NATIVE BUILDING IN TANZANIA AND THE SUDAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY.

by

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For more than a decade, since 1967, the developments that took place in Tanzania attracted the attention of many people inside and outside the country. The experiments in which Tanzania embarked ever since have enriched the literature concerning the debate on African political developments. In the Sudan, since May 1969, similar, though not identical developments started to take place in various fields specially in the political arena. The concern of both countries, being among the poorest 25 countries in the world, has been with development. Both countries are committed (at least theoretically) to achieving rather similar goals. This is perhaps the major reason that encouraged me to do my research. My belief is that through comparing developments in two or more countries, people can make sound judgements about what is good and what is not for their country and the continent as a whole. Individual countries can benefit from the experiences and experiments of each other instead of trying to push ahead by themselves into the unknown.

The first chapter deals with the concept of Nation-Building. A definition of the term Nation-Building is being made as far as our case is concerned. Concepts like
"Centre", "Periphery", "Termination", "Participation" and "Communication" are defined.

The second chapter examines the importance of ideology. In both Tanzania and the Sudan the claim being made is that both countries are socialist. This is why I decided to deal with "Socialism" rather than other ideologies. Chapter three examines the role that an organization can play as far as Nation-Building is concerned. In our case the political parties and local government agencies in both countries are subsumed under the rubric "Organization".

Chapters four and five examine the effectiveness of both ideology and organization in promoting the nation-building efforts in both Tanzania and the Sudan respectively. A glance at both chapters might give the impression that they are unbalanced as to length and size. This might technically be undesirable. However, it is difficult to strike a balance when two case studies, in the case of Sudan, have been included.

Examining the effectiveness of ideologies and organizations in both countries enabled me to find out where policies went wrong and where institutions failed and the reasons for failures and setbacks. This being revealed, it was not difficult to make concluding remarks
point to add is that my views are not conclusive. They are rather suggestive. The area is wide open for researchers to enter, challenge and give their own views.
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developments in two or more countries. There are few who attempted to do comparative studies, but still much work needs to be done.\footnote{1} The bulk of the literature is confined to individual countries. Two or more countries might have similar political institutions, preach similar ideologies and opt for similar policies as far as their development is concerned, but still the outcome might be different. This makes comparison a necessity to find out why success is achieved in one or two countries and not in the others. For example, it is a fact that no two African countries are similar whether geographically, ethnically, or culturally. Levels of economic and political development also vary from one country to another due to the different economic endowments and political awareness in each individual country. The only similarities that many African countries share are found when one is dealing with regime typologies. The majority of African countries are either single party regimes or military regimes. Even the single party regimes or military regimes have different interpretations to different concepts. Concepts like
'Democracy,' 'people's participation' and 'opposition,' for example, have different interpretations in people's democracies like Mozambique and Angola; dictatorships like the one in Malawi or mass-party regimes like Tunisia. Although all can be brought under the rubric of single party regimes, differences could still be cited. Military regimes themselves are different when it comes to practice. The military regime in Uganda during Idi Amin's reign of terror is different from the Ethiopian regime under Colonel Mengistu, and both are different from the military styles found in Sudan and Somalia.

Differences between African countries are many, but this should not deter one from studying two or more countries in a comparative manner. Whatever the differences are, a student of African politics can find certain variables that are similar in the countries concerned. It is these variables that can be a base for a useful and meaningful research. The variables could be things like political parties, national assemblies, local government institutions, and electoral procedures, to cite only few. The variables in question can be tested, successes and failures pinpointed, reasons detected and recommendations made.
When choosing Sudan and Tanzania, there were certain things that made for the choice, but still it was possible to choose another country or other countries to compare with the Sudan depending on which variables to be compared. Sudan and Tanzania are not identical. There are differences, but in some areas similarities are found. It is because of those similarities that I decided to choose Sudan and Tanzania. From an economic point of view the two countries are among the least developed countries in the world according to a United Nations report. Area-wise both countries could be regarded as among the largest in Africa, with Sudan being the larger. Population-wise, both countries are not densely populated if compared to Nigeria or Egypt for example. Their population is heterogeneous due to ethnic and tribal factors. The economy of both countries depends on agricultural produce. More than 65 per cent of their population earn its living from the land and together with a larger share of their revenue. Distribution of economic activity and hence of population and purchasing power is affected by conditions in the agricultural sector. Industrial development which is taking place in both countries is mostly agro-based. It was not because of the above similarities that I made my decision in comparing Sudan and Tanzania. There are things that are of greater importance
as far as the concept of 'Nation-building' is concerned. These are political parties and local government institutions. Before anything is said about these institutions, one must mention that the evolution of these institutions in both countries did not take place at the same time. This means that one must be careful enough as far as historical points of departure are concerned. In both countries, I am interested in the post-independence era with emphasis on developments that took place in the post-1967 period in Tanzania and post-1969 period in the Sudan. This does not mean that the pre-1967 and 1969 period in Tanzania and Sudan, respectively will be ignored. A brief, rather than detailed, mention about those periods will be made whenever it is necessary in clarifying our case. Points of departure being made, the question that follows is where to stop? In my view, a decade is quite enough to make an assessment about whatever experiments have been made. Roughly, our terminus as far as Tanzania is concerned will be 1977 and for the Sudan the year 1979.

1967 in Tanzania and 1969 in the Sudan are the years that witnessed basic changes as far as politics is concerned. The most important thing is that both countries seemed too determined to follow the socialist path as far as development is concerned.Various books and pamphlets were produced
after that to explain what form of socialism. (This will be detailed in the part that deals with ideology and organization).

Both countries could be described as single party regimes. The only difference is that the party in Tanzania was found even before the country could achieve its independence. In the Sudan the party was created after 1959. Before 1959 there were various political parties. The formation of the single party took place after a military coup on May 25, 1969 took place and dissolved all the parties. Two years after that the need arose for the creation of a party to allow for people's participation. The organizers of the party insist that it is not a party per se. They call it a "coalition" or "alliance of the People's Working Forces" and sometimes a "Front". All these are only names. In essence what we have is a political party both in its organization and functions. In Tanzania alongside the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU), there existed the Arwato Shirazi Party (ARP) in Zanzibar, but still Tanzania was considered a single party regime. In 1977, a merger of TANU and the ARP took place and this led to the creation of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), or the Revolutionary Party in Tanzania.
A third feature that made for my choice is the system of local government, especially after the decentralisation policies in the two states. Decentralisation is thought to be a solution for the many problems that are a direct result of the central government's failure in the local areas.

RESEARCH PROCEDURE

When I started to think about doing the research, and after defining the problem of nation-building, I was confronted with the problem of where to start from and how? As far as the theoretical side is concerned, there was no problem in collecting the necessary material. A visit to the United Republic of Tanzania was essential since it is the only place where one can collect material about Tanzania. The visit took place between June and October 1977. In Tanzania, the bulk of my work was library work. I also made short visits to some of the districts and talked to some people who were helpful enough. The idea of making a questionnaire was out of the question for various reasons. In my view a questionnaire is not always useful. It is rather difficult to always get the right information from the people especially when dealing with sensitive issues like the political ones.
An element of mistrust is always there. If a questionnaire is made, one needs to make several questions to check the answers made. This is a long and time-consuming process. An important factor that precluded the idea of making a questionnaire is that all non-Tanzanians who think of making questionnaires inside the country must first get the "research release". The release is granted by the Tanzanian Government. It is a lengthy process, and passes through various stages. Much of the material I collected, as mentioned, was from the library at the University of Dar es Salaam, plus interviews made in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Kilimanjaro College and party officials in the Kilimanjaro area, specially in Moshi. Interviews were made with students at the University and some of the members of the staff as well. Concerning Tanzania, much has been written by Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians who are interested in the Tanzanian experiment. Valuable assessments, evaluations and selections are made. The Tanzanians are far ahead of the Sudanese as far as their experiment is concerned. This makes possible the use of the material gathered from Tanzania in trying to find out where successes and failures are. Against this background one can study the Sudanese experiment and see if they are following the same path as the Tanzanians or being careful enough not to repeat the same mistakes that the Tanzanians made.
As far as the Sudan is concerned, the difficulty was that, apart from the official documents, no other serious attempts are made to objectively evaluate and assess the functioning of the political and local government organs. Reliance on official sources does not give a true picture of what is happening. Official sources normally give a rosy picture about what is happening and in most cases describe things as they want them to be and not as they are in reality. Even the few articles that appear in magazines and newspapers are not very different from what is found in official documents. In short, relying on official sources is only one face of the coin. To know the other face, one has to rely on fieldwork, interviews (of both officials and non-officials), make questionnaires if necessary, and by being a participant observer. For the purpose of my work, I extensively went through the available official documents and policy statements. These were descriptive but never analytical, with the exception of two documents published by the Organisation Committee in the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU). Few dissertations by graduate students were of much help to me. I declined from talking to people at the Centre (Khartoum) because I have the impression that most, if not all, of what they say will be mere repetition of whatever is written
is written in the official documents. I also decided to visit two different parts of the country and test on the spot what is really happening. The two areas are the Red Sea Province (RSP) and Northern Darfur Province (NDP).

In both provinces I met party functionaries, administrative officials and elected councillors. They are the ones who represented the official side of the coin.

Apart from the officials I met, I also talked to people who can be described as ordinary. Ordinary in the sense that they have nothing to do with running the affairs of the Sudan or the local government councils. They come from different backgrounds and from different professions and trades. When meeting these people, I avoided having a questionnaire for reasons cited elsewhere. In both provinces I was able to visit the RSP headquarters and look into the available documents. In NDP I was successful in visiting the province headquarters, and found access to the files of the People's Executive Council. I failed to do the same in the RSP. In the RSP I was able to visit many places, while in NDP the problem of transport restricted my movement.

This is briefly the way in which I collected the information needed for conducting my research, the title of which is 'Nation-Building in Sudan and Tanzania'. At this juncture, our definition of 'nation-building' as far as the research is concerned must be made.
FOOTNOTES


3. The area of the Sudan is estimated as 2,500,000 square kilometers and that of Tanzania as 955,087 square kilometers. See; Africa South of the Sahara 1977-78 (London, Europa Publications, 1977), pp. 385 and 911.

4. In April 1973, Sudan's population was estimated as 34,810,571. The Tanzanian population in 1970 was 13,896,000 and estimated to rise to 15,155,000 in 1973. Reference same as in No. 3.

5. For the Tanzanian case, see W. M. J. B. Wyerere, Freedom and Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968); For Sudan, various statements were made in May 1969 and June 1969 by the Prime Minister at that time and President of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

6. These were mainly 'mature students' who worked for the government before joining the university.

7. Both documents were an evaluation of the role of the RCC.
CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF NATION-BUILDING

In most, if not all, African countries before independence, the driving force of nationalism and nation-building may be partly cultural (a resistance to alien rule) and partly economic (the result of growing demands for the control of the resources of the territory). After independence, the main driving forces become economic and political. Politically nation-building is necessary for the national political elite to establish its authority and power to act coherently and appropriately. Economically, nation-building is a response to the belief that underdevelopment and poverty can be overcome only through increasing the scale of human activity. In both these respects, political elites may be expected to promote nation-building, but it is doubtful if the same consideration applies to the governed. For the people, the subject of all political activity, a different set of consideration may be of greater importance. It is necessary to distinguish between acts of government designed to strengthen the nation-state and the social and economic and political attitudes of the government that ultimately determine the viability and strength of the nation-state as an institution. Poverty is a major constraint to nation-building.
but no too can be the social and cultural barriers between people. A lack of social cohesion may arise from poverty and contribute in turn to the persistence of poverty.

Common to most of the newly emerging states in the world scene, is the belief that it is within the competence and ability of government to promote actively the growth of a nation, that is 'nation-building' and furthermore that such a task is of paramount importance and each government ought to promote "nation-building". Nation-building is seen by the rulers of new states as an integral and necessary part of their political, economic and social development. Why? The nation-state as seen by the new elite of the new political groupings on the world map, is one important answer to the problem of economic, social and political change.

What do we mean by nation-building then? Models and theories of nation-building derived largely from Western experiences have influenced a significant part of the literature on development and modernisation in the Third World. It is not easy to say if one can do without such theories when dealing with a question like nation-building in a specific country. At the same time, these theories cannot be relied upon completely when dealing with an African
situation in the present time, since Western theories were designed a long time ago. It is probably true that one of the biggest problems in the study of history and theory of ideas is that words change their meaning over a period of time. The trouble with words like nation, monarchy, democracy and many others is that the institutions change considerably whilst the words used to describe them remain the same. Hence the immediate difficulty in trying to answer the question posed by Fredrich "are nations really built or rather do they grow"? is that historically both have occurred, but we face the problem of finding a definition relevant to contemporary nationalism and nation-building in Africa. Tidy definitions are unsatisfactory because historical phenomena change dynamically and their real meaning may be apparent only in their history.\footnote{3/}

To try and find a single definition for what we call nation-building is a futile attempt. Definitions of a 'nation' are various and consequently are definitions of nation-building. Traditionally, a nation is understood as that group of people who share a consciousness of one-ness animated by common language, religion and family patterns, moral codes, ethical codes, political and territorial identity, and self-control.\footnote{3/} However, there are
extremely few, if any, nations that possess all the characteristics. In fact, a nation may exist without territorial identity or even self-control. The Jewish people might perhaps serve as an illustration of this situation. Also a nation rarely, if ever, possesses complete uniformity in its cultural traits. That is to say, creating or building a nation need not necessarily include all these qualities, because as one observer has noted "there is no real agreement as to what a nation is". Accordingly, there is no right theoretical formulation to which nation-building in a certain country need necessarily be bound.

The concept of nation-building has lately attracted wide attention among scholars and politicians. It would therefore enhance the objectives of this work to outline or summarize a few of such views. Among those views are those of Almond and Powell. They define nation-building as being the problem of integration and establishing control. They introduce a version similar to that of Geertz who argued that "in order to build a nation a feeling of national consciousness and national identity need to be created". Almond and Powell portray that nation-building involves the transfer of commitment and loyalty to new structures and organisations — a transfer from the smaller parochial societies to the larger and newer collectivity, the nation-state.
Carl Frederich, while in effect arguing for the broadening of the concept of nation, goes on restrictively to define nation-building as a matter of group cohesion and group loyalty, for purposes of international representation and domestic planning. Further, another scholar, E. H. Harlow, argues that "the central fact of nation-building is the orderly exercise of the nation-side public authority." Bert Henselitz describes the process of nation-building as being "above all the formation of a national elite with power over all parts of the country, and development of a uniform national territory, and the evolution of political procedures adequate for successful interaction with other nations in the modern world."

In this regard, Lucian Pye observes that:

"this generation has come to a new view of man's potency for directing change. Over-night, leaders and would-be leaders believed that conditions for social and economic and political life could readily be created out of purposeful planning, Nations which once took generations to mould could now hopefully, be established in short order, and with purposeful political development all other forms of development might instantly follow."

Pye seems to introduce a new picture in both thinking and practicing of nation-building process. The new picture is that of practicing the effort of building the post-colonial society as deliberate, rather than either 'natural' or
accidental. Pye also introduced what he called the "human dimension of nation-building". This, in effect, has to do with the question: when all is said and done about socio-economic and political developments, what of people....
the men and women... who are thus involved in these unprecedented changes? Pye puts the situation as follows:

"The quest for nationhood, the awe of politics, and the widespread ambivalences of personal identity are clearly related phenomena, but it is not clear by what logic they are related, at least a circumstantial pattern is present, a search for the individual identity, and the latter calls for a coherent and consensus-bound political process, but people cannot fundamentally respect themselves and their spokesman, when they are sure that they do not respect themselves, and so back to the issue of personal integrity and identity. A dilemma is faced, the need for a reassurance of individual worth procedures, the need for a politics of status and yet such policies is consistent with the requirement of nation-building". 18

This human dimension is also expressed by Worsley. It includes what might be the psychological man, who, as Worsley puts it, desires to be respected, one who has feelings about his past, present and future, and one who aspires for the future with the knowledge that he does not only have background for his and his posterity's psychic make-up but also brings that background to bear on his future; it also includes the political man who concerns himself with votes, constitutions, parliaments, and the economic man who concerns himself
with the bread, the shelter and the clothing. Pye notes in this same connection that the time of nation-building is marred by:

"most personal insecurity, for millions must make frightening adjustments in their personal perspectives on life. Never has the extent of basic social change touched the lives of so many, shaking the intellectual, moral and emotional foundations of their individual worlds... they are confronted with the most basic or human issues, that of individual integrity and personal identity."

Milton Raman appears to incorporate Pye's ideas of deliberate efforts into those of Almond and Powell when he observes that nation-building "is the deliberate fashioning of an integrated political community within fixed boundaries in which the nation-state is the dominant institution". A smaller definition of nation-building is that of David Wilson who describes it as a "metaphorical fabric of the societal process by which national consciousness appears in certain groups and which... act to attain political autonomy for their society."

Another view of nation-building is that of Marcel Tamin who describes nation-building within the administrative process of functioning to foster industrial development, manage new state economic enterprises, improve the transportation and communication network, reform educational systems and achieve
other developmental goals. Societies argue that the effort to build a new nation is nearly always subject to many influences such as that of time, internal and external forces, the socio-economic forces and so on. But the basic fact of unification or interaction of knowhow and resources is always present to some degree. In this sense, nation-building is hardly a new phenomenon since all nations of the world have had to build this total sense at some stage of their histories.

Economists as well, like Paul Baran and Albert Hirschman, have their own version of nation-building. They tend to look at nation-building as the state of the policy which might facilitate economic growth. Others view nation-building as consisting of the organisation of political life and the performance of political functions according to standards expected of a modern nation state. The assumption being that historically there have been many types of political systems and all communities have had their form of politics, but with the emergence of the modern nation state, a specific set of requirements about politics came into existence. Thus, if a society is to perform as a modern state its political institutions and practices must adjust to these requirements. Modern nation-building then becomes the process by which communities that are nation-states only in form and by international courtesy become nation states in reality. Specifically this
involves the development of a capacity to maintain a certain level of public order, to mobilise resources for a specific range of collective enterprises, and to make and effectively uphold types of international communities.

From the definitions and arguments cited, it is clear that the term nation-building is a multi-dimensional concept with no one definition that is agreed upon by everybody to be applied everywhere. It appears as if it is difficult to find a definition, a suitable definition to apply to our Sudanese and Tanzanian cases. But this is not so. One has to ask the question: do we need to follow patterns established elsewhere for example in the West? Do the ruling elite need to establish a frame of reference, similar, if not identical, to that of Western powers, or what Pye calls the Western way of life? Linda Pye seems to embody this attitude by holding that Western culture possesses a degree of "minor coherence", and it is generally recognised as being the essence of modern life.21/ He further argues that "there is a minimum level of what were once Western but are now world standards which the new states must accept if they were to survive in a world of independent nation states.22/

Carrying this view to its logical conclusions it reduces nation-building to simply emulating what others have done as opposed to creating or bringing into being and
refashioning of the existing knowledge, skills, technique, and infrastructure in order to guarantee a social capacity such as the circumstances of nation-building demand.

As mentioned before, the concept of nation-building today encompasses a broad range of meanings and it means different things to different people, and the term nation building has a degree of confusion accordingly. However, behind this confusion there are some bases of agreement. The various definitions given to the concept "nation-building" imply that it is a process by which the political leadership aims at organizing political life, perform certain political functions and achieve a sound level of economic development. In our definition of nation-building as far as Sudan and Tanzania are concerned, we shall set aside all disputes regarding the idea of the nation as a form of integration within a specific social context of a variety or individual groups (ethnic, religious, tribal... etc.); in order to confine ourselves to the study of nation-building considered as a process whereby the social and cultural distance separating regions and social groups within a given context known as a "Nation" can be reduced. Nation building is going to be considered as a phenomenon that deals with the capacity of the political system, that is, outputs of
the political system and the extent to which the political system can affect the rest of society, governmental performance and conditions affecting performance and the effectiveness and execution of public policy. This makes necessary analysing the institutions and structures of the political system under consideration. In order to rid ourselves of the problem that arises as a result of the various definitions given to the term nation-building, our definition will be restricted to the question of grassroots penetration. Our definition will centre around the problem of how can the government reach down into society and affect basic policies. At the same time one would like to know how the grassroots respond to the actions of the government. Nation-building, for the purpose of this research, then, involves penetration by the centre into the periphery and at the same time participation by the periphery when responding to the centre.

Both Tanzania and Sudan in their efforts to build the nation are applying the diffusionist model of national development. The model emphasizes the importance of regular interaction between the centre (core) and periphery. This interaction is crucial for the process of national development. The model assumes that penetration by the centre into the periphery is always desirable. The centre can even use force to penetrate if it is necessary (it is assumed that the centre is always stronger than the periphery).
The 'centre' in a new state is the locus of 'state power' exercised through 'state apparatus' by a 'state bureaucracy' ultimately controlled and directed by a 'ruling group'. Thus, political penetration is that process by which the most influential and powerful actors - the penetrators - in the ruling group and state bureaucracy use state power and the state apparatus both to maximize state sovereignty and pursue the ideas and material interests both of themselves and ideally for the society over which they exercise control. Although the centre may be the arena for the struggle for status among various differentiated protoclasses and factions, it tends to be perceived by much of the rest of society as a single dominant stratum. The periphery in our case can mean one group of people and area that do not fall within the locus of power but can affect it through participation. This linkage between the centre and the periphery is important in solving a variety of problems. A look at the problems in new states, in particular the problems of instability and uneven development, shows them to be exacerbated by communications difficulties. Communications between the constituent parts of many new states may be difficult; there may be no easy contact between people within a state because of geographical distance and barriers and the underdevelopment of transport. The restrictions of
the flow of information can hinder development by not providing people with a range of appropriate choices. The effectiveness of government may be reduced by communication difficulties in that it may be possible to communicate effectively with only a small proportion of the population. That may be no problem for a ruling elite representing a minority, but in terms of real development and progress it is a communication problem. Nation-building involves overcoming these and other difficulties, and communications from and to the centre through the linkage process is an inescapable part of the process. To pursue nation-building objectives in each case requires the existence of effective and strong institutions that can effectively eliminate the communications problem. This could only be solved if resources of the country will allow. Often the most persistent constraint is the lack of skilled manpower. It is only when the institutions become effective that they are accepted and valued. It is ultimately on this that both the autonomy and legitimacy of government in the context of the nation-state rests.

Nation-building defined as the process of reaching the grassroots by the government and affecting change, by necessity involves the equitable distribution of the wealth
of the state. If there are serious economic inequalities then there is a potential for tension which may be exploited by rival elites. Economic development and the allocation of resources and services are central considerations of nation-building, affecting as they do all aspects of the nation-building process.

Communication between the centre and the periphery, as it has been argued, is of vital importance. The centre needs to convey messages to the periphery and expects the periphery to respond by sending messages in the upward direction. Penetration by the centre and participation by the periphery is largely affected by means of available communication. The whole process depends on the effectiveness of the institutions built, (mainly political in our case). Communication in this case is political in nature.

Before going into further details about these institutions, the concepts of political communication, penetration and participation, need to be elaborated a bit more so as not to allow room for any confusion that might arise.

Politcal Communication

The art of effective governing requires that some communication be established between the government and the governed. By definition a system of communication
links the various groups, interests and sections of society. The frequency of communication provides an insight into intra-social relationships; the lack of communications reflects social isolation, distance and estrangement. In government efforts to unite a disparate group of people and mobilise them for political action and development purposes (without employing coercion) must be premised on a high level of information interchange and communication, similarly the consolidation of the legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the establishment of effective lines of communication through which the people are informed about the achievements and goals of their government and which gives the people a sense of meaningful participation in the formulation of policies. According to Ake:

"Communication facilities are an important instrument of government power. The existence of channels of communication between the political class and the governed enhances the government ability to influence the behaviour of its citizens... there is also a need for channels for transmitting ideas and information from the people to the political class. In the first place, this helps to give the governed some sense of having control over events and to neutralise their tendency to feel helpless and alienated. But just as important is the fact that this upward flow of ideas and information helps the political class to understand the governed, the political class is better equipped for determining what incentives to offer, what superstitious to exploit and what pressures to apply, to mobilise support for its policies."
It is not possible to think of politics without there being communication, and yet much is written about politics, both historically and analytically without explicit consideration to the communication process which pervades political life. Political power requires possession of an information about those over whom it is exercised. Similarly, information must precede obedience and compliance. We can obey a command, observe a regulation or fulfill an obligation without knowing what these are. Communications become political by virtue of the consequences, actual and potential, that it has for the functioning of the political system. \(^{30}\)

Even though source, message channel and obedience may not be political, the communication process may nonetheless have effects which are political. All political power involves communication. Although communication that does not involve political power is common, the reverse is difficult to imagine. Communications are the web of society, the communications system demarcates the political system, and arising from this a person's situation in a communications network can bestow political power on him.

"Positions of communications centrality in which a person both receives disproportionate information from others and passes on a disproportionate share of information to others are likely to give other occupants power not to be anticipated from the other attributes of these individuals". \(^{31}\)
There is a direct relationship between the structure and organisation of communications and the character of political activity. No politician can escape the restrictions of the communications system to which he has access, and a study of communications can help to reveal how power and control are distributed. All political systems can be looked at in terms of the amount, patterning, methods and content of their communications. The communications network of a political system defines and limits the extent of that system, governs its efficiency and capability, and may be extended and contracted according to the requirements imposed upon it. The general communications process determines how the vast majority of the people will relate themselves to political life, through providing a basis for interpreting and evaluating political events. Social, interpersonal or face-to-face communication at any level brings together diverse social entities and can form the basis of political and social action in society at the local level.

It might also be said that any modern nation in which rule is based on the legitimacy of majority support must develop a communication network covering its entire population and area - a communication network that is capable of magnifying political action so that they become felt throughout the system. Without a network capable of enlarging and
mamifying the words and choices of individuals, there could be no politics capable of 'spanning the nation'.

This is why communications are of special importance in nation-building. Leaving aside the effects they may or may not have on attitudes, state or nation-wide politics are impossible without the capability of 'spanning the nation'.

It should be emphasised that a national communications network includes communications to all directions. The expression and aggregation of opinion and interest involves communications just as much as the dissemination of information from government to governed. The communications process in a society can be said to have three main functions. It informs people about their social, economic and political environment. It links the component parts of society and it transmits social values, norms and more.

What then provides the modern nation-state with its communications network? Communications networks are made up of channels. The most salient channels of political communications are often political institutions like parties, trade unions, pressure groups and bureaucracies. Other organisations not formally part of the political structure, may function as important channels of political communication.
In totalitarian regimes, for example the importance of informal social groups is recognized. But while it is relatively easy to control certain kinds of relationship, it is not easy to control what is informal. The communist cell system is an attempt by ruling communist regimes to formalise and institutionalise group relationships at the level of the community, the street or the workplace. TANU and the SAV in both Tanzania and Sudan have similar though not identical raison d'être.

The communications network that facilitates access to information is necessitated by the fact that the problem of nation-building is encompassed by the problem of rivalries for power. The search for order is the problem of the political system. The search for order exists because of the rivalries for power. Now the premise is that 'authority without power is operationally ineffective and that it takes power-legitmate power in this sense - to build a nation. Whether it is power of the national elite over all parts of the country... or it is the army generals or even the political party - it is an absolute necessity that someone has power - power to coerce if necessary. In order to prevent this rivalry of power, that is, that power should rest with the government and its authority respected, the communications network must be strong and
effective enough. If the 'voice' of the central government is not clearly heard and what is said is not understood by those who are far from the centre, this might encourage the emergence of a competing group or groups to the government. Power must be secured by the centre and it is within this power umbrella that nation-building must take place.

**Penetration**

Upward as well as downward communication, that is, participation and penetration, is facilitated through the creation of structures and procedures that will involve the masses of the population in decision making at all levels. Before dealing with the structures and procedures and elaboration of the concepts 'penetration' and 'participation' is deemed necessary.

In the case of any state, the penetration of official hierarchies into the society to exact and sometimes change a specific pattern of behaviour must be balanced with the opposing need for participation if such participation is to be effective and efficient.\(^{37}\) State power penetrates or seeks to penetrate a society through a variety of structures which schematically should include the following:
1. Governmental structures which are formal, presumptively authoritative, usually constitutionally prescribed, and territory-wide in purview, namely, executives, bureaucracies, armies, parastatal agencies, and the like, the ensemble of which constitutes the state apparatus through which the centre endeavours to establish and maintain its presence, exact compliance, extract resources and evoke supportive response. The ensemble also includes:

i. Structures of territorial (regional, provincial, district) administration which may historically have varying degrees of limited autonomy, depending upon the penetrative capacity, the centralisation will or permissiveness of the centre.

ii. Presumptively participant structures which can be either formal bodies or associations, either officially created and sanctioned or tolerated by the state, and used, or not, as channels for participation at best.

iii. Structures for resource extraction, economic control and direction.

The foregoing central structures of penetration can be and are selectively perceived by the affected either as meaningful and legitimate sources of direction, or coercion to be avoided or resisted. They may impinge only intermittently
It is not my intention to argue for or against the above statement but it shows the importance given by some people to the bureaucrats when penetration is concerned.

Helliner's contribution is that penetration policy takes different forms. He argues that they can be direct as well as indirect. The manipulation of economic incentives in particular can be a powerful force for short run change. At the very best it can also be an essential part of the infrastructure for the achievement of more fundamental change. Helliner's concern is mainly with economics. Hyden on the other hand tried to illustrate problems of achieving social change and economic development through centrally initiated and directed change; what he calls 'political engineering'. He argues that when trying to identify the determinants of receptivity to political and social change it may be more fruitful to examine such variables as the character of the economic system rather than to seek explanation solely in terms of the attitudes and styles of political leadership or to concentrate solely on the prevailing value systems. Government capacity to penetrate society for the purpose of mobilising new resources will probably depend more on the ability of political and administrative leadership to anticipate and adapt to new situations than the assumed all pervasive values of a group whose behaviour
they are endeavouring to change. Influential political and administrative leaders can bring about manifestations in the participation and implementation of policies. The ordinary peasant often seen as the 'object' and even beneficiary of such political engineering, is in fact often distinctly disadvantaged because he does not possess the same power to defend and promote his interest. Even though politicians are better informed about local opinions than civil servants - they do at times fall victims of giving too much regard to political directives from the centre as a way of promoting their ability to the top leadership.

Doornbos argues that political penetration in rural development refers to the strategies and means by which an organizing state asserts its power in rural countries, and seek to incorporate and direct political and production processes on its own terms and promises. These tendencies of bureaucratic encroachment, however, seem to occur within, and to a certain extent, not withstanding divergent political strategies in the countries concerned. To be effective, the centre is likely to need increased powers, in fact 'penetration' was first asked about in this sense. "But if the centre is given extra-powers, what is to ensure that these will not lead to renewed inequalities, a fresh class of 'dirigistes'? How can a concern for below be validated
through an approach from above? or indeed how else? 

Concern with penetration strategies usually implies particular interest in the connecting element in the relationship between an organising state and a rural society, government invariably seeks channels of contact at the end of the line so that its policies, instructions and controls may be passed down and enforced. Such linkage roles are performed by a number of factors in the local field, chiefs and headmen, ward chairmen and party officials, extension workers and also progressive farmers. All are designated as channels for contact, mobilisation and command. Most of them are appointed officials 'posted' to rural areas, but some are auxiliary members enlisted from 'below'. If the issue of penetration is viewed from the opposite angle, chiefs or progressive farmers will do little to change this picture. In fact it may be viewed as a way of buttressing the system at the expense of grassroots interests if only because it siphons off the latter potential leaders. It should be borne in mind that material incentives and status expectations are powerful instruments with which to ensure the loyalty of coopted agents and their identification with the declared purposes and interests of government. In all penetration strategies, the middleman's interest is a crucial factor.
The term participation, or popular participation, is used to mean the involvement of the masses either directly or indirectly in the determination and execution of decisions that affect them, and in the direct and indirect selection as well as control of their leaders. Although there appears to be little agreement over what political participation ought to imply within a given political context, there still remains a controversy over who should participate in what kind of decisions and how, at various levels and stages for that political context. It is often difficult to identify what political participation means operationally in a given political setting so that we can gather real-life evidence related to it. The problem is magnified when one attempts to make a comparative analysis of political participation in different political systems, and even seemingly in similar political systems. Some of the ambiguous areas related to the subject are:

1. The meaning of participation in relation to the weight of the real power exercised at various levels of decision making. Participation here is associated with power to make decisions affecting the public. There is a need to determine whether and to what degree, participation means both in theory and in
practice having a voice in decision making. The different roles played by different citizens as well as the nature and variety of decisions that have to be taken make it difficult for every citizen to have equal ability and voice to participate equally in all decisions.

2. One should ask whether participation is a continuous aspect of decision making, or whether it can be formalised into a particular procedure at only certain stages.

3. Whether participation is by proxy or direct. It is important here to know the nature of the relationship that exists between the representee and the representative; the distance separating them, the way people can influence their representatives, and in turn, the way he influences them.

The degree to which the masses actually have been motivated to participate within the institutional settings, and the effectiveness of their participation, seems to be dependent upon several factors. These include:

1. The nature and role as well as the structures of those participatory institutions.
2. The degree of the members participation within the institutions under consideration.

3. The consequences of previous participation (if any).

4. The individual members' perception of the price of participating or non-participating, and above all, the degree of political consciousness.

In most new states in the third world, leaders often proclaim to transform society into something fundamentally new and different, far superior to what has gone before. Wider political participation is part of the expected transformation. It may simply mean attending periodic ceremonies calling out thousands to cheer in the capital. In some parts of Africa it has come closer to self-imposed convoys of labour. This is demanded in the name of economic development and given as a sign of new-found participation. It may represent efforts to institute local consultative bodies largely for show, to develop links with the countryside, weakening, at least temporarily, the hold of urban-based politicians. Regardless of the form or process, however, the transformation of society implies the involvement of substantial proportion of the populace. No longer can regimes of privilege count upon public apathy; political
life can no longer be the exclusive province of only
the few unless rulers make substantial efforts to
discourage or divert the energies of important groups
from political activity. 146

Miller, writing about the rural African party argues
that the building of the state, both in terms of economic
development and in the creation of a national consciousness
depends upon some type of participation by citizens. If
the citizenry population is dispersed throughout the state
in remote homesteads, as many African populations are, then
the problem becomes one of linkage between the government
and the remote populace. To gain participation, new
political structures must be built at the rural level and
old institutions must be changed to fit into national goals.
Rebellious attitudes by the people must be neutralised and
consensus or at least some support of the national goals
must be gained. It is necessary, argues Miller, that rural
people be brought into the government plan, that they accept
the government's general viewpoint and that they provide
the will and manpower to change the status quo. In many
new states, the stimulus for such participation is aid to
be coming from the ruling elite who see participation as a
prerequisite for political stability. The people on their
part can either participate in party activity, or do not
participate or become active resisters to party activity.
The continuity in any one of these depends on the satisfaction the individual receives on a wide range of issues. Intervening factors such as the individual's expectations, personal links with party leaders in decision-making positions, and the actual process by which a conflict is resolved are things that affect the process of issue satisfaction. When analysing the factors affecting participation, Miller argues that three questions need to be illustrated in order to understand participation in rural areas:

1. The context of political life in which rural party participation takes place. This necessitates understanding the role of the peasants, leadership groups that are found and political relationships between the different groups.

2. The process of issue satisfaction. How satisfied are individuals in a number of issues?

3. Links between the rural areas and the national party.

In spite of the different interpretations given to, and difficulties in obtaining party participation, there are strong reasons why national leaders in Tanzania, Sudan and other new states persist in promoting such involvement. These are:
1. The party leaders need the support of the populace for their national plans. Their acceptance is to be sought.

2. If there is no participation in the party, checks and balances on party leaders, especially at the local levels, will not exist. The party apparatus has been constructed, but if it is not supported by the people, it can be misused by self-seeking local leaders.

3. To facilitate building other institutions like the cooperatives, welfare societies, and the like.

4. The local party by encouraging participation is forcing the individual into a broader political system and exposing him to institutional structures that can represent larger numbers of people.

Penetration and participation are both useful means in fostering the communications process needed in both Sudan and Tanzania in their efforts to achieve their declared goals of nation-building. Both are committed to the establishment of this linkage process through both social mobilisation and the establishment of political institutions and local government structure. The intention then is to give an idea about what political institutions and local government structures established in both Sudan and Tanzania to link the centre
and the periphery in both directions. This is important since we are trying to find out how successful is penetration by the centre in both countries and how effective is people's participation. It should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of these linkages is determined by the existence of key resources like trained and qualified personnel and finance. It will be useful enough if the level of institutionalisation of these institutions could be detected. As Huntington characteristically measures it, institutionalisation is to be viewed from the point of view of organisational adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence. On the other hand, maintains that institutionalisation involves the generation of affect, the transformation of an organisation 'from an expendable tool into a valued source of personal satisfaction'. Thus to the extent that African economic structures are valued and esteemed both in terms of personal satisfaction and the ways in which they can be used to satisfy agreed upon particularistic values, they are institutionalised.

Ideology also is important in the linkage process. Ideology and organisation in both Tanzania and Sudan are the means by which the linkage process is supposed to be achieved. It is logical enough then to make the discussion of ideology and organisation as a next step.

2. G. J. Fredrich, "Nation-Building", in Deutsch and Pols, op. cit., p. 27.


5. Ibid., p. 210


8. Carl Fredrich, op. cit., p. 32.


22. Ibid., p. 15.


26. Ibid., p. 9.


33. Ibid., p. 60.

34. Pay, Communications and Political Development, p. 6.

35. Reference is made to Almond and Powell's "Problems of the Political System" as itemized in Comparative Politics: A Development Approach, pp. 25-7.


39. Ibid., p. 39.


45. Ibid., p. 31.


SECTION TWO

IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION.
that is characterised with adaptive\textsuperscript{4} and responsive\textsuperscript{5} institutions, capable of inducing, steering and controlling socio-economic and political change. It has to convince the people about the legitimacy of the system. Legitimacy for the political system is desirable if change and development that the masses regard as beneficial to them are to be maintained.

2 - How/Find a way to mobilise the available national resources (people and other factors of production) for the simulation, rationalisation and maximisation of the society's economic potential.\textsuperscript{3}

To achieve the above goals, authority must be maintained. The problem of establishing authority seems to be a major challenge to the political system. To enjoy constitutional framework, a certain consensus about primordial loyalties must already have gained acceptance in the wider community. A breakdown of parochial attachments must take place if consensus is to be built. Without such consensus, political authority
remains the most sensitive problem in the modernising nations. To achieve this new polity requires more than a prophet. It requires effective organisation. Indeed a prophet without an organised militant following will be less than without honour. He will be unsuccessful. Effective organisation requires an ideology as well. Leaders of an organisation need to propound an idea which they expect their followers to implement. These ideas, or ideologies to be more specific, refer to policy preoccupations of the political leadership. They place value on things, and achieve official status when the values expressed are dominant within the political system. Ideology includes the wants of the top leadership as justifications of their policies and acts. As an attribute of 'key' political actors, it refers to a set of stated goals and/or declared intentions about certain situations which for given reasons are considered to be problematic. At this level ideology tends to remain general - a set of vague general aspirations, loose normative themes, prescriptions and definitions.

After argues that a creative and innovative leader must create or transfer the loyalties of the led to the new role which he has created for himself. To him this could be achieved by making use of an ideology since the
two main functions of ideology are to bind the community
together and organise roles. Both of these joint to
legitimise authority. In developing countries:

Authority becomes legitimised on the basis
of these ideologies that lay claim to superior
planning and rationality, and that provide
moral bases for social manipulation for
development purposes. In short, ideology helps
to support an elite and justify the exercise
of power.9

Ideology as an instrument of political power can perform
many functions. It may confirm the legitimacy of those
who rule. The mass parties particularly those which are
demanding wide range change and imposing unfamiliar
sacrifices and disciplines, require exceptional authority.
This authority must be legitimised in some way. Since
their goals are beyond the realm of possibility, the
legitimacy derived from performance does not come often.
Legitimacy therefore may be sought by an all inclusive
ideology. Leaders attempt to use ideology as a means for
providing guidelines to the populace on appropriate polit-
ical behaviour. Ideologies may carry ideas of historical
cause and effect, guiding men’s hands to the levers of
history and showing the way to cope with economic change,
bureaucratic inefficiency, internal political enemies, or
threats from abroad.10 Ideologies are the means by which
political leaders and their entourage attempt to affect the perceptions, the goals, the attitudes and ultimately the actions of political followers. They are also the prism through which political leaders peer at their reality, sometimes distorting it, sometimes illuminating it with a particularly sharp light.

The need to manage centre-periphery relations involves the search for new social values; in the process old values are modified, strengthened or rejected. It takes time for old values to be rejected or modified, and for new ones to be established and strengthened. The process itself is an ongoing one. Ideological expressions are to be viewed as attempts to sell and defend particular viewpoints about which patterns of social values and beliefs should be the norms guiding the conduct of authority in the state. Just as there are competing values, there are competing ideologies. Viewed in this sense, ideologies do not serve to legitimate or maintain or promote authority. Rather they serve to justify authority or to advocate how authority should be exercised.11 One point that must be made is that ideologies in modernising societies are significant for a relatively short period of time. In very few cases has ideology served as a deeply satisfying explanation of, or even a useful programmatic guide
to social and political life. This means ideology should not be relied upon for building consensus.

But however its effects may be, an ideology is needed by modernising leaders.

Ideologies do not operate in a vacuum, and since they help to support an elite to justify the exercise of power, then there is a need for an organisation. Power can be exercised directly by one man over his subordinates. Some societies, notably the feudal ones, are characterised by highly personalised webs of power relationships. However,

"In feudal complex societies, power is normally exercised in organisations. Organisations are structures of differentiated roles which require the ordered exercise of power. In these structures, some men command and others obey. Since all societies need the ordered exercise of power, all societies have organisation. Every civilised society has complex organisations ranging from macro-societal political networks down to the smallest human grouping. Our definition of organisation suggests that all organisation is ultimately political," 12.

Organisations are needed to promote the ideology. Perhaps the most reliable organisation in this is the political party. If the ideology is sound enough it will attract followers and induce in them both loyalty and commitment, and if the party is effective, it will provide an organisation capable of promoting the ideology. Political ideology
and organisation thus interact and reinforce each other. Since it will usually be the leader himself who is presented as the originator, interpreter and guardian of the ideology, personality, organisation and ideology, all work together. 13 However, our discussions will centre around ideology and organisation alone.

Political support as well as creative leadership will depend in large part on the effectiveness of political organisation (the political party in our case). Of the most important roles of a political party in a single party state are socialisation and mobilisation. The political party is an instrument to educate people about development and nation-building, and must strive to persuade them that sacrifices in the short run are justified in terms of long run gains. It is naturally to the party that rulers everywhere have assigned the performance of major tasks. They involve supervision, control and coordination of all other instruments of government, supplying individual and communal incentives for development, training both adult and children for citizenship in the new nation, serving as the concrete expression of the nation, acting as the major channel of communication between the leaders and the population and between one centre and localities, both downward by
party as an organisation must shoulder are very heavy, not only because they include many tasks which in many other societies are performed by other political agencies, but also because the new states were born very suddenly and everything must be done all at once.15

Stability in modernising political systems depends on the strength of its political parties. A party in turn is strong to the extent that it has institutionalised mass support, its strength reflects that support and the level of institutionalisation.16 One aspect of party strength as Huntington argues is organisational complexity and depth, particularly when it comes to the linkage between the party and the socio-economic organisations such as labour unions and peasant associations. Another aspect of party strength concerns the extent to which political activities and power seekers identify with the party and the extent to which they simply view the party as a means to other ends.17 Huntington also advocated the view that expansion of participation is one of the signs of party strength.18

Local government councils can also fulfil functions similar to those of political parties. They are structures
that are created in order to make room for wider citizen’s participation and enable them to make their demands and aspirations known to the centre. The councils are also expected to play a role as far as development is concerned. But how adequate are these ideologies, parties and councils for the performance of these manifold tasks? What about their organisation, personnel and prevailing norms? Solberg when answering such questions, especially about political parties, in relation to the West African case argues that a great deal is left to be desired because the political parties had been fashioned by their experience as movements for the cancelling of grievances and then as political machines admirably designed for the distribution of tangible rewards to leaders and followers. As far as Tanzania and the Sudan are concerned attempt will be made to find out whether the parties resemble the findings of Solberg whether in West Africa or they really perform the tasks they are supposed to be doing? Also I am trying to find out if the local government structures are capable of generating development at the grassroots level and pave the way for wider participation. As far as ideology is concerned, its effectiveness in providing guidelines for the populace on appropriate political behaviour, is what I am after. The success failure of the political organisation, local government structures and ideology is determinant to the success failure of nation-building efforts in each country. It is logical enough at this point for the discussion to
focus on what form of ideology we do find, and what shape organisations (both political parties and local government structures) do take in both countries.
CHAPTER 11.
IDEOLOGY.

Socialism as an Ideology.

The term “Socialism” is a rather complex system of ideas, not amenable to a single definition. Definitions that are given to the term are as many as the number of its adherents. As Berk's argues, Socialism might mean a great variety of things to different people at different times, and there is no point in looking for a unitary meaning. The term lacks what might be called a concrete identity.

Whenever the word “Socialism” is mentioned, a number of phrases and ideas immediately come to one’s mind: words, phrases and concepts such as “equality among the people”, “brotherhood”, “social justice”, “cooperation among the people”, and many others. It is also thought by many that “Socialism” is against oppression, exploitation, against war and injustice.

However, it is not adequate to state what socialism stands for or against, if a clear understanding of the term is needed. There are many people who do not claim to be socialists or in favour of socialism but who do believe in and approve of nations such as justice,
brotherhood, equality... etc. Such values are not a monopoly of socialists or peculiarity of socialism. This should not discourage us from trying to find out what the term "Socialism" is about and what socialists are after.

Socialists differ in their interpretation of the term. In different countries, at different times, different interpretations are given to the term. Any group of socialists might think that it is correct in its understanding of the doctrine since there is no one single definition of the term, but no group can pretend to have an exclusive monopoly of the term.

"All of those professing themselves to be socialists are in fact participating in the same discussion. And this in turn means advancing the thesis that the identity of socialism lies in the irreducible plurality of values and institutions which constitute its area of reference. Socialism is not a single thing but a range, an area, an open texture, a self contradiction", p2.

In spite of the variations and differences that could be found when dealing with the term "Socialism", one cannot deny the fact that there are basic concepts which are found in almost all socialist schools of thought when tracing the history of socialism. By pin-pointing the common features, one can design a rather narrow, but not conclusive definition
of the term. The most common feature is that socialists are interested in the advancement of the community (or society) as a whole. Different schools of socialist thought have different means for achieving that goal. If this is accepted, one can argue that socialism is logically understood as a contrast to individualism understood as a doctrine in which society existed to serve the individual and the pursuit of his own satisfaction, natural rights inherited in each individual, and government does not regulate the economic life of society. Socialism then refers to a state of society in which the economic activities are deliberately planned and controlled on behalf of the community as a whole. Thus, socialism is opposed to laissez-faire (free) system of economic organization in which individual firms compete with one another on their own initiative to supply goods at profit without any centralized directing plan. It is a doctrine that arose in opposition to free market (capitalist) economy that cannot operate without periodic crisis and widespread unemployment, and in which wage earners are subjected to the will of capitalist employers. Under socialism, the argument is that the crisis that characterizes the capitalist economy can be avoided by planning the economy as a whole. Such planning, the socialists maintain, should be carried out so as to give
priority to the basic needs of all rather than luxuries of a few, and so as to free the workers from economic dependence upon their employers. Socialism aims at transforming societies by means of reform or revolution. Thus, one can say that socialists not only differ in their interpretation of socialism, but also in the means by which the goal is attained. At this juncture, a description of the basic and different schools of socialist thought is necessary for a better understanding of the term.

Utopian Socialism.

The first school of socialist thought was that of "Utopian Socialism" led by François Fucier, Claude S. Simon, Robert Owen and many others. Before discussing the philosophy of Utopian Socialists, a brief definition of the term "Utopia" will help in explaining why "the Utopian Socialists" were so named. The word "Utopia" as it is defined in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences is applied colloquially to any idea or proposal that may be desirable but is impractical or unrealizable, that is thought to be delusive or furtively put out of accord with reasonable expectation, or that implies a radical departure from existing conditions. More
Formally, the word is applied to any speculation in ethical philosophy about the good life; or to any speculation in political theory about fundamental political principles or forms of government; or to any imaginary society found in a treatise, novel, story or poem, or in any vision or conception of a perfect society. 23

The utopian socialists were essentially moralist. They set out, some with more and some with less regard for time and place, to prescribe the conditions needed for the establishment of the good society; or for 'good societies' which would enable men to escape the evils of the actual societies in which they were living. In their analysis of society, the utopians acknowledged the fact that men and women are bound to make mistakes and misbehave when interacting with each other. The utopians were not at all pessimistic about this fact. To them, it was possible to persuade people to live a good life. This depended on "devising and establishing a right structure of human relations". 24

The utopians were "moral reformers who held that the clue to moral reformation was to be sought in the reformation of the social order", 25 What they hoped to do was to organize society in a way that guarantees happiness for
every one when people are happy. The way they behave is bound to change. Happiness and good behaviour are inseparable in the thinking of the utopians.

Utopian socialists have a lot in common with socialists of other schools. They condemned, as other did, the system of private property with its economic and social injustices. Most of them were in favour of abolishing the system of private property completely which they regard as the major cause of exploitation and other evils. They also voiced the sentiment of all schools of socialism when they call for a society which guarantees each individual a full opportunity for physical, intellectual and moral development. They are also in line with other socialist schools when they recognize that work is a necessity and that all should participate in it. The Utopian’s plans for an ideal society sprang from profound humanist motives, and their main concern was to give the people of the new society the conditions for a real human existence. To demonstrate this, few examples are necessary:

Thomas More (1478–1535), in his book *Utopia*, drew a picture of his Commonwealth where neither idleness nor burdensome toil, nor poverty nor hunger existed, but where the end was the good and happy life. More came to the
conclusion that "equality and happiness, man's physical and intellectual development, social justice and an intelligent conduct of social affairs were inconceivable as long as private ownership existed as long as the wealth created by the labour of the majority fell into the hands of a few, who led an idle life." 26 A considerable step forward in developing a just principle of distribution was made by the French Philosopher C. R. de Mably (1707-1785) who argued that the ideal society is the one that gives its citizens the maximum possible happiness. Such a society could only be built after the abolishing the system of private property. 27 Francis Bacon in his New Atlantis, written in 1621, advocated the recognition of equal social rights for all reasoning through the return of primitive communism. 28

The Utopians thought too high of their own power to bring about a future society, their power of discerning the exact truth regarding social principles; their power of spreading knowledge; their power of conversion, of actually transforming society. However, their dreams were incapable of realization and it was logical enough that they gave way to others whose schemes for social change have some relation to reality. 29 In spite of this, one cannot dismiss their importance. They raised many basic problems that were later resolved by Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Marxian (Scientific) Socialism.

Utopian Socialism was succeeded by Marxian socialism which, for a long time, left a profound influence over world thought and world events. The basic difference is that the former rests not on speculative ideas and good intentions, but on a scientific understanding of laws of social development. Marx and Engels attempted to turn socialism from Utopia to science. In the Communist Manifesto (1848) and later works, Marx and Engels set forth the belief that the methods by which men and women owned, produced and distributed goods and services in any epoch, basically determined the political, social and cultural life of that age. This is the philosophy known as the materialist conception of history or the Marxian interpretation of history. They also contended that economic change was largely a result of class conflict taking place in society between the two dominant classes — the workers and capitalists — The driving force for change is struggle, and the determining factor is the last resort is power. Power is economic rather than political. In Marx's theory, political power is a consequence of economic position. He had no belief in the power of legislation to remedy economic abuses. Marx had hoped and expected that his revolutionary radicalism would issue a
form of socialism, social equality and genuine liberty, which would complete the equality and liberty of political democracy. In his scientific socialism, Marx gave great importance to the role of the working class in conquering power. He advocated revolution as a means to that end regardless of any moral issues that might arise. He held the same view as other socialists did about the question of exploitation and domination of one class by another. Exploitation to Marx was unacceptable and must be severely dealt with in the interest of humanity. To Marx, class conflict was bound to occur "because of the inexorable movement of economic forces which were fundamentally independent of men's wills".

The main objective that Marx hoped to achieve from his scientific socialism was the emancipation of the working classes from the capitalist domination and the creation of a classless society; a society that gives the working people the right to work and engage in creative endeavour in any sphere of human activity. In such a society, people work not for the landowner or capitalist, but for their society. It is also argued that in a classless society, real freedom will be given to the toilers. It is a society in which public ownership is established, chaotic nature of the market is eradicated and where people get the opportunity of consciously directing the country's...
economic, political and cultural development. It is a society where complete economic and social equality of all the people is established, where every citizen works according to his ability and receives material and spiritual benefits according to his needs. A society in which human relations are founded on the principle of "one for all and all for one". What Marx hoped to create was what he called a Communist society in which the social structure is classless.

Marx made great emphasis on the role that could be played by the working class in making a revolution. But, time proved that Marx was not right in his prediction. Class struggle and class consciousness were far from being spontaneus. The Marxist philosophers after Marx were aware of that and that is why new dimensions have been introduced in the Marxist brand of socialism. Lenin in Russia and Mao Tse-Tung in China could be cited as examples to demonstrate this. Both could be described as revisionists as far as classical Marxism is concerned.

To Lenin, the question of spontaneity is no longer there. The working class cannot by itself rise and make a revolution. This is specially true in advanced capitalist societies where working class revolutionary character has greatly been influenced by modern affluence. In such
situations, Lenin thought that a group of dedicated people "Communists", must form a vanguard party. The role of the party is to keep reminding the working class about its role in making a revolution. Its role is to keep the revolutionary fire burning. Lenin in his *What Is To Be Done?* reviewed the role that a vanguard party can play in making a revolution. Lenin argued that a political organisation is necessary for the expansion of political agitation and training the masses in political consciousness and revolutionary activity. Lenin emphasized strongly the absolute necessity for the revolutionary party to make all progressive demands and movements of all oppressed social layers and classes its own. "The central strategic plan advanced by Lenin in *What Is To Be Done?* is therefore one of party agitation that unites all elementary, spontaneous, dispersed and merely local or sectional protests, revolts and movements of resistance. The function of the revolutionary party consists in developing revolutionary consciousness in the vanguard or the working class. The building of a revolutionary party is the process whereby the programme of the socialist revolution is fused with the experience of the majority of the advanced workers have acquired in struggle."
In China there was a small industrial working class. The peasants were greater in number. It was not possible for China to wait for the emergence of a big industrial working class to make the revolution. This would take a very long time. Although Orthodox Marxists did not give the peasantry an important and respectable role in making a revolution, Mao believed that the revolutionary potential lies with the peasantry. To him, a revolution always starts in the rural areas. This is how his revolution started. The peasantry was its army.

The core of Mao’s thinking consists of armed struggle and reliance on the support of the countryside. "The Maoist philosophy emphasized the concept of "people's war" and organization of paramilitary forces. The concept of "people's war" was Mao's main contribution to the Marxist philosophy. He called for the mobilization and organization of the rural population and also called for the creation of a large party led by revolutionary army characterized by extreme emphasis on discipline and maintaining friendly relations with the local population. When this happens, it becomes possible to wage guerrilla warfare against the army of the enemy in order to wear it down to the level at which it could be defeated."
Another feature found in the Maotist philosophy, which also differs from Orthodox Marxism, is Mao's analysis of classes. Mao claimed that "in any country, anywhere, there are the three categories of people: upper, middle and lower. If analyzed in more detail, there are five categories: the big property class, the middle property class, the small property class, the semi property class and the propertyless class". This is not like the Marxist analysis because in classical Marxism class is not based specifically on wealth or property, but rather upon social relations to the modes of production. In different economic modes, there are different types of wealth or property. But for Mao, social structure was a pyramid based simply upon wealth.

Mao did not reject Marxism as some may think. He did believe in the basic ingredients of Marxism, but his tactics differed from the original Marxism. The strategy and tactics of Mao were the result of the integration of Marxism Leninism with the special circumstances obtaining in the vast peasant based country. As a Chinese Marxist revolutionary, Mao has worked for the revolutionary transformation of China. But that transformation has always been justified in the name of Marxism. Addressing the central committee of the Chinese Communist party in
October 1938 Mao emphasized practice-oriented knowledge. He argued that "we should not study the words of Marxist Leninist theory, but study their standpoint and approach in viewing problems and solving them." Mao also talked about what he called specific Marxism. "Specific Marxism is Marxism given a national form. It is Marxism applied to the specific circumstances of China." In his later years Mao went further by emphasizing the general validity of China's new democratic model for other colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Fabian Socialism:

When Marx and Engels issued their Communist Manifesto, they were of the opinion that the collapse of capitalism and the coming of socialism and communism were comparatively imminent. However, their prediction was not a total success. The capitalist system expanded rather than collapsed. The revolution by the working class never took place and class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists was true only on paper. On the contrary, conditions of the working classes in industrial countries improved rather than worsened. Millions of workers obtained better opportunities for education and they began to rely increasingly on legal, democratic measures to improve their conditions and obtain a new social order. With these new
social, economic and political changes, new schools of thought and socialist action began to develop. Most important of these was the school of Fabian Socialism led by Beatrice Webb, C. B. Shaw, Graham Wallas and others. The Fabian Society was formed in 1884 by a group of British intellectuals. They agreed with Marx on many things but rejected completely his revolutionism. The society was reformist rather than revolutionary in character. Fabian socialism, or "evolutionary" socialism is normally differentiated from Marx's by its belief on what is called gradualism. To be characterized as "reformist" or "gradualist" is not surprising at all since the founders were British. In the British tradition there is always no room for violence or revolution, The British do believe in gradual or evolutionary change. To be revolutionary is very anti-British.

The Fabian thought, though very anti-Marxian in some respects, was much influenced by various Marxian concepts and often followed Marx more than is often supposed. The Fabians adopted Marx's historical method and generally accepted his theory of economic determinism, but arrived at different conclusions as to the direction and meaning of economic evolution. They observed, as Marx did, the growing integration of economic organization and agreed with him that large scale industry had outmoded laissez-faire.
But they rejected the Marxist conclusion that the liberation of the working class could come only by a revolution. The Fabians do have faith in democracy and democratic practice. To them it is not necessary to be revolutionary to build socialism. Socialism can also be promoted through democracy. The Fabians rejected totalitarian methods as means for achieving ends. Instead of revolution, they preached evolution. They were in favour of step by step socialism. They concentrated on specific, and usually halfway, measures of taxation, public ownership, industrial regulation and social amelioration. They opposed "revolution almost as vigorously as capitalism, discouraged class feelings, and accommodated within its ranks bourgeois as well as proletarians."

The aims of the Fabian society are the emancipation of land and industrial capital from individual and class ownership and the vesting of them in the community for the general benefit. In this way, only the natural and needed advantages of the country be equitably shared by the whole people. The society works for the extinction of private property in land, and of the consequent appropriation in the form of rent, of the price paid for permission to use the earth, as well as for the advantages
of superior soils and sites, the society further works to enable the community to administer socially things like industrial capital. The organizers of the society argue that owing to the monopoly of the means of production in the past, industrial inventions and the transformation of surplus into capital have mainly enriched the proprietary class; the workers became dependent on that class to earn a living. "The Fabian society seeks salvation in the spread of socialist opinions, and the social and political changes consequent thereon, including the establishment of equal citizenship for men and women."

To conclude this part, one can argue that although there are different schools of socialist thought, and in spite of the many differences that are found as far as the interpretation of socialism is concerned, there are enduring features of socialism that all schools of socialist thought agreed upon. Almost all socialist schools accepted the basic ingredients of socialism. Social and political values such as fraternity, freedom, and equality are echoed by all socialists. All socialists, starting with the utopians denounced the evils of private property. Socialists argue that private property divides society. In consequence, they are all in favor of abolishing the private means of production. They advocated communal ownership of means of
production, this by necessity means that they are against free competition and its attendant evils. To the socialists, free competition favours individuals and not society as a whole. Socialists advocated cooperative effort instead of cutthroat competition. This is why the state is supposed to play a leading role in this regard.

Socialists are opposed to the domination of a class or classes, of group or groups, over the rest of society. They are against exploitation in all its forms. By accepting such features, the end result that socialists hope to achieve is the creation of a society characterized by equality and where all people benefit equally.
SOCIALISM IN AFRICA

In most African countries, especially after gaining their independence, there has been much talk about socialism as a way of life. Immediately after independence, the problem that faced many new African nations was finding some unifying symbols beyond parochial and local identities in order to instil a sense of pride and action in their people. After independence the political leadership knew that it cannot use the threat posed by the colonial powers as a unifying factor. In such a situation, the political leadership tried to make use of ideology.

In most cases African leaders rejected capitalism for various reasons. Most important among these is the fact that colonialism and capitalism were seen as two faces of the same coin. The underdevelopment that characterized almost all African countries was attributed mainly to the capitalist path of development under capitalism. With independence, some African countries opted for socialism. Socialism was seen as a new thing; something to take the place of anti-colonial passion that fueled many of the independence movements. Seeking a specific content for socialism in Africa, its ideologists have stressed the indigenous character of society and the
extensive network of social obligation which ties society together.\textsuperscript{13}

Socialism also appealed to those leaders who hoped to create what might be called "utopian societies". Out of the fragmented societies, there are leaders who hoped to create or build a society where equality among the people is the norm rather than the exceptions, a society where all the people work for the same goal and for the betterment of all individuals rather than a small number. Such leaders always argue that life in a traditional African society was communal in nature. The argument is that the colonial powers destroyed the communal system and transplanted the capitalist system characterized by inequalities among the people of Africa. There are political leaders who argue that socialism in Africa is nothing more than the revival of the traditional communal system. Most prominent among these leaders is J.J. Mbaruku of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{13}

Socialism also appealed to a number of African leaders since tighter control of the economy, and hence society, is guaranteed, at least for a while. Under socialism the means of production are controlled and monopolized by the state. The state apparatus in turn is controlled by the ruling elite. By controlling the state apparatus, the elite hope to control the economy. Socialism also appealed
to those who opted for it because of the values that are attached to it. Things like freedom, equality, justice, democracy and many others are often thought to be part and parcel of the ideology of socialism. Political leaders in Africa as elsewhere, would always like to be called democratic and just leaders in search of creating a society of equals. But whether the adoption of socialism makes them democratic and just in reality, is another story. Professed African socialists are uniformly interested in economic development. They have also sensed that some form of expansion in the agricultural fronts are required in order to achieve that goal. This, to them, will be facilitated under socialism.

The doctrine of socialism very widely in pronouncement and implementation throughout Africa. At one point of the spectrum, one would find the radical socialism of Ghana’s Nkrumah or Mali’s Keita. Their intent clearly was to use state power to mobilise all the resources of the total society to fight the problems of underdevelopment, national weakness and social maladjustment. Similar in character but varying in direction, would be the socialist regimes of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. These regimes, while they imply an enormous growth of central government regulative capability, directed much of their initial reform thrust
towards the peasant sector of society, inasmuch as it was that sector which provided the regime with much of its early support. Somewhat more conservative in nature would be the moderate socialist regimes of Zambia and Kenya. In these countries, the public sector did not dominate the scene. The private sector, both foreign and indigenous, was allowed to play a role in running the economy. It was a form of a mixed economy. By the end of the 70's the usage of the term socialism became very common in many African countries. To distinguish their brand of socialism African leaders added the word "African" on the names of their respective countries to the word "Socialism." Hence "African Socialism", "Tanzanian Socialism", "Kenyan Socialism" and many other brand became very common in the literature about Africa. Most leaders claim that their brands of socialism are original and suit their own environment. The originality of such ideologies is rather difficult to prove. Almost all of those who talk about originality of the ideology, did rely heavily on and make much use of the earlier schools of socialist thought. At this juncture, a discussion of one of the most famous socialist experiments in Africa is useful for a better understanding of the term "African Socialism." The Tanzanian experiment will be the focus of discussion.
TANZANIA AS AN IDEOLOGY IN TANZANIA

Tanzania has in many senses been the centre of progressive African ideological development and its influence has extended beyond the borders of the nation to other African countries. Frequently its pre-eminence has been ascribed both inside and outside Africa to the intellectual power of President Nyerere. Yet while the clarity of the President’s vision has understandably been a major factor in Tanzania’s emergence in this role, such an interpretation is too far simplistic to afford much guidance in assessing both present developments and probable development trends in Tanzania.

Before 1967 a variety of economic and social problems were found in Tanzania. There were persistent balance of payment problems. Such problems require economic controls and social discipline. The rate of agricultural output in rural areas was likely to fall because there was no improvement in agricultural practices. Popular demands upon the economy were likely to increase. Pressure from the urban working forces was noticeable. Many school leavers did not find jobs, and much of the benefit of development had occurred to a small minority of the population who lived in the urban areas. Nyerere in 1966 attributed much of the cause of these problems to the policies and attitudes of the
government. There was a shift away from communal values, and something had to be done to stop that. Nyarere thought that the immediate policies of government had to be brought more into harmony with the long term objective of building a socialist Tanzania. Nyarere had also come to the view that the government's agricultural development policies were intensifying capitalist motivations within Tanzania. He had similar misgivings about the investment policies of the National Development Corporations. His concern in 1966 about the longer term implications of governmental activities however extended beyond the consequences of specific policies. He had come to the idea that the behaviour and attitudes within the Tanzanian leadership contributed to the problem and led to a drift away from the goals of human equality and dignity. Part of the leadership at that time thought that salvation will only come through receiving mass foreign aid. There was another group within the leadership which developed an attitude of self-seeking acquisitiveness and elitism. Facing such problems, Nyarere thought that something had to be done within government and the party. He made the transition to socialism in Tanzania his central concern. The Arusha Declaration is a direct consequence of Nyarere's concern over these problems.
The Arusha Declaration of January 1967, is TANU's policy paper for transforming the Tanzanian society into a socialist one. According to the Arusha Declaration, a true socialist society in the eyes of the Tanzanian leadership is one in which exploitation of man by man is absent. It is a society that is characterized by absence of classes. Under socialism, the Tanzanian leadership hopes that class divisions which are characteristic of capitalist societies will give way to a society where people live in harmony. It is a society characterized by equality among the people.

The essence of socialism is the practical acceptance of human equality. "The equality of man by man may not be susceptible to scientific proof, but its acceptance as a basic assumption of life in a society is the core and essence of socialism." The concept of equality is not as we have been, a new thing. It is an old concept which is found in all schools of socialist thought.

Under socialism, the Tanzanian leadership hopes that the major means of production and exchange are under the control of the peasants and workers. It has been argued that peasants and workers can control the means of "production" and exchange through the machinery of their government and cooperative societies. It is argued further
in the declaration that Tanzania is a country of peasants and workers. Accordingly, it is these people who must control the means of production and exchange if a socialist society is to be built. Controlling the means of production by the workers for building a socialist society is not a Tanzanian invention. Reference to it has been made by many schools of socialist thought. Most important is the school of scientific socialism. However, controlling the means of production by itself does not, or will not lead to the creation of a socialist society if it was not supported by a democratic form of government. Democratic government in the Tanzanian situation means the creation of a government predominantly composed of, and led by workers and peasants. To the Tanzanian leadership, true socialism and democracy are inseparable. "A society is not free if it is not governed by the people themselves through their freely elected representatives." Emphasizing the importance of democracy is not unique to the Tanzanian case. All socialists claim to be democratic. The definition of democracy vary from one school to the other.

Greater popular participation is also one of the cornerstones of Tanzanian Socialism. Participation was judged to be necessary in order to check abuses of power. Nyerere could not conceive of people being coerced into socialism.
Socialism is a belief in the first place, and a successful implementation of socialist objectives depends very much upon the leaders. It is a belief in a particular system of living, and it is difficult for leaders to promote its growth if they do not themselves believe in it.

Socialism in Tanzania calls for the creation of a self-reliant society. Stressing "Socialism and self-reliance" as the basis of the country's future development, the Arusha Declaration demands greater control over the commanding heights of the economy and a change of emphasis from urban to rural development. However, self-reliance is not a call to xenophobia or complete rejection of foreign aid. Tanzanian leaders know that the country is too poor to reject aid completely. Self-reliance was an assertion that Tanzanians had to look primarily to their own efforts if their poverty was to be lessened. By creating a self-reliant society, the Tanzanian leadership hoped to achieve continuous economic development. Economic development will enable the masses to experience perceptible improvement in their living standards. Achieving a sound level of economic development is by no means unique to the Tanzanian case. Almost all ideologies, socialist or otherwise, give prominence to that objective.
One can say that the components of socialism in Tanzania are not different from what is found in socialist ideologies elsewhere. Nyerere made use of and relied on different schools of socialist thought. His ideas are difficult to describe as original. Yet, there are people who talk about Tanzanian socialism, or African socialism in Tanzania. What makes Nyerere's brand of socialism different is his emphasis on the revival of African Social system and his introduction of "Ujamaa". The charisma of Nyerere himself is an important factor. Whenever the word "Ujamaa" is mentioned, the name of Nyerere immediately comes to mind. "Ujamaa" and "Nyerere" are inseparable.

The proclamation of Socialism created a new sense of purpose in Tanzania. The rhetoric against inequality and exploitation was bound to appeal to the peasants and workers who had scarcely any property to lose, but everything to gain, by the mere distribution of wealth.

The Arusha Declaration of January 1967 defined socialism as it is understood today in Tanzania. Its most important features were:

1. Conceptualisation of traditional Tanzanian society as an Ujamaa whose essential elements are essential as a base for economic development.
ii - Rejection of the policy of modernisation based on encouragement of individual achievement, as leading to the growth of rural class system with exploitation inevitably arising from labour and land markets.

iii - Emphasis on gradualism, popular acceptance and minimising central direction.\(^{54}\)

Ujamaa is the Kiswahili for the traditional kinship communalism existing in many rural communities in Africa. Though differing widely in extent from community to community this traditional communalism does or did not usually include communal production as a central aspect.\(^{55}\) When Nyerere first identified his ideology of Tanzanian socialism with the Ujamaa concept, it still had strong traditional connotations. But as it developed over the years and was translated into actual policies, these connotations have tended to disappear and Ujamaa is now almost exclusively understood to mean the contemporary Tanzanian socialist ideology and policies with a strong emphasis on state controlled or collective production. The philosophy is perhaps most clearly spelled out where Nyerere deals with Ujamaa Viidiini, rural socialism, which occupies a central place in the whole ideology. What it means is rural development through gradual - but eventually complete - transformation of rural
Tanzania into socialist communism, where all political and economic activities, especially production, are collectively organised. The period from 1966-73 marked the first stage of the policy of Ujamaa Viijiini, when mobilisation of the peasantry to establish communal economic ventures in rural areas received top priority by the Tanzanian government and the party. Ujamaa could probably best be described as a type of idealistic utopian socialism. Certain basic principles are presumed as objectives and justification of human society. These fundamental values which Nyerere finds recurring also in the great world religions, as well as traditional African society, are the rights of all human beings to equal human dignity, the recognition of society as a necessary means to the common good, and by the same token, that society in the last instance exists for the sake of preserving and developing the human dignity of all individuals. Only in a society where equality and a combination of freedom and a sense of community prevail are these ethical/political principles fulfilled. In Nyerere's ideal society socialist and democratic institutions provide framework for equality, freedom and unity, while the 'socialist attitude of mind' among its members ensures the adherence to these principles.
and contribute with their work to the creation of these benefits. Through mutual cooperation the Ujamaa communities are linked together in still larger unities, up to the level of nation, ideally on the basis of equality, freedom and unity among all mankind. The establishment of Ujamaa depends on the development of a 'socialist attitude of mind', without that the institutions are of little significance, so the socialist society must be built through dissemination to all its members of this socialist attitude of mind and the institutions must at first be adapted to this purpose.

While there has been, especially in latter years, increasing talk about elimination of exploitation and exploiters, the ideology does not see socialist development in the African context (at least) basically as a matter of class struggle and class interest.

In his policy paper on Ujamaa Vidiini (socialism and rural development) Nyerere called for the establishment of Ujamaa villages - cooperative communities in which people would live together and work together for the good of all,
In the paper case the following:

"What is here being proposed is that we in Tanzania move from being a nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and ethics of the capitalist system. Instead, we should gradually become a nation of Ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these groups cooperate together for joint enterprises. This can be done. We already have groups of people who try to operate this system in many parts of our country. We must encourage them and encourage others to adopt this way of life too. It is not a question of forcing our people to change their habits. It is a question of providing leadership. It is a question of education, and it is a question of all of us making a reality of the principles of equality and freedom which are enshrined in our policy of Tanzanian socialism". 56.

The policy contained very little however in the way of a general strategy for the socialist transformation of rural Tanzania, linking the ideology and the tactics of implementation together through analysis of such questions as: the role of the state in post-colonial Tanzania, developments of the relations between agriculture and industry, the development of the country’s external economic relations, the role of different regions, large scale versus small scale production, or – perhaps including all the above – the relations between two different sectors of the economy and the corresponding relations between social classes, notably between the peasants. Whatever thinking
in TANU there may have been on such questions, it was in any case not propagated as an essential framework for the implementation of the Ujamaa policy, and as a tool for the peasantry in this implementation process.
Socialism as an Ideology in the Sudan.

The call for socialism in the Sudan started mainly after the Second World War, and was not confined to a particular political group or organization.

When talking about socialism in the Sudan, the role of the Sudanese Communist Party immediately comes to mind. The Sudanese Communist Party is the best organized among the groups that tried to introduce socialism in the Sudan. Its history goes back to 1946 that witnessed the beginning of an organized movement by a group of Sudanese intellectuals who were in turn heavily influenced by Egyptian intellectuals. The group of intellectuals who started the communist movement in the Sudan gained a number of followers and sympathizers among Sudanese workers specially in the railways.

The Sudanese Communist Party stood for socialism. Its brand of socialism is scientific socialism (Marxism Leninism). At its third annual congress in February 1956 the Sudanese Communist Party argued that it is in the interest of the peasants, workers, intellectuals and other middle classes to opt for socialism. To the communists, the only sector that is opposed to socialism is the capitalist. In the programme of the Communist Party it has been argued
that political independence in the Sudan is the first step towards a national democratic revolution. There is a need to carry this revolution further so as to lay down the basis of socialist development in the country. In the eyes of the communists, the capitalist path of development which Sudan opted for after independence led to the many problems that the country faced. It led to a decline in the agricultural produce, led to increased debts and to total dependence on the United States and Western Europe. Capitalism is the sole cause to the present underdevelopment in the Sudan. To the communists, salvation lies in following a socialist path of development. Socialism can take place when:

1. All sectors of the economy are freed from dependence on foreign companies and monopolies.
2. The agricultural sector is reorganized in a way that benefits the small tenants and workers.
3. The public sector is expanded to control almost all sectors of the economy.

The communists hoped to create a socialist system where inequality does not exist. To them this can only take place under socialism.
Another political group which espoused socialism was the Socialist Party of the Sudan founded on 22 January 1967. Its preparatory committee comprised sixty members, representing workers, peasants and national intellectuals. They announced their adherence to "Scientific Socialism" and stressed their respect for religion, as a dominant factor in Sudanese society. It was a people's party and its ranks were open to all. It was against sectarianism in all its forms. The party hoped to liberate the Sudanese economy from all forms of dependence. It called for the expansion of the public sector, nationalization of foreign trade, nationalization of foreign banks and insurance companies. It also advocated a system of central planning for the economy.

In April 1968 representatives of the Sudanese Communist Party, the Socialist Party, Blue Nile Tenants Association, Association of Socialist Teachers, Socialist Lawyers, Sudan Tenant's Union and other prominent figures signed what came to be known as the "Charter for Socialist Forces". In the charter, the signatories condemned the liberal democratic parties and their policies. They attributed the social, economic and political problems of the Sudan to the non-socialist policies adopted by the liberal parties. The socio-economic and political problems can only be solved
if the non-socialist policies are rejected and if socialism is accepted as an alternative. Under socialism performance in all fields will improve. It has been mentioned in the Charter that it is the duty of all socialists to come together and do something to save the country. It is further argued that the leadership of the liberal parties can not help the country because they are mere representatives of imperialist powers. The liberal democratic political parties have been condemned for being the sole reason behind economic dependence, underdevelopment and corrupt government apparatus in the Sudan.

The socialist forces hoped to build a broad democratic front uniting all sectors of the society who are willing to initiate change for the purpose of national liberation and development. In the economic field the aim was to increase the Gross National Product and the rate of investment by diversifying the economic base. It also called for the liquidation of foreign companies that monopolize more than 70% of Sudan foreign trade, nationalization of foreign banks, nationalization of foreign insurance companies and expansion of the public sector and protecting it from attacks launched by neo-colonialism represented in the World Bank. The state was to monopolize the export of major product. In the agricultural field, the Charter calls
for ending of feudalism and redistribution of land in order to rid the peasants from the shackles of the feudalists. It also calls for the extension of medical and educational services for the benefit of all Sudanese. The socialist forces did not find much time to rally support for their cause. The parliamentary period was terminated when a military coup took place on 25 May 1969.

When the May 25 1969 coup took place, all political parties and groups were banned. A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and a Council of Ministers were formed. The RCC was the highest authority at the time. Its programme was socialist in nature. This was probably because within its membership a group of officers who were loyal to the Communist Party were found. The Council of Ministers as well included a number of communists within its ranks. The programme of the RCC included an expansion of the public sector and protection of national capital. Such would be democratic, socialist and non-aligned. Relations with socialist countries were extended. One of the first public acts of the new rulers was to recognize East Germany and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the Vietcong). In the economic sphere, all banks and foreign properties were nationalized in May and June 1970 and the assets of large landowners and most businessmen,
specially those previously associated with the conservative parties, were expropriated. Existing economic plans were scrapped and replaced by new ones based on "Scientific and Socialist Principles". Foreign military and economic aid from socialist countries increased. In the political sphere a new political movement would be found to represent workers, farmers, intellectuals, soldiers and "those who work with national capital that is not tied up with capitalism". The movement is what is currently known as the Sudanese Socialist Union.

By opting for socialism, the regime hoped to create, or build, a new society. A society in which the "people’s working forces" can receive directly or indirectly the full fruits of their industry. A society where there is no group of private owners which constantly appropriates a large proportion of the wealth produced. By building such a society, the leaders of the regime hoped to instil a new sense of nationhood in the minds of the people. It hoped to create a society in which people regard themselves as belonging to one nation. This, it is hoped, could be possible under socialism.

The present regime promulgated the Charter for National Action as an embodiment of its ideology and a beacon for
patriotic action. In the Charter for National Action comes the following:

"Scientific socialism, applied to our own circumstances and based on our history and cultural heritage religion and positive traditions is the persistent line of the revolution."

and:

"The final aim of socialism is to free the human man from the servitude of need, restore his human dignity, and take him away from misery and wretchedness." 63/

It is argued that use will be made of other people's experiments who preceded us in the march towards socialism. Endeavours will also be made to build a socialist society in which national wealth is directed to the benefit of all citizens. The socialist society will be based upon:

i. Ownership of the means of production by the people so that the public sector takes the lead both in economic development and in the new relations of production, helped by the cooperative, mixed and private sectors. 63/

ii. Application of new democracy thus enabling the working masses to add their creative abilities to socialist construction, to abundance of production and justice in the distribution of wealth.
The above principles are embodied in the permanent constitution of the Sudan. Article 3 of the Constitution reads:

"The socialist system shall be the foundation of the economy of the Sudanese society so as to realise sufficiency in production and fairness in distribution."

Article 31 and the ones that follow up to 37 deal with the economic question. It is mentioned that the economy is to be steered in a way that makes it easy to realise the objectives of development plans in order to achieve the society of sufficiency and justice, and the state shall own and manage the fundamental means of production in the economy, as far as the achievement of the objectives set out by political elite - increasing the rate of production - there seems to be a real challenge. Social justice can only be achieved by broadening the base of national wealth and by controlling its resources.

As it was the case with Tanzania, those who called for socialism in the Sudan did not come with new ideas. The communists and other socialists borrowed from and relied heavily upon the old schools of socialism.

Although 'socialism' is advocated, by different people at different times, as a solution to our problems, in the Sudan, it is very difficult to say what is exactly meant
by the word socialism. In politics, economics as well as other fields, there seems a constant swing and imbalance in policies. In spite of the vague definition given to the term 'socialism', it is common to hear that the intention is to 'create a socialist society characterised by abundance in production and fairness in distribution'. Too many practices, especially in the field of economics go astray as far as socialism is concerned. Yet the claim that Sudan is a socialist country remains as it is. In the last eight years 1972-1979 - Nimeiri's government has swung from vaguely progressive economic and political policies to a programme of actively soliciting western aid and investment. The early policies included an extension of the public sector to replace foreign investment and encouragement and protection of national capital. Economic ties with the socialist bloc were increased. At the present time the picture is totally different, but still, as mentioned before, the claim that Sudan is a socialist country continues. However, this vague definition given to the word socialism in the Sudan and the deviations that happen as far as the 'socialist path' is concerned should not discourage us.
The assumption made in the first chapter that both Tanzania and Sudan claim to be socialists still hold. Having briefly discussed the basic features of ideology in both countries, we can conclude by saying that in both countries emphasis is laid on development of the people and creation of a society based on justice. Unused talents were to be used to achieve the desired goals. To develop the people they must have an opportunity to participate in running their own affairs. To participate, necessary channels for participation must be found. It is through these channels ideologies become 'practical'. It is only through practice that the success or failure of nation building efforts could be determined.

The discussion will now attempt to answer the question, what institutions are found in both Tanzania and Sudan to enable both the rulers and the ruled to carry the task of building the nation. These could be divided into two: political parties and local government structures.
FOOTNOTES

1. Adaptive not in the sense of adjusting 'passively' to environmental conditions. Adaptive as used here relates to the ability and capacity of the system to cope with its environment.

2. Responsiveness of institutions is determined by the type of demands made and needs that arise and the ability to meet them.


5. Ibid., p.302.


15. Ibid., p.93.
17. Ibid., p.110.
18. Ibid., p.418.
21. Ibid., pp.9-10.
22. Ibid., pp.15-16.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p.16.
29. Ibid., p.35.


62. Ibid., p.12.

65. See the Charter for National Action specially the section on Economics.


66. MEPRE REPORTS, Washington, Middle East Research and Information Project, No.46, p.3.

67. Ibid., p.12.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION

POLITICAL PARTIES

1 - The Single Party in Tanzania

In the United Republic of Tanzania - URT - since it became known by that name after the merger between Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar, up to the 5th, day of February 1977, there were two parties TANU in mainland Tanganyika and the ASP in Zanzibar. On the 5th, day of February 1977 delegates to the joint TANU/ASP National Conference acting on behalf of all the members of TANU and ASP unanimously resolved and pronounced the dissolution of TANU and ASP, and at the same time to establish a new single political party for the whole of Tanzania, which will have supreme constitutional power over all state organs. TANU and ASP were dissolved in grandeur and style. It is argued that:

the dissolution is not because they have failed to accomplish their tasks. On the contrary, TANU and ASP are political parties which have achieved unique success in Africa in fulfilling their historical role, and it is because they have achieved those successes that these two parties have been able to dissolve themselves. TANU and ASP will forever be respected as the kings of the liberation struggles of our nations and the continent of Africa.
A new party was established by building on the foundations laid by TANU and ARP. It is hoped that the party will be strong enough both structurally as well as in its ideas and actions and act as a link between Tanzanians and fellow revolutionaries elsewhere in Africa. The name of the new party is the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and shall be the sole political party exercising supreme authority over all state organs.²

I decided to cite the above for the sake of informing readers who did not hear about the TANU/ARP merger and the formation of the CCM. From the contacts made, I noticed that many people even among the academics, still hold the idea that TANU is the ruling party in the URT. As far as the thesis is concerned, reference will always be made to TANU because the bulk of the information I collected, as far as the URT is concerned, was available before the merger.

TANU'S STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION.

Classifications are not difficult to make among the one party systems in Africa. There are the 'one party authoritarian', that is contrasted with 'one-party pluralistic',³ the 'exclusionary' as against the 'revolutionary',⁴ one party system, the 'pragmatic-pluralistic' pattern as against the 'revolutionary centralizing trend'.⁵ TANU is considered as a revolutionary party with less centralizing
tendencies. It is organised as a mass party with the consequence that it is at least theoretically dependent upon the mass support of its policies and it is ideologically committed to being responsive to the masses' perception of the needs and priorities. At the same time, the party plays a great role in defining the nation's ideological framework, and in formulating major policy objectives. To a great extent, it leads and controls the institutions charged with the task of implementing public policies. Thus it mobilises and leads the masses.

Although TWP is hierarchically organised, the nature of representation in the various organs is supposed to make the leadership at higher levels responsive to the views and suggestions that come from below. The principle of "democratic centralism" is followed and it is theoretically possible for the higher organs of TWP to make decisions that might not be welcomed by the lower organs.

The basic formal organ of the party is the cell. The leader of the cell is its representative to the annual conference of the party's rural branch. A number of cells are grouped together to form a party branch, which is linked with other branches to the district structure, the regional and finally national structure of the party. At the grass-roots level it is possible to form branches and sub-branches
at work places or the village. The rural party branch is
supposed to be engaged in mobilisation and organisation of
the peasants for their community oriented development
activities. In the party branches in urban areas members
of the party are supposed to engage themselves in day to
day activities of the party. At the higher levels, the
district structure is found. The main organs of this level
are the District Annual Conference, the District Executive
Committee and District Working Committee. Membership of
district conference include a variety of local groups and
interests. The size varies depending on the number of
branches and wards. The district conference elects the
district Chairman, some members of the district executive
committee (DEC), and delegates to represent the district
at the national conference. The DEC is responsible for the
supervision and coordination of all the activities of the
party in the district as well as implementing decisions
made by the National Conference, the national Executive
Committee and the regional conference as far as the district
is concerned.

The district structure is linked to the regional and
national structures. It is only the regional chairman and
regional secretary of the party who are directly represented
at the higher organs of the party.
At the national level, four main organs are found.

These are:

1. The National Conference which meets once every two years and is regarded as the supreme organ of the party with the responsibility of formulating general policy;

2. The Electoral Conference. It includes all members of the national conference and delegates from the party. Among its functions is the selection of the candidate for election to the Presidency;

3. The National Executive Committee which is the most powerful organ of the party. It guides all major policies and is directly answerable to the National Conference; and

4. The Central Committe. Besides the President it includes the Vice-President, 20 members elected by the National Conference from each region, and members not exceeding five nominated by the President.

It is assumed that the party’s formal structure will give an ordinary member some opportunity to influence, not only the selection of leaders but also the making of decisions by the party. This, it is argued, is made possible by the relative open nature of F&U membership and the breadth
of issues it may address. However, a high degree of control by the central leadership is exercised on lower party organs. This is mainly done through power to reject candidates for political office, the right to determine some issues, guidelines and directives, as well as to have its decisions binding to the lower organs and its appointment of functionaries responsible for the day-to-day running of the affairs of the party. Yet, it is argued that the possibility that any individual member of the party can exercise some influence on the party does exist. This could be done through direct participation in debates within various organs and levels of the party, or through the election of leaders and representatives. In spite of all this, attempts by the centre to increase the control are bound to grow as long as the party is increasingly preoccupied with ideology. This is expected to continue until the level of political consciousness in the periphery is felt to be satisfactory. 7

TANU is expected to play a great role as far as implementation of the policies made by the political leadership is concerned. The success of the Ujamaa policy is highly dependent on how the party tackles it. TANU is expected to explain to the masses what the policy of Ujamaa aims at, how it is to be implemented and in whose interest it is carried out. The decentralization policy (to be
discussed later) is also dependent on TANU. In short, both Umma and the decentralisation policy which are of key importance in making real the efforts by the Centre to reach down to the grassroots and at the same time enable the grassroots to contact the centre depend on how effective is TANU.

2 - The Single Party in the Sudan

Since its independence in January 1956, the Sudan witnessed two parliamentary and two military regimes. The first parliamentary period started with independence and was terminated in 17th November 1958 by a military coup. All political parties were banned. The military dominated the scene for almost six years until October 21st, 1964, the time when it was replaced by a civilian regime. A new era of multi-partism started. This was brought to an end on May 25th, 1969 when the second military coup took place. All military regimes so far, political parties in the Sudan were banned. All military regimes tend to be apolitical. The Sudan is no exception. But the military wanted to win the support of the masses without which its survival becomes doubtful. Channels of participation - citizens' participation - became the need of the hour. The regime is then forced to create its own party if the masses are to be gained and a sense of legitimacy obtained. This is the dilemma that the
present regime in the Sudan faced in its early years, the need for an organization was felt; hence arose the need for a supreme political organization able to channel the energies of the people in order to defend the interest of the masses and build the new society. The Sudanese Socialist Union was a consequence of this thinking. 10 And:

The Sudanese Socialist Union has come about in response to the popular demand and quest for national unity within which the whole nation can cooperate towards nation-building and progress. 11

The SSU held its inaugural meeting on January 2, 1972. The regime’s National Charter for Action was presented at the meeting. The Constituent Conference of the SSU discussed the Charter and approved it on January 10, thereby laying the foundations of the Union’s proposed activities within the framework of the government’s adopted policies. 12 The policy objectives were made clear in the Charter addressing the issues of Freedom, Democracy, Socialism, The Economic Social and Cultural Revolution, National Unity, The People’s Struggle, Foreign Policy and the Protection of the Revolution. A phased programme of action was also designed. The first national congress of the SSU was held on January 21, 1974. The SSU has been designed as a melting pot for all progressive and nationalist groups. The idea “to establish direct and permanent contact between the government and the country”. 13
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SSR

The Basic Unit is considered to be the nucleus organ of the SSR and is established in the area of residence normally. There is a basic unit's congress and it is the supreme authority at that level. It elects members of the basic unit's committee and delegates of the basic unit to the congress of the district.

There are branches as well. The branch is the SSR unit in the place of work. The branch congress is the supreme authority in the place of work.

At the District level, the district's congress is formed of the delegates of all existing basic units within the district. The district congress elects a district committee and delegates of the district to the area congress. Delegates of all district in one area form the area congress, which is the supreme authority of the SSR at the area level. The area congress elects the committee of the area from among its members and elect delegates of the area to the province congress.

At the province level, the province congress shall include delegates of all existing areas in the province. The province congress is the supreme authority at that level. Beyond the provincial level, at the national level, the following is found:
The President of the SSU is authorised to make decisions concerning all aspects that aim at protecting the SSU and its organs, according to article 30 of the Basic Rules of the SSU. In the absence of the Central Committee or the political bureau, or in an emergency, the President can have the same powers as the Central Committee or the political bureau.

The National Congress; it is formed of delegates of the provinces to the congress, members of the Central Committee of the SSU, secretaries of the specialised committees of the SSU, representatives of the armed forces, police, prisons and five brigades, and other members appointed by the President of the SSU. The National Congress is the supreme political authority at the level of the republic. It elects the chairman of the SSU who shall be Chairman for the national congress, the central committee and the political bureau. It also nominates the candidate(s) for the Presidency.

The Central Committee; Composed of the President of the SSU, who is its chairman, elected members from the provinces, secretaries of specialised committees of the central committee, secretaries of the SSU in the provinces, members appointed by the President of the SSU. It is the supreme authority of the SSU between the sessions of the national congress. It elects members of the political bureau as well.
The Political Bureau: Composed of the President of the
SSU and elected members whose number is decided by the
president of the SSU. The political bureau is the supreme
authority in between the sessions of the central committee.

Within the SSU, the concept of the 'people's working
forces' is always emphasised and no room is allowed for
factionalism, political struggle, (at least in theory).
It is thought that the SSU is a new form of alliance in
which all the Sudanese will find room to participate and
express themselves. By its thousands of cells and branches
scattered throughout the country, through a large number of
the population and almost all social groups, the government
is supposed to be constantly listening to the people. It
hopes to know the people's views about policies adopted,
and the variations in and development of this opinion, and
can then model its conduct upon it. Contact is not only
established in one direction 'people-leaders' but also
downward in the direction 'leaders-people'. Like wireless
stations serving both for the reception and transmission of
the messages, the party enables the leaders to hear the
voice of the country and the country to hear the voice of
the leaders. The same pyramidal structure which makes it
possible for the summit to know the reactions of the base
makes it possible for the base to receive directives from
the summit with a commentary adapted to each group. The party
gives the government the opinion of the people; it enables
the people to understand the decisions of the government.
As Duverger argued, the stalemate of when it is supposed
to revive the lukewarm who remain outside the community. 14

The architects of the SEU are convinced that a two-way
communications is a prerequisite for achieving the goals
and aims that the SEU is supposed to fulfill. By creating
the SEU, it is hoped that communication between the rulers
and the masses will be made easier. This in turn will help
in building a unified socialist nation and make real the
slogan of 'giving power to the people'.

DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

TANZANIA

The local government system of Tanzania at the present
is based on decentralisation. The decentralisation policy
was introduced in 1972. 15 To understand the objectives
behind the 1972 decentralisation policies, it is logical
enough to briefly explain the pre-1972 situation.

Prior to 1972, most decisions related to development
programmes in the regions and districts as well as relating
to expenditures of public funds were made at the headquarters
in the capital and implemented by ministerial representa-
tives posted to the regions and districts. There also
existed at the district level, a local government structure with a properly elected council whose jurisdiction included raising of local taxes, issuing by-laws and other activities. Thus at the district level, there were two governments performing the tasks that, although at times related, were not usually coordinated. This administrative structure was not capable of meeting the challenges of developed posed by the Arusha Declaration, and it fell short of the acclaimed ideals of “giving power to the people”.16

The pre-1972 system was not consistent with Tanzania’s version of rural development which stresses that development must be of people. It is emphasised that “the people cannot be developed but can only develop themselves”.17 It was argued that:

1. Whilst it is necessary to involve people in initiating planning and implementation of programmes in order to increase production, the present participatory structures do not reach down to the majority of the people to cater for the necessary involvement.

2. That the present day low productivity is mainly due to the management inadequacies inherent in the public service administrative style.
The system of rural development is not geared towards the optimisation of available development resources in view of the fact that there is not only systematic assessment of available resources at any one time.

Consequently it was argued that in order to succeed in raising productivity rapidly, there is an urgent need for creating structures of participation, which reach below the present institutional levels, and therefore involve most of the present local masses in their development programmes.

Of equally great concern, particularly to TANU's leaders was that the central government ministries became competing loci of power vis-à-vis the party since they exercised central control over most development programmes. Decentralisation therefore was expected to increase the role of the party in initiating the local development programmes. Moreover, since development programmes were initiated by the centre, this meant that the people affected by the programmes were not involved in drawing them. The central ministries were far from the people to know exactly about people's felt needs.

Each ministry had its own staff in the districts and regions. Vertical relationships with Dar es Salaam, where central ministries are found, continued. This made it difficult enough for any sort of integrated rural development programmes
to be implemented. Duplication of efforts and activities resulted.

The party and government in Tanzania seem to have pinpointed the basic problem and were convinced that the solution did not simply lie in increased development inputs or more funds. On this understanding, the Tanzanian government, with the help of Mckinsey and Company Inc., an American consultant firm, made recommendations about the best ways to achieve the objectives of the Arusha Declaration. Most important of the recommendations were:

1. Establishing of sound government structures for managing rural development that provides for
   a: strong rural organisation with clearly defined development responsibilities,
   b: coordination and direction of rural development works of all ministries and regions.

2. Building equally strong structures outside the government to ensure the full participation of the people in development.

3. The introduction of disciplined planning and control system for managing rural development.

The overriding view of the adherents of decentralisation of government structure besides allowing for a smooth
administrative machinery is to give as many people as possible an opportunity to participate optimally in the government and developmental fields that are of direct concern to them. Thus some of the central government decision making powers on rural and urban development were transferred to the regions and districts. It was hoped that this would make the government more responsive to the needs of the population and would enable more effective planning and control of social and economic programmes, at the local level. Regional and district structures were organised to ensure active popular participation and have socio-economic planning stemming from the people.

Under the new administrative system, the responsibility of locally based staff is to the regions and districts and not to their ministries in Dar es Salaam. A regional development director (RDD) heads the development team in each region. He coordinates development planning and implementation and is financially accountable to the parliament. He is assisted by three staff officers and functional managers who head each of the decentralised ministries.

All regional programmes are coordinated by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) at the national level. Besides acting as a "spokesman" for the regions to the other central government ministries, the PMO is also responsible for
providing clear policy directives and planning guidelines for the regional and district authorities. The PMO is also expected to assist the regions in development plan preparations, when necessary, and regularly reviews the work of the regions to enable high standards of performance. All contacts between functional managers at the district and their counterparts at the region or sectoral ministries' headquarters, and vice versa, are required to be done through the district development director (DDD) and the RDD.

Local implementation teams were granted financial and decision-making autonomy within defined limits. Manpower in the regions and districts was organised as 'development teams', - RDD, DDD, each with its own staff and functional managers. Coordination within and between district and regional organisations is facilitated by development councils and committees. District development councils (DDC) replaced the former district councils under the old system. Planning and implementation are the responsibility of the district development and planning committee (DDPC) which is the executive arm of the DDC.

The Committee structure is not confined to the regions and districts. It extends down to the wards and village levels. In each case the party branch chairman and secretary
being the chairmen and secretaries of the development committees respectively. Elaborate committee structure was deliberately introduced to facilitate planning from the grassroots level. 19

Decentralisation of government administration is viewed by its proponents as being simultaneously an administrative device and a political strategy. As an administrative device it emphasises:

1. Efficiency in the operation of government activities.
2. Effective integration in development programmes at the local level.
3. Increased accountability by both administrators and local government organs.

As a political strategy it aims at:

1. Increasing popular participation in plan formulation as well as implementation.
2. Enhancing the leading role of TANU in development activities.
3. Redistribution of development resources.
4. People's control over the bureaucracy.
In the Sudan, there were changing patterns as far as local government structure is concerned, since its independence. A quick survey of the system of local government up to May 1969 is deemed necessary if the post-1969 developments are to be understood. The survey for the pre-1969 systems of local government will be very sketchy since our concern is mainly with the present system (post 1969).

The basic law that governed and organised local government in the Sudan after its independence is the Local Government Ordinance which was based mainly on the recommendations of Dr. Marshall's report of 1949. Councils were created by separate warrants or Charters issued by the Central Government. By the end of the 1950s warrants had been issued to over sixty local government councils in the Sudan. Under these the local council was recognised a 'corporate body of perpetual existence'. The local government authorities varied according to the degree of their development and authority. Powers granted to local councils were wide and varied. They covered almost all local services except those considered to be of highly technical nature, which are left for the central government. The councils were given financial powers to provide important local services, and execute policy and pass laws of local application. The Ministry of Local Government,
created on May 4th, 1954, was given the task of coordinating the work of all departments, and acting as representative for the central government for development and supervision of local government authorities in the country at large. However, strong vertical links between the various government departments and their sectoral ministries in Khartoum existed. Composition of local councils varied according to population, area and geographic factors. To strengthen the autonomy of the councils they were given the power to levy taxes. They have their own staff, and for reasons of economy might share staff with the central government. Some key posts were filled by central government officers who were seconded to local authorities. The executive officer was the key officer in the council with the responsibility of executing council decisions as well as being the treasurer of the council. Other officials were recruited locally and any shortage is alleviated through central government secondment. Central government staff dominated the councils in most cases. Local Government in the early days of independence was far from the ideals of Dr. Marshall. Implicit to the Marshall Report was the view that local government should be based on local bodies with corporate status, with electoral responsibility with independent sources of revenue, with the ability to recruit their own staff and with sufficient sources to
support a competent executive, technical and accounting staff. The people's role in development was totally neglected.

Under the military government of President Abass a Commission was formed in November 1959 to make recommendations to give the people an effective role in the development of their own affairs. The Commission recommended:

1. The continuation of local government authorities with appointed instead of elected membership.

Provincial Councils were set up in the nine provinces - the government representative was appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). He was ex-officio Chairman of the province Council and the head of all civil servants in the province. The province councils were not executive organs like local government councils. The province authority was to execute the policy and decisions of the province council. The province council was established by warrants issued by the Council of Ministers, as was the case with the province authority. Province councils were responsible for
supervision and promotion of local government. They could exercise functions of local authority if the latter failed or lacked funds or staff.

People's participation seemed to be of secondary importance to the military. However, the military regime did not survive for long to enable the new system to stand on its feet. By 1968, when the military regime was giving way to a civilian regime, governmental authority in the provinces was collapsing too. Tribal and sub-tribal elements, tribal fronts and political parties stepped in to fill the vacuum. Native administration as well was trying to gain a foothold. Although all these organisations were trying to expand at the expense of the central government, they were not able to be completely independent. They needed the help of the centre. In this struggle for influence, native administration had the biggest stake for they were the organs of authority that were directly in touch with the people. Their responsibilities covered security, local government services and taxation, judicial work and miscellaneous services. The period between 1964-69 was characterised by political instability at the centre. Political parties were fighting against each other to win seats in the parliament and form the government. Instead of rectifying the cracked image of local government in the
provinces the political parties at the centre exacerbated the problem by trying to gain support from the competing organisations in the provinces. In between, the services that the people were supposed to get deteriorated and local government was local government in name only. This continued to be the case until May 1960.

To evaluate the work of local government up to 1960, two questions could be posed: the first is about what benefits did the people get from it? The second is whether it succeeded in encouraging the people to accept new values and prepare them to become partners in running their own affairs or were they left with the old attitudes that look to the government as the provider of services. Regarding the first question it is noticed that local government authorities in the Sudan seemed to be isolated from the masses and their daily problems. Local authorities were not creative enough, and their efforts were purely administrative. Concerning the second question, local government has failed to achieve that goal. It failed to prepare the people for new roles. It failed to provide new economic measures that are necessary if new social relations and behaviour were to be created. The main reason was that local government has been dominated and manipulated by forces that are inimical to radical change. These forces blocked all possible channels for genuine people's participa-
tion, and involvement by more dynamic forces.
Under the present regime of General Nimeiri, the picture changed completely. The leaders of the regime realised the fact that the central government cannot and will not hold the burden of development and change unaided. Hence if development and modernisation is to be achieved, new attitudes, new methods, new procedures, new skills, indeed new social behaviour and relations are to be instilled into the Sudanese society. Moreover the ability, the desire, and the will of society to change must be very strong. It was also believed that no change will be accepted unless the will for it is accepted. This could be achieved by paying greater attention to the local government system since it will ensure mass participation and involvement.

Having such ideas in mind, the leaders of the regime thought of reforming the local government system which was also part of the government’s strategy of broadening its base. From such background originated the new system of local government that is based on the 1971 People’s Local Government Act. The act was not solely about provincial administration however; it was also concerned with what the government hopes will become a major infusion of local popular participation into the administration of the Sudan. This strategy presupposes that the Sudan is becoming, however gradually, a reformist and democratically minded political society and that local government should be organised to meet and encourage these new political aspirations.
It was also believed that in order to implement the regime's policies and programmes as outlined in the National Charter for Action and various policy statements and declarations, a thorough transformation and change in the local government system is desirable. The people in the provinces must be involved in the development process, and this involves the acceptance of the measures of policies filtering from above. Accordingly, the 1971 People's Local Government Act meant to provide a new leadership and values at the local level that will help in mobilising the masses and to make them participate, both at local and national levels, in activities and programmes that help in accelerating the rate of development. The view which is held was that without a modernised and popular local government system, the regime will fall short of its objectives and aims. The aims of the new system are:

1. Provide for a decentralised system that will relieve the centre from routine executive work which will best be achieved by local authorities. By so doing, the central government will find ample time for planning, coordination and general supervision.

2. Local government is the best platform for the realisation of popular participation and involvement.
3 - amalgamation of popular effort activity with official and governmental action.

4 - The regime hopes that the creation of the new system will provide for strong popular support and make it easier for the centre to listen to the periphery.

5 - The creation of a network of councils will ensure the protection of the government's system and/or machinery into the society. When the government steps down to reach every citizen, it will provide a necessary platform for national integration and unity.

6 - Local government units are expected to become specialised agencies for the central government and can, in such capacity, administer a number of services on its behalf.

The position of local government is legalised by embodying it in the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan. 

The new system, viewed formally, is a pyramid of Province Executive Councils, People's District Councils and People's Rural and Town Councils. Below the rural councils are
Village councils which are the first councils to be elected. There are also residential area councils. To gain election to these councils a candidate should be a member of one of the SBU organisations. The rules allow for nominated members, but these should never be greater than a third of the total number of seats. Women must hold 25 per cent of the seats and if the election does not provide this number, appointees should represent the balance. Elections to the higher levels are indirect, that is to say, members from the lower authorities elect those who sit in the higher levels of government.

The People's Province Executive Council (PPEC) under the chairmanship of the Commissioner, is the highest provincial level of local government; and under the new arrangements the province Commissioner will have equal status with government ministers. The PPEC meets not less than six times a year. A central committee comprising the Commissioner, his deputy and seven members, five of whom must be elected, acts in emergencies or when the council is not in session.

The Commissioner is a political appointee - responsible directly to the President of the Republic for the good administration of the province. He is the SBU Secretary at the province level. Although bound by the assent of the
Council, the Commissioner may suspend a PPWC decision if he believes it to be against the public interest, or that it jeopardizes the security of the state or the rights of citizens. This shows how strong are the powers of the Commissioner.

The PPWC is both deliberative and executive body. It is generally responsible for the maintenance of national unity, public security, economic and social development, popular enlightenment and political mobilisation. It is also a revenue collecting authority, with the power to impose projects as it thinks fit. It draws its own budget and prepares its own estimates to the central government. The degree of devolution of power from the PPWC to the town and village level is discretionary, but compulsory devolution of some powers is also found.

People's Councils from the village level up to the district level have no individual corporate existence. The only agency that has corporate existence is the PPWC. All people's local councils below the province level are subordinate organs of the PPWC. Hence they derive their powers and functions by delegation from the PPWC. This delegation or devolution of powers and functions by the PPWC to the subordinate local authorities is meant to decentralize power away from the provincial headquarters.
to the lowest levels of local government units. The hope is that this will result in more interest, participation and enthusiasm on the part of the local population. It is assumed that by involving the people at the local levels to participate in running their own affairs, by invoking the latent energies of the masses, then the heavy burden on the central government will be lessened.

However, without a comprehensive decentralisation of power, the rural community cannot and will not generate this involvement. The new system, it is hoped will reduce the gap between the people and the administration. To make the slogan ‘power to the people’ a reality, as the leaders of the regime think, further steps towards decentralisation were taken. This took place in early 1979 when a number of central ministries were abolished and the powers of others were reduced. The powers of these ministries were transferred to the provinces. The aim was to provide services in areas where they are required, economy in men, materials and equipment. Under the new system, all decentralised government staff is supposed to be responsible to the province authorities rather than to the centre. Government staff are supposed to operate as a cohesive group in the province rather than each department operating independently of the others, especially in the planning process. That is
to any, management of development in the provinces is to take place on basis of coordination of all functional activities within the province rather than on the basis of individual functional ministries run from the capital. It was also hoped that reallocation of resources, including staff, from the advanced provinces to the less privileged ones, would be achieved by transferring the functions of some ministries to the provinces. It was also hoped that the reallocation process, would keep the number of new posts needed to a minimum.

It could be said that the decentralisation reform taken in the Sudan, like those in Tanzania, are ambitious enough. Like any extensive organisational surgery, to borrow Hyden's words, it has had both anticipated and unanticipated consequences. This is inevitable because while it is possible to teach individual management techniques and to introduce structural rearrangements in the organisation, the cultural predispositions which are needed to support such measures take long time to develop. Such unanticipated consequences are also expected to be found when dealing with other organisational procedures whether these were Ujamaa villages, political parties or local government structures. They are structures that are, in theory, most suitable for building
the nation as it is conceived by the political leadership in both Tanzania and Sudan. When it comes to practice, unanticipated consequences will be discovered and deviations from the theory are generally made. This is what I am attempting to show in the next two chapters which will concentrate on the practical side of the experiments of both countries.
FOOTNOTES:

2. Ibid.
6. The ward as defined by Dr. Nkado is the lowest government administrative unit. A ward executive officer is appointed by the government to oversee the development activities of each ward, and also serves as Party's branch secretary.
8. The military coup of 1952 and 1969 in the Sudan are not the only attempts by the military to take over in the Sudan. Between 1958-1960 and after, many abortive coups took place. Most important is the one that took place on 13th, July 1971 which succeeded in deposing Nimriki from power. That coup lasted for three days only. Troops loyal to Nimriki launched a counter-coup on 2nd. July 1971 and reinstated Nimriki.
11. Ibid., p. 22.

12. P.K. Rechold, Politics in the Zambian Parliamentary
   and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation

13. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London, Methuen


15. See J.K. Myerere, Decentralisation, (Dar es Salaam,

16. E. Baguma, Decentralisation and Managing of Rural
    Development in Tanzania, M. L. Thesis, Dar es Salaam,
    University of Dar es Salaam, 1974, p. 69.

17. J.K. Myerere, Freedom and Development, (Dar es Salaam,

18. See the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania,
    Achieving the Objectives of the Busha Declaration,
    Managing Rural Development, Report of McKinsey and

19. Samuel Mushi, Popular Participation and Regional
    Development Planning in Tanzania: The Politics of
    Decentralised Administration; DRU Discussion Paper,
    Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, October,
    1977, pp. 9-17.

20. Local Government Ordinance 1952, Togolone Government
    Gazette, 1951, Section 6, p. 632.

21. See S.M. Sahih and J. Howell "Local Government after
    Independence" in J. Howell (ed.) Local Government
    and Policing in the Sudan, (Khartoum: Khartoum University

22. See Report of the Commission on Coordination between
    the Central and Local Government, Khartoum, Sudan,

23. Q.M.A. Bakht, "The Politics of Native Administration"

24. Ibid., p. 47.

25. For an elaboration of this point see M. A. Idris,
    People's Role Role in the Sudan, M. Sc. dissertation,
    Khartoum, University of Khartoum (May 1972), pp. 60-61.

27. The People's Local Government Act of 1971 provides a comprehensive framework for a new system of local government for the whole Sudan. There is also a Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act 1972, which is designed specifically to cater for the needs of the South. See K. Bala, The 1971 Local Government Act: The Case of the Southern Region, paper presented for the Economic and Social Research Council, Khartoum, June 1972.


SECTION THREE

IDEOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND THE PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING IN TANZANIA AND THE SUDAN.
The purpose of this part is to examine the effectiveness of the political and local government structures in both Tanzania and the Sudan in achieving the objectives set by the political leadership. These objectives are pronounced in the form of ideologies created or opted for in both countries as it is the case with almost all third world countries.

Ideologies are easy to formulate, and the organisations that are supposed to make them a reality are easy to create. But whether the organisations are effective enough or not is determined by many things. Among the most important prerequisites of a fully-fledged organisation is the quality of leadership. By leadership is not meant the upper strata only, but all those who hold key posts at different levels of the hierarchy. A committed and dedicated leadership is the type that is needed. An organisation is also said to be strong and effective by its degree of autonomy. Autonomy means not being influenced by pressures from outside, be they governmental or otherwise. In single party states complete autonomy does not exist since the party and government are one. One can argue that the strength of organisations in single party states is related to the strength of the government, especially governmental capabilities in this respect.
CHAPTER IV
TANZANIA

Success in achieving policy objectives is largely determined by the organizational setup and quality of leadership. Attainment of socio-economic and political objectives is largely influenced by the leader's ideological commitment and their capacity to motivate the people and organize them for the attainment of the objectives.

Tanzania's concept of development gives equal weight to output and equality. Equality in the sense of increased participation by the people in decision-making process. This is considered an ultimate goal with an intrinsic value of its own. Without people's participation one cannot talk about development, although economic growth and change might be taking place. "Participation in Tanzania is thus more than a management problem; it is ultimately involved in the leaders' asserted conception of the good life." The goal of the Tanzanian leadership is to change the farmers' entire way of life by allowing him to participate in a nation-wide modernisation process. Barriers to modernisation, like the attitudes which farmers and to some extent bureaucrats, hold, and the structures which reinforce these attitudes need to be changed. The government must make itself heard by the masses if the desired transformation is to take place. This
made it necessary to reach the Tanzanian man in rural areas away from the centre. For this purpose the ideology was formulated and organisations built. But how successful were ideology (Ujamaa's ideology) and organisation in fulfilling the aspirations of the Tanzanian leadership?

Ujamaa

As far as the Tanzanian ideology of Ujamaa is concerned, there is no doubt that President Nyerere has made a contribution to African political thought which has been influential elsewhere in Africa. But promise is not performance and philosophies are easier to enunciate than to put into practice. Heroic and dramatic words and gestures might provide a platform for ego satisfaction, but they may not or cannot solve fundamental problems. Statements of policy and philosophy are comparatively easy to draw up. Making them a reality in everyday life is an entirely different thing. It is not always easy to change the basis of society - especially if it is very poor like the Tanzanian. But it is easy to introduce socialism and obtain much enthusiasm for doing so. Later, however, when really crucial issues emerge, the real problems begin. In the first stages of transition to socialism, the government has all the advantages, a mandate, early idealism and enthusiasm, obvious inequalities to right; while the first experiments (such as the creation of ujamaa villages) can always be carried out among the obvious sympathisers. It
is during the second stages that problems tend to arise, possible resistance and possible violence in the face of change are to be encountered.  

In Tanzania, the heavy emphasis on the agricultural sector on broadfront development of Ujamaa villages has as its eventual objective the creation in phases of economically viable agricultural units.  

The villages are to be organized on patterns involving communal ownership and collective decision making by the villagers themselves in relation to local requirements and capabilities, and in contrast to the more centralized policies adopted by socialist countries, like the Soviet Union and Cuba. During the latter part of 1967 and early 1968, a larger number of Ujamaa villages proliferated around the country in response to the President's call. By the middle of 1973, there were about 5,500 Ujamaa villages (of more than 15% of the population living). Until that time, no timetable was set for Ujamaa-isation of the country. Ujamaa was to be politically implemented. This made the education and mobilisation of the peasantry essential. The peasantry need to be told how cooperation and self planning could be of any use to their specific situation, and how it can help them improve their living standards. This required considerable knowledge to learn about the specific technical and social conditions in each part of the country. The process is not an easy one and
it requires a vast number of trained manpower. The peasants are not fully aware of the new policy, and it is not a surprise that their response to government calls is rather slow. Those villages that were built in the early stages were poorly planned and both farmers and government officers who were advising them had inadequate understanding of the reasons behind the policy. In some cases overeager civil servants tried to push the farmers into villages without explaining to them what they were doing. In order to prevent Ujamaa policy from falling into disrepute, the government and party went to great length to clarify its meaning and to show how it can be implemented. In September, 1968, Nyerere said that successful Ujamaa villages must be formed by the members and not imposed upon them from outside.4 It has been made clear that Ujamaa villages will be created by the people themselves.5 This was also emphasised in the Party guidelines, Nungozi. One of the statements reads: it is not correct for leaders and experts to usurp the people’s rights to decide on an issue just because they have the expertise.6 However, the response of the peasantry continued to be slow. This has led to a change in the government’s attitude. Since the beginning of 1974, the more socialistic aspect of Ujamaa has been abandoned in favour of a policy aimed at moving people into villages at any cost. However, it will be wrong to assume that there is a swing away from Ujamaa. The Tanzanian government remains committed to the original policy, but no body
disputes the fact that it has drastically changed its strategy to achieve it. Whatever energy and enthusiasm there was at the beginning, much of it seems to have evaporated in the process of implementing the programme. The reasons for this implementation were many, but most important were:

1. The government relied on the bureaucrats in the process of implementation. Though Ujamaa was to be implemented by peasants themselves, it was also a government policy, and, as such, the responsibility of government staff, whose success and capabilities were to be judged in terms of their achievement in implementing Ujamaa. There is a natural tendency for administrators to reframe broadly stated goals in terms of more specific and measurable objectives, for this simplifies the measures of success. This dictated a concern with villagisation and with the number of villages started, rather than with the degree of community, economic productivity or internal democracy in the villages. Very little attention was given by the bureaucrats to the local conditions and under such conditions the advice of the bureaucrats was rarely heeded by the peasants. Nyden argues that there was little evidence that the officials worked from within the villages. Policies were rather imposed from outside.7 Pakias was right when he argued that:
the implementation of the programme has from the start been characterised rather by administratively than political or voluntary initiative. Rugged over-capitalised and bureaucratically run, this ambitious programme to transform Tanzanian agriculture by setting up nuclei of 'modern' farming failed even to achieve its primary objective. The lesson was obvious; the mechanised methods were uneconomic given to existing social relations of production, and in any case far too expensive to be extended to more than a minute proportion of the country's farmers. More importantly, authoritarian leadership snatched the initiative and will to work of the members, who treated the scheme as government farms.

Pairos, when identifying the reasons for failure, argues that the policy ignored a number of general tendencies of bureaucracy which are likely to occur in any development scheme which is administratively implemented regardless of its initial direction. The democratic self-development of peasants was something antagonistic, if not incomprehensible, to bureaucratically mode of thought, according to Pairos, the attitude held by the bureaucrats, by virtue of their education during the colonial period, is that they (the bureaucrats) are the bearers of modernity to a traditional peasantry who would resist their innovation through conservatism and ignorance. It has been argued that such an attitude by the bureaucrats leads to an intensification of the original problem rather than its solution. The acceptance of 'traditional-modern' dichotomy leads to an uncritical attitude towards all innovations since they are by definition 'modern'. Failure of peasants to adopt is simply looked at by the bureaucrats as a result of their ignorance rather than deeply looking into the causes of that refusal and how it is related to the relevance of policies adopted to the peasants.
conditions. This in turn leads to further alienation by the peasants expressed either by apathy or passive resistance. Resistance to innovations thus certainly exists but as a function of self-reinforcing antagonistic relations between peasants and bureaucrats. Such notions correspond closely with the self-interest of the bureaucrats as a member of the educated class, and this mode of operation is one of the means by which he maintains his superior status both in his own eyes and in those of the peasants. Thus education training and class interest coincide to produce a distrust of peasant capabilities. 9

In brief, the implementation of Ujamaa through government administration set in train a number of pressures for its redefinition, de-emphasizing the cooperative and economic aspects and placing stress on villagization only. 10

Being dominated by administrative staff, very little real citizen participation in decision-making and very little cooperation resulted. 11 Evidence suggests that government staff most of the time used force in their efforts to make the peasants grow more food, or even form new villages. An example to illustrate this could be given from one of the villages (Bugasi) in Bukoba area. In that village command and not persuasion was the predominant means used. The people of that village said that some of the leaders never bothered to explain to them what was involved in “going Ujamaa”. Instead they simply told that new settlements were to be established and that they were expected to join them. Force was often used. The Area Commissioner in his report at
one of the TANU district annual conferences, and in a seminar in Dodoma, it was recorded with much regret that the villages were started in a very bad way. He said that "smart from being concentration camps for habitual criminals, they soon became places for those people against whom the local leaders had personal grudges."

The bureaucrats, in the implementation process, failed to understand the social obstacles. Most important among these obstacles, as pointed out by Van Velsen, are:

1. Feeling of insecurity - This mainly revolves around the notions of income, a rough idea about the quantity and quality of social and economic goods one may expect. Among peasants, this notion consists of an estimation of the yields to be expected from a given amount of labour input under normal circumstances. Additionally, it comprises estimates of the volume of assistance one hopes to secure in return for the help given to others.

11. Relative deprivation - Those feelings of resentment and insecurity which arise when people estimate that their income is decreasing in relation to other groups and persons in the community. The cause of these feelings may be the declining incomes of ego while that of others in his community remains constant. Often the awareness of relative deprivation emerges in a rapidly developing situation in which some groups enjoy a marked rise in income while others feel that their share does not keep pace with the general trend of prosperity.
iii. Vested interest - any new ordering of property relations is likely to run counter to the local 'establishment', those people who control the resources, for example.

Failure to understand such social obstacles was a contributing factor in the low response by the peasants to the calls made by the centre represented by its staff. No wonder that voluntary participation in socialist settlements has been replaced by coercive villagisation, as mentioned before, with a corresponding decline in agricultural production.13

b. Rich farmers were very influential. Communal labour for Ujamaa villages required communal landholding, something which required careful political education for peasants, both large and small, if they were to give all or part of their plots on which their livelihood depended. More particularly, of course, the larger farmers plainly stood to lose, and this could have led to some difficult choices in view of their considerable local political influence. This discount would have been the greater since by training, inclination and previous practice, the administrators were accustomed to work through precisely these local leaders and especially the rich ones. This, it is argued, has been the stated objective of colonial agricultural policy and was largely continued through the first years of independence. Concentration of advice, credit and membership of cooperative and other local committees
upon such groups had led, in many areas, to the emergence of a fairly small and tight group of relatively rich farmers whose relations with government staff were much closer than those of the mass of the peasantry. Rich farmers in areas like Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, Arusha and Muhoto, accepted Ujamaa in order to gain more land, according to Hyden. In these areas, what took place were not real Ujamaa villages, but cooperative ventures by a group of already well-to-do farmers. As an explanation to this, Hyden argues that the existing social norms have a role to play. In a society like the Tanzanian, people used to live within minimum government interference, and where such interference is looked at as a threat, villagers have in some cases elected leaders whom they know will leave them “in peace”. Concepts like mobilization and supervision were not known in places in rural Tanzania. To be a leader has always meant being the spokesman of others.

Very often those who are chosen are the rich farmers who are looked at as patrons rather than exploiters. Thus the inclination on part of many poor peasants has been to elect leaders who, in the Marxist sense, are their potential enemies.

Alliances between the well-to-do farmers and the government staff was a phenomenon that characterized the implementation of the Ujamaa policy in many parts of Tanzania. Van Heekken and Van Velzen make an attempt to show how rich peasants consolidate their position in rural Tanzania when they argue that the process takes place.
1. Through a creation of patron-client relationship in the villages. The rich peasants are the only ones who can rent plots of land and employ labourers. In rural areas supply of labour vastly exceeds demand and the rich peasants become men who open more opportunities for the labourers.

2. Rich peasants monopolise relations with the outside world by forming coalitions with government personnel working in rural areas. Government personnel have the strongest impact in rural areas. They are supposed to propagate the values of self-reliance and egalitarianism. But at the same time they reinforce existing inequalities by siding with the wealthy peasants. Automatically, the masses are excluded. This coalition is made possible since the rich peasants exemplify 'development' in the eyes of government staff for the mere fact that they are better off financially and otherwise. Also for the realisation of national goals and objectives, the government cannot do without local initiative. Self-help schemes, for example, which play a crucial role in the expected transformation of rural Tanzania, cannot take place if the rich are isolated. Local leaders are given the initiative, and without putting their hands to the wheel, nation-building is bound to lose momentum. The government lack the means and manpower to take over projects, and the intention is not to do that, even
if the means were available, since it is in contradiction with the declared 'grassroot' ideology. The door is left open for rich peasants to enter. They have a brighter chance of being elected as leaders because they have the means at their disposal. Being in such a position, they can incorporate the other peasants into "nation building projects", and may even threaten others with sanctions if they did not comply. The ultimate outcome of all this is a strengthening of the position of rich peasants and, to an extent, the government staff vis-à-vis the rural masses. 21

Vychi also dealt with the problem posed as a result of the existence of rich peasants when he observed that:

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It should be known also that the richer peasants are the dominant strata in rural areas both politically and economically, thus any 'outsider' has first got to reckon with them and create amicable relations before they can even get to know the people. Moreover the rich peasants and kulaks entertain well with the resources they possess. Their hospitality to the government personnel or from other institutions is backed by their financial resources. 22
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The implementers of the Ujamaa programmes are faced with a dilemma due to the existence of rich peasants. To implement a policy of rural producer cooperation, they need to act against the very same group which they view as an example of modernity. That the government staff and bureaucrats were to implement the programme, seems to have created more problems.
c. Implementation of the policy started in the poor areas. This has been one of the major weaknesses that characterized the Ujamaa policy. Its development tended to take place in economically backward areas where there is no shortage of land, where the people are very poor, and where existing farms are mainly for satisfying family subsistence needs. As a result:

rural socialism became a plan for the poor with little impact on the overall development strategy. Since the socialist objectives have been avoided by the export producing areas, the real confrontation with the supporters of Tanzania’s socialist strategy has yet to take place. 23

Even when few Ujamaa villages have been established in more developed areas, it has been done on land provided by government. It has been stated that such practices will not benefit socialism in Tanzania. The testing ground for Tanzanian socialism is those areas where capitalism has already gained a foothold. The Kilimanjaro area is perhaps the best example. The Imani area, for example, of Iringa District, a typical example of capitalist rural development. The farmers in Imani area contributed greatly to economic development by using capitalist methods. Hiring of labour was practiced since the farms were too big for a family to work in. Economic differences were found due to the fact that the rich farmers were able to buy land from the less successful. They acquired assets like
tractors and were able to hire them. The land market developed as a result of the difficulty in getting access to fertile land. The scope of exploitation increased. The traditional values of social cohesion which the farmers might have brought with them from their home soon broke down under the commercialising pressures of capitalist development in Imani. Development in Imani has been characterised by individualism, labour, exploitation and an increasing concentration of economic power. This was the situation when the Arusha Declaration was proclaimed, and when the revolutionary policy was set out. This was still the situation in the second half of the 1970s. If the Ujamaa policy is unable to achieve socialism in such areas of rural Tanzania, then the policy becomes not more than an empty slogan. 25

d. Corruption is rampant. Corruption is one of the reasons that led to a bad implementation of the Ujamaa policy. The phenomenon is in particular found in the cooperative societies that are found in Ujamaa villages. Shaidi argues that

Corruption at this level raises special concern since Ujamaa villages and the cooperatives are supposed to be the cornerstones of rural socialism. How then can Ujamaa villages and cooperatives permeated with corruption be the 'vanguard' or the peasants? 26
In an attempt to find the reasons for the phenomenon the following reasons were given:

1 - Some of the supposed to be pioneers of Ujamaa lack the political consciousness of the thing they are supposed not only to build, but to defend.

2 - In Ujamaa villages there is still unnecessary big room for private business. Private work or business in some cases overrides that of the Ujamaa thus bringing economic inequality and competition among the villagers. This in turn forces some people to venture into some short-cuts for accumulating wealth, and this will definitely involve the commission of malpractices such as corruption.

According to Shaidi, as long as many loopholes exist, corruption will always thrive. The leadership as far as the cooperative movement is concerned is the core of the problem. In some of the cooperatives, after the policy of Ujamaa was started, the leaders, who were mainly 'kulak farmers', were replaced by what Shivji prefers to call 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie, dependent on control of resources at the centre'. In a situation where everyone is trying to strengthen his position such replacement makes the cooperative union to become not more than a stepping stone or a tool to enhance one's own interests. Examples of cooperative unions characterised by corruption are not difficult to draw. In
Bukuma cooperative organisations corrupt practices were rampant and those who wielded power manipulated it for their own interests. The Singida cooperative union on the other hand was characterised by nepotism, and the same is applicable to the cooperatives in Arusha where the cooperative unions leaders benefited themselves.

However, the failure that branded most of the cooperative societies does not mean that successful cases were not found. But those were like isolated islands. An example could be found in the Bukoba cooperative union which was successful before and after the Arusha Declaration. But in spite of the success there were also few people who benefited more for the mere fact of being leaders. The leadership is of crucial importance in the success or failure of cooperatives. Most cooperatives in Tanzania seem to lack the right type of leadership. There is a shortage of appropriate manpower to staff the cooperatives. As a result, dishonest and inadequately trained people found their way through to the cooperatives. In most Ujamas villages, evidence thus far suggests that the cooperative leadership is in the hands of rich peasants; that corruption has been a common characteristic of cooperatives, and that cooperative labour facilities usually benefit rich peasants.

The main objective of the cooperative movement in Tanzania, which is the cornerstone of the whole policy of Ujamas, was to
prevent further growth of rural class formation and to move away from the incentives and ethics of the capitalist system. Unfortunately, it is difficult to argue that the cooperative movement has contributed to the reduction of inequality among the peasants. The existence, in many cases the prevalence, of private farming in Ujamaa villages is a major cause. This has greatly undermined the original socialist intentions. 14

Some scholars tried to explain the bad implementation of the Ujamaa policy in terms of class analysis. As Hyden argues, a main reason why the socialist results have been meagre is that any revolutionary strategy is ultimately a class strategy and not a development strategy that can be bolstered by bureaucratic control and technical assistance inputs. In a rather similar vein, Meghji argues that the problem is not only the technical problem of the masses, and of raising their standard of living, but the political question is the basic one. That is, a class-stratified society differing class interests depending on the nature of classes obtaining, and that the economic structures that exist cannot be divorced from the class relations that obtain in rural areas and their relation to urban areas and at the national level. These, according to Meghji, determine the process of development and underdevelopment. He cites Kilimanjaro region as an example where the dilemma of the ideology of Ujamaa is mostly manifested.
For him, the policy of socialism and rural development in Tanzania suffers from the weakness of class basis.

The ideology of Ujamaa does not take into account class-struggle and therefore class analysis as a point of departure in implementing the policy and also in the formulation of the policy itself. Ujamaa does not realize the basic differences between a rural capitalist (Tolak) and a poor peasant's interests, and their material basis of existence. 36

The issue is not only discussed from the vantage point of classes and class struggles, but an attempt is made to give the Ujamaa policy a global connotation:

Ujamaa villages are not islands that obtain within a particular historical period and within particular socio-economic formation. This means that the villages as organized internally, is not the end of the story. What they produce in the economy for what purposes, who appropriates the surplus and what use is the surplus put to, are all the questions related with the economic structure that obtains at the national level and the local level. Ujamaa villages producing cash crops suffer from the same domination and exploitation as individual peasants producing the same commodity... It is true that to a certain extent the establishment of Ujamaa villages may do away with certain exploitative intermediaries, but the fundamental change can only come about when the basic contribution as between imperialist exploiters, their intermediaries at the local level on the one hand, and the labouring classes - the workers and peasants - on the other hand has been resolved. Therefore, so long as at the national level the neo-colonial economic structure obtains and the national petty-bourgeoisie holds state power at the expense of the working class and labouring peasants, the basic question of imperialist domination and underdevelopment cannot be resolved. 37
To try and analyse the problem as one of class conflict is partially true, but it is by no means the whole story. The problem is mainly related to the number of trained and committed cadre at the disposal of the party and government. There simply are not enough trained political cadre at any level. Trained leadership is essential to the development of Ujamaa. Some villages collapsed because they did not have that. Party and government cadre in the villages, far from carrying out an ideological and political mobilisation campaigns to raise the political consciousness of the masses, have in effect, in most cases, fallen back to the easy way out of promising the material incentive of government aid as the sole basis for transforming the villages into socialist villages. Training the material aid has led most of the poor peasants to regard their own productive efforts as ineffective and therefore to rely on government aid for almost everything.

Training of village leaders is essential for the development of Ujamaa. If the Tanzanian government wants the people to 'listen' to its voice, the Ujamaa policy must succeed, but success is difficult in the absence of trained and committed leadership. This is not an easy task to achieve in a short period. A prerequisite for that success is a strong political organisation. Training village leadership is made more difficult especially because the trainers themselves have little
personal experience about the subject. One of the major functions of political cadres is to work in the villages as mobilizers and organizational advisers. Once accepted by the people they can inject the necessary enthusiasm and understanding where strong leadership from within is lacking. The difficulty of finding people to guide the Ujamaa farmers and train village leaders highlights the importance of developing a committed and knowledgeable leadership in the party and government if the Ujamaa policy is to bear fruit. The danger of authoritarian leaders imposing their will on the masses is never far distant and the risk of self-seeking elites gaining strength cannot be dismissed in the absence of trained and committed cadre.

It is evident from what has been mentioned that the Ujamaa policy, which is the official ideology, was not successful enough at the practical level. The policy makers failed to communicate with the majority of Tanzanians and transmit the idea to them in order to make the masses participate in building the nation economically. A greater part of the blame goes to TANU since it failed to explain the meaning of and objectives behind Ujamaa policy to the masses.

Apart from building Ujamaa villages, the Tanzanian government invented means and created other structures that will enable the masses to participate. Participation in the sense of giving the people more local freedom for both decision
and action on matters which are primarily of local impact, within the framework which ensures that the national policies of socialism and self-reliance are followed everywhere. The Tanzanian government was aware that in order to gain participation, new political structures must be built at the rural level and old institutions must be changed to fit into national goals. Therefore rebellious attitudes by the people must be neutralised and consensus or at least some support of national goals must be gained. It is necessary that rural people must be brought into the government's plan; that they accept the government's general viewpoint; and that they provide the will and manpower to change the status quo.

People's participation is supposed to take place within the local government's structure, and the decentralisation policy is being applied in an attempt to give more weight to the slogan 'power to the people'. Real people's participation is supposed to take place in the planning process: both formulation and implementation.

The Planning Process: since the rural masses are the very people that the government is trying to help, then they (the masses) must have a say in the plans made. In theory, the planning process starts with the district level. The first stage in the planning process is that people consider and process what they would want for development. Their views are taken by cell leaders to the ward conference when they are
sorted. The priorities for the ward are listed. Meanwhile government officials (experts) have to tour the district and seek people's opinion and offer them any help they need. Village and ward proposals together with project proposals that might be initiated by district officials, are worked out by the district officials giving their estimated costs, their viability, the districts technical capacity to carry them through, estimated time of completion, and so on. These programmes are then presented to the district development council for further consideration. Having gone through these stages, it remains to be found whether the plans are in line with the party's ideological goals or not. This is the duty of the party which has to be the watchdog in the district. The district executive committee of KANU examines the plan proposals before they are sent to the regional headquarters where they undergo a similar process. When the plan goes to the regional level, it is coordinated with other district plans. Various regional plans are in turn sent to the Prime Minister's office, where their consistency in terms of national goals and objectives, priorities and financial feasibilities are reviewed. The regional plans are integrated with ministerial and parastatal plans by the Ministry of Finance and planning into a national development plan. This is precisely the way in which plans are made. The question is, does actual participation take place? Does the present system allow for maximum citizen's participation?
Programmes are, in theory, proposed by the peasants in Ugandan villages and ward development committees according to what they look at as their immediate priorities. But, the studies made by different people who are interested in peasants participation reveal that neither villagers nor the ward development committees participate in the actual preparation or design of their programmes as such. What actually happens is that during the first stages of planning, a number of district administration officials are normally assigned to a village or ward meeting to form ideas about what sort of programmes they would like to see. Occasionally, the district officials would suggest to the peasants some programmes and proposals, particularly those the officials might consider viable and appealing to the peasants. Once approved, all proposals go to the district planning officer, who is responsible for coordinating all district programmes. On the basis of proposals coming from the villages and wards, the district functional managers, under the coordination of the district planning officer, design programmes which concern their professional areas. These, together with proposals made by respective functional managers, are put in front of the district development and planning committee. At the designing stage, a number of proposals might be dropped or deferred to the district development team, the initial and indeed the dominant decision-making role seems to be played by appointed
rather than elected officials. This is made possible because they have access to information essential to feasibility and viability of programmes, and the fact that the organ that coordinates and prepares the programmes and proposals in their first stages is dominated by, if not exclusively consist of, appointed officials. Projects proposed by appointed officials find their way cut since they (1) cover more than one local area (2) meet short and long-term national priorities, and (3) detailed and contain rich information.

Participation by village elected leaders seems to be further lessened by the fact that almost all of them are either illiterate or not educated enough to understand the language used by the appointed officials (technocrats) which might even be difficult to the educated but not with technically oriented mind. Accordingly, it is very rare to find any cases in which TANU executive committee's (formed of elected villagers) role resulted in any modifications of proposals or decisions made by appointed officials at the district level. This is the case with most districts. Any criticisms in the plans were hindered by the elected officials low level of education and their ignorance as far as the technical language of the plan is concerned. The villagers are further handicapped by the fact that the proposals they make pay no consideration to the financial constraint or the feasibility of the programmes. This tendency puts them at a disadvantage
when actual implementation takes place. Financial and technical constraints always set a limit on many of the proposals made by the villagers. Due to this, the masses are bound to be disillusioned and lose interest in participation when none or few of their proposals are implemented.

Villagers seem to be left out in the decision making process for their development. This contradicts with the whole notion of people's participation which is one of the cornerstones of official policy in Tanzania. The political party - TANU - is accountable for this outcome because its role is to ensure that the leaders and experts implement the plans that have been agreed upon by the people themselves.

The decentralization policy itself is an administrative device that aims at rationalizing democracy as stipulated in the Arusha Declaration and the party guidelines. It is left to the party officials to carry these policies to their practical level under the decentralization policy. They were supposed to ensure that village plan proposals are in conformity with the national ideology on the one hand and, on the other hand, to ensure voluntary compliance with government policy initiatives. This is due to what is known as "party supremacy."

However, TANU proved to be very weak in the process. Concerning the policy of decentralization, one cannot expect the peasants with their low level of education and political consciousness to be fully aware of the role they can play.
Rural population can easily be suited for socialist transformation if rightly educated on the subject. For a political party to achieve this, it must be very close to the people to detect what the people want. It also depends on its skills to convince and educate. TANU, as mentioned before, proved to be a failure. The right type of leadership in the lower organs of the party was missing.

Related to the weakness of TANU, is the fact that a wide gap does exist as far as cooperation between the government officials (bureaucrats and experts) and the people and their representatives is concerned. It was thought that under decentralisation the gap that separated the two groups, will be closed. This is a duty of TANU, since TANU is supreme. To close the gap, government officials are expected to accept a subordinate position to the politicians; while, at the same time, it is assumed that party officials will necessarily accept the technical advice from the experts. This is supposed to be the most appropriate situation if cooperation between government and party apparatus at the local level is to be achieved. But the gap is still wide open. 42 Kimarogo was right when he argued that under decentralisation two groups are found. The phenomenon becomes clearer as one goes down to the bottom of the hierarchy. In the districts, for example, one can find:
1 - The people and their representatives. These include MNU Executive Committees from ward and Village level and party and district development committees.

2 - The bureaucracy and experts. Those include the development director, the planning, personnel and financial officers, functional and supporting officers.

Both groups are having different views as far as popular participation is concerned. The powers of these two groups, as mentioned earlier, do not seem to support the idea of giving power to the people. Inequality in status worked against the people and their representatives. It appears that the government officials and some of the politicians who work with them are usurping the power of the people.

In Massa district, for example, it has been found that the decentralised bureaucracy is not responsive to people’s problems and demands. This lack of responsiveness is not only to people’s development projects that demand government aid or help, but also to the projects that are to be implemented on a self-help basis. But on the other hand the district bureaucracy is very responsive to high authority when it comes to matters that seem to threaten its position.

The government officials at the districts know that they should be following the route laid down for them by the party and government on the management of rural development, but still they tend to be unresponsive to the citizens. This attitude by the bureaucracy worked against the concept of popular participation.
Mushi, in an attempt to find the reasons that led to the bureaucratia – people gap, relates the whole problem to the models of planning used in practice and the model implied by the Tanzanian ideology of socialism and self-reliance. What is preferred by the technocrats is what Mushi calls the technico-rational model, while what is supposed to be taking place, is what might be called the politics-transformation model. 45 Few words about each model are necessary.

a - the technico-rational model: This model emphasizes techniques, efficiency in performance, rational procedures and optimal results, with the assumption that management of the development process at both micro and macro levels will be the responsibility of technocrats. Thus whatever is mentioned about people’s participation is of secondary importance. Mass mobilisation is not given any weight, let alone the machinery for its achievements. Obtaining optimum programmes and projects constitute the central element of the model. The advocates of the model do so because they think that (1) the government bears the responsibility for financing most of the development projects and programmes. The people’s contributions are minimal; (2) there are enough experts to manage development projects and programmes; (3) information about the development situation is available and feedback is not a major constraint; (4) there is a widespread economic
rationality in the villages so that where projects require popular inputs, the people will readily cooperate as long as they can be assured that the projects will advance their material well-being; and (5) the purpose of planning is not to bring about a fundamental change in the economy and society. It is simply a rational way to achieve optimal results from scarce resources.

b - The political-transformation model: Those who advocate the political-transformation model (mainly politicians) argue that while aspiring to achieve higher levels of production, they have transformation of the economy and society as its central objectives. Too much emphasis is laid on the broad masses in bringing out development, but it must be development accompanied with transformation and not simply statistical increase in production with the existing economic structure. Transformation here includes significant changes in relations of production and power relations. It also involves equitable distribution of economic and political links between the nation and external centres of finance capital and technology.

The disagreement between the advocates of the two models is on the importance of people's participation in development. It is clear that the technical-rational model regards it not as part and parcel of rural development, but rather as something that assists in procuring it, while the political-transformation model views people's participation, not only as part and parcel
of the development effort, but as an important and essential element in the policy of socialism and self-reliance. These conflicting views have wider effects as far as the objectives found in the Arusha Declaration and Party Guidelines are concerned. It was in large part a realization of this danger that led to the '1975 Village and Ujamaa Village Act'. Villages in Tanzania now constitute entities with legal autonomy. However, this autonomy will only be meaningful if it is accompanied by economic, social and political power. The Act made no significant changes. The government bureaucrats continue to be unresponsive to the citizens. The bureaucrat's perception of development did not change. They still see it as their duty to initiate and direct all developmental activities. They see that the villagers in the initial stages of decentralization need to be guided and directed.

In Mtwara village for example, all civil servants tend to believe that villagers have social and cultural values that are negative to development. It is from these negative socio-cultural values that the Civil Servants see the need of sometimes making all decisions at the district headquarters, and by-passing the villagers. The technocrats in the district tend to make complaints accusing the politicians of making work difficult for them by introducing unplanned campaigns and operations and making too many risky ventures into the unknown.
Moshi argues that the political leadership at the centre on its part is not happy with the pace at which planning is taking place. Planners are blamed for not being too fast. This attitude by the political leadership affected the nature of participation by the planners. In most cases they lost the sense of being creative and their participation has been transformed from one of initiative and innovation to that of compliance with central directives in some cases. "Technical planners and functional managers have tended to say: 'Let us go along with whatever the party directives say'. Planners in such cases view national campaigns and operations simply as 'political programmes geared at mobilising the people' and that the mobilisation task is the responsibility of the politicians and party functionaries alone. This feeling tends to maximise the inevitable conflict between popular participation and formal planning procedures leading to the split between formal government administration and local structures of popular participation, 51.

Of the important factors that worked against people's participation and making a reality of the slogan 'power to the people' is central control on the periphery. This control is both political and administrative. Central control is contradictory to the whole policy of decentralisation. Although horizontal relationships between the political and government bodies are found at lower levels, it is evident that both the party and government maintain links with their head of offices in the centre. Central control by the government is clear through the recruitment, promotion and transfer
of its officials; allocation of public funds, issuing of plan guidelines and receiving the plans of different regions.

Control of the party over local government is related to the fact that all units working in districts, be they local government or otherwise, are subject to decisions made at the party's apex. TANU is supreme. All activities and decisions made by units in the districts and regions, must be revealed to the higher party organs. TANU at the centre also monopolises the decision of transferring party regional and district secretaries and executive secretaries. It also selects candidates who wish to fight the elections for leadership positions at the local level.

The vertical relationships that exist between the government and party structures in the rural areas and the centre resulted in excessive control by the centre. It is bound to hinder, rather than accelerate popular participation and contribute to the continuation of the conflict between the government and party at the local level.

The Role of the Commissioners. The Commissioners in Tanzania, have a big role to play. In both regional and district levels (regional commissioners and area commissioners respectively) are supposed to harmonise relations between the government and party at both levels, since they head the administration and are leaders of political activity. They are supposed to set a good example for those people below them to follow. If
the commissioners were effective and efficient enough, they
are likely to make possible the fusion between the government
and party. An achievement of such fusion by the commissioners
is far from being real, in Swaziland region for example they
"failed to lessen the dominance of the bureaucracy in favour
of increased political participation in economic and political
decision-making at the district and regional levels." Their
failure is attributed mainly to the highly centralised process
of resource allocation that pays more attention to sectoral
and departmental rather than local priorities. They also
lack the necessary sanctions which they might wield with
respect to civil servants who are nominally under them. The
civil servants also maintain strong relations with their
departments, and it is to these departments that they look
for guidance and promotion. The commissioners in such
situations are left helpless.

The commissioners are agents of the centre in the regions
and districts who are supposed to mobilise the people to
follow central directions. The accusation made against this
is that only marginally did they increase participation
either by exerting TANU control over the bureaucracy or by
representing the interests of the people of their area in
the national allocative process. The commissioners are also
supposed to coordinate the government bureaucracy in a manner
consonant with national political goals and, within the
parameters set by these goals, local political demands. They are ideally to ensure that the broad interests of the people are not subverted by departmental localism and that development plans are people's plans when the initiative for this is lacking at the local level. But it is doubtful enough if these functions are being carried properly.

The Prime Ministers Office - PMO. Under the decentralisation policy, the PMO was created to act as a central coordinating unit vis-à-vis the region. It was expected to direct the regions and act as a 'super ministry' with which government staff in the regions and districts will consult. It was handicapped by lack of qualified staff. However, the results were not in favour of the system. The office was handicapped by lack of qualified staff. The PMO was not welcomed in the regions, district and by functional ministries. Government officials considered it as a handicap and a bottleneck to their activities. It was not a surprise to find government departments ignoring the existence and finalising deals between themselves. This is an indication that unless the attitude of the government officials change, it is almost impossible to convince them to accept any new reforms.

As a conclusion to the discussion of the government officials - party officials conflict, one can say that the
situation in Tanzania is rather similar to what happened in Ghana during Nkrumah's rule. In Ghana,

the alliance between party and government which was the heart of the political system was more apparent than real. It was not an alliance between equals. Only in Nkrumah's person were party and government truly united. In theory the party was supposed to be the political power house from which members of government drew their energies and inspirations. But at all levels below the leader, party and government viewed each other with reserve and some hostility. 56.

It seemed that instead of the alleged party supremacy in Tanzania, TAWU was not capable enough to command and resolve the difficulties found at the local level and foster the ground for a sound participation by the people in an effort to transform the Tanzanian society. "The level of participation from below is very limited." 57 It is not a problem of organisation per se. Theoretically TAWU is strong. The core of the problem is with the people at different levels of the hierarchy, especially the lower levels, who were given the responsibility to lead. It is true that TAWU faced many difficulties, but were not insurmountable if the right type of leadership is found. The leadership problem is perhaps a common problem that characterises most African countries. In Tanzania, as was the case in the Niger Republic villages remained largely in the hands of local elites and town chiefs. Party
activities failed to generate a sense of mass participation in a national task and the creation of village level party cells failed to improve the quality and volume of communication possible between the national leadership and the villagers.56

Although the results of the decentralisation policy up to now are not (or did not) favour people's participation, it has been argued by Rweyemamu that there is still room for local initiative. This will depend on (1) the extent to which villagers are able to make use of powers bestowed on them by the villages and Ujamaa Village Act of 1975 in bargaining with agents of public service, and (2) the extent to which the local party functionaries are able to utilise the local supremacy of the party to mobilise and guide the peasants into a progressive direction.59 These two factors have not been fully achieved.

Rweyemamu's thesis concentrates on the fact that regional planning has been vertically oriented since the decentralisation policy left financial powers at the centre. Accordingly, the Centre can determine the fate of the regions and districts for the mere fact that it controls the finances. Without adequate revenue, the masses are left helpless, and in this connection, Naeda argues that before the national leadership can undertake to delegate more decisions making powers to the
local organs, it must ensure that these lower organs are capable of using their powers to generate social and economic development within the system ideological framework. So what is also needed is that the general level of the masses must be raised both technically and politically. A high degree of political consciousness is necessary if the congruence between the masses and their leaders is to be achieved. This will necessarily decrease the pressure that comes from above. Such pressures are manifested in the continued control of the localities by the centre. Technical capabilities of the elected leaders also need to be raised to enable them to understand the language used by government officials as far as planning is concerned. To achieve the above objectives will entirely depend on how strong TANU is. The task ahead is great as far as strengthening TANU is concerned. Success is greatly influenced by the leaders’ ideological commitment and their capacity to motivate the villagers and organise them for the attainment of the social, economic and political objectives. Party branches in the villages have to play a greater role in this process than is currently occurring. The party’s role must be more defined and made more understood to the villagers. This necessitates politicisation of the masses since:

politicisation has appeared to be an important aspect of the solution to many problems of the development front, and it is also clear that the political party must be the major vehicle
of that politicisation. Such a party must be characterized by an effective organisation and ideological coherence.

In the absence of such politicisation, many government initiatives may be self defeating.

It is clear from the discussion that in Tanzania, at the local level, the problem was, is and will continue to be, that of releasing the creative innovative power of the peasant mass and to harness its energies to national economic objectives through peasant participation in development programmes. Farmers attitudes need to be changed to make them more receptive to involvement in and responsibility for local level development. Peasant participation would have to be structured and re-structured to guarantee its survival. Structuring does not involve only local level organisation, but adequate linkages to the national elites. Such a process would not only involve vastly improved farmer modernisation but the growth of national level access to the village, with the diminution of the power of intermediary level notables. A radical transformation of local political structures is needed through a combination of national economic action and grass-roots political action.

To conclude this section, one can argue that the policy dilemma in Tanzania is a very real one. Up to
the present time the objectives stipulated in the Arusha Declaration and party guidelines are far from being real. The transformation of the society, changing the peasants attitudes, and building a socialist society has not taken place. The Tanzanian government has not yet succeeded in obtaining mass acceptance of its policies. Without this mass acceptance it will be difficult to talk about building the nation. A long distance race is still to be won if the transformation of society, which is a prerequisite of socialism, is to be attained.

Despite Nyerere's emphasis on adopting a policy of policies that suit the situation of diverse peasantisms, little has been done to follow up his insight. But, it would be rash to judge Nyerere's socialism from a cynical point of view. There is no reason to doubt the moral conviction of Nyerere's brand of socialism. One may doubt his, and his supporters' as well, ability to achieve what he believes in. The programme of ideological and economic development on which Tanzania has embarked is an ambitious one. It involves overcoming a number of basic challenges inherent in the decision to bring about a revolution by evolution. The policy of gradual transition to socialism represents a logical response to the extreme poverty of Tanzania. Tanzania cannot afford not to experiment, but it
cannot also absorb many major setbacks without seriously retarding or endangering the process of transformation. In the next few years, Nyerere's policies will have to achieve further socialist advances, or he and his policies are likely to meet tougher resistance both inside and outside Tanzania. However, Nyerere needs every kind of encouragement and support for what may be described as the bravest experiment in socialism in the African continent.


17. Ibid., p.9.

18. Ibid., p.15.


Further confirmation for this exploitation was cited in the Tanzanian Daily News, July 9, 1971. The heading "Police hunt for child labour agents" appeared. It has been revealed that the police have mounted a search for agents who recruit primary school children from Njombe district to work in capitalist tobacco farms in Iringa, about 40 per cent of primary school pupils in three divisions in the district desert to seek manual labour in Iringa annually. It was argued that rich tobacco growers in Iringa send agents to bribe parents and woo the children. The Area Commissioner of Njombe said that large scale farmers sent trucks to Njombe to collect children who were paid as little as two Shillings per day. (The stipulated minimum wage for farm labourers in Iringa is 6 Shillings 85 cents a day for adults and 7 Shillings 60 cents for those under 18 years of age).

There are people who do not see the need for Ujamaa villages in such developed areas if the purpose was to increase production. Production is already in good shape. What is needed is to put an end to practices which are against the socialist spirit and stop exploitation of people. There is no guarantee that if Ujamaa villages were started in such areas the malpractices will stop. What is needed is more political education in order to change the attitudes. This is a socialising role which TANU is supposed to play. Among the supporters of such a view is Dr. Neda of Kilimanji College and the Prime Minister's Office in Dar es Salaam.

Ibid., pp. 35-7.


37. Neshji, op. cit., p. 278.


40. Miller, op. cit., p. 506.


46. Samuel Muchi, *op. cit.*, p. 3.


48. G. Hyden: Decentralization and the Government Staff, Decentralization Research Project, University of Dar es Salaam, 1976, p. 37; *The Village and Masama Village Act: It is an act to provide for the registration of villages, the administration of registered villages and designation of registered villages*, 12th, August, 1975.


51. Samuel Muchi, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

52. Finusamu, *op. cit.*, p. 27.


55. Attitudes towards the role of the peasants in development. The government officials have a negative view about the issue and look at any attempts introduced by the government to allow the peasants to participate with suspicion. The government staff's perception as far as development is concerned must change if they are to accept new policies that favour peasant participation.


60. Masada, loc. cit., p. 351.


In this part an attempt will be made to assess the functioning of the SNU and local government structures and try to find out whether theory and practice tally. The practical level of ideology will be in consideration, too. But this is a rather difficult task compared to the Tanzanian case. In Tanzania, the ideology of Ujamaa is made clear, as well as the means for its achievement. There was no difficulty in pinpointing any deviations from the official ideology. In the Sudan, the difficulty stems from the fact that no coherent ideology as such exists. The term 'socialism' was only used after May 1969, and no agreement as to what kind of socialism could be made. Different versions were used by different politicians depending on what they regard as most suitable. However, the many names given to our brand of socialism should not discourage us from comparing and contrasting our experiment with the Tanzanian one. The many names used as far as ideology is concerned might show inconsistency, and perhaps weakness, as far as the ideology is concerned. But one common denominator could be drawn: that all the ideologues want to build a socialist society characterised by 'abundance in production and equality in distribution'. No clear policies were made as to how to achieve that goal. But
the new political and administrative structure were supposed to be the first step. Concentration on the functioning of the NSU and local government structures will be the gist of this part.

The importance of the newly created structures is found in the assumption that they are the melting pots where differences are resolved, efforts by the people put together, mobilised and directed towards a certain goal. An educational role is expected from them as well. It is the belief of the leaders of the present regime in the Sudan (from May 25, 1969) that the institutions that existed before May 1969, be they political parties or local government agencies, arrested the creative efforts of the people, failed to educate them and consequently mobilise them to achieve the goals of nation building. Political parties, before May 1969, are always accused of helping in fostering division rather than unity, a phenomenon that is dysfunctional to the development process. Weaknesses in the social, economic and political spheres were attributed to the defunct political parties. The local government system was also given its share of the blame. A wide gap separated the leaders and the led. The reasons, it has been argued, were found in the fact that the political parties were not serious about people's participation in politics. Contacts with the people were only made during elections for the parliamentary seats. This was accompanied
by corrupt practices like using economic incentives to gain the votes. This was a one-way communication. Feedback, that is, to say, communication from the bottom to the top, did not exist. Total rejection of people's participation created a passive and apathetic citizenry. Within the newly created structures it is thought that enough room will be made for people's involvement in all development fields in an attempt to push the country forward towards economic, political and social progress. It is hoped that a double-way communication will be made possible, and the masses will make their 'voice' listened to by the leadership.

But, to convince the people to participate, it is not enough to create new institutions, be they political or otherwise. The people must first be convinced of the usefulness of participation. What they need to know is that by participating they will be better off, economically, and otherwise. In the absence of a clearly defined ideological line, as it is the case in the Sudan, one does not expect to find what might be called 'ideological conviction'. In countries where ideologies are clearly defined and are strong enough, they could be used as a sort of 'political religion' to gain the support of many people, especially in a political system where the creation of public policy rests on some distance away from the vast majority of the population. Ideology could be used as a "media to beat"
psychic benefit on a given policy to those sectors or individuals who do not receive any material benefit from the policy, and who did not have any opportunity to participate in its formulation. 4 But it must be mentioned that ideology is only one variable among others that could be used to convince the people to participate. In the case of Sudan, the absence of a clearly defined ideology, other variables must be found. The newly created structures must offer the people something in return for their participation. If the people are convinced that their standards of living will materially change for the better, then one can expect what can be called 'participation unlimited'. However, the process depends entirely on how skillful is the political leadership in convincing the people to participate. The quality of leadership is of crucial importance. The present regime found no difficulty in building the new institutions; but was it successful in producing the right type of leadership?

1. The Sudanese Socialist Union - SSU

The SSU is given (at least in theory) a major role to play as far as policy guidelines are concerned. It is supposed to be the initiator of major policies and follow-up their implementation. Regarding the question of mobilization and participation of the masses, it is expected to
play a key role. If the SSU is to effectively play this role, then the question of attitudinal change must seriously be taken into consideration. Old values and beliefs held by the people must be changed before they can accept new ones. The citizens must know that they are capable enough to participate in decisions that affect them. What Almond and Verba call 'civic-competence' need to be created. But is the SSU capable, or did it prove to be capable, for the job? In one of the reports came the following as far as the SSU is concerned.

A new school of thought has emerged: the phenomenon of national involvement through open deliberations throughout the country. Problems are discussed and solutions suggested at the local level. Resolutions are then reached through committed active involvement, not through the impersonal and distant bureaucratic attitude.

In the same report, the importance of the human element was stressed, especially those entrusted with work in key positions.

It therefore becomes imperative that all members, particularly those in the leadership, show their commitment and full devotion and loyalty to the May Revolution.

In a different report, similar emphasis on the leadership was made, and added to it was the question of mass participation.
The leadership of the political organisation for national action in all positions came from the fact that it is a ruling organisation, and effective due to its popularity gained through attracting the masses to its arena, A.

Addressing the Central Committee of the SSU in its third session, President Himmaf argued that the SSU is "the only means of popular participation," All these statements were made because it is the hope that the SSU through its thousands of basic units and branches throughout the country could provide the necessary platform for a sound people's participation. These were the hopes. But about the reality? Did the hopes become true or is there a different story?

In my assessment of the functioning of the SSU, and the new systems of local government, I will start by citing some of the views given by men who are at the helm of these organisations before embarking on discussing the findings from my case studies in the Red Sea Province (R.S.P.) and Northern Darfur Province (N.D.P.).

4, The President of the SSU: In a joint meeting for the San's political bureau, the Council of Ministers and the SSU's Secretariat General, the President of the SSU made an assessment about the functioning of the SSU as he sees it. He argued that after almost ten years of critical assessment must be made. He started by discussing the basic rules of the SSU.

He concentrated on the fact that the rules, if properly
followed, provide for smooth action, interaction and development at all levels. To the President, there is no need for directives to come from above since the SSU is a mass organisation. "But", argued the President, "in spite of this, I was cautiously watching how the SSU was functioning, and recorded some of the mistakes", and, "I was determined not to let others know that, because I do believe that if things went wrong, the others can detect them and remedy the malady".

The President was confident enough that the leadership at different levels of the SSU is qualified enough to carry the job properly. They, as he thought, were capable enough for 'cleaning the house' from those members who prove to be beyond the required calibre. He stressed the fact that his role as President is a limited one. He was expecting others, especially in the Secretary General, to take the initiative and let the 'winds of change' blow in order to put an end to malpractices and/or deviations from the policies made. But, according to the President, the political leadership seems to have kept a close eye on the failures and setbacks that took place. There are too many areas in which the SSU failed to play its role properly and assert its supremacy. The President commented about those areas of failure. Most important of the comments were:
1. The SSU failed to help the people in solving their basic problems. Problems that have to do with consumer goods and the rocketing prices. Basic units, branches and those at the top proved to be a failure.

2. Basic units and branches neglected their organisational role completely. Conferences are rarely held; even when this happens, the leaders do all the "talking" and never listen to the masses.

3. Conflict between branches in workplaces on the one hand and management and trade unions on the other is noticeable.

4. The SSU failed to play any role, whatsoever, to put an end to the many strikes that took place in different parts of the country.

5. The SSU failed to present any meaningful suggestion about what to do to raise productivity in many of the projects in which production is deteriorating, or stopped completely.

6. The role of the SSU in explaining to the people the 'Decentralisation policy' is very insignificant.
7 - The daily activities within the SSR in Khartoum, seem to be very bureaucratic in nature rather than being with and for the people.

8 - There is no evidence of coordination between the SSR headquarters and other parts of the country. Even contacts between the leaders at different levels are rare.

9 - Concerning financial matters, extravagance characterised spending in the SSR.

A thorough accountability in the SSR is necessary as the President argued. Even an alternative for the SSR could be made if the people wanted that. The President said that if the malpractices were a direct responsibility of the leadership, at all levels, then there is no reason for them to continue. All this shows the deep concern by the President of the SSR, and his awareness about the problems facing the SSR if it is left to continue functioning as it is.

8 - The Organisation Committee of the SSR. This is one of the committees of the Secretariat General, and is directly responsible for organisational affairs in the SSR. In 1977, the Committee published a report in an attempt to evaluate the functioning of the SSR. The report is an attempt to give a rosy picture about the SSR. Apart from admitting that
conferences at different levels are not held according to the Schedule, the report given the impression that perfection is maintained. Paradoxically enough, the Secretary of the same Committee that published the report, in one of the meetings of the Central Committee of the SSR, said things that are totally different to what is embodied in the report. (This will be cited later).

C - The Central Committee of the SSR: In most of the sessions of the SSR, the views of delegates from all parts of the country are expressed openly. Critical assessments are made and drawbacks as well as successes are pinpointed. In one of the sessions a member of the Committee argued that:

After seven years from its inaugural conference, the SSR is still on the ground. It is weak, disunited and disorganized especially in urban areas... It failed to mobilize the people and gain their acceptance of it... Even among some of the members of the central committee there are some who do not know what their duties are. It is a clear indication that some of the members did not read, or do not understand, the basic rules of the SSR. If this is the case with the Central Committee members, how can we blame those who are at the base for not being active enough? 14.

attacks by the same member were made on the Secretariat General for not stretching a helping hand to the provinces. To him, very few attempts were made to enlighten the people in the provinces about what is taking place. Another member talked about the 'effectiveness' of the SSR and argued that it is
not effective enough. As an example, most of the decisions made by the province committees and conference of the SSU are not implemented. To him, the government officials, mainly the administrators, are unwilling to cooperate and do not take the decisions made by the SSU seriously. The SSU is helpless. Such a problem is cited by a third member from the Gede province. Instead of cooperation, there is mistrust and disliking he argued. The Commissioner of the Gedare province found himself on the defensive. He tried to defend the SSU by relating the problem to other things 'both domestic and external'. To him the SSU is strong enough. But the Commissioner did not clarify what those 'other things' really are. The Commissioner of the Blue Nile Province admitted that there is a problem facing the SSU in his area. He blamed the administrative organs for not seriously considering decisions and recommendations made by the SSU. What is noticeable, is that the Commissioners, who are at the same time Secretaries for the SSU in the provinces, always try to attribute the problems that face the SSU to 'other things', but not to the malfunctioning of the SSU. It is not my intention to find out why it is common among the commissioners to echo the same views about the SSU. The commissioners themselves were attacked by other members of the Central Committee. The reports made by the Commissioners were the focus of the attacks. The
majority of the members of the Central Committee think that the reports are not at all satisfactory since they dealt with services and other minor issues and neglected completely the ideological and organizational problems facing the SNU. Such attacks exposed most of the commissioners and some people started to question whether they (the Commissioners) are capable for the job or not. The Commissioners were expected to deal with their party guidelines, their implementation, the problems they faced and how successful were they in transcending them. But such things never appeared in their reports except in few cases.

Another accusation against the commissioners, is that they tend to concentrate all powers in their hands. Such accusations if they are true, tend to make the whole issue of people’s participation, a mere slogan. As one of the members argued “The commissioner and his deputies should be held responsible for the success or failure of the SNU in the provinces since political activity is concentrated in their hands.”

Some of the commissioners, being critically attacked by members of the Central Committee, tried to find a scapegoat and argue that it is because of the lack of communications between Khartoum and other provinces that not too much has yet been achieved. It has been argued by one of the commissioners that the Secretary General in Khartoum does not
communicate properly with other provinces, and in most cases, people in the provinces do not know about what is taking place at the centre in Khartoum. The attack was mainly directed towards the Organisation Committee. The Secretary of the Committee, tried to defend himself, as everyone else did. He argued that they 'in Khartoum' do send reports and try to keep in touch with the different provinces. He tried to shoulder the blame on the Secretaries and assistant Secretaries of the SSU in the provinces. He argued that after the implementation of the decentralisation policy, the challenge facing the SSU increased tremendously. He added that the SSU as it is presently organised in the provinces is not capable both as to quality and number of Secretaries to function properly. He argued that it is not enough to have five assistants for each Secretary in each province. He also raised doubts about the quality of the people who run the affairs of the SSU in each province and whether they are the most suitable for the job. He questioned the capability of assistant Secretaries for development for example, are they technically and politically qualified for the post? Do they know much about educational, agricultural and industrial problems in the provinces? What solutions, if any, do they have in mind for such problems? To him, similar questions are applicable to other assistants. To him, many of the assistants in the provinces are below the required calibre,
His personal contacts and experience with many of them in
different provinces are convincing enough for him to argue
that way. (See p. 46). The majority, if not all of them, are
politically and technically incapable and inexperienced for the
job. The solution, is to start a complete reorganisation and
change of the political cadre in all the provinces. If the
SSP is to be built on firm grounds,

As has been mentioned by the Secretary for Organisation
the core of the problem is found in the weakness of the
existing political cadre. Accordingly the SSP's mission in
mobilising the people and preparing them to play an active
role is not more than wishful thinking. Members of the
Central Committee were aware of the lingering problem and
on many occasions it has been argued that too much is wasted,
either time and money, in training people who did not benefit
the SSP. Lack of trained manpower, paralysed the army. Both
trained and committed manpower were lacking. Many of the
commissioners admitted the existence of such a problem. But
the Commissioner of the Red Sea Province argued that it is
not the lack of trained manpower which is the problem, but
the existence of too many leaders at the same time. The problem
becomes more clear and grave as one goes below the province
level. This creates confusion and lines demarcating responsibil-
ity are blurred. Hence the question of who is doing what is
not answered. This leads to uncertainty, delays and more
problems.
The leadership problem is reflected on the membership. An organization with weak and inexperienced leadership will not be able to gather followers. However, it is claimed that the membership of the SNU was 4,500,000 in 1977. A member is a person with a membership card. Whether this is the right yardstick or not is open to dispute. The membership problem will be dealt with in a more detailed manner in the case studies that will follow.

What has been mentioned so far could be regarded as the views of people who really know how the SNU is functioning. But the ideas and views expressed were limited to what is taking place at the province level only. Very little was mentioned about what happens below, especially about people's participation. In my view, two reasons could be given as an explanation: it is either because there is no real participation taking place or the leadership does not know much about it.

One can conclude by saying that most of the members of the central committee are not fully satisfied with the performance of the SNU so far.
II. Decentralisation and Local Government

Building the NSU is meant to be the political device for moulding, shaping and preparing the people to play a leading role in developing the country. It is hoped that the NSU will succeed in changing attitudes, and mobilize the people to participate in the nation building process. Giving power to the people, it was thought, could not take place without an effective system of local government as well. This was the main reason for the creation of the 1971 People's Local Government Act - PLOA - and the decentralisation policies that followed. The objectives were:

1. Mobilisation of resources by the population in areas where they live.
2. Utilisation of resources for development in projects and schemes that reflect particular area priorities and needs.
3. Direction and control of policies by representatives and officials who are in close touch with the needs of the area and responsive to the wishes of the population there.
4. Allowing of differences (though not conflicts) between areas to suit the needs and wishes of the local peoples.

It was hoped that by achieving the above mentioned goals, the people will be in full control of their own affairs and able
to play an effective role as far as development and building of a socialist society are concerned.

The PLGA, like any other new philosophy or programme of government is bound to face some problems when it comes to the implementation stage. One of the major reasons for such problems is that the masses are as yet not fully aware about what the PLGA is about, and what power they have. A number of new and different organs have replaced the old system of local government in both urban and rural centres. Following the creation of the PLGA, no serious attempts followed it to enlighten the masses about it. The problem was more serious in rural areas where Sheikhs and Qatias dominated the scene for a long time. When they (Sheikhs and Qatias), officially, lost their status, many organs that are affiliated to the SNU were created, these include Youth and Women Unions, Village Development Committees and Village Councils. However, the persistence of tribal loyalties made many of the tribal leaders to continue to have a strong influence over local affairs. This was one of the problems that faced the people who engineered the PLGA. What added to the problem is that the creation of the PLGA left two main confusion unresolved.

1. Confusion over division of power and responsibilities.

The PLGA does not spell out detailed responsibilities and relationships.
Confusion in the minds of the people. The people in villages and rural areas were accustomed to the single focus in native administration, and still in most areas deeply influenced by tribal life, villagers cannot understand why these new institutions are needed. 22

In an attempt to assess the performance of the new PLGA in different parts of the Sudan, a Select Committee was formed in 1976 to carry the job. The members of the Committee were members of the people's assembly at the time of its formation. In its findings, the Select Committee found out that the People's Executive Council - PEC's - in the provinces is below the required standards. 23 The reasons were mainly financial and administrative.

1. The Administrative Argument. The PEC's have been accused of concentration of powers at the province levels. Very few powers are delegated to the councils below the province level, especially when it comes to finance. This accusation was echoed by many of the delegates who attended the First National Congress for People's Local Government held in Khartoum in 1976. Delegates from the Red Sea Province for example argued that services in most parts of the province were not rendered because all powers were concentrated in the hands of the commissioner, his assistants and the central
committee of the PRC. In a rather similar vein delegates from Northern Pradesh argued that concentration of powers at the province level resulted in slow and erratic rate of performance. Delegates from Northern Darfur Province made similar complaints and argued that powers are concentrated in the PRC, and very little is delegated to the intermediary and base levels.

2 - The Financial Argument: The financial problem is a direct result of concentration of powers in the PRC at the province level. But, the finance that PRC's themselves possess is not enough to allow for too much delegation of financial powers to levels below the province, as the Select Committee's report shows. Such a situation left the People's Councils in a bad shape.

People's Local Councils generally do not possess the financial base that make them institutions effective in the performance of services to the required extent. They do not have the budgets nor do they have the suitable buildings nor the equipment nor the trained cadre. This case as a natural outcome for the tremendous increase in the number of councils for it is impossible to provide the financial needs to such tremendous number of councils. This is how the People's local councils are.

In the First National Congress for People's Local Government, the delegates of the different provinces admitted the existence of financial constraints both at the province level and the levels below that. The delegates wanted more decentralisation.
as far as finance is concerned, to levels below the province. But without increasing the financial capability of the PNC’s it is not possible to see such decentralisation of financial powers taking place. At the same time concentrating financial powers, however weak these powers may be, defies the policy of decentralisation. This is a dilemma, but a solution must be found.

The financial problem is a real problem facing the implementation of the PNC’s, and increasing shortages of funds became the featuring aspect of the services of the PNC’s. The problem is exacerbated by the reluctance of some of the Central ministries to transfer some of their powers to the PNC’s. But even when that took place, the PNC’s tend to exercise complete control over all activities of central units functioning in the province. The PNC’s were designed to blame progress inside the province through the contribution of rich councils to support the needy ones. But in practice it did not happen. Instead, the rich councils were impoverished and the poor councils did not get better. The President of the Republic who is the patron of the people’s local government admitted the existence of such problems when he argued that:
in the permanent constitution it is clearly stated that the people's local government is one of the means through which the needed change takes place.... Although these were undeniable successes, there are also too many shortcomings and setbacks concerning the implementation. There are too many obstacles in the way ahead. One of the major obstacles is the reluctance of central ministries to transfer some of their powers to the provinces. Another reason is that the People's Executive Councils in the provinces monopolize financial and administrative fields and made no efforts to decentralize further down wards, 30.

The weakness and the bad implementation of the PLOA in the Sudan is not only a consequence of powers with the PLOA's. Two more problems could be added, These are:

3. Lack of trained and qualified manpower. The PLOA, especially after the decentralization policies that accompanied it, required a certain calibre of cadre,31 which seems to be lacking so far. The problem has been discussed in the First National Congress for the People’s Local Government, but no solutions were offered. The present councillors in most parts of the country, in both urban and rural areas, do not seem to be doing anything more than the distribution of consumer goods, but, how to promote the new system of local government and convince the people to be involved in it, is not being given too much attention. The confusion over division of powers and responsibilities, which is left unresolved by the PLOA, might partially be responsible, but not totally. The
Councillors' role as distributors of goods, created problems for them. When there are shortages, the people accuse them for being the reasons. Many have been described as being corrupt, opportunists seeking personal gain and enrichment. Such accusations gave the councils a bad name and most people were reluctant to join. Under such circumstances there is no wonder if ordinary citizens turned to deposed Mvire and Gwede for guidance and advice. This is especially true in areas where native administration was very strong.

2 - Lack of Collective responsibility in the Councils. In most councils there seems to be a conflict between government officials and elected councillors. One of the objectives of the MCA is to foster the ground for a better relationship between the government staff on the one hand and the elected councillors on the other since the names will be the only losers in case of any conflict between the two groups. The creation of a collective sense of responsibility at the local level is thought to be possible under the MCA. Administrative officers - AO - and Technical Officers - TO - are given seats in rural and town councils, and, where present, in village councils, by right of office. Their number was not to exceed one third of the membership of the council they join. They were supposed to have an equal say as elected members of the council without giving them any special status. The idea was intended to, (1) break down the popular attitude that it
is the officials who govern, (2) allow government officials to be involved in decision making with the popular representatives; and (3) put an end to the officials—people's split.

In practice, the so-called 'sense of collective responsibility' rarely existed. Government officials do not seem to have understood, or disliked, the system yet. On the other hand, the capacity of most elected councillors to stand on equal footing with the government officials is doubtful. They are behind us to both educational and technical capacities. When it comes to problem solving issues it is the government staff who are normally given most recognition by the ordinary people. The government officials used to work with the people even before the creation of the PEA.

What adds to the lack of a 'sense of collective responsibility' is that even the government staff are not united among themselves. Technical officers, when it comes to technical issues, see no point in letting the administrators, for example, to participate in making decisions. In the report Local Government and Development in the Sudan: The Experience of Southern Darfur Province, it has been clearly stated that technical officers in the Council do not understand the system itself, and in most cases resent the system for their apparent subordination to the administrative officers. Councillors on the other hand are expected to take a major role in
decision making and implementation of policy, but are
either prepared or accustomed to it. 33 This is probably
the situation elsewhere. Such a situation, if left to
continue, will not lead to the desired collective respons-
ibility. Without the collective responsibility, the masses
are always the big losers.

Generally, the situation of the People’s Local Government
is not bright enough. As has been mentioned, the system is
hamstrung by both financial and human constraints which
resulted in the bad performance that has characterised the
implementation stage. The people’s local government is
shouldering great responsibilities in providing the necessary
services to the people. If it failed to help the people in
getting their basic needs and demands, a negative response by
the people to government policies will result. If this happened,
the nation building efforts will atrophy. Without increased
central government extractive and distributive capabilities,
one cannot imagine how the system will succeed.

After giving a rather generalised picture about the
performance of the GSU and the application of the PLEA in
the Sudan, the arguments made, could only be supported or
refuted by confining ourselves to specific areas. These
areas are, as mentioned before, the RSP and NDP,
THE RED SEA PROVINCE - REP

Introduction. The organisation of the SSU in the REP is similar to what is found in other provinces. There is a Secretariat General and the Commissioner of the province acts as its Secretary General. There are five assistant Secretaries who head each of the five specialised committees. Below the province level branches and basic units of the SSU are found in all areas, districts and villages in the province. The total membership of the SSU is said to be 155,880 in 1979. The assumption made is that the SSU is strong and effective enough to provide for effective communication network between the different layers of the organisation. As far as the organisation of local government is concerned, local government councils cover most parts of the province with the REP at the apex of the pyramid. The Commissioner as well is the president of the REP. The main idea behind the whole system is to give 'more power to the people', a slogan being echoed almost by all politicians.

In the REP, I met both officials and non-officials. The views of the two sides are listened to since both are supposed to be involved in the policy-making process. By officials I mean those who hold key positions as far as the SSU in the province is concerned, and by non-officials the spectrum is wide. This is made clear by looking to the table below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession or Trade</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in the Port</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual workers outside the Port</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers (grocers, greengrocers and butchers)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students in Port-Sudan High Secondary School</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel Attendants</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The choice of these people was made at random and no specific and/or direct questions were made. But the case was different with those who work in the SSU. There was no hesitation in asking whatever questions I wanted to ask.

The Views of the Officials: In the SSU headquarters in Port Sudan, my concentration was on the SSU’s membership, the problems facing it and the solutions offered by the leadership in the province. In between, other questions are made, but all are related to the membership, structure and functioning of the SSU. Those whom I met, especially in the Organisation Committee tended to concentrate on how the SSU is organised at different levels and make quotations from the Basic Rules of the SSU. To me, this was not
interesting enough. What I wanted to know from them were things like: what role is the SSU playing in educating, mobilising and preparing the people to play their role as far as participation and development are concerned? How successful is the SSU in transmitting to the people outside Port Moresby the ideas and principles of the regime, and what response did it get from the people? What incentives is the SSU using in order to convince the people to join? What role did the SSU play to help the people in their daily problems especially in connection with consumer goods and fighting black-marketeers? What role is the SSU playing in fighting tribalism and sectarianism which are rampant in the area? What are the obstacles that obstruct the SSU when trying to achieve the above, and what efforts are made to bypass them? These were the kind of questions I was interested in, and was expecting to get detailed answers for them.

As far as the structure of the SSU is concerned, there was no difficulty in explaining that to me, since the whole thing is included in the Basic Rules of the SSU. As far as membership is concerned, it has been argued that total membership of the SSU in the PAP is 155,000. The PAP officials are convinced that by having such a big number, they can easily speak about a strong SSU organisation in the PAP. To me, this is not necessarily true. Commitment and dedication by the members is more important. To this, the
officials in the BSN argue that since all members hold membership cards, and since membership is voluntary, then commitment is there. Such an argument is not convincing enough, and expanded membership does not mean strength unless all, or most of the members, are actively involved in the activities of the party.42 I tried to find out how, or in what activities, do the registered members participate. Without participation, the slogan ‘power to the people’ cannot, or will not, become real. It was very difficult to produce any evidence of people’s participation other than participation in self-help schemes. In the early 1970’s, the people were active enough in building schools and clinics for example. Self-help was part and parcel of the country’s development. But the phenomenon seems to be fading away gradually because in most cases, the government was not able to provide its share in the schemes. In the case of schools built, teachers were not available in some places; and with clinics, medical staff was difficult to provide. It is difficult to say if the government’s failure to provide its share is due to the government’s lack of enough resources (human) or because the self-help schemes were not built in congruence with the government’s development plans. But what needs to be emphasized is that it is the government that told the people to participate and the people responded in the beginning. The government’s failure to inject the necessary impulse to make
the schemes look successful, whatever the reasons are, left the people disillusioned and they lost interest in self-help schemes. However, it is one of the duties of the SSU to enlighten the people on what to build, how and when. Such guidance and direction was not provided by the SSU.

Another aspect in which party members are said to be participating in is a very ceremonial in nature. Festivals, anniversaries and demonstrations in support of the regime are good examples to cite. However, such participation is of a very limited effect as far as development is concerned. Participation in ceremonial activities might help in ‘ego-satisfaction’. The leadership will start to think that the SSU they are building is really strong. Participation of such nature might help in expanding the regime’s symbolic capabilities but not the extractive and distributive ones.

The effort made by the political leadership in the PSP in order to encourage the people to participate positively, is not encouraging enough. All the assistants of the Secretary General of the SSU in the province and their aides, know that there is a need for citizens’ participation, and they have a role in directing the people. They are convinced that citizens’ participation is for the good of the province and the country at large. But how to achieve
that? Many of them seem to be ignorant as far as how to make a reality of the slogan 'people's participation' which they all echo. The assistant Secretary for development, for example, claims that the SSU encourages the people to participate, and they do participate in development efforts. But he was not specific enough about how the process is taking place. What could have been done by the SSU in the field of development can take different forms. The SSU branches can play a role in increasing production by encouraging workers in factories to work for longer hours and minimize time wasted in strikes, meetings or demonstrations in support of the regime. Maximum utilization of the scarce resources must also be one of the things that the workers need to know. Patriotism is something that needs to be instilled in part of the working force. This could be achieved if the SSU's role as an educating and socializing agent is effective enough. Some of the workers must learn that mishandling and misusing of machines, excess consumption in electricity and water supplies and continues demands for higher pews without increasing their productive efforts for example, have nothing to do with being patriotic. Branches can also help in creating better working relations between the workers and management and create a healthy atmosphere that will help in boosting production. But such things seem to be absent
from the minds of the people who are in charge of the development committees. Branches in the place of work, spend most of the time discussing politics without too much consideration to production and/or effectively carry their functions reflects the weakness of the branches and their leaders. This is not a surprise when the whole process of cadre training from the Secretariat General level down to the lowest level of the SSA in revealed. During my visit to the province, there were only three people who are said to be trained and qualified leaders capable of transmitting and filtering down the ideas and principles embodied in the basic documents. 42 Even the training that the three people got, is not an extensive one. They spent few weeks in Khartoum at the Socialist Studies and Research Institute - SSRI - 43 and were lectured on various themes concerning the Sudanese Society. When they are back in the SSP, they were expected to ‘enlighten’ the people, starting with the province down to the lowest level of the hierarchy. In my view, the training that the political leaders get at the SSA is not sufficient enough in order to produce the required type of leadership. 44 There is no wonder if the trainees of the SSA themselves failed to carry the job properly when they are back in their own provinces.
added to the weakness of the political cadre in the means they use when trying to communicate with the masses. One of the means, although not yet started, is the creation of small research institutes in the parts of the province. The effectiveness of such institutes is going to be very limited if the people in the province are serious about having them. Lack of qualified and capable trainers coupled with a high level of illiteracy are the major obstacles. Without removing the obstacles, the creation of mini-institutes in the DTP is going to be a waste of time and scarce resources.

Another means of communication is the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets in order to enable the people to read and understand the principles of the regime. A monthly magazine Al-Yakhsa (Vigilance) is also published. But the success of such means is doubtful enough in a province where the literacy rate is not more than 20 per cent. Its usefulness might be confined to a certain stratum — the educated.

A third means of communication is sought through face-to-face meetings. This is probably the most useful way of explaining to the people what role they are supposed to play and why. Discussions, and questions raised by the people in the presence of SSU leaders at different levels are useful enough. Useful in the sense that those who do not know can ask and get answers from those who know, or are supposed to know. Unfortunately such meetings and seminars, when they
take place, are held in the SSU headquarters in Port Sudan. Not too much effort is being made to visit other areas and sections in the province. The excuse given is that there is a transport problem. This means that the so-called political leaders in the province do not want to move from the centre. At the same time, no one can expect people who are as nomad and rural as the Beja, Halendsawa or Beni Amir to travel all the way from their villages to Port Sudan to listen to and participate in political debates. It is only when they are convinced that a better alternative is offered, better than what they already have, their response is positive. The people in rural and urban areas alike, must be convinced that by participating in activities and debates organized by the SSU, their economic and social standards will rise; otherwise there seems to be no point for them to respond. The government's extractive and distributive capabilities are of great importance in this respect. At this juncture, one must make a warning against false promises that are made in an attempt to win the rural people. False promises might help as a short-term solution, but will backfire in the long run.

The lack of trained and qualified cadre is reflected in the failure of both SSU officials and some of the administrative officers in the RD to explain to the people what is meant by the concept of decentralization. The impression I got when
interviewing different people in the NRM headquarters, and few administrative officers, is that the new system of decentralised administration has been digested by the officials. The officials knew about the objectives behind the policy, and most of them read about the new policy. They know that the country is too big to be administered from the centre and that is why they are in favour of decentralised administration. They know that a decentralised administration will give the people 'more powers,' and let them share in making decisions affecting them. To the officials, decentralisation is one way of making possible the mobilisation of resources by the population in areas where they live. It will also help the representatives and officials who are in close touch with the needs of their areas to direct and control policies according to the wishes and needs of the population of the area. They also know that the decentralisation policy will enable the centre to deal with national issues and leave minor ones to be dealt with locally in the provinces. The officials, in brief, read about the policy and can easily echo phrases like 'power to the people' and alike. But, the problem is that the understanding of the policy stops at that level. Most of the ordinary people, do not seem to understand much about the policy of decentralisation. The officials, who seem to understand are not capable enough in educating the people and
informing them about what the policy means. This failure reflects two things: either the officials are not willing to make an effort and explain the policy to the people, or they themselves, were echoing phrases which they read about but seem to have digested only on the surface.

The decentralization policy is not an easy thing for everybody to understand and great efforts must be made by the leadership in order to let the people know. But without making sure that the necessary qualified cadre, both as to quantity and quality, is created, the whole issue will continue to be monopolised by very few people at the centre, while the masses, who are supposed to be the real objective behind the decentralisation policy will continue as ignorant as ever and will not be able to play any constructive role as a result. 66

Finance is one of the obstacles facing the implementation of the policy of decentralisation and the activities of the SSU as well. 67 The problem is rather acute in the SSF "in spite of the big amount of revenues that the Central Government makes by using the port of Port Sudan", some of the officials argued. The implementation of the decentralisation policy is not an easy thing and it requires continuous supply of money. To implement the policy, requires the growth of a large number of councils in urban and rural centres, it requires efficiency
in communication between the councils and an increase in
the number of services especially in areas which were
neglected in the past. The decentralisation policy aims
at a total transformation of the society. This means that
the penetrators must penetrate into all villages and living
quarters and the policy must filter down to affect every
single individual if a positive response is required. However,
the chronic financial problem in the area, although not the
sole reason, is a factor that contributed greatly to the
very slow progress that characterised the implementation.

Officials in the SNF also complained that due to the critical
financial situation in the provinces, most of their activities
stopped. They argue that they have a transport problem
because there is no fund to buy or even hire automobiles,
and research institutions are not built because of the
financial position. Many of them believe that the situation
will improve if the financial problem is solved. 48

Besides the lack of resources, both human and financial,
there are other problems that stand as strong obstacles in
the face of the political leadership in the RSP when trying
to implement the policies and directives of the central
government. These are tribalism and sectarianism. To
assume that tribalism and sectarianism are dead, as most
people especially in the SNF headquarters in Khartoum argue,
is a very naive way of looking at the problem. Many people,
especially among those who are called political leaders, think that the present regime succeeded in fighting tribalism and sectarianism. Those people try to attribute the whole thing to the defunct political parties which were banned on 25th May 1969. It is true that the political parties, especially the Umma and People’s Democratic Party, were able to exploit tribal and sectarian loyalties to gain votes in the elections. But one can hardly argue that it is because of the party system that tribalism and sectarianism flourished. This is a wrong assumption, because both tribalism and sectarianism were deeply rooted into the Sudanese society even before the creation of any of the political parties. In the RSP tribal and sectarian loyalties do exist. Among the Beja in particular, there are still many people who still think about the ‘Beja Congress’. The Beja think that the Beja Congress is the most suitable organisation in the province to represent them. Those who think about a revival of the Beja Congress are not organised and are not strong enough accordingly. Legally, they are not supposed to function. However, the movement can find a fertile ground to grow if the SSU proved to be a failure in the RSP. The people are always looking for a better alternative and if the SSU did not prove to be the one, it can easily be defeated by tribal politics in the province.
Sectarianism on the other hand, is rampant. The danger that faces the SSU as a result is even greater than the one posed by tribal loyalties. In the RSP, especially in Sawakin and Sine'a, there are too many followers of the Khatmiyya Sect, and the SSU officials are aware about the strong influence of sectarianism. As followers of the Khatmiyya Sect, the people used to support traditional parties like the People's Democratic Party, and the Democratic Unionist Party. The leaders of the Khatmiyya Sect were to an extent the patrons of these parties. When the political parties were banned and the SSU formed, the problem was how to win the support of those people who are influenced by sectarianism and who used to support the traditional political parties in the past. This is a problem that seems to be absent from the minds of those who are in charge of the SSU in the RSP. To answer, since there is only one political party - the SSU - then the people, whether they are influenced by sectarianism or not, have no choice other than joining it. However, this thing never happened in practice and many people were hesitant about joining the ranks of the SSU. Some of the politicians do realise that there is a big threat posed by sectarianism. However, one of them, who is a former assistant for ideology and orientation, told me that the SSU would not hesitate in collaborating with the Khatmiyya Sect to fight tribalism for example. I tried to know the reasons for what
he said. Is it because he himself is influenced by the
Khadiriyya Sect? Is it because he thought that the sect
poses no danger as far as the activities of the SSU are
concerned? Or is it because of other reasons? The answer
he gave did not deny the threat caused by the SSU’s activi-
ties because of the sectarian influence. He argued that the
Khadiriyya Sect in particular never showed any sign of
opposition to the present regime. The answer was not
convincing enough. The question is not whether the Khadiriyya
opposed the regime or not. It is a question of whether
sectarianism as such is desirable at this stage of the
SSU’s growth and development. Will the SSU be able to
advance its cause smoothly in an atmosphere in which
sectarian beliefs still blur the eyes of the people?
Those who are influenced by sectarianism in the RSP must
be won by the SSU. This can only happen by changing the
attitudes of the people. This requires a very strong
political organisation, both as to human resources and
material incentives, to make possible the required attitud-
inal change. The SSU must make tremendous efforts to enter
sectarian strongholds before sectarianism can enter into
the SSU. 51

The View of the Non-Officials. The non-officials, or
ordinary citizens, view about the SSU and local government
organisations in the RSP, are rather gloomy. The picture they have
in mind about the SSU in particular, inspite of the rhetoric made is not bright enough. Ignorance about what the SSU is doing, or supposed to be doing, dominates most of the answers I got from the people I was able to talk with. There are some who are ignorant because they do not read for the mere fact that they are illiterate. These form about 36 per cent of the total number. There are some who are ignorant because nobody approached them. The percentage is higher. It is approximately 55 of the total number. There are some, especially among the educated ones, who read some of the documents but still claim that they do not really know what the SSU is doing for them. Some argue that the language is too difficult to understand and nobody bothered to approach them and explain the issue to them. Since ignorance about what the SSU is or what it is supposed to be doing characterised most of the people I met, and since most of them did not read a single document that dealt with the organisation of the SSU, the answers I got from them should not be considered as conclusive, but should rather be suggestive of the isolation of most people from the SSU.

The leadership problem in the SSU is part of the problem. Most of the people claim that they don’t know about the organisation of the SSU because nobody bothered to explain it to them. Surprisingly enough, about half of the people
I met, claim to have membership cards. The number is higher among the educated ones. The reasons for holding a membership card of an organisation which they knew very little about varied from one extreme to the other. About seven people argued that they think that it is good for them to be members, without giving any reasons. Some argued that without the membership cards, they might be deprived of the right to buy things from cooperative shops. Some, especially among the civil servants, think that promotion to higher ranks might be difficult without being a member of the SSU. The sad side of the story is that not a single person told me that he or she is a member because he or she believes that the SSU offers a better alternative than what they used to have in the past. The varying views given are a good indication that a gap still separates the political leadership and the masses. If the gap is to be bridged, great efforts are expected from those who are in charge of the SSU to make contacts with the ordinary citizens in order to explain to them what the SSU is, and what it is supposed to be doing. One cannot expect people to accept an idea without understanding its objectives. This is a challenge to the leadership in the SSU. The leadership must either prove to be capable of facing the challenge or be honest and give way to others who can.
Concerning the local government system, the majority of the respondents claimed to be members in councils that lie within their areas of residence. I tried to find the reason for that and got rather similar answers from both the educated and those who are not. The main reason for joining the local government councils is due to the fact that the people think that the Council's function is to distribute basic necessities like sugar, tea, kerosene, cooking oil and alike. To get such goods is difficult if one is not a member of a local council. This point is mentioned by almost all the people I talked to. This indicates that the people still regard the government system whether at the centre or the local level as a provider of goods and services. Most, if not all of the respondents, do not think that they have a role to play as far as the local government system is concerned. When I asked if being a member of the council brought any benefits or not, the majority answered in the negative. About 60 percent think that they are not better off by being members. The rest do not really know.

The views that most of the people have about the councils and councillors are rather ugly. Many people think that the councillors enriched themselves and favoured relatives and friends. It is argued that the councillors at times create what is known as 'black-markets' by selling sugar, tea, cooking
oil and other goods to one or two merchants whom they know. These in turn will hide the goods and create a scarcity in certain commodities. When the goods are released for sale, the prices normally go up. Too many accusations have been made against the councillors and the ordinary citizens think they are the sole reason for the rising prices in the market. However, all of these accusations have been made without any concrete evidence. None of my respondents thought of making a case against any of the councillors, when they call corrupt, to the court or police authorities. The reason, as given by some, is that it is no use complaining since they are not very sure of winning the case. In spite of the fact that all of the accusations made are groundless and not supported by any evidence, the local government councils and councillors seem to have a bad name in both rural and urban areas. The councillors in the eyes of most people, are corrupt to the core of their character. Such an image will discourage other people from joining the councils and participating in one way or another. However, it is not too late to rectify the cracked image.

As far as the decentralisation policy is concerned, the majority, especially the illiterates, do not understand the meaning of and objectives behind the policy. This is not a surprise, since those who understand, or supposed to understand, what the policy means, made no efforts to explain its meaning
to the people. The leadership is responsible for the ignorance that characterized most of the people I talked to as far as the decentralisation policy is concerned. But, as I mentioned before, the leadership itself is having difficulty in fully digesting the policy. This will leave the problem unsolved for a period of time until the required type of leadership is created.

Among the educated people, there are some who pretend to know about the policy. Most of the arguments they have centred around the slogan 'giving power to the people'. But how to do that is what they really do not know. Almost all of the respondents who claimed to know, understand or read about the decentralisation policy, thought of it as a panacea to their local problems. They regarded the policy as increased government inputs to the province. Such views are a threat to the whole policy since they allocate room for people's participation in the process. Without people's participation, the question of 'giving power to the people' will continue to remain as nothing more than a political rhetoric.

The most threatening and disturbing views about the policy come from those, both among the educated and non-educated, who consider the decentralisation policy as an attempt to isolate the NPP from the rest of the country. There are some people, especially those with strong tribal affiliations who think that after the implementation of the policy, the
resources of the province and the revenue that the country gets from using the port should all be spent in the CSP.

The holders of such views think that the CSP is being exploited enough by provinces like Khartoum and it is time to end this exploitation. The people who hold such views are not big in their number, but with little, or perhaps no, sense of political consciousness, coupled with little efforts by the political leadership to explain to the masses what the decentralization policy really means, such views if left to prosper, might not only be a threat to the implementation of the policy, but to the unity of the country as a whole if those who think in that way were able to mobilize followers making use of the strong tribal loyalties that are rampant.

Conclusion: Both the SSU and the local government councils in the CSP are still very weak, and cannot, or will not, be expected to function as channels through which people's participation can take place. Being so weak, it is no wonder that communication between the Centre and the Periphery is made difficult, if not impossible. Without adequate participation by the people and with low level of communication between the different layers of the hierarchy in both the SSU and the local government councils, the slogan 'more power to the people' does not sit here. The SSU and local government councils still have to prove their ability in the linkage process. So far this has been made difficult as a result of the leadership
problem that haunts the NSF. The leadership problem prevented the NSF from successfully playing its educational and mobilizational roles on the one hand, and prevented the local government councils from being a real platform for people's participation on the other. The weakness of the system must not be regarded as something shameful. The shame is when people know that the NSF and local government organs are weak but do not admit it.
1 - Introduction. In NRP, my intention was to do the same thing as I did in the NCP - to try and find out how effective are the SSU and the local government organs in fulfilling the task they are expected to be doing. I tried to talk to both officials and non-officials since their views about the SSU and the local government system are complementary to each other. As far as the official views are concerned, there was no difficulty in reaching many of them. Access to different people in both the SSU and the province headquarters in al-Fasher was made possible. As far as the ordinary citizen's view (non-officials) are concerned I was not able to get information from a larger number. Most of the people I met in the streets, market area or coffee houses were reluctant to speak and unwilling to cooperate. Those who work for the government like teachers, clerks, and others were willing to speak freely. However, the number is rather small compared to the non-officials in the NCP. If this is considered to be a limitation, the disadvantages are made less significant by the fact that I succeeded in having access to almost all files and documents in the province headquarters. In these files and documents it was not difficult to form an idea about the views of the people and their representatives. This is made possible by reading the letters that the people and their representatives wrote to the officials in al-Fasher.
Rather than dividing this part into two by looking at the views of the officials and those of the non-officials as I did in the case of the BBB, the tendency is to examine the functioning of the SSU, the local government system and give an idea about the financial position in the province.

In the conclusion I will try to show whether the policy directives are being rightly implemented or not.

2 - The SSU in NPP: When I visited the SSU Secretariat General in el-Pasha, the Secretary General introduced me to his assistants who welcomed my visit and promised to stretch a helping hand. When I started, I first met the assistant Secretary for ideology and orientations. What I wanted to know was how big is the SSU as far as the membership is concerned. The assistant secretary for ideology and orientations directed me to see the person who is in charge of the SSU membership records. To my surprise, in the SSU in NPP, they do not have records for the membership of the organisation of its affiliate bodies like Women and Youth Unions. When I tried to find out why up to date records are not kept, the answer I got was shocking. The excuse for not keeping the records was that the SSU buildings are still under construction and there is no room in which such records could be kept.

The question that followed was; in such circumstances, how can you know about the real strength of the organisation? Is it swelling upwards or downwards? The answer came from
the assistant secretary for the organisation who told me that an increase or decrease in membership could be checked whenever the congresses of the basic units, districts and areas take place. During the congresses people apply for renewal of membership cards and sometimes there are newcomers. It is the time when total membership of the SSU is detected, and an increase or decrease in membership is possible to find out. The question I kept asking myself is: how can they find out whether the membership is increasing in the absence of membership records since the very first day of building the SSP? However, the assistant secretary for organisation is convinced that 'most' of the people in the province are members. A member is defined as a person who holds a membership card. It is also believed that all the members are committed for the very fact that they applied for membership out of their own free will without being coerced. This is similar to what I heard in the SSP. When I tried to find out if all the so-called committed members participate in the activities of the SSU equally or not, I have been told that some participate more than others. When this has been admitted, I asked participation in what? It was almost impossible to give any examples of genuine people's participation in the activities of the organisation. All I knew is that real participation takes place within the affiliate bodies of the
Examples given were things like participation in different exhibitions, celebrations of the independence day and the 25th day of May every year, campaigns to fight anti-social acts like prostitution and excessive drinking of liquor and alike.

The USM membership in ZDR is claimed to be 240,000. To involve such a large number, if it is the true number, or part of it, in the activities of the USM and prepare them to play an active role in developing their province is not an easy thing to do. To educate and mobilise the masses necessitates the creation of a political cadre that will be able to explain to the people the ideas and principles of the USM. The efforts made so far to create such a cadre are not encouraging enough. One of the devices used in order to create the necessary political cadre is what the officials in the USM in ZDR call training camps. An example of such camps is the one that was held in Millet in the Western area of the province. The training started on 29th October 1978 and ended on the 4th of November of the same year. This means that the duration was less than two weeks. About 45 'political leaders' from the province, area and district levels were included. Lectures and seminars about the National Charter for Action, the Basic Rules of the USM and the 1973 Permanent Constitution were made. It was thought
that by making such training camps, more dedicated and committed leadership will be created. Attempts to start more training camps in different areas were made difficult due to the lack of finance. I think that the officials in the SPU in the province must not regret their failure in holding more training camps. Such camps, in my view, are more waste of time and scarce resources, and the possibility that the required type of political cadre will be created as a result, is very slim. One of the clerks who work in the SPU Secretariat General was not wrong when he told me, that too many opportunity joined the camp held in Villkit. None of those who participated in the camp made any efforts to tell the people what he learned or why, or that role they (the people) are expected to play in the SPU.

Assistant Secretary General in the province act as political supervisors in the area, and assistants secretary general in the area in turn are made political supervisors in the districts. It is hoped that the political supervisors at different levels will be effective enough when talking to the people, and will be convincing and successful enough in fulfilling their role as mobilisation agents. The difficulty with such procedure is that assistants secretary general at both the province and area levels, are civil servants with little or no political background and skills. It is doubtful enough if civil servants who are used to the office work and
who are at times very bureaucratic in dealing with different problems, can succeed as political agitators and mobilizers.

In order to mobilize the people to participate in the activities of the GSK, they must first be convinced of the benefits of participation. They must be convinced that by participating, their way of living will change for the better. If the people’s basic problems are being tackled properly and solved, the people’s support for the policies of the regime and its political institutions, can easily be gained. In this, the problems that face the people are things like water shortages, shortages in basic consumer goods, transport problems and housing problems. Hence efforts are being made by the authorities in the province to solve many of these problems, especially the water problem. Efforts are also made to classify most of the small towns and villages. Other efforts are undertaken for increasing the supplies of dairy products, vegetables and fruits. All these projects, if successful enough, will affect the way of living of the people living in the province, and will be appreciated by many. However, the political leadership in the province must be aware and not count on this and think that such a change in the living conditions of the people will by necessity make the GSK more acceptable to them. It is true that some people will start to increase their faith in the GSK. But this
might only be a minority. The majority of the people, especially in rural areas, regard the government, the UNRWA and the SESW as two separate things. Whatever is being done by the government, in their view, is the 'duty' of the government, and the SESW has nothing to do with it. The people in the rural areas used to, and continue to regard the government as the provider of goods and services. Their role (people's) is used to be and continues to be that of the receiver. When the SESW was created, it was assumed that this distinction between the government and the party will give way to a new way of thinking that looks at the government and the party. This new way will give way to a new way of thinking that looks at the government and the SESW as two faces of the same coin. However, the distinction still holds. The political leadership in the party must make great efforts to teach the people that in a single party state it is difficult to separate the party and the government. The people must also be taught that their joint efforts as actors within the SESW are needed to make life better for them since the SESW is entrusted with making the policy guidelines which the government executes.

It is only when the people understand that the SESW has a role as far as development is concerned they will join its ranks. However, this assumption holds true only when the development taking place is really changing the people's way of living to the better. It is one of the challenges that the political
leadership in RBW must tackle cautiously before it can expect more people to join the SBW and believe in its mission.

What role can the SBW play in the economic development of the province seems to be absent from the minds of most people who claim to be 'political' leaders. The assistant secretary for development, for example, does not know much about what role the SBW play regarding the development of the province. He keeps records and information about the projects that could be called 'development projects'. He is also aware of the benefits of such projects to the people. But how to involve the SBW members in such and other projects is a question that seemed to be rather difficult for him to answer. One of the important aims of the present regime has been the realization of economic and social development through the utilization of unlimited resources of the people in order to bring about a society of social justice and abundance. This could only be achieved through the party's efforts because the party is a single party state is the only institution, whose content with and support among the masses of rural population enables it to attempt to liberate individuals from the traditional constraints that impeded development. It can be a vehicle for mobilizing people to make about changes in the lifestyle of social relationships for facilitating the acceptance of new methods and technology in farming and for changing the set of values. On the other hand the party needs to gain the support of the local population in order to use that support to facilitate change and foster the acceptance of new programs.
This necessitates effective communication between the political cadre and the masses on the one hand and between the political cadre at different levels of the hierarchy on the other hand. In MMP, it is only during the SUS congress that effective communication between the party functionaries and the masses takes place (at least in theory). Such communication seems to be taking place more effectively at the province level when compared with levels below. As one goes below the province level, communication between the people and the leaders, and between the leaders at different levels tends to decrease in intensity. Insure economic resources and inadequacy of transport are contributing factors to the problem.

An effective communication network must exist at different levels of the SUS, between different levels and between the actors within the different levels if the SUS is to succeed in breaking the crust of traditionalism and loyalty to tribal and/or religious chiefs. The existence of dual loyalties—one to the nation-state and one to tribal or religious chiefs—is disruptive to the whole process of development that the present regime is hoping to achieve through mobilizing the people and rallying them behind the SUS. The existence of dual loyalties cannot be ended unless the SUS proved to be efficient enough as far as communication is concerned and enter into every nook and cranny in the rural
areas. This by necessity means the existence of people who can communicate effectively. In NDR the influence of native administration was great enough and many people approached the native chiefs for guidance and advice. One of the first things which the present regime did was to abolish the native administration system since it arrested the people's creative efforts and hindered their development, as the leaders argue. It was hoped that the SNU would succeed in educating and socialising the people in the province and alter their attitudes and beliefs as far as native administration is concerned. This was intended because the architects of the SNU argue that the SNU is supreme and its supremacy must be felt everywhere.

It is true that native administration did exploit the masses in rural areas like NDR. But it is also true that the system was accepted by many people for various reasons among which politics as such might not be of great importance. To think that the loyalty and respect given by the people to native administration could easily be ended by issuing decrees that call for the abolition of the system and installing SNU representatives and creating a new system of local government, is rather naive. The efforts made by the SNU in NDR as far as altering old attitudes and beliefs are not successful enough. The SNU is not yet able to gain mass acceptance by the people for its policies. It is not yet supreme. Supremacy will only
become a reality when the people swing loyalties from old institutions to new ones created by the SSU. It is not only the ordinary people’s attitudes that did not change. Even part of the local government councils and the councillors running them cannot, or will not be able to, carry their job without cooperating with native administrators. This is an indication that the loyalty and respect given to the native administrators in part of the province is not affected greatly by the policies introduced by the SSU.

3 - Local Government and Decentralisation in NUP - The failure of the SSU to educate, mobilise and prepare the people to play a positive role as far as development of the province is concerned affected the local government system and the decentralisation policy as well. Local government and decentralisation are thought to be the means through which real participation takes place; hence ‘giving power to the people’ becomes meaningful enough. The success of the policy depends on how successful is the SSU in convincing the people to accept new ideas and policies. As I mentioned earlier, the SSU proved to be a failure in this area, and this is why the implementation of the new policies as far as local government and decentralisation are concerned suffered.

In NUP, most of the people I met do not understand fully the new system of local government which came as a result of the PIGA of 1971. The people do not understand what role they
can play in making the systems successful. Too many people still hold the same view that local government councils are merely agents for the central government and their sole function is to provide goods and services. Even among the councillors, there are some who do not exactly know what they are supposed to be doing apart from being agents who provide supplies for the people. Participation by the people is rarely, if ever, mentioned by the councillors. The councillors and the councillors in NDR, too, have an ugly picture in the minds of the people. Accusations that the councillors are 'corrupt' 'opportunist' and people who made a fortune by exploiting their position, are often heard. Rising prices and scarcity in the supply of basic commodities are attributed to the way in which the councillors run the councils. A civil servant in NDR told me that the councillors run the councils 'as if they are their own private shops'. The councils have been praised in very rare situations. The SNJ can make many 'friends' by helping the people to fight things like scarcity in commodities and 'black-markets'. But the impression I made about the SNJ, is that it is deaf and blind as far as the people's daily problems are concerned. If the situation is left as it is, the government will discover that it is not succeeding in reaching the people. Therefore no response is to be expected from below.
As far as the decentralisation policy itself is concerned, the concept is rather ambiguous to many people. The political leaders talk about decentralisation as an attempt to 'give more power to the people', and 'let the people to run their own affairs'. Some of the councillors also echo similar phrases. The understanding of the policy with the majority seems to stop at that level, the level of echoing phrases only. How to implement the policy is not clear, apart from the commissioner of the province, his assistants and two administrative officers whom I met, there seems to be no other person with clear vision as to how to implement it. As for the ordinary citizens, no matter how small the number I talked to, the concept seems to be the most confusing. Some think the decentralisation policy is nothing more than increased governmental inputs to help the provinces and others think that it is an attempt to completely separate the province from the rest of the country. Others think that the policy means that NDP is to be the exclusive domain of those who are born and live in it. Such attitudes can seriously endanger the unity of the country especially under the promised regional division. The SNU's role cannot be denied here. SNU functionaries through the SNU's basic units and branches are expected to explain to the masses what the policy is all about, how it is to be implemented and what role can they (the masses) play in it. But, the SNU with its
present political cadres will not succeed in educating the masses about the policy and in turn help in the process of rural transformation. The right type of cadre must first be found if the policy is to succeed, or at least be understood by the masses.

One of the reasons that add to the problem at the local level is the fact that too many 'leaders' are found. Politicians, councillors and representatives of decentralised ministries are found. The existence of many 'leaders' who come from different backgrounds regarding the job they are doing, tend to confuse the ordinary people. The confusion in real where lines demarcating responsibilities are not clear. In the absence of demarcation lines, who is doing what is not clear, and in between the people's interests are lost. The problem is further exacerbated by the continuous conflict between the councillors, politicians and government staff in the districts. If such problems are left to continue, whatever is claimed to be built, will not be more than a house built on sand.

Leaving the SAP aside, the PNC in NDE, as with the PNC's in other provinces, is accused for being one of the contributing factors for the bad implementation of the decentralisation policy. The PNC is blamed for concentrating most of the powers at the province level while very little is being decentralised for councils below those levels. This was true in NDE until
April 1979. An attempt was made to rectify the error when a circular made it clear that Area, Town, Village and living quarters' councils must have more powers and autonomy in connection with (1) self help, (2) Economic development and revenue raising, (3) Financing of 'specific' projects, (4) Education, (5) Public Health, (6) Land, (7) Community development and social advancement, (8) Roads and Communications, (9) Cooperation, trade and supply and (10) Public Order. Most of the above mentioned powers were carried out by the PRC. It is thought that the councils below the province level will have more freedom in running their own affairs. This, theoretically, seems sound. However, for the councils below the PRC to act effectively two things must be available. These are finance and qualified personnel. Both finance and personnel at the moment continue to concentrate at the centre (PRC). With the exception of financing 'specific' projects (No. 3 above) the council do not have autonomy as far as finance is concerned. Even the amount that the councils can spend in financing these 'specific' projects is allotted by the PRC. The councils themselves will not be able to successfully raise their revenues in a manner that will secure their autonomy for the mere fact that the province is too poor and revenue-raisin sources are not available in most parts. As far as qualified personnel is concerned, decentralisation did not take place since the PRC itself is short of trained and qualified manpower. The attempts
that are made to give councils below the PPC more powers will only be of any significance when backed by financial and human resources.

A further accusation made is that not only are powers concentrated at the centre, but it is the commissioner in particular who decides for the PPC. This view is only found among the educated people I met. These allegations, although not supported by any evidence, do give the system a bad image. They are counter to the whole concept of people’s participation. The formation of the ‘Consultative Council for Services’ in PPC is perhaps the best answer to those who argue that it is the commissioner by himself who decides for the PPC. The composition of the council is as follows:

- The Commissioner - President
- The Executive Director - Vice President
- A secretary appointed by the Commissioner
- Assistant Commissioner / hold executive posts in PPC
- Assistant Secretary for Development and Services in the Secretariat General of the DAP in PPP
- President of the Public Order Committee in the PPC
- Commander of the Police Force
- Director of Prisons
- Senior Inspector of Land
- President of the Teachers and Fathers Associations
- Any other persons
The functions of the council are mainly to do with development of services and coordination between different governmental departments. As the name indicates, it is a consultative body and is expected to give the chance for various parties to participate in making decisions concerning development. It is meant to help the commissioner of the province to make the right decisions. It is true that the council is a consultative one and various people from different departments are represented in it. But the majority, if not all of the members of the council seem to be included because of the official post they hold. The masses do not seem to be represented in the council and their views as far as provision of services is concerned seem to be totally neglected. One can argue that the council is dominated by 'bureaucrats' and 'experts', 'people's participation', and 'power to the people' are slogans that might be true somewhere but not in the 'Consultative Council'. The excuse might be that the council is very specialized in nature. It might also be argued that to have popular representatives in the council will lead to an expanded membership and a council similar to the PNC might be the result. These arguments might have truth in them. But it is also true that people's representatives know better about the services that their area need and their views are of great value. Since 'any other person'
can be included in the council, popular representatives can be consulted whenever the need to provide their areas (be they districts or villages) with services arise. But to continue excluding the popular representatives might give the people the impression that all things are being decided on their behalf.

A more clear picture about whether people’s participation exists or not, whether the councils below the PRC are functioning properly or not, could be made by looking at the nature of decisions made by the central committee of the PRC. The nature of decisions made by the Central Committee of the PRC between June 1974 and January 1979 will give an idea about what is decided in the PRC and what is left for the councils below the PRC. The table below explains the nature of the decisions made by the Central Committee.
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Source: Compiled from the Central Committee of the PRC's files.

From the table above, it appears that the central committee of the PRC dealt with various activities. Ceremonial decisions are things like celebrations for Independence Day and the 25th of May every year. Financial decisions vary and they range from things like discussing a French offer to sell planes,
duties on local traders and incentives for former Sheikhs and Qawas. The discussion of the financial situation at the end of every financial year is also included. Financial decisions are difficult to separate from other decisions since almost all the decisions cannot be implemented without adequate financing. The definition in our case means allocation of funds and/or payments made for individuals or institutions. Services also are wide in scope. They vary from building houses, digging wells, buying furniture to an administrative officer, issuing licenses to sell liquor and even closing down restaurants during the holy month of Ramadan. Tenders in most cases dealt with supplying food stuffs for school children, hospitals and prisons. Even tenders for buying bricks for building houses are included. This is briefly an explanation of some of the major issues that the Central Committee of the PEO used to discuss and make decisions about.

From the nature of issues discussed and decisions made, one can reach the conclusion that too much time is being wasted in discussing things that could easily be discussed and decided upon by the councils below the PEO. This is an indication, perhaps an affirmation to the accusation, that the PEO tends to concentrate everything at the centre and little is left for the councils below. This tendency is
diametrically opposed to the policy of decentralisation. If most of the issues, especially the minor ones like buying furniture, building a house or closing a restaurant during Ramadan, are left for the councils below the PRC level, enough space will be left for the Central Committee of the PRC to concentrate in discussing and making decisions about issues that are of vital importance as far as improving the financial situation and the development of the province. An excuse might be found in the fact that most of the decisions involve financial approvals and that is why the central Committee of the PRC is trying to discuss every single issue. However, this argument is not acceptable at the same time when too much political rhetoric and too many promises continue to be made in favour of decentralisation, people's participation and power to the people. At this juncture, it seems desirable to examine the financial situation in NDF.

4. The Financial Situation in NDF: The province is probably among the poorest areas in the Sudan. Collection of revenue mainly depends on taxes that are levied within the boundaries of the province. Natural resources are very poor so far and nothing of any great value is discovered to be mentioned. There is heavy dependence on agriculture and this has made things even worse due to the scanty and unpredictable rainfall. This makes the province entirely dependent on the taxes levied on various items as far as its revenue is
concerned. The quantity and quality of services rendered depends on the revenue collected from the taxes and grants made by the Central Government.

Financial deficits are characteristic of the annual budgets of the province. In the financial year 1975/76 for example, the deficit in the budget was £2,367,160,66 This was a direct result of the increased number of services that were expected to be rendered under the decentralisation policy. This was not accompanied by an increase in the revenue of the province due to its weak revenue sources, as mentioned before. It was hoped that grants from the Central Government will help in covering the deficit. The Central Government's help to cover the deficit and create a balanced budget is only a dream since the Central Government's extractive and distributive capabilities themselves are rather weak. Deficits continued to characterise the annual budgets in 1976 and 1977.

In the financial year of 1976/77 the total deficit was £2,450,000. This was mainly the result of over-expenditure which characterised the activities of most government departments. Over-expenditure was not matched by an improvement in the financial situation. Internal sources of revenue remained as poor as ever and aid from the Central Government lagged behind the needs of the province. This left the POC hand-cuffed as
far as many services were concerned. The gloomy picture continued to be the norm in the budgets that followed. In 1977/78, financial year no changes took place and the financial situation was even worse than the years that followed. The Commissioner, who is the president of the PRC, commented that the 1977/78 budget 'is the most disappointing and far beyond our aspirations'. The situation reached what could be called a crisis point in the 1978/79 budget. The estimated budget was about $8.13 million. Out of that amount $8.11 million was expected to be covered by the Central Government. This means that the total share of the province from its own domestic sources does not exceed $6.2 million. In an interview with the assistant commissioner for financial affairs in WNP, he told me that even the amount they are expecting the central government to cover is not always approved by the centre due to the weak financial position of the Central Government itself. When an amount is approved by the centre, it is not paid lump-sum. The amount will be divided by twelve and paid on a monthly basis. The assistant commissioner for financial affairs argued that such a procedure does not allow the PRC to start big projects that need large amounts of money to be paid to contractors or suppliers of material for example, since the money is not always available in the treasury of the PRC. The solution is said to be found in increased financial aid by the centre. That is the only way to cover the ever increasing deficits in
the budgets to allow the PNO to provide more services.

5 - Conclusion. From what has been discussed, the problem with NDF as far as the implementations of the policies and programmes of the present regime seems to be multi-faceted. The political party - the SNU - is the institution that is expected to play a major role as far as policy implementation is expected. It is supposed to play an educational and mobilisation role and act as a conveyor belt between the people at different levels of the hierarchy. The SNU in NDF proved to be a failure so far. It is handicapped by lack of trained and qualified manpower and by a weak financial base. The failure of the SNU left its marks on the implementation of the PNO in the provinces. Both local government councils and the decentralisation policies did not succeed in 'giving power' to the people. Things continue to filter from the top to the bottom without a positive response from the other direction. The people as yet do not understand what their role is. The people cannot be blamed since the SNU and its agents failed to explain to them what the policy aims at. Finance is also one of the bottlenecks as far as the success of the local government councils and the decentralisation policies are concerned. If the financial capability of the province did not increase the situation will not only remain in a bad shape, but it will get worse. What is noticeable i.
that financial dependence on the Central Government is increasing every year. This dependence is one of the aims that the decentralisation policy wants to fight. Without finding a solution to the chronic financial problems that face WNP, the leaders will only be wasting time trying to achieve what they profess.

The problems once they are made clear to those who are concerned with the success of the policy, must be treated in a rational and objective manner. If the theoretical side of the policy is thought to be right, admitting that there are problems in implementation will not cause any harm to the theory. But all the harm is caused when people discover the problems and continue to bury their heads in the sand. Only an ostrich will do that.
7. The terms 'scientific' and 'Arab' socialism were much used during the first years of the present regime, at times 'Islamic' and even 'fanatical' socialism were used. In the National Charter for Action and the various speeches made by the President, ministers, all these versions given to socialism are found.

2. By education I mean political education that aims at preparing the people to accept the policies of the regime.

3. Examples of using an ideology as a political religion could be found in Communist China under Mao Tse Tung, in present day Cuba. The trend seems to be taking place in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Ethiopia under Colonel Mengistu.


10. The meeting took place in Khartoum, Saturday 18th August 1979 at the SNU headquarters.
12. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
16. Ibid., p. 50.
17. Ibid., p. 70.
18. Ibid., pp. 22-3. The problem is not only found in the fact that power is concentrated with the Commissioner and his assistants; but could also be looked at from a different angle. The masses are not aware enough about their rights and responsibilities. The Commissioner alone cannot be held responsible for that. It is the duty of political leaders at all levels of the hierarchy.
20. Members of the Central Committee, especially the elected ones from the provinces to an extent reflect the views of the people they represent.
27. People's Assembly Select Committee Report; Opitit.
29. Ibid., Pp. 41-42.
30. Speech made by the President of the Republic in the
    People's Assembly on May 21, 1977.
31. Trained and qualified as are in the sense that it
    understands the policy and in skillful enough in
    communicating with the masses to explain it to them.
32. Such accusations are common nowadays. In almost all
    places where there are councils and councillors, you
    find people who accuse them as being opportunists. The
    accusations tend to be greater when there are difficul-
    ties in getting basic consumer goods.
33. Local Government and Development in the Sudan: The
34. The specialized committees are: Organization, Ideology
    and Orientation, Development and Services, Popular
    Organizations and Professional Organizations.
35. According to what the charts and diagrams in the SDU
    headquarters show, the figure is up to 1979.
36. The assumption is made by almost all the assistants
    secretary of the SDU.
37. Although I was able to speak to few administrative
    officers, I was not able to get the exact number of
    councils.
38. During normal conversation with people, especially
    when discussing their daily problems in getting basic
    goods like sugar, oil or meat, people can easily give
    their views about the SDU and local government councils
    and their role in solving the problem, but to ask them
    direct questions from the start, especially about the
    SDU, is difficult to get answers from them.
39. This was only made possible after letters of introduction
    from the University and from the SDU in Khartoum were
    introduced. The letters requested those in Port Sudan to
    stretch a helping hand.
40. The figure shows total membership up to May 1979.

41. Numbers are needed in a multi-party system where each party is trying to capture the majority of seats in the parliament. However this does not deny the fact that a single party as well needs means following.

42. The basic documents are the National Charter for Action, the Basic Rules of the SSU, the Permanent Constitution of 1973.

43. The Socialist Studies and Research Institute is supposed to be the political college of the party. It is one of the branches of the Ideology and Orientation Committee.

44. Training normally lasts for short periods. It does not exceed one month in most cases. Lectures on Swahili, society, history, politics and economy are given to students who come from different parts of the country representing various organizations. The lecturers are mostly graduates and some of them are post-graduate degree holders. While the students, or the majority of them, at times are elementary school leavers. This makes communication rather difficult. The duration of the programme, the subjects taught and the difficulty in communication between the lecturers and students all compound to make the programme not the one that will qualify the students to be the political cadre that is highly qualified for the job.

45. Although a complaint has been made that there is a lack as far as transport facilities are concerned, there were about five vehicles outside the SSU’s building in Port Moresby left unused. These parts were not available to run them was the excuse.

46. Among the civil servants it seems that the policy is only understood by the administrative officers.

47. Many people argue that the country is getting much revenue by using the port, but the MGP in which the port is found, gets very little from that revenue.

48. Available funds can only help in solving the problem if it is accompanied by a proper understanding of the policy.

49. The Raja Congress supported some of the candidates in the election for the constituent assembly between 1966 and 1969. Candidates drew their support by exploiting
tribal loyalties rather than national. See Colin
Ratnam and S. Desanis (eds) African Contemporary
50. A brief idea about elections during the
period is made. Among the parties was the Baia
Congress.

51. We is at present a member of the People's Assembly.

51. To demonstrate the strength of tribalism, the follow-
ing could be mentioned: (1) During my visit to
Port Sudan, elections for the village development
committees were taking place. Delegates came from
different parts of the province. The elections were
cancelled twice. The reasons were fears that those
who were backed by tribal and sectarian supporters
might dominate the village council. Those who
represented the ABU had slim chances for success.

A compromise was made before the elections were held
that all parties will be represented in the committees.
The elections took place after the compromise. This
is a clear indication that the ABU and its supporters
in the province do not stand on firm grounds.

(2) Every Friday in the RSF, in Siesat and Sawakin,
especially the latter, the strength of the Khartoum
power is demonstrated. The two towns are known to be
two of the oldest strongholds of the Khartoum Sect
in the RSF. Every Friday the Khartoum march the
streets in drilled formations, chanting slogans in
praise of Sayf al-Din and the Khartoum Sect. It
appeared that the 10th anniversary of the 'Revolution'
in 1979, was a Friday. Official celebrations were supposed to take place in Port Sudan. In the
afternoon, I was in Sawakin and there were hundreds of Khartoum followers doing the same
thing they used to do every Friday. In the afternoon
I was in Port Sudan and decided to watch how the
celebrations for the 10th anniversary of the 'Revolution' take place, and how big is the attendance.
In contrast to what I saw in Sawakin the people who
gathered in Port Sudan Stadium to attend the celebrat-
ions were very few, not exceeding 500 people at most.

Many of those seem to be army officers and government
officials. I was wondering where are all the RSF
supporters which the ABU in the RSF, and especially
in Port Sudan, continuously and probably used to talk
about?

52. Most people, especially the old ones, do not like to
go to court or report to the police about what they
think is wrong since be going to the court or the
police. It is not only the councilor (if found guilty) who is going to suffer, but his family as well which depends on his support. Reasons like 'supporting a big family', 'an old man or he is not the only one' are always found and that is why many peoples escape from being taken to courts or police stations in spite of the malpractices they commit.

53. The figure is given by one of the officials who work in the Organisation Committees in the SSB in NRP. No records were presented or any other documents to support his claim.


55. A case from the Western Area of NRP will illustrate the validity of my argument. In May 1978 members of the people's local council of al-Ginsa sent a letter to the Northern District Chief Judge concerning Prince Abdel-Rahman Mohamed Bahr al-Din. Prince Bahr al-Din was the people's court and president of the area people's council at the same time. He was informed by the Chief Judge that according to the new People's Court Act, he cannot combine both posts. He was advised to choose one of them and resign the other. Members of the people's local council in al-Ginsa in their letter requested that Prince Bahr al-Din's case be regarded as an exceptional case due to his character, his dedication and love to his country and his area, and that all the people in the area do respect and trust him. He was also regarded as a helping hand to, and committed to, popular organisations in the area. He was an authority as far as customary law and civil cases were concerned in the area. His dual role in both the council and the court helped in solving tribal disputes, and border problems. (That is why he remained in his post when native administration was banned).

Members of the council argued that his presence is for the benefit of the area and the country. However, Prince Bahr al-Din resigned his post as President of the people's Local Council on June 9th, 1979. See File M.R.P. General/120/9/6.

Another thing that illustrates the influence of former local chiefs is that up to now, in most parts of NRP, especially in rural areas that are far from the centre where the presence of the government represented by the SSB and local government councils is not yet made tangible.
the collection of tax is only possible when ex-native administrators are involved. In RDF headquarters in al-Waher, ex-chiefs and tribal Sheikhs could be seen in the premises almost everyday to deposit what they collected.

56. It is probable that the people themselves do not have faith in their ability to do anything. No serious attempts are made to change their habits and old beliefs. They continue to believe that the function of the government is to provide and their duty is to receive.

57. This belief is held because in reality many of the councils in RDF seem to be doing nothing apart from distributing goods.

58. There are many people in RDF who talk about the province as Dar-Bladh (home of the westerners) and about the rest of the country especially the northern and central parts as Dar-Sabbah literally meaning home of northerners.

59. The Western provinces of Northern and Southern Darfur will continue to form the 'Darfur Region' under the proposed regional division.

60. See file M.R.P./100/V6 for conflict between Hilale's Rural Council's President on the one hand and the administrative officer and the assistant commissioner on the other hand. The conflict was over giving a plot of land to a citizen by the administrator. The President of the council opposed the idea and tried to bring the members of the council in a meeting to discuss the issue. The administrative officer refused to provide transport to collect the members from their areas. As a counter-attack, the administrative officer was able to make quick contacts with sixteen of the members of the council and brief them about the meeting. When the meeting took place, the administrative officer told the attendants that the president of the local council is a 'thief' who sells their sugar to 'black-marketeers'. This accusation made the members of the council to support the administrative officer in his plea for giving a plot of land to a citizen and they opposed the president. The president of the council instead of trying to prove himself innocent to the charges made against him, submitted his resignation from the council.
61. File No. MDR/100/17/5 26th April 1978.

62. Such accusations make one question if the people do have faith in their representatives or so they think that they are 'Yes-men' who agree on whatever the administrator decides.

63. The council was formed on 13th April 1978.

64. File No. MDR 100/17/1 (5).

65. File No. MDR 100/17 (6)

66. File No. MDR 100/17 (7)

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. File No. MDR 100/17/1 (8).
In the last two chapters an attempt has been made to examine the policies pursued, and institutions built to build a nation in both Tanzania and the Sudan. Both experiments have been treated separately. In this chapter the attempt is to bring the experiments together and find out where each country failed and/or succeeded. It is not my intention to make a final judgement as to which country is intrinsically far superior to the other as far as building the nation is concerned. My concern is primarily with performance in both countries. To what extent have Tanzania and the Sudan fulfilled their efforts? What difficulties did they confront, and how successful were they in finding solutions? What lessons can be learned?

In both Tanzania and the Sudan in order to achieve their goal of building a nation, the governments recognised the necessity of reaching down to the grassroots and affect change. The goal is to transform the society and inject new ideas and beliefs that will help in creating a socialist society. Socialist society in the sense of ending all sorts of exploitation and where abundance in production will benefit everyone in society. It is not going to be a society where the rich get richer and the poor remain poor if not getting
poorer. Socialism, as an ideology in both countries is
accepted for as a result. In both Tanzania and the Sudan
the belief is that it is not enough for the centre to
reach down to the grassroots (penetrate). The belief
is that the opinions of the grassroots must be known
by the centre. Participation from below is looked at as
an essential part for the success of the policies and for
building and maintaining the socialist society. Political
and local government organs that will facilitate the
penetration process by the centre, and participation
by the masses have been created. Both political and
local government organs are important as far as the
success or failure of the communication process is
concerned. It was hoped that they will also succeed in
turning the ideology in both countries from mere policy
statements to practical and tangible achievements.

In both countries, the slogan 'more power to the people'
which is echoed by the political leaders, is believed to be
rather difficult without a genuine participation by the
masses in the institutions built. Citizens participation
in the governance of their society is a central component
of the development effort in both countries. The emphasis
that each country places on participation and the benefits
it brings and the means by which it is to be achieved are
quite similar.
The political leadership in both countries is aware of the fact that the masses, at least a sizeable majority, want first to understand, then accept the policies made by the centre if any success is to be achieved. Without such understanding and acceptance of the policies by the masses, the centre can only rely on sheer force to coerce the masses, if that is possible, to comply. However, force is not always desirable for various reasons among which is the lack of effective coercive capability. The economies of both countries are also very poor to allow the government in each to use economic incentives as a measure to convince the people to participate. Under such circumstances, it is believed that it is only through attitudinal change that the masses can be convinced to participate. Changing the attitudes of workers, peasants, managers and political leaders alike requires “a protracted struggle as well as an intense political education which instils among an oppressed and down-trodden people the confidence, social responsibility and ability to learn and help each other.”

This is a function of both NRM and the SNN in Tanzania and Sudan respectively. In both countries, the theory has been made clear, but what about performance?

As a logical departure, the ideology will be our point. From the discussion made, it is not difficult to argue that
ideologies as being defined in Tanzania and Sudan are far from being real. In Tanzania, as well as in the Sudan, lack of ideological awareness is noticeable especially on the grassroots level. Nyambe, as we have examined, is founded on the principles of equality, principles which ought to appeal to the general populace of Tanzania, because it promises equal development for all. But unfortunately the masses are not yet articulate on the ideology, which according to Nyambe, has been characteristic of their living. People at the grassroots have not yet been conditioned to accept the ideology as perceived by the national leadership. In many parts of Tanzania, people still regard proposals for its implementation as something being introduced to them by outsiders. And any change coming from outside is not meaningful, and at best, it has no permanence. The change agents on the other hand, mostly government bureaucrats, have tended to assume that the masses have no capacities to deal with their own problems. They further assume that the masses do not want to change. Such assumptions do not advocate faith in the people. They contradict the most cherished principles of Tanzanian socialism which stresses equality of man with others. It contradicts the very principles from which the ideology
of Ujamaa draw its inspiration. Many of the change agents in Tanzanian districts and villages have not yet digested the official ideology of Ujamaa. Their perceptions of ideology are not in harmony with those stated by the national leaders. Thus the decisions they make on development tend to be irrelevant to the general policy objectives of PNU and the government. Perceptions of district and village leaders concerning the national ideology were in most cases distorted. As a consequence, the masses of the people who rely on this leadership for their knowledge of the ideology will have scanty or slanted information about what it exactly means or constitutes. It is no wonder that the national ideology of Ujamaa has not yet adequately penetrated the entire Tanzanian society. Clear knowledge of the ideology seems to be an exclusive domain of the national leadership. The gap that separates the centre and periphery in Tanzania which the national leadership thought of closing, or at least lessening, by ideological means, still exists. Currently however, there is a stumbling block somewhere and this is the lack of ideological awareness on the part of most Tanzanians especially at the grassroots level. Until something is done to remove this obstacle, Tanzania cannot hope to succeed in constructing the socialist society that the leadership have in mind.
The failure to understand fully the meaning of Ujamaa and lack of ideological awareness on the part of the people left its marks on the implementation level when the Ujamaa villages were started. Physically, the programme seemed to be successful (See Table). But the villages were dominated by government bureaucrats with very little participation from the people. Even when villagers participated in building villages, the process was in most cases characterized by coercion. The policy also became a strategy for the poor with very little impact on development, agricultural and peasant innovations in rural areas tended to regard Ujamaa as a means for getting services. In rich areas, the policy was met with severe resistance. In fact it is the rich farmers who benefited from the policy of Ujamaa. They were able to exploit their powerful financial position and create alliances with government bureaucrats who were given the upper hand in implementing the policy.

It can easily be argued that the villagisation of the countryside has not resolved any of the questions about rural socialism in Tanzania. But it is hard to conclude that rural socialism has failed and can never be achieved. The villagisation programme itself cannot be branded as "useless" for the mere fact that it failed to achieve rural socialism. As Massamenas argues:
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Key: 1st Figures indicate No. of villages, 2nd Figures indicate No. of people.
Tanzania's villagisation programme ranks among the most outstanding indigenous rural development policies in Africa. In less than ten years the rural settlement pattern of Tanzania has been physically transformed, and now over ten million Tanzanians live in villages instead of living in scattered and isolated homesteads. Both in a narrow technical sense as well as in a wider context, groups of people living in nucleated settlements make it easier to improve the well being of the people. 

But, while villagisation proved easy to attain physically, as a strategy for rural transformation, it is a long term policy and its effectiveness will depend on the proper identification and the successful implementation of the policies that must follow. Kazembe's was right when arguing that:

"Some of the biggest tasks, which have to be undertaken before there can be transformation in the rural areas, still face Tanzania, despite villagisation. Tanzania does not enjoy the luxury of starting fresh, it inherits problems from the past. These problems include the competitiveness for all resources, the multiplicity of factors hindering agriculture, poor national bargaining power in the national arena, the need for proper and maximum utilisation of national resources and for trained manpower."

The emphasis is made on Tanzania's weak financial and technical capabilities which are essential for a successful implementation. Von Freyhold agrees with those who talked
about the failure of villagisation. To her, the communal villages made little progress and finally failed because "the ruling party that called for communalisation did not support the poor and middle class peasants against kulaks, did not support the democratic structures of villages against the authoritarian bureaucracy and did not force the technical staff to serve the villages loyally and intelligently." Von Frischholz did not blame the Tanzanian peasantry as some scholars did. To her, all the blame must be directed at the party and the ruling group. It is thought that the ruling party called for communalisation and then failed to give it the necessary support because the idea of communalisation was not a natural product of Tanzania as a whole but a product of some intellectuals in the party and the President in particular. Social groups that dominated the party were neither collectively nor individually in favour of communalisation. From the standpoint of the dominant groups in the party and the state, the plea of the President for democratic communalisation thus appeared to be something like an aberration. Yet this party continued talking about socialism and some of its more prominent members continued stressing the need for giving more power to workers and peasants. After 1967
major institutional change was introduced with the premise that it would give workers and peasants more control over their affairs and each time in practice class emerged strengthened.\[10/\]

The arguments that could be advanced to support the failure of villagisation policy in introducing socialism in Tanzania are many. But, the views of Professor Hyden are interesting enough and worth mentioning. Hyden, unlike many writers did not blame the party of the government bureaucracy for the failure of the policy so far. For him, the problem is found in the peasant's mode of production, as he argues:

"The challenges to Usamia were essentially confined to the peasant mode of production, firstly they implied a transformation from individual to communal peasant production; secondly, the redirection of political and administrative efforts towards the peasant economy. Nyarere tried to avoid pitfalls of previous approaches by politicizing the state machinery. There was a belief that TANU could achieve what the colonial administration and foreign aid agencies had failed to do, because its leaders were local men with ability to understand the peasant mind. By relieving the peasants from the colonial shackles and reducing their exposure to capitalist temptations, peasants would become more open to influence by the party and the government. In fact, Nyarere, and many with him, were of the opinion that the peasants would surge forward to produce more and transform relations of production as a result of the anticolonial and anti-capitalist stand taken by TANU."\[11/\]
The dilemma of most post-independence governments like the present one in Tanzania, when trying to introduce socialism is that the peasantry cannot be made responsive to official policies because "the economic structures of the peasantry made here not been transformed in most African countries".\textsuperscript{12} To endure much of the villagers are inward looking in their orientation. Much of the productive efforts are still carried out by individual households quite independently of the work in other production units. "It is as if everybody is paddling his own canoe rather than accepting the implications of working on a larger sailing vessel."\textsuperscript{13}

As far as the development of socialism and implication of socialist policies in the Sudan are concerned the task is made difficult since the concept (socialism) is not clearly defined as it is the case of Tanzania. As it has been mentioned (p. ) the concept of socialism is given different interpretations and different explanations by different peoples at different stages of the historical political developments in the Sudan since 1946. Different groups that were in favour of socialism in the Sudan were not able to practice what they preached. The main reason is that these groups were not in power. They were either opposition parties, or groups that did not take the shape
of formal political parties. The exception is found in
the present regime of Nimeiri which came to power in 1969.
By holding political power, the leaders of the regime were
in a position to implement their own version of socialism.
However, even Nimeiri's regime, socialism is vaguely defined,
abrupt from echoing phrases like "abundance in production
and equality of distribution" those who are in favour of
socialism, or claim to be so in the Sudan, no clear defin-
tion is being made. Even the means by which a socialist society,
where the workers and peasants and other sections of the
"people's working forces", will control the means of
production, produce more and equally share the production
are not made clear. In the Sudan, since 1969, the present
regime started constructing a number of industrial and
agro-based industries in different parts of the country.
Sugar schemes, textile mills and a network of road systems
are among the big schemes. Other smaller schemes, both
private and public are scattered throughout the country.
But whether the majority of the people in rural areas are
benefiting from such projects is problematic.

It might be premature to give a concrete judgement
about the success or failure of such projects in helping
the masses to get out of their misery. If such projects
did not prove their success in the very short run, then
there is very little that the present regime can offer to support its pledge to create a socialist society where abundance in production and equality in distribution is the norm. However, so far the socialist society that the regime hopes to build is nothing more than a mirage. In most rural areas, especially poor ones like Nubia, exodus from villages to major towns is a daily phenomenon. In rural areas people abandoned working in the land mainly for economic reasons. Even in the big towns, people are still confronted with severe economic problems. This forced many people to emigrate to the oil-rich Arab countries in search of better economic conditions. The tragic thing is that while many people complain about the hard economic conditions, it is not difficult to notice, especially in big towns like Khartoum, Port Sudan and Juba in the South, that a number of people are getting richer. It is normal to listen to people talking about the widening gap between the few rich and the poor who are the majority. When the present regime came to power and opted for socialism as a policy for development, it promised the masses of workers, farmers in particular that things will change to the better and the regime will stand by their side. It did not promise a paradise, but made strong promises. But after more than ten years, things look
gloomy enough. In spite of the many favourable legislations, the workers and the farmers continue to live in miserable conditions. Under such conditions, the regime cannot rely on using the term socialism as an ideology in its attempts to penetrate the periphery. Sudan is nevertheless a country under quite severe strain and its transition to socialism is confronted by severe problems. Socialism in a poor country cannot primarily concern itself with distributive questions or questions of social organisation. A socialist regime in a poor country, must show results in the form of rising living standards for the great mass of the people. This has not been adequately achieved in the Sudan. Some external factors as the rising prices of oil and rising prices of imported machinery have contributed to the bad economic performance but cannot be held responsible for all the problems. The present regime sees itself as being under great pressure. The leadership has become much more production conscious. Many within the government appear now to regard increased agricultural and industrial production as having the very highest priority. In many ways they are right. Socialism will surely go ever in the Sudan if it comes to be associated in the popular mind with a perpetuation of mass poverty.
In both Tanzania and the Sudan, it is not easy to talk about a socialist revolution. What is taking place in both countries is more like a wishful thinking. In both Tanzania and Sudan, regardless of the gloss with which they paint their brand of socialism, the leadership must understand penetration into the rural areas is not possible if the slogans made in the name of socialism and promises made to raise the living standards of the masses are not made real. The first step however is to widen the economic base and involve the masses in the process.

The political leadership in both Tanzania and Sudan, so far, failed to build the socialist society they promised to build. The political leadership failed to use ideology as one of the means to penetrate into the periphery and effect basic change. But what about the role played by the political parties and local government agencies in the nation-building process? Did they succeed in mobilising the people and preparing them to participate?

Successful mobilisation by a political party, and successful participation by the people on voluntary basis is preconditioned by an understanding and acceptance of the ideology and the programme for its implementation, and by
meaningful relation of the programme to the reality and
the resources available. However, lack of understand-
ing of the official ideology characterized the so-called
'penetrators' in both Tanzania and the Sudan. TANU and
the CSU proved to be very weak at the district and
village levels. It is on the success of the political
parties at the grassroots level that the Tanzanian and
Swissese political leadership depend for letting the
masses listen to them and accept the policies intro-
duced. If the official ideology proved to be difficult to accept
or understand by the masses, it does not mean that the
political party at the local level has to stop functioning.
A strong political party with a message to convey, must
work with and for the people. The party and party function-
aries must continue to work with the people and try to
find out where the policy or ideology went wrong and why
the people do not accept it. All this requires a strong
political party with good organisation at all levels. Our
experience has shown that parties in most rural areas in
Africa tend to be weak especially at the village and district
levels. TANU and the CSU are no exception. As Romain Miller
observes, parties in rural areas tend to be an election year
phenomenon. They become viable organisations only to serve
the campaign, nomination and election functions. In general
it could be argued that political parties are poorly organised at the lower levels where the degree of underdevelopment is high. Both TANU and the SAD seem to be well organised at the national, regional (in Tanzania) and province (in Sudan) levels. In those two levels, both human and financial resources tend to be concentrated. Hence resources in both countries make it difficult to provide the different levels with their needs. Below the regional and province levels in Tanzania and Sudan respectively, the activities of TANU and the SAD are only noticeable during party congresses. This should not give the impression that at the province level in Sudan for example, the SAD is effectively functioning. Performance at that level is relatively better than the levels below. At the district level, there are normally three tiers, the district, the branch, and the cell (in Tanzania) and basic unit (in the Sudan). For the political party to be effective at that level, there has to be a good communication level between the three tiers. In both Tanzania and the Sudan, the policies of the government and the party can easily reach down to the regional and province levels. The problem starts with how can the policy filter down to other levels? As the case studies in the NTF and the EPR show, the SAD is incapable
of making effective contacts with the levels below the province. In Tanzania the problem is not as grave as it is in the Sudan, but both countries suffer from the same ailment at the district level. The political leadership at the districts and the levels below in both countries is far from being effective and capable for the job. No serious efforts seem to have been made by the leaders at that level to contact the cells, basic units and branches. It is no wonder that the lowest organs in the party in both countries made no efforts from their part to contact the district. In the rural areas the majority of the population live, and it is in these areas that TASSU and the BSSU are expected to concentrate their efforts. The overall objective of the political system in both countries is to encourage political socialisation of the people and increased participation by them in the party and government policy making process as mentioned before. In order to achieve such participation the people must be acquainted with the general purpose of the various political institutions including the cell itself. The people must understand the purpose of the cell system, the basic units and branches, what it requires from them and whether they are active participants in the political process or simply passive recipients of political orders from above. In the districts,
in both countries, apart from lack of understanding the role of the cells or the basic units, there are still people who think that these organs are merely local government institutions rather than being basic party organs. Some people in Tanzania still think that they are TANU members only because they pay tax to TANU government.

If the objectives of nation-building in both Tanzania and Sudan are sought, the whole process must start with the mobilisation of individuals and groups in response to new ideas, programmes and information which will induce people to want to behave in new ways. The process of mass mobilisation should lead to articulation of interests and, consequently, to mass participation in party and government policy-making process. If the concept of development from below is to succeed in both countries, there should be a breakthrough in communications from bottom to top. Much inefficiency in the functioning of both TANU and the SSU is due to ignorance and lack of political consciousness on the part of the political leaders in the districts, branches, cells and basic units. What is called "progressive" leaders is missing. Progressive in the sense of welcoming new ideas and values. Such leadership is not difficult to create if TANU and the SSU have the qualified political cadre that is
equipped with patience and ability to help the local population. Without such qualities a cadre will have little impact. Unfortunately the availability of a political cadre of the required kind is limited in both countries. Probably this is one of the major weaknesses of TARU and the MSU.

Another sign of weakness of both TARU and the MSU has to do with party membership. In both organisations, there seems to be little in concern, except at the national level, about statistical data on membership. Records about party membership, especially in the case of the MSU, are hardly kept up to date. As in the case of the TARU, the figures given about the total membership of the MSU are mentioned without producing any record to support the claims. Annual change in membership and, if possible, the activities in which the members participate are not kept in places like the SSP and MNP. In spite of this it is often to hear political talking about the MSU as if it is a 'mass party' 'people's party' and most of the time 'a melting pot for the people's working forces'. Statistics about party membership and the swing in that membership is needed to give the political leadership an idea about the backing they might have or have not from the masses. However, the problem is one of organisation and it is not difficult to overcome.
A strongly organized and effective political party is also evaluated in terms of functions it performs. Such functions include promotion of economic development, education and alike. In the sphere of economic development, no significant achievements can be cited as far as both TANU and the SBU are concerned. As far as TANU is concerned, its role in the implementation of the Nyerere policy, on which the transformation of the whole Tanzanian society depended, is a negative one. To talk about the failure of TANU in the implementation process, will be a repetition of what has been mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. In the case of the SBU, it is not only that the role of the SBU is absent in the field of economic development, but the role that the SBU with the help of its branches in the places of work is not even understood. In the cases of MUP and the PA, even the assistants secretary for development do not understand what role can the SBU play in development. No one seems to be encouraging the workers and farmers to work more and produce more. If the SBU is really a representative of the workers and farmers in the Sudan its role in affecting these two groups will have a great impact on the field of economic development. But as the case studies show, SBU branches in places of work had little or no impact as far as raising the production levels are concerned. Their presence
created more problems since most of the time is spent in organizing meetings and discussing politics. Politics is given prominence over economics. Similar problems faced Tanzania. Workers in work places cannot be blamed for not working hard, if those who claim to be leaders, political or otherwise, are unable to set a good example to the workers. As Nyden argues "one of the gravest problems facing the African countries is the shortage of "those men of action", which Reinhard Bendix says, have the inevitable but unavoidable task of subordinating other people to the demands of modern economic enterprises: to impose authority and discipline but at the same time find ideological justification for their exercise of power."

The only area that can be related to economic development in which TANU and SWU were involved in, is that of self-help projects. Whatever the level of success of these projects may be, justice will not be made if mention for them is not made.

In the field of education, both political and non-political, the role played by both TANU and the SWU is rather limited. As far as political education is concerned, both institutions were handicapped by shortage of qualified political cadre to carry the job. The problem is more acute in the Sudan. TANU was founded in July 1954, seven years before Tanzania became
independent in 1962. This gave it an advantage over
the SSU which is about ten years old approximately. The
problem of political cadre in both countries is reflected
in the difficulty of explaining policies to the masses, as
discussed earlier. Leaving political education aside, in
other fields of education, both TANU and the SSU registered
a constant advance. Both institutions can play an effective
role as far as illiteracy eradication in the rural areas is
concerned. Both Tanzania and the Sudan suffer from high
illiteracy rates with their negative impact on the develop-
ment policies. Both countries cannot provide the means to
fight the phenomenon in the short run since there is shortage
in both schools and teachers to provide for every village.
TANU and SSU calls, basic units and branches can help in
solving the problem by assigning to members who are literate
enough to teach those who cannot read and write. Both seem
to have paid no attention to the issue. In Sudan for example,
other than the Secretary General of the SSU in Khartoum
there seems to be no mention to the problem as one goes down
to the province and other levels. However, to talk about
the success of the SSU in eradicating illiteracy, one must
assume that in all basic units and branches, at least one
or two of the members must be capable to educate both TANU
and the SSU can make use of the Cuban experiment as far as
the problem of illiteracy is concerned.
One can conclude that the political parties in both Tanzania and Sudan are badly organised at their lower levels, communication between different layers is lacking and both suffer from lack of qualified political cadre. This affected both TANU and the SSU in effectively fulfilling their educational and mobilisation roles that the political leadership relied upon in its effort to build the nation. The process of penetration is affected accordingly. But what about the response of the masses regarding the efforts made by the parties and government in both countries? In other words has people’s participation been realised?

The leadership in both countries was convinced that local government councils will be the appropriate platform for people’s participation. The decentralisation policy in both countries was intended for giving more powers to the people, without giving powers to the people their participation will be ineffective. These are the views of the political leadership. But in reality, did the people participate? As far as participation in local government councils, the answer depends on whether the people understand their role or not. In Tanzania, people’s participation is confined to the Ujamaa village councils only. But even in these councils, people’s participation is limited. The
Tanzanian government is trying to encourage the people to play an active role in the planning process. The people in Nyasa village councils participate in the plan preparation only. As far as plan implementation is concerned, it is an exclusive domain of the government bureaucrats and technocrats. At the district and regional level, participation by the people is totally absent. In the Salama on the other hand the situation is worse. Most of the people do not understand what the PDA is about and what role they can play. Local government councils in most cases are looked at as agents of the central government with the sole purpose of distributing goods. Even some of the councillors do not understand what people's participation is and what form it is supposed to take. The people, especially in the rural areas are accustomed to the old system where the government plays the role of the donor and the people are the recipients. Participation by the people is a new concept which the government and party want to introduce. But the people are ignorant and no efforts were made by either government bureaucrats or party functionaries to explain to them the meaning of participation and how to participate.
Peo-Le's participation in both Tanzania and Sudan is further hindered by the attitudes of government bureaucrats and technocrats towards elected councillors. Government staff are not convinced of the view that calls for people's participation in running their own affairs as far as development is concerned. The bureaucrats and technocrats view people's participation in planning for example, as unnecessary and can only cause unnecessary delay. It is not a surprise to find most of the bureaucrats and technocrats thinking that way since the majority of them are not acquainted with the official ideology or policy that stresses the importance of people's participation. Conflicts between government staff and councillors is a phenomenon that characterized local government councils in both countries. When those who are supposed to set a good example for the masses and help them to participate are fighting among themselves, it is no wonder if the masses turned a deaf ear to the calls of the government.

The masses in the rural areas cannot also fully participate in making plans and implementing them for the mere fact that they are technically incapable. The problem is especially clear in the Tanzanian case where more serious efforts are attempted to involve the people in making plans.
Local government councils not only proved to be a failure as far as mass involvement is concerned, but the image that the people have in their minds about these councils is not at all conducive to participation. Councillors, especially in the Sudan, are branded as corrupt and the councils are only a stepping stone to self-enrichment. How can anybody expect the masses to join local government councils and effectively participate, when they have such an image in mind?

As far as the decentralisation policy in both countries is concerned, misunderstanding and bad implementation are both true in Tanzania and the Sudan. The decentralisation policy is a complex one, and in both countries it required understanding and digestion from the part of the political leadership and the masses alike. But the policy, how it is to be implemented, and what it requires from the people, was only known to a small group at the political centre and few bureaucrats. The political leaders, in Sudan for example, at the province, district and village levels are as ignorant as the masses they are supposed to educate. Misunderstanding of the policy led to different interpretations by different people. This exacerbated the problem since many people did not know where the truth lies. These
Few who knew kept aloof and did not bother to come forward and explain the reasons for and objectives behind the policy. In the Sudan, the implementation of the policy is further handicapped by the fact that PNU's at the provinces tend to concentrate most of the powers at that level. Little was decentralised to the levels below. Some of the provinces, especially the poor ones like NUF, became more dependent on the central government after the policy has been introduced. The main objective behind the policy which aims at giving the provinces more autonomy in directing their own affairs and leaves major issues to be dealt with by the centre, has not been realised.

In Tanzania, on the other hand, decentralisation which intended to expand peasant participation, increase bureaucratic efficiency and facilitate planning, failed to achieve these objectives. Peasant participation did not increase and most of the studies made about the policy in Tanzania confirm this. There is a good reason to suspect that decentralisation in fact has increased the power of local civil servants, at the expense of both NNU and elected officials. Planning is still done on behalf of the peasants. Government bureaucrats and technocrats do not have faith in the policy or the ability of the people to participate. In fact, the gap between
rhetoric and the reality of peasant participation remains wide open.

Both Tanzania and the Sudan in their efforts to decentralise are handicapped by shortages in both human and financial resources. Without adequate and continuous supply, ambitious policies like the ones pursued in both countries are bound to fail. Failure of the policy by definition means that the most cherished slogans like "giving power to the people" will continue as a puzzle in search for a solution.

The argument that can easily be made is that the ideology, political parties and local government agencies in both Tanzania and the Sudan did not greatly help the political leadership in making real their dreams about building their nations, building a nation in the sense of reaching down to the grassroots and making the presence of the government and party being felt by every single individual, building a nation by listening to the complaints, ideas and suggestions made by the masses as a result of their involvement and participation in the political and local government institutions. The whole process did not succeed since an effective system of communication was missing. The political parties did not
properly play their educational and mobilizational roles. Both TANU and the MBE are more like political machines than political parties. Local government institutions on the other hand did not provide the necessary platform for people's participation. The following arguments can be made as far as both experiments in Tanzania and the Sudan are concerned.

1 - Regarding ideology, the political leadership in both countries tried to exploit socialism to achieve its own goals and aspirations. In the two countries, a mild sort of socialism was undertaken to mobilize mass support and legitimize regimes that are on the verge of economic collapse. The proclamation of socialism created a new sense of purpose. Rhetoric against inequality and exploitation appealed to the peasants and workers who had nothing to lose but everything to gain in the process since a better future has been promised. The leadership thought that this will make it more easier to get more effort from the masses. But in reality both countries are too poor to offer any better material conditions to the masses and there is less surplus to share. Hyden was right when he argued that "most African Governments have adopted a socialist approach quite unprepared... African socialism has been quite arbitrarily introduced by petty bourgeois rulers to cope with the
intrinsic instability of modernisation under capitalism". The leadership in both countries opted for socialism since there is a limited range of policy options available for them, but if socialism cannot prove its case in the very short run, this might leave the masses quite vulnerable to any other ideas.

2. As far as mobilisation of the masses is concerned, the creation of a single party per se does not mean that the process will succeed. A single party in order to succeed in mobilising the masses, especially in an African situation, must clearly bear in mind that stress on politics alone will not attract supporters. In a society which is crisis-crossed by tribal, ethnic and religious loyalties, a single party is unlikely to succeed in its mission if such loyalties are not taken into consideration. In the case of the Sudan for example, after the ban on all political leadership thought that by offering an alternative ideology and an alternative organisation the masses will quickly respond. The process is easier in societies where tribal, ethnic, religious and other affiliations are not strong enough and where single parties can prove to be strong enough as to both human and financial resources. But in the case of the NRM for example, and to an extent MUV, there are other centres of power that compete with them directly or
Indirectly, in Tanzania for example, the influence of the Christian missionaries is very strong in the Kilimanjaro area and it posed a real threat to TANU. In the Sudan, tribalism, sectarianism, ethnicity and religion can all be considered as centres of power that can impede or accelerate the functioning of the NCP depending on how successful is the NCP in accommodating them within its ranks. It is not enough to make decrees and regulations barring the native administration or organisations like the Beja Congress in NCP. The NCP must prove that a better alternative is being offered. This depends on the strength or weakness of the party. In both Tanzania and the Sudan, TANU and the NCP are poor as far as resources are concerned. Without having adequate financial resources and effective and trained cadre, the mission is difficult to fulfil.

3 - The objectives of political participation in both Tanzania and the Sudan are both ambitious and proved difficult to attain. Participation is not only considered as a process of providing the citizens with an opportunity to elect representatives. It is intended to link the periphery to the centre and is regarded as a critical and immediate component of the developmental process. It is considered as a sine qua non of development that cannot be
constrained or deferred. The leadership is in favour of (at least in theory) ceding political control to the mass population on the ground that such control is both democratic and just, and hence a requisite for socialist construction. Just as unequal distribution of wealth must be eliminated to achieve a socialist society, so too must the unequal distribution of power be eliminated. Participation in short, is the political corollary of material equality.

The political leadership in both countries in reality, proved to be unprepared and perhaps unwilling to allow the people to participate as the theory stipulates. The resources that they have at hand are not sufficient to enable the people to participate. Human resources and financial resources are needed if mass participation is to be effective. As it has been mentioned several times, both countries are too poor for that. The only alternative which the political leadership can resort to under such circumstances, is to use force as some people think. However force is not always a desirable way of achieving success and there is no guarantee that what peaceful means failed to achieve could be achieved by using force. Force is especially not desirable in regimes that lack the support of sectors of the population and where the population itself is ethnically, tribally and religiously
divided. Even when a regime draws its legitimacy from the majority, if not all, of the population force cannot always be a variable to count upon.

But as far as the decentralization policy in both countries is concerned, it did not succeed in giving 'more power to the people' and the costs so far seem to be more than the benefits in both countries. The cost incurred under the decentralization policy is manifested in the growing number of bureaucrats for example. Salaries paid to maintain the expanded bureaucracy in the regions sliced big pieces from the small national cake. Some people used to argue that under decentralization no more jobs will be created. What will happen is that staff will be decentralised from the centre to the periphery. In reality this is not happening and the central ministries are reluctant to send their staff to the regions. This is noticeable in the case of the Sudan. Such a tendency will force the provinces to recruit people from the local areas to do the job. Hence an expanded bureaucracy becomes real. Under decentralization more buildings, like houses, offices and host-houses are being built to accommodate bureaucrats and their families. This is briefly the cost side of the thing. What about the benefits? Economic benefits in
particular; as the Tanzanian and Sudanese experiments show, the decentralisation policies did not politically succeed by giving 'more power to the people'. More autonomy for the regions and provinces in Tanzania and the Sudan, respectively, has not been achieved as well. In the Sudan in particular more dependence on the central government became the norm for a province like NUB. There are no economic stories of success that resulted in either Tanzania or the Sudan as a result of the decentralisation policy. The financial problem is probably one of the most important obstacles facing the implementation of the policy in a country like Sudan, whether from the part of the central government or individual provinces. The centre is too poor to assist the poor provinces to stand on their feet. The provinces on the other hand are too poor to be independent. The decentralisation policy offered no solution to either country as far as the worsening economic conditions are concerned. In spite of the failure that characterised the policy so far in the Sudan, the political leadership is thinking of making further steps regarding the policy implementation. Instead of trying to remedy the malady by discovering where the policy went wrong, proposals are being made to divide the country into five regions. It is thought that regionalism in the Sudan is the highest and perhaps the
last step as far as decentralisation is concerned. When regional governments are formed, 'power to the people' will change from a mere slogan to a real thing. Whatever the arguments given for the benefits of the new measures, one must warn against such a step. If the pre-regionalisation measures did not succeed, who will guarantee that the new measures will succeed bearing in mind that they will be built on the foundations of the old ones? At the present moment the problem that faces the Sudan is mainly an economic problem, and not a problem of whether Sudan decentralised or not. What is needed is the creation of a strong economic base by increasing the sources of revenue. Unfortunately, neither the decentralisation policy nor the new measures that aim at dividing the country into five regions offered a solution. What will happen in my view, is an increased spending when regional governors, regional ministries and regional people's assemblies start to function. What economic returns will ensue as a result is difficult to predict.

So far, the efforts of building their nations have not been fruitful for either the Tanzanian or the Sudanese political leadership. The leadership chose a model, 'the diffusionist model,' which is not suitable for their environment. The policies they wanted to adopt sometimes proved to be unrealistic and difficult to attain when the econom
conditions are taken into consideration. At times the policies are met with resistance and at times passive reaction resulted when the realities of the political situation are concerned. The few stories of success that were available were only like isolated islands in a sea. The chronological period of 10 years of comparison is a right one for making an assessment for what has and has not been achieved. But such assessment can hardly be conclusive. An assessment, reassessment and more assessment is needed. Any new experiment is bound to face problems at the beginning and failures and setbacks are normal. No experiment in the political history has ever been successful from the beginning. However, an experiment that faces failures and setbacks cannot be rectified if the political leadership is not ready to admit them. All human beings, leaders and led, are bound to make mistakes. Only when mistakes are discovered and their commission is admitted, can proper solutions and alternatives be offered.


7. Ibid., pp.120-9.


9. Ibid., p.120.

10. Ibid., p.121.


12. Ibid., p.209.
13. Ibid., p. 305.

14. In the meantime, most of the specialist policies that the regime adopted in its first years, especially with regard to state control of the economy, are giving way to policies that have nothing to do with socialism.

15. Hyden argues that socialist revolutions will only materialize under conditions of incipient capitalism; where capitalism had a socially mobilizing and politically conscious-raising effect. He further argues that in those places where socialism has triumphed in the Third World by revolution, the majority of the producers have experienced exploitation by feudal landlords or capitalist owners of the means of production. They have been forced by those social classes to devote most of their time to produce surplus over which they have no control. These countries have had a social class base on which socialism could be effectively built. An interpretation of Hyden’s thesis means that in Sudan and Tanzania a socialist revolution is a distant reality. See his arguments in Beyond Edmund in Tanzania, pp. 20-23.


argues that turning the peasant producer to become a modern farmer by effectively participating in Ujamaa villages and raising production cannot be attained by education, training and government services alone. He argues that the structural conditions of peasant economies are such that very often the only approach available implies authoritarianism. If governments were to depend on participatory and grass-roots approaches alone, there will be no modernization and no development. See Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 225.

24. The five regions are: The Northern Region, The Eastern Region, The Central Region, Darfur Region and Kordofan Region.
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