THE CONCEPT OF
CAUSALITY IN EARLY ISLAM

an M.A.

Gaafer Sheikh Idris

London Khartoum 1969
CONTENTS

Abstrakt

Introduction

I. DIVINE WILL AND PREDETERMINATION
   (1) The Concept of Will
   (2) Principles of Divine Will
   (3) Predetermination.

II. CREATION
   (1) Divine Action
   (2) Meanings of Words Expressing the Idea of Creation.
   (3) "Be! And it Becomes!"
   (4) Theories of Creation.

III. DIVINE PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE WORLD

IV. THE ROLE OF CAUSES AND OF MAN
   (1) Foreword.
   (2) Arabic Causal Terms.
   (3) The Role of Causes.
   (4) The Role of Man.

V. DETERMINISM IN SCIENCE AND IN RELIGION
   (1) Foreword.
   (2) Scientific Determinism.
   (3) Religious Determinism.

Books and Articles Cited
ABSTRACT

This is mainly a logico-linguistic analysis of almost all the Qur'anic terms that are related to the idea of causality, an analysis which attempts to discover the true and original meanings of those terms as they were understood in early Islam and before the Arab Muslims came into contact with other civilizations, Greek, Persian or modern Western. From this analysis a coherent Islamic view of that concept is synthesized, and viewed in the light of modern philosophical thought. It is concluded that the idea of a Creator necessarily limits causal efficacy and human freedom, but is not essentially incompatible with either.

The method adopted, the conclusions drawn, and the comparisons made are in many ways novel as far as traditional Islamic philosophical studies are concerned.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

I. Nature of the Problem

Both for purely intellectual satisfaction and for practical considerations man has always been very much concerned with three related questions: How do the things that we see come into existence?, How do they continue to be?, And how do they change?

In answering the first question, people have always been divided into two main groups; those who say that things have been created by an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Eternal God; and those who say that they need not be created either because they are eternal, or because they originated by chance, or simply because the concept of creation is an unscientific one. It is unscientific because, it is sometimes claimed, it is incompatible with the Principle of Causality and the Law of Conservation of Matter, both of which it is claimed are vital assumptions of science.

Concerning the second and third questions, both parties (or most of them) agree as to the observational fact that persistence and change occur in a regular or lawful manner. They differ as to the ways these regularities and laws are to be interpreted. Differences
of interpretation are not however necessarily related to whether the thinker is a believer or an atheist. Some people from both parties hold the view that causes have efficacy and that effects necessarily follow their causes. If they are atheists they would claim that that is all there is to it; but if they are believers they go on to say that the efficacy of causes is given them by God, and the necessity predetermined by Him. Another group, which also includes both parties, claims that causes have no efficacy and that when effects follow their causes they do not do so by reason of any necessity.

When we come down to more detailed questions concerning causes and effects, e.g. whether they can be contemporaneous, whether there is a plurality of causes, etc., difference of opinion becomes more independent of belief and non-belief considerations.

By the Islamic Concept of Causality, I mean the Qur'anic answers to these three basic questions as well as some of the important implications of those answers.

The Qur'anic answer to the question: How do things come to be? is that God issues the command Bel! and they become. That is not however all that there is to it:
we find in Qur'an some details about what goes on before this order is issued, and what happens after it. Before God creates anything, he wills to create it; He makes a plan of the whole creation in which everything is predetermined. We begin our study with a discussion of these two concepts. God not only brings things into existence by an act which is called creation – the idea of which we analyse in Chapter Two – but is also responsible for their persistence and every change that occurs in them. This concept of preservation is analysed in Chapter Three, which brings us to the end of what can be considered the first part of this study.

In the two remaining Chapters we look for the roles that natural causes (Chapter Four) and human agency (Chapter Five) can play in a world in which everything – as the first part shows – seems to be due to God.

We consider the Qur'an, as it really is, to be the only reliable source on the Islamic viewpoint concerning any matter, philosophical or otherwise. The authentic traditions of the Prophet are – on the authority of the Qur'an itself – explanations of the Qur'an. To have a clear conception of the nature and place of causes and the answers to the different questions concerning causality we have decided to make our way to the
Qur'an right away. This then is primarily a study of the text of the Qur'an, an attempt to formulate a comprehensive and coherent theory of causality whose elements are collected from the teachings of this book. Historical notes, individuals' ideas, comparative digressions are resorted to only by way of serving this main purpose.

But how are we to understand the Qur'an? From the time this Arabic book made its first appearance, it is now about fourteen centuries during which time the meanings of so many Arabic words used in it have changed; words acquire additional meanings, they lose some or all of their older meanings, and even when the old meaning remains, it often acquires new associations and shades of meaning. This change of meaning, especially of the 'philosophical' words that are our concern here, happened especially when Muslims came into contact with the concepts of Western civilization and culture both in the Middle Ages when they started translating Greek science and philosophy, and in modern times when the impact has become even wider and stronger. Before drawing any conclusions from the Qur'an, we must, therefore, be sure that the senses we give to its words and sentences are the classical Arabic senses which were meant by them at the
time of the appearance of the Qur'an. This is of paramount importance to any serious student of the Qur'an who seeks to know its true meanings and not — as it has become common — to read into it modern ideas which are foreign to it. This common mistake of reading into the Qur'an modern views is sometimes due to the fact that when reading European translations of the Qur'an, we naturally understand the words in their European sense. But it is even more often due to the fact that when reading the Qur'an in the original Arabic, we cannot help — and this is more true of Arab students — giving its words the meanings with which we are very familiar. Perusing modern Islamic literature in the Arabic language, one can find hundreds — literally hundreds — of such examples of misunderstanding the Qur'anic text.

Before explaining the method I have tried to follow to avoid such pitfalls, and by way of introducing and justifying it, I find it pertinent to say a word about the relation between language and culture that underlies our semantic investigations.

II. Language and Culture

It is often said that language is a system of
arbitrary symbols. But this statement can be very misleading. On hearing it one might picture languages as being no more than alternative codes registering, mirroring, reflecting, or corresponding to objectively given particulars of the real world. It would not make much difference to call this 'tree' or 'sha'jara'; and it is only by accident that the first symbol happened to belong to English and the latter to Arabic; and the same applies to all other symbols.¹

This is obviously a grossly unrealistic picture of language. A more realistic view of language shows that it is related to the culture, the philosophy, the worldview, of those who use it, and thus that it cannot be a mere system of arbitrary symbols. The epithet 'arbitrary' has to be qualified and its nature be clarified.

It is true that, onomatopoeic words apart, if we take a single word from any language and ask ourselves why should this particular word stand for that particular object or concept, we cannot find any reasonable answer. We therefore conclude that its choice is arbitrary. But we have been able to come to this conclusion only because

¹. For a more detailed explanation of this and some other points on which I have touched in this section, see Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur'an, pp. 9-16.
we severed the word from its 'family' of words, and thus ignored the only possible clue to a reasonable justification. That language is not a collection of independent atomic words, but rather - to a large extent - a system of families of related words, shows that the arbitrariness of its symbols is not absolute. But how are these 'families' formed?

To explain this let us begin from the beginning. About the origin of language, as far as it concerns us here, there are mainly two views: either the first words were arbitrarily chosen as symbols for their referents, or the choice was made on a principle of natural relation between the words and their objects, the words being onomatopoetic, echoing the sound of their objects; or gestural, imitating their motion and contour, or representational in any other sense. Let us assume that our original words were arbitrary and nonnatural. The question now is how do we increase our necessarily meagre stock of those initial words? Do we augment our stock of words by continually adding to them arbitrarily chosen ones? Surely we do not do so all the time. Language is not merely augmented, it usually evolves by - among other things - the process of deriving new words from old ones. It is this fact which in my
It would however be a mistaken and too narrow view of languages to suppose that each one sticks rigidly to one point of view. The example of a rich language like Arabic shows that the same referent can be given as many derived names as the classes to which it is thought to belong. Thus the sword - a vital instrument for the nomadic Arabs of that time - is said to have many names, each one symbolizing a different aspect of it and classifying it differently. So, though the referent is one, yet the different names are not synonymous and thus not interchangeable. In some medieval and modern books of literary criticism contemporary poets and writers are often criticized for using the inappropriate word, thus revealing their ignorance of the nuances of classical Arabic. On the other hand, from a single root like جم (meaning to add or gather together) so many things derive their names, which shows that as far as they are so named, they are being looked at from their numerical or collective point of view. Here are some examples that come to mind.
opinion sets a serious limit to the claim of semantic arbitrariness and which shows that different languages reflect the different cultural views of those who use them. The process of derivation is based on the principle of the similarity of the 'referents';

(when similarity is considered to be complete, we do not need to derive a new name; we just call the new 'instance' by the old name). But similarity depends on point of view. A newly discovered object can be similar to an already known one in quantity, to another in shape, to a third in colour ... size, texture, sound, speed, behaviour, taste etc. In fact it usually resembles many of the already known objects each in more than one way. Once we give a derived name to the new referent, we thereby decide to which class we think it should belong. The decision is neither objective nor is it biological, but is mostly cultural. It has been shown that different languages adopt different principles of similarity or different ways of classifying reality. It has been shown moreover that 'perception is not merely a matter of recording what is presented' but 'is influenced by mental set'.

1. The same applies to the metaphorical use of language.
Jama'a
Jam'a
Majmu'
Majmu'a
Mujtama'
Jama'a
Jamiyya
Jami'
Jami'a
Jim'a
Jama'a
Ijtima'
Juma'a

to add (in the mathematical sense),
also to bring together.
addition
total
collection
community
association
society or concentration
mosque
university
intercourse, sexual and otherwise
to make an intercourse
meeting
Friday (the day on which people make
a special congregational prayer)

So, far from being a mere alternative code of
naming facts that independently exist out there, every
language is an alternative way of looking at reality, a
different view or philosophy of the world. It does not
merely register facts, it is a principle according to
which the continuum of reality is dissected into classes
and categories.

And so when we study the language of a nation, we do
not just learn how to manipulate our tongues in the way
they do (perhaps we can never achieve that) but we gain
one of the best insights into its mentality and learn
how to look at the world from another vantage point that
might enrich our experience and prove to be more
advantageous and thus more rewarding than our own.

Another conclusion to which this view leads is that
since language is not a mere conveyer of ideas, but has its own philosophy one cannot say something in a language without automatically committing oneself, at least partially, to a certain view of the world. This is why the choice of an appropriate medium is very important for the message, since if its basic philosophy is incompatible with that of the message which it is supposed to carry, it inevitably distorts and misrepresents it. Partly to avoid such distortions, people, especially scientists, resort to making explicit redefinitions of the terms that express their key concepts.

III  The Method

To give as honest a Qur'anic picture as possible of each of the theologico-philosophical concepts here discussed, I have read the Qur'an several times to collect what I have deemed to be the key terms in which the concept is expressed.

Suppose that the concept whose 'elementary constituents' we are seeking is \( C \). We start by finding out the ways in which \( C \) is expressed. Let these be \( q, r, s, t \). This is how we proceed.
(A) q, r, s, t are often treated as synonymous but we do not readily accept this. Since real synonyms are hard to come by, we try to find out the possible differences of meaning among these terms. This is done by an attempt to discover the root-meaning of each of these words, which is done in the following manner:

(B) We consider the perceptual use of a word to be its primary sense from which its more abstract uses are derived. We therefore look for the objects in connection with which these words were originally used. Three reasons have induced me to make this assumption:

(i) It seems to me that this is the way language evolved. But I must make it clear here that the primacy I am speaking about is neither a logical nor a genetical primacy of cognition. Whether we start, as it used to be believed, by cognizing the concrete and particular and then abstracting the general and universal therefrom, or whether, on the contrary, our knowledge of the particular presupposes an innate knowledge of the abstract as it is now held by some, it seems to me that for purely pragmatic and practical reasons, and since the role of language is primarily social, people must have talked about what they could
easily agree upon, namely the perceptible, and then used that language, in a somewhat metaphorical way to talk about more subtle experiences. This partly explains the practice which is sneered at by behaviourists, of talking about mental phenomena as if they were physical things: the will is strong; an idea occurs, it attracts; intentions are motives, they are executed; a mind is searched, exhausted, it is enlightened or blinded, it is level or crooked, it is an insight, that sees truth, or if unsound gropes in darkness etc. etc. I repeat that this proves only the linguistic primacy of the perceptual, and has nothing to do with its cognitive primacy, unless it is assumed that priority of expression entails priority of cognition. Moreover, it cannot be applied to all the vocabulary of a language in all its historical stages.

(11) Because this seems to be the assumption of Arab linguists who almost always consider this to be the literal and original meaning of the word.

(iii) It is the surest way of avoiding later philosophically and theologically coloured definitions, some of which found their way into dictionaries that purport
to give classical meanings. Realization of this fact has led some authors to consider all dictionaries as unreliable sources for Qur'anic usage, but I think that by following this procedure one can guard against the possibilities of being misled by them, and yet benefit greatly from them.

(c) If a word, say q, is used to refer to more than one object I do not hasten to conclude that the word is a mere homonym. I try to see whether behind its different classes of denotata lies a common quality which the word connotes. I am aware that this is against a trend in Linguistic Philosophy which Professor Gellner aptly calls Polymorphism and which has always seemed to me to be very dubious. Equally untenable, however, is a commitment to Unimorphism. Whether a particular word is a genuine homonym or a general concept is an empirical matter that has to be found out for every individual case. From my limited experience, however, I would venture to say that there are less homonyms in Arabic than in English.

(D) But how can we decide whether a certain word is only accidentally used to refer to entirely different denotata (or concepts) or whether it expresses a unity

behind this diversity? Suppose that the word q refers to objects \(0_1, 0_2, 0_3\). I have found it useful in solving that problem to proceed as follows:

(i) Are the objects \(0_1, 0_2, 0_3\), designated by any other symbols besides q? I have found that this is usually the case.

(ii) Suppose that besides being designated by q, \(0_1, 0_2, 0_3\), are also designated by \(q_1, q_2, q_3\) respectively. Our next question is: Is q in each case a mere alternative to \(q_1, q_2, q_3\), or is there a special criterion for its usage? When is \(0_1\) called q and not \(q_1\), \(0_2\) q and not \(q_2\), etc.? Or when is it wrong to call one of these q rather than call it by the other name, and why? If the criterion (or set of criteria) for its usage is the same for all \(0_1, 0_2, 0_3\), then q must be referring to a common quality of \(0_1, 0_2, 0_3\), which that criterion of its usage specifies.

Let us give a concrete example. The word \textit{sabab} (cause) is used in the Qur'an to refer to a rope, a way or street, a door. Applying our procedure we find that besides being designated by '\textit{sabab}', a rope is also designated by \textit{hable}, \textit{wilhaq}, \textit{ribat}, a way by \textit{taric},
sabil, sirāt: a door by ♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭♭ Blond

The criterion for using sabab to designate a rope is stated in dictionaries of classical Arabic. Here are some examples. 1. 'Any rope let down or made to descend from above'. 2. A strong and long rope, but no rope is so called except one by means of which one ascends or descends. 3. '...this appellation is only given to a rope of which one end is attached to a roof or ceiling or the like', 'one by means of which one ascends palm-trees', 'a rope by means of which one reaches or gains access to water.'

This is taken to be the original meaning of the word from which all other meanings are derived. Hence the generalization by one of the lexicographers 'A thing of any kind by means of which one attains, reaches or gains access to another.'

Turning to actual classical (including Qur'anic) usage we can easily find evidence for this generalization; when the conditions obtain it is used, and when the conditions do not obtain another more apt word is used.

1. E. Lane, Arabic English Lexicon.
2. Ibid
rope  'Let him stretch a rope (sabab) to the roof
(or ceiling of his dwelling) and thereby cut ...'
(15:XXII) It is obvious that 'sabab' is used here in
its most literal and original sense. Compare this with
other contexts where other words are used to designate
rope.

While sabab designates a rope (and derivatively
anything) which you use to get something or to get to
somewhere, hable designates a rope with which you tie
things together, so that they remain firm and do not
scatter or fall apart. The connection here is more
constant and 'static'. In its derivative usages, in
which the Qur'an abounds, it is clearly used to express
this sense. Thus scripture is called hablu Allah
(the rope or cord of God), to which people are asked to
hold firmly that they may not go astray. It would have
been odd to use the word sabab here. How can one remain
holding on to something that one uses as a means to
obtain something else?  'Upon her neck a rope of palm-
fibre' (5:49) This usage is the nearest one to what
I said is the primary meaning of habl.

Having found the special meaning of the term sabab,
which is only one of many causal terms, we follow the
same method to find out the special meanings of all the
other terms. If all these terms are used to express the general notion of cause, then causality as the Arabs understood it must be the sum total of the meanings of these terms. This raises two problems.

1. The quality and richness of a concept whose meaning is obtained in this way is definitely dependent upon the number and type of words which we include in its class. Since neither the Arabs nor the Qur'an explicitly classified their terms according to the classes of general concepts which they express, how do we know whether a term is or is not to be included in a certain class? In other words, is there a scientific way of delineating the class boundaries of the concepts whose meanings we seek to reach? This is a very difficult question, and it is for this reason that however plausible the method I have chosen seems to me, I cannot be sure that the words I have chosen to include in any particular class are exhaustive, nor can I be sure that none of them are misplaced. However, in deciding what word to include or exclude I have certainly relied on my personal intuition, but have been much assisted by two factors:

(a) Words which belong to the same class are usually explained or defined by commentators and lexico-
graphers in terms of each other, and are generally, as I have repeatedly pointed out in the course of this study, treated as synonyms. That a word is used to explain or define another, establishes a *prima facie* case for their being members of the same class.

(b) A word which had a *prima facie* case for inclusion in a certain class might nevertheless be excluded from it if on inspecting its Qur'anic contexts and finding out its root-meaning I feel that it does not belong there. For example the word *sawwara* (to form) is sometimes used to explain and is explained by the word *khalaga* (to create). At first I included it in the latter class, but when I investigated its meaning I decided to transfer it to the wide concept of preservation. A crucial evidence for this is a verse which shows that *taswir* (forming) comes after creating.

2. If an 'Arab philosophy' is embodied in these Arabic expressions, and if the Qur'\'an uses these expressions, does this imply that the Islamic conception is equivalent to an Arab conception? I would not now hesitate to say that unless the Qur'\'an clearly states the contrary then one is naturally led to the conclusion that
it accepts the basic notions expressed by the language it uses. How can it be otherwise? But this does not mean that the Qur'an, or anyone who uses the Arabic language, is thereby precluded from adding new information or ideas to those expressed in Arabic terms. People can agree on the general meanings of 'cause', but disagree (as they do now) on whether the event E is caused by C or F. In the same manner, while agreeing with the Arabs on the general meaning of the expression bi (by cause or reason of), the Prophet disagreed with them that rain is ultimately bi (caused by) the clouds. This result re-emphasises the importance of our semantical approach since if we do not understand what the Arabs and Muhammad had in common, we shall definitely fail to understand on what they disagreed.

Before concluding this introductory chapter I would like to add two remarks about this method:

(1) Semantical analysis is only a method of finding out what the Qur'an says, i.e., what this method settles is an empirical dispute about the philosophical views actually expressed by the Qur'an and is not invoked to solve any such philosophical problems. This is why, having stated through this method what the Qur'an actually said, and
having supported that, where possible, by quotations which bear directly on the problem in question, I then go on to examine these views for internal consistency and consider some of the objections to them and the difficulties which they raise. This is done in the wide context of modern philosophical and scientific discoveries. So while I am on the one hand doing my best to probe into the real meaning of the Qur'an, and not to superimpose on it any foreign views, I am on the other hand concerned to see how far that true meaning fits into the philosophical and scientific ideas now in the air.

(2) Though I have on the whole followed in practice the method here described, I have not found it necessary to spell it out in detail whenever I treated a certain word. But having now explained it here I hope that the reader will not fail to 'see' it between the lines.

IV A Note about the Title

As I have just said, this study is not a historical one. I am therefore unhappy about the word 'early' which appears in the title. It was meant to show only
that our study is based on the Qur'an as it was understood at the time of its appearance and before it began to be looked at through the glasses of Greek philosophy. Having finished this study I feel however that its more proper title should be simply 'The Islamic Concept of Causality'.

V Transliteration

The transliteration system adopted here is that of the second edition of *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (London 1960, continuing) except for two modifications with which British Arabists are familiar namely, q for k and i for dż.¹

---

DIVINE WILL AND PREDETERMINATION

(1) The Concept of Will

God is omnipotent. He can do anything short of logical impossibilities. But he does not do whatever He is able to do. Besides being omnipotent God is also wilful, omniscient, wise, merciful, etc. So whether a thing is to be or not to be, be depends on whether God wills it or not. And whether He wills it or not depends on whether it is compatible with the attributes of mercy, omniscience, wisdom, etc.

Mashi'a and irāda are the two words mostly used in the Qur'ān and elsewhere to express the idea of will. Philosophers, theologians, literary and ordinary men have usually considered them to be synonymous; and the very few who saw that this was not exactly correct did not succeed— in our view— to give an adequate account of the distinction between them that does justice to the different Qur'ān usages of these words. I think that our analysis— though not entirely satisfactory— does make some progress towards this end.
We start by recording the special features of each word, as they can be seen from the texts in which they appear; and then we try to propose a theory about the difference between them.

Mashī'a

(a) This word is usually used with words like whenever, wherever, whatever etc., that do not specify what is willed and that imply the presence of alternatives. I give here a list of these words, and some examples of the Qur'anic verses in which they are used.

1/ Ḥaythu (wherever) "... to make our dwelling wheresoever (haythu) we will (nāshā') in Paradise". (1)

"So we established Joseph in the land, to make his dwelling there wherever he would". (2)

2/. Kayfa (however) "it is He who forms you in the womb as (kayfa) He will". (3)

3/. Idha (whenever) "and He is able to gather them whenever He will". (4)

4/. Man (whom or whoever) "Say: 'O God, Master of the kingdom, Thou givest the Kingdom to whom thou wilt, and seize the Kingdom from whom thou wilt. Thou exaltest..."

---

(1) 74: XXXIX (Arb.)  
(2) 56: XII (Arb.)  
(3) 6: III (Arb.)  
(4) 29: XIII (Arb.)
whom Thou wilt, and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt." (1)
5/. Ma (what or whatever): "If He will, He can put you away, and leave after you, to succeed you, what He will." (2)
6/. Anna (as or wherever): your women are a tillage for you; so come unto your tillage as thou wish (shittum'). (3)

(b) Mashh'ā is mostly used in conditional sentences the majority of which are in the past sense. Something happens or is the case, and the Qur'ān says that had God willed otherwise it would not have happened.

Something does not happen or is not the case, and the Qur'ān says that had God willed it would have happened or been case. This implies two things. The presence of alternatives among which God has chosen or can choose; and the fact that God is omnipotent i.e. everything depends merely on his will to do it, the power to do it being always present. e.g. "Had God willed (law shā'ā), He would have taken away their hearing and their sight. Truly, God is powerful over everything." (4)

(c) Following is a list of the conditional terms used with mash'ā, a brief explanation of their meanings and some examples of the verses in which they are used.

(1) 26 : III (Arb.) (3) 223 :11 (Arb.)
(2) 133:III (Arb.) (4) 20 :ii (Arb.)
Law. The statement, 'Law A then B', signifies three senses.

i- That B is conditional upon A e.g. A might be the cause of B.

ii- That this conditionality belongs to the past, e.g., the meaning being 'Had A been B would have been'

iii- The denial of A.

By itself the statement 'law A then B' does not tell us anything about the occurrence or non-occurrence of B. This depends on some extra knowledge e.g. if we know that A is a necessary and sufficient condition or cause of B.\(^{(1)}\)

I have said before that God's ability being taken for granted, everything depends on His will i.e. his will is a necessary and sufficient condition. So in any sentence of the form 'law A then B', where A is God's will, both A. and B are denied e.g. 'And if thy Lord had willed, whoever is in the earth would have believed, all of them, all together, wouldst thou then constrain the people until they are believers?\(^{(2)}\) 'Wast thou not regarded thy Lord, how he has stretched out the shadow,? Had He willed, He would have made it still.'\(^{(3)}\)

\(^{(1)}\) Ibn Hisham, "Mughni al-Labib (an Kutubi al'A'qrib" vol.1., p. 258.

\(^{(2)}\) 99 :IX (Arb.)

\(^{(3)}\) 45 :XXV (Arb.)
2/. In is a future conditional. Just as everything that happened in the past, did so because God had willed it to be, so nothing can happen in the future unless God wills it to be. Thus, the Qur'an teaches us not to be certain about what we are going to do or what is going to happen, and to qualify our statements of such future occurrence by the phrase in shā'a Allah 'God willing' or, literally, 'if God wills').

3/. Idha is said to be an adverb of time that involves a sense of conditionality; e.g. '... and when (idha) we will, we shall exchange their likes.'(1)

4/. Illā' an This phrase simply means unless e.g. "had we mustered against them everything, face to face; yet they would not have been the ones to believe, unless (illā' an) God willed; but most of them are ignorant". (2)

(d) The concept of mashī'a involves and emphasises - we have seen, the fact that there are alternatives from which one can choose. Besides being implied by words like whatever, whoever, however etc... and by conditional terms, this fact is sometimes explicitly stated i.e. the alternatives among or between which one can choose are explicitly mentioned e.g.

"... to whoever of you desires (shā'a) to go forward or lag behind". (3) "God confirms those who

(1) 28 :LXXVI(Arb.) (2) III: VI (Arb.) (3) 1.37: LXXIV (Arb.)
believe with the firm word, in the present life and in the world to come; and God leads astray the evil
deers; and God does what He will.\(^{(1)}\)

(a) Mashi'\(\text{a}\) is the infinitive of sh\(\text{a}'\)\(\text{a}\) (to will).

A very interesting fact is that Shay' besides meaning 'thing', is also an infinitive of sh\(\text{a}'\)\(\text{a}\). It is as if the thing is solidified will. But it is usual in Arabic to name an effect by its cause e.g. when something happens you say this is God's Qadar (predetermination) or that it is His 'amr (order), meaning to say that it came as a result of his will, or predetermination or order. It is in this sense that Jesus is called the word of God. He is not a word but he came as a result of the word 'Be'.

Ir\(\text{a}'\)\(\text{a}\). We shall start by making — in the light of Qur\(\text{\text{"a}}\)\(\text{nic}\) usage, a logical analysis of the statement,

\[ \text{(A ar\(\text{\text{"a}}\)\(\text{a} B.)} \]

1. The object of ar\(\text{\text{"a}}\)\(\text{da}\), B, is a specific thing. While the Qur\(\text{\text{"a}}\)\(\text{\text{"a}}\)\(\text{'n}\) abounds in sentence where the object of ar\(\text{\text{"a}}\)\(\text{da}\) is specified, I have not succeeded in finding a single sentence where A is said to sh\(\text{a}'\)\(\text{a}\) B, where B is a particular thing. Mashi'\(\text{a}\) sentences — as we have seen — express the idea that one is free to do or choose one of many alternatives, while sentences of

\(^{(1)}\) 27:XIV (Arb.)
irāda express the idea that one is set on a particular aim or purpose. Its meaning is nearer to words like desire, intend, drive at, etc... Here are some examples:

"As for the ship, it belonged to certain poor men, who toiled upon the sea; and I desired (araddu) to damage it, for behind them there was a king who was a king who was seizing every ship by brutal force". (1)

"And constrain not your slave girls to prostitution if they desire (aradna) to live in chastity." (2)

The fact that the object of irāda is a specific thing comes out even more clearly in two special senses of irāda in which it differs completely from mashi'a. Arada is used in the sense of to like, or love, and with inanimate things in the sense of about to; e.g.

"God desires (yurīd) case for you, and desires (yurīd) not hardship for you". (3)

"There they found a wall about to (yurīd) tumble down, and so he set it up." (4)

What one loves or likes or is pleased with; and what is about to happen, are always definite and

(1) 79:XVIII (Arb.)
(2) 33;XXIV (Arb.)
(3) 185 : 11 (Arb.)
(4) 77 : XXVIII (Arb.)
specific things, and not one of many possible alternatives.

2/. B is called the murād i.e. what is intended, what is to be attained, goal, aim, end, etc..

While murad is something which one has not yet attained or obtained or got etc... The musha' (what is willed) is always something which has already been willed i.e. while irāda is a process through time, mashi'a is an action at a point of time.

3/. The concept of aim implies that of a means, and of the suitability of the means to the end. That is why A must do something e.g. use x to obtain B.

"And whosoever desires (arāda) the world to come, and strives after it with all due striving, and have faith, they are the ones whose striving is acceptable". (1)

"By means of intoxicants and games of chance Satan seeks (yurīd) only to sow enmity and hatred amongst you, and to turn you away from the remembrance of God and from prayer. Will you not then resist?". (2)

4/. When do we say of A that he arāda B? By observing him using or doing X which usually leads to B.

(1) 91:VI (Arb.) (2) 19:XXVIII (Arb.)
"But when he would have (arada) assaulted the man who was an enemy to them both, the man said, 'Moses, dost thou desire (turīḍ) to slay me, even as thou slowest a living soul yesterday. Thou only desirest (turīḍ) to be a tyrant in the land; thou desirest (turīḍ) not to be of them that put things right'.(1)

If X is a necessary condition for obtaining or doing etc... B, and if A does not do or use etc... X, then we say that A does not yurīḍ B.

"For, had they been (really) desirous of setting out (with thee), they would soonily have made some preparation therefore."(2)

5/... If we do not know that X is a means to B, or if we know that it is a means to more than B, and if we have not been told by A that his aim is B, then we usually ask: What do you turīḍ? i.e. what do you want X for? In this case we are asking about the final cause, and thus demanding a teleological explanation. The answer is usually 'I turīḍ X li (for) B'. If you think that X does not lead to anything, then you may ask the question 'what do you turīḍ X for?' in a sarcastic way, meaning that A's doing of X is purposeless or futile.

(1) 46 : LX (Asad.)
"... whereas those who are bent on denying the truth say, "what does God mean (yurīd) by this parable?" In this way does He cause many a one to go astray, just as He guides many a one aright."(1)

Here the answer to the question is both teleological and causal. It is explained to them that X does lead to something and that it is this something which is intended by the use of X.

The question 'Do you turīd B?; is asked sarcastically when the questioner knows that B is an unattainable end or when he knows that X which A is using is not the suitable means to B.

"Do you perchance seek to (turidūna) guide those whom God has let go astray - when for him whom God lets go astray thou canst never find a way?"(2)

6/. A yurīd B and he used X as a means to it. If asked why he wants B he might say 'to obtain C' and C to obtain D etc.. In the same way X which is a means to B can be described as being wanted or desired - (turad) by A for B. We saw an example of this in (26:ii).

7/. The idea of a means or cause to a final end is associated with that of hindrances, and obstacles and counter causes etc.

(1) 26: 11 (Asad.)  (2) 86 : LV (Asad.)
"So he resolved (arāda) to remove them from the face of the earth: But we did drown him and all who were with him."(1)

It is only God in whose way nothing stands:

"Indeed the truth deny they who say, 'Behold, God is the Christ, son of Mary.'" Say: and who could have prevailed with God in anyway if it had been his will (law arāda) to destroy the Christ, son of Mary, and his mother, and everyone who is on earth — all of them? For, God's is the dominion over the heavens and the earth and all that is between them."(2)

8/. 'Irāda' is also used with the conditionals law, in, idha, etc... But while māshī'a conditional sentences are of the form "if A (God's māshī'a of B) then B", irāda sentences are of the forms.

(i) law or in or idha A (God's irāda of B) then X (the cause of B).

X can be a natural cause of B, or a legal prerequisite to have B.

9/. Both māshī'a and irāda are contrasted to action. So their meanings cannot be exhaustively expressed in behavioural language.

(1) 103: XVII (Ali.) (2) 17:V (Asad.)
'Surely thy Lord accomplishes what He desires (Yurīd).' (1) 

'God does whatsoever He wills (yurīd).' (2) 

'And God does what He will (yasha').' (3) 

10/. The fact that irāda involves the idea of means to ends is suggested by the primary sense of this word. Irāda is said to be derived from rawada which means to move to and fro gently seeking something. It is interesting to remember in this connection the English expression 'drive at', 'labour for', 'set before oneself' when they are used in intentional senses.

(2) PRINCIPLES OF DIVINE WILL

Because God is omnipotent - we said - whether anything is to be or not to be depends on whether He wills it or not. The question now is: Why does He will to do what He wills to do?

The question to some people looks like being a contradiction in terms. God's will, they would say is absolutely free, and if so nothing can bind it;

(1) 107:XI (Arb.) (3) 27:14 (Arb.)
(2) 14:XXII (Arb.)
but to demand an explanation of the ways of the will, is to demand it be restricted by some laws or principles. To others it is blasphemous. How - they say - dare man ask God why He does this and not that; 'He', they would quote the Qurā’n "shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned."

Such people confuse the concept of free will with that of caprice, and thus end by rejecting all forms of rationality, including science. If for example you ask the very important question, "Why do some people believe in God and others deny His existence?", They would simply say: 'Because God so willed', and quote the Qurā’n verse; 'But He let go astray whom He will, and guides whom He will.' These dogmatic believers agree with the dogmatic atheists in thinking that a rational or scientific explanation is not compatible with belief in Divine will. To be consistent the believers refuse to look for reasons and causes and turn away from them when they are presented with some; while the non-believers look for and find some causes by which they can explain natural, social or psychological phenomena which explanation - in their view - renders Divine will gratuitous.
Such an irrational and dogmatic attitude is, in my view, foreign to the spirit of the Qurʾān which abounds in rational explanation and justification, which calls upon people to think and meditate, and in which a prophet like Abraham says, 'O my sustainer. Show me how Thou givest life unto the dead.

Said He: Hast Thou, then, no faith?

(Abraham) answered: Yea, but (let me see it) so that my heart may be set fully at rest.'(1)

Commenting on Abraham's question the Prophet said, 'We have more reason to doubt than Abraham.'

Our question, then is legitimate; its legitimacy is further assured by the fact that there is an answer for it in the Qurʾān. The Qurʾān does give reasons for God's willing to do this rather than that, at this time, in this place, to this person etc... rather than that time or place or person etc... The reasons are ultimately given in terms of God's attributes. Let us take as an example of this rational explanation of the ways of Divine will the question of God's will to guide some people and let others go astray. Some people think that God capriciously willed that some of us be elect and others be damned; '"' if mankind be

(1) 260 : 11 (Asad,)
divided into the elect and the damned, and eternal salvation or damnation follows irrespective of what we ourselves do, then there is no need to pretend that fate which befalls us in an after-life is — either a reward or a punishment, since there exists nothing which could be either rewarded or punished". (1)

The Qur'ān does say that some people are elect and others are damned; but it does not say that 'eternal salvation or damnation follows irrespective of what we ourselves do.' There is no place here for a detailed exposition of the Qur'ānic theory of salvation, and damnation. We shall therefore be content with some general points which suffice to prove that the division is not capricious.

a) God granted man the ability to distinguish between good and evil when they are made clear to him.

b) He gave him the will to freely choose either the one or the other. 'Have we not made for him a pair of eyes, and a tongue, and a pair of lips and shown him the two highways? (2) (3),

"Verily we created man from a drop of mingled sperm in order to try him: So we gave him (the gifts of) hearing and sight. We showed him the way: Whether

(1) Frederick Vivian, 'Human Freedom and Responsibility. P.76
(2) The two highways are of: evil and virtue.
(3) 8 — 10 : XC (Ali.)
he be grateful or ungrateful (rests on his will). (1)
c/. He sent messengers to clarify to people the facts concerning the two ways of evil and good.
d/. No one is punished unless the facts become clear to him and he wilfully chooses evil rather than good, 'We never chastise until we send forth a messenger.' (2)
e/. The answer to the question 'whom does God guide, and whom does He let go astray?', is now very clear. He wills or chooses to guide those who seek to be guided, and damns those who - having seen the truth - choose not to accept it. Numerous Qur'ānic verses state and emphasise this fact. But before we give examples of these, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the key Qur'ānic concept of 'kufr'. Usually this word is taken to mean 'nonbelief' and its derivative, (kāfir) to mean (nonbeliever or infidel). The word literally means to cover or hide something e.g. a sower is called 'kāfir' because he hides the seeds or covers them with earth. A 'kāfir' then is someone who hides the truth, and if so, he is not a mere non-Muslim or nonbeliever; he is someone who has seen the facts, recognized them in his mind to be so,

(1) 2-3: LXXVI (Ali.)  (2) 15:XVII (Arb.)
and then rejected them for some bad motives. In ordinary classical Arabic, as well as in Qur'ānic usage a 'kafir' is also someone who is ungrateful
i.e. he is aware of the favour someone bestows upon him but he conceals and refuses to recognize it. Now to some Qur'ānic verses which lay the qualities that qualify a person for damnation or election:

"When they swerved, God caused their hearts to swerve; and God guides never those who are unjust (5:61). So it is only after people decide to turn away from truth that God lets them go astray. This sense is made clear in other verses where some people said that they cannot believe because God has created them with 'covered' hearts i.e., to which truth cannot penetrate. The Qur'ān explained that the 'covering' of their hearts was a consequence and not a cause of their denying the truth (being kafirs)."(1)

'In this way does He cause many a one to go 'astray' just as He guides many a one aright: but none does He cause thereby to go astray save the iniquitous.'(2)

'... and God leads astray the evil doers (zalimīn); and God does what He will.'(3)

(1) 88: II; 155: IV
(2) 26:II (Asad.)
(3) 27:XIV (Arb.)
'Surely God guides not him who is prodigal and a liar.' (1)

'Even so God leads astray the prodigal and the doubter those who dispute concerning the signs of God; without any authority come to them, very hateful is that in the sight of God and the believers; so God sets a seal on every heart proud, arrogant'). (2)

The ultimate reason why everything is as it is, is that God so willed it to be. But God's will is not capricious; He wills according to certain principles. Indeed these principles are themselves willed by Him; and so it might be said that He could do without them. But in a sense these principles are necessary to the concept of God i.e. a being that does not abide by them can hardly be described as being a God.

(3) PREDETERMINATION

Before creating the world, God had not only willed to do so, but had made a detailed 'plan' of the creation; a plan in which everything that concerns the thing to be created is predetermined, e.g. the time of its appearance, its duration, its 'nature', its quantity;

(1) 28:XL (Arb.) (2) 345:XL (Arb.)
size or quality, its place, its relation with other created things etc... The term that is frequently used both in the Qur'ān and in philosophical and theological discussions to express these and similar ideas is Qadar'. So it would be better before going into details of this idea of predetermination or predestination to analyse the different senses and Qur'ānic usage of this word. This is all the more important because this term has been the cause of much confusion, and hot and serious controversy. There is a whole sect that goes by the name qadariyya (those who deny qadar) and an opposing sect or school Jabriyya (those who affirm qadar to the point of denying causes and human freedom of the will).

A term that is often mentioned together with qadar and whose meaning is often confused with it is qada'. Both for the clarification of this confusion and for the importance - in its own right - of this concept we will make similar analysis of it.

**Qadar**

Qadar and its derivatives have two main senses.

A/ To measure.

To compute or determine the quantity, measure, size, bulk, proportion, extent, amount, sum, limit,
number of something.

To agree with or be according to measure e.g. a garment is *qadr* a person.

The quantity, quantum, measure etc. of a thing.

As many as or equal to e.g. *qadr miyya* i.e. as many as a hundred.

To compare e.g. *qaddara bayn al-'amrayn* (he compared the two things together).

Taqdi' to make a thing according to the measure of another. To adapt something to another.

To decree, appoint, decide, determine, destine, predetermine, predestine etc...

To think upon a thing or on an affair and consider its end, issue, or result.

To distribute, divide, or apportion (as though by measure) sustenance, or the means of subsistence. Thus (*laylatul qadr*) the night of *qadr* i.e. the night when the means of subsistence are apportioned. Also his means of subsistence was *qudira 'alayhi* i.e. straitened to Him.

*Qadduraha*, he assigned or appointed a particular time for it.
B/. To have power or ability to do, effect, accomplish, achieve, attain, or compass something.

To be able to prevail against something.

Though these senses are many and different, yet they are closely related. In fact some of them logically imply others. The primary sense is that of measurement. Qadar in the sense of predetermination implies the sense of measurement, because what happens actually corresponds to what was previously planned i.e., it is made to the measure of the plan.

al-Nawawi explains qadar as meaning God's predetermination of things and His knowledge that they shall happen at certain times, which He knows, and shall have certain qualities. So they happen in accordance with what He determined. (1)

The sense of ability or power is related to that of design or determination, because ability or power is needed to execute what has been planned; and it seems that qadar in the sense of predetermination, or planning was primarily attributed only to one who had the power to execute what he designs.

The following verses state clearly the fact that

everything happens according to God's qadar
(predetermination of it).

(1) Who (God) created and shaped, who determined
(qaddara) and guided. (1)

(2) And He created everything, then He ordained it
(qaddarahu) very exactly (taqdirah)" (2)

(3) "God has appointed a measure (qadr) for every-
thing" (3)

(4) Everything with Him has its measure (miqdar)" (4)

(5) "Surely we have created everything in measure
(qadar)" (5)

Since the translation might not make the sense
clear, I shall give here a summary of what some of the
commentators have to say in clarifying the meanings
of these verses.

Yusuf Ali (6) who translated qaddara in (1) as
'ordained laws' says in his commentary on this verse,
'He has measured exactly the needs of all and given
us instincts and physical and psychological predisposi-
tions which fit into His decrees'. But Yusuf Ali seems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Arabic Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>LXXVII (Arb.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>XXV (Arb.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>LXXV (Arb.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>XIII (Arb.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>LIV (Arb.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to confine the verse to human beings while the fact is that it is very general; it includes everything that is created by God.

Ibn Taymiya cites some Traditions of the Prophet which state that long before He created heaven and earth, God had determined everything that concerns the creatures that would inhabit them.\(^{(1)}\)

Commenting on \(^{(2)}\) Sayyid Qutb says: He measured (or predetermined) its size and shape, its role and function, its time and place, and its relation with other members of this big world.\(^{(2)}\)

Al-Tabari says that God had adapted everything to that which suits (or benefits) it.\(^{(3)}\)

Yusuf Ali takes qadr in \(^{(3)}\) to mean 'a due proportion'. Al-Tabari takes it to mean duration, limit, or time at which the thing ends. 'Everything with Him has its measure', so', says al-Tabari 'nothing which happens exceeds or falls short of the measure which God ordained for it.'\(^{(4)}\)

Having stated the fact of qadar in these general terms, the Qur'an goes on in many different verses —

\(^{(1)}\) Majmu (al-Fatawi, vol.VIII p.66
\(^{(2)}\) El Zilali al-qur'an Part XIX p.12
\(^{(3)}\) Jamil al-Bayan Ah Ta wili-i-Qur'an, vol.XVIII,p.180
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid. vol.XIII p.109
to give specific examples of how the courses that things follow, the qualities that they possess, the times at which they appear or disappear, and in fact everything that concerns them is preordained to serve a particular purpose.

1. 'Did we not create you of a mean water, that we laid within a sure lodging till a known term decreed? We determined; excellent determiners are we'.

2. 'We have decreed (qaddarnā) among you death; we shall not be outstripped.'

3. 'He splits the sky into dawn, and has made the night for a repose, and the sun and moon for a reckoning. That is the ordaining (taqdir) of the All-might, the All-knowing.'

4. '... they said: we have been sent unto a people of sinners, excepting the folk of Lot; them we shall deliver altogether, excepting his wife - We have decreed (qaddarnā) she shall surely be of those that tarry'.

5. '... then we opened the gates of heavens unto water torrential, and made the earth to gush with

(1) 20-33: LXXVII (Arb.)  (3) 96:VI (Arb.)
(2) (60:LV (Arb.)  (4) 60:XV (Arb.)
fountains, and the waters met for a matter decreed (qudir)" (1)

Our exposition of the idea of qadar would be incomplete and perhaps misleading if we confine ourselves only to verses where the word 'qadar' appears, because the idea is clearly enunciated in so many other verses where this word does not occur. The term that comes next to 'qadar' in expressing the idea of predetermination is kataba (to write). But even this together with 'qadar', do not exhaust the Qur'anic verses that affirm the fact that things are preordained.

I shall here give a few examples of verses wherein qadar is not used.

Of the things that are preordained by God, especial attention is given in the Qur'ān to the predetermination of terms. There is especial emphasis on the fact that men, nations, heaven, earth and all events that occur in this world have specified 'terms ('ājel) which nothing can increase or decrease. Everything comes into existence exactly at the appointed time, and when its appointed 'term' has ended it passes away.

(1) 12: LIV (Arb.)
(1) 'It is not given to any soul to die, save by the
leave of God, at an appointed time'.

(2) 'To every nation a term; when their term comes,
they shall not put it back by a single hour, nor put
it forward.'

(3) 'Have they not seen that God who created the
heavens and earth, is powerful to creat the like of
them?

He has appointed for them a term, no doubt of it.'

(4) 'And they demand of thee to hasten the chastise-
ment. But for a stated term, the chastisement would
have come upon them; but it shall come upon them
suddenly when they are not aware.'

(5) 'God created not the heaven and the earth, and
what between them is, save with the truth and a stated
term; yet most men disbelieve in the encounter with
their Lord.'

Things that happen in this world are not only
predetermined or foreknown by God, but are already
'written' down or 'recorded' in a 'book'.

(1) 145:III (Arb.) (4) 53:XXIX (Arb.)
(2) 34:VII (Arb.) (5) 8: XXX (Arb.)
(3) 99:XVII (Arb.)
(1) 'No affliction befalls in the earth or in yourselves, but it is in a Book before we create it; that is easy for God.'

(2) 'Surely thy Lord knows what their hearts conceal, and what they publish, and not a thing there hidden in heaven and earth but it is in a Manifest Book.'

(3) 'And We decreed for the Children of Israel in the Book: you shall do corruption in the earth twice, and you shall ascend exceedingly high.'

After the 'plan' (qadar), comes the execution, qada', but the word 'qada' is more often than not confused especially nowadays with qadar, and not infrequently the sense of the one is consistently given to the other. But a revision of the classical usage of 'qadaa' in its different forms leaves no doubt as to the fact that it gives the sense of execution, accomplishment, carrying out etc.,. So, it has a distincts different meaning. We shall see, however, that the confusion is not entirely unjustifiable.

Qada'

Here is a summary of what Lane collects from different authorities on the meaning of qada':

| 1 | 22:LVII (Arb.) | 2 | 75:XXVII (Arb.) | 3 | 4:XVII (Arb.) |
i. Qadā' - He finished a thing entirely, by word or by deed. This is the primary meaning.

ii. He completed, accomplished or finally performed; a thing.

iii. He paid, discharged, or satisfied a debt, claim, or demand e.g. qādāytuhu (gave him) or paid him his due fully.

iv. ingada and tagadda, it passed away, came to an end.

v. qada' a term of the law; a decree; an ordinance, a sentence, or judicial decision.

Qada' in the Qur'an is used in the different senses listed above. Here are some examples:

- '... So Moses struck him, and dispatched (qada') him.' (1)

- '... So when Moses had accomplished (qada) the term...' (2)

- '... some of them have fulfilled (qada) their vow by death, and some are still awaiting'. (3)

- 'And remember when ye met, He showed them to you as few in your eyes, and He made you appear as contemptible in their eyes; that God might accomplish a matter

(1) 15:XXVII (Arb.)
(2) 29: XXVIII (Arb.)
(3) 23: XXXIII (Arb.)
already enacted.' 

- '... but it was a need in Jacobs' soul that he so satisfied ( qadā-ha ),'(2)

- 'Then, when the prayer is finished (qudiyat) scatter in the land and seek God's bounty..' (3)

Sene v seems to be problematic and it is one of the causes of confusing qada' with qadar because the latter as we have seen is also, and more appropriately, used in the sense of decree.

A judicial decision or sentence is described as qada because it gives the final word, it ends the dispute. So while decree in the sense of qada ends something, decree in the sense of qadar starts it.

Qada is used in the Qur'ān in the sense of a judicial or moral decision or value judgement. He decrees what is the best for people to do, but they may or may not do it. But if He decrees anything - in the sense of qadar, then it has to be the case.

(1) 44:VIII (Ali)
(2) 68:XII (Arb.)
(3) 10:LXII (Arb.)
II

CREATION

(1) Divine Action

Creation is a special kind of action; and since any action is a kind of cause, it is more logical before discussing God's act of creation - to discuss His actions generally.

The two Arabic words that compete in denoting the most general idea of action, or deed or performance etc. are the words "fi'il" and 'amal. An analysis of the way they are used supports the view of some authorities that fi'il is more general than 'amal.

Here is a summary of what the dictionaries may about the different usages of these two words in their different forms.

'Amal

Ya'mal (i) To do with a sort of difficulty.
(ii) To do with intention.

'Amal (iii) Any deed that proceeds from an animate being with intention.
(iv) 'Amal is seldom attributed to inanimate beings.
(v) It is not used in relation to irrational animals.
Fi'il

(i) Any 'amal

(ii) Fi'il is sometimes attributed to animate beings from which it proceeds without intention.

(iii) And sometimes to inanimate things.

(iv) But fi'il sometimes involves the idea of originality and innovation. Thus mufta'al means anything that is innovated, thus original poetry is described as being mufta'al. Also any "fabricated" talk is called hadith (talk) mufta'al, the idea of course is that it does not correspond to or describe any existing facts.

In sense (iv) fi'il resembles khalq (creation) which as we shall see involves the idea of originality and which is also used in the sense of 'fabricated' talk.

Fi'il in its most common usage is more general than 'amal but the fact that it involves the idea of originality and the fact that form fa'a'al has the same sense as 'amal i.e. manual workers, makes it somewhat difficult to conclude without qualification that fi'il is more general than 'amal.
(the word \textit{yad} 'hand' is also used to denote favour).

\textit{Fi'il}

Qur'\textacute{a}nic usage of \textit{fi'il} supports the view that it is more general than \textit{'amal} from the point of view of the classes to which it is attributed. \textit{Fi'il} is attributed to God, to man, to the angels, to \textit{jin}, and to all inanimate things.

It is significant that \textit{fi'il} rather than \textit{'amal} is used to describe God's actions. \textit{'amal}, as we have seen involves the idea of effort and difficulty, but God does not find any difficulty in doing anything. In fact it is said clearly in the Qur\textacute{a}n that God does everything easily, that He does not get tired or ill of doing anything:

i. For all this it is more appropriate to describe His action by a term that does not involve the idea of effort and weariness.

ii. \textit{Fi'il} as we have seen involves the idea of originality and innovation. This makes it more appropriate as a description of the actions of God Who always innovates and does not copy or imitate.

(2) Meanings of Words Expressing the Idea of Creation.
Now we come to the Qur'anic usage of these words: 'amal and its derivatives occur many times in the Qur'an of which it is only once attributed to God, and not in a direct way. It occurs in this verse.

"See they not that it is We who have created for them among the things which our hands have fashioned ('amilat) cattle which are under their dominion? (1)

This is Yusuf Ali's translation.

A.J. Arberry renders the phrase (a'amilathu ayardina as "our hands wrought"

That the word a'mila is not here used in a direct or ordinary sense is supported by the fact that some linguistic authorities ignore it altogether and state that 'amal is never attributed to God, and also by the fact that some commentators consider the phrase aamilathu ayardina (our hands did or wrought or fashioned) to be metaphorical. God has no hands like ours, and the term 'hand' is often used to denote power and strength. So the phrase does not so much describe the nature of God's action as it describes the product of that action i.e. cattle. Men are asked to ponder on God's creation (here cattle) and to conclude from it that their maker must be powerful and benevolent.

(1) 36: 71 (Ali)
Here is a summary of what Lane has to say on the meanings of these words.

*Khalq* (a) *khalq* signifies the act of measuring or determining the measure, proportion, or the like of a thing, and the making of a thing by measure or according to another thing, or proportionating a thing to another thing; (syn. *tagdīr*)

You say *khalāqa al adīm a lissiqā* (He measured the skin to cut from it a water bag). When one cuts it, one says *farāhu*.

(b) It also signifies the bringing of a thing into existence according to a certain measure or proportion; or producing a thing after a pattern or model which one has described, not after the similitude of anything preexisting.

*khalāqa Allahu al khalqa*. This is a tropical phrase meaning God brought into existence the creation or created beings or mankind according to a predetermination (*tagdīr*) required by wisdom.

A worker in leather is called *khāliq* (lit. creator) because he measures first and then cuts. *Khalīq* as an epithet applied to God, means he who brings into existence according to the proper measure or proportion or adaptation.
ii. **TBD**. Abda'ahu, means he originated it; invented it, devised it, caused to be, brought to existence, newly, for the first time, it not having been, or existed before, and not after the similitude of anything existing. You say abda'ahu el sha'ir when he (the poet) produces something original.

iii. **SUN**. Sana'ahu, he made, wrought, manufactured, fabricated, constructed the thing, or he made it skilfully or well. **Al SUN** Signifies ijadata el fi'l (the well doing of something) every sun' is a fi'l but not every fi'l is sun'. Sun' is not predicated of irrationals (unless tropically) nor of inanimate things like as fi'l is.

iv. **JA'L**. Perhaps the special meaning that distinguishes ja'l from khalaq, sun' etc. is that it is used to describe the manner in which a thing is made or the qualities or relations which a thing is made to have(1) Lane quotes some authorities as saying that it signifies the making of a thing to be in a particular state or condition, and also the changing of a thing from its state or condition.

v - **INSHA** (a) Naqsha'a he rose, or became elevated or high, he grew up and became a youth.

(1) al Rummani Said: The essence of alja'l is the making of the thing to be in a special way" al Tusi, Tibyan, vol.1 - p.131
(b) Nashá'a 'an it became produced, it originated from another thing.

(c) Ansha'a he founded, or began to build a house. Ibn Fāris says that the primary sense is that of elevation and highness.

vi - ḌHARA'A Dhara'a he multiplied and made numerous; dhar'; of spring; dhar, the act of scattering e.g. dhara'a al ard, he sowed seeds in the land.

vii - BAR' Ibn Fāris says that the primary meaning of the root bar' is to denote a thing becoming clear, or free, of, or from, another thing, either by being released (therefrom) as in bari'a al marīd (the patient recovered. lit., the patient was released from illness) and bari'a al madyun min daynihi (the debtor was released from his debt i.e. he paid it), or by production therefrom as in barā'a s Allahu 'adama min al'tīn (God produced or created Adam, from or out of clay).

viii - FATAR Fatara (a) to split, slit, crack, e.g. the nab (tooth) came forth) i.e. it clave the flesh and came forth. Ibn Fāris says that the primary meaning is that of opening and making to appear.

QUR'ANIC USAGE OF THESE TERMS

Qur'an uses these words in the same senses given by lexicographers. There is ample evidence in the Qur'an for this; in fact some of the contexts in which these words appear leave no doubt as to the fact that they are used in their primary and distinctive meanings explained previously.

Khalq as we saw involves the meaning of taqdir (measure, or determination, or ordaining etc.) This sense comes out clearly in some verses e.g. (He hath created khalaqa every thing and hath meted out for it (gaddarshu) a measure (taqdir) (2) 'Lo 1. We have created (khalaqa) everything, by measure" (3). The sense of making something to serve a particular purpose is involved in that of making it according to a plan or measure. Thus the word khalaqa is in many verses used to convey this sense of purpose and to deny that creation is purposeless.

"He it is who created (khalaqa) for you all that is in the earth". (4)

"I created (khalaqa) the jin and mankind only that they might worship me" (5).

(1) Op cit.  (2) 2: XXV (Pick)  (3) 49: LIV (Pick)  
(4) 29: II (Pick).  (5) 56: LVII (Pick.)
"He it is who created (khalâqa) the heavens and the earth in truth" (1)

"Our Lord: Thou created (khalâqta) not this in vain" (2) "We created (khalâqna) not the heaven and the earth and all that is between them in play" (3)

"Deemed ye then that we had created you (khalâq-nâkum) for naught?" (4)

**IBDA'** Has the sense of innovation. It is said about the Prophet that he is not *bid'ân* among the messengers i.e. he follows in their footsteps and does not come with something entirely new (5). And it is said of the Christians that they *ibdadu* monasticism and that God did not ordain it for them. (6) God is described as being bâdî (innovator) or heaven and earth (7) That *sunû* is used when perfection, skillfulness etc. is meant is very clear in the verse "And thou seeest the hills Thou deemstest solid flying with the flight of clouds: the doing (*sunû*) of God who perfecteth all things." (8).

---

(1) 73:VI (Pick) (5) 9:XLVI
(2) 191:III (Pick.) (6) 27:LVII
(3) 16:XXI (Pick.) (7) 117:11), (1.1:VI)
(4) (Ibid 115: XXIII) (8) 88:XXVII
We said that ja'ala does not refer to the creation or origination, but to their becoming or to their having qualities or relations in respect to other things.

"Who hath appointed (ja'ala) the earth a resting place for you" (1) placed (ja'ala) among you prophets (2)

"Praise be to God who has created (khalqa) the heavens and the earth, and has appointed (ja'ala) darkness and light" (1:VI)

"It is He who made (ja'ala) the sun a radiance and the moon a light (Arberry, 5:X). "We made them (Ja'alnahu) as reaped corn extinct (15:XXI). "And we make them (Ja'alnahu) like as wreckage (that a torrent hurleth)" (pickthall 41:XXIII).

INSHA' Is used to describe the act of making or originating gardens (18:XLIII), trees (73:LV), clouds (12:XXIII), ships (24:LV), and humanbeings (98:VI) (123:VI), 32:III etc. all of which are things that are small when they start, but develop and grow to be large. Resurrection is described as the second inshaa (20:XXIX).

(1) (Pickthall, 22:11) (2) (20:V)
DHARA' Describes the creation or making of plants, animals (136:VII, 13:XVI) and human beings (79:XXIII), (24:LXVI) (179:VII) (LL.XLII) when the sense of their multiplication is meant e.g.

"We have created (dhara' na) for Gehenna many jinn and man" (1)

"We have created (dhara' na) (2) for gehanna many jinnis and men (3).

BAR' The use of bar' is said to be confined to the description of animals and that it is seldom predicated of inanimates (4). In the Qur'an however, it is predicated only of human beings (22:LVII, 54:II). Creation is called albariyya, but the context suggests that the reference is to mankind only (6,7:XCVIII). That bara'a is not exactly synonymous to khalaqa comes out clearly in a verse where God is described as being alkhaliq, albari', al musawwir (24:LIX).

Fatara is predicated only of heaven and earth and men (79:VI, 56:XXI, 5: xvII, 72:XX).

(1) 179:VII (Arb.)

(2) Translators differ in the sense they give to this word here e.g. Asad renders it "destined" urged", Ali, 'made' and came. 'Made' comes nearest to the true sense which cannot be expressed by one English word, since besides making, dhara'a also, and as we have seen, has the sense of multiplication and numerousness! (3) 179:VII (Arb.)
The original nature of man when he is newly born and before he is influenced by bad environment is called *fitrah* (30:XXX).

The conception of God as Creator, that these Qur'anic concepts depict in our minds is this. God is an Eternal Omnipotent being. He does *(yaf'al)* everything easily and is never tired or worn out. He does everything wilfully *(ya'asha)*. He does not create *(yakhuq)* anything in vain but according to a plan *(quadar)* and to serve a particular purpose and He executes *(yaqiḍi)* what He plans. He does not copy or imitate but innovates *(yubdi)* and perfects *(yasna)* everything that He makes. Some of the things that He creates He causes to develop and grow, *(yunshi)* others He causes to multiply *(yadhrā)*. He creates somethings from others either by constituting *(bara)* *(ansha)* or by bringing them forth therefrom *(fatera)*. Just as the origin *(bad)* of everything is due to Him, so are its states and conditions and any change that occurs to them *(is'il)*.
(3) 'BE 1 AND IT BECOMES'

On the way how God creates things the Qur'ān says that when He wills to do something He says to it "Be 1 and it becomes". (40:XVI and many other verses.) This raises some very interesting problems which we shall now touch upon.

1. What is it that is ordered to be?

If before it becomes it is nothing and how can nothingness be ordered? After it has become, the order is otiose. Four ways have been suggested to come out of this dilemma.

(a) It is said that the order 'be' is not to be taken literally. Nothing is in fact ordered, but this is only metaphorical language to convey the sense of promptness with which God creates.

(b) "God's" "word" is itself the deed .... there is no interposition of time or condition between his will, and its consequences, for He is ultimate reality"(1) It is very difficult to imagine a word being a deed. Some reliable authorities have warned us against saying what Yusuf Ali has said.

---

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal says that Jesus is not the word "be" but he came as a result of that word\(^{(1)}\). Moreover, the verse makes the becoming conditional upon the 'be'. If as Yusuf Ali suggests the becoming is the same thing as the order, then the statement becomes tautologous (If A then A).

\[(c)\] Al Tabari says that the order and the becoming occur simultaneously "It is impossible for a thing to be ordered and willed to become unless it already is, and it cannot be unless it is ordered and willed to be\(^{(2)}\). "The time of His ordering a thing to be is the time of the becoming of the thing that is ordered to be"\(^{(3)}\).

\[(d)\] Ibn Taymiya\(^{(4)}\) says that before a thing is created it is known and predetermined. It is to this idea—if one might say so—that the order "be\(^{1}\)" is addressed. So even before a thing actually exists, it need not be nothing; it can be an idea which is known and spoken about by he who has it and who intends to make it an actuality.

\[ii.\] "Be\(^{1}\) and it becomes" expresses the immediacy with which the order is carried out; once a thing is

\[\begin{align*}
(1)\ & \text{Arrad 'Ala-Zznadiga ha-1-Jahmiyya, p. 58.} \\
(2)\ & \text{His commentary vol.I. pp.509-10} \ (3) \ \text{Ibid p.511} \\
(4)\ & \text{Najmu Fatawi, Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiya -vol.VIII- pp.182-186}
\end{align*}\]
ordered to be it becomes. At what is it that becomes of the thing? Does it start to be or does it become in its complete form? The latter alternative is ruled out on both empirical and Qur'anic evidence. We know that things take time to reach complete forms, and the Qur'an tells us about things that come as a result of this order and whose becoming took time e.g. Jesus (59:III) and Heaven and earth (54:VII).

iii. If everything becomes by being ordered to be, does this rule out the possibility of causes and laws of being and becoming? By itself the expression is not incompatible with laws of being and becoming. God orders things to be, but they become in a lawful way. If you say to someone "Get out" and he disappears, it does not mean that he does so in a mysterious, noncausal way.

iv. Some people say that God's words are themselves created. But the verse tells against such a view because the coming into existence of every created thing is conditional upon the uttering of the word 'be' \(^1\). Now if 'be' is itself a created thing, it must come as a result of a word 'be' \(^1\) and so on and \textit{infinitum}; but this makes creation impossible.
(4) THEORIES OF CREATION

In the light both of the foregoing, and some forthcoming textual facts, we now try to look into the main theories of creation to see to what extent they can be reconciled with the Qur'anic conception of God and creation. There seem to be four types of creation theories:

(A) Creation Ex Nihilo

The most popular religious view is that in the beginning there was only God with nothing besides Him. Then out of that nothingness He miraculously created the world. So the world (by which is here meant the whole creation) has a beginning. To many people, including those who accept as well as those who reject it, this view seems to be the most obvious and perhaps even the only logical consequence of belief in a Creator. But once we delve into the matter seriously, difficulties, both logical and theological, begin to arise.

Textual Evidence

Is there any textual evidence either Qur'anic or Traditionistic for this view? Do the terms used to express the idea of creation imply creation out of
nothing? Is it mentioned anywhere in the Qur'ān that God created something out of nothing? The answer to all these questions is in the negative. In fact Ibn Taymiya claims that there is no evidence for such a view not only in the Qur'ān but in any of the scriptures of revealed religions\(^{(1)}\).

If we make a quick revision of our previous meaning analysis of words expressing the idea of creation, we can easily see that none of them expresses or implies creation \textit{ex nihilo}.

b- It is nowhere in the Qur'ān mentioned that God created the world or any part of it out of nothing. On the contrary it is clearly said of somethings that they are created out of other things \textit{e.g.} every living thing is created from water\(^{(2)}\), the sky is created from water vapour\(^{(3)}\); and man is created from earth\(^{(4)}\). It is true that the Qur'ān says about man that there has come upon him a time when he 'was a thing unremembered' (1:LXXVI). The verse only denies the eternity of man; it does not say that he is created out of nothing, otherwise it inevitably contradicts the numerous verses in which it is said that he is

\(^{(1)}\) of. "The doctrine of creation out of nothing - \textit{ex nihilo} - is nowhere expressly mentioned in Holy Scripture" \textit{Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion} Vol.4 p.229
\(^{(2)}\) 30:XXI \(^{(3)}\) II : XLI. \(^{(4)}\) 59: III
created from earth, or clay, or a clot of blood etc.

o- It is stated in an authentic Tradition that some people from Yemen said to the Prophet "We have come to ask you about the beginning of this matter (or affair) and that in answering their question he said "There was God; and there was nothing else (Chayruhu); and His throne was on water; and He wrote in the dhikr (sheet) everything, and after that He created Heaven and earth".

This hadīth is usually taken to be a very clear evidence in favour of the view in question. But a careful study of the text weakens this evidence considerably. I here summarize what has been said about it by two reliable authorities of hadīth(1) adding my own comments.

Though the story is one and the same, there are three different versions of it:

i- "There was God and there was nothing else (Chayruhu).

ii- "There was God and there was nothing with Him (Ma'ahu)

iii- "There was God and there was nothing before Him (Qubalu)

The first two versions have the same meaning as far as we are here concerned, since they both say that there was a "time" when there was only God and nothing else, and that creation came "later" on i.e. that

(1) Ibn Hajar al 'Asqalani, Fath al Bari and Ibn Taymiya.
creation is not eternal. But the third version only state the obvious and yet important fact that nothing preceded God; by itself this version is no evidence for the view that creation had a beginning or that it was ex nihilo. Since this version of the hadith thus differs from the other two, it would be better if we could find evidence to prove or at least to increase the probability of the truth of one of them.

It seems to me that version three is nearer to the truth, for the following reasons:

a) It resembles another authentic tradition in which the Prophet, praying to God, says "Thou art the first, nothing preceded Thee"

b) Immediately after the sentence 'and there was nothing else (or with Him) comes the sentence, 'and His throne was on water" which clearly contradicts the first. There would have been no contradiction had it said 'and then He created His throne and on water'; but as it stands I am not convinced of any interpretation of it that attempts to resolve the contradiction.

c) The questioners said, "We have come to ask you about the beginning of this matter (or affair)".
There are two interpretations of this; either they asked about the beginning of this apparent world in which we live, or they asked about the beginning of creation as such. The word 'this' is taken to support the first interpretation. It is also supported by saying that the direct answer to their question is, 'and He created heaven and earth' i.e. that heaven and earth created first as far as this world is concerned. He mentioned God's Throne being on water and existing before heaven and earth, without talking about its being created first, because it does not belong to this world about which the question had been asked.

If there is no clear textual evidence for this view, why has it been so popular and wide-spread and taken for granted? If there is no scriptural evidence is there, perhaps, some compelling rational evidence for it? On the face of it there seems to be such an evidence, because among possible theories of creation this seems to be the only one that is more likely to be compatible with the idea of a Creator. A believer cannot accept the theory of the eternity of the world, because it is logically impossible for God to create something that is eternally coexisting with Him; it is difficult for him especially if he is a Muslim - to accept the
view that the world emanated from God, because while in the concept of creation the world is different from God, and comes as a result of his will and action, the concept of emanation implies that the world is in a way like God. So the only alternative seems to be the theory now under consideration(1). Admittedly it is a relatively better alternative than the eternity of the world or its emanation from God, but is not a good alternative either, because, as we shall presently see, there are very serious rational objections to it.

a) God is described as being Creator. But if creation had a beginning, and if God is eternal, there must be an infinite 'period' in which He created nothing and thus could not properly be described as Creator.

c) If He had the ability to create why didn't He do so? Because the answer runs, if we say that so long as He had the power to create, He had been exercising it, this will lead us to conclude that the chain of created things is eternal which is logically impossible. We shall see however that it is not.

(1) We shall see, that there is a fourth alternative which—in our view is more compatible with the religious idea of creation.
b) If He did not create because He did not have the ability to do so, then it would have been impossible for Him to acquire that ability because He cannot have it from something other than Himself since.

But this means that while God had the ability to create, creation was impossible which is a flagrant contradiction.

d) It might be said that though He had the ability to create, and though creation was possible, yet He did not will to create and that creation appeared only at the 'time' when God decided to create\(^{(1)}\). But this only shifts the question to God's will. Why did He remain for an infinite time unwilling to create and then suddenly decided to create? Is there any reason why He did so? Al-Ghazali's answer is that such a question is illegitimate since God's will in his view is by definition "an attribute of which the function rather nature, it is to distinguish something from its like"\(^{(2)}\).

---

\(^{(1)}\) cf. Al-Ghazali. 'Tahafut al Falasifah. Problem I.

\(^{(2)}\) Tahafut al Falasif p.25
This answer is in my view unacceptable because it makes God's will arbitrary and irrational, and we have seen before that the conception of God's will that we find in the Qur'an is not compatible with such a definition of His will. The Qur'an never says that God did so and so just because He so willed. It usually gives reasons why God chose or willed to do it rather than doing some other equally possible thing.

Moreover, this argument by itself is no proof at all that creation had a beginning, since the most it says is that it is equally possible for creation to have a beginning or not to have a beginning. There must be another independent evidence to show that God opted for the former rather than the latter. But we have seen that there is no such evidence in Scripture, and there cannot if this argument is to have any validity be any rational evidence, because if there were such an evidence it would have been incorrect to say that God opted for one of two likes.

e) Assuming that all the difficulties raised against argument

d) Could be surmounted, it can still be said that a being who has the ability to create and who does create,
is more perfect than a being who has that ability but who does not exercise it; and, in the words of the Qur'ān "Is He then who creates, as Him who does not create?" (16: XVI)

(B) THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD

"The philosophers disagree among themselves as to the eternity of the world. But the majority of the philosophers, ancient as well as modern agree upon its eternity, holding that it always co-existed with God (exalted be He) as His effect which was concurrent with Him in time, concurrent as an effect is with the cause, e.g. light with the sun, and that God's priority to the world is the priority of the cause to the effect, viz., prior in essence and rank, not in time."

The religious argument for the eternity of the world is based mainly on the view that the effect occurs simultaneously with the cause, and that since God is eternal and is the cause of the world, the effect of that cause (i.e., the world) must be eternal.

There are several objections to this view (1)

a) Since according to the Qur'ān, everything except God is created by Him, and since creation is a volitional action, and since commonsensically everything that

(1) See Taymiya Majmu at al rasā'il, "Majmu at altafasir and other works.
comes as a result of a wilful action must have a beginning, because it must come after having been willed and done, the world, which is created by God, must have a beginning, and cannot therefore be eternal.

b) The previous objection is based on the denial of the assumption that the effect is simultaneous with its cause. Now suppose that this assumption is true. It follows that the world is eternal, and that therefore there can be no events or change in it, because if there are events they must have a cause and their cause can either be the world or God, but since both of these are eternal and since effects are simultaneous with their causes, every event must also be eternal, but this is a contradiction in terms. It follows that there can be no events. But it is an empirical as well as a Scriptural fact that events occur\(^\text{1}\); therefore, by reduction and absurdum, the assumption of the simultaneity of cause and effect must be false. And therefore though God is eternal, the world is not.

c) A corollary of objection \(a\) is that God is not to be likened to natural causes from which effects necessarily and unwilfully follow, because unlike natural causes that 'necessarily' produces their effects, He is a wilful agent.

\(^{1}\) The Qur'an says that heaven and earth have been created in six days. How can a thing that comes into existence in a limited time be eternal?
"Emanation: literally, an outpouring or flowing forth, specifically applied to the process of derivation or mode of origination, immediate or mediate, of the multiplicity of beings whether spiritual or material from the eternal source of all being, God, of whose being consequently they are a part and in whose nature they somehow share. It is opposed to creation from nothing." (1)

This conception of the relation between God and creation cannot be reconciled with the teachings of the Qur'ān because it contradicts a very famous and important chapter of it which describes God as being:

"the only one
the samad
He begeteth not nor was He begotten. And there is none comparable to Him." (2)

Samad: Literally means solid, not hollow. It also means that in whom refuge is sought. Now, if God is one and He is samad, if He does not beget and if nothing is comparable to Him, how can things emanate from Him? Emanation contradicts the idea of samad since nothing overflows from solid things. If things overflow from

(1) "The Dictionary of Philosophy", edited by Dagobert D. Runes.
(2) 1-4 : CXII.
God, they must of necessity resemble Him in one way or the other, but our Qur'anic chapter states that nothing is comparable to God. And is not emanation a kind of begetting if we take this in its Arabic wider sense of 'tawallud'?

Like the theory of the eternity of the world, the theory of its emanation from Him makes God a cause from which effects naturally follow or flow, and this, as we have seen, is not in consonance with the idea of a Being who does things wilfully and not naturally.

[B] BEGINNING-LESS CHAIN OF CREATION

According to this theory, neither was there a 'time' when there was only God and nothing else, nor did any particular kind of creation eternally coexisted with God. God is eternal and has been eternally creating things. Every particular created thing is temporal and finite, but the chain of these particulars is infinite and eternal. Such in a nutshell- is the view which seems to me to be the only one that does justice to the Qur'anic concept of God and creation. Some thinkers raised a few logically and theological objections against it, but I am satisfied that the replies of those who uphold the theory, Ibn Taymiya in the main, - are very convincing.
The main argument for this view is that God's attributes cannot be separated from His essence, and since God is eternal all His attributes must be eternal. Among these are the attributes of creating and speaking. Now these are relational attributes which necessitate the existence of something other than God. When God speaks, something must happen, and when He creates something must be created. Things happen and are created as a result of God's words, and since God's words—according to the Qur'an—are infinite (1), there must be an eternal chain of things that come into existence and pass away as a result of these infinite words. Also since God is described as being creator, and since therefore, there was no time when He lacked this attribute, and since one cannot be said to create or make without there being something created and made, it again follows that there must be an eternal chain of created things.

Both the thesis of this theory and some of its logical consequences and tacit assumptions have been rejected by some theologians. We shall see however that in its fight against such critics the theory comes out victorious and is better established.

a) The only textual evidence that could have been rightly cited against this theory is the Prophet's saying "There was God and there was nothing else", but we have seen that there is another version of this hadith which tallies with our theory and to which textual criticism lends more support.

(1) 109 : XVIII
b) The second objection can easily be ruled out since it results from a confusion of this theory with that of the eternity of the world, and so adduces against it objections which are not applicable to it. This is why the defenders of the theory are always at pains trying to explain that the it does not commit us to a belief in the eternity of anything except God. God created $x$ and before that He created $x_1$, and before that $x_2$ and $x_3$ and so on ad infinitum and after $x$ He created $x + 1$ and after it $x + 2$ and $x + 3$ and so on ad infinitum. Each $x$ is temporal and finite but the series of these created $x$’s is infinite.

c) It is said that this clearly is an infinite regress and any argument that is based on an infinite regress is necessarily invalid. Ibn Taymiya takes this opportunity to explain the difference between two kinds of regression, infinite regression of a process, or series and infinite regression at a point of time, and says that it is only the latter which is invalid. For example God creates a thing by saying 'be' Now if you say - as some people do - that His words are created then 'be', must be created, but to create 'be' He must say 'be' and so on ad infinitum. It is this kind of regression which is false because
it makes creation impossible. But if it is said, "God said 'Be' \(^1\) and before it He said, 'Be' \(^1\); and before it 'Be' \(^1\); ad infinitum, this is not logically impossible. The latter is a regression of particular causes and effects, while the former is a regression of causation itself. \(^1\)

It is very interesting to compare this with what Passmore has to say in "Philosophical Reasoning"\(^{2}\) on the difference between infinite regress and infinite series. "Compare the following: (1) Every event has a cause; (2) To know that an event has happened one must know how it came about. The first simply tells us that if we are interested in the cause of an event, there will always be such a cause for us to discover. But it leaves us free to start and stop at any point we choose in the search for causes; we can, if we want to, go on to look for the cause of the cause and so on ad infinitum, but we need not do so; if we have found a cause, we have found a cause, whatever its cause may be. The second assertion however, would never allow us to assert that we know that an event has happened although it professes to lay down the conditions under which we can make precisely that

\(^{1}\) Taffir Ibn Taymiya pp. 312, 313

\(^{2}\) Taffir Ibn Taymiya pp. 312, 313.
assertion. For if we cannot know that an event has taken place, unless we know its cause, then equally we cannot know that the cause-event has taken place unless we know its cause, and so an ad infinitum. In short, if the theory is to fulfil its promise the series must stop somewhere, and yet the theory is such that the series cannot stop anywhere unless that is, a claim of privilege can be sustained for a certain kind of event, e.g. the creation of the universe.

Ibn Taymiya's other argument in defence of the possibility even the inevitability, of the infinite regression of events is to turn the tables against the critics and assume that it is impossible, and point out the absurd consequences of this assumption. If an infinite regression of events is impossible then God has not always been creating. If so then there was an infinitely long time when He lacked the attribute of creator. It would not avail you to say that He had it but did not exercise it because, according to the assumption, it was not possible for events to appear and thus impossible for Him to create them.

d) The fourth objection concerns the temporal relation between the cause and its effect. There are three main views concerning this relation. Either the effect
is simultaneous with its cause, or it follows it after sometime or it occurs immediately after it.

Those who uphold the first view are committed to the theory of the eternity of the world, while upholders of the second view are committed to its creation out of nothing and those of the third view to an eternity of the series of created things.

Now the fourth objection against the eternity of the series of events is that it is committed to a wrong view of causality. We shall see however that this is not true.

e) The fifth objection is that since according to this view God was not in eternity a complete (necessary and sufficient) cause (otherwise all creation would have been simultaneous) and that there is a series of created things, and since every creature must be preceded by a Divine Will and word to create it, there must also be a series of Divine Wills and words. And if there is a series of wills and words every particular one must be temporal and finite. But this means that events can be attributed to an eternal being. If we add to this the fact that everything that does not lack
events and that is not prior to them must itself be temporal, it follows that the eternal is temporal which is a contradiction in terms.

Ibn Taymiya does not hesitate to accept the conclusion that God is a 'Place for temporal events'\(^{(1)}\), but goes on to explain that this does not militate against His perfection. We have already mentioned the argument that a being who continually creates is more perfect than one who remains dormant for an infinitely long time and then begin to create. But God does not only create things, He also observes and sustains them, and since things are continually changing, He must besides His previous knowledge of everything that is going to be, know what happens when it actually does so. And if so then besides His eternal knowledge, He has also, temporal knowledge, just as besides His eternal will, He has temporal wills, and besides His eternal ability to act and create, He has temporal actions.

But while accepting the view that "God is a place for temporal happenings" He does not accept the conclusion the He is, therefore, Himself temporal. He criticises the statement 'anything which does not lack events and is not prior to them is itself temporal" as being ... vague and misleading. We have to differentiate

\(^{(1)}\) Tafe\'Ir Ibn Taymiya p. 266
between a finite number of events which it logically follows that anything that is not prior to them must itself be finite, since it either coexists with them or comes after them and in both cases it has to be finite and temporal. But what about an infinite series of temporal things? How can it be said that everything that does not precede it is finite? (1)

Now I come to a difficulty which I myself find in this theory and which I found nowhere either raised against the theory by its critics or replied to by its defenders. If nothing is eternal, then it seems to me something must be created out of nothing. But Ibn Taymiya is against the view that things are created out of nothing. It could be said that though nothing in its complete form, and with all its characteristics is eternal, yet the substance or matter, or building bricks from which things are made is eternal. But Ibn Taymiya is emphatically against the idea of a primeval matter and the conception of creation as being the bringing together and separating of eternally existing 'atoms'. One might interpret the theory as denying the emergence of all creation out of nothing at some point in time, and against the idea that every created thing is completely new and has nothing to do with things.

(1) He says that this fact is stated in more than ten places in the Qur'an 'Ar-Rad 'ala l-Mantiqi ȳȳn, p.465.
that preceded or come after it, but not against the view that though things are related to each other to the extent of saying that the one is created from the other, yet they - or some of them at least - must contain an element of novelty.
DIVINE PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE WORLD

God is not just a 'first mover' who creates and let go. He also preserves and manages the affairs of His creation. Like creation, the concept of preservation has many aspects denoted by a variety of terms with whose analysis and exposition we are here concerned.

As usual we start by giving a short account summarising the dictionary meanings\(^{(1)}\) of the words that express this concept; and having made this necessary furnishing of the ground we then move to our philosophical observations and conclusions.

1. **Rububiyya.**

\textit{Yurabbi}, to rear, foster, bring up, feed, nourish.

To take good care of a child and act as its guardian until it attains to puberty or the utmost term of youth.

**Tarbiyya**, the bringing of a thing to a state of completion by degrees.

You say \textit{al-matar yarubbu annabata wa-thara}, rain causes plants and earth to grow; and \textit{rabba al 'amra}, he put the affair into a right or proper state,

\(^{(1)}\) E.W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon
adjusted, arranged rightly, disposed it, and established it firmly.

Rab, Lord possessor, owner, or proprietor.

Also ruler or governor, regulator, disposer, orderer, rectifier or reformer.

2. Qayyūmiyya

qāma stand still; stop; stand up or erect; rise from sitting or reclining.

qāma bi 'amri,

Undertook the affair (and the epithet is qā'im, qayyīm); manage, conduct order, regulate, superintend, the affair.

qāma 'alayhi, has this latter signification; and take care of, be mindful of, keep to, constantly or steadily.

qāma bi l yatīm, he maintained the orphan.

Qawwama, make straight or even.

a qamā, sustain or support, put in a right state.

qiwanu al'amr its stay, or support where by it subsists and is managed and ordered e.g. the food that is a man's support qā'im, lasting, continuing, unceasing.
Qayyûn (God), self subsisting by whom all things subsist.

3. Raqāba

Yargub, watch, keeps watch; guard, keep, preserve; take care of; be mindful, regardful of

Raqîb an appellation applied to God, meaning the Guardian, Keeper, Watcher, Observer, from whom nothing is hidden.

4. Hifz.

Hafiza keep, preserve, guard, protect; take care of; prevent from perishing or becoming lost, and hence hifz (remembering) contrary of nisîn, (forgetfulness); be careful, mindful, regardful, attentive or considerate.

Tahaffaza, guarded himself.

Haifz, preserver.

5. Taskhir :-

Sakharahu, rendered him subservient, submissive, tractable, or manageable; you say sakharahu lahu, made it practicable to him, or prepared or disposed it for him agreeably with his desire. You say sakharahu Allahu assafinata, God made the ship to obey or run its course, and sakharahu 'alayhim made it to prevail against them.
Sakhara, constrain, compel (servant, beast) to do what he did not desire, or to work without recompense or hire or wages, and without price.

Sukhra, person made use of, without compensation.

al sukhriy is the one who is made volitionally subserient

6. Tadbir,

Dabarahu, followed behind his back.

Dabbara al 'amr, considered or forecast the issues or results of the affair or event or case, or its end, issue, or result.

Tadabbarahu, he looked to what would or might be its result.

Tadabbara fîhi though or meditated upon it.

Dabbara amran did, performed, or executed a thing or an affair with thought and consideration. And hence to manage or conduct or order or regulate an affair because the doing so requires consideration of the issues or results of the affair. And dabbara alone signify action with consideration of the issues or results of the aff airs or events, or fases and also action with exercise of forecast or forethought or action with policy.

(1) Ar-Raghib, Mufradât
Mudabbir, manager of affairs (usually of importance)

7. Wakala

Wakīl, commissioned agent, factor, deputy;
wakāla, disposal

Tawakkala 'ala, rely upon, confide in, submit oneself to

Wakīl, administrator of one's property.

8. Milk

Malakahū, He possessed it or owned it, (and particularly) with ability to have it to himself exclusively.

He exercised or had authority over it.

Mulk the exercise of authority to command and to forbid in respect of the generality of a people; the having power to exersize command or authority.

Malaka amrahu, he had the ruling, or ordering, or his affairs, or case.

Malik, king

Malakū l'amr, that whereby a thing etc..., subsists, its qiwām (see no 2) by whom or by which it is ruled or ordered; its foundation, its support, that upon which it rests, it may be rendered the cause or means of the subsistence of the thing
Malik, possessor of command, or rule

9. Hadyy
Hadahu, he directed him or guided him to the way; directed him aright; caused him to take or follow, a right way, or course, or direction

10. Haymanah, guard, protect, cover the young ones with the wings. (1)

11. Shahādah.
Shahida, he told, or gave information to, what he had witnessed or seen or beheld with his eye; this is the primary signification.

Shahida 'ala kadha, he became a witness (shāhid) of, or to, such a thing; he had knowledge of such a thing, and witnessed it, or saw it or beheld it with his eye.

Shahidahu, he was, or became present at it, or in it.

Shahīd possessing much knowledge with respect of external things.

12. 'ilm, knowledge.

13. Taswīr
Yusawwir, to form, fashion, figure, shape, sculpture, picture,

(1) F. Steingam, Arabic English Dictionary
Surah, form, fashion figure etc.; and the state, condition or case of a thing.

14. Taswiyah

Swawahu, he made it equal, equalable, uniform, even, level, flat, plane or plain.

He made it symmetrical or symmetrically, by or with, or just adaptation of its component parts; made it congruous or consistant in its several parts. He made it, formed it etc. in an equitable manner; he made it to be adapted, or so as to be adapted, to the exigencies, or requirements, of its case or wisdom; he made complete or in a complete manner; rectified it, adjusted it, or put it into a right or good state.

15. Hasib, reckoner, or taker of accounts, or a sufficier or giver of what is sufficient.

16. Muqit

giving or giver of, food, nourishment, or sustenance; and hence, keeping, preserving, guarding, or protecting, also watching and witnessing; one who is acquainted with a thing; possessor of power; he who gives to everyman his food and likewise to everything.

The meanings of some of these words do overlap, and this is why in commentaries, lexicons and other
religions and linguistic sources they are used to explain each other. But a deeper look into the original meaning of each one, and into the Qur'anic context in which it is used does reveal the special sense which characterises each word, and hence the inaccuracy of treating them as synonyms.

While all the words partake in the sense of managing, taking care of etc., each word is used to describe a special aspect of this general meaning. The more of these aspects we discover, the better picture we shall have of the relation between God and the happenings of His created world, and hence the nature of the world itself, from the Qur'anic point of view.

Rububiyya is the most general term, and hence the one with the highest frequency of occurrence in the Qur'an. The word is used primarily to describe the parents' act of rearing their children until they attain puberty. This meaning is then generalized to incorporate any act of management in which the manager attains to the thing managed until it reaches the desired goal; and hence 'Arraghib's definition, quoted by Lane, "The bringing of a thing to a state of completion by degrees."
a- It is repeatedly mentioned in the Qur'an that God is the 
raḥ of the worlds.\(^{(1)}\) Creation is composed of different worlds e.g. The world of humans, the world of animals, the world of plants, etc.\(^{(2)}\) And God is the Lord (raḥ) of all these worlds. Now if raḥubīya (Lordship) signifies the bringing of a thing to a state of completion, can we deduce from this that every creature has a goal of perfection towards which it progressively moves or develops (or is moved by God)? This suggestion finds support in the idea of tawṣīya which, as explained, means completion or perfection. Tawṣīya is a pervasive trait of creation, because God not only creates but also completes what He creates. "Who hath created, and further, given order and proportion"\(^{(3)}\)

It is only in the verse just quoted that God's tawṣīya refers to creation in general. In all its other occurrences it refers either to the creation of human beings or to that of the heavens.\(^{(4)}\)

When we speak of the existence of something we may be referring to (a) its subsistence, the holding of its parts together and its continuation through time to be what it is, or (b) its movement in space, or (c) its existence in relation to other existing things.

The existence of things in all these three senses is

\(^{(1)}\) e.g. 1:1
\(^{(2)}\) Sometimes the word umma instead of 'alam is used, e.g., in 38:VI 2:LXXXVII (Ali)
\(^{(3)}\) e.g. 38:LXXV, 7:XXXII, 28 :LXXIX
due to God.

a-i. The first sense is expressed by the term qawāma, which, as explained, has the sense of standing still, stopping, being erect, etc. And also the sense of continuity (1). So everything depends for its subsistence on the direct power of God, Who alone is qayyūm, i.e., self subsisting, (2) "... the heavens and the earth stand fast (taqūm) by his command."

The fact that God is such a necessary cause for the subsistence of everything is very well expressed by a verse which nearly every Muslim learns by heart: "God: There is no God save Him, the Alive, the Qayyūm. Neither sleep nor slumber overtake him. Unto him belong whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth... His throne includes the heavens and the earth and He is never weary of preserving them" (3).

ii. Relevant to this fact is the fact that it is God who makes the thing what it is, i.e. He gives it its special form (ṣūra) and qualities or characteristics (Khalq). "He is God, the Fashioner, the Shaper." (4)

(1) e.g. "...wherein are delights that endure (muqīm)"
21:9 (Ali) (2) 'aRaghib.
(3) 255 :II (Pick). (4) 24:69 (Pick)
"O man 1 what hath made thee careless concerning thy Lord, the Bountiful? Who created thee, then fashioned, then proportioned thee. Into whatsoever form He will, He casteth thee."(1)

"God it is who appointed for you the earth for a dwelling-place, and the sky for a canopy, and fashioned you and perfected your shapes."(2)

"Our Lord is He who gave unto everything its nature, then guided it aright."(3)

b. Every movement in space (growth, extension or contraction, changes of state, changes of position and speeds, etc ...) is caused by God. All this is included in the wider concepts of trabiya and tadbîr.

The Qur'an abounds in verses that describe this continuous Divine activity in the world. Since this description is made in connection with the main message of the Qur'an i.e. to remind man of the unity and might of God that he may believe in Him and worship Him alone, almost all the workings of God to which man's attention is drawn are those that have direct relation to with his life and destiny.

(1) 6:8 :LXXII (Pick.) (2) 64:XL (Pick.)
(3) 50:XX (Pick)
It is God who sends the winds so that they raise clouds, who spreads these clouds along the sky as He pleases, who causes them to break so that you see rain down pouring from within them (1) "Look therefore at the prints of God's mercy (in creation): How He quickeneth the earth after her death "(2). Of the water that descends from these clouds some He gives lodging in the earth (3) or causes to penetrate the earth as water springs (4) "and afterwards thereby produces crops of different hues (5). "Let man consider his food. How we pour water in showers. Then split the earth in clefts and cause the grain to grow therein, And grapes and green fodder. And olive tree and palm trees and garden closes of thick foliage and fruits and grasses. (6) It is also with this water which He sends down the sky, that He causes to spring forth joyous orchards whose trees it never has been man's to cause to grow. (7)

It is He who causes rivers to flow, seas to be bitter, barriers to be set between them to prevent them from encroaching one upon the other (8) and ships to be able to flow on them, and had He willed, He would

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>48 : XXX</th>
<th></th>
<th>5</th>
<th>21 : XXXIX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>50 : XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24-31 : LXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18 : XXIII</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60 : XXVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>21 : XXXIX</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20 : LV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
have calmed the wind so that they keep still upon its surface (1) Heaven and earth are created by God and it is He who prevents them from deviating from their course "and if they were to deviate there is not one that could grasp them after him" (2), Who holds back the heaven from falling on the earth (3) who set in the heaven (4) mansions of the stars and beautified it for beholders (5). The earth he made a suitable place for men to live in by appointing it as a bed (mahd) (5), a resting place; (literally a mattress) (6), and a fixed abode; (7) and by creating it into the shape of a (8) and making it a subservient (9) and wide expanse (10). The succession of day and night is also due to Him (11). He appoints the one as cloak (12) and resting time (13), and the other for livelihood; and men are asked to think that if He made night or day "ever lasting for them till the day of Resurrection, who is a God beside Him who could bring them day or night." (14)

All the stages of man's evolution as a species and his development and growth as an individual, are due

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>16 : XV</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>15 : LXVII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>21 : XXXIX</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>19 : LXXI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>24-31 : LXXX</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>54 : VII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>60 : XXVII</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>10 : LXXVIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>20 : LV</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>73 : XXVIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>35 : XLII</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>11 : LXXVIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>30 : LXXIX</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>71,72 : XVIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to God. God is said to have created man from water (1), from dust (2), from earth (3), from plastic (4) clay (5), from potter clay (6), from black mud altered (6), from a suffix (chain, product) of wet earth (7). From man who passed all those stages until he became the creature we know, is created his mate, and from them "spread abroad a multitude of men and women (8). The "Water" which man emits, and from which every individual man is formed, is created by God (9). "Verily, we created man from a product of wet earth, then placed him as a drop (of seed) in a safe lodging; then fashioned we the drop a clot, then fashioned we the clot a little lump then fashioned we the little lump bones, then clothed the bones with flesh, and then produced it as another creation" (10). When man comes to life it is the Beneficent God who guards him day and night (11), who provides him with food and drink (12) who gives him wives from whom He gives him sons and grandsons, and - in short - causes everything in this man's world to be

(1) 30 : XXI  (7) 12 : XXII
(2) 5 : XII  20 : XXV  11 : XXV  
7 : XL  (8) 1 : IV
(3) 33 : LIII  (9) 58 : 59
(4) 11 : XXXVII  (10) 12-14 : XXIII (Pick.)
(5) 7 : XXXII  (11) 42 : XXI
(6) 26 : XV  (12) 79 : XXVI
subservent to his needs. Every change in man's state or condition, and all the differences between men are due to God, since it is He "Who maketh laught and maketh weep" "giveth death and giveth life" "enricheth and contenteth" (1) "gathereth you at night" "then raiseth you again to life" (2), "bestoweth female (offspring) upon whom He will, and bestoweth male (offspring) upon whom He will, and bestoweth male (offspring) upon whom He will", or "... mingleth them males and females, and He makes barren whom He will" etc. (3) etc...

c. The third sense is expressed by many of the terms listed above, and by numerous verses in which the particular terms do not appear.

Hifz : While the term qawāma refers to the subsistence of a thing, and its protection from internal forces, the term hifz refers to its protection from external forces. Some of the Qur'ānic contexts in which it is used bring out this sense clearly.

"For him (man) are angels ranged before him and behind him, who guard him (yahfazūnahu) by God's command." (4)

(1) 43-48 : LV  (3) 49-50 : XLII
(2) 50 : VI  (4) 11 : XII (Pick.)
"And verily in the heaven We have set mansions of the stars and We have guarded it (hafiznahu) from any outcast devil." (1).

"So when they (Joseph's brothers) went back to they father they said: O our father. The measure is denied us, so send with us our brother, that we may obtain the measure, surely we will guard (nahfaz) him well. He said "Can I entrust him to you save as I entrusted his brother to you aforetime? God is better at guarding (hafiz), and He is the most merciful of those who show mercy." (2)

Nothing - except God - exists independently of other things. It is God who manages things in such a way that each thing finds what it needs for its existence and development in others. Several terms express the different aspects of this interdependence of creation.

Muqit The original meaning this is, "to supply with food". The extended meaning, which seems to be meant in the Qur'an is, "to supply with whatever is needed for the existence of a thing."

(1) 16-17 : XV (Pick) (2) 65, 64 : XTI (Pick.)
"God is the Muqit of everything" (1).

Taskhīr, is the rendering of something subservient to the needs of another. The only idea which this term is used in the Qur'ān to express, is the Islamic basic principle that everything in this world is created for man. The many verses in which the word occurs besides stating this basic and general fact, give examples of the things that are created with the intention of serving the needs of man. Here are some examples of the twenty-five occurrences of this term in the Qur'ān.

"See you not how God made serviceable (sakhara) unto you whatsoever is in the skies and what soever is in the earth" (2),

"... Who created the heaven, and the earth and caused the water to descend from the sky, thereby producing fruits as food for you, and maketh the ships to be of service (sakhara) unto you that they may run upon the sea at His command, and hath made of service unto you (sakhara) the rivers. And maketh the sun and the moon, constant in their courses, to be of service unto you (sakhara), and hath made of
service unto you (Sakhãna) the night and the day. And he giveth you of all ye ask of Him, and if ye would count the bounty of God ye cannot reckon it. Lo men is verily a wrong-doer, an ingrate."(1)

And it is He Who hath constrained the sea to be of service (sakhãra) that ye eat fresh meat from thence, and bring forth from thence ornaments which ye wear. And thou seest the ships ploughing it that ye (Mankind) may seek of His bounty, and that haply ye may give thanke."(2)

In one verse the word is used to express the dependence of men on each other in their search for means of livelihood.

"... We have apportioned among them their livelihood in the life of the world, and raised some of them above others in rank that they may take labour from each other."(3)

Hady: Originally meaning, to guide to the way, is used in Qur'ân to express the idea of endowing everything with a natural disposition to the things that are necessary for its existence, and also the idea

(1) 52 - 34: XIV (2) 16: XVI (3) 32:XLIII
of endowing man with the ability to choose between right and wrong courses.

As such hady is a common trait of all creation. This is why besides being creator God is also the Hādī (or Director). The Qur'ān says,

"Our Lord is He Who gave unto everything its nature, then guided it (hada) (1), "Praise the name of thy Lord, the most high, who createth then disposeth, who measureth, then guideth (hada) (2)."

"And we guided him (hadaynahu) to the two ways (of good and evil) (3).

d. The impotence and helplessness of created things beside the power and might of God is a repeated theme in the Qur'ān.

Here are some of the key terms that express this fact.

i. Wakīl. God is wakil (literally, deputy, agent, manager of ones property etc.) As an attribute of God it expresses the fact that created things do not manage their own affairs but it is God Who does that on their behalf. God is said to be the wakīl of everything. (4)

(1) 50 : XX (Pick) (2) 1-3 : LXXXVII
(3) 10 : XC (4) 129 : IX
When doing good, man should not get over worried, about the dangerous consequences (to his person) of his good deeds, and should not pay much heed to the powers of evil however great they are. To be psychologically prepared to behave in such a way, man should remember that it is not he, but God, who manages his affairs, and should therefore leave the consequences of his deed to Him.

"Now, if they turn away ( O Muhammad ) say : God sufficeth me. There is no God save Him. In Him I have put my trust ( tawakaltu ) (1).

"Those unto whom men said ; Lo ! the people have gathered against you, therefore fear them ( the threat of danger ) but increased the faith of them and they cried 'God is sufficient for us ! Most Excellent is He in whom we trust ! (wakil)" (2).

" O Prophet ! keep thy duty to God, and obey not the disbelievers and hypocrites. Lo ! God is Knower, Wise. And follow that which is inspired unto thee from the Lord. Lo ! God is aware of what ye do. And put thy trust in God ( tawakkal ) for God is sufficient as trustee ( wakil ) (3).

(1) 129 : IX (2) 173: III (Pick.) (3) 1-3:XXXIII.
The attribute Ḥasīb in the sense of, sufficer or giver of what is sufficient, is very much related to the attribute of wakīl. This is why the two terms are usually used together as we saw in the previous verses and shall presently see in the following. God's wakāla is described as being enough or sufficient i.e. people do not need to have any wukala (plural of wakīl) besides Him.

"And if anyone puts his trust (yatwakal) in God, sufficient is God for him (hasbih)\[1]\[1]\[1]."

"Say: sufficient is God for me (hasbiya)!
In Him trust (yatawakkal) those who put their trust (Mutakkilun)\[2]\[2]\[2]."

God is ʿAlīk (exclusive owner) of the world and hence He is also its ʿalik (only ruler or king) who alone has the authority to command and forbid. This is why events and occurrences are called commands, since they happen as consequences of Divine decrees or orders.

---

(1) 3 : LXV (Ali.)  (2) 38 : XXXIX (Ali.)  (3) "God alone is He who will and can discharge any trust put in him. All other things will fail. Therefore those who put their trust in anything should put their trust in God" Yusuf Ali, "The Holy Qur'an, text translation commentary," vol. II, p. 1249; note 4301.
"He unto whom belongeth the Sovereignty (mulk) of the heavens and the earth, He hath chosen no son nor hath He any partner in the sovereignty (Mulk)" (1)

God is the only real and true Malik. All other kings and rulers are called so only in name; they have no real power to change the course of nature. Besides, even nominal kingship and authority is given then by the true king.

"Exalted be, the True King (Malik)" (2).

Bethink thee of Him who had an argument with Abraham about his Lord, because God had given Him to kingdom (mulk); how when Abraham said: My Lord is He who giveth life and causeth death. Abraham said: Lo! God causeth the sun to rise in the east, so do thou cause it to come up from the west. Thus was the disbeliever abashed." (3)

"Say O God! owner (mālik) of sovereignty (Mulk), Thou givest sovereignty (Mulk) unto whom thou wilt, and Thou withdrawest sovereignty (Mulk) from whom thou wilt. In thy hand is the good. Lo! Thou art able to do all things" (4).

(1) 2: XXV (2) 114: XX (Pick.)
(3) 285: II (4) 26: III (Pick.)
The attribute Muhaymin, is usually given the correct but inadequate senses of guarding, protecting, having full authority over etc. But the fact that the word is originally used to describe the state of a bird covering its young ones with its wings make this guarding and protection kindly as well as comprehensive.

To have the attributes of power, control, efficiency, etc. which previous terms express, God must necessarily have some other attributes whose detailed examination will take us beyond the range of this study. We shall therefore content ourselves with a mere listing of some of them.

God must be aware of everything that occurs in the world; hence his knowledge (ʿilm) is said to be muḥīt (comprehensive). And so he must witness whatever happens; hence the attribute of shahīd (witness or omnipresent.) Related to the attribute of shahīd ( are the attributes of Raqīb and hasīb. Raqīb is one who observes, not passively, but has the power to interfere, to question, and to call to account.
Hasib which also has the sense of watching and observing, has, by virtue of its original meaning, the sense of keeping a record or counting what is happening with the intention of calling to account.

In Islam the most important fact is—of course—that God is One; He has no partner and no like. It is therefore necessary while asserting the fact that it is God who manages the affairs of the world to deny this to any creature, especially angels, prophets and saints who—in virtue of their high rank in the eyes of God—might be (and in fact are) thought by some believers to have some say in the running of the affairs of the world.

The basic Qur'anic argument against mushrikeen (those who associate gods with the one God) is that they attribute to their supposed gods, whether they be angels, humans or mere stones, powers which they in fact do not possess; that they are not worshipping real gods but only names\(^{(1)}\). None of their alleged gods has created anything\(^{(2)}\); they have not the power to give life, cause death or bring about resurrection\(^{(3)}\); they cannot even act as intercessors\(^{(4)}\) and, generally, they are incapable of bestowing on those who worship

\(^{(1)}\) 5: XXV  
\(^{(2)}\) 11: XXXI  
\(^{(3)}\) 3: XXV  
\(^{(4)}\) 13: XXX
them any good or with holding from them any evil since they are too weak to do that even to themselves. Their impotence is vividly expressed by this parable: "O mankind! A similitude is coined, so pay ye heed to it; Lo! those on whom ye call beside God will never create a fly though they combine together for the purpose, and if the fly took something from them they could not rescue it from him. So weak are the seeker and the sought." A prophet is a man chosen by God to communicate a Divine message to his people. His prophethood does not change his human nature. Even Jesus is not excluded from this generalization; but special emphasis is laid on the fact that this applies even to the Prophet Muhammad. There is nothing Divine in the nature of Jesus since, like Adam, he is created from dust. Having died, Jesus, like any other man, is not aware of what happens after him; and like any other man he is held accountable for his deeds before God.

"And when God saith; O Jesus, son of Mary! Didst thou say unto mankind; take me and my mother for two gods beside God? He saith: Be glorified!

(1) 106: X, 66:XXI, 71:VI, 12:XXII etc.
(2) 16: XIII, 3:XXV (3) 73:XXII (4) 59: III
It was not mine to utter that to which I had no right. If I used to say it, then thou knewest it. Thou knowest what is in my mind, and I know not what is in Thy mind. Lo! Thou, only Thou art the Knower of things hidden.

I spoke unto them only that which Thou commandest me, (saying): Worship God, my Lord and your Lord. I was a witness of them while I dwelt among them, and when Thou tookest me Thou wast the watcher over them. Thou art witness over all things."(1)

As to the prophet Muhammad he is asked to tell his people that he, like all prophets before him— is an ordinary man who eats, drinks, begets, and dies; who mingles with ordinary people in market places, who does not see the future, nor does he have any power to do superhuman things. When he tells the future he is communicating what God told him, and it is God who makes superhuman things in order to support his true prophets' claims of being sent by God. Being such an ordinary human being with nothing Divine in him, the prophet cannot possess in any real sense any of the Divine attributes we

(1) 116, 117 : V (Pick.)
have been considering. Lest this fact should be obscured, the Qur'an states and stresses it in so many verses of which the following are some examples.

Nothing (concerning) the affairs (of the world) belongs to thee (the Prophet)\(^{(1)}\).

"It is not for thee to make people follow the right path\(^{(2)}\) since it is God (alone) who guides whom He wills"\(^{(3)}\).

"Remind them, for thou art not but a remembrancer, thou art not at all a warder over them\(^{(4)}\).

The prophet is not - like God - a wakil\(^{(5)}\) or haфиз\(^{(6)}\).

---

(1) 128:III my translation  (3) 272:II Asad
(2) Lit, "their guidance is not upon thee" i.e., Thou art responsible only for conveying God's message to them and not for their reaction to it". A sad, The Message of the Qur'an, vol.1.p.81
(4) 21,22 :LXXXVIII
(5) 6:XLII (6) 48:LII
IV

THE ROLE OF CAUSES AND OF MAN

(1) Foreward.

The world is the result of Divine will and action, as it is explained in chapters I and II, and its preservation as well as any change in it is due to God as chapter III showed. What then is the role of causes, if there are any, and what is the role of man, if there has any? It is to this problem that we address ourselves in the present chapter. By way of indispensable introduction to the elucidation of this problem we start by making an analysis of Arabic causal terms, a task which proves to be useful in its own right, besides serving as the introduction it is meant to be.

(2) Arabic Causal Terms.

Philosophical analysis of the concept of causality has attempted to enumerate the elemental ideas of which this concept is formed. The analysis which follows — of Arabic causal terms — yields the same elemental ideas of the concept of causality,
and does so in a very interesting way. Besides being used to express the idea of causation, it is found that each term is also used to express other ideas, some of which are described by lexicographers as being inseparable from the term. These other senses which are tied to causal terms include the idea of succession, conjunction, regularity, and all the other ideas to which modern philosophical analysis has attempted to reduce the concept of cause.

The list of Arabic words here analysed is not exhaustive, but it includes, I think, the terms which are most frequently used to express causation.

The terms that are usually used to express the idea of causation are:

1 - *sabab* (cause) and its correlative *musabbab* (caused).

2 - *illa* (cause) and its correlative *ma'ilul* (caused).

3 - *sahar* (effect) and its correlative *mu'athir* (lit. maker of the effect).

4 - *aqib* (lit. immediately after).

5 - *matija* (lit. result).

6 - *bi* (prep.; lit. with or by).

7 - *fa* (prep.; lit. immediately after).
8 - **li** (prep.; lit., to, for etc.)

9 - **law** (lit. if.)

A. Dictionary Meanings of Causal Terms.

**Sabab**

- Rope by which one ascends or descends.
- Rope by which one reaches or gains access to water.
- A thing of any kind by which one attains, reaches or gains access to another thing.
- A connection, or tie, or relation.

**'illa**

**'illa** To give to drink the second time.
- To dye something for the second time.
- To beat someone repeatedly.
- To pluck fruit one time after the other.

**al'alla** To divert or occupy someone with something.
- To assign the cause, or to account for an event by assigning something as its cause.

**i'talla:** You say, he i'talla with a 'illa; i.e. he urged or adduced something as a plea, or pretext, or excuse.
ta'al'ala (verb) to become unsteady or shaky.

'allaka taf'al kadha: May be you will do such a thing.

illa An accident that befalls an object and causes its state to be changed, and hence a disease, sickness or malady.

Also an accident that diverts a person to whom it occurs from his course or from the object of his want as though it became a second occupation hindering him from his former occupation.

And hence, an excuse, an apology a plea whereby one excuses oneself.

'Athar Footprint; mark;

. a remain or relic of a thing;

. tradition, narration e.g. a saying of the Prophet is called 'Athar ie it is something that remained after him.

fi 'atharibī After him, near after him.

'athāra, a trace remaining of a thing.

'athār (pl.) remains, monuments, memorials, of antiquity or of any past time.

'ath-thara: Made or left or caused to remain, and impression or a mark, a trace upon something.
It is said of a sword that it "ath-thara" in something, i.e. it made a scar. So a scar is called the "athar" (effect) of the sword.

It is also said: "Prostration in prayer "ath-thara" on his forehead."

'ARTHAR (v) You say he "athara" the foot of the camel i.e. made an incision in it.

'ATH-THARA You say he "ath-thara" something with something else i.e. he made the one to follow the other.

'ATHARA. Chose or elected.

You say he "athara" some one to himself i.e. he preferred him before himself.

'i'tatharahū (v) He followed his footsteps

'AQIB

'aqib, heel.

'aqib. You say he came "aqibahu" i.e. after him as though at his heel; and hence, properly, close after him; but often meaning near after him.

'aqib punishment.

'a'gaba you say he made something that "a'gabahu" repentance i.e. it occasioned him as its consequence, repentance. You also sah he ate something that "a'gabahu"
sickness i.e. occasioned him as its consequence, sickness. It is said in the Qur'an, "And some of them have made covenant with God: if He gives us of His bounty, we will make offerings and be of the righteous!"

"Nevertheless, when He gave them of His bounty they became covetous, and turned away, swerving aside. So He 'a'qaba - hum hypocrisy into their hearts"(1) i.e. the putting of hypocrisy into their hearts came as a consequence of their breaking their covenant with God.

'Uqba  consequence or result.

Natija :

Nataja  Bring forth e.g. the She camel natajat an offspring i.e. brought forth or gave birth to - the wind Tantij the clouds i.e. it draws forth rain from them. You say of something that it nutija i.e. was produced, or it resulted or was a natural consequence of something. The same word was later used to mean conclusion in the logical sense. Thus you say this premise does not tuntij a true conclusion. It is clear that the word is here used metaphorically; the premise is likened to an animal that bears an offspring (i.e. the conclusion).

(1) 76 : IX
bi used to denote adhesion of the verb to its objective complement; it also denotes adjunction or association; and some say that its meaning of denoting adhesion is inseparable from it. Its primary meaning is that of denoting adhesion and mixture e.g. there is difference between 'amsaktu (I seized) bi Zayd and 'amsaktu Zayd. The first means that I layed hold upon or seized somewhat of the body of Zayd, or what might detain him, as an arm or a hand or a garment and the like; whereas the second may mean I with held him or restrained him from acting according to his own free will.

bi also denotes the employing a thing as an aid or instrument e.g. I wrote bi the pen, i.e. with. It also denotes a cause. Thus it is said in the Qur'an, "... and (He) sent down out of heaven water wherewith ( bi hi ) He brought forth fruits for your provision."

and, "there has come to you from God a light, and a Book manifest whereby ( bi hi ) God guides whoever follows His " and "... that was because ( bi ) they used to disbelieve in the signs of God", and "... that was because ( bi ) they disobeyed."
This is one of three prepositions that denote order. The other two are **wa** and **thumma**; all of which mean 'and'. You say "I visited Britain **wa** France **wa** Egypt." and "I visited Britain **fa** France **fa** Egypt." and, "I visited Britain **thumma** France, **thumma** Egypt." In the first sentence no order is implied. You might have visited France and Egypt before Britain. But in the second and the third order is implied. In the second you are saying that immediately after visiting Britain you visited France and .. etc.; but in the third you imply that there was a period of time between the visits.

This is why it is said of **fa** that it denotes 'proximate sequence', and 'it is a particle denoting sequence in a case in which is an uninterrupted connection between the events.

While retaining its sense of order, **fa** also denotes causality.

We read in the Qur'an, "Moses struck him and ( **fa** ) dispatched him ... "To put 'and' for 'fa' here is a doubly wrong translation, because ( **fa** ) denotes order as we have seen; and because besides order it denotes causality in this and similar cases.
It is not that the dispatch happened merely after the strike, but that it happened as a consequence of it i.e. the blow caused the immediate death.

**Li**:

This particle is used in the senses of 'at', 'with', and 'from'; but its two senses that interest us here are that of teleological explanation or justification, and that of becoming. In the first sense it is called the **Li** of ta'li (see 'illa) and in the second sense it is called the **Li** of Sayrūra (becoming) or 'aqiba (See aqid). In the first sense you say e.g. I took the book **Li** (to) read it; I explained the lesson **Li** (to) the students He did so and so **Li** (for) her good. Examples from the Quran are, "And we have sent down to thee the Remembrance (the Qur'an) that (**Li**) thou mayest make clear to mankind what was sent down to them, and so haply they will reflect." and, '... messengers bearing good tidings and warning so that (**Li**) mankind might have no argument against God, after the (sending of) messengers."

Using **Li** in the second sense, a poet says:

It is for (**Li**) death that mothers feed their young, just as it is far (**Li**) destruction that
houses are built". And the Qur'an says "So then the folk of Pharaoh picked him (Moses) out to (li) be an enemy and a sorrow to them"

Al-Zamakhshari, a famous commentator of the Qur'an said about the second sense of li, 'The fact is that it is the li of 'illa and that the ta'il (teleological explanation) is used in it metaphorically i.e. the motive of the folk of Pharaoh in picking Moses was not that he might be an enemy and a sorrow ... but since this was the consequence and fruit of their picking him it was likened to the motive or the aim for which an act is done."(1)

Law :-

It is said in grammar books that law expresses conditionality, and denotes the tie of causality between the two clauses that follow it. The clause that immediately follows it states that something did not happen in the past. And though the use of law implies that the fact stated in the second clause is conditional upon the first one, it does not by itself imply whether the fact took place or not e.g. law A happened B would have happened, implies that A did not happen but it remains silent on whether B happened or not. The occurrence or non-occurrence of B depends on whether A is a sufficient or necessary cause of B.

(1) His commentary, al-Kash-Shaf.
If A is a sufficient cause of B and A did not happen, then we cannot say whether B happened or not.

If A is necessary and A did not happen, then we can be sure that B did not happen.

The use of law by itself does not tell us whether the cause is necessary or sufficient. This is to be decided either by reason, observation, or revelation. Law expressions are often used in cases of proof or evidence. If people somehow know that A is a sufficient condition for B, and that B did not happen, then to prove the fact that A could not have happened, one can say: Law A happened, B should have happened e.g. to argue against the plurality of Gods the Qur'an says "Why, were there gods in earth and heaven other than God, they would surely go to ruin". This argument is based on the observed fact that the heaven and the earth are not ruined, and the assured fact that the plurality of Gods is sufficient to cause them to be ruined.

Sometimes it is used to prove that the cause is not a necessary one e.g. talking of a very pious man Caliph Omer Said "Law he did not fear God, he would not have disobeyed him". Now those whom Umar addressed,
knew that this man obeyed God i.e. that the effect happened. Omer is telling them that in the case of this man this effect is not solely dependent on the usual cause (fearing God), but it is also dependent on other causes. So Omer's statement either implies that fearing God is not a necessary cause of piety, or that there are causes which can contribute to produce a better effect. Since the use of Law implies that this man did fear God, the second interpretation is more probable.

Comments and Conclusion.

(1) I have already said that besides expressing the idea of causality, causal terms are used to express other ideas, some of which are those notions which philosophical analysis has shown to be somewhat related to the concept of causation e.g. it is said that if A is the cause of B, then there is a regular conjunction between A and B; A does not occur after B; usually B follows A but there is difference of opinion as to whether A and B can occur simultaneously etc. etc. The philosopher arrives or so he claims to do— at his conclusion by observing how people actually use the expression 'A causes B'. He finds e.g. that they do not say that A causes B when A hinders the occurrence of B;
that when they observe A they expect B to follow it; that when they say A causes B, they do not say B causes A, etc. and he draws his conclusions from these observations. Then having examined the different senses from a logical point of view he might suggest a modification of the common sense usage e.g. by leaving out some of the notions because they are not compatible with others which he has good reason to believe are more basic, or because the notion or notions are not or cannot be verified in experience.

Our method, which is slightly different, confirms some of the conclusions of the philosophers' method. Instead of observing directly how people use the expression 'A causes B', we observe the different ways in which they express the idea of 'A causes B. Let these different ways be:  

\[
\begin{align*}
A & \rightarrow C \rightarrow B \\
A & \rightarrow D \\
A & \rightarrow E \\
A & \rightarrow F \\
A & \rightarrow G
\end{align*}
\]

The thing in common between \(d, e, f, g\) in this context is that they all express the idea \(c\).
But since they are different, we suppose that they must have some other senses that distinguish them from each other and from c. Suppose we find that besides expressing the idea of c, these terms are also used to express the following ideas:

\[
d \quad e \quad f \quad g
k \quad l \quad m \quad n
o \quad p \quad q \quad r
s \quad t \quad u \quad v
\]

We now assume that it must be because of something common between them - other than that they mean c - that these terms were chosen to express c. For example h is not used because some of its basic notions are not compatible with that of c. The idea of a basic notion of a term or, as the Arabic dictionaries say, "the meaning of a term that is inseparable from it", is very important here. For example if o is basic to d, and d is used to express c, then we can safely conclude that c, at least sometimes means o. And if e.g. k is basic to all the terms that express c, then k must be part of the meaning of c. Having given an idealized model of our method, let us now come down to the world of imperfect actuality.

We shall now try to show how the notions that are related to the concept of cause can be discerned
in the different ways in which the idea of causation is expressed. Needless to say that our conclusions here are only probable because we have not taken the necessary but difficult steps to prove whether a certain sense of a term is basic to it or not. We shall accept the authority of dictionaries when they tell us that it is, and we shall also take it for granted that the 'material' or concrete sense is more basic than the abstract or metaphorical.

Sabab, as we have seen originally meant a rope when it is actually used to tie two things, and moreover when the tie is not a static one. It is used as a rope which enables one to attain something e.g. to hang oneself, to bring water from a well etc.

So when Sabab is used to express cause it must retain this idea of an active tie or connection, or relation. 'illa expresses the idea of change i.e. the cause makes a change somewhere which is called its effect.

It also expresses the idea of repetition. 'ather implies that the effect follows the cause and does so immediately just as the foot leaves its prints on the ground.
'aqib expresses more clearly the idea of immediate succession. We have seen that 'aqib means heel and that as a verb it means that someone followed the other as though at his heel. It is contrasted to ba'd which means after and ma'a which means with. ma'a implies that the two events happened simultaneously and ba'd, that the one followed the other after a lapse of time, but 'aqib implies that it follows it immediately.

'aqib also implies that the effect does not merely follow the cause, but follows it as a consequence of it.

'aqab a derivative of 'aqib means punishment, which expresses clearly the idea of 'to follow as a consequence of .'.

nataja originally meant to beget which expresses the idea of production.

It is said of bi that its meaning of contiguity or adhesion is inseparable from it.

fa is primarily used as a conjunction which denotes order and sequence 'in a case where there is an uninterrupted connection between the two events.

bi expresses becoming and law expresses conditionality.
We can thus conclude that the following notions compose, or are especially related to the concept of causation: efficacy, tie, connection, relation, change, repetition, immediate succession, consequence, production, contiguity, becoming and conditionality, all of which are familiar to the causal analyst. The only notion that he misses here is that of necessity connection which I could not discern in any of the Arabic causal terms. Arabs - like European philosophers and theologians have quarrelled over this notion, as we shall see in the next section.

(2) It is usually taken for granted that 'illa and Sabab (in the sense of cause) are strictly synonymous but looking carefully into their different usages we can discern some important distinctions between them.

Sabab, as we have seen, is a means to something e.g. to the effect desired. So if we want to bring about an effect, we talk about its sabab; but if the effect is given and we are wondering how it happened, we talk about its 'illa. Ordinary usage supports this hypothesis about the distinction between the two terms. Thus if someone does something and we want him to justify it, we ask about the 'illa of doing this i.e. the motive or purpose, or we ask him to yu'allil (justify) his action. But we do not in such a context
say yusabbib (the verb derived from Sabab), because this means to cause. In fact the verb yu'allil is never used in the sense of to cause. It either means to explain, or — following the original sense of 'illa — to distract or divert, while the verb yusabbib always means 'to cause' or bring about etc. and never 'to explain'. For example one can yu'allil the eclipse of the moon by showing its causes (ilal or asbāb) just as one yu'allil one's unusual behaviour by showing one's reasons or motives for doing it; but one does not yusabbib the eclipse of the moon.

(5) The Arabic concept of causation is very remote from the idea of natural mechanical causation. A cause is not always something that necessarily produces its effect. It is more like an instrument that is used by someone to produce that effect. Therefore besides a cause (Sabab) and its effect ('athar), we have the causer (musabbib). The difference between cause and causer is very important since while speaking of God as a causer, we never — I think — speak of Him as a Cause, except perhaps in literal translations of Greek philosophical writings.
(4) The fact that the occurrence of bi both in the Qur'an and in ordinary usage is more frequent than the other terms supports the view, previously alluded to, that the Arabic (cause) is more of an instrument than an independent producer of effects. This is so because the use of the preposition bi implies three things (a) a causer who uses (b) the cause to produce or obtain (c) the effect.

(5) The (cause) which those terms express is not always the efficient cause. Often some of them express the Aristotelian final cause i.e. the purpose or end for which a thing is done.

(3) The Role of Causes

Before enquiring into the role that causes can play within the boundaries of an Islamic world view we should see whether the presence of causes is acknowledged in the Qur'an. And to find that out we would see whether causal language is used in the Qur'an. Having had an idea about Arabic causal language, we are now in a position to undertake this investigation. In fact all types of Arabic causal language that we have been analysing are used in the Qur'an. Here are some examples.
(a) "Sabab" : "They will ask you of Thul Qarnaya. Say : I shall recite unto you a rememberance of him. Lo . We made him strong in the land and gave him unto everything a Sabab. And he followed a Sabab . Till when he reached the setting-place of the sun ... Then he followed a Sabab. Till when he reached the rising-place of the sun ... The he followed a Sabab till he came between the two mountains, he found..(1)

(b) ( On the day ) when those who were followed disown those who followed (them), and they behold the doom, and all their asbab (pl. of Sabab) collapse with them". (2)

(c) "Or is the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and all that is between them theirs? Then let them ascend in the asbab". (3)

(d) "And Pharaoh said: O Haman! Build for me a tower that I may reach the asbab, the asbab of the heavens and may look upon the God of Moses ...." (4) Ibn al-Qayyim (5) reports that Ibn Abbas (6) explained Sabab in (a) to mean 'knowledge', that Qatadah, Ibn Jurayj and Addahāk explained it to mean "knowledge which he used to obtain what he desired"(7); that al-Mubarrid (8)

(1) 84 - 94  (2) 116 : II  (3) 10 : XXXVIII
(4) 36, 37 : XL (5) Shifa,'ul' Aḥāf, pp. 261-62
(6) A companion of the Prophet. (7) Lit "... which he used as a cause (tasababa) to what he..." (8) Ibid p. 262
said "anything that connect one thing with the other is a Sabab." Ibn al Qayyim reports also that Mujăhid explained sabab in (a) to mean a way (or a road); and that some comentators said that the second sabab in (a) is identical with the first i.e. that "to reach his goal he followed (or used) one of those asbab which God gave (or showed) him. He explains asbab in verse (d) to mean doors, and says that doors are called asbab because it is through them that one enters to . . ., that ropes are called asbab because they enable one to reach or attain ones goal or desire, and that connections and relations among people are called asbab (b) because it is through such relations are connections that people sometimes reach their goals (or satisfy their needs).

bi

"And the water which God sends down from the sky and with (bi) which He then revives the earth after its death" (1)

"And He it is Who sendeth the winds as tidings heralding His mercy, till, when they bear a cloude heavy (with rain), we lead it to a dead land and then cause water to descend thereon and thereby (bi hi) bring forth fruits of every kind. Thus bring we forth the dead (2). Haply ye may remember" (3)

(1) 164 : II  (2) The reference here is to resurrection  (3) 57 : VII p.
"And we send down from the sky blessed(1) water thereby ( bi hi ) we give growth unto gardens and the grain of crops"(2)

"See they not how many a generation we destroyed before them, when We had established in the earth more firmly than we have established you, and we shed upon them abundant showers from the sky, and made the rivers flow beneath them. Yet we destroyed them for ( bi ) their sins and created after them another generation."(3)

"Whatever of misfortune striketh you, it is because of ( bi ) the things your hands have wrought."(4)

Fa

"And they disobeyed the messenger of their Lord therefore ( fa ) did He grip them with a tightening grip(5)

" But Pharaoh rebelled against the messenger, whereupon ( fa ) we seized him with no gentle grip."(6)

(1)"Mubarak" lit.,"useful in many ways"  (2) 9 : L. p
(3) 6 : VI  (4) 30 : XLII  (5) 10 : LXIX
(6) 16 : LXIII
"But they denied him and they hamstrung her, so ( fa ) God doomed them for their sin."(1)

Conditionals:

"And whosoever keepeth his duty to God, We will appoint a way out for him"(2)

"And whosoever keepeth his duty to God, He make his course easy for him."(3)

"... if ye give thanks, I will give you more"(4)

Ibn al-Qayyim who says that (5) "if we enumerate (statements) in the Qur'an and Sunnah wherein causes are expressed and affirmed, we will find more than ten thousand places and that "this is not an exaggeration but a statement of fact" mentions many other types of statements which he thinks are expressive of causality.

There is no doubt, then, that causal language is used in the Qur'an. The question is how to interpret it.? I shall give the views of eminent Muslim intellectuals, and then make some comments on them.

(1) 14 : XCI  (4) 7 : XIV
(2) 2 : LXV  (5) Shifa'ul alāl , p.361
(3) 4 : LXV
Al Qazwī

"In our view, the connection between what are believed to be the cause and the effect is not necessary. Take any two things. That is not this; nor can This be That. The affirmation of one does not imply the affirmation of the other; nor does its denial imply the denial of the other. The existence of one is not necessitated by the existence of the other; nor its nonexistence by the non-existence of the other. Take for instance any two things, such as the quenching of thirst and drinking; satisfaction of hunger and eating; burning and contact with fire; light and the rise of the Sun; death and the severance of the head from the trunk; healing and the use of medicine; the loosening of bowels and the use of a purgative, or any other set of events observed to be connected together in Medicine, or Astronomy, or Arts, or Crafts. They are connected as the result of the Decree of God (holy be His name), which preceded their existence. If one follows the other, it is because He has created them in that fashion, not because the connection in itself is necessary and indissoluble. He has the power to create the satisfaction of hunger without eating, or death without the severance of the head, or even the survival of life when the head has
been cut off, or any other thing from among the connected things (independently of what is supposed to be its cause).

The philosophers deny this possibility; indeed, they assert its impossibility. Since the inquiry concerning these things (which are innumerable) may go to an indefinite length, let us consider only one example—viz.; the burning of a piece of cotton at the time of its contact with fire. We admit the possibility of a contact between the two which will not result in burning, as also we admit the possibility of the transformation of cotton into ashes without coming into contact with fire. And they reject this possibility.

There are three points from which the discussion of the question can be started;

Firstly, the opponent may claim that fire alone is the agent of burning, and that being an agent by nature (not by choice), it cannot refrain from doing what it is its nature to do—after it comes into contact with a subject which is receptive to it.
This is what we deny. We say that it is God
whether through the intermediacy of angels, or directly—is
the agent of the creation of blackness in cotton; of the
disintegration of its parts, and of their transformation
in — to a smouldering heap or ashes,.. Fire, which is
an inanimate thing, has no action. How can one prove
that it is an agent? The only argument is from the
observation of the fact of burning at the time of
contact with fire. But observation only shows that
one is with the other, not that it is by it and has no
other cause than it. To take another example, it cannot
be contradicted that the advent of the spirit and of the
motive and cognitive faculties into the sperm of animals
is not a development out of the natures which are pent
up in heat and cold and moisture and dryness. But the
act of procreation, the father is not the agent of the
son; or of the son's life, vision, and hearing, or of
any other thing he may have. Obviously, all these things
are observed to exist with some other conditions. But
we cannot say that they exist by them. On the contrary,
they derive their existence from God—either directly,
or through the intermediacy of angels to whom these
temporal events are entrusted. (This argument is valid
against the philosophers who believe in God; and it is
they whom we address here.) So it is clear that existence with a thing does not prove being by it.

Let us illustrate. Suppose there is a blind man whose eyes are diseased, and who has not heard from anyone of the difference between night and day. If one day his disease is cured, and he can consequently see colours, he will guess that the agent of the perception of the forms of colours which has now been acquired by his eyes is the opening of the eyes. This will not be absolutely untrue, inasmuch as given the soundness of the eyes: and the obstruction being removed: and the object before him having colour, it follows that he must be able to see, and it would be unintelligible if he were not. But when the Sun is set, and the atmosphere is dark, he will acquire the knowledge that light of the Sun was the cause of the impression of colours upon his sight.\(^{(1)}\)

**As-Sanūsī**

"Among the types of polytheism is the attribution of action to other than God ... such as saying that "fire burns, and food nourishes, dress cover, and other examples of establishing connection between these regular happenings to the extent of thinking the connection to be

\[(1)\] Tahafut al-falasifa (Lahore, 1958) translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali."
necessary. This is a deviation in which the philosopher was followed by the lay Muslim, nay even many jurists who engage themselves in sciences that do not concern them. Such people adhere to different doctrines. Those who say that it is by their nature that (causes) are effective, are, by consensus of opinion, nonbelievers. Those who say that it is by a power that God caused to inhere in them that they are effective, are innovators; and people differ as to whether they are to be considered nonbelievers.

"As to those who say that eating is a rational evidence for repolution and not just something that regularly precedes it, they are ignorant of the meaning of rational evidence. The person who knows that God connected some of His actions in such a way as whenever He does this He does that, according to His choice, and if He wills to violate this habit, He does this is the the real believer whom God by His grace caused to be saved from this malady(1)

Ibn Taymiya

Ibn Taymiya says, "The rightly guided ones believe that God is the Creator, the Lord and the Ruler of everything. That what He will must be, and what he

(1) As-Sanusiyya, Arabic text p.92
does not will cannot be. That He is Ominipotent and
He then supports his view by citing some of the Qur'ānic verses which we quoted at the beginning of this section; and then goes on to comment on them saying, "So He informs us that He acts by (bi) causes. Any one who says that He acts at ('inda) them, and not by them contradicts what is stated in the Qur'ān, and denies the 'powers' and 'natures' that God creates ... And those who say that they (causes) create or originate (effects) have thereby acknowledged agents other than God, and attributed His action to others. This is because every cause is in need of another cause so as to produce its effect, and because a cause cannot produce its effect unless God protects it from counter causes. Therefore noting in existence—except God—which alone is able to do something (1).

Ibn Rushd (Averoes)

Ibn Rushed writes about causality mainly to criticize the Ash'arites, especially al-Ghazali. Here—in points—is a summary of his views. (2)

(1) Al-Risalatu-l Tadmuriyya, Arabic text
(2) See Manāḥij al- 'Adilla fī 'Āqā'id al-Milla
"Just as anyone who does not know or who cannot understood how it is that effects follow causes in (a certain) art is thereby ignorant of both the art and the artisan, so anyone who denies that effects in this world come into existence in consequence of their causes, is thereby ignorant of the Wise Maker".

Their doctrine that causes do not have any real effect on what they cause and that the connection between them is a habit which God caused to continue, is a doctrine that is very far from what wisdom necessitates, nay it even makes such wisdom unreal. "This is because if effects can be produced without their respective causes, in the same manner as they are produced by them, what then is the wisdom of producing them by those causes?"

Effects are produced by their causes either because it is necessary that they be produced by those causes, or because it is better that they be so produced, or neither this nor that, in which case the fact that effects are produced by their causes must be accidental. But if the coming of things into existence is accidental, then the atheists would be right in denying the existence of a wilful Maker of the world. Suffice the point which he goes on to elaborate, to say that he thinks
that the denial of the necessity of the connection between causes and effects is not compatible with the Argument from Design.

The 'Ash'arites, he says, refused to acknowledge causes because they thought that this implies acknowledging efficient causes other than God. But they are mistaken. "There is no agent here except God, because it is He who created causes and made them the efficient causes they are".

Comments

The main point on which there is full agreement among these different interpreters and for which there is ample evidence in the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet is that there are no causes in the materialistic sense i.e., even those who affirm the presence of causes do not attribute to them an efficacy of their own that is independent of the will and power of God.

Another point on which there is agreement is the regularity of succession of causes and effects.

A third point on which there seems to be agreement and which might follow from the first point is that there is no logical necessity between a cause and its
effect. This is very clear in al-Ghazālī. But it might be doubted whether Ibn Rushd subscribes to the same idea. I think that he does, and that the necessity he is talking about is not a logical necessity between a cause and its effect and that he is affirming two things. First, lawfulness as against chance; and rational justification of the acts of the wise i.e. that it is not by mere chance that God willed that fire and not, say, water shall be the cause of burning.

I admit that there is a difficulty here. If we are not satisfied with mere Divine choice of fire as the cause of burning. And if we look for a reason why this choice has been made, then our question can only be answered in terms of the qualities of fire. But these qualities were given it by God and so we are back to our first question; why has God given fire these particular qualities, or why should these qualities and not, say, the qualities of water be connected with burning?. My view is that the quest for justification is here based on a mistake. I think that justification is always relative, and not absolute. I mean to say that it is the apparently abnormal in relation to certain criteria of normality that is to be explained or justified; but if there is no such
standard of normality then the question does not arise; and if it is asked it cannot—in principle—be answered. This is of course different from another legitimate question which science is ever trying to answer. This is a question like: Why is it the eye and not the ear that sees? Or: What is it that makes the eye see? This is answerable by looking for some characteristic qualities of the eye which the ear, say, does not have, and associating them with seeing. This type of explanation can go, as the history of science proves, to deeper and deeper levels and I see no reason why there should be a definite depth at which explanation shall stop. I see no reason why there should be anything like ultimate explanation. But if the levels of explanation are infinite, explanation at each level is essentially mere description i.e., it can point to nothing more than the correlation of certain qualities with certain phenomena.

We now consider some points of difference. The point at which there is the greatest dispute is the actual relation between a cause and its effect, having admitted that God is the creator of both the cause and the effect. The Ash'rites—including al-Ghazali—say that there is nothing over and above regular
succession, that what we call a cause is only a sign that what we call the effect shall follow, or an occasion at which God produces the event we call the effect. More orthodox Sunnites like Ibn Taymiya see in this a deviation from Qur'anic usage. If God says that it is by (bi) water that He revives the earth, what right has anyone to alter this language and say it is at (inda) the fall of water that He revives the earth? What difference is there between the two statements if both parties are agreed that it is God who is the real efficient cause? The difference is that while for the Ash'arites there is no difference between water and, say, oil in reviving the earth, except that the former has regularly been seen to precede that revival, while the latter has not been so observed, the Sunnites believe that God has given water a special 'power' by which it produces that revival. So the difference between water and oil as far as the revival of the earth is concerned is not a difference in regular succession, but a difference in 'natures' and properties. However, as we have just observed in the previous point, the question can be shifted to these qualities or 'natures' by virtue of which special causes are said
to 'produce' their especial effects. This might be explained by reference to a deeper level of qualities and natures which does explain the level just above it, while itself remaining unexplained, except by a deeper level: and so on ad infinitum, or until we reach an ultimate level which explains all levels above it while itself remaining unexplainable.

Miracles

For those who take causes to be mere events which accidentally occur before what we call effects, and whose occurrence is thus, in fact, irrelevant to the production of effects, the explanation of miracles is very easy. God sometimes decides to produce the effect without allowing the 'cause' to precede it. For those who hold causes to be more than mere preceding events, a miracle occurs when God prevents a cause from producing its normal effect or when He produces an effect in an abnormal way. By making a miracle in either of the two latter ways, God need not violate the principle of causality. An effect which normally follows a certain cause, may sometimes fail to do so. But this failure itself may be causally explained. When we say that a cause is that which always produces its effect, the "always" is not absolute, since a statement like 'if there are no counter causes' is
always understood. And so a miracle like that of Abraham need not, for a believer, militate against the principle of causality. The same applies to the miraculous birth of Jesus, where an effect is produced in an abnormal way. Scientific explanation becomes more successful the more it posesses from general to particular causes of events. For an ordinary person it is the fly A which causes the disease B, but for a doctor it is the virus a which is carried by the fly A which causes in man the effect b which is associated with the disease B. Once we pass from A - B to a - b -- B, we conclude that it is possible for B to be produced by a cause other than A especially if it is experimentally shown that a can be carried by means other than B. Does this mean that as science develops it might one day be able to explain miracles and hence perform them?

For Ibn Taymiya this is impossible, because a miracle which is performed to Vindicate a Prophet is by definition something which it is impossible for man to perform. The Arabic word for miracle, mu'jiza supports this view since it literally means: something which it is impossible to do. Ibn Taymiya adds that the impossibility is not absolute. It is impossible only for those who are defied, namely, men; but not for e.g. angels. It can therefore be said that the impossibility -
in his view - is not a logical but a physical one.

Causes and Divine Action

In the Qur'an Divine action and causal efficacy are not contrasted; the same action is sometimes directly attributed to God and sometimes attributed to causes.\(^1\) This is in line with the Arabic sense of cause as an instrument to be used by a causer.

Causes and Reasons

In Arabic, as our previous analysis of causal language has led us to believe, there is usually no clear distinction between causes and reasons, and hence no clear distinction between natural explanation and rational justification. This is why Ibn al Qayyim, in his attempt to prove the Qur'anic assertion of causes, gives as evidence some statements which are clear instances of rational and not causal language. In his opinion the clearest example of causal language is the usage of the term \textit{kay} or \textit{likay} (in order that) in such verses as "what God has bestowed on His Apostle (and taken away) from the people of the townships - belongs to God - to His Apostle and to kindred and orphans, the needy and the wayfarer; in order that \textit{likay} it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you"\(^2\) and "No misfortune can happen

\(^1\) Compare e.g. verse 164:2, where the revival of the earth is attributed to water as an instrument or cause by which God brings about such an effect, and verse 19:30 where the same effect is directly attributed to God.\(^2\)7:LIX
on earth or in your souls but is recorded in a decreed
before we bring it into existence. That is truly easy
for God. In order that (likay) ye may not despair
over matters that pase you by nor exult over favours
bestowed upon you.\textsuperscript{(1)} Is this merely a defect of a
particular language? By no means, since this confu-
sion of causes and reasons is not a peculiarity of
Arabic. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives – as one
of the senses of reason "(fact adduced or serving as)
argument, motive, cause or justification" and as one of t
the senses of "cause" ground, reason, motive, for action;
adequate motive or justification. The English 'cause' is
derived from the Latin \textit{causa} which meant both cause and
reason. What is the relation between causes and reasons
that must be responsible for this ambiguity in their
linguistic expressions? As causes, human beings have
a special characteristic, namely their being able
sometimes to produce one of two effects, or to withhold
from producing an expected effect. And as places of
effects they are sometimes able to refuse to be affected.
When this peculiar kind of cause makes any of the
choices open for it by producing one rather than the
other of the effects that it is able to produce, it
is asked the question why it did so? i.e. we are asking

\textsuperscript{(1)} 23 : LVII (Ali)
a cause to give us the reason why it chose to make (or not to make) a particular effect. There are different kinds of reasons and hence many different answers to our question—consider for example the following answers to the question, "Why did you do a rather than b", put to a person.

1 - Some one compelled me to do a
2 - I did not know of the possibility of b
3 - Because I love doing a. (Or), Because I hate doing b
4 - Because I want to attain x, and it is a rather than b which causes x.

Reasons 1, 2, and 3 are the causes of which the person's action is an effect.

Reason 4 is more complicated.

If the aim which the person is trying to attain is itself caused, then reason 4, like Reasons 1, 2 and 3, is ultimately a cause which produced the person's action. If this is not the case, but if it is the case that given the goal x, a is the only means to it, then even here reasons are partially reduced to causes.

If reasons can sometimes be reduced to causes, then it is natural to say "what causes you to do so?"
meaning "what is your reason for doing so?". And if this is so, then an argument like Ibn al Qayyim's that passes from the assertion of reasons to the assertion of causes, can be a valid argument.

If man's goal determines his choice of the means to that goal, this does not apply to God, who is completely free in the choice of means as in the choice of goals. If man cannot but choose a cause or a means that leads to a certain end, it is God who gives the properties that make them the causes they are. And therefore His actions cannot be caused.

I now give an example from the Qur'an of rational justification which presupposes causal laws.

The Qur'an abolished the Arab's custom of adopting children and ordered that children be related to their real fathers. The Qur'an then ordered the Prophet to marry the divorced wife of his adopted son Zayd, and explained the wisdom of this order by saying:

"We joined her in marriage to thee in order that (in future) there may be no difficulty to the Believers in (the matter of) marriage with the wives of their adopted sons when the latter have dissolved with the necessary formalities (their marriage) with them".

(1) "But if ye know not their fathers (names, call them) your Brothers in Faith or your Mawlas (5:XXXIII(Ali)
(2) 27: XXXIII (Ali)
The habit of treating an adopted son as a real one and hence of treating his divorced wife as that of a real son had been so established an institution that even if all Muslims the Arabs now know that an adopted son is not in fact a son, none of them would have dared to defy society and actually marry the divorced wife of an once adopted son. The Prophet was asked to make such a practical precedent. This reasoning is surely based on a series of psychological laws. e.g. the law that practical precedents are more effective than more preaching; and the law that a precedent made by a charismatic leader is more sure to be imitated than one made by an ordinary person.

The Purity of Causes

According to Ibn Taymiya, God is the only 'complete' cause. Nothing except Him is a complete or independent cause. The hot body that causes heat makes this effect only in a place that is capable of being heated, and "so the heat that is produced in the heated body is caused by the hot body as well as the heated body." Besides this, the effect is also conditional upon lack of counter causes.\(^{(1)}\) This is not to say that the effect is a partial cause of itself,

\(^{(1)}\) Kitāb ar-Rād 'ala - Mantiqiyyīn p.218
since according to him "one of the two effects cannot be the cause of another"(1)

Temporal Precedence

According to Ibn Taymiya, an efficient cause by necessity precedes its effect because an efficient cause is an agent and it is inconceivable that the agent's action, and that which came as a result or is produced by this action occur simultaneously. As to the examples which al-Ghazālī and others gives as evidence of the simultaneity of cause and effect, or action and its product, he says that they are not at all examples of causes and effects. Their standard example is "I moved my hand and the ring moved". Here it is supposed that the hand (the cause) and the ring (the effect) moved simultaneously. Ibn Taymiya says that it is not the hand that moved the ring, the movement of the hand, that moved the ring, the movement of the hand, like that of the ring is an effect and not a cause. When the hand is moved, the ring necessarily moves because, owing to its connection with the finger, it has become part of the hand. And so "I moved my hand and the ring moved" is equivalent to "I moved my hand and my fingers moved" or "I moved my fingers moved" or "I moved my hand and my hand moved"(2)

(1) ibid p. 404 (2) ibid. pp. 377-79
(3) The Role of Man

The Qur'ān attributes to man actions for which he is held responsible. It is an old age question to say: 'If God is the creator of everything - including man, his will, and his actions - in what meaningful sense can we attribute real action to man? A detailed enumeration - let alone, examination - of the issues that have traditionally been connected with this problem is sure to take us far beyond the boundaries of this thesis. Let us therefore confine ourselves to a brief discussion of the major questions.

Since everyone interested in philosophical matters is at least partially aware of the nature of the problem we are here discussing, it might be a good procedure to start with the solution I suggest, and then adduce the evidence that supports it and in its light look at the defects of some of the other solutions. The theory of the role of man which I suggest, or accept, can be called an Islamic theory since it is compatible with the Qur'ān, as well as the facts of our experience.

Man does not have the freedom to act; he has only the freedom to will to act, and since willing presupposes knowledge, this freedom is limited by the amount of information that a person has. If this is so, then man
is not responsible for what he does, but for what he wills, when that willing is based on correct information i.e. man is not responsible for his actions but for his volitions.

That God rewards people for their good intentions even when the latter are not followed by good deeds is a matter on which there is consensus of opinion among Muslims.

What about someone who is keen on doing something bad, e.g. stealing someone's money, but who could not actually do so. Since according to the view I have suggested men are responsible for their volitions, my opinion is that he will be treated as if he actually performed what he intended.

Some Qur'anic verses and some traditions state the principle of treating people for their intentions in a general way and do not confine it merely to good intentions. And there are verses and traditions which include bad intentions in this general rule. The problem is about those traditions which exclude bad intentions from the general rule, saying that in this case men are punished only for bad intentions which have been actually translated into action. In my opinion this last type of traditions can be interpreted in such a way as to be compatible with the general rule. Man is not punished for a bad intention if - before doing what he intended -
he changes his mind and regrets that he had such an intention. In fact in this case he is even rewarded for this change of mind.

We must also differentiate between niyya, 'azīma and hīrs on the one hand, and mere (ham) on the other. The first class describes strong will, while the other expresses the mere thinking of doing something, or the mere occurrence of bad ideas in peoples' minds. This kind of thinking is often involuntary and even when it is not, it is usually a weak kind of will which is not followed by action. If it is followed, this means that it has become a strong will. Ibn Taymiya's theory of reconciling these traditions with the general rule is not, in my opinion convincing. He says that there is a necessary connection between strong volitions and actions. If a man wills to do anything, then he necessarily at last starts doing something of it, even though he might not be able to complete it. And because of this necessary connection, the question of whether man is rewarded or punished for his intentions or action does not - in his opinion arise. Had it been true that there is a necessary connection between willing to do and doing all that we will to do, or had the responsibility been only for that part which we actually did and not for all that we had intended to do,
Ibn Taymiya's solution would have been satisfactory. But as it is, the necessary connection is at the most between the will to do something and the doing of only some part of it, and as the example of the two fighting Muslims\(^{(1)}\) shows the punishment is the same while the actually performed actions are not, since while one succeeded in killing, the other only started doing so and failed to complete what he had started.

One objection that can be raised against a suggestion like ours is that action (\textit{\'amal fi\'il}) is attributed to man, in the Qur'an e.g. "Then (on the day of judgement) shall anyone who has done an atom's weight of good see it? And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it.\(^{(2)}\).

The obvious answer is that actions here comprise physical actions as well as mental acts or what Muslim theologians call (acts of the heart). This has to be so because man - as we saw - is not responsible for every physical action that he happens to do, and because a good man is not good by virtue of the amount of the physical good acts that he performs, even when these are accompanied by good intentions. Alluding to the

\(^{(1)}\) The Prophet is reported to have said that if two Muslims take swords against each other then both the killer and the killed one shall go to hell. When asked why should the one who is killed be punished, he said "Because he was keen on killing the other"

\(^{(2)}\) 7-8: XCIX
companions of the Prophet someone said: 'They have not gone far ahead of you because they did more than you do in the way of prayers and fasting but because of something that rested in their hearts.'

The Jabriyya, those who deny human freedom, say that since our actions are created by God, they are not really our actions, and that therefore reward and punishment have really nothing to do with what we do; God uses his freedom of will to punish whom He will and reward whom He will, and no body has the right to question Him. We have already had opportunity to reply to the latter part of this argument, and shall, therefore confine ourselves here only to the first part.

It is true that actions, even so voluntary and personal actions, like the raising of my arm, or the closing of the eyes are created by God, but this does not raise any problem if we adhere to the theory suggested here. I intend or will to raise my arm to say, slap someone on the face. God may or may not, for good reasons, and without violating any causal law, let this intention materialize in overt action. Since I am able only to intend, and not to put my intention into practice, and since I am responsible only for the intention, then the fact that the overt action that follows is created by God, should not worry me. To illustrate this let us
suppose that someone is given the duty just to mention—on specified suitable circumstances—the words "on" or "off"; and that someone else is assigned the duty of carrying or not carrying out this order (the circumstances are also specified to him) of putting light on or off by pressing a button. Suppose that the second person never made a mistake and that after one hour the result was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;on&quot;</td>
<td>off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;on&quot;</td>
<td>on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;off&quot;</td>
<td>off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;on&quot;</td>
<td>off</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first man is rewarded for his success in saying the appropriate word three times, and is punished both for saying the inappropriate word (twice) and for failing to say anything while he was supposed to say something (one). For him correspondence between his words and the actions of the second person are accidental and, any way irrelevant. This picture does not exactly correspond to the relation between man's intentions and actions, as we shall see, but it does help to illustrate the crucial point that there is no contradiction or injustice in that while actions are created by God, man is responsible for intending them.
What about the will itself? Isn't that also created by God? And if so how can we say that man is free even to will and let alone to act? While it is difficult to define what the will is, it is not so difficult to explain—by examples—the difference between having and not having a will. If I am presented with the two alternatives, a and b, I can say to myself without mentioning it, and before actually doing anything, that I prefer a. It is immaterial for the exercise of this freedom whether I find that I have no ability to choose a or whether I am compelled to choose b. I can well imagine myself to be created in such a way that once I am presented with "a" and "b", I naturally and necessarily opt for "a", the idea of preferring b does not ever occur to me; and thus "b" for me cannot be called an alternative. In this case though I have some mental state that precedes my action, it cannot be called a will. This might be the case of animals which can be contrasted to the case of inanimates whose 'behaviour' is not—for all we know—preceded by such mental states. If the difference between case one, on the one hand and cases two and three on the other hand is conceivable, then there is no logical difficulty in saying that the will is created and yet free.
The Ash'arites are accused of paying mere lip-service to man's freedom of will because they rob it of its essential meaning. They say that man has a will but that on every particular occasion it is God who makes him prefer one of the two alternatives. If this is so then there really is no difference between case one and case two. It seems to me, however, that the source of their mistake is their inability to differentiate between the mental state of preferring and the physical state of making the choice. Or perhaps, as some of their statements imply, they feel that any amount of real freedom that is given to man is not compatible with Divine omnipotence. But this is a mistake. If man's will is willingly created by God, and if it is He who chose that man shall exercise this mental freedom of preferring or willing, then I do not see how can such human freedom be incompatible with Divine will or omnipotence.

Freedom and Foreknowledge

(1) The sect of Qadariyya (those who deny Divine fore-knowledge) mistakenly think that there is a real contradiction between Divine foreknowledge of our acts, and our freedom to perform those acts. If God knows beforehand what I am going to do, then they say,
I have to do what God knows I will do, and hence my action cannot be said to be free. Is there a real contradiction between foreknowledge and freedom of action? No one claims that astronomers' foreknowledge of eclipses is the cause of them, nor does anyone blame weather forecasters for a bad weather. If present knowledge of future occurrences is certainly true, then it cannot logically speaking – cause those occurrences, because true knowledge is knowledge of some facts which must thus be logically prior to knowledge of them. And if true foreknowledge can not determine future occurrences, then the latter can happen freely. And any way we have shown that the question is about freedom of will and not of action.

**Freedom and Qadar (predetermination)**

If there is no contradiction between man's free will and Divine foreknowledge, then there is no contradiction between this human freedom and predetermination, because as far as man's responsibility is concerned, predetermination means nothing more than foreknowledge. Before bringing men into existence, God knows what - when they are given the ability to will - are the kinds of good or evil deeds they are going to will. And before creating them He decides according to some moral
principles - call them social laws - and in accordance with the laws that he lays for nature (physical laws), the kind of good and evil that he is going to allow to follow those volitions. All this is written 'down' in a "book" or "sheet". This interpretation of gadar is essentially that of Ibn Abass - one of the famous learned companions of the Prophet. He says "God created men. He knew what they would do. He told his knowledge to be a book, and it became a book".

Volitions, Actions and Natural happenings

From all that we have been saying it is now clear that the relation between a particular volition and its action cannot be causal. Volitions may or may not be followed by actions; good actions might follow bad intentions and bad actions might be preceded by good intentions. In spite of this, there is however some causal connection between intentions and actions as classes. If the class of good actions comprises a, b, c, d, e, and if the class of evil actions comprises o, p, q, r, s, then if A wills to do good and if he happens to will to do a and b, and he does not succeed in doing them, then he must succeed in doing either c, d, or e. And the same applies to B - an evil wisher - with regard to o, p, q, r, s.
The connection between the mental states and deeds of men (especially as a community) on the one hand, and what happens to them, on the other hand, seems to be more certain than the connection between their volitions and actions.

"And I (Noah) have said "Seek pardon of your Lord because he is ever forgiving; (and because if you do) he will let loose the sky for you in plentiful rain and will help you with wealth and sons and will assign for you gardens and rivers"(1) "O prophet! say unto those captives who are in your hands: if God knows any good in your hearts, he will give you better than that which has been taken from you, and will forgive you"(2).

Man has therefore a big role to play in the world since he is able not only to will and do good (or evil) deeds, but also to direct the course of nature to his advantage (or disadvantage). We shall elaborate on this point when in the next chapter we discuss some examples of Qur'anic social laws.

(1) 10 - 12 : LXXI (2) 70 : VIII.
DETERMINISM IN SCIENCE AND IN RELIGION

(1) Foreward

We have said that before God creates things, He wills to do so, and He predetermines their course. Now 'to determine', in its most general sense means just 'to fix beforehand'; and as such determination need not be lawful. I can determine for example that students A and B shall pass while students C and D shall fail irrespective of their performance in the examination. Relative to my decision success and failure are in this case unlawful. Fatalism, as I understand it, is the view that events are unlawfully predetermined, because it asserts that "all events are predetermined by arbitrary decree"(1) i.e. that events are unconditional. In this chapter we shall try to find out the kind of Divine determination that is stated in the Qur'an, whether it is lawful or fatalistic, and to what extent. It seems to me that this can best be done against a background of the modern philosophical discussions concerning scientific determinism. We shall start,

therefore, by giving a brief summary of the main issues of this discussion and then get on to our main topic.

(2) Scientific Determinism

In its very general sense the principle of determinism has been given different formulations. Here are some examples - :

a) "The doctrine that every fact in the universe is guided entirely by law"(1)

b) "The doctrine that all the facts in the physical universe, and hence also in human history, are absolutely dependent on and conditioned by their causes."(2)

c) "It is the view that all events are caused ... by an event I mean any change or persistence of state or position. And what is meant by saying that an event is caused? The natural answer is that the event is so connected with some preceding event that unless the latter had occurred, the former would not have occurred. Indeterminism means the denial of this. And the denial of this is the statement that there is at least one event to which no preceding event is necessary"(3)

---

(1) The Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Dagobert D. Runes
(2) Ibid. (3) Brand Blanshard, 'The Case for Determinism' in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Science.
d) "There are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once, will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen again". (1)

d) "All that is needed in order to maintain determinism in a general sense is to hold the hypothesis that events happen in one or more definite (determinate) ways, that such ways of becoming are not arbitrary but lawful, and that the processes whereby every object acquires its characteristics develop out of preexisting conditions. (2)

Several objections have been made both to the meaning and some of the formulations of the principle of determinism in this general and wide sense.

1- The first question is about the logical status of this principle. Is it an empirical generalization? If so, to be admitted as scientific its statement i.e. "every event has a cause", must be testable. This however cannot be done.

a) It is a fact that there are innumerable events the determining conditions of which are unknown to us. Shall we conclude therefore that the deterministic hypothesis has been falsified? We do not and need not

---

(2) Mario Bunge, *Causality* (Massachusetts, 1959) p.13
do so, because this fact can be — and is usually explained by saying that though the determining conditions in these particular cases are not known to us, yet there are in fact such determining conditions; it is only a matter of patience and time before we discover them. But if that is the case then the hypothesis can neither be conclusively established nor can it be conclusively refuted i.e. it turns to be a metaphysical statement which though meaningful is yet untestable and hence unscientific.

b) Suppose we succeeded in formulating the hypothesis in such a way as to make it testable. And suppose that some facts did falsify the hypothesis in this more precise and scientific formulation. Shall we conclude that nature is undeterministic? That while some of its happenings are lawful others occur in a lawless manner?

But "To abandon the deterministic principle itself is to withdraw from the enterprise of science"(1). This is why many philosophers of science have come to consider the principle as a methodological rule of inquiry and not an empirical statement about pervasive traits of nature. To that end the principle has been given new formulations e.g. "whenever you come across

similarity both of events or occurrences or facts etc. and of the way these things are treated i.e. the modes of their coming into existence, of their becoming, and of their persistence. If everything were completely unique, laws would not be possible, since no statement about a completely unique thing would be subsumable, as legality demands, with statements about other things under one general statement i.e. a law. And if though things were similar they behaved in dissimilar ways, that also makes laws impossible since laws are based on the assumption that similar things behave similarly.

Determinism - in the sense explained above - implies predictability. If the present determines the future, and if I know the law that explains the special way in which the present state, e.g., of a physical system, determines its future, and if I have the appropriate initial information of this system, then it follows that I can predict its future. This is why determinacy has sometimes been defined in terms of predictability. "Quantum physics is now admitted to be indeterministic in the sense that it implies the impossibility of predicting certain kinds of physical events .... classical physics on the other hand is usually taken to be deterministic in the sense that it
implies the predictability, with any desired degree of precision, of every single physical event on the basis of sufficiently precise initial information."(1)

And because determinism implies predictability, the fact that some phenomena can be predicted is taken to be an empirical evidence for determinism.(2)

If determinism in its wide and general sense is untestable, and thus non-scientific; and if it is for this reason considered as a mere methodological maxim, not so is the case with especial forms of determinism. In its specific and precise form determinism can be testable and can therefore be properly scientific. A paradigm of scientific determinism in the realm of physical science is the theory of classical mechanics. Stated vaguely this theory says simply that given the mechanical state (position or velocity) of a system at time $t$, its mechanical state at an earlier or later time can be precisely predicted. Just as general determinism is sometimes mistakenly identified with a special category of determinism, namely casual determinism, so is scientific determinism sometimes confined to mechanical determinism. If classical mechanics defines the

a) \((x) (ax = bx)\) i.e. for every \(x\) if \(x\) is \(a\), then \(x\) is \(b\).

b) All \(a\) is \(b\).

This raises two questions:

i) Does every statement of this form express a law of nature? Isn't there any essential difference between the following two kinds of statements?

\[a) \text{ 'All the books in my office are either Arabic or English; or 'For every book if it is in G's office, then it is either Arabic or English.'} \]

\[b) \text{ For every object if it is a metal then it expands on heating.} \]

It is generally admitted that there is an essential difference between the two. While the second is said to express a real law of nature, nomic necessity, a physical necessity etc., the second is said to be a mere accidental or de facto generalization.

Having admitted the difference, philosophers found themselves at pains in their search for an objective criterion of determination. It seems to one that the best suggestion is that: "A universal of law support a subjunctive conditional, while an accidental universal does not\(^{(1)}\)" e.g. to revert to our two previous

\(^{(1)}\) Ernest Nagel, Ibid P. 52
statements, suppose that x is a book which is not in my office, and which does not in fact now exist because it has been burnt, can it be said that if x were in G's office, x, would have been either Arabic or English. Certainly not. While this cannot be said of an accidental universal, it can be said of the other statement which expresses a law of nature i.e. it is legitimate to say of an object which does not now exist that if it were a metal, it would have expanded when heated.

ii) Granted there is a difference between mere accidental generalizations and generalizations of law, and that this difference can be brought out in the way just indicated, our question now is, what is it that makes this so? Why is it more than a de facto generalization that whenever a metal is heated it expands? Why is it believed that gold not only expands on heating, but that being the object it is, it must expand, it necessarily does so? What is the kind and force of such expressions as must and necessary when applied to universals of law? One interpretation of necessity can be easily ruled out, namely, logical necessity, since there is no contradiction in saying that a piece of gold was heated and yet it did not
expand. Is the necessity, perhaps a physical one? But what does that mean? Since the answer to this question has not yet been settled, I shall venture to give my own interpretation. It seems to me that in answering this question we can be helped by the notion of logical dependence or necessity. From the statements,

a) Socrates is a man, and
b) Every man is mortal, the statement
c) Socrates is mortal, is said to follow by necessity; and the nature of this connection between statements is sometimes explained by saying that statement C is contained in statements A and B. In the same manner $7 + 5 = 12$ is explained by saying that 12 is just another way of saying $7 + 5$.

I suggest that we follow the same procedure in interpreting physical necessity i.e. if the connection between event a and event b is a physical necessity, we say that event b is contained in event a. In mathematics the "i.e." that fastens one term to another is brought about by means of axioms (or postulates or assumptions) and definitions.
Similarly, I suggest, an event is 'tied' to another by means of axioms about events i.e. theories about the physical world. Let me give some simple examples:

A) A man died
   a) "A man died"

B) His heart stopped.
   b) "his heart stopped"

Statements a and b, describing the physical realities A and B, are not contradictory, but neither is \( \bar{a} \bar{b} \) (or \( \bar{a} \bar{b} \)) contradictory. All these statements are possible, conceivable, etc. in a logical sense. But event B is contained in event A in a physical sense. According to our present knowledge of death, it is a phenomenon that is made up, as it were, of different phenomena among which is the stopping of their heart. Therefore, to say that a man died while his heart was working strikes us as being very odd; it is contrary to our present knowledge of death, and therefore, though logically conceivable is scientifically inconceivable. But because our knowledge is growing, scientific conceivability changes. An event which seemed at one stage of scientific knowledge to be completely independent of another, is discovered at a later stage to be tied to it, and vice versa. "The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discussion in the dark, assures us of the presence of some person"(1) Gone are the days when

(1) David Hume 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding', Sect. IV, Part I, P.27.
that was so. Had Hume lived long enough to see the age of radios, televisions, tape recorders etc., he would have known that rational discussion and articulate voices heard in the dark do not necessarily prove the existence of persons in that place.

Throughout this brief summary of philosophical ideas concerning the nature of scientific determinism, we have been assuming that all scientific theories are deterministic. But the advent of quantum physics has caused some physicists and philosophers of science to question the validity of this assumption, and caused nearly all those acquainted with its main results to change their conception of scientific determinism. The main feature of quantum physics that originated the modern heated dispute over the question whether science (or reality) is deterministic or indeterministic, is the empirical fact that in the realm of subatomic particles it is no longer physically possible to simultaneously ascertain the position and velocity of a physical elementary particle. This is because "according to the Heisenberg principle, there is a correlation between the fuzziness of a position measurement and the fuzziness of a velocity measurement such that when one fuzziness becomes less the other
becomes greater in proportion\textsuperscript{(1)}

It is therefore said that at the micro level nature is indeterministic; and since the macro level is but a phase of the micro level, it is necessarily and ultimately indeterministic. Such is the orthodox interpretation of the quantum mechanics. But several other attempts have been made to interpret it in such a way as to restore determinism to science. Here briefly are some of these suggestions:

a) The particles do have position and momentum, but we cannot ascertain these simultaneously, for the contingent fact that in trying to do so we influence the object of our knowledge.

b) These particles are not the sort of thing that has position and momentum and therefore it is inappropriate to speak about our inability to have initial information of their position and momentum i.e. the state of a physical system is not here to be defined in terms of position and momentum as it is the case in classical mechanics.

c) We cannot\textsuperscript{now} ascertain positions and momenta of particles but might overcome this difficulty in future.

\textsuperscript{(1)} Porcy W. Bridgman, 'Determinism in Modern Science, in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Science, ed. Sidney Hook, New York, 1961, p. 67
(3) Religious Determinism.

i. The Uniformity of Nature

Nature is the work of a Wise and Just Being. And since wisdom (Hikma) involves rationality and principled behaviour, the Uniformity of Nature follows as a matter of course. So while the best status that could be accorded the principle of the uniformity of nature in a secularist world view, is that of a methodological rule, its syntheticness and truth cannot be doubted in a religious world view. But this needs some elaboration. I give here some of the arguments that can be deduced from the Qur'ān in support of the view that nature is uniform.

1) According to the Qur'ān only God is unique "Like Him there is Naught"(1). No creature is entirely unique, since "of everything We have created pairs"(2). But if there are similar creatures, or cases or conditions, and the author of these is a wise Being, then there must be regularity also. This is because a wise or rational being is by definition he who treats similar cases similarly i.e.

---

(1) 11 : XLII       (2) 119 : LI
whose behaviour whether verbal or practical is consistent and not arbitrary. Now if God creates \( X \) which possesses \( Q \), and by virtue of \( Q \) gives it \( P \), and if He creates \( Y \) which also possesses \( Q \), then, to be consistent He must give it \( P \) also. But while for a believer the principle of the Uniformity of Nature can amount to such an article of faith, he can never be sure, when it comes to particular things, whether it is because of \( P \) that \( X \) is \( Q \), unless God says that it is so. Short of such a textual evidence he can only make conjectures and test them against experience.

2) The other argument which I have in mind, and of whose validity I am not as yet very sure, is based on the religious fact that things come to be as a result of God's words i.e. orders. Because scientists assume that nature is uniform, they do not accept internally inconsistent theories, nor do they finally accept two or more contradictory theories that purport to explain the same phenomena. This means that words that describe uniform phenomena must themselves be consistent. Can we say the same thing of words as a result of which phenomena come to be? i.e. does it follow from the fact that God's words are consistent, that His creation must be uniform?
If so then our argument is valid, because we can deduce from the Qur'ānic concept of God and from other direct textual evidence that God does not utter contradictions. It is said of the Qur'ān that "if it had been from other than God, surely they would have found in it much inconsistency"(1)

And since the Qur'ān is the word of God, the same applies to all his infinite words i.e. He does not utter contradictory statements.

3) Just as it is said of God's words that they are consistent it is clearly said of His creation that there is no tafawut in it, "thou seest not in the creation of the All-Merciful any tafawut"(2)

5) It is stated or implied or assumed, in many places in the Qur'ān that similar things produce similar effects e.g. (a) throughout history and irrespective of time and place similar mental states produce similar attitudes.

i. "And they that know not say, why does God not speak to us? Why does a sign not come to us?"

(1) 82 : IV (Arb.) (2) Translators do not agree as to the English equivalent of this word. Here are some of their suggestions: want of proportion (Yusuf Ali), imperfection (Arberry), fault (Pickthall). (3) 3 : LXVII
So spoke those before them as those men say; their hearts are much alike. Yet we have made clear the signs unto a people who are sure." (1)

ii. "Even so not a messenger come to those before them but they said, "A Sorcerer or a man possessed". What, have they bequeathed it one to another? Nay but they are an insolent people" (2)

(b) A nation that behaves like another should expect similar consequences.

"So do they watch and wait for aught but the like of the days of those who passed away before them? Say "Then watch and wait; I shall be with you watching and waiting" (3)

"The warning came also to Pharaoh's folk. They cried lies to Our signs, all of them, so We seized them with the seizing of one mighty, omnipotent. What, are your unbelievers better than those? Or have you an immunity in the Scripture? Or do they say, "We are a congregation that shall be succoured? Certainly the host shall be routed, and turn their backs" (4)

(1) 118 : II (Arb.)  
(2) 52:LI (Arb.)  
(3) 101:X (Arb.)  
(4) 41-45 :LV(Arb.)
6) Since God is just and wise, it follows as we said, that He must treat similar things similarly and different things differently. This fact is unequivocally stated in the Qur'an; True, the contexts in which it is stated, as far as I can see, confine it to social phenomena, but there is no reason why, since there is no evidence to the contrary, the same should not apply to natural phenomena.

"Surely for the God fearing shall be Gardens of Bliss with their Lord. What, shall we make those who surrendered like to the sinners? What aile you then, how you judge?" (1)

"Or do those who commit evil deeds think that we shall make them as those who believe and do religious deeds, equal their living and their dying? How ill they judge." (2)

"So said those that were before them; but that they earned did not avail them, in that the evils of that they earned smote them. The evildoers of these men, they too shall be smitten by the evils of that they earned; they will not be able to frustrate it". (3)

---

(1) 34-6: LXVII (Arb.) (2) 21:XLV (Arb.) (3) 50-1 (Arb.)
"Shall the recompense of goodness be other than goodness?" (1)

7) What we call 'laws of Nature' are in the Qur'an termed 'ways or habits of God' (Sunan Allah) that do not change or vary. Whenever God does something for a certain purpose and under certain conditions, then we expect Him to do the same in similar conditions and for similar purposes.

"So do they expect anything but the wont of the ancient? And thou shalt never find any changing the wont of God, and thou shalt never find any altering the wont of God. What, have they not journeyed in the land and beheld how was the end of those before them?" (2)

For a religious scientist, then the Uniformity of Nature is something more than a mere methodological rule, and as such he should be psychologically more prepared to look for and expect to find scientific laws in the light of which different aspects of the world are to be explained. When it comes to scientific natural laws, however, his position does not differ from that of a nonbelieving scientist i.e. he does not admit them as laws before they are tested.

(1) 60 : LV (Arb.)  (2) 33-4 :XXXV (Arb.)
nor does he believe in their eternal validity and unalterability once they are tested.

But a believing scientist includes in the category of laws of nature some laws which a non-believing scientist might not include. The Qur'an abounds in generalized conditionals which for the Muslim are not mere accidental generalizations but law-statements. Some of these law-statements are empirically testable. But his belief in their validity is prior to their actual passing of the empirical test. Admittedly corroborating tests strengthen faith in their validity but it does not create it. Their validity— for him— derives from their unsuspect source, namely God. Does this mean that repeated unfavourable tests are completely irrelevant? By so means. Repeated unfavourable tests do induce a Muslim to reinterpret Qur'anic statements in the light of the new factual discoveries. This is made possible and is done without any scruple for two reasons.

a) Since the Author of the Book of Nature is the same as the Author of the revealed Book, there should, in principle, be no real contradiction between the two. Any contradiction must, therefore, be apparent; in which case it is to be resolved by interpreting the
this connection, but because this is one of the ways God does things, and the ways of God to not change. This connection is therefore due to God, and is therefore moral, rather than natural or logical, since the succession of B to A is not unconditional, its failure to follow A even in the case of miracles need not be a violation of the causal principle. Causes, we have been told - are networks not chains\(^{(1)}\).

If we take it for granted that nature is uniform, then we have to opt for a deterministic interpretation of the Quantum Mechanics, saying with Einstein "The Lord God does not throw dice".

\textbf{(4) The Nature of Religious Social Laws}

Since according to the Qur'ān man's condition, actions, achievements, and whatever happens to him, depend on his mental state i.e. on his conception of God, his inward relation with Him, his intentions, etc., all Qur'ānic social laws are necessarily psychological. The most general law in the light of which all other laws, and social and historical changes are to be explained is therefore the generalization that,

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] Cf. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, S. Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science
\end{itemize}
}
"God does not change the condition of any people until they (first) change that which is in their minds (anfus)\(^{(1)}\)

Many commentators are agreed — and the context supports their views — that the (change) mentioned here is a change to the worse.\(^{(2)}\) God — they say — does not change the good condition — of ease, comfort, wealth, well-being etc. — of a people into a bad one, until they change the good conditions of their souls (or hearts or minds) into a bad one. This interpretation of the verse is supported by many other verses which can be viewed as explanations of this more general one. The first verse is one which is nearly the same as the one under discussion,

"Because God will never change the Grace which He hath bestowed on a people until they change what is in their (own) souls"\(^{(3)}\). This verse is preceded and followed by verses which show this meaning clearly. Here is the preceding verse,

(1) 111 : XIII
(2) Cf. (i) at-Tabari. Jami' al-Bayan, vol.13, p.121
(3) 53 : VIII (Ali.)
"... After the manner of the people of Pharaoh and of those before them: they rejected the signs of God, and God punished them for their crimes: for God is strong and strict in punishment".

The Qur'an is full of examples of nations, communities and individuals whose easy and comfortable life was changed into a hard one because of the sins and crimes they committed. Here are some examples.

"There was for Sabba, aforetime a sign in their home - land - two gardens to the right and to the left. 'Eat of the sustenance (provided) by your Lord, and be grateful to Him; a territory fair and happy, and a Lord Oft-Forgiving. But they turned away (from God), and we sent against them the flood (released) from the Dams, and we converted their two garden (rows) into gardens producing bitter gruit, and tamarisks, and some few (stunted) Lote-trees. That was the requital we gave because of their ungratefulness, and do we ever give (such) requital except to the ungrateful?'(1)

"Seest thou not how thy Lord dealt with the 'Ad (people), of the (city of) Iraw, with lofty

(1) 15-17 : XXXIV
pillar, the like of which were not produced in all the land? And with the Thamūd (people), who cut out (huge) rocks in the valley? — And with Pharaoh, Lord of stakes? All (these) transgressed beyond bounds in the lands. And heaped therein mischief (on mischief). Therefore did thy Lord pour on them a scourge of diverse chastisements. (1)

"Set forth to them the parable of two men: for one of them we provided two gardens of grape - vine and surrounded them with date palms; in between the two we placed corn - fields. Each of those gardens brought forth its produce, and failed not in the least therein: in the midst of them we caused a river to flow. (Abundant) was the produce this man had: he said to his companion, in the course of a mutual argument: "More wealth have I than you and more honour and power in (my following of) men. He went into his garden in a state (of mind) unjust to his soul: He said "I deem not that this will ever perish, nor do I deem that the Hour (of judgement) will (ever) come: Even if I am brought back to my Lord, I shall surely find (there) something

(1) 5 - 15 : LXXXIX (Ali.)
better in exchange. His companion said to him, in the course of argument with him: Dost thou deny Him who created thee of dust, then out of a sperm drop, then fashioned thee into a man? But ( I think ) for my part that He is God, my Lord, and none shall I associate with my Lord. Why didst thou not, as thou wertest into thy garden, say "God's will ( be done ). There is no power but with God. If thou dost see me less than thee in wealth and sons, it may be that my Lord will give me something better than thy garden, and that He will send on thy garden thunderbolts ( by way of reckoning ) from heavens, making it ( but ) slippery sand - or the water of the garden will run off underground so that thou wilt never be able to find it. So his fruits ( and enjoyment ) were encompassed ( with rain ), and he remained twisting and turning his hands over what he has spent on his property, which had ( now ) tumbled to pieces to its very foundations, and he could only say 'woe is me! Would I had never ascribed Partners to my Lord and cherisher! 'Nor had he numbers to help him against God, nor was he able to deliver himself."(1)

Why is it that the change is to the worse? Because - I think - man - according to Islam - is

(1) 32 - 43 : XVIII (Ali.)
naturally good. Evil is a deviation from this normal state, a deviation that is partly caused by the external environment in which man finds himself. The Prophet says, "When anyone is born, he is in the 'natural pattern' (fitra), but his parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a Magian; just as a beast is born whole. Do you find some among them (born) maimed?" (1). Islam is called 'the religion of the natural pattern (fitra)'" The suggestion being that it strengthens, protects, and develops this original nature of man without coming into conflict with it in any of its teachings. It is interesting to note here that the word chosen to describe the best mental state of man from which all kinds of good naturally flow is the word **tagwa** (2) (usually translated 'God-fearing', 'godliness', 'piety', etc.) which literally means 'protection' the implication being - I think - that since man is born good, all that he needs, and all that religion helps him to achieve, is protection from evil.

---

(1) *Mishkat al-Nasabîth*

(2) A person who is in such a state is called *taqi* or *muttaqi*, lit. one who is shielded or one who shields or protects oneself.
Just as a man is naturally good, the natural environment in which he finds himself is good i.e., it suits his good nature. Even before man is born, God prepares for him all kinds of favourable things and when man is born, He continues to bestow His bounties upon him and does not stop doing so until man changes the good natural state of his mind. The evil that befalls man by reason of his wilful deviation from this natural state is the withholding of some of these bounties. So God, who is all good, does not positively do evil. He only withhold good, and this Divine withholding of good from man is, relative to man, evil. Evil is never attributed to God, but to man, because it is by reason of his wilful deviation that God withholds good from him. (1)

Being so merciful, God does not punish man for all the sins that he commits but only for some of them. "If God took mankind to task by that which they deserve, He would not leave a living creature on the surface of the earth." (1). So all the evil that befalls man—however great it is—is just punishment for only some of the sins that they commit, "what ever misfortunes happen to you, is because what your hand have

(1) 45 : XXXV (Pickthall)
wrought, and for many (of them) He grants forgiveness" (1).
And "corruption doth appear on land and sea because of (the evil) which men's hands have done, that He make them taste a part of that which they have done in order that they may return." (2).

Just as a deviation from the way of God is the cause of all the hardships - material, social and psychological - that befall man, so a return to his way causes a return of the bounties. The more a people are in the of taqawwul the more of these bounties they enjoy:

If the people of the towns had but believed and feared God (ittagaw), we should indeed have opened out to them (all kinds of) blessings from heaven and earth" (3).

"If they had observed the Torah and the Gospel and that which was revealed unto them from their Lord, they would surely have been nourished from above them and from beneath their feet" (4).

As a social law that never fails, this rule of punishment and reward (in this life) applies, as it

(1) 30:1 XLII (Yusuf)  (3) 96:VII (Yusuf)
(2) 41 : XXX (Pickthall)  (4) 66 : V (Pickthall)
seems to me to communities and not to individuals. This is why it is only in such cases that the word (sunna) which literally means (the usual way of God) but which might safely be said to be equivallent to what we now term (laws of nature or society) is used e.g.

"And they swore by God, their most oath, that if a warner came unto them, they would be tractable than any of the nations; yet when a warner came unto them, it aroused in them naught save repugnance, (shown in their) arrogantly in the hand and plotting evil, and the evil plot encloseth but the men who make it. Then can they expect aught save the treat-ment of the folk of old? Thou wilt not find for God's way of treatment (sunna) any substitute, nor wilt thou find for God's way of treatment (sunna) aught of power to change. Have they not travelled in the land and seen the nature of the consequence of those who were before them, and they were mightier than these in power? "(1)

While communities that deviate are sure to be visited with misfortunes and hardships, and those that remain good are sure to live in ease and happiness,

(1) 42 - 44 :XXXV (Pickthall)
not so is always the case of deviant and righteous individuals. A righteous man in a bad community might live in poverty, be humiliated, tortured, and even killed. The Qur'an and some Traditions show that this happened even to Prophets and not just ordinary good men. In fact the Prophet says that it is the Prophets who live in the most trying conditions, then come those who are just below them and so on; "the stronger a man's faith is, the more difficulties he is made to face". These however are material and not spiritual hardships, and they help to rid good men of their sins so that when they die they are cleansed of all evil. (1) On the other hand a bad man that leads a materially easy life might be psychologically tortured. But in the case of communities - I repeat - the bad are sure to be visited by material as well as spiritual hardships, and the good are sure to live comfortably in both the material and the spiritual senses.

A conclusion that is inevitable from this Qur'anic philosophy of history and society is that individuals - whether good or bad - have proportionately only a minor role to play in the changing of the world.

(1) The Prophet says that even a thorn that pricks a believer helps to rid him of some sins.
The argument runs as follows. Social happenings and changes are related to man's mental state; but a man's mental state cannot be changed by environment alone. And so what happens to society depends on the intentions of a considerable number of the individuals comprising it.

So the mere activity of good or evil individuals in a society is not a sufficient cause for that society to change to the better or the worse. We read in the Qur'an of Prophets who spent years in activity inviting people for good, but who succeeded in convincing but a small minority of their people.

The Prophet - confirming this - says that while on the Day of Judgement, a Prophet would come leading a multitude of people, and another would come with a fairly big following; some would come with only three persons and yet others would come alone. (1) On the Day of Judgement Satan would say to those who followed him in this world" I had no power over you save that I called unto you and you obeyed me." (2)

Another inevitable conclusion - this time stated in the Qur'an itself - is that, since nothing brings about - against

(1) Ibn Kathir  (2) 22 : XIV (Pick).
man's will - a change in his mental state of desiring good or evil, "There is no compulsion in religion." (1) This Qur'anic verse is sometimes interpreted as a prohibition i.e. do not compel people to embrace religion; but it is better to leave it as it is - a statement of fact i.e. there can be no compulsion in religion. The prohibition is of course implied because if, as a matter of fact, no one can be compelled to embrace religion, then do not attempt the impossible.

Even a Prophet, we said, cannot change the heart of someone who does not wish his heart to be changed. God reminds the Prophet that he cannot "guide whom he loves to guide", (2) that he is "but a remembrancer. Thou art not at all a warden over them" (3) etc.

The importance of this fact in our present context is that one who adheres to Qur'anic teachings should not - in explaining the propagation and development of ideas include compulsion as a factor. And that social reformers, rulers and educators etc., should not resort to compulsion as a means of propagating ideas because this will not cause the desired effect and will cause nothing but harm.

(1) 256 : II (Ibid)  (2) 56 : XXVIII  (3) 21-2 : LXXXVIII
Natural Causes:

If the real causes of social and even natural happenings like rainfall and draught are to be sought in man's mental state, what, then is the role of natural causes?

Natural causes are the means that serve, but do not determine, the ends. Ends are determined in accordance with moral, or say rational, principles. Suppose you tell someone that if he rings you at 5 p.m. you will visit him at home. He does. To go to him you have to do many things e.g. opening your door, entering your car, starting and then driving it on a smooth road, and on arriving at his house you ring the bell etc. etc. All these things are done as means to the end of visiting this person. The same — mutatis mutandis — applies to God in relation to man, and natural causes. As a reward or punishment for a change in man's (soul), God decides that \( x \) shall happen to him. This decision is made on completely rational or moral standards and is not in any way determined by natural causes. But having decided that \( x \) shall happen to him, God then orders the series of causes \( c, p, q, r, s, \) etc. to happen, leading to \( x \). Therefore, for an external observer the cause of \( x \) is the series or network of the causes \( c, p, q, r, s \); but the real cause is the change \( o \) that man caused to occur in his mind. To revert to our example, an external observer who can see only
material movements, might explain the visit by mentioning the series of events that you had to do, to make it, but will never mention the real cause or, more precisely, reason, of your visit, namely the conditional promise you made, and the person's fulfilment of the condition. To fix our ideas, let us take a concrete case from the Qur'an.

The Qur'an says to believers, "If you aid (the cause of) God, he will aid you."\(^{(1)}\) This is a conditional promise. But because Divine promises are never unfulfilled, it is also a social law. Once man fulfils the condition, the promised consequence necessarily follows, the necessity being — as we said — moral and not natural.

The Qur'an tells us about a community (the Prophet and those around him after about ten years of his prophethood) which fulfilled this condition.

The Prophet and many of these men were expelled from Mecca, their homeland and had to resort to another town Medina.

Now God wills to aid this community of Muslims against the aggressive community of the Meccans (and their allies) that unjustly expelled them then. How does this come about? By causing many of the factors of victory to be on the side

\(^{(1)}\) 7: XLVII
of the Muslims and many factors of defeat to be on the side of their enemies. Here are, some examples of these factors (as mentioned in the Qur'an, which helped the Muslims in their first battle—called Badr—against the Meccans.

a— In this battle even the decision that there should be a battle was made against the desire of many Muslims who had preferred instead to attack and capture an unarmed and richly laden caravan of the Meccans. (1)

b— Angels were sent by God on this and other occasions to assist the fighting Muslims. (2)

c— Muslims were told about the presence of angels so that their hearts might be at rest. (3)

d— "Remember He covered you with a sort of drowsiness to give you calm as from himself". (4)

e— "And He caused rain to descend on you from heaven to clean you therewith, to remove from you the stain of Satan, to strengthen your hearts, and to plant your feet firmly therewith." (5)

f— "I will instill terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers." (7)

---

(4) 11: VIII (Ali.) (5) The rain was welcome for many reasons: (1) water was scarce both for drinking and ablutions; (2) The Muslim band, without baggage or equipment or comforts, found that their thirst aggravated their fatigue; (3) The sand was loose, and the rain consolidated it and enabled them "to plant their feet firmly". Yasuf Ali Is commentary.
(6) 11 (7) 12
b- "When ye meet a force, be firm, and call God much [and
often]." (1)

c- "And fall into no disputes lest you lose heart, and your
power depart." (2)

d- "And be patient and persevering." (3)

e- "And be not like those who started from their homes
insolently and to be seen by men." (4)

f- "Against them make your strength to the utmost of your
power, including steeds of war, to strike horror into (the
hearts of) the enemies of God and your enemies." (5)

If the basic factors of victory are psychological, the
causes of defeat are also psychological and should not there-
fore be sought in - or confined to - the apparent causes. In
explaining to those Muslims the causes of their temporary
defeats in battles, the Qur'ān always concentrated on the
psychological factors. Here, for example, are the causes of
a temporary defeat of the Muslims in their second battle
(called Uhud) against their enemies.

a- "God did indeed fulfil his promise to you when ye - with
His permission were about to annihilate your enemy, - until
you flinched and fell to disputing concerning the order." (6)

(2) 46. VIII (Ali.) (3) 46. VIII (Ali.) (4) 47. VIII (Ali.)
(5) 60. VIII (Ali.) (6) The order was not to run after booty,
but strictly to maintain discipline. Uhud was in the begin-
ing a victory for the Muslims. Many of the enemy were slain
and they were retiring when a part of the Muslims against
orders, ran in pursuit, attracted by the prospects of the
after desire the Hereafter. Then did He divert you from your foes in order to test you. But He forgave you: for God is full of Grace to those who believe."(1)

b- "Those of you who turned back on the day when the two hosts met - it was Satan who caused them to fail because of some (evil) they had done. But God had blotted out (their fault), for God is Oft-Forgiving most forbearing."(2)

"What! when a single disaster smites you, although ye smote (your enemies) with one twice as great, do ye say? 'Whence is this?'. Say (to them): 'It is from yourselves, for God has power over all things."(3)

One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis of the nature of Qur'ānic social laws, is that there are two kinds of causes (and hence laws), for social changes and natural happenings that are related to human society. The primary, basic, and internal causes are the changes that people wilfully make in their mental states; and the secondary (or apparent) causes are the material or natural causes beyond which a materialist sees nothing.

Both causes are necessary and must thus be sought in explaining or helping to bring about social changes, but the first type of causes is nonetheless the primary and more important one. The consequences of both types of causes follow by the permission and power of God.

   Al-Mufradat fi Gharībi al-Qur'ān (Cairo 1961)


Robson, James. Mishkāt al Masābīḥ, English Translation
   with Explanatory notes (Lahore, India 1963)

Sayyid Qutb. Fi Zilālī al Qur'ān (second revised edition, Cairo
   undated)

Steingas, F. Arabic-English Dictionary (London 1884)

al-Tahārī, Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarīr. Jamī' al-Bayan
   fi Ta'wīli al Qur'ān (Cairo 1954)

Toulmin, Stephen. The Philosophy of Science (London 1953)

Vivian, Frederick. Human Freedom and Responsibility (London 1964)

al-Zamakhshārī, Mahmūd b. Umar al-Kašī Shāfī
   (Cairo 1354 A.H.)
Ibn Kathîr. Tafsîr al Qur'an al 'Azim (Beirut 1966)

Ibn al-Qayyim. Shams al Din Abu 'Abdullahî Muhammad b. Abî Bakr. Shifâ'û al 'Alîl fi Masa'il al Qadâ' wa al Qadar wa al Ta'lîl (Cairo undated)


Ibn Taymiya. Majmu' Fatawa Shaykh Al Islam Ibn Taymiya. (Riyad 1383 A.H., continuing)

Tafsîr Ibn Taymiya (Bombay, India, 1374 A.H. - 1954 A.D.)

al Risalatu al - Tadmuriyva


Kamal, Sabin Ahmad. Al Ghazali's Tahafut al Falâsifa, Translated into English (Lahore 1958)

Lane, Edward William. Arabic-English Lexicon (New York 1955)

Makhluf, Hassanayn. Safwatu al Bayân li Ma'âni al Qur'ân (Cairo 1958)

Mill, J.S. A System of Logic (London 1879)

Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science (London 1961)

Pap, Arthur. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (London 1963)
