It also limits their initiative because most actions, if not all are dictated from the headquarters. Added to this is the
facts that the bureaucracy deprives the electorate of its potential leadership by absorbing the most energetic and educated people.

On the other hand, the bureaucracy, by setting its net too wide, paralyzes the activities of the interest groups. The rural interest groups depend financially on the loans from the central government, and if they deviate from the ways designed by the bureaucracy they are more likely to face drastic reduction in the loans given to them. Also the urban interest groups which are mainly composed of the private entrepreneur enjoy certain privileges which are provided by the bureaucracy. Among these we mention the loans given to the growing industries through the Industrial Bank. Such loans might amount to 60% of the total expense of the industry; it is a huge amount which could hardly be risked by challenging the control of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy not only paralyzes the potential power of the rural and urban interest groups, but also it initiates its own interest groups which publicize its activities and so such interest groups are no more than a mere extension of the bureaucracy.

The fact that elections in Sudan are still based on religious and regional backing deprived the parliamentary system of the best talented and educated citizens. Naturally the tribe would like to be represented by its head or Sheikh who is more likely than not to be ignorant about the modern concepts of government. The bureaucracy, finding such a situation, in which their recommendations could hardly be questioned, tend to usurp the legislative powers. The bureaucratic institutionalized procedures which do not lead the bureaucracy to political control aggravate the
matter more than would be the case in other similar developing countries. The only two media available for the legislative control of the bureaucracy are the annual budget and the questions which are directed to the ministers in Parliament to explain certain administrative acts. But even these two media face major limitations; the budget is never presented at the required time, and even if it is finally approved some departments might have already exhausted their allotments. So the control in such a situation is just nominal. On the other hand most of the questions which are asked by the legislators are framed by the bureaucrats, so as to give them a chance to publicize a certain action. The answers also for most questions are broad and vague and can hardly give further insight into bureaucratic decisions.

Moreover, the bureaucratic secrecy impedes the free flow of communications and so an informed public opinion which has the capacity to pass judgment on the merits of policies is lacking. This bureaucratic secrecy is further strengthened by the fact that both the radio and the television are a government monopoly and so they can hardly be a place for controversy on either political or economic issues. The press on the other hand is severely controlled by the regulations of the ministry of interior.

The above stated arguments reveal clearly how the bureaucratic power expanded and controlled all the political aspects. The bureaucracy itself became very politicized and through default it absorbed the political functions. It became the sort of bureaucracy which is meant by Arnold Broenk once he said: "Bureaucracy is a state of affairs where too much power is in the hands of appointed
employees.  Such a situation tends to be more authoritarian than democratic and it inhibits the growth of political institutions. Through such monopolization of power the bureaucracy no doubt retards political development because it deprives the different political institutions from exercising their functions.

In the fourth chapter of this paper we have tried to pursue the effects of the ineffectiveness of the political system on the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Our analysis of the four major dysfunctions of the Chinese bureaucracy has shown that these major limitations were first initiated by the political system, but that they were later institutionalized by the bureaucracy. The major dysfunctions we have dealt with mainly are: lack of sound plans and programs, excessive centralization, personalized behavior and formalism, and overlapping and lack of effective coordination.

Due to the fact that the policies of the different political parties are not based on doctrines, the bureaucracies find it a mere necessity to frame the plans of the whole nation. Such plans, as we have suggested, lack popular support because they are only framed by the top bureaucrats and the public did not participate in them; consequently such plans lack popular support when they come to be implemented. It seems to us the cause of such a limitation is that the bureaucrats believe that planning is the task wholly of economists, and so they neglect the views of educators, sociologists and public opinion in general.

There is a wide belief among the politicians that discipline can only be enforced through controlling the activities of the different

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regions at the centre. This situation is further aggravated by the
tendency of some bureaucrats to build their own empires. Such
excessive centralization not only causes a delay in work, but
also deprives the regional areas of responsive and adaptive organs
which are sensitive to the local needs.

The personalized behavior which is characteristic of the
political parties has also been adopted in the bureaucracy through
the acts of some ministers. Although such tendency prevails in
the Sudanese culture in general, the politicians are to be blamed
for not controlling it in the bureaucracy through the adoption of
strict regulations. It is not only the fact that strict regulations
are lacking, but it is also the fact that some ministers are
initiating such personalized tendency by giving full attention
to the real or fictitious grievances raised by their relatives,
party colleagues, and constituency groupings. Such personalized
behavior, as we have suggested earlier, induces formalism because
every case becomes a special one.

The continuous adjustments made in the different ministries' structures so as to suit the ruling party or coalition groups
overlapping. The hurried manner in which these changes are made
does not give a chance for both the politicians and administrators
to define the task of each ministry or department. Unavoidably this
situation leads to ineffective coordination. We have also indicated
during our discussion of this topic, that the committee as a means
of coordination are overused in Sudan. The writer is not against
the concept of the committees in principle, but he believes that
they are only useful in subjects which are debatable or involve more
than one interest.
5.2 Proposals

The fact that policy and administration are inseparable subjects specially in a developing country like India where the decisions are unavoidably enmeshed so intricately and so deeply in value judgment, does not lead us to the conclusion that administrators should operate like politicians. On the contrary, this necessitates from the administrators on the first hand to bring to those problems an education of the highest level of intellectual quality which gives him broader and deeper insights into the policy decisions which are hopefully more beneficial than the partisan concern of the moment. On the other hand, the politicians should agree among themselves about the different roles of both the political and administrative institutions. Their functions should be specified in a manner which does not lend itself to overlapping or lack of effective coordination. The more definition of the functions will not serve unless the public is kept well informed, and free to criticize any tendency which might lead to the misuse of the assigned authority. Donald Stone believes that the definition of roles is a prerequisite for a healthy relationship between the political system and the administrative subsystem. He says:

Among the objectives to be sought in these adaptations are ways of defining realistically the relative roles of the legislature and the administrative branches of the governments. Unless the functions of each and the manner in which they work together are clearly identified and regularly policed, either through legal action or citizen criticism, the tendency will be for political leaders and legislative bodies to encroach upon and disrupt the administrative domain, seek for administrative officials to usurp legislative functions.4

Donald C. Stone: Relation of Political Action to Development Administration, Pittsburgh, 1965 (mimeographed), p. 10
The writer tends to believe that the politicians in Sudan need to evaluate the existing political and administrative structure before they engage in assigning a certain role to any agency or institution. An important question still remains to be answered: Does the existing structure satisfy the interest and the needs of the country? It is true that we have borrowed a system which worked effectively in Britain, but does that ensure its effectiveness in Sudan? The answers for such questions need a detailed investigation which is beyond the scope and the limits of this paper, but still broad suggestions might be stated. In the first place we should bear in mind that political institutions are usually affected by the cultural environment in which they existed. So we should not borrow indiscriminately from a system that works well in another country. We should borrow from a system which is more likely to fit our culture and we should adopt it gradually to our own culture so that the ultimate product will be the result of a natural evolution in our society. Hassen Mirghani states in a similar argument the following:

Public administration can only be developed in relation to the cultural, political and moral conditions in the country. There is no common or universal prescription. It is only natural for developing countries in their search for solutions to their problems to want to borrow from developed countries. But it must be remembered that the organizations and administrative structures and concepts of developed countries have grown as an accommodation to conditions in those countries which are materially different from the conditions in developing countries.

It is true that the governing elites in Sudan and in many other developing nations are trying to bridge centuries in a few years, but they should bear in mind that historical experience indicates that no society ever simply abandons its traditional culture. So if they try to enforce transplanted concepts without adapting them to the host culture, this will result in conflict which might lead to repulsive attitudes on the part of the indigenous citizens. Nevertheless, the traditional culture must undergo drastic alteration, but it should be achieved in gradual steps.

No doubt this type of modification as we have already suggested needs time, energy and detailed investigation. Yet we feel that some aspects in both the political and administrative structure need immediate measures because if they are left for a long time without drastic change, they will tend to perpetuate themselves. Among these are the administrative regulations which were framed by the colonial administrators during the Anglo-Egyptian rule. These regulations we have indicated earlier do not lend themselves to legislative control because they were drafted at a time when no parliament existed in Sudan. We strongly believe that a drastic change and revision of these regulations is an urgent need in order to insure administrative responsibility. On the other hand, the writer tends to believe that the change of the administrative procedures would not insure the administrative responsibility unless parallel modifications are also made in the structure of the parliament. As we have already stated most of the representatives are Omdas and Sheikhs who are generally not acquainted with the bureaucratic terminology. Yet nobody would
dare to force the people to elect those who are more acquainted with the government activities. It seems to us that a solution could be found by creating two legislative institutions: a house of representatives and a senate. In such a case, some of the Obeida and Sheikhs and the different tribal chiefs could be elected to the Senate thereby giving such wider chances for the young and educated people in the house of representatives. The advantages of such a modification are mainly: widening the scope of representation; insuring that a critical discussion of the administrative actions would arise in the house of representatives while the Senate would be in a position to check the decisions taken by the house of representatives.

It is true that democracy is a plant of slow growth, which gradually develops. But without an established party system democracy will keep floundering in a vacuum. So we believe that if the political parties in Sudan continue to refrain from establishing basic doctrines, a democratic system could hardly be institutionalized. "In the long run" Mrs. Kitchen suggests "there is little doubt that the secular-minded Sudanese intelligentsia will replace the sectarian leaders as the politically decisive group in Sudan." 6

Yet there still remains, at least for the near future, a need to absorb a group of the educated elites in the political parties. This could hardly be maintained in a higher degree unless the political parties open more attractive avenues than the secured career in the public bureaucracy. We suggest that if the apolitical system is adopted on a smaller and controlled degree, it might attract

a number of the educated elite who might hopefully infuse more universal values in the political parties. The spoils system also keep the ruling party informed about the consequences of its decisions, and in such a case they could make rapid adjustments in their decisions easily.

However, it should be emphasized that the establishment of political doctrines and sound policies will not be effective unless the indigenous people abandon their regional demands for more national size. This could hardly be achieved unless the number of the educated people becomes much higher than in the case today.

As Kii-Zerbo observed, in the case of the whole African continent, education lies at the heart of development:

It is one of the main levers for speeding up her advance in all spheres. In the political sphere, through the establishment of a minimum education without which democracy is a meaningless term; in the social and human sphere, since it awakens in man the consciousness of his own dignity, and his possibilities of expression, creation and liberation, in the economic sphere, since education constitutes the most profitable long-term investment, and in the international sphere, since it makes it possible to understand better and hence, to appreciate other peoples.7

It is not only academic education that is needed but also civic and political education. Since the literacy rate among adult males is as low as 22 per cent (according to the 1955/56 census) we believe that there is no ideal way to teach the illiterates democracy other than by giving them a chance to practice it in their rural councils and municipalities. This could be

achieved by breaking the excessive bureaucratic centralization which denies the people the chance of expressing their own views. The devolution of authority to the local councils will not only give an opportunity for immediate action, but it will also give the indigenous people a sense of belonging to their local institutions. In a sense the local councils will be infused with the values of the community in which they exist; consequently they will symbolize the community's aspirations, its sense of identity. In the words of a United Nations expert:

The devolution of functions to local and state authorities encourages wider participation by the citizens in the handling of government functions. Such participation helps overcome inertia, apathy and undue reliance on the centre in matters of local interest, and breeds a sense of identification of the citizen with government. Moreover, participation will ensure decisions more closely answering local needs and desires.

On the other hand, informed public opinion is a necessary support for the maintenance of the democratic institutions. So we believe that the bureaucratic procedures which favour secrecy in actions should be kept to a minimum and the public should be kept informed always because the discussion which might prevail among the public may direct attention to favourable alternatives. In the first place, both the radio and the television should be disconnected from their close link with the bureaucracy, and they should no longer be a government monopoly. A situation analogous to the BBC might be ideal because it opens the door to both political and economic uninhibited discussions. On the other hand the press should be released from the tight bureaucratic control through the Ministry of Interior. The regulations should be revised.

and redefined in a manner which ensures free public opinion and responsible journalism.

It is the writer's belief that the public enterprise in Sudan is not too wide. Nearly everything is public. We believe such an approach has two major disadvantages: in the first place it gives and concentrates power in the hands of the appointed employees—a situation which is contradictory to democratic practices. Secondly, it limits the growth of private enterprise and consequently limits individual initiative. In the words of Kissinger we find invaluable advice which asks for a balanced growth of organizations:

The greatness of a society derives from its willingness to chart new ground beyond the confines of routine. Without organizations every problem becomes a special case. Without inspiration a society will stagnate. Too much stress on organization leads to bureaucratization and the withering of imagination. Excessive emphasis on inspiration produces a panic de force, without continuity or organizational stability.9

There still remains the need to unify the centrifugal forces of differing interests, races, tribes, religious groups and ideological factors. The great menace which might endanger the unity of the whole nation, if it is not checked, is tribalism. We agree with Lowridge that progressive detribalization could be achieved through better communication, education, growing industrialization, a reduced need for self protection with the spread of law and order.10

by the provision of national goals and policies which should be popular enough to gain the support and the confidence of the people. It should be emphasized that the people at the local level and the provincial level should be given a significant opportunity to contribute to the different policies and plans because only through their participation can their support be assured during the process of implementation. Our argument for the need of national unity and social solidarity does not mean that a diversity of outlook should not prevail. On the contrary, a diversity of ideologies will insure a check and balance upon the various political and administrative actions. In the words of Charles Issawi:

For democratic institutions to develop, and for the democratic spirit to flourish, two conditions seem necessary: the community must be bound by a strong social solidarity; and at the same time it must contain enough diversity to generate tension between its constituent parts. In the absence of solidarity, the community is constantly threatened with disintegration; democratic government is too weak to hold it together, and there is a powerful tendency to resort to a strong, absolutist government. On the other hand, unless there is diversity and tension, resulting in the clash of ideas and interests represented by different groups, no effective check on the power of the government is likely to be established.¹¹

party system, legislature, interest groups, electorate, supports this hypothesis. Also, the bureaucratic secrecy, expertise, knowledge and wide discretion beside the bureaucracy as a secured career further assure its validity.

The minor hypothesis is: the ineffectiveness of the political system has its effects on the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Our analysis of the four major dysfunctions of the Sudanese bureaucracy namely: lack of sound plans and programmes, excessive centralization, personalized behavior and formalism, lack of coordination and overlapping proved the validity of this minor hypothesis.

7.4 Some Suggestions for Further Research

Quite a number of issues which are related to this topic—bureaucracy and political development—remain to be investigated in detail. First among these are the social bases of political and bureaucratic behavior. It is true that public bureaucracies, although sharing common basic structural characteristics, can be expected to show significant variations in patterns of bureaucratic behavior according to their environment. So we believe that a study of the main variables which constitute the Sudanese culture will bring more insights which will help in understanding the relationship between the political system and the administrative subsystems. Among the main variables which should be investigated, we mention: the values inherited from the colonial period, the indigenous customs and attitudes, the Islamic ideology and the educational system. At least such a study will reveal to us if
the dysfunctions of the political and bureaucratic systems are inherent by virtue of the Sudanese culture or if they are artificial.

Another question remains to be answered: to what extent is the Sudanese bureaucracy representative of the society? This kind of study would show whether or not the great powers which the bureaucrats wield are in the hands of a certain privileged interest group. Such a survey should provide basic data about the social and educational background of the bureaucrats, their ethnic origin and religious affinity.
AGREEMENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUDAN

Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt relative to the future Administration of the Sudan.

Whereas certain provinces in the Sudan which were in rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive have now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive;

And whereas it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration of and for the making of laws for the said reconquered provinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition of large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different localities;

And whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said systems of administration and legislation;

And whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wadi Halfa and Suakin may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent;

Now it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose, as follows:

ARTICLE I

The word "Sudan" in this agreement means all the territories south of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which (1) have never been evaucated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or

(137)
(2) which having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been administered by the Government of His Highness the Khedive were temporarily left to Egypt and have been reconquered by His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, acting in concert: or

(3) which may hereafter be reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert.

ARTICLE II

The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together both on land and water, throughout the Sudan, except in the town of Sankan, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used.

ARTICLE XIII

The supreme military and civil command in the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the 'Governor-General of the Sudan.' He shall be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and shall be removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE IV

Laws, as also Orders and Regulations with the full force of law, for the good government of the Sudan, and for regulating the holding disposal and devolution of property of every kind abrogated by Proclamation of the Governor General. Such laws, Orders, and Regulations may apply to the whole or any civil part of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing Law or Regulation.

All such Proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the Khedive.

ARTICLE V

No Egyptian Law, Decree, Ministerial Arrtcte, or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply to the
Sudan or any part thereof, save insofar as the same shall be applied by Proclamation of the Governor-General in manner hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE VI

In the definition by Proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or reside in the Sudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more Power.

ARTICLE VII

Import duties on entering the Sudan shall not be payable on goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory, but in the case of goods entering the Sudan at Suakin or any other port on the Red Sea littoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Sudan, at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by Proclamation.

ARTICLE VIII

The jurisdiction of the High Tribunals shall not extend, nor be recognized for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Sudan, except in the town of Suakin.

ARTICLE IX

Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined by Proclamation, the Sudan, with the exception of the town of Suakin, shall be and remain under material law.

ARTICLE X

No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be accredited in respect of nor allowed to reside in the Sudan, without the previous consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.
ARTICLE XI

The importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by proclamation for the enforcement of this Regulation.

ARTICLE XII

It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd of July 1890, in respect of the import, sale, and manufacture of firearms and their munitions, and distilled or spirituous liquors.

Done in Cairo, the 19th January 1890

Signed

Supplemental Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan

Agreement made between the British and Egyptian Governments Supplemental to the Agreement made between the two Governments on 19th January 1890 for the future administration of the Sudan.

Whereas under our Agreement made the 19th day of January 1890, relative to the future administration of the Sudan, it is provided by Article VIII, that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend nor be recognised for any purpose whatsoever in any part of the Sudan except in the town of Sukakin.

And whereas no Mixed Tribunal has ever been established at Sukakin and it has been found to be inexpedient to establish any such tribunal in that locality by reason notably of the expense which the adoption of this measure would occasion.

And whereas grievous injustice is occasioned to the inhabitants of Sukakin by the absence of any local jurisdiction for the settlement of their disputes and it is expedient that the town of Sukakin should be placed upon the same footing as the rest of the Sudan.

And whereas we have decided to modify our said Agreement
accordingly in manner hereinafter appearing:

Now, it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned duly authorized for that purpose, as follows:

ARTICLE I

Those provisions of our agreement of the 19th day of January 1899 by which the town of Faskia was excepted from the general regime established by the Agreement for the future administration of the Sudan, are hereby abrogated.

Done at Cairo, the 10th of July 1879

(Signed)

Gourley

APPENDIX B

MEMORANDUM
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY
From Lord Kitchener to the Governors (Nuirs) of Provinces

1. The absolute uprooting by the Dervishes of the old system of Government has afforded an opportunity for initiating a new administration more in harmony with the requirements of the Sudan.

2. The necessary laws and regulations will be carefully considered and issued as required, but it is not mainly to the framing and publishing of laws that we must look for the improvement and the good government of the country.

3. The task before us all, and especially the Nuirs and Inspectors, is to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to a higher level. This can only be affected by the district officers being thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population. Nuirs and Inspectors should learn to know personally all the principal men of the district, and show them, by friendly dealings and the interest taken in their individual concerns, that our object is to increase their prosperity. Once it is thoroughly realised that our officers have at heart, not only the progress of the country generally, but also the prosperity of each individual with whom they come into contact, their exhortations to industry and improvement will gain redoubled force. Such exhortations, when issued in the shape of proclamations or circulars, affect little; it is to the individual action of British officers working independently but with a common purpose, on the individual native whose confidence they have gained that we must look for the moral and industrial regeneration of the Sudan.

4. The people should be taught that the truth is always expected, and will be equally well received whether pleasant or the reverse. By listening to outspoken opinions, even respectfully expressed, and checking liars and flatterers, we may hope in time to effect some improvement in this respect in the country.
5. In the administration of justice in your Province you should be very careful to see that legal forms as laid down are strictly adhered to, so that the appointed courts may be thoroughly respected; and you should endeavour, by the careful inquiry given by your courts to the cases brought before them, to inspire the people with absolute confidence that real justice is being dealt out to them. It is very important that the Government should do nothing which could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and all insubordination must be promptly and severely repressed. At the same time, a paternal spirit of correction for officers should be your aim in your relation with the people, and clemency should be shown in dealing with first offences, especially when such may be the result of ignorance or are openly acknowledged. In the latter case, they should be more than half pardoned in order to induce truthfulness.

6. Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in any way interfered with, and that the Mahometan religion is respected.

7. Mosques in the principal towns will be rebuilt, but private mosques, takias, sawiyas, sheikh’s tombs, etc., cannot be allowed to be reestablished as they generally form centres of unorthodox fanaticism. Any requests for permission on such subjects must be referred to the central authority.

8. Slavery is not recognized in the Sahan, but as long as service is willingly rendered by servants to masters it is unnecessary to interfere in the conditions existing between them. Where, however, any individual is subjected to cruel treatment, and his or her liberty interfered with, the accused can be tried on such charges which are offences against the law, and in serious cases of cruelty the severest sentences should be imposed.

Source: quoted by Sir Harold MacMichael on pages 74-76 of his book (THE SUDAN)
CIVIL SECRETARY
KHANUM

DEAR SIR,

It is with the earnest wish for good understanding and sympathetic feeling that we, the educated class of this country, with due respect submit our following communication, hoping that it will be received with the spirit which inspired its writing.

As you are aware, the Sudan Schools Graduates, prompted by a sense of duty towards their country as its most enlightened elements, and by a sincere desire to cooperate with Government, in such ways as may be opened to them, in furthering their country’s welfare, held last February a Congress at the Sudan Schools Club, Khartoum, to decide on the necessary steps to give effect to these aims. The Congress was met with a ready response. 1150 out of 1600 members, a fair number of them from provincial centres, attended and elected a council of 60 members. These in their turn elected from amongst themselves 15 members to form the Executive Committee, who have the honour to be your present addressees.

A copy of our constitution is attached herewith.

Our duties, as we envisage them, will lie in the main and distinct spheres:

I. The sphere of internal matters, relating to us and lying outside the ambit of official Government concern, such as social reform, charities, etc.

II. That of matters of public interest involving the Government or lying within the scope of its policy and concern.
CIVIL SECRETARY
KHARTOUM

DEAR SIR,

It is with the sincerest wish for good understanding and sympathetic feeling that we, the educated class of this country, with due respect submit our following communication, hoping that it will be received with the spirit which inspired its writing.

As you are aware, the Sudan Schools Graduates, prompted by a sense of duty towards their country as its most enlightened elements, and by a sincere desire to cooperate with Government, in much work as may be open to them, in furthering their country's welfare, held last February a Congress at the Sudan Schools Club, Omdurman, to decide on the necessary steps to give effect to these aims. The Congress was met with a ready response. 1250 out of 1600 members, a fair number of them from provincial centres, attended and elected a council of 60 members. These in their turn elected from amongst themselves 15 members to form the Executive Committee, who have the honour to be your present addressees.

A copy of our constitution is attached herewith.

Our duties, as we envisage them, will lie in two main and distinct spheres:

I. The sphere of internal matters, relating to us and lying outside the habit of official Government concern, such as social reform, societies, etc.

II. That of matters of public interest involving the Government or lying within the scope of its policy and concern.
DEAR SIR,

I am directed to reply to your letter of the 2nd of May informing me of the decisions of a congress of graduates from Sudan educational institutions of a standard higher than elementary, which was held at Omdurman.

It is manifest that without the support of educated members of the public, measures designed for the welfare of all the inhabitants of the country cannot attain their maximum efficiency. I therefore note with sympathy the desire of the graduates, by an organization, to increase their individual contributions to the service of the country and engage in philanthropic activity.

It appears that the congress, whilst neither seeking formal recognition as a political body, nor claiming to represent the views of any but its own members, nevertheless wishes to be regarded as a semi-public organization interested in philanthropic and public affairs and competent to hold and express opinions on such matters as come within its purview.

It recognizes that the inclusion in its membership of a number of Government officials would prejudice participation in any line of action likely to bring it into conflict with Government policy or with constitutional authority; it seeks to achieve its purpose in close cooperation with the Government.

If I have thus correctly interpreted the intentions of the congress, I am happy to assure you that communications made to me on its behalf will receive my most careful consideration and, furthermore, that the Government is fully alive to the important contribution to a healthy development of the country which may be made by more progressive elements in the community.

APPENDIX B

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

100. (1) There shall be a Public Service Commission (in this Chapter referred to as "the Commission"), the chairman and other members whereof shall be appointed by the Supreme Commission after consultation with the Council.

(2) The Supreme Commission may make regulations determining the number of members of the Commission, their tenure of office, and their remuneration, and making provision for the Commission's staff.

101. The Commission shall be consulted by the Council or the Minister concerned, and shall make recommendations to the Council or Minister in respect of the principles to be observed in the following matters in regard to the public services:

(a) recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer and retirement,

(b) the holding of examination for entry into service or promotion,

(c) the enforcement of discipline.

Provided that the Supreme Commission may by order specify the matters (not being matters of major importance) on which either generally, or in any particular class of case, or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for the Commission to be consulted.

102. The Council or the Minister concerned shall submit the following matters to the Commission which may make recommendations to the Council or the Minister concerned:

(a) Proposals for regulations affecting the salaries or conditions of service of Government servants.

(b) Proposals for the creation of new posts to which super-scale salaries are to be allotted.

(c) Proposals for the promotion of Government servants to posts to which super-scale salaries are allotted.
With regard to the matters of the former category, we shall act independently, but always in the spirit of friendly cooperation and obedience to the requirements of the law and local regulations governing the same.

With regard to the matters of the latter category, we hope that the Government will give due consideration to the views and suggestions which we may submit from time to time on such matters.

It is not our intention in any way to embarrass the Government, nor is it to pursue lines of activity incompatible with the Government policy. Most of us are Government Officials and are fully conscious of our obligations as such, but we feel that the Government is aware of our peculiar position as the only educated element in this country, and of the duties which we, in this peculiar position, feel to be ours.

We also do not claim a position prejudicial to that of important elements in the country, but it is our duty to offer our contribution in thought and effort to the welfare and the progress of the country as a whole.

The Government has been in the habit of seeking and welcoming advice from the educated Siamese individually. We submit that the time has come when it will be more advantageous to the Government, as well as more reassuring and gratifying to the educated Siamese, if such advice is sought and welcomed from them as a body, through their Committee of the Congress, in whom the whole class has placed its confidence. Our belief that we can render a special service to the country and inspired us to write this letter to understanding and cooperation well established between us and the Government.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) ISMAIL EL AHARI
Gen. Secretary,
GRADUATES' GENERAL CONGRESS

Provided that the Supreme Commission may by order specify the matters (not being matters of major importance) which either generally, or in any particular class of case, or in any particular class or case, or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for the Council or the Minister concerned to submit to the Commission.

103. The Supreme Commission on the advice of the Council may by order confer upon the Commission such additional functions, of a like nature to those hereby specified, in respect of the public service as it may from time to time think fit.

104. In order to enable the Commission to perform its functions and exercise its powers hereunder, the Supreme Commission may make regulations—

(a) authorising the Commission to require the production before it of any Government documents or records, and to require any person to appear before the Commission and give evidence on any matter which is under consideration or investigation by the Commission;

(b) providing for all other necessary subsidiary matters, including the prescribing of offences and the imposition of penalties in respect of any of the matters mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

105. Save as law otherwise provided the Commission shall exercise and perform—

(a) the powers and duties vested in the Central Board of Discipline under the Official Discipline Ordinance, 1927;

(b) the powers and duties vested in all or any of the Councils constituted under the several Sudan Government Pensions and Provident Fund Ordinances.

106. (1) Any Government servant, aggrieved by any decision made against him, may submit a petition to the Commission.

(2) Upon receiving such petition the Commission shall consider the same, and, while doing so, may ask for any information from any department of Government, and the same shall be supplied to it.
(1) The advice of the Commission regarding such petition shall be communicated to the Minister concerned, and if the petition was made against a Minister's decision, the advice shall be communicated to the Council.

(4) In any case where the Council does not accept the advice of the Commission, the Council shall forthwith report the fact to the Supreme Commission giving the reasons for such non-acceptance and the decision thereon of the Supreme Commission shall be given effect to.

107. The Commission shall submit to the Supreme Commission an annual report on its work, and the Supreme Commission shall cause a copy of the report to be laid before the Constituent Assembly.

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