AFRICAN POLITICAL RHETORIC:
AN ANALYSIS OF PERSUASIVE STRATEGIES IN THE DISCOURSE OF

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ABSTRACT


This dissertation was the analysis of the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri of the Sudan 1970-1980. Persuasive strategies were defined in a sampling of discourse to persuade. Political rhetoric was defined as the strategic management discourse to create and sustain political order.

An analysis of African political rhetoric, such as in this study, must be grounded in an appropriate theoretical position. Accordingly, this dissertation was placed into a known theory of "situational communication" as expressed in the works of Bitzer, Black, Campbell, Jamieson, Scott, Simons and White, among many.

The situational view of communication appeared advantageous. It allowed the researcher to account for the utilization of strategies in respect to situational constraints. It allowed the researcher to trace the articulation, maturation and decay in the use of the persuasive strategies under scrutiny.

The purpose of this dissertation was to identify the persuasive strategies employed by President Nimeiri. Thirteen
presidential speeches were carefully selected and analyzed. Two methods were employed in the identification of the strategies: 1) content analysis and 2) a qualitative assessment. Content analysis enabled the researcher to account for the degree of emphasis given to each strategy by its frequency distribution and percentage of occurrence. A more qualitative assessment was useful in that it assisted the researcher in explicating the utilization of strategies in relation to the exigential flow of events.

The study showed that the discourse of President Nimeiri was characterized by eight strategies: revolutionization, legitimation, delegitimation, mobilization, unification, theocratization, dedication, and Afro-Arabization. In addition, the study indicated that the rhetoric of President Nimeiri was intrinsically characterized by: the radicalization of language, language intensity, coercion and verbosity.

This study revealed that the situational constituents had a great bearing in shaping the articulation, maturation and decay in use of the persuasive strategies under investigation.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Rationale

The significance of the study of African political rhetoric is very apparent in numerous ways. It allows the scientific observer to understand how persuasive messages operate in that part of the world. The articulation of political symbols and the strategic and tactical manifestation embedded within them provide the scientist a point of entry into the functioning strategies of a given policy.

Most crucially, the study of African political rhetoric shows how a particular leader organizes his discourse in different situational constituents and in realization of his goals in the transformation processes, and in the maintenance of political order.

Although scholarly writings on revolutionary rhetoric are literally staggering, only scant attention has been devoted to the rhetoric of political leaders in Africa. The absence of a focused analysis of African political rhetoric in general and political rhetoric in the Sudan in particular as an entity in its own right has motivated this researcher to conduct this inquiry in an attempt to fill the gap in this important area of research.

Objective of the Investigation

The objective of this dissertation was to develop and apply a methodology for the analysis of the discourse of President Gaffer.
Mohammed Nimeiri of the Sudan, from 1970 through 1980. More precisely, this investigation was an attempt to identify and explicate the persuasive strategies as exhibited in the discourse of President Nimeiri and to provide preliminary answers to the following three interconnected questions:

1. What were the dominant persuasive strategies in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri in his attempt to create and maintain political order? More specifically:
   A. What was the strategy(ies) that received most emphasis by the president?
   B. What was the strategy(ies) that was least emphasized?
2. Was there any continuity in the utilization of strategies across the speeches selected for the study through time and situations?
3. What were the intrinsic characteristics of the political rhetoric in the Sudan?

Definition and Explications of the Key Terms

- Strategies in this study refer to "the general rhetorical stances or choices designed by the communicator in response to situational exigencies." The analysis of the strategies is centered around the communicator's arguments, choices of language and repetition of key words and phrases in realization of his goals.

The theoretical assumption here is that different types of situational constituents may produce different kinds of rhetorical responses. Miller and Bergson demonstrate that:

When people seek to communicate persuasively, they must choose from a
With Miller and Burgoon, persuasion can be conceived of as "any exercise, or attempt to exercise of social influence, for the student of communication; however, only those attempts that rely primarily on symbolic transactions are of central concern." By focusing on attempts to practice social influence, this researcher will make no claim about whether a revolutionary act, or a given strategy has had an effect on an audience. This approach is justified for two reasons.

First, there is the notion that the audiences in the Sudan are not exposed to presidential messages alone, rather, they expose themselves to a variety of messages emanating from foreign print media and especially to foreign broadcasting systems such as The Voice of America, British Broadcasting Corporation, and to hostile communicative messages from the radio of Tripoli, Libya. Seemingly it is unrealistic to state that presidential messages are accepted at face value and, hence, affect the populace.

This view corresponds to Baker's approach of a "mosaic," in which he conceives of contemporary rhetorical messages as fragmented in bits and pieces with each individual constructing his own message in accordance with his/her needs and images of the world. Becker writes:

Despite the efforts of individuals sources, we do not get our information
in a neatly organized fashion; each person gets a different experience, a different set of a multiple image and, from these, abstracts some sort of a relatively organized story.6

Secondly, this study will not seek to investigate the effect of discourse on a given audience because the framework chosen for the analysis of the speeches was a message-speaker relationship, as popularized by Rosenfield.5 The focus of message-creator will allow the researcher to concentrate on how and why the message was created. The message-source, Rosenfield argues, "concentrates on understanding discourse as an expression of its creator."6 This approach in another part allows the researcher to complete the analysis by examining the relationships between persuasive strategies and the influence of situations in formulating them.

Finally, the emphasis on symbolic transactions allows one to exclude strategies that rely primarily on force and/or coercion.

2 - Continuity in this study refers to the presence of a given strategy through times and situations. The attempt was made to trace the rise, maturation and fall of each strategy across all the speeches selected for the study. By tracing the development and decay of each strategy, the researcher can make a judgment in regard to the role of situations in shaping the strategic selection of messages.

The examination of the role of situational factors in shaping persuasive messages is advantageous in that 'messages when separated from their situational contexts are often ambiguous and frequently indecipherable'.7 But the point needing to be stressed here is
that while situational contexts are vital in influencing persuasive messages, the communicator is not fully bound by the situation. In fact, the “range of viable options is restricted, but in the most cases there remains considerable room for rhetorical invention.”

3 - Political rhetoric refers to “arrangement of political messages in an attempt to affect political and societal conditions.” When investigating the intrinsic characteristic of the political rhetoric in the Sudan, the researcher focuses primarily on the intrinsic features that give individuality to the political rhetoric in question. Seemingly, the concentration on the internal characteristic will allow the researcher to account for features that can’t be quantifiable.

The analysis of the political rhetoric of President Haidiri must be preceded by some prior, fundamental theoretical text. To do this, the researcher placed his study into a known theory of situational communication. The following section provides a brief synthesis of that theory.

Meta-Theoretical Perspective

The rhetorical situation of a political rhetoric embraces rhetorical forms that make it unique to any human discourse. The forms have come to be widely used by communication scholars to denote a variety of phenomena such as genre, strategies and characteristics.

The strategic sense of rhetoric has been advanced and encouraged by a number of scholars. Scott, for example, theorizes
that there are three approaches of rhetoric; one of these is strategic. Scott indicates:

This sense of rhetoric suggests that there are forms that endure; that is, that are not peculiar to particular circumstances. The strategies—the forms that are rhetorical—can be used to shape discourse. I do believe that rhetoric in its strategic sense binds together the rhetoric of many times and places.

Chesebro and Hamacher propose that "rhetorical critics may appropriately examine communication strategically. Messages classified within a given rhetorical genre must share strategic mode of action." Essential to the understanding of these two views is the claim that the arrangement of persuasive messages within the same genre must possess the same kind of "strategic response to questions and situations." Correspondingly, rhetorical forms (strategies) don't occur in a vacuum; rather they are influenced by situational factors.

Edwin Black demonstrates the following assumptions concerning situations:

First we must assume that there is a limited number of situations in which a rhetor can find himself... Second, we must assume there is a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and will respond rhetorically to any given situation type... Third, we must assume that the recurrence of a given situation type through history will provide the
critic with information on rhetorical responses available in the situation and with this information the critic can better understand and evaluate any specific rhetorical discourse in which he may be interested.\(^{15}\)

Inherent in Black's assumption is the idea that similar situations produce similar strategic responses by the communicator.

A situation, according to Black, refers to "the prevailing state of audiences' convictions, the reputation of the rhetor, the popularity and urgency of subject."\(^ {15}\) In his view strategies "are characteristic of discourse."\(^ {16}\)

A more comprehensive view of rhetorical situations has been advanced by Bitter.\(^ {17}\) Bitter argues that: "The rhetorical situation is a necessary condition of communication by which persons strive to achieve balance and harmony with their environment."\(^ {18}\)

Bitter defines the rhetorical situation this way:

A rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects and relations which presents an exigence that can be completely or partially removed if discourse - introduced into a situation - can influence audience thought or action so as to bring about a positive modification of the exigence.

According to Bitter, situations are not static; rather, they are subject to change by "historical forces and causal networks."\(^ {19}\)

Nor do they work in isolation from one another; instead, "within a single frame of time and place, they may overlap and implicate one another. Any attempt to resolve one may well generate another."\(^ {20}\)
Bitzer's conception of rhetorical situation revolves around the idea that rhetoric is "pragmatic." He observes that prior to the occurrence of a successful communication, three constituents must be presented in a situation:

First, there must be an exigence - a problem or defect something other than it should be. Second, there must be an audience capable of being constrained in thought or action in order to effect positive modification of the exigence. Third, there must be a set of constraints capable of influencing the rhetor and an audience.12

Among all three constituents - exigence, audience and constraints - Bitzer views the exigence as "pivotal because human beings respond to situations in proportion to their perception of matters that are other than they should be."13

Bitzer further defines the exigence as: "an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something to be corrected. It is necessarily related to interests and valuation. Exigence is a necessary condition of a rhetorical situation. If there were no exigence, there would be nothing to require or invite change in the audience or in the world. Hence there would be nothing to require or invite the creation and presentation of pragmatic messages.14

Bitzer distinguishes between two types of exigence. Non-rhetorical exigence is the one that cannot be modified by human efforts. Rhetorical exigence requires modification by the assistance of "messages addressed to mediating audiences."15
A similar view of rhetorical situations has been developed by Eugene White, who initiated the term "exigential flow." White defines an exigential flow as follows:

The exigential flow is the cyclical, historical movement, or antecedents - events - consequences, that provides both the matrix for the speech and the speech itself. Thus the exigential flow is at once the cause, context, and product of rhetorical action, as well as the potential provoker of further responding actions in continuing the cycle of antecedents and consequences.

Like Bitzer's rhetorical exigence, an exigential flow is marked by a need for alteration by rhetorical devices. White notes that "the exigential flow, as its name suggests, is the flowing, moving, on-going developing of an exigence, or urgency - one that is receptive to modification by rhetorical means." Like Bitzer, White suggests:

If we wish to understand a rhetorical transaction, we must appreciate the relation of rhetorical modifying action to the exigential flow of which the action is a part. The meaning of the speech act is not in the urgency alone, but in the message alone. It is in the contextual relation of the exigential flow to rhetorical action and vice versa. The exigential flow provides the contextual, process and correlational character of a rhetorical action.

It is through this contextual relation of exigential flow to rhetorical action that gives the analysis of revolutionary rhetoric
a variable frame of reference in addition to its strategic considerations. Viewing revolutionary rhetoric in its strategic sense, coupled with situational aspects, allows one to relate the strategies employed to their situational base. More importantly, this perspective allows the researcher to explain the utilization of strategies and their flow through time and situations. By doing so, one can account for the constraints that give rise to a certain speech and the strategies employed within it. Simons put this perspective very succinctly:

... The new scholarship bias fair to producing a social science of rhetorical choice, one that delimits strategic and stylistic options in the face of situational and purposive constraints. 30

Review of Relevant Research

An investigation of scholarly writings about the Sudan reveals the absence of systematic studies that investigate the utilization of persuasive strategies employed to create and sustain political order. There is a considerable amount of speculation regarding the rhetoric of Third World leaders and strategies of political order maintenance.

To illustrate, Staresa generalizes that Third World leaders employ the following tactics in their attempts to manipulate people's realities including:

The projection of a charismatic personality, the selective reinterpretation of historical events to legitimize a
present condition, the progressive substitution of ever more inclusive identities for outworn characterizations, the atavistic justification of modern institutions in traditional terms, or a creation of a compelling "foil," as ready realignment to explain a way of shortcomings."

Starecta's generalizations appear advantageous for they specified the manner by which Third World leaders structure their discourse in their attempts to persuade the public and to justify their existence. These generalizations, however, needed to be placed into a more appropriate specific context.

Focusing on a more precise study - "state-subject communication in Zaire: domination and the concept of dominion consensus" - Callaghy speculated that President Mobutu utilized three main techniques of mobilization - "mass meetings, marches of support and animation." \(^{32}\) The author concluded:

This authoritarian Regime does maintain basic order, but the cost is very high. It brutally exploits the population, and destroys liberty, local autonomy and community spirit. In addition, it created inequality and fosters dependence on the state, while presenting useful incremental change. In short, the communication techniques employed by the regime of Mobutu create a gap between the state and the society.\(^{33}\)

The persuasive techniques delineated by Callaghy clearly emerged from non-discursive material. One believes that a focus on persuasive messages employed by President Mobutu could have
generated more comprehensive techniques than those categorized in the Gallagher study.

A great number of studies about African political leadership had been conducted by political scientists who are interested in comparative politics. Part of their attention had been focused on sources of leadership, magnitude of leadership, quality of leadership and themes of variations in leadership. In another part political scientists occupied themselves with how "power" or political order can be maintained.

For example, Wriggins contends that leaders in Africa and Asia employ nine strategies in their attempts to sustain political order including: projecting the personality, building an organization, promoting an ideology, rewarding the faithful and the susceptible, intimidating the opponent and the wavering ally, developing the economy, expanding [or contracting] political participation, and planning foreign policy.

While Wriggins' strategies are politically sound, the role of communication or persuasive devices used in realization of these strategies was not scrutinized.

In their book Personal Rule in Black Africa, Jackson and Rooborg classified African leaders into four distinct categories: princes and oligarchic rule, autocrats and lordship, prophets and leadership, and tyranny and abusive rule. The authors contend that personal rulership plays a significant role in political life of the new states of black Africa.

Jackson and Rooberg further observe that African leaders maintain political order both by persuasion and coercion:
In African states rulers use strategies in the following ways: (1) co-option and consultation, which in effect indicate their power is legitimate and therefore a part of the state; (2) patronage, which may be seen as exchange of state resources for political support; and (3) agreement and accord, between parties or countries, to perform certain activities or to forbear from performing them. Of course, African rulers may also employ intimidation and coercion.

Jackson and Rosberg's observations concerning the utilisation of strategies as well as coercion is true as far as the political situation in Africa is concerned. But, this observation needed to be put into a particular context. For example, in what way and in what manner does this observation bear in a political rhetoric of a particular leader in his attempt to create and maintain political order?

As Chapter Three will show, the reader will be struck by the enormous utilisation of the term "revolution," in the rhetoric of President Nimeiri. The following discussion is intended to orient the reader about the precise meaning of the term "revolution," and how African leaders, particularly President Nimeiri, use the term.

When discussing the meaning of "revolution," the researcher will make no claim whether an actual revolution has taken place in the Sudan or not. The discussion centers primarily on the elucidation of the term revolution as it appears in the rhetoric of President Nimeiri in his effort to ingratiate himself with the Sudanese society and to sustain political order.
The Meaning of Revolution: A General View

The phenomenon of revolution, that is, political revolution, has been a controversial issue through the years. This controversy lies, in part, on the illusiveness of the term, and in part on the degrees of intensity, duration and consequences of revolutions. Scholars tend to define revolution differently, depending on the nature, scope, causes and effect of the phenomenon each selects for his study.

To illustrate, two schools of thought can be identified in regard to a definition of political revolutions. The first school adopts a narrower definition that restricts the use of the term to major political revolutions; these include not only the French and American revolutions of the eighteenth century but the Russians and Chinese of the twentieth century as well. 

Cottrell, for example, views revolution as "a popular movement whereby a significant change in the structure of a nation or a society is expected. Usually an overthrow of the existing government and the substitution of another comes early in such a movement, and significant social and economic changes follow." 40

A more precise definition of revolution, in accordance with the first school of thought, is provided by Pette, who argues that a great revolution is a "reconstitution of the state." 41 Great revolution, then, as Pette sees it, is characterized by a fundamental change that results in a given society, in its values, in its elite formation, and above all, in its constitutional arrangements. 42
The second school of thought, in relation to definitions of revolution, views revolution in a broader sense. Groth, for example, conceived of revolution to denote "any non-systematic change either in the leadership or in the institution of the state, or both." By non-systematic change Groth means "change which in its form is not expressly or by wide arrangement, authorized by the constitutional legal provisions of an existing system, and one which redistributes the loci of political decision-making power." Inherent in Groth's conception is the belief that if the electoral process brought a new class of rulers to power, which managed to change the political and social structures of a particular state, a revolution would not be said to have occurred.

Like Groth, Tanter and Kilian's definition of revolution exhibits an illegal transfer of power. Tanter and Kilian demonstrate that:

A revolution may be said to exist when a group of insurgents illegally and/or forcibly challenge the governmental elite. A successful revolution occurs when, as a result of a challenge to the governmental elite, insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles within the structure of political authority.

The authors empirically analyzed eighteen countries from Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, as an attempt to arrive at a scientific judgment concerning which country among those studied is truly revolutionary in nature. Their analysis suggests four types of revolutions, depending on their degree of intensity:
revolution, the reform coup, the revolutionary coup, and the mass revolution. Of the eighteen countries analyzed, only the Cuban revolution was considered "mass revolution" and only the Cuban revolution was characterized by sharp economic reversal immediately before the break of violence.46

Within this broad conception of political revolution, Huntington defines revolution in a unique way. Huntington defines revolution as "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure leadership, and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence."47

Revolution in this view is "an aspect of modernization."48 Political modernization includes the expansion of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics. Political development embodies the creation of political institutions capable of bringing new groups into politics and capable of promoting social and economic change. Seemingly, a revolution would not be said to have occurred without the extension of public consciousness.49

It is this aspect of expansion of public consciousness that received high attention from the leaders of developing nations that claim to be revolutionary. Virtually all African leaders who claim their regime to be revolutionary created a one-party system to bring the public into politics, so that their regime can be conceived of as revolutionary.
The creation of new institutions in this regard means establishing symbolic political routines; what "must be done" is switched into "what I desire to do." Building an institution by itself is not enough for the regime to be called revolutionary. The institution of the party must be dynamic to attract new groups and to mobilize them to achieve a desired change in all levels of the society.

To briefly summarize the position of the two schools of thought in regard to the conception of the term revolution, the two schools have some aspects in common, such as the attainment of change, whether it be political or social. One of the major differences between them is that the theorists in the great schools tend to take what Cohn calls an "exclusivist view" of what constitutes revolutions. As mentioned, this school considers as revolutions only those in which radical change occurs, whereas the second school expands its conception of revolution to encompass a wide range of phenomena such as the Mexican, Cuban, Algerian and the Egyptian revolutions.

Given this classification of the two schools of thought and definition of revolution, what are the dimensions of political revolution? Viewing political revolution from a broader perspective, it exhibits the following dimensions:

1) A change in the means of selecting political leaders, and the creation of new political elites, usually by extra-constitutional or non-systematic means;
2) new and expanded channels for access to positions of political power; 
3) expanded political participation, possibly temporarily; and 
4) the creation and solidification of new political order on a different basis of political legitimacy.53

Among other things, the above dimensions point to the differentiation between coup d'état and revolution. A revolution in the awareness of many scholars leads to a profound and accelerated change in governments and in all levels of the society, whereas the consequences of a coup d'état are limited.

This limitation of consequences led the scholars discussed in this section to exclude coups from revolution. For a revolution, a political change must be established in all segments of society and include the entire state as well. A coup, like revolts and civil war, usually brings, in the larger part, moderate change, with limited consequences upon the society. But, the coups, revolts, or civil war could preclude a revolution as a triggering event for a complete overthrow of the current political regimes.54 More importantly, however, unless new institutions are created and new segments of society are mobilized into politics, a change in the ruling elite or a challenge to current political order "stop short of political revolution."54

Despite the relatively sharp distinction between revolutions and coups, the term revolution has come to be widely used by African leaders who came to power by military coups, as well as by those who led the struggle for independence and came to power by legal means.
(elections). The following section examines the term revolution as used by four African leaders. Two came to office by waging coup d'etat: President Nasser of Egypt and President Nimri of the Sudan. The other two, Nyerere of Tanzania and Akroma of Ghana, led the struggle for independence and then were elected to rule their countries.

The discussion will describe broadly how each of these leaders uses the term revolution. The question of whether a total revolution actually took place is beyond the scope of this inquiry.

The Meaning of Revolution: An African View

Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power after a successful coup d'etat that overthrew King Faruk and his traditional regime on July 23, 1952. Nasser remained in power until he died September 28, 1970. During that period, the term revolution was pervasive in Nasser's speeches as well as in his writings. Revolution for Nasser was an ongoing struggle for unity, development and justice.

This struggle can be maintained through the two revolutions: political and social. Nasser asserted that:

Every nation on earth undergoes two revolutions, one political, in which it recovers its right of self government from an imposed despot or any army of aggression occupying its territory without its consent. The second revolution is social, in which the classes of society struggle against each other until justice for all citizens has gained and conditions have become stable.
Nasser emphasized that Egypt must undergo the two revolutions simultaneously. "Political revolution demands, for its success, the unity of all national elements, their fusion and mutual support as well as self-denial for the sake of the country as a whole."

The hallmark of the Egyptian revolution was to achieve a rapid and accelerated change in the whole country. With that in mind, Nasser warned those who thought that the army coup was aimed merely at overthrowing the monarchy:

This aim is a minor objective compared to the wider aims of our revolution. The latter seeks to change the political system for the benefit of the people. It is therefore necessary to defend the revolution against those who try to deter it from attaining its ultimate goal.

The ultimate aim of the Nasser regime was to accomplish change and unite the Egyptian society. Nasser, however, recognized that while he and his associates were striving for attaining that objective, there was counter-revolution that aimed at destroying the unity of the nation.

Aside from Nasser's speeches and writings, in the Charter for National Action, which exhibits the regime's ideology, the same phenomena of unity and development appear in a very appealing manner. According to the Charter, "revolution is the only way to overcome underdevelopment, forced on the Arab nation through suppression and exploitation." The Charter coined the motto for the Egyptian revolution: "Freedom, socialism and unity."
Freedom is seen as freedom of the country and freedom of the public. Socialism is adopted in order for the regime to achieve "sufficiency and justice." The avenue to unity is viewed as a "popular call for the restoration of the natural order of a nation."61

Along with Nasser's emphasis on unity, the Charter makes strong reference to the importance of unity. Unity is expanded beyond the Egyptian territories to include Arab unity. The unity of language among the Arab nations was seen as establishing the unity of future and fate. The attainment of such unity was seen as imperative for the benefit of all Arab nations, since they share similar objectives.62 According to the Charter,

The concept of Arab unity no longer requires a meeting of the rulers of the Arab nations in order to depict solidarity among the governments. The phase of social revolution has developed that superficial concept of Arab unity and brought it to a stage where unity of objectives has become a symbol of unity. The unity of objective is an accomplished fact for the popular bases in the entire Arab nation."

Nasserism became not only a powerful and influential ideology in the Middle East, but also a model that was adopted by many Arabic countries in their effort to build revolutionary and socialist states. The Sudan and Libya, in earlier phases, stand as good examples for the application of the Nasserism model.

Like Nasser, Nkruma believes revolution is an indispensable road to development. Long before Ghana gained independence in 1957,
from British rule, Nkrumah waged revolutionary struggle to achieve independence for his country. He formed the Ghana Conventional Party that brought him to office after winning the elections of 1957. Until he was overthrown by coup d'etat on March 6, 1964, Nkrumah strived to achieve what he calls "consciencism."

In his book Consciencism, Nkrumah emphasizes the need for eradication of colonialism, poverty, illiteracy and all phases of backwardness that were encouraged by colonialist rule. Socialism is seen as a realistic solution to these severe problems. The passage of socialism accordingly must be "guided by the principle of scientific socialism." The philosophical consciencism contradicts the Marxist conception of class struggle and exploitation, for these were seen as alien to African conditions.

Philosophical consciencism, according to Nkrumah, seeks "to promote individual development, but in such a way that the conditions for the development of all become the conditions for development of each."

The major enemies of consciencism as Nkrumah conceived them - colonialism, imperialism, disunity and the lack of development - were seen as preventing social justice that is grounded in "true equality." Equality, for Nkrumah, could not be achieved unless revolutionary change was undertaken to move the society from communism to socialism. Socialism, therefore, represents the backbone of Nkrumah's revolutionary stance. Nkrumah indicated:

"My assertion is that socialism is the only pattern that can within the shortest possible time bring the good life to the people. For socialism assumes the public ownership of the..."
mean of production - the land and its resources - and the use of these means for production, that will bring benefits to the people.

It appears that there is a congruence in Nasser's and Nkrumah's conceptions of socialism. Both believed in public ownership of production and equality in distribution of public goods.

Crucial to Nkrumah's African revolutionary thinking is the need for unity. Unity, in accordance with Nkrumah, does not limit itself only to the unionisation of the Ghanaian people, but rather it pursues a continental scope. Nkrumah was a strong advocate of African unity. He views neo-colonialism as the greatest danger to African unity. Nkrumah writes:

The conversion of Africa into a series of small states is leaving some of them with neither the resources nor the manpower to provide their own integrity viability. Without the means to establish their own economic growth they are compelled to continue within the old colonial trading framework.

A unified Africa accordingly will assist African countries to stand strong and powerful against enemies of all sorts, and to successfully mobilise their resources under a unified political direction. Although Nkrumah spent all of his years in office calling for Africa to unite, his revolutionary ideas faded and took a back seat in African conferences and platforms.

Like Nasserism, Nkrumahism became an "ideology", directed at destruction of the "evils" of colonialism, tribalism and replacing
them with freedom, dignity and social justice, with appreciable
living standards. Cmeri describes Nkrumahism as follows:

Nkrumahism is, basically, socialism
adapted to conditions in Africa and
African tradition. As socialist
philosophy it seeks to adapt socialist
ideas to the evolution of an African
society which has emerged from
colonialist domination. It seeks to
realise its socialist aims amid the
legacies of colonialism and yet, in the
process, never sacrificing its African
character and heritage.

President Nyerere of Tanzania views revolution as a violent and
gradual process toward unity and development. Seemingly,
development of rural areas as well as improving the living
conditions of the whole country were seen as possible only through
the establishment of socialism. Throughout his revolutionary
aspirations, Nyerere believes that "socialism is an attitude of
mind."71 The establishment of socialism in Tanzania depends in
large measure on the dissemination of socialist understanding and
socialist attitude of the people in all areas of the country.
Without this socialist understanding, revolutionary goals would not
be met when they were needed most.72

Nyerere calls for the rejection of the capitalist attitude of
mind which colonialism established in Africa. He further calls for
the rejection of capitalist methods, such as individual ownership of
land in Tanzania. Land, in accordance with Nyerere's socialist
understanding, is a property of all citizens. Each individual is
given the right to use land to earn his living and achieve a better standard of living.\(^7\)

The purpose of socialism in this view is the well-being of all people. An individual is seen as an equal member of the community with "equal rights and equal duties." The essence of Nyerere's socialist philosophy is:

To build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all can live in peace with their neighbors without sufferings or imposing injustice, being exploited or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare, before an individual lives in luxury.\(^7\)

Socialism in Tanzania is an extension of an indigenous belief which Nyerere calls ujama (familyhood). Thus Nyerere attempts to establish a socialist society based on "ujama," a world view of traditional African society. In his book Ujama, Nyerere contends that the traditional African way of life resembles the essential characteristics of socialism. AFRICA Familyhood encompassed such features as working, loving-sharing, and providing security for all members of the community. Ujama, then, opposes capitalism, which seeks to establish a happy society on the basis of exploitation, and it equally refutes "doctrinaire socialists," which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of unavoidable conflict between man and man.\(^7\)

Essential to Nyerere's revolutionary belief is the issue of unity. He views unity as a safeguard for independence and
prosperity, and it should be extended beyond his homeland to include all African countries. Nyerere emphasizes:

We know that Africa will only be secure in its freedom, and only allow real economics for its people, when the present multitude of small states are one internationally sovereign authority. And we know, too, until the whole of Africa is free from racialistic minority rule, and alien colonial rule, no part of our continent - united or otherwise - is free from danger from these forces.

Although Nkrumah and Nyerere have called for African unity for a long time, neither of them have worked out a detailed and a comprehensive framework through which an African unity could be accomplished. Neither have other African leaders, whose revolutionary rhetoric is filled with such slogans. It appears that the yearning for African unity has become part of the daily routine of African leaders to legitimate their regimes locally, regionally and internationally.

Like his predecessors, Misesiri's revolutionary thinking incorporates both elements of unity and development. The yearning for national unity stems from the fact that southern and northern Sudan engaged in civil war for seventeen years, until 1972. The civil war cost lives, but also prevented the country from achieving stability and from accomplishing noticeable development in all areas. Unity, therefore, establishes a solid ground for development. Misesiri asserts:
The national unity is a forge where barriers between the people disappear and their desires reach harmony, where individual abilities are transformed into mass ability and individual wills into a popular force to achieve change and development."

The quest for national unity between Northern and Southern Sudan still persists, in spite of the fact that unity was achieved in March 1972. This continuous call for national unity can be attributed to the necessity to consolidate and enhance the unity between the two regions so the climate for development can be created.

Like Uhuru and Nyerere, Nimriri believes in African unity. But, he believes that the unity of African neighboring countries is prerequisite to African unity. Nimriri indicates:

The Sudan shall remain as it has always been - the loyal and honest friend to all its neighbors. We do believe unhesitatingly that the unity of Africa begins with the unity of its closest zone. Our people will contribute to the revolutionary movements against colonialism in African society to deter colonial invasion and to end racial humiliation in our rising continent. This is a historic responsibility which we shall never give up.

Like the African leaders discussed in this section, Nimriri attempts to build development with socialism. The essence of such socialism centers around: the people's ownership of the means of production, expansion of the base of the public sector, pursuing
scientific planning, increase of growth rates in the major productive sectors, promotion of modern production relations to safeguard the interest of the workers, and redistribution of national income in a "fair way."79

The above generalizations were further called "scientific socialism." According to the Charter for National Action, "scientific socialism applied to our own circumstances and based on our history, cultural heritage, religion and positive traditions, the persistent line of the revolution."80 The Charter depicts imperialism as anti-progress, encouraging exploitation and backwardness in all developing nations.81

The preceding discussion dealt briefly with how African revolutionary leaders Nasser, Ikram, Nyerere and Nimeiri used the term revolution. It appears that African revolution means a quest for unity and development. The leaders in these countries constantly appeal for the attainment of national unity, Arab unity, African unity and national development. The ples for unity and development emerge from historic realities. Almost all of these countries and social schisms that were attributed to either colonialism, as in the case in Tanzania, Ghana and the Sudan, or to previous monarchies, as in the case of Egypt.

Crucial to the revolutionary thinking of all these leaders is the application of socialism to resolve the predominant problems of development. All of them adopted socialism in varying measures, in accordance with their cultural heritage and indigenous living conditions. Each established a one-party system to carry on the responsibilities of achieving and consolidating unity and
establishing socialist society. In Egypt, an Arab socialist union was formed ten years after the revolution, in 1962. In Ghana, the People's Convention Party was formed in 1947, and later became the only ruling party of the state. In Tanzania, the Tanzania African National Union was established in 1954. The Sudanesse Socialist Union, the ruling and the only party in Sudan, came into being three years after the coup in 1972. Each leader strongly believes that the one-party system is the best form of representation for an African state that seeks to foster development and unite the fragmented society to achieve the noble aim which is "socialist society".

These parties were established to widen the power base, encourage public participation and facilitate "democracy" and "freedom". Although democracy and freedom are often emphasized in African ideological doctrines, they are only allowed within the parameters of a given party line.

African "revolution" not only is a quest for unity and development, but also a symbol that forms as a nexus that binds the rulers and the ruled. The term revolution in these lines is regarded as a "condensation symbol". As Smedley argues, " Practically every political act that is controversial or regarded as really important is bound to serve in part as a condensation symbol. It evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response because it symbolizes a threat or reassurance."

In the case of "African revolution," each leader utilizes the term "political revolution" to symbolize and reassure a better living standard for the people and reassure the public that
revolutionary regimes are far better than communism, monarchy, multi-party systems and above all, better than colonialist domination, which attempted to dissolve public identity. In the case of threat, African revolutionary leaders, by assuring the public of better living conditions, a threat is manifested against those who attempt to suspect or challenge revolutionary actions.

Symbols thus create a common ground for communication by using a language that corresponds to people's aspirations, hopes, and fears, and by appealing to their emotions. The notion of social cohesion and development, therefore, represents the core of this symbolism.

The concept of revolution as adapted by African countries is also part of their ideological "paraphernalia". The ideologies of Nasser, Khartoum, Nyerer and Nimeiri are condemned with such an adaptation. These ideologies attempted to provide a world view to guide revolutionary actions and to furnish legitimacy to those regimes. That is, each regime perceives itself and likes to be perceived by the ruled as having a right to act. So, "revolution" becomes a central identification of African regimes in their constant search for legitimacy. It resembles the agenda for the regimes and provides an actual guide for the decision-making processes in these countries.

The following section provides information about the political setting in the Sudan and what the Nimeiri regime accomplished in its quest for social transformation.
The Political Setting

The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, the largest country in Africa, covers about one million square miles. The Sudan is bounded by eight countries and the Red Sea. It shares borders with Egypt and Libya to the north, Chad and the Central African Empire to the west, Zaïre, Uganda, Kenya to the south, Ethiopia to the east, and across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia.

The Sudan has a population of seventeen million, three hundred seventy-eight thousand inhabitants. Sixty-seven percent of the inhabitants live in rural areas, fifteen percent in urban centers and the remaining portions are nomadic tribes. The people of the Sudan belong to different tribes speaking different languages, and belong to different regional backgrounds. In spite of this diversity, there are two distinct groups - the Arabs in the north and the Africans in the southern part of the country.

Ethnically, however, the population of the Sudan is made up of a variety of tribes that speak different languages. According to Henderson, there are 597 tribes, comprising 56 tribal groups. Seventy percent of the total population is Arab Muslim and a multitude of ethnic minorities and nilotic people comprise twenty-five percent, and five percent are Christian.

In spite of this diversity, the Sudanese are more homogeneous culturally than they are racially. Abdul Mahim explains:

In the first place, the majority of the Sudanese are Muslims, and historically speaking, the spread of Islam was hand in hand with that of the language of the Quran. Secondly, the fact that Arabic
is the national language and that it is the language used in business, education, journalism, broadcasting and in government offices - where it is now officially supposed to be supplanting English - at once explains and propagates its adoption throughout the country. The Sudan gained its independence on January 1, 1956 from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. Since its independence, the country has had four political regimes: (1) a civil parliamentary democracy that lasted until November 17, 1958; (2) a military regime under General Ibrahîm Abboud from November 17, 1958 until October 21, 1964; (3) a civilian revolutionary regime in October, 1964 which maintained party-system government until May 25, 1969, when (4) a group of young officers staged the second military coup d'etat of the country under the leadership of Colonel Nimeiri. Since the Nimeiri regime is the focus of this study, the following pages present a brief discussion of the nature of this regime.

In the first decree announced to the Sudanese public, President Nimeiri accused the previous regime leaders of corruption, deterioration of the economy, and a lack of social and economic development, and denounced their inability to stop the civil war in the south that continued for fourteen years. Subsequently, the new coup leader dissolved all political parties and jailed all of their leaders, except those who managed to escape from the country. The communist party was excluded from these actions because at least three of its active members participated in the coup.
Following the success of the coup, a ten-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was formed, including Colonel Museveni, who became the head of RCC. All council members were military officers, except former Chief of Justice Nabikir Awadilla, who became Deputy Chairman of RCC and Prime Minister of the first government of the NRM Regime.

In attacking the policies of the dissolved parties, the situation called for President Museveni to face political realities and change the situation for the better. As Wringle observes, a leader in a newly independent African nation, in order to stay in office, must cope with a number of complicated problems, such as expanding political participation, unity, and initiating a proper economic planning. Wringle's observations are applicable to all leaders in that part of the world, whether they claim to be revolutionary or not. So, President Museveni has to create a new political order based, in some respect, on the aforementioned observations.

First, concerning expanding political participation and recruiting new groups into the politics, Museveni was aware that the continuation of his regime was largely contingent upon the support of the masses. The first step in this direction was that Museveni attempted to test his popularity by placing his name as a candidate for the President of the Republic in a plebiscite that took place in September 1977. He was elected to the presidency on October 12, 1971, and immediately dissolved the RCC, which had always made him equal to the other members of the council in relation to the
decision-making processes concerning the state. In the referendum, Nimeiri received 95.6 percent of the vote.

As virtually the only decision maker in the country, Nimeiri pursued further this line of seeking mass popularity by establishing the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) late in 1971. The rationale for establishing the SSU was to unify the alliance of working people: workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, national capitalists and the armed forces, whose interests are complimentary. The SSU, as the only political party in the country, has the task of guiding and leading the national work, and is responsible for the leadership of the state as a whole.

The SSU has the authority to draw up national policies, plans and programs, and to guide, supervise and execute them in the name of the masses. The precise aims of the SSU were:

1) To unite the people to protect the achievements and aims of the May revolution.
2) To push the revolution and its leaders forward toward the ultimate aim of the perfect democracy.
3) To construct a unified socialist Sudan according to the Charter of National Action.
4) To build and lead popular organizations.
5) To realize in practice the principle of the transfer of authority to the people or the people's representatives.

The structure of the SNU is organized in a pyramidal manner, that is, from the base upwards. The SNU starts at the village level with the basic unit of one hundred or more SNU members. The elected chain of command then moves through branch, section district, area, province and finally to central origins, the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the People's Assembly. Each region in the country has its own People's Assembly.

The first People's National Assembly (Parliament) was created in October 1972. One of its achievements was the passage of a permanent constitution, which was signed by the president on May 6, 1973. The People's National Assembly may be regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the Miremi regime. For one thing, the members of the assembly have enormous freedom to speak their minds without any fear. The members have a full right to express their demands and aspirations, regardless of whether or not they will be met. The meetings of the assembly are broadcast regularly, so citizens know what their representatives are doing.

In addition to the creation of the SNU in 1971, the Miremi regime established the People's Local Councils, to give regional areas autonomy and to widen the power base, and to expand public participation in rural areas. A wide-ranging network of people's local councils was created and headed by the People's Executive
Council in each province. The essence of such councils was to enable the people to run their own affairs without reliance on decisions made in Khartoum, the capital.

To expand public participation even further and to establish decentralisation in the country, in March 1979 the Central Committee of the NISS endorsed President Nimeiri's proposal that the Sudan be divided into three largely autonomous regions: Western, Eastern and Northern, with the Southern region also retaining its self-governing status.

Secondly, the problem of national unity in the Sudan had been one of the most important and urgent issues that demanded a proper solution from the leaders of the country. The successive governments, however, had exerted tremendous efforts to end the civil war between the north and the south without feasible results. The war, which had started one year before independence, continued for fourteen years until President Nimeiri made the first announcement concerning the southern problem exactly two weeks after he seized power.

That announcement came to be known as the June Declaration, which was the first step toward the solution of the problem. Nimeiri declared that:

The revolutionary government is confident and competent enough to face the existing realities. It recognises the historic and cultural differences between the north and the south and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built on these objective realities. The southern people have the right to develop their respective
cultures and traditions within the united Sudan.  

More importantly, Nimeiri announced that the southern region would be granted a "regional autonomy." With the June Declaration, the public was prepared for a more comprehensive and decisive solution to stop the schism between the two regions and to end the agony and the bitterness of the war that cost the country many lives and drained its resources.

Not long after the June Declaration, intensive communications and negotiations took place inside and outside the Sudan in an effort to reach a peaceful solution to the problem. On February 27, 1972, the Nimeiri regime and the Southern Sudan Liberation movement (the official representative of the south) concluded their negotiations by the ratification of an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The agreement put an end to the civil war, and the southern region became a self-governing region within the Republic of the Sudan.

Under the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement, the unity of the country was maintained and the southern region was given the power to be run by its own citizens. A People's Regional Assembly was created to form a legislative body for the southerners, and a high executive council was established to supervise the administration and to direct public affairs in the southern region of the Sudan.

While the Addis Ababa agreement brought the southerners and the northern Sudanese together, there remained another problem to be dealt with, one that concerned the dissolved parties representatives
who refused to join the Nyeri Regime and seemed to be clinging
tenaciously to their beliefs and democratic doctrines.

To consolidate the Sudanese unity and to expand political
participation, President Nimeiri announced a general amnesty act in
1979. Accordingly, all members of the opposition were forgiven and
allowed opportunities to participate in all aspects of political
institution in the Sudan. For example, those who returned from long
years abroad or who were released from prisons were allowed to stand
for the 1979 parliamentary elections. Some of them were elected to
the present parliament and others appointed to the Central Committee
of the SUD.

In spite of the fact that the opposition leaders accepted the
reconciliation as a genuine approach to join the regime and tackle
the problems of the country together, all of them have some
reservations concerning the "efficiency and democratization of
the SUD". The debate concerning the latter issue still persists
and the issue of national reconciliation is far from full
realization and acceptance.

Thirdly, regarding planning the economy as a major constituent
of political survival, it is worth noting that the Sudan is listed
as one of the twenty-five least developed countries. The Sudan
shares with these countries a low per capita income ($320
dollars), a low rate of literacy (75 percent), and its economic
planning is constrained by poor physical infrastructure, lack of
skilful manpower and a shortage of resources for investment. The
question here is how well President Nimeiri dealt with planning the
economy.
In 1970 the Nimiri Regime initiated a five-year plan (1970-1975). Before the plan completed its course it had been expanded to two more years to match the end of the presidential term that ended in 1977.

A major objective of the extended plan was to achieve "self-sufficiency in essential goods and services, to achieve better balance between production and consumption, and to minimize the burden on the economy of government budgetary expenses." The plan called for an increase in Gross Domestic Product of 7.5 percent per annum. However, the economy, during that period, registered a growth of 5 percent. So the plan did not meet its objective in this respect; neither did it in other objectives, such as achieving self-sufficiency in basic products, for example.

Another plan was introduced in 1977 to cover a six-year period (1977-1982). The general objectives of the plan, in the president's words, "stem, and are inspired by, the thrust of the nation towards development and progress, guided by a balanced ambition for welfare and honorable life in environment of social justice." The following are some of the objectives of the six-year plan:

- increase in per capita income of 7.5 percent annually.
- preservation and optimal utilization of national resources.
- increase in the production and level of performance in all sectors of the economy.
-- realization of self-sufficiency in certain food products and other necessities.

-- encouragement of national and foreign private investment to play its full role in the development effort.

-- improvement of the balance of payment situation through the increase of exports and production of import substitution commodities. 104

The latter objective has been one of the major problems confronting the Sudan. From 1973 to 1975, the deficit on current account increased from 68 million dollars to 640 million dollars. Since, no significant change has taken place. Debt service obligations mounted, and external payments had accumulated to a level of about 1.2 billion dollars by September 1979. 105

In its efforts to improve the deteriorating situation, the Mneiri Regime, in consultation with the International Monetary Fund, established a number of policies, which involve incentives to encourage exports and an economic stabilization program based on limiting the growth of nondevelopment expenditures and increasing tax revenues. 106

While President Mneiri dealt with these three issues (expanding political participation, uniting the society and planning
the economy) in one way or another, these issues are not problem-free. For example, the SSU can be criticized on the grounds that it failed to attract and recruit all members of the Sudanese society, especially the intellectuals. The SSU has not trained a specialized group to take the responsibilities of disseminating the socialist ideas throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas. Consequently the SSU, as Wal indicates, has not acquired autonomy as a tool for recruiting top political leaders, and it lacks a "well-defined ideology." 107

In the economic arena, the major problem seems to be that there has been much more planning than actual economic development. 105 Officials and non-officials in the Sudan alike attributed the lack of development in the country to the instability that the country has experienced since its independence. Aside from instability, the failure of the seven-year plan has been attributed to "transport bottlenecks, liquidity problems, slow and unsatisfactory utilization of loans, red tape, and the incompatibility between desk planning, execution and follow-up capabilities of some key government units." 109

The third aspect concerning the achievement of national unity between the northern and southern Sudan has been the least criticized issue. As one observer notes:

President Nguiri has been credited rightly for bargaining peace to the Southern Region by agreeing to regional autonomy instead of pursuing war. It is, however, an illusion to think that the Afro-Arab conflict in the Sudan has been resolved. The Addis Ababa Peace
Agreement is an institutional framework which hopefully, over a period of time, will provide the atmosphere for enhancing mutual understanding between the North and the South, and the full realization of the malady of this duality."

It is against such deficiencies in policies that at least fifteen military coup attempts and plots have taken place since the inception of the Nimeiri coup. The three most serious attempts are under consideration.

On July 19, 1971, a group of communist officers launched the first military coup attempt under the leadership of Hashim El Alta, who had been dismissed from the Revolutionary Command Council in October 1970. El Alta claimed that Nimeiri and his group had diverted the revolution from its path and that they had taken over to return the revolution to its correct path to socialism.*** President Nimeiri and his cabinet members were arrested. Two days later a successful counter-coup brought Nimeiri back to office. El Alta and his associates were executed after immediate trials.

The second military coup attempt took place on September 5, 1975, when a limited number of right-wing army officers seized a broadcasting station and announced their victory with a short statement that denounced the Nimeiri Regime and its policies regarding the freedom of expression and academic freedom. The leader of the coup, Lt. Colonel Hassan Hussein, was executed after his defeat two hours after the seizure of the radio station.

The third military coup attempt, staged by the National Front—a major opposition to the Nimeiri Regime—took place under the
direction of Muammar el-Qaddafi and Sharif El-Mendion on July 2, 1976. The coup members and their followers had received tremendous help from the President of Libya, Qaddafi. They attended a proper training in Libya before they crossed the borders and started their operations. The coup members held strategic positions and captured the radio station and Khartoum airport. They fought with the government forces for several hours before they were defeated.

According to Malwal, the coup members who were involved in the actual fighting include, in addition to the Sudanese, an assortment of other foreign nationalities from neighboring states - Libya, Ethiopia and Chad.\textsuperscript{112} The leader of the coup, Mohammed Nur Saad, along with his followers, were executed after immediate trials.\textsuperscript{113}

Before concluding this section, a final note on the nature of the presidency in the Sudan needs to be discussed. In the Sudan, the executive power is vested in the President of the Republic, who will be nominated by the JSSU for a renewable six-year term. He is the Supreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces and Security Forces, and the Supreme Head of the Civil Service. The constitution specifies the nature of the presidency as follows: \textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Article 91}

The President of the Republic is responsible for maintaining the constitution and he shall be responsible for the protection and independence of the country, safety of its territory and protection of the integrity of the state, and guarantees the proper conduct of the public authorities.
Article 82

The President of the Republic is the symbol of sovereignty and national unity, and representative of the people’s will.

He shall be responsible for protecting the victories of the May Revolution, the achievements of the people, the consolidation of solidarity of the working forces of the people, the preservation of freedom, justice and welfare of the people.

The legislative power, however, is vested both in the People’s Assembly and the President of the Republic. The People’s Assembly has 250 members: 70 nominated by the People’s Working Forces Alliance, 70 representing the administrative units, 25 appointed by the president and 125 elected by geographical areas.

According to the constitution the president has the right to veto any bill passed by the People’s Assembly, which gives him a wide range of power to make decisions even without the approval of the legislative body.15

To briefly summarize this section, President Nimeiri has attempted to alter the previous political system by creating a one-party system to encourage public participation, to build and plan the national economy and to unite the Sudanese people. The overall aim of President Nimeiri has been to achieve rapid change, which is the ultimate aim of any revolution.
Conclusions

The study of political rhetoric is a very important area of inquiry. The foregoing sections were an attempt to provide necessary background for the study. The rationale, the purpose of the investigation, and the explication of key terms were stated. The meta-theoretical orientation upon which this project emerges was described; relevant studies were reviewed. The meaning of the term "revolution" was elucidated and the political setting in the Sudan was explored to provide the reader with the information needed for the understanding of the contextual environment.

Preview of the Study

Chapter Two describes the manner by which the speeches are selected, presents the coding scheme and explains the procedure by which persuasive strategies are identified. Chapter Three analyzes the persuasive strategies in the discourse of President Majeiri in relation to situational constituents. Chapter Four summarizes and concludes the analysis, shows the implications of the study, and proposes suggestions for future research.
Notes

2. ibid., p. 35.
4. ibid., p. 32.
6. ibid., p. 59.
8. ibid., p. 65.
11. ibid., p. 95.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 134.
16. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
22. Ibid., p. 27.
23. Ibid., p. 25.
24. Ibid., p. 25.
27. Ibid., p. 14.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 15.
34. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 25.
39. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Alexander Groth, “A Typology of Revolution.” In Welch & Tainter, p. 32.
45. Ibid.
47. Ibid., pp. 157-175.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 265, 256.
52. Cohn, p. 13.
52 Welch and Tainter, p. 2.
53 Ibid., p. 3.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution, pp. 64-65.
62 The Charter, p. 256.
63 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 98.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
72 Ibid.


75. Julius K. Nyerere, Ujama, pp. 2-12.


81. Ibid.


83. Ibid., p. 7.


85. Ibid., p. 179.


87. Ibid.


89. Sudan: The Country and Its Market, p. 15.


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Marketing in the Sudan, p. 2.

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111. Waj, p. 86.


113. Ibid.


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116. Ibid.
CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGY

Methodological Scope

The purpose of this study was to develop and apply a methodology to the analysis of the discourse of President Nimri of the Sudan, from 1970 through 1980. More specifically, this investigation was an attempt to identify and explicate the persuasive strategies as exhibited in the discourse of President Nimri and to provide preliminary answers to the following three interconnected questions:

1. What were the dominant persuasive strategies in the political rhetoric of President Nimri in his attempt to create and maintain political order? More specifically:
   A. What was the strategy(ies) that received most emphasis by the president?
   B. What was the strategy(ies) that was least emphasized?

2. How was there any continuity in the utilization of strategies across the speeches selected for the study through times and situations?

3. What were the intrinsic characteristics of the political rhetoric in the Sudan.
The execution of this dissertation involved the selection of a sample of speeches, the development of a methodological scheme and the identification and explication of key terms.

Selection of the Speeches

This researcher spent a period of ten weeks in the Sudan in an attempt to gather presidential speeches suitable for the study. One difficulty facing the researcher was that there was no single place from which these materials could be gathered. Speeches from 1976 up to the end of 1980 were found in the Sudan News Agency "Suna," which is the only news agency in the country, established in 1976. Speeches prior to 1976 were found in two main sources: the Documentation Center at the Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Archives Center at the Sudanese Socialist Union.

Thirteen presidential speeches delivered by President Nimeiri at different times and occasions were eventually selected for the study. The rationale for limiting the materials for this study to speeches alone stemmed from the conviction that following the oral linguistic footprints of the President was the best possible way to locate persuasive strategies. Of course, there are other possible ways in which persuasive strategies could be identified, such as in memoranda. The researcher eschewed to include such material for its limited persuasive impact.

Procedurally, the materials for this study were accumulated in four main categories.
The first category was presidential speeches that were delivered on occasions of the regime's anniversaries. Six of the twelve anniversary speeches were examined. These were:

(1) The first anniversary of the regime, 1970;
(2) the third anniversary of the regime, 1972;
(3) the fifth anniversary of the regime, 1974;
(4) the seventh anniversary of the regime, 1976;
(5) the ninth anniversary of the regime, 1978; and
(6) the eleventh anniversary of the regime, 1980.

The method employed for the selection of these speeches was to choose the first anniversary speech and then every other one.

The second category was the presidential platform speeches:

(1) The presidential platform speech of 1971;
(2) The presidential platform speech of 1977.

The third category was what may be termed as the achievement speeches:

(1) The presidential speech on the occasion of the achievement of national unity, 1972;
(2) The presidential speech at the opening session of the first National Assembly in 1972.
The fourth category was the presidential speeches in response to aborted coup attempts:

1. The president's speech in response to the communist coup of 1971;
2. The president's speech in response to the aborted coup attempt of 1975;

It is the contention of this researcher that these categories together form a coherent data base that would encompass the comprehensive strategies that were employed by President Honefri.

The rationale for choosing these categories for analysis stemmed from four considerations. First, the regime's anniversary speeches represent unique situations that symbolize a victory of the revolution and offer an opportunity for the president to review his achievements, initiate a new policy and justify the occurrence of events that took place in the preceding year. It is in the listing of these achievements, initiation of new policies and the justification of previous events that persuasive strategies are likely to dwell.

Second, the category of the presidential platforms includes a wide array of persuasive appeals that show the direction of the revolution regarding the changes that it was about to accomplish. These speeches established a solid base upon which the public could identify itself with the revolution or insulate itself from the whole process of political change. Consequently, it seems obvious that not all programs would be accepted by the public. So the
effort of the president would be great in challenging his audiences to accept his programs and his overall platform. These appeals would potentially reveal interesting strategies.

Third, the achievement speeches concern themselves with the changes that actually took place. In their symbolic grounds, these speeches deal with the transformation of revolutionary actions that were made possible in the course of political change. It is likely that such speeches would yield strategies of great significance.

Fourth, as mentioned in the first chapter, the Minawol regime had experienced great difficulty in creating a stable form of government free from opposition and counterattack. The result was the occurrence of a number of plots and coup attempts that were waged against the regime. Only three of those managed to assume power for a short period of time. Following the failure of each coup attempt, the president addressed the nation explaining what happened and what steps would be taken to secure the regime from counterattack.

So each response to a coup attempt was potentially encompassing unique exigencies and constraints. It is these exigencies and constraints that would provoke the president to respond positively to restore political order. Correspondingly, the conflict between the revolution and counterrevolution was expected to produce a shift in emphasis regarding the employment of strategies in ways that differed from the previous three categories. That is why the responses to coup attempt speeches were scrutinized.
To investigate the content of a variety of speeches under investigation, two methods were employed to identify and explicate data reflecting the relative emphasis in the utilization of persuasive strategies.

The first method this researcher chose to identify the persuasive strategies under scrutiny was content analysis. Content analysis is simply a method of observation and measurement of communication messages. As Kerlinger describes it:

"Content analysis, while certainly a method of analysis, is more than that. It is ... a method of observation. Instead of observing people's behavior directly, or asking them to respond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes the communication that people have produced and asks questions of communication."

The rationale for employing content analysis stems from the belief that content analysis yields more precise numerical data that enhances the power of a researcher's conclusion. Holsti illustrates the advantages of quantification as follows:

"Statistical methods provide a powerful set of tools, not only a precise and peremptory summary of findings, but also for improving the quality of interpretation and inferences."

Moreover, the primary contribution of content analysis is precisely that it "has explored the whole business of breaking up a
text into distinct, countable items (something that is termed "unitizing"), of classifying these items, and weighing them against one another.

Based upon this conceptual framework, the textual analysis of the speeches employed in this study involved a careful search for persuasive strategies. The researcher began by breaking the following question into countable units: "What were the dominant persuasive strategies in the discourse of President Nineteenth?"

Specifically, the unit of analysis chosen for this coding scheme is the key word or phrase. This unit of analysis is called "the coding unit," which is defined as "the smallest segment of the content counted and scored in content analysis." The researcher proceeds by counting the number of times a key word or phrase appears in the speech. A key word is the word that receives persistent verbal emphasis by the communicator and potentially encompasses a persuasive element. The key words were counted within each speech, which served as a "context unit." A context unit, according to Bud's and his colleagues, is "the body of materials as required to characterize the unit being analyzed." The authors note that the context unit "needs to be large enough to provide the background necessary to permit accurate judging, but not so large that the coders become confusing."

The analysis proceeded by classifying the coding units into distinct separate categories, which this researcher labeled as persuasive strategies. By doing so, the categories, that is, the strategies, reflected the content of the speech in such a way as to
permit answers to the research questions raised in Chapter One. To suit the subject matter, categories have to do two things:

They must be each inclusive enough to hold all appropriate items, and together they must cover the whole range of issues pertinent to the inquiry. The categories have to be such that an item can be classified under only one of them, not under several.

Having identified and grouped the key words or phrases, the researcher proceeded to label each category. The label given for each category was carefully chosen to reflect the persuasive strategies the communicator chose to emphasize in his attempts to persuade the audiences.

In the discussion of the results (Chapter Three), quotations from the speeches are provided to serve as examples of the strategies under scrutiny.

Then, the researcher tabulated the results for each set of speeches (N=4). Each table specified: type of strategy, year speech delivered, frequency and percentage of occurrence of key words in each strategy.

The rationale for choosing the key word or phrase as a unit of analysis is encouraged by a number of communication scholars who have used and encouraged the use of this method for obtaining reliable results. In this study, the use of a key word or phrase as a conceptual tool of analysis is justified further by three reasons.

First, following the track of socio-linguist meaning socially constructed by group members who use that language of their
community. As Brunsford and Rocrell indicate, "meaning ... is best viewed as something that is 'created' rather than restored and retrieved."7

Secondly, based upon the first assumption, language itself can be viewed as bounded by a culture a speaker and his fellow men share. As Carney observes:

Language is social: group consciousness gives words their meanings. These meanings are distilled in the course of group experiences. A person responds to them in the way that is normal for his group. Nobody can arbitrarily change word meanings and still be expected to be understood.

Based upon Carney's view, language is not just an instrument which one uses. It is part of individual's apparatus for relating to the world around him. "To a very large degree, what becomes conscious is what we have words for."9 Epidemiology shares this perspective. He indicates that "every word and phrase used in a casual speech and thought have a connotative burden which opens the way to especially approved conclusions and inhibits the recognition of possibilities that are not culturally condoned."10

This line of argument does not suggest that a key word by itself necessarily identifies a strategy a communicator chooses to employ; rather a key word along with other root words used can be viewed as a strategy after examining their relationships and the setting within which the word or group of words are used. Carney theorizes that:
A word cannot be used independently of other words. Along with the mixture of shades of meaning, there is an associational field consisting of the word company it keeps, and the sorts of contexts in which it tends to crop up.

Thirdly, analysing words and the language they constitute can serve as an indicator of the communicator's rhetorical strategies, persuasive style, and his ability to adopt to various situations.

This method of coding key words/phrases is a viable tool for analysing communication content and has the advantages of reliability in coding procedures. But, as Babbie points out, it has the disadvantage, on another side, of the problem with validity.\(^\text{12}\) To overcome this problem, the researcher coded the latent content of message in the fewer instances where the identification of a specific strategy cannot be understood solely from the employment of key words within it. The phrase latent content refers to "the meaning contained within communications. The determination of latent content requires judgment on the part of the researcher."\(^\text{13}\)

As can be seen, the methods of content analysis provide the parameters for coding the content of messages. But this method by itself is not enough for the interpretation of the utilisation of the strategies.

The second method of analysis this researcher undertook was that of situational rhetoric as synthesized in the metatheoretical perspective in Chapter One. In accordance with that theory, the utilisation of strategies was interpreted in their relationships to rhetorical exigencies, constraints and audiences. This approach was
advantageous, for it permitted the researcher to account for variables not readily quantifiable.

Operational Definitions and Methodological Identification of the Strategies

A preliminary scanning of the thirteen speeches selected for this study suggests that the discourse of President Nimeiri shows the utilization of the strategies of: revolutionization, legitimization, delegitimization, mobilization, unification, theocratization, dedication and Afro-Arabization. The following discussion focuses on the essence of these strategies, their operational definitions, and the methods by which they were identified.

1 - Revolutionization: In Chapter One of this dissertation, the term "revolution" was defined as, "a quest for development and unity." Methodologically, however, development was divorced from unity and emerged as a distinct and separate strategy. Such separation reflects the investigator's attempt to avoid ambiguity in the coding scheme. Seemingly, if the key words reflecting these two categories were combined, there would be greater difficulty when discussing the role of situations, especially on unity, in a speech such as that delivered on the occasion of the declaration of unity agreement between northern and southern Sudan.

Operationally, the strategy that was eventually called "revolutionization" was defined as, "a dynamic process through which persuasive appeals are created and disseminated in response to revolutionary exigencies." The substance of such a strategy
represents an effort by the president to translate his revolutionary aspirations into cohesive symbolic forms to motivate the populace to comply with the desired change.

The association of key words/phrases that correspond to the revolutionisation in strategy were: revolution, change, reform, radical development, progress, and modernisation.

Legitimation: A starting point in the discussion of the category that was later called "legitimation" is the distinction between legitimation as a process of symbolic manipulation, and legitimacy as a concept which Lipset defines as: "The degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper," and as involving "the capacity of a system to engender the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society." According to Apter, legitimacy has two types of values: "consummatory," and "instrumental"; consummatory values are concerned with a particular set of moralities which may involve political ideologies and cultural norms. Instrumental values, on the other hand, pertain to the aspects of governmental efficiency. To the extent that a government formulates an ideological frame of reference for its citizenry and deals with political issues in an efficient manner, the government, or the spokesman for that government is employing a persuasive strategy called herein "legitimation." As Carl Friedrich observes, "The ruler who improves the standard of living will be considered legitimate." The ultimate concern of this inquiry in relation to the strategy under discussion was not to measure legitimacy, that is,
the degree to which the regime was accepted as proper or had a right to govern, but rather, the aim was to account for the communicative choices the president selected to support his legitimacy claims.

Operationally, the category of strategies that came to be called "legitimation" was defined as "a process whereby the president communicates his legitimacy claims to the public in a realm of ideological formation and policy-making in an effort to persuade the public and to allow consensus to be built up."

The key words/phrases that were counted to form this strategy were: socialism, democracy, freedom, justice, equality, ideology, constitutional, proper right, sovereignty, and delegation of power to the masses.

Delegitimation: One category of persuasive strategies that emerged and was called "delegitimation" evolved around the premise that if a new form of legitimacy needed to be created and sustained, the old order must be removed from the political source and hence, its legitimacy must be abolished. Political sociologist Claus Mueller explains this process and the consequences of delegitimation.

This process [of delegitimation] signifies, apart from the obvious erosion of political authority, that the loyalties of citizens to their institutions declines, and that they are less reluctant to support extra-legal and even illegal means to reach political goals.
Operationally, delegitimation refers to the "use of acrimonious language to degrade and vilify parties, groups and/or individuals in an opposition in an attempt to stigmatize the old party members in the eyes of the public, for the purpose of turning potential enemies to supporters."

The constellation of key words/phrases in the strategy of delegitimation was comprised of any key word or phrase typified by the "opposition in a harsh language or fixation of blame on others' actions." Among the key words/phrases that were counted as indicators of the delegitimation strategy were: reactionary forces, tribalist, neo-colonialists, agents of imperialism, sectarianists, pockets of imperialism, merchants of politics, buffooneries, bankrupt politicians, religious opportunists, conspirators, hypocrites, and compromisers.

Mobilisation: The concept of mobilisation has been used in a variety of ways by social scientists. In his influential article "Social Mobilisation and Political Development," Karl Deutsch defines mobilisation as a "process in which major cultures of old social economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken, and people become available for new patterns of socialization." 19

Thus, Deutsch's central concern was on social mobilisation. Deutsch, who equates mobilisation with modernisation, presents key indicators of the process as expansion of literacy, communications, voting participation and per capita income. 20 Deutsch's work became a guideline for scholars who pursue an understanding of the process of social mobilisation rather than of political mobilisation.
Following Deutsch's conceptualization of social mobilization, Obershall defines mobilization as a "process of forming crowds, groups, associations and organizations for the pursuit of collective goals." Obershall's definition of mobilization is clearly rooted in the study of social movements in which a movement strives to form individuals into a collective.

Obershall terms within the total political and social system and its development, Etzioni views mobilization as: "The process by which the energy that is latent from the viewpoint of the acting unit is made available for collective action." Etzioni points out that mobilization is a downward process of control from a central institution to controlled member units, resulting in societal guidance. Since mobilization is controlled by the acting unit, mobilization and public participation in political processes are the major means of communicating new ideas.

Based upon the above concept evaluation of mobilization, operationally, the persuasive strategy that was eventually called "mobilization" in this study referred to "the process by which the president utilized discourse to organize the public and expand its consciousness in an attempt to motivate people to participate in the processes of revolutionary change." Hence, the mobilization potential, at least in its persuasive realization, depended in this study on the degree to which the president successfully articulated mobilization appeals and responded to their exigencies in order to organize support to reach a shared goal of revolutionary change.
The key words and phrases counted in this strategy were: mobilization, participation, organization, endorsement, and support. Since these words do not account for all the dimensions of mobilization, each time the president summarized his views about mobilization was counted as an instance of mobilization, such as to direct, urge, or advise the public to get involved in politics.

Theocracy: Theocracy is defined as: "1: government of a state by immediate divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided; 2: a state governed by a theocracy." H. Ali Kamru, who studied the role of theocracy in politics in Uganda, conceives of theocracy as:

A political system which uses God as a point of reference for policy-making and makes God the focus or political morality. Political wisdom in a theocracy is ultimately divinely inspired. The world of politics and the world of religion in a theocracy are profoundly intertwined.

In fact, this interwoven world of politics and religion constantly receives considerable emphasis by politicians who use religious symbolism and transcend their religious experiences in an attempt to persuade the public and to manipulate their realities in the name of God.

Aside from its attachment to politics, religion is also interconnected with rhetoric. In his book, The Rhetoric of Religion, Kenneth Burke put the relationship of religion and rhetoric very succinctly:
The subject of religion falls under the head of rhetoric in the sense that rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and religious communicators are designed, in the last analysis, as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion. To persuade men towards certain acts, religions would form the kind of attitude which prepares men for such acts. And in order to plead for such attitudes as persuasively as possible, the religious ground their exhortations (to themselves and others) in statements of the widest and deepest possible scope, oppressing the authorship of new motives."

As used in this study, theocratization refers to the persuasive strategy reflecting the articulation of religious appeals in an effort to attain political objectives. The key words that were encompassed within this strategy were: religion, God (Allah), profit, mosque, church, pray, worship, blessing, grace of God, and faith.

Unification: Conceptually, unification means the methods by which two or more conflict groups are fused and brought together under one nation, or as Etzioni indicates, unification is the "bonding of units into supra-units." 27 The process of unification is often referred to as the process of national integration, which refers specifically to the "problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows or eliminates subordinate parochial loyalties." 28

Essential to the understanding of the process of unification is the presumption that a nation embodies within its territories a plural society with different languages or other cultural artifacts
that characterize the fragmented groups and their attachment to specific ethnic or political qualities.

Operationally, the strategy that was called "unification" was taken to mean "a communicative effort in the direction of the creation and solidification of national unity and a rejection of any form of fragmentation within the Sudanese society."

The key words/phrases that were embodied within this strategy were: national unity, integration, reconciliation, and solidarity.

Dedication: Operationally, "dedication is the manner by which a speaker designates himself as committed to national interest and public welfare through the use of rhetorical forms in an effort to build a favorable image and to enhance his credibility."

The significance of the credibility issue of the communicator has a lengthy heritage stretching back to Aristotle's time. Aristotle equated the power of the communicator with the power of the communicatee who receives the message. Aristotle rightly demonstrated that:

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others. This is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinion is divided ... It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion."
The key words/phrases that comprised the strategy of dedication were: dedicated, patriot, loyal, honest, committed, sincere, nationalist, hero, faithful to the public, protector of a nation, sacrificer, devoted to national interest, admits mistakes, and trustworthy.

Afro-Arabization: As used in this study, Afro-Arabization refers to "the selection and articulation of argumentative appeals in the realization of both African and Arab commitments." The key words/phrases counted in this strategy were: Africa, our continent, case of a country in Africa, Arab, Middle-East, and a name of a country in the Middle-East.

To briefly summarize, the methodology discussed in this chapter was an attempt to furnish a methodology by which this study can be executed. The methodological scope was specified, the manner by which speeches were selected was described, the methodological scheme was explained, and the methods employed for the identification of persuasive strategies were explicated.
Notes


4Ibid., p. 56.

5Ibid.


8Carney, p. 86.

9Ibid.


11Carney, pp. 87-88.


13Ibid., p. 262.


15Ibid.
19. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
CHAPTER III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter is a presentation of the results and discussion of the investigation of the revolutionary rhetoric of President Nimeiri of the Sudan. The results and the discussion in relation to the four categories of speeches are presented in four separate sections: 1) May anniversary speeches, 2) presidential platform speeches, 3) achievement speeches, and 4) response to coup attempt speeches. In each section the researcher answers two questions: 1) What were the dominant persuasive strategies in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri in his attempts to create and maintain political order? 2) Was there any continuity in the utilization of the strategies across the speeches selected for the study through times and situations? The final section of this chapter will be devoted to answering the question: What were the general characteristics of the political rhetoric in Sudan?

Persuasive Strategies in the May Anniversary Speeches

Background

The examination of the May anniversary speeches (1-6) revealed the utilization of the strategies of: revolutionization, legitimization, delegitimization, mobilization, unification, theocratization, dedication and Afro-Arabization. These eight persuasive strategies were directed toward challenging the existing
political order and threatening the prevalent values of the Sudanese social system. Essential to the understanding of these strategies is the comprehension of the nature of these anniversaries and the rhetorical situations embodied within them.

The May anniversary speeches occurred on the twenty-fifth day of May each year. On that day, ceremonies and festivals were organized in remembrance of the day on which the Nimiri Regime succeeded in holding power. The purpose of these celebrations, aside from their symbolic nature of keeping the flame of victory alive, the President in these celebrations reviews his achievements and plans for the future.

The anniversary speeches, then, constitute a type of discourse that is distinctively recognizable from other classes of speeches. One element that unites the anniversary speeches is that they all represent an attempt to illuminate the exigence of the anniversaries in which both the communicator and his audience engage in a memorable occasion of celebrating victory.

The rhetorical situations of the anniversary speeches manifested several exigencies that needed to be addressed. Generally, the situations demanded that the speaker advocate a new form of political order be created; the old political order be abolished and the experience of the masses be restructured; aspirations for obtaining a relative developed economy; hopes for raising the standard of living and demands for achieving a profound change be met.

The foregoing describes a rhetorical problem which President Nimiri confronted on the occasion of each anniversary. To degree
to which the president has dealt with these rhetorical challenges is shown in Table 1. The table shows the breakdown of the emphasis in utilization of the eight persuasive strategies under investigation and the percentage of each strategy employed in relation to the others in the same speech.

Analysis of the First Anniversary Speech - 1970
Situational Context

The rhetorical situation of the May 1970 anniversary speech exhibited several exigencies that needed to be addressed. First, the demands of the audiences must be addressed. Since the independence of the Sudan in 1956, the public had been yearning for a change that would alter the aspects of life in the Sudan.

Second, exactly two months before this anniversary, the Nimeiri Regime had confronted two bloody contests with the opposition, specifically the Umma Party, and these confrontations had to be acknowledged. The first of these confrontations took place in March 1970 in Kad Sabawri, Omdurman, which was "put down with unnecessary force, and resulted in uncalled-for bloodshed." The second confrontation took place at Elgezara village when a group of Umma party challenged the legitimacy of President Nimeiri a few weeks after the first confrontation. That plot was also put down by force.

Thousands of people lost their lives, including El Hadi El Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party. Although President Nimeiri had provided explanations for his actions at the time, the exigence was still, then, in the minds of the public.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency Distribution and Percentage by Year</th>
<th>Total of Key Words in Each Strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionization</td>
<td>F 1970 438 36.5 240 30.8 184 40.0 65 29.0 145 27.0 170 29.5 1242</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>P 1972 18.7 225 29.0 121 26.4 49 22.0 122 22.7 149 26.0 893</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegitimation</td>
<td>F 1974 223 18.3 42 5.4 14 3.1 04 1.8 03 .5 07 1.2 293</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>F 1976 85 6.7 73 9.4 42 9.2 23 10.2 116 21.6 78 13.5 417</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>F 1978 64 5.2 72 9.2 25 5.5 20 8.9 49 9.1 65 7.9 275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theocratization</td>
<td>F 1980 61 5.0 36 4.6 19 4.1 16 7.1 27 5.0 31 5.4 190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>F 1970 38 3.1 66 8.5 27 5.9 18 8.0 58 11.0 33 5.7 240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Arabization</td>
<td>F 1972 79 6.5 24 3.1 27 5.9 29 13.0 17 3.1 62 10.8 238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Total</td>
<td>F 100 100 100 100 100 100 100</td>
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Third, the first anniversary speech had to witness a presence of two distinguishable leaders who came to share the occasion of the celebrations with their neighboring country. These leaders were Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Muamar El Gaddafi of Libya. Thus the appearance of these two leaders onto the scene obviously influenced the direction of the president's speech in some respects.

Revolutionisation Strategy

Of the eight persuasive strategies employed in this speech, revolutionisation was by far the most emphasized one (F = 435, F = 36.5). See Table 1. The speech was laden with revolutionary words/phrases such as: "radical change," "progressive revolution," "political reform," "progress," "modernity," "development," and "nationalisation." The president's extensive use of revolutionary language was an attempt to persuade the audience that his regime was a "revolutionary" one, and that it differed from all forms of political regimes that the Sudan had experienced since its independence.

President Nimeiri affirmed:

The revolution came for the purpose of rallying on the road of progress and socialism. It aims at achieving radical change, brought about by the creative talents and exuberant energies of the Sudanese people. The revolution releases these talents and opens for them the gate of change toward a great future.
The choices of key words/phrases such as "radical change," "progress," and a "great future," coupled with the consideration of the people themselves as recognizable agents of change, clearly dramatised the president's appeals. For one thing, the appeals for radical change not only represent the regime's outlook, but also were responses to the expectations and the demands of the audiences.

Another important element of revolutionization strategy appeared when President Mneir declared his decision about "nationalizing international banks and corporations in the Sudan," an action which took place immediately following the speech. The nationalization decision was justified on the grounds that:

Your invisible revolution has taken this decisive step of nationalization as a natural procedure necessitated by the economic and monetary policy which is based on scientific planning and socialist guidance.

Nationalization as an eminent tactic of revolutionization strategy may be considered a tradition adopted by revolutionary leaders in the Third World. The leaders who nationalize foreign corporations seek, in addition to rectifying economic conditions, societal acceptance. The eminent rule here is that whoever nationalizes international banks will be conceived of as a revolutionary. Thus, it is implicit in Mneir's decision concerning nationalization that he was as revolutionary as Nasser, who undertook a similar step of nationalization early in the course of the Egyptian "revolution."
Legitimation Strategy

Legitimation was the second most common strategy emphasized of all the strategies employed in the speech of 1970 (P = 27, P = 18.6). In his search for legitimacy, President Nimeiri stressed the thesis that his regime was struggling for the attainment of "democracy," "socialism," "justice," "freedom," "liberation of the economy from foreign influences," "equality," "sufficiency," and "delegation of power to the masses." The latter phrase is, perhaps, the most indicative of legitimation strategy. President Nimeiri asserted:

Today we celebrate a progressive socialist revolution, that delegated the power to the masses.

Implicit in this assertion is that the president attempted to inspire the audience to believe that the Nimeiri Regime was not a mere militaristic form of government seeking to rule by force; rather, it is "revolutionary" in nature where the masses had a full right to govern themselves.

It appears that the articulation of legitimacy claims is very essential for the maintenance of political system, and hence is a very pivotal strategy for persuading the public to comply with the policies of the regime. To illustrate, Bill and Leiden indicated:

Every revolutionary government immediately seeks to establish its legitimacy claims; where it is unsuccessful, in this, its life is
usually short and some more successful claimant takes its place.

The president's communicative effort to establish his legitimacy claims was not grounded in an ideology, nor were the terms he employed such as "democracy," "freedom," and "socialism," for example, clearly defined and explained to the public. The ambiguity of such terms probably reduced the efficacy of this strategy at the time.

Delegitimation Strategy

The delegitimation strategy received almost the same emphasis as did the legitimation strategy ($P = 223, P = .083$). In his first year of office President Meir gained little support from the public, partially because a considerable portion of the public were clinging tenaciously to previously held political affiliations and loyalties. The recently aborted opposition revolts helped the president to define the situation to his advantage, by attacking the opposition forces and explaining their actions to the public.

The rhetorical situation demanded that the old political order be challenged so that some degree of consensus might be established on the basis of public knowledge about what the "true nature" of the opposition really was.

One basic element of delegitimation strategy was that of denunciation and stigmatization of the opposition members and their activities. The opposition members were typified as: "neo-colonialist," "corrupt," "distractivist," "imperialist-agents," "sectarianists," "anarchists," "conspirators," "traitors,"
"opportunistas," and "exploiters of the masses." These
delegitimation terms were likely employed to minimize the public
support of the opposition and to maximize support for the Nimeiri
regime.

Another element of delegitimation strategy employed by
President Nimeiri was that he attempted to define what the
opposition really was, and to draw a sharp line between his regime
and the opposition:

The reactionary forces constitute a
selfish unprogressive group that
contradict the law of human force
progress. Its immoral cowardice
emanating from a fear for its
self-interest. This group would be
greedily willing to cooperate with the
devil so as to abort and hinder every
revolutionary struggle that aims at
achieving human freedom and social
justice. Essentially, the reactionary
forces build the fortresses of their
authority and wealth from the
exploitation enslavement of man.10

As can be observed from the above sharp depictions, President
Nimeiri, by juxtaposing legitimation and delegitimation words,
attempted to show the difference between his regime and the
opposition in a dichotomous way. On the one hand, there was a
legitimate political system of authority which was perceived and
credited for pursuing legitimacy that was based on socialism,
freedom and social justice. And on the other hand there was an
illegitimate system (opposition forms) which was depicted as based
on selfishness, exploitation and enslavement of mankind.
To pursue this line of differentiation between the opposition forces and his regime even further, President Mineiri asserted that: "The revolution and the reactionary forces are irreconcilable oppositions."11

The third element of delegitimation employed in the 1970 speech was that of blame fixing. President Mineiri placed the blame on the previous political parties, i.e., the opposing forces, on a number of grounds. The opposition members were blamed for: "deteriorating the economy," "lacking efficient policies locally, regionally, and internationally," "exploiting the masses in the name of religion," "exercising political corruption," and "creating a generation of naive politicians."12

These three elements - denunciation, differentiation and blame focusing - operate so as to degrade the opposition so that the general public could perceive these depictions as real and, hence, act in supporting the Mineiri regime, or at least not to be involved in any of the opposition's actions against the regime.

Mobilization Strategy

Mobilization strategy was the third most commonly employed strategy in the 1970 speech (F = .95; F = 6.7). The process by which President Mineiri attempted to mobilize a substantial number of the mass to support his regime and/or consolidate his decisions involved quiescence of both those who openly challenged the regime in March 1970, and those who passively disengaged from politics.

Mineiri's appeals centered around his perception that "The May revolution is a mass revolution in its formations and in its
objective. The concept of "masses" necessarily includes all the Sudanese people. The masses were called upon to participate in the perfection of governmental policies, eradication of illiteracy, and maximization of work for the benefit of the whole country.  

Another form of mobilization strategy included a direct appeal for labor organizations to undertake certain tasks:

Labor organizations are obliged to fulfill important and serious duties, the first of which is to disseminate cultural enlightenment and national guidance among its members in a way that enables them to bring about the revival of a nation that seeks progress and its inevitable consequences.

By appealing in this manner, President Nimeiri attempted to encourage the labor unions to be fully involved in solidifying governmental policies. President Nimeiri further conceived of the masses as a responsible partner whose participation was necessary for forming a protective shell against any counter-revolutionary actions.

Despite these pleas for public participation, the president's efforts toward mobilizing the public remained limited. Such limitations of mobilization activity can be attributed basically to the absence of a political organization at the time, that could serve as the locus of activity, from which members could operate efficiently under decentralized directions instead of "being agitated from above."
Unification Strategy

Unification strategy was a basic strategy also utilized in the first anniversary speech (P = 64, P = 5.2). The rhetorical situation at the time was marked by the racial conflict between the north and the south. So in spite of the June Declaration in which President Nimeiri promised to end this conflict, the southern part of the Sudan was still, then, in turmoil.

In dealing with this problem rhetorically, President Nimeiri pleaded with the public to forget the past situation that contributed to the escalation of the war in the south, and appealed to the people to comply with the regime's efforts to end the civil war and establish unity in the country. President Nimeiri declared:

The revolution came to actualize national revolutionary unity, by bringing together the people of the Sudan in one nation, one party. It aimed at creating out of you one harmonious national unity, that can move forward with a deep determination on the road of transformation into democracy and socialism after the elimination of reactionary forces, subversive agents and opportunists.

Thus, as evidenced, there appeared to be a strategic mixing in Nimeiri's appeals. Unity that facilitates the transformation of the Sudan into a socialist democratic state was seen as possible only after the elimination of previous political parties.
Theorization Strategy

Theorization strategy was emphasized with moderate frequency (Y = 61, P = 5.0). President Nimeiri used the word "God" as a central communicative premise. He expressed his strong belief in "God", and told the audience that "God will help us," in the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, poverty and illness.19

While President Nimeiri employed religious symbols to support his claims, he did not forget to accuse the opposition of allegations such as: "The reactionary forces exploited the masses in the name of religion," and the reactionary forces "have violated the religious principles of Islam."20

Dedication Strategy

Although it was the least emphasized of all (P = 35, P = 3.1), dedication strategy still remained an important strategy in the discourse of President Nimeiri. Despite the fact that the president spent one year in office and had toured the country to disseminate his ideas, his character was still not fully pervasive among the public. The rhetorical situation at the time called for him to present himself to the public in an acceptable fashion. His rhetorical response to that was:

I will remain a sincere soldier and will give you all and every drop of my blood, in order to protect your independence and your revolution.21
Afro-Arabization Strategy

The articulation of both African and Arab commitment was also a significant element in the first anniversary speech (F = 74, F = 6.5). A great number of Afro-Arabization words appeared when President Nimeiri declared that the leaders Bassar, Gaddafi and himself agreed to establish a "triple alliance" among Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan. The formation of a triple alliance was seen as a necessary step to enhance the "Afro-Arab struggle against Zionism, colonialism and imperialism."22

Analysis of the Third Anniversary Speech - 1972

Situational Context

The rhetorical situation of the third anniversary speech was characterized by immense activities in the direction of organizational revolution and institution building. In 1972, the newly established Sudanese Socialist Union and its origins were not fully understood by the participant elites in the Sudan, let alone by the general public. More importantly, the situation was also marked by the ratification of the Unity Accord, which put an end to civil war between southern and northern Sudan.

If the first anniversary speech was characterized by the articulation of the regime's objectives, the third anniversary speech was marked by the documentation of these objectives into the National Charter, which encompassed the regime's ideological thought and its political vision toward the future. The rhetorical situation demanded that the president's address should reflect these situational exigencies in a very precise and persuasive manner.
Revolutionization Strategy

Revolutionization strategy again was the most permanently used of all the strategies in the speech of 1972 (p = 240, p = 30.8). One of the most basic features of revolutionization strategy was the president's determination to pursue the course of the revolution without compromising or retreating from the declared objectives:

The revolution will not retreat. The revolution will not compromise. The revolution will neither retreat nor compromise."

Another distinguishable element of the revolutionization strategy was the raising of expectations of the Sudanese people:

The revolution aims at the development of production, modernization of methods, construction of new social relations and the increase of national individual income, the raising of living standards and reduction in the cost of living, and the supply of social services to all citizens."

Here the president used the raising of expectations as a motivating device to persuade the public to accept his premises of the revolution. In fact, the increase of individuals' income, and the improvement of living standards was actually what people wanted and desired to be accomplished. The promise of a material reward was sounded, for example, in the above quotation, at least rhetorically. As Graber indicated: "The promises serve as a balm for anguishing minds, even when no future action occurs."
Legitimation Strategy

The president's search for legitimation procedure represented another powerful expression in the speech of 1972 (P = 121, P = 29.0). The situation was characterised by a number of rhetorical factors encompassing the adoption of legitimation strategy.

President Nimeiri perceived the role of Congress and the National Charter as follows:

The congress will always remain a landmark on the road to our organisational revolution, and the embodiment of the people's will. The charter with its principles and objectives will be our manual to build the revolutionary society, based on justice, sufficiency and social development.

Legitimation strategies were very prevalent in the president's above claims. By emphasizing the importance of the congress and the charter, President Nimeiri attempted to make the people believe that his regime was based on legitimate organizational institutions, rather than on decision imposed from above.

In pursuing this line of legitimating claims, President Nimeiri stressed that:

- [We] laid the foundation for people's local rule to extend democracy.
- Laid the foundation for constitutional rule with the election of the president by free will.
- Fulfilled the revolution's pledge to place power in the hands of people.
The organisational revolutionary began with the National Congress of the
Socialist Union and the establishment of base units of the union.
- Begun the legislative, administrative and organizational revolution.**

These legitimacy claims signified the president's eagerness to establish legitimacy by presenting his organizational revolution to the public as characterized by a well-established system of socialist states, where its ideology is grounded in both the national charter and the national constitution. These claims signified in another part that that form of institution was created by the people and for the people’s benefit. Consequently, key words such as "efficiency," "justice," and "constitution," were presented to give the public a sense of an efficient form of institutional practice.

**Delegation Strategy**

The process by which the opposition was discredited was more sharply declined than in the 1970 speech (Y = 42, P = .01). The deemphasis of the strategy of delegitimation can be attributed to situational factors. Three years have passed since the Museveni regime took over and he dissolved the government's political parties and established his government one-party system.

Many of Museveni's delegitimation words, however, appeared as a response to the unsuccessful coup attempt which took place in July 1977. The coup organizers were depicted as "cheap opportunists" and as a "gang of treachery."26 In addition, the president denounced his opponent in the following manner:
We learned great lessons and accumulated precious experiences from the ill-fated July conspiracy. Above all, the hypocrites and the compromisers - those who would sell the objectives of this nation and betray it - were revealed to us. The Revolution had opened its arms to them, giving them a place in its leadership and other positions, hoping they would prove a support to socialism to strengthen the march towards a great transformation. But they betrayed their trust, swelled in corruption and dissipation, sabotaged the economy to weaken the people's faith in the Revolution, and proved to be against socialism.  

Aside from the use of acrimonious language to degrade the persons who waged the coup attempt of July 1971, the structure of Nimeiri's strategy of delegitimation is built through the use of dichotomies: Nimeiri attempted to force his audience to see the world through a specific window -- the loyal, honest noncompromiser Nimeiri versus the hypocritical conspirator, compromiser coup members, a socialist system versus a corrupted system; the Nimeiri regime of justice versus the unjust practices of the coup members.

The key underlying issue in these dichotomist appeals was the legitimate system of Nimeiri's pursuit of socialism and the transformation of the society, while the illegitimate coup members are against socialism and anti-public welfare.

While certainly Nimeiri is addressing the whole nation, he also wanted to get his message across to those who might try to commit probable counterrevolution: "... all the conspiracies aimed at this nation broke, and will break, against the solid rock of your revolution."
Mobilization Strategy

As Table 1 reveals, this strategy was utilized in the 1972 speech more than in the first anniversary speech ($F = 7.3, F = 3.4$). Several factors probably undermine the emphasis of this strategy: the aspect of organizational revolution which was in progress, the achievement of national unity, the process by which the president sought to solidify his regime. All these factors demanded a well organized discourse to mobilize the public to actively participate in the newly established organizations, specifically the Sudanese Socialist Union. The exigencies of this speech, then, needed to be altered; that is, the public had to be mobilized so that a collective action would result from a collaborative effort of individuals, and, hence, from their positive participation.

President Nimeiri appealed to the public this way:

"The Revolution welcomes the effort of every Sudanese who works for the development of this country. All sons of this land are called to participate now that factors of discrimination are no longer existent."³¹

While the president called for all the Sudanese people to participate, his efforts to accomplish this task involved two main tasks: the first of which was the atomization of the masses into five distinct yet cohesive groups: "The Sudanese Socialist Union," said President Nimeiri, "is open to workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and national capitalists."³² The second element was the polarization of groups: "The Sudanese socialist Union," in
Hisnir’s words, “is the supreme organ and revolutionary authority over state organs and the sole political party.”

So, while mobilization was pursued and participation was encouraged, mobilization strategy operated to create a loyal committed citizenry whose participation was allowed only within the boundaries of the regime’s institutions, namely the Sudanese Socialist Union.

Unification Strategy

As can be seen from Table 1, this strategy was employed in the 1972 speech more than in the 1970 speech (Y = 72, P = .02). The proliferation in use of the strategy of unification can be attributed to the exigencies of the speech. At the time, the Unity Accord between the north and the south was accomplished exactly seven weeks before the speech was delivered. President Hisnir’s appeals represented an effort to define the situation and to explain the advantages of unity over disunity and social upheaval:

National unity is a forge where barriers between the people disappear and their desires reach harmony; where individual abilities are transformed into mass ability; and individual wills into a popular force to achieve change and development ... Those who dream of achieving national unity except by revolution’s principles and objectives will be disillusioned.”

By juxtaposing unity and development, the president explicitly emphasized that unity would facilitate and foster development. The appeals for unity seemed to be potentially powerful since they
explained clearly what the advantages of unity were. These explanations gave to the audience what it meant to be a united people in a united country. In addition, they communicated to the public that unless the people supported the unity in question, there would be no collaborative effort that would result in the development of the country.

While the strategy of unification stressed togetherness and gave all individuals in the Sudan a sense of belonging, some groups, especially those who opposed the Nasser Regime, seemed to have been alienated from national unity:

National unity is not a forum open to all forces of backwardness and their blind loyalties, but summons to the revolutionary fold, dedication to its principles, readiness to give and sacrifice for construction and development.

Theocratization Strategy

As Table I reveals, this strategy was used in the 1972 speech, of about the same percentage of twice as in the 1970 speech (F = 36, P = 4.6). Many of the theocratization terms appeared when the president specified the role of the Ministry of Religion:

The Ministry is undertaking the task of restoring to the mosque its position and effectiveness as a center for intellectual and religious influence and a focus for guidance and instruction to infuse tranquility into society and
transform them into creative and constructive emphases ... The Ministry is concerned with the patronizing of developing churches and takes an interest in Christian institutions, education, clergymen, and establishing a Sudanese church for the Sudanese Christians.  

Obviously, President Nimri's appeals encompassed the demands of both Muslims and Christian citizens in the Sudan who regarded religious and spiritual concerns as the most important aspect of life.

**Dedication Strategy**

In the 1972 speech, dedication words were employed about three times more frequently than in the 1970 speech ($F = 66$, $P = .05$). The use of ethical proof was frequently manifested:

> In meeting with you, I experience an immense happiness. Such happiness is equalled only by our loyalty to this country and the dedication of the people to the invaluable revolutionary legacy.

The key phrase, "our loyalty," clearly represents the president's attempt to identify with his audience. Kenneth Burke's concept of "identification" is particularly useful here in an understanding of Nimri's strategy. Burke defines identification as "consubstantiality," or "as acting together." In Burke's conception, "the identifying of himself with his audience will be more effective if it is genuine." Thus, the interaction of
appeals such as to loyalty, dedication, and identification, made the Jneiri appeals appear more sincere and hence functioning in the desired direction.

To give his audience the sense that he was a dedicated and trusted leader, the president ended his speech with the following plea:

My countrymen everywhere, I take an oath that I will remain loyal to the people of this country, struggling for their aims and aspirations.

Afro-Arabization Strategy

The utilization of the Afro-Arab strategy was the least used strategy in the second anniversary speech ($P = 24$, $P = 3.1$). The choices exhibiting Afro-Arabization commitment were chosen and presented in a very appealing fashion: "We belong to both the African and Arab families." These relationships were further specified as follows:

Our people are at the heart of the Arab revolution ignited by our nation in order to achieve its moral objectives of liberation, socialism, and unity.

...our people... together with the forces of the African revolution, confront colonialism and powers of racial discrimination.
President Nimeiri tended to use this strategy in furthering of his foreign policy. His appeals seemed to reflect both political and cultural background of the Sudanese people and their racial configuration, which included both African and Arab heritage.

Analysis of the Fifth Anniversary Speech - 1974

Situational Context

The rhetorical situation of the fifth anniversary speech was characterized by a relative degree of stability. In the sense that, during the previous two years there had been no coup attempt that seriously challenged the Nimeiri regime. More importantly, the relative stability has come into being because the unity problem had been resolved in 1972 -- the People’s General Assembly had been formed and had managed to draw up the national constitution for the country.

In spite of these achievements that brought relative stability to the political system, there remained the problem of economic development -- a problem which represented not only a concern of the leader, but also a desire of the public.

It can be said in general terms that the rhetorical situation of the 1974 speech was characterized by a need for emphasizing development issues and for consolidating what had been achieved in the domains of unity and development of political institutions.

Aside from the relative stability, another exigence imposing itself on the situation was the opening session of the Second People’s Assembly. Its inauguration was tailored to correspond with
the fifth anniversary speech. How President Nimeiri attempted to
accommodate the exigence is shown in the following discussion.

Revolutionization Strategy

As can be seen from Table 1, revolutionization strategy
was used extensively (F = 134, P < .05). A considerable number of
revolutionization terms were articulated in a manner of hopes and
determination for alterations of societal conditions. "The new
Sudan," said President Nimeiri, "looks forward to a new year of
revolutionary change, progress and prosperity." These noble aims
of progress and prosperity were seen to be possible only through the
attainment of economic development.

Economic development, to President Nimeiri, was not solely
economic growth and an increase of gross national product, but
rather economic growth was viewed within social context:

Development should lead to the building
of a new society where creative,
productive and humanized work will be
the order of the day. We will see to it
that the development will not entail the
disintegration of our social
institutions and values. Man is still
the most precious thing we have,
and should not turn into a spiritless
robot, nor should his work be regarded
as a commodity.

While the selection of these terms was rhetorically sound,
President Nimeiri said nothing about how individuals would be
morally alleviated, except for a persistent emphasis on raising the

**Legitimation Strategy**

Legitimation strategy continued to be the second most utilized strategy (F = 121, P = .064). Addressing the first session of the Second People's Assembly, whose opening coincided with the anniversary of the revolution, President Nimeiri praised the National Assembly:

> Your assembly is a new representative institution born out of a new democracy — the democracy of participation, alliance, integration and national unity.

> ... The May Revolution has been as good as its word. Political and constitutional institutions have been set up the length and breadth of the land to concretize the sovereign power of the people. And now the zenith of this process has been reached with the convening of your assembly.

The strategic selection of words such as "democracy," "political institutions," "constitution," "sovereign power of the people," was apparently designed to persuade the public to believe the legitimacy claims of the regime are real.

Apparently the reliance on creations of political institutions and the articulation of legitimacy claims is more persuasive than the application of force, or as Duncan put it:
The legitimation of authority is based on persuasion. Political leader goes directly to his people, both in his struggle for power and in his attempt to stay in power. Force may put a leader in power, but it will not keep him there; for, as a proverb reminds us, we can do everything with bayonets but sit on them.

Delegitimation Strategy

Delegitimation strategy declined drastically ($F = 14, P = 3.1$). This sharp decline in the utilization of delegitimation terms may be attributed to the exigential flow of events which in turn influenced the selection of messages. The rhetorical situation at the time called for emphasizing revolutionary ideas and the sustenance of legitimacy claims rather than focusing energy on delegitimization of an enemy who was virtually nonpresent.

Much of what was emphasized in the speech in relation to the delegitimation procedure centered on how previous politicians were abolished:

The bankrupt politicians, the religious opportunists, the profiteers of hatred and discord, and the protagonists of silenced institutions were all removed from the political scene.

These harsh depictions were employed basically to keep the public conscious about the political actions of the previous politicians.
Mobilisation Strategy

Mobilisation strategy was emphasised in the 1974 speech at about the same rate as it received in 1973 (F = 42, F = 9.2). The strategy of mobilisation as employed in this speech involves three basic elements, the first of which was ordering members of the People’s Assembly to be responsible members:

I would ask you, members of the People’s Assembly, to be your people’s true representatives, not to be self-seeking and to have in view only the public and popular interest. I would remind you that, in principle, each and every one of you is a representative of the nation, and as such cannot put any sectarian interest before the public interest.

The second basic element in mobilisation strategy incorporated warning against intellectual debate. President Nkomo warned that:

I would not like to see your assembly become the theatre of farcical argumentation or futile tournaments of wit. I want to see it a site of fruitful and continuous work, becon of new democracy.

The third element in the mobilisation strategy evolved around encouraging participation. In the president’s words:

I have issued a presidential order for the readjustment of the provinces in order to ... guarantee broad popular participation in the affairs of government and to enable the people’s
local government authorities to fulfill their task effectively and efficiently.

It appears that the elements of mobilization were created basically to serve as a vehicle for communication between the ruler and the ruled.

Unification Strategy

Unification strategy appeared to have declined considerably in use in the 1974 speech than in the 1972 speech ($F = 42, P = 5.5$). The relative decrease in unification words may be placed in the context of the situation. Unity itself as a primary aim of the regime, has been accomplished in 1972; what the exigence called for in 1974 was appeal for solidification of unity. President Xheiri urged the public that:

The most noble aim of the May Revolution has hitherto been accomplished, is the national unity, that you should guard like the pupils of your eyes. Let no traitor or opportunist sabotage national unity.

As can be observed in this quotation, there appeared to be a strategic mixing: by juxtaposing unity, mobilization and delegitimization terms, President Xheiri affirmed that the unity of the nation was always a target for an illegitimate element, and, hence, he attempted to mobilize the public to be united and alert and to safeguard its unity.
Theocratization Strategy

Theocratization strategy remained very consistent in usage \( F = 19, \nu = 5.1 \). In describing how the revolution succeeded in crushing political doubts, President Nimeiri declared that "by the grace of God and with the ardent support of the people, the revolutionary power succeeded to nip in the bud these acts of folly." And to what extent had these plots affected the president’s belief? President Nimeiri answered:

Through all these trials my absolute faith in God and the people has never wavered. On the contrary, events have sustained it.\(^\text{54}\)

Dedication Strategy

As Table 1 showed, this strategy was used less than in the third anniversary speech \( F = 27, \nu = 5.9 \). After inaugurating the Second People’s Assembly, President Nimeiri declared that: "I have thus kept any word to transfer power and sovereignty to the people."\(^\text{55}\) By indicating that he kept his word, the president attempted to inspire the public to believe that he was a trustworthy leader. Additionally, President Nimeiri’s use of dedication strategy was an attempt to make the public believe that his regime was as legitimate as the world’s transfer power and sovereignty implied.
Afro-Arabisation Strategy

Afro-Arabisation strategy increased somewhat over that found in the 1972 speech (F = 23, P = 5.9). As can be seen from the following passage, President Nimeiri constantly attempted to balance his relationship with the Afro-Arab world. Even his articulation of these relationships was often expressed in a similar fashion:

The Sudan will remain true to his Afro-Arab heritage, playing its unique and distinctive role in promoting African solidarity and brotherhood among African people, in strengthening the unity of Afro-Arab struggle and in lending unstinting support to free mother Africa from the scourge of racial discrimination and resist minority regimes.

Analysis of the Seventh Anniversary Speech - 1976

Situational Context

The rhetorical situation of the seventh anniversary speech exhibited at least three exigencies. First, the exigencies of the anniversary itself demanded a well-structured discourse to define the meaning of anniversary celebrations after an elapse of seven years in the course of the revolution. Second, the speech was delivered before the members of the National Congress of the Sudan Farmers Union, whose conference was tailored to fit the occasion of the anniversary. Third, the rhetorical situation of the anniversary was overshadowed by another exigence pertaining to the escalation of conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean
Revolutionary Guerrillas. Since the fighting between those two parties endangered the national security of the Sudan in the eastern borders, the exigence necessitated a rhetorical response, so that both the parties in conflict and the refugees who fled their country could hear the position of the Sudan in relation to the whole situation.

Revolutionization Strategy

In the seventh anniversary speech, revolutionization strategy remained the most emphasized of all. As can be seen from Table 1, revolutionization strategy was used often: $P = 65$, $P = 29.0$. Many of the revolutionization terms occurred in regard to the persistent effort to achieve a noticeable change in all spheres of life.

President Kimeiri addressed the gathering of farmers:

We are proud of our model of national development which enters for the needs of every region in the Sudan and aims at bettering the lot of the working man socially and economically.

By emphasizing the issue of bettering the life of individuals, President Kimeiri continued to rouse the expectation of the Sudanese people. His speech was totally empty of discussion of what actually had been achieved in improving the living conditions of citizens. Following the same line of argument, President Kimeiri told the audience that:

The year 1976-1977 will witness the implementation of the Arab programme for
agricultural investment and development which is composed of sixty-five projects totaling 535 million pounds.

As yet, these developmental programs remained ink on paper. The attempt to raise expectations may have been well persuasively stutte, though, in time, audiences may have discovered that they were not told facts but rather were told intentions and hopes. More importantly, the issue of rising expectations could have had a serious consequence with what Daniel Lerner called "rising frustrations." Lerner theorized that:

Because their achievements — particularly in the economic development — have lagged so far behind their expectations, many LDC peoples have moved from rising expectations into a second phase of rising frustrations. People simply have not been getting what they had been led to want by their charismatic leaders ... As a result, the "wants/got ratio" has become seriously imbalanced and the LDC peoples have suffered continuing and deepening frustration.

Legitimization Strategy

The persuasive search for legitimacy remained an important element in the seventh anniversary speech (f = 43, P = 22.0). By adapting the speech to his immediate audience, President Kheliri attempted to sustain the farmers' confidence in his regime:
The revolution liberated the farmers, and restored their full right under the banners of freedom, socialism and democracy.

It was evident that President Nimeiri, by depicting his regime as socialist democratic and fostering freedom, was seeking the support of the farmers whose union was one of the powerful pillars of the alliance of working people.

Another element of legitimation strategy appeared in regard to foreign policy, where the Horn of Africa was on fire. The conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean guerrillas had reached its peak. President Nimeiri appealed to both parties in conflict:

I have appealed to our brothers in Ethiopia and Eritrea to leave behind the legacy of the past, with all its violence, hate and suspicions inspired by the aspirations of Africa, for freedom, peace and justice.

The persuasive implication of this passage is conspicuous: the message the president wanted to convey to his immediate audience, the Sudanese public and the African people at large, was that he conceived of his regime as a legitimate one, and further, he appealed to African leaders involved in that conflict to follow the same track of freedom, peace and justice in resolving the conflict between them.
Delegitimation Strategy

Delegitimation strategy continued to decline sharply in use in the 1976 speech ($P = 4$, $P = 3.1$). The indictments and denunciations of politicians whom the Nimeiri regime had replaced were no longer necessary. There was no present enemy who should be vilified, denounced, or to be conceived of as illegitimate.

Mobilisation Strategy

As Table 1 reveals, use of mobilization in 1976 dramatically increased the record ($P = 23$, $P = 10.2$). Many of the mobilization words occurred in an attempt to mobilize farmers to be loyal to the regime and to act positively in increasing production. The president directed his appeals to the farmers in the following manner:

For the new Sudan the continent that is the Sudan will not be built except by strong men -- men with faith, national fervor and patriotic dedication.

... our task must be to a generation with faith in God, love for the country -- armed with knowledge and infatigable will to work and build in our deserts, mountains and under the most adverse conditions.

As can be seen in these quotations, President Nimeiri's attempt to motivate the farmers for work was couched in religious and mythical forms. The belief in God was linked with the love of the country and the belief in both was conceived as a motivational force to do the unimaginable. Consequently, the selection and the
articulation of these appeals seemed to function in the desired
direction of setting the stage for mobilization. "The
communicator's appeal to the receiver's "patriotism," his
"humanity," his "religion," argued Rittinghaus, "seemed to affect
people."

Unification Strategy

President Nimeiri stressed the aspects of unity more than in
the fifth anniversary speech (P = 26, P = 9.2). Unification terms
appeared in his appeals to the farmers to support national unity by
educating the youth and implanting in them the imperativeness of the
nation's unity:

We should instill in our young the love
of their country and its glorious
history and the spirit of Sudanese
national unity.

How might this aim be implanted? President Nimeiri believed
that it could be implanted through an educational system whose
duties were prescribed as follows:

Such a system must make out of our
schools, colleges and universitites a
reservoir of Sudanese national spirit,
unity and principles of the alliance of
the working forces.

The president not only pleaded for the public to consolidate,
to unify, but went further by suggesting ways of curing any form of
fragmentation that might occur. The educational system was seen,
necessarily, as an indispensable tool that could provide continuing energy and serve as a source of unity in the nation.

Dedication Strategy

The president's effort to build a favorable image and to enhance his trustworthiness was relatively increased from his efforts in the fifth anniversary speech (P = 15, P = 8.0). A great deal of dedication strategy was employed to enhance the president's ethos among the Sudanese people. President Nimeiri set the motto: "Victory is for us: by faith, unity, dedication and work." The combination of the terms "faith," "unity," and "work," served as an amplifying device to the role of the president as he dedicated himself to his country.

Specialists in Third World politics often view the issues of credibility building as very pivotal for policy creation and maintenance. Riggins, for example, demonstrated that the aspects of a leader's personal credibility must be built in order to solicit people's acceptance of his policy. Riggins viewed the role of the leader in the following manner:

... he will usually show himself devout, dedicated to traditional shrines and ceremonially respectful of the men in whose supernatural wisdom the simple people have faith.
Afro-Arabization Strategy

The proliferation of Afro-Arabization strategy in the 1975 speech \( (P = 29, P = 13.6) \) may be attributed to the political exigencies at the time. First, the speech took place at the time when the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Revolutionary Eritrean guerrillas reached its climax. This situation necessarily endangered the national security of the Sudan:

Troubles and conflict in this part of Africa have the most serious repercussions on the security of the Sudan and the security of the Red Sea. And we cannot nor can the Arab nation allow a hostile power to endanger peace and security in the Red Sea.

President Nimeiri was certainly alluding to the foreign powers such as the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Cuba who were supplying both parties with weapons and, hence, were escalating the war.

Secondly, the sharp increase in utilization of Afro-Arabization strategy was due to the ambitious plan by the Arab nations to invest a total of 930 million pounds in agricultural projects in the Sudan. President Nimeiri explained the dimensions of Sudan’s Arab policy:

The essence of our Arab policy has been to lay emphasis on projects for political, economic and cultural integration, so that Arab unity may be built on a solid basis of vital interests and concerted national aspirations.
President Nimeiri showed a continuous consistency in the realization of Afro-Arab commitment: "We cannot but live up to our distinctive role in consolidating Afro-Arab solidarity."  

Analysis of the Ninth Anniversary Speech - 1978  
Situational Context

The ninth anniversary speech was delivered before a joint session of the National and Regional People's Assemblies. The political situation at the time was pictured by, first, a relative degree of stability brought about by the absence of any military coup attempt in the previous three years; secondly, an initiation of reconciliation attempts to bridge the gap between the Nimeiri regime and the opposition; thirdly, a continuous effort by President Nimeiri to maximize political support for his political institutions; and finally, the president's persistent effort to initiate developmental programs to rectify the economy and improve the living conditions of the Sudanese people.

The latter aspect had been the most troubling one for the president. His strategic considerations were directed mainly to convince the public that development was an ultimate goal of his regime. The relationships among the foregoing factors, along with the celebration of the regime's anniversary, coupled with the joint session of the two assemblies, placed considerable constraint on the part of the president to make justified rhetorical choices to tackle these issues.
Revolutionization Strategy

As can be interpreted from Table 1, revolutionization continued to be the most employed of all the strategies in the ninth anniversary speech ($Y = 145, P = 270$). One of the eminent tactics involved in this strategy was the emphasis on the achievement that the Nileiri regime had accomplished. "The National Charter," said President Nileiri, "changed the Sudan and its people and took the country from the depth of despair to the bright high hopes."

Another element of revolutionization strategy was the emphasis on potentialities for change through which the Sudanese society could be transformed. President Nileiri demonstrated:

Our country, the Sudan, is in possession of basic economic factors for building a strong economy. The Sudan's natural and technical resources, its varied wealth, offer unlimited opportunities for economic development of the great production leap forward. Our lands, hills, forests, plains, our suburbs, rivers, valleys, our wealth on the surface of the earth, under it, give the Sudan the factors for sufficiency, abundance, prosperity, and progress.

By highlighting these various aspects of potentialities for change, President Nileiri attempted to make the public believe that revolutionary change was possible. Surprisingly, while he listed all these factors that would enable the country to achieve prosperity, the president did not specify how the desired change could be accomplished.
Legitimation Strategy

In the ninth anniversary speech, legitimation remained the second most employed strategy (R = 122, P = 22.7). The creation and the maintenance of the political institutions gave the president a solid ground for claiming legitimacy and justifying his decisions.

To illustrate, President Mmeiri greeted the audience in the following manner:

I salute you at the end of nine years during which we have finalized the establishment of an integrated comprehensive political system based on principles that we included in our Charter of National Action, governed by the constitution, and built on a solid base of democratic people institutions, people's local, regional and national entities which are open for the people to speak their minds, express their hopes, manifest their will and unify their abilities for the construction of the country and the happiness of its sons.

Such claims evolved around the president's conviction that his regime represented a set of political institutions organized by the nation's constitution to govern the state. It appears that constitutions are very essential dimensions of legitimacy claims.

After argued:

Constitutions are potential warrants of legitimacy. As such, they specify some of the virtues they seek to establish. If these virtues eventually provide a basis for new groups to claim the right to represent the people, the
constitutions embodying them will...come to be regarded as a moral document.  

Delegitimization Strategy

As Table I showed, delegitimization words were not only the least emphasized ones, but indeed, they were almost nonexistent (F = 3, P = .5). The decline in the use of the strategy of delegitimization may be attributed to the prevalent political exigencies that demanded, in part, a communicative effort for the sustenance of the existing political order. The sharp decline of delegitimization terms may also be attributed in another part to the relative stability and the absence of conflict between the regime and any opposition at the time. The absence of conflict, therefore, gave the president little choice but to emphasize his own political order.

Mobilization Strategy

As can be observed from Table I, mobilization strategy in the ninth anniversary speech of 1978 surpassed use in earlier speeches (F = 115, P = .01). The exigent flow of events, the existing rhetorical constraints, the presence of two political institutions as a primary audience, all called for the proliferation in use of the mobilization strategy.

The 1978 speech was marked by the completion of the political institutions of the Nimeiri regime. The compilation of political institutions called for mobilizing all the members of the two political institutions to participate collectively to give the
institutions a tangible dynamism that would result in the desired goal of shared revolutionary change.

By their nature, mobilization forms as a catalyst to support both revolutionary appeals and legitimation procedure. Without a successful mobilization effort, revolutionary symbols and delegitimation routines would remain rootless and unheard of on the part of the public who is the primary target for these appeals.

In his effort to mobilize the public, President Mineiri pleaded for the Sudanese people to participate in building the country. "We have learned, brothers," President Mineiri addressed the joint session of the National and Regional People's Assemblies, "that there is no alternative to the people, and no alternative to the people's sweat." Not only did President Mineiri plead for the people to participate in developing the country, but he stipulated that, "Our set principle is that the working people are the ultimate goal of development." This argument was consolidated even further, "Those working with their hands and brains will find equitable rewards for their effort."

Clearly, President Mineiri used the promise of reward as a motivating device to encourage the public to participate. Here, the president's mobilization strategy seemed to be functioning very well as Bettencourt indicates:

If emotions are aroused, and decisions made in part on what the receiver sees as desirable, then that message which promises the receiver something he needs or wants or seems useful, ought to be more successful than the message that does not make such promises.
Another pervasive element of mobilization strategy in Nimeirí's appeals was that of waging a campaign against the high cost of living. President Nimeirí appealed to the public to be more productive and to reduce the extravagant consumption that was prevalent in the Sudanese society: "We should direct our basic resources," he told the audience, "to create a productive society as against extravagant consumption patterns for which our people have neither the factors, the need nor the ability."

President Nimeirí also attempted to define the situation that would encourage people to participate. The message conveyed to the public attempted to show them that the political climate furnishes a solid base on which the public could participate energetically:

"Being aware of the inevitability of social change, your revolution, dear brothers, has intensified effort to purify our people's heritage, explore the innovating abilities of its sons and to enable the masses to be aware of and educate their sons to put their effective participation in the reconstruction process."

Unification Strategy

As Table 1 showed, this strategy obtained about the same emphasis as in the 1976 speech (F = 49, F = 9.1). The joint session of the People's National and Regional Assemblies, which the president addressed, was an aspect of unification. The Regional People's Assembly represented the southern region of the Sudan, which was formed after the achievement of national unity in the
country. The exigencies of unity, then, were present and demanded a reply to modify them by rhetorical means.

In this endeavor, President Nimeiri conceived of the two assemblies as "capable and highly qualified to guard and protect this unity." Since unity had been achieved six years ago, the hallmark of the president's appeals seemed to be a focus on the one main aspect that pertained to the protection of national unity:

"We thank the Almighty who protected and saved our people from the evils of disintegration and disunity and who made up the pride of our generation on the realization of the unity of its soil and people, an achievement which will be strongly protected by the masses and guarded by the army."

The president's persuasive effort to crystallize the importance of unity seemed to be organized around a powerful religious symbol: the message the president wanted to get across to the audiences was that God who helped in achieving unity would guard against any attempt aimed at disintegrating the Sudanese society. In addition, he pleaded for the masses to play a significant role in protecting the unity in question which would also be protected by the army. Territorial and social unity were conceived by the communicator to be a desirable thing, while disintegration was perceived not only as undesirable but evil as well.
Theocratization Strategy

In the ninth anniversary speech, religious symbols were less emphasized than they were in 1976 ($F = 27, P = 5.0$), but were still used. (See the next strategy for illustrations.)

Dedication Strategy

This strategy in the 1976 speech exceeded an overall time record ($F = 38, P = 11.9$). President Nimeiri concluded his speech with colorful words and projected his persona in the following manner:

I promise, my God to be my witness, to remain loyal to this people, leading them through faith, righteousness, justice and virtue, to support the weak, protect the scared, safeguard the country's independence, its unity, stability and the unity of its citizens.

The juxtaposition of religious words such as "god," "faith," with the italicized dedicated terms, i.e., "loyal," gave his appeals a sense of honesty and sincerity.

Afro-Arabization Strategy

In the 1976 speech, this strategy appeared less frequently than in the 1976 speech ($F = 17, P = 3.1$). The president's appeals for Afro-Arab commitment appeared to be consistent in all of his speeches. For example:

The Sudan in its tenth revolutionary year is assuming its leading role amongst the Arab and African states
calling for solidarity, freedom and reconciliation, to reserve the people's energies for building and reconstruction.

Analysis of the Eleventh Anniversary Speech - 1980

Situational Context

With the Nimeiri regime approaching the twelfth year of his rule, the situation had become increasingly stable. Since the aborted coup attempt of July 1976, the situation was characterised by the longest period of stability the regime had enjoyed. This stability came as a result of the reconciliation efforts which created an atmosphere of negotiations between the Nimeiri regime and the opposition, rather than an atmosphere of hostilities and counterattacks. This increase in stability obviously had some bearing on what the president had to say.

A second feature of the eleventh anniversary speech was the presence of President Mengaatu Mofeyo Olopo of Ethiopia, who came to participate in the anniversary celebrations. The appearance of the Ethiopian leader, his relationship with Sudan, the continuous conflict between the Sudan and Ethiopia at their borders -- all function to influence the flow of messages, at least in regards to foreign policy issues.

A third peculiarity of the eleventh anniversary speech was that both the president and the audience perceived that, since the birth of the regime twelve years ago, much had been said about revolutionary change, but little success had been achieved. The development effort, for example, had lagged behind people's needs
and what they had been promised. Since this exigence was real and observable, it placed an urgency on the president to offer a rhetorical alternative.

Revolutionization Strategy

In the eleventh anniversary speech, revolutionization continued to be the most common in the speaking of President Nimeiri (P = 170, P = 29.5). President Nimeiri seemed to be selecting relatively the same terms in an effort to revolutionize the Sudanese social system:

The first political and social issue for the May Revolution is the development and complete civilisation leap. By development process the Revolution has changed aspects of life in our country.

One major conspicuous factor of revolutionization strategy in the 1980 speech was the absence of the element of raising the expectations of individuals and the promise for a better life. Much of the president's articulation in relation to revolutionization strategy was in a form of review of what he thought his regime had accomplished and changed. Such changes were characterized by such terms as: "agricultural revolution," "educational revolution," "the change of women's situation," "development of railway capacity," "wages reform," "progress of our national economy," and "elimination of people's suffering."

The absence of the element of raising expectations can be linked to the deteriorating economic conditions in the country. In 1980, the Sudanese people became extremely frustrated. Their
frustration came as a consequence of the fact that they had been promised a revolutionary socialist society in which development would be obtained, and as a result of that, the standard of living would rise and social life would be changed for the better. At the time, development was lagging behind the actual needs: not only had consumer prices gone up, but, in addition, every essential commodity was either in acute shortage or had disappeared from the market.

Seemingly, instead of continuing in the same path of raising expectations, the president chose to change his strategic position to deal with the social realities so as to alleviate people’s frustrations. This strategic modification seemed to be a proper one as Spengler has argued:

... because expectations are subjective and hence flexible, they can be very easily modified in the face of frustration consequent upon nonrealization of aspirations and adjusted downward in keeping with the realities."

Legitimation Strategy

In the eleventh anniversary speech, legitimation continued to be the second most common of the strategies employed (F = 14, P = 26). President Nimeiri continued to project his regime as legitimate. Such legitimacy, as the president perceived it, was grounded in the participatory power of the Sudanese people: "One of the main revolution’s concern," said President Nimeiri, "is to
liberate the people's will and to establish the new democracy of popular participation and delegate power to the people.89

The element of "people," represented the essence of Nimeiri's use of the legitimation strategy: "Backed by its clear-sighted revolution, the great people of the Sudan have already chosen the path of freedom, democracy, socialism and unity."90 The italicized key words appeared constantly in the president's appeals of legitimation. The president's effort to view his regime as based on freedom, democracy and socialism revealed his eagerness to persuade the public to accept these propositions as experienced realities.

The use of legitimation was also evident in Nimeiri's discussion of the political stance of the Sudan in respect to foreign policy:

We are with peace and against aggression. We are with people's freedom to choose their destiny. We are against the suppression of people and to decide their destiny, we are with people, they choose their way, agree upon their way, to formulate their existence and this should be from them, not to them.7

**Delegitimation Strategy**

Delegitimation strategy sharply declined in use in the 1980 speech (P = 7, P = 1.2). The decline in use of the strategy of delegitimation may be regarded as a logical consequence of the flow of political events: President Nimeiri was not so much constrained by the need to delegitimize an enemy who disappeared from the
political scene so much as to legitimate his existence and policy formation.

Mobilisation Strategy

Although this strategy was less used in the 1980 speech (F = 78, P = 13.5), still it remained one of the main strategies in the discourse of President Nimeiri. The rhetorical situation of the 1980 speech was constrained on the one hand by the need to reinforce the reconciliation effort which was initiated two years ago; then to reconcile the difference between the Nimeiri regime and the National Front (the opposition) that operated outside the Sudan to bring an end to the Nimeiri regime and on the other hand, by the need to mobilise the Sudanese people to accelerate the steps of development, since the official effort had come to a vicious cycle: Since the Nimeiri regime seized power, a lot had been said about development but little tangible success.

In his mobilisation strain, President Nimeiri pleaded to the opposition members not only to come home from abroad, but in addition, to participate with their peers in building the Sudan:

Come to us and catch the people's march. The people do not know hatred against its sons, its lines make room for all of us. The revolution has to unify all the nation. I call you again to come to your home with dignity to participate in the formation of its progress and goals.

President Nimeiri's propositions were selected and transmitted in an appealing manner. The appeals for the opposition to "come..."
home" were couched in emotional terms, in that their return home would be allowed by their fellow men in a spirit of love. The employment of intense words such as "with dignity," clearly added a mystique that would inspire the opposition to accept the substance of these propositions.

At home, President Nimeiri appealed to the populace to participate in developing the country: "The water of the Nile will not be sufficient enough to irrigate our land if we do not add to it more and more sweat from arms and foreheads of men." He appealed to the audience: "I have ever wished that every one of you would interpret that call into action. By production we build our country ... it is through production and production alone that ever countries could be built." 94

Here, the oratinal capacity of President Nimeiri to mobilise the public to act immediately and positively seemed to have greater potentialities of efficacy. The selection of arguments such as "sweat," and repetition of key words such as "production," seemed to furnish a solid ground for motivation and, hence, for moving the public to act in the desired way.

Unification Strategy

In the 1980 speech, this strategy received (F = 45, P = 7.9). President Nimeiri's effort toward national unity seemed to have taken different procedures other than that announced in the second anniversary speech, in which he viewed national unity as restricted endeavors which were not open to all forces of backwardness.
In the 1980 speech President Nimeiri attempted to change the formula so that unity was open to all the races to encompass the reconciliation initiative:

I declared the national unity loudly in my first address in opening of the eternal day - the 25th of May 1969 ... and still repeat it [the unity] and you accepted it until we have achieved the national reconciliation for the sake of our unity within my initiatives for all sons of the nation to come and gather their efforts with us to build our nation.\textsuperscript{55}

Theocratization Strategy

In the 1980 speech the employment of religious symbols was at about the same rate as in the 1978 speech (P = 31, P = 5.4). A great deal of theocratization strategy appeared specifically in conjunction with the use of the strategies of mobilization. In his attempt to mobilize the public to work, President Nimeiri pleaded with the audience: "Come to the field of work, of effort, of giving so as to please God, people and home."\textsuperscript{56} To support his proposition to bring people to work, he quoted a verse from the Holy Quran to make his appeal more sounded: "Say you do and God, his prophet and the believers will see your work."\textsuperscript{97}

The italicized key words clearly operate to motivate the public to work, which would bring about not only an increase in production, but even more importantly, would please God. Thus, work was perceived as an essential ingredient of religion.
Dedication Strategy

In the eleventh anniversary speech, the strategy of dedication was less used than in the 1978 speech ($F = 33$, $F = 5.7$). The key words/phrases such as "patriotic," "sincere," "honest," "bravery," "generosity," and "devotion," appeared most frequently. Moreover, President Nimery projected himself as "armed with national concern," and "a keen protector" of national interest. Still, the presence of these words undoubtedly aided significantly in building the president's character and, thus, in increasing his credibility as a nationalist devoted leader.

Afro-Arabization Strategy

The employment of key words/phrases that reflected both African and Arab belongings in the 1980 speech was considerable. As can be seen in Table 1, the strategy of Afro-Arabization in the 1980 speech ($F = 62$, $F = 12.0$) was the second highest in frequency of the Afro-Arabization strategies employed in the previous five speeches.

The relatively high usage of the strategy of Afro-Arabization was essentially caused by the rhetorical situation: the presence of President Mengesatul which Kiamis of Ethiopia, the escalation of the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean revolutionaries and the political situation between the Sudan and Ethiopia, in which the two countries were approaching reconciliation of their political differences.

In the realization of Afro-Arabization strategy, President Nimery viewed the Sudan as committed to "the reality of Afro-Arab
solidarity. In the African front this realisation was articulated as follows:

The Sudan which is neighboring so many sisterly nations in our African continent has bound itself to a firm policy based on good neighborhood and on the necessity of cooperation, integration and coordinations with all sisters.

The prevailing exigencies led the president to emphasize African policies more than Arab policies. The key words pertaining to African commitment represented 64.5 percent whereas the key words corresponding to Arab commitment received 35.5 percent of the total number of occurrences of the strategies.

In relation to the Arab commitment, President Nimeiri asserted that, "The Sudan in the Arab nations is a fighting partner in all its battles till achieving victory and what comes after."

To briefly summarise, this section identified persuasive strategies found in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri in respect to the anniversary speeches (N - 6). The maturation and the decline of each strategy was described, and the relationships of strategies employed to the exigential flow of events were explained.

Persuasive Strategies in the Presidential Platform Speeches

Background

Following the abortive communist coup attempt of July 1971, President Nimeiri realised that his reliance on military power alone would not enable him to carry out his programs of revolutionary
change. During the preceding two years or so, President Nimeiri had relied essentially on the Revolutionary Command Council as a primary decision maker which formulated ideas and executed political decisions. With the public isolated from the decision-making process, the Nimeiri regime lacked the essential backing of the public who might otherwise rally behind the regime’s ideas, support its decisions and protect it against active opposition.

To overcome the problems of bringing a new group into politics, President Nimeiri nominated himself for the presidency and then proceeded to establish popular institutions to carry out the responsibilities of legislation and to recruit a considerable portion of the Sudanese people into these institutions to practice what was perceived to be a “new democracy.”

In accordance with the permanent constitution of the Sudan:

“The term of presidency shall be six Gregorian years computed from the date of taking oath and the same president is eligible for reelection for another term or successive terms.” Accordingly, there had been two presidential terms: beginning in 1971 and 1977. Corresponding to these two occasions, President Nimeiri presented his platform — his program of change — prior to the election days so that the public could say yes or no to these programs in the referendum days.

Analysis of the Presidential Platform Speech — 1971

Situational Context

The experience of the previous two years in office convinced President Nimeiri that his political rule by military force alone
would not create the stability he needed to execute his program of change. The aborted two political plots by traditional opposition in 1970 and the aborted communist coup of July 1971 stood as examples of the continuation of conflict which functioned basically to divert the president's attention from executing change to defense of his regime against continuous disputes.

President Nimeiri thought the solution for this instability was to nominate himself for the presidency, then move to establish a one-party system - Sudanese Socialist Union and to formulate an ideology that would enable considerable numbers of the Sudanese people to participate in political decision-making.

This speech was delivered with these visions in mind. The most crucial exigencies that needed to be addressed and modified were what constituted the president's program of action (platform), and the degree to which it differed from the current governmental programs. In addition, the speech had to address the future relationship between the Nimeiri regime and the political opposition that challenged and attacked his policies. The following discussion focuses on the president's responses to these exigencies.

Revolutionization Strategy

While the president's persuasive effort to revolutionize the Sudanese society was the most emphasized in the anniversary speeches, in the presidential platform of 1971, revolutionization was the second most often employed strategy ($P = 134, P = 26.3$). See Table 11. This strategy involved three major elements, the first of which was the contention that development was contingent on
the accomplishment of national unity. Commenting on the June declaration which was the first positive statement on the realization of national unity, President Nimeiri asserted "that declaration was a revolutionary and progressive step to accomplish opportunity of development for the entire country." 102

The second element of revolutionization strategy was the belief that developmental change should be based on scientific planning:

While our people are looking forward for deep reformative changes and for modernisation of all aspects of life, they cannot accomplish these great ambitions outside the framework of modern science without which there would be no background for economic, cultural and social revival. Without science our country's standard will never rise nor its people's lives be changed from a society of superstition and jungle to the threshold of the twenty-first century.

The italicized words represented the key words used in the realization of revolutionization strategy. As can be noticed in the above quotation, President Nimeiri placed his supportive evidence on logical proof. His premise that change cannot be achieved without scientific knowledge and planning was supported through deductive reasoning. The logical explanations were set forward to show the audience the advantages of science in all spheres of change.

President Nimeiri's use of revolutionization strategy seemed to be rhetorically well chosen and articulated. Communication scholars have demonstrated that deductive procedures are pivotal instruments
in supporting rhetorical appeals. For example, Settisbaum has argued that:

Deduction is a powerful tool. With it, one can derive statements that are implied by some other statement. With it, one can determine the validity of many linguistic structures that he might be using. With it, he can establish the truth of statements without the necessity of making observations himself. It is one of the major ways in which the communicator can establish proof for an audience ...

The third element employed in the strategy of revolutionization was the conviction that change is a gradual process:

I said to you before that the revolution will not promise to reach the stars. This I repeat again and I mean every word of it. The backwardness of centuries, the poverty of generations and the ignorance of decades cannot be removed over months or even years.

While in the May anniversary speeches promises were the core of the Mreiriri appeals, in his presidential platform speech of 1971, President Mreiriri was careful not to promise nor to use emotional appeals. His logical assertions were influenced both by his contention to stay away from rising expectations and to use logical proofs instead of emotional ones.
Legitimation Strategy

As can be seen from Table 2, this strategy was the most used of all the strategies employed in the presidential platform speech of 1971 (P = 148, P = 29.1%). The president's search for legitimacy exhibited four basic elements.

First, he experienced a determination to complete the nation's constitution which would substitute the military and provisional laws and serve as an organizing principle for policy implementation:

> I shall work to complete Sudan's permanent constitution. It will be the first permanent constitution of the independent Sudan which had lived for almost two decades under exceptional laws or emergency orders.

To solidify his legitimate claim even further, President Nimeiri affirmed that "the constitution is purely Sudanese." 107

Secondly, Nimeiri affirmed that the Sudanese Socialist Union "will be the only political organization in the Sudan." 108 "I shall endeavor," said President Nimeiri, "to make the Sudanese Socialist Union an organization that would entail in all its ranks, all the honest and efficient patriotic elements." 109

Thirdly, Nimeiri contended that the state would be governed by laws and not by force or mass terror: "All this revolutionary action that is aimed at justice and the well being of the people can only be accomplished in an atmosphere of stability and sovereignty of law." 110 Nimeiri's selection of the italicized words was,
Table II. Presidential Platform Speeches.

Frequency Distribution and Percentage by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Strategy</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionization</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegitimation</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theocratization</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Arabization</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
clearly, an attempt to orient the public toward the expected system of government which he sought for their ascent.

In addition, President Nimeiri in reference to his security organs, assured the audience that, "I do not want them [security organs] to be tools of terror or oppression but I want them to be an alert protector and honest watchful to give peace to every citizen." 111

The emphasis on laws was a clear attempt by the president to legitimize his regime through recognizable and established laws. As Edward Seit has indicated: "Even though power comes to them by force, soldiers have to legitimize themselves by means other than force." 112

The fourth and final element utilized in the strategy of legitimation was the characterizing of the new political order of the regime based on "the socialism of our course, the democracy of government, the sacredness of freedom of the individual." 113

Delegitimation Strategy

Delegitimation strategy was the second least employed strategy in the presidential platform speech of 1971 (P = 32, P = 6.). The situation at the time was still echoing with the unsuccessful communist coup attempt of July 1971. President Nimeiri brought into focus the memory of the three days of upheaval and denounced the coup members in the following harsh words:

Those were the days of impurity that had been provoked by a bunch of cunning and atheistical communists. But wickedness can
only bent the wicked and ignoble atheist had to be crushed.

Knowing his audiences to be mostly Muslims who have no respect for communism, President Nimeiri couched his depiction in very stridentious language that equated communists with atheists so as to raise the emotions of the audience to see the communists as an alien, undesirable and illegitimate element in the Sudanese society.

Mobilization Strategy

As can be seen in Table 2, mobilization was the fifth ranked strategy employed in the program of action speech of 1971 (F = 4', F = 5.0). The president's mobilization effort included two major dimensions -- first, to encourage the youth to be fully involved in the process of transformation of the Sudanese society:

I look forward for more participation on the part of our youth in building their country since they are more effective and creative than any other sector of the nation and since they aspire more than anybody else to make use of the future.

Second, to inspire the public to participate in the self-help program "We should," said President Nimeiri, "encourage the self-help programs which were practiced in the past stage so that the self-help may become a standard philosophy for performance and construction."
Unification Strategy

The use of a persuasive strategy to sustain social integration and to foster a sense of nationhood in the Sudan ranked the third most employed strategy in the program of action speech of 1971 (F = 54, P = 10.6). At the outset of his speech President Nimeiri asserted that, "Today I am introducing my platform to you, because I want our will to be united." While this message was directed to the whole nation to be united behind one leader, his main pledge for unity centered on the procedure by which a sense of unity could be attained:

The coming period will be an era for political mutual action between the working people represented in shepherds, farmers, intellectuals, soldiers and national capitalists. It will be a mutual action by their great alliance which creates the true national unity. It will attain solidarity and there will be no conflict, differences, class or sectarian domination. There will be no room for tragic duels in a society the entity of which is based mainly on sound brotherhood. [*Italicics added.*]

The italicized words were likely chosen and articulated to inspire the Sudanese people to forget the past agonizing experiences of conflict. Since the president was seeking nomination, the appeals for unity were necessary, for a minimum consensus was needed to sustain the maintenance of social order.
Theocratization Strategy

Theocratization strategy was moderately employed in the 1971 speech (F = 40, P = 7.9). President Nixon frequently projected himself as a "religious," "faithful," leader who saw his victory over the communist coup attempt as a result of the "will of God." In his reference to the aborted coup attempt, President Nixon quoted from the Holy Quran: "They suffered on your hands and God disgraced them to relieve the hearts of the believers." 119

The president's basic communicative efforts in relation to theocratization strategy revolved around his determination that politics should be guided by religious principles:

The heavenly religions should be the real check on our relations, the guide of our behavior, the incentive of the spirit of virtue and the deterrent of evil. To do so, religions will receive the care they deserve.

The president, then, proceeded to count the advantages of religions:

They [religions] reject injustice, stimulate people to struggle for benevolence, urge men to earn their living decently and condemn idleness and dependency.

Dedication Strategy

Dedication strategy was used with about the same frequency as theocratization strategy (F = 42, P = 0.1). Since President
Nimeiri was seeking nomination, the aspects of building a favorable image among the public was as important to him as his whole platform: "We shall proceed on the road of truth and justice with vigilance and dedication...." President Nimeiri declared to the public and added, "We shall never achieve victory in our battle unless we devote our efforts honestly - the efforts of each one of us and the honesty of each one of us, although I mean the leaders and pioneers in particular...."

The italicized words represent the president's attempt to achieve trustworthiness. The language he used was clearly an attempt to identify himself with the general public. The words "we," "us," and "our," appeared in a repetitive form to give his appeal sincerity and to narrow the gap between him and the audiences.

It is on the basis of this identification, that the president's appeals of dedication were formed. "I am," President Nimeiri told the Sudanese people, "nothing but one of your sons who comes from one of your villages. I am the descendant of parents who could only live on scarcity like the millions of you."122

While in the above passage the president identified himself with the lower class citizens, in another passage he identified himself with the whole citizenry: "We had to handle this problem," he said, "with the spirit of patriotic responsibility and within the framework of our revolutionary democratic commitment to coordinate the ties between the citizens of one country."125
Afro-Arabization Strategy

This strategy was the least employed strategy in the presidential platform speech (F = 18, P = 3.5). In his reference to the national charter, President Nimeiri asserted that: "It [the charter] will prove the truth of the Sudan's Arab existence and African commitment."124

President Nimeiri assured the audience that the Sudan would support the Arab countries to complete the "liberation of Arab soil" and would support "African countries to deter colonial invasion."125

Analysis of the Presidential Platform Speech - 1977

Situational Context

The situational context of the presidential platform speech of 1977 was marked by a high degree of contradictions. In the last week of January 1977, President Nimeiri announced to the Sudanese public his intention not to nominate himself for a second term of the presidency. This situation had created enormous speculation as to who would be the next president of the republic, and what would be the direction of the regime without the leadership of the person who brought it into existence.

When the time came for presidential elections, however, President Nimeiri retreated from his earlier statement and nominated himself for a second term. "In response to your will and desire," he addressed the Sudanese people, "I agreed to nominate myself."126

The presidential platform speech was televised and broadcast through the president's program "Face the Nation" on the eve of March 28th, 1977. At the time the president had just returned from
a tour of four Arab countries: Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. The president devoted exactly 23 percent of his speech to a discussion of the objectives and outcomes of his tour.

Here, the president seemed to have transformed the genre of platform speaking to include antecedent events such as his tour in an attempt to add to his program of nomination some factors that were at the heart of presidential practices.

Revolutionization Strategy

In the presidential platform speech of 1977, revolutionization was the second most employed strategy (Y = 112, P = 26.0), the same emphasis as it received in 1971. One expects that the exigence of the platform speech must necessarily involve the dissemination of new ideas and new programs that foster change and transcend the revolution beyond its current stage, President Nimeiri’s effort was limited in this regard and lacked innovative and constructive vision of change.

Much of the president’s program centered on the same old ideas that were declared in his first platform of 1971. The phrases of “radical change,” “economic development,” “prosperity,” and “progress,” appeared repetitive.127 Again, President Nimeiri was careful not to make specific promises in regard to his program. His appeals were general in nature: “The post-plebiscite period is an area for concentration on growth and development of the Sudan’s most backward regions in the West, South and East.”128

To give the audience some hope for a better future, President Nimeiri assured the audience that: “the revenue of development will
be utilized for the benefit of the people, for their prosperity and happiness.”

Legitimation Strategy

This strategy was the most employed strategy in the president’s platform speech of 1977 (P = 137, P = 31.8). Legitimation terms were more common than those in the 1971 speech. Such usage may be attributed to the establishment of the regime’s institutions such as Sudanese Socialist Union, People’s National Assembly, the formulation of the nation’s constitution, whereas these institutions represented only hopes and targeted aims in 1971.

The key words/phrases such as “democracy,” “constitution,” “delegation of power to the mass,” and “social justice,” represented much of Nimeiri’s legitimacy appeals: “Democracy after the referendum,” said President Nimeiri, “means more power to the people’s local councils on the provincial, regional, sectorial and residential area levels.”

President Nimeiri persistently grappled with the term “democracy” as a basis for his legitimacy claims:

Democracy after referendum means more dependence on the popular masses at all levels with the frame of the constitution, the charter and the Sudanese Socialist Union laws and regulations.

Surprisingly, while the key word “socialism” was employed frequently in all of the president’s speeches, the 1977 platform speech was totally devoid of such a term. The absence of the term
"socialism," from the president's program may be attributed not to a shift in policy realization but to the contention that the president attempted to take a moderate stance; that is, instead of promising the audience that socialism was inevitable, or that it could be reached easily, he lowered his appeals so as to deal with the existing realities and the exigential flow of events. So it was unrealistic to speak about the attainment of socialism while the country was suffering from a high cost of living, absence of essential commodities and a development effort which lagged behind the aims of the ruler and the expectations of the ruled.

Delegitimation Strategy

The use of this strategy, as can be seen in Table 2, was declined in frequency in the 1977 speech compared to the 1971 platform speech ($F = 1.1$, $P = 2.5$), while the conflict between the Nimeiri regime and the opposition was not visible in 1977. President Nimeiri continued to delegitimize opposition to make the public alert and cautious about the notion that: "Despite all the conspiracies to which the Sudan was subjected and which were masterminded by crazy ambitious enemies of the Sudan we managed to go ahead to realize our noble strategic objectives."

Mobilization Strategy

As indicated in Table 2, the use of mobilization strategy declined in the 1977 speech as opposed to the 1971 speech ($F = 23$, $P = 5.1$). President Nimeiri's efforts to mobilize the public was organized around two main elements: First he appealed to the youth to assume their roles in the regime;
Second, the president appealed to the Sudanese intellectuals to reactivate and animate Sudanese civilization and thought. "This can be done," said President Nimeiri, "...by encouraging the activities of the artists, poets and others."

Unification Strategy

The strategy for national unity and social integration was relatively deemphasized in the 1977 speech ($F = 26, P = 6.0$). In his review of the presidential responsibilities after the referendum, President Nimeiri saw as his duty "To confirm national unity and establish the Sudanese nation by constant work, cohesion between its various parts regardless of being near or far from the cities."

Theocratization Strategy

This strategy was used with about the same frequency as the 1971 platform speech ($F = 31, P = 7.2$). The president's effort to foster the belief that he was acting in accordance with religious principles was organized around three basic dimensions, the first of which was his attempt to convey the message that he was a religious leader who obeyed God's order and avoided bad conduct: "I will perform my religious duties, avoid all sorts of sin and obey God in every aspect."
Second, his religious beliefs emerged from the Islamic religion: "I will do my utmost to behave according to values and principles of Islam and be a just leader." 138

Third was his assurance that he would leave the office of presidency if he violated these principles: "Whenever I feel that I got conceited and am unable to perform my duties toward God and my people, I promise to quit the office and return to God." 139

Dedication Strategy

There was relatively more dedication terms employed in the 1977 speech than in the 1971 platform speech ($F = 47$, $P = 11.0$). The president's appeals for trustworthiness were often enveloped in an aura of religious symbols. "Leaderships," according to President Kissirri, should be characterized by, "purity of soul, patience, honesty, ability to curb desires and presence of virtue." 140

In order to improve his image and increase his credibility, President Kissirri assured the audience that:

I promise you, if I am chosen as leader, to study, educate myself and indulge in Islamic studies to give an example of a just and beloved leader. 41

Afro-Arabization Strategy

Use of this strategy sharply increased in the 1977 speech as opposed to the 1971 platform speech ($F = 41$, $P = 10.2$). This sharp increase in the use of this strategy articulation of Afro-Arab commitment, was due to the emphasis President Kissirri placed on the
Afro-Arab Summit Conference which had finished its session: "The Sudan regards the Afro-Arab Summit Conference," said the president, "as a historical turning point, and considers it a model for the whole Third World which is subjected to similar socio-economic circumstances that could not be overcome individually."[42]

It is on this rejection of individuality in international relations that President Nimeiri built his appeals in relation to both African and Arab cooperation:

The era after plebiscite will mark a drive of cooperation between the Sudan and its brothers in the Arab world and the African continent.[43]

In summary, the preceding discussion focused on the identification of persuasive strategies found in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri in relation to platform speeches (N = 2). The emphasis as well as the decline of each strategy was explored and the role of situational constituents in shaping the direction of the strategies in question was described.

Persuasive Strategies in Achievement Speeches

Background

Since the inception of his regime in May 1969, President Nimeiri exerted a continuous persuasive effort to challenge the predominant problems of disintegration and backwardness. In addition, the president had exerted efforts to institutionalize political organizations, such as the Sudanese Socialist Union and
the People's Assembly, and to convince the Sudanese people about their appropriateness and effectiveness.

The president's efforts were reflected in two major achievements: the achievement of national unity in March of 1972, and the establishment of the People's Assembly in October of the same year. The present section focuses on two speeches which were delivered on these occasions.

Analysis of the Unity Speech - 1972

Situational Context

The unity speech was delivered on Friday, March 3, 1972, before a rallying audience at Wad Nobawi, the home town of President Nimeiri. The rally was organized by the public in honor of the president for his efforts that had ended the civil war in the south and had achieved territorial as well as social unity of the country.

The rhetorical situation of the unity speech demanded a rhetorical discourse that would unify the disintegrated groups, mobilize their effort to guard the unity in question, and communicate the linkage between social integration and other revolutionary objectives that needed to be changed after the restoration of peace in the country. The following strategies represented the president's responses to the exigencies of unity.

Revolutionization Strategy

As can be seen in Table 3, revolutionization was the third ranked strategy most employed in the unity speech of 1972 (P = 0.1, P = 17.3). A great deal of revolutionization effort centered around the solution of the southern problem. President Nimeiri regarded
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Strategy</th>
<th>The Unity Speech</th>
<th>People's Assembly Speech</th>
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<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Arabisation</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the achievement of unity as a "revolutionary creative achievement". He saw the only fundamental task remaining for the regime to accomplish, after the achievement of national unity, was "the real progress."

Apparently the articulation and dissemination of revolutionary goals were less important than those for national cohesion and national unity, for without the achievement of national unity, any attempt to reconstruct the state and develop its most backward areas would not find a solid ground of stability that would enhance the likelihood of its success. The de-emphasis on revolutionisation strategy seemed to be a reasonable response to the situational factors of instability that blocked desired changes from the past.

Legitimation Strategy

As Table 3 revealed, legitimation was the most commonly used strategy in the unity speech of 1972 ($P = .13$, $P = .28$). President Mwaemba attempted to define the political situation after the achievement of national unity to show the audience the direction of his policies. He affirmed that:

... the efforts for political and social freedom were simultaneous because we have been aware that the real freedom could not be achieved without achieving its two wings: democracy and socialism. [Italics added]

The italicized key words pertained to the president's legitimacy claims. Simply stated, President Mwaemba projected his
new social order as a legitimate one, for it pursued freedom, democracy and socialism.

Internationally, President Nimri converted the audience that: "We improve our neighborhood relations, support the movement for freedom in our continent. We have always been committed to the front of peace and freedom."147

Delegation Strategy

This strategy was ranked as the fourth most employed in the unity speech of 1972 (F = 49, P = 10.1). President Nimri attributed the proliferation of the civil war in the south to the "awkward policies," and to the "policies of cheating," that were practiced by the previous governments. The president further depicted the previous politicians as "reactionary forces," and "discouraging elements," which pursued a "narrow party interest," and failed to solve the problem of "separation" in the south.148

Apparently President Nimri wanted to convince the audience that his regime, by achieving national unity, did what all previous governments in the Sudan had failed to achieve. Thus, this strategy functioned to increase the illegitimacy base of the previous politicians, and seemingly to widen the gap between his opponents and the general public.

Mobilization Strategy

This strategy was ranked the fifth most utilized strategy in the unity speech of 1972 (F = 44, P = 9.4). Since the situation was overwhelmed by the exigencies of unity, President Nimri exerted a
relatively moderate effort to mobilize the Sudanese people to support social integration and to be united:

From this place I appeal to the sons and girls of this country, to our youth, and our elderly, to our women and our men, to our pioneers, to stand united for the construction of the country -- you alone are capable of constructing it and you will complete its construction.

Unification Strategy

As can be observed in Table 3, unification was the second most employed strategy in the unity speech of 1972 (P = 103, P = 22.1). The rhetorical situation of the unity speech demanded and organised discourse in support of unity and rejection of separation and disunity. In addressing the rallying audience, some of whom were his relatives and neighbors, the president pleaded:

I hope you will celebrate today everywhere, celebrate the unity of the land, the end of separation, the beginning of development of the New Sudan. Celebrate the beginning of a just and satisfactory settlement and a prevailing peace.

President Nimeiri clearly linked the achievement of unity with the beginning of development, and reflected his position that without unity, development cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of instability. This linkage between unity and development appeared most frequently in the president's speech: "For the first time the
chance is given for development to cover the whole country without obstacles."

Closely related was his proposition that the country cannot be built without the societal integration in question:

The Revolution came to build for our people a socialist country by its sons' effort. It unified them, stopped their bloodshed and achieved their national unity. It is impossible for disintegrated people to build their country.

Theocratization Strategy

This strategy was the second least employed strategy in the unity speech of 1972 (F = 1.7, P = 3.6). President Nimeiri expressed his thanks to "God," who helped the Sudan to accomplish national unity, and hence opened a new door for peace. He further appealed to the audience that: "Everybody should go praying a prayer of thanks and appreciation to God who gave us this victory."

Dedication Strategy

As can be seen in Table 3, dedication was the third least employed strategy in the unity speech of 1972 (F = 38, P = 8.1). President Nimeiri viewed himself as "committed to national interest," in relation to both local and foreign policies. In addition, he identified himself with the general public in a very
appealing fashion: "I will always be with you, faithful to the revolution, responsibility and leadership."\textsuperscript{156}

President Nimeiri extended the attempt to enhance credibility to include the vice president, who happened to be from the southern region:

... the Ministry of Southern Affairs began its efforts under the leadership of brother Abel Aleir, the vice-president, whom I thoroughly knew and almost three years' period and in whom I found the intelligence, tolerance and sincere patriotism that qualified him to be my right arm in what concerns the south - the beloved part of the country.\textsuperscript{157}

\textbf{Afro-Arabization Strategy}

Afro-Arabization strategy was the least employed strategy in the unity speech of 1972 (\(P = 5, P = 1.1\)). The Afro-Arab commitment was expressed in about the same words as in the previously analyzed speeches: "We carry our responsibilities toward the Arabs because we belong to them but we are also keen to safeguard our African belonging."\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{Analysis of the First People's Assembly Speech - 1972}

\textbf{Situational Context}

President Nimeiri's speech at the opening session of the first People's Assembly was delivered on October 12, 1972, the day on which the president had been inaugurated one year earlier as the first President of the Republic. The address was intended to serve
two purposes: first, to inaugurate the opening session of the Assembly, and second, to lay down the principal rules for the members of the assembly so that they could practice their parliamentary procedures with pre-existing and established rules.

Since the People's Assembly was the first political institution to be inaugurated, the rhetorical situation exhibited at least three powerful exigencies that needed to be altered rhetorically: articulation of legitimacy appeals that were needed for the solidification of the political order, the creation of revolutionary appeals that placed the People's Assembly in its proper position as innovator of achievement, the mobilization of the members of the People's Assembly in a way that secured an appropriate direction in the use of parliamentary procedure, since most of the members were unfamiliar with parliamentary debate of this kind. The following discussion resembled the president's utilization of persuasive strategies, in relation to the whole rhetorical situation.

Revolutionization Strategy

As Table 3 revealed, this strategy was the second most employed strategy in the people's assembly speech of 1972 (F = 88, P = 25.1). President Nasser's effort to change the Sudanese society encompassed three basic elements, the first of which was the belief that, "The revolution has been staged for the benefit of the human being. It has been staged for his good living and dignity." Here, the president attempted to show the audience that their problems of living with decency were at the center of his concerns.
The second element employed in using the strategy of revolu-
tionization was that President Nimeiri insisted in transcending the
revolution to include each individual. That is, the revolution was
not a property of the president that would fade after his death;
rather, each individual Sudanese was perceived as a revolutionary
who would guard and protect the regime. President Nimeiri asserted
that, "The revolution will keep going because the revolution is not
Nimeiri and it is not the ministers of Nimeiri."  ^53

The third element employed in the strategy of revolutionization
was the contention that "modernization" was a difficult process and
demanded constant work: "For heavens never rain gold or silver,"
President Nimeiri told the audiences and added, "...This demands an
increase in effort in the way to achieve modernization and to give a
new birth to man, a new physical and intellectual birth." ^60

Legitimation Strategy

Legitimation strategy was by far the most stressed strategy in
the People's Assembly speech of 1972 (P = .27, P = .56.2). The high
use of legitimation strategy was a result of the exigencies of the
occasion. The rhetorical situation of the opening session of the
first People's Assembly demanded a rhetorical discourse that
explained what it means to create such an institution. Nimeiri had
to address questions like "What are its duties? What rights will
it have?" President Nimeiri provided the answer to the first
question:

Today ... we meet again to celebrate the
first session of the first real People's
Council, a council which geographical entities, popular organizations, and national groups have been represented in a real council whose members have been elected in ultimate freedom.

As far as the duties and objectives of the people's council were concerned, the president specified: "There are two basic objectives before the People's Council: drawing the permanent constitution and participation with the president in legislation." 62

Concerning the question of rights of the People's Council, President Huseiri affirmed:

I want to affirm for the members that this council enjoys a free will and there are no limits upon it except the limits of law according to which it has been formed and the by-laws organizing its work.

As can be noticed from this passage, the president's attempt to make the audiences believe that the people's council was a legitimate institution which came into being by the free will of the citizen and it was guaranteed freedom to practice its two duties of formulating the constitution and assisting the president in legislative matters.

Aside from the People's Council conceived legitimacy, the president viewed his whole system of government as a legitimate one:

The organizational revolution has been a prompting factor for the revolutionary
qualities, and handled the power for the people in every sphere. Thus the people had been liberated from sectarian and tribal domination. Popular organizations have been organized, popular local government systems have been established, and the Vietnamese Socialist Union has been formed.

Delegation Strategy

Delegation strategy was less utilized in the People’s Assembly speech of 1972 than in the unity speech of 1972 ($P = 34$, $P = 9.8$). President Ximei announced the previous regimes for their inability to form a permanent constitution for the country. In addition, he viewed their parliamentary practices as “had been just oratory, fraud and assembling of flowers.”

Mobilization Strategy

As reflected in Table 3, mobilization was the third most often employed strategy in the People’s Assembly speech of 1972 ($P = 53$, $P = 16.0$). The president’s mobilization effort involved three elements: The first of which was ordering the members to pursue a “good conduct,” and respect the “public mood, and the prevailing traditions,” because the public “figure is a public ownership.”

The second element was forbidding the members from seeking personal gains:

Members of the People’s Council should not seek trade licenses, export quotas for themselves and others whom they know. They should not ask for weapon licenses, licenses for building mills or
bakeries. They should not mediate for the benefit of others and should not call on the ministers and government employees to serve themselves. All this should not and will not be. We shall not tolerate it under May Revolution.

The third element President Nimeiri used in respect to the strategy of mobilization was instructing the members of the People's Council to gain enough knowledge to enable them to perform their duties:

... So the thing I want to direct your attention to is to be acquainted with the least of knowledge which is necessary for understanding government work and evaluating it. I direct your attention not to judge anything by guessing, without enough knowledge.

These three elements -- of ordering, forbidding and instructing the members of the People's Assembly to comply with rules set forth for them to be responsible and trusted public servants -- seemed to be a "fitting" response to the exigencies of the situation. President Nimeiri went even further in his mobilization of the members to practice their duties with high morality. The president dramatized the situation for the members: "...there is nothing between good and evil and there is so third alternative for good conduct or resignation."170

Unification Strategy

As shown in Table 3, unification was not used very often in the People's Assembly speech of 1972 (P - 28, P - 8.0). The decline in
use of the strategy of unification was probably due to the exigencies of unity which were most prevalent in the other rhetorical situations and were not present for the speech under investigation. President Nimriri viewed the achievement of "national unity" as "a kind of political maturity." He added:

The greatest of our achievements in the elapsing year is the restoration of national unity following the statement of regional autonomy which had brought about harmony to the country.

Theocratisation Strategy

Theocratisation Strategy was the second least employed strategy in the People's Assembly Speech of 1972 (F = 16, P = 4.5). Much of the president's religious appeals occurred when he attempted to draw a line between his regime as acting in accordance with religious principle and the opposition which acted from an immoral base: "The Revolution wanted the factory to serve this country and God, wanted the mosque to be a place for prayers." President Nimriri told the People's Assembly members, "They [the opposition members] are all immoral and unreligious, otherwise they would not have sold their conscience and should not aim to destroy their country by turning means of production into a place for conspiracy and the mosques for dividing the Muslims."
Dedication Strategy

As can be noticed from Table 3, the strategy of dedication was not employed at all. The non use can probably be attributed to what Pitzer called “the degree of interest.” Simply stated, President chose not to emphasize his “ethos,” because he felt that the use of the other seven strategies was more important.

Because the issue of credibility is very important, the president perhaps misconceived the strategic options available to him at the time. With the president confronting an exigency of mobilizing the members of the People’s Assembly, for example, to pursue a “good conduct.” It was important for him to show how he as president would act in the manner of a proper leadership, so that they could follow him as an example of a trustworthy, loyal and dedicated leader.

Afro-Arabization

Afro-Arabization strategy was the second least employed strategy in the People’s Assembly speech of 1972 (F = 5, F = 1.6). President Nimeiri was consistent in articulating the Sudan Afro-Arab policies.

... our effort, in the Arab field, originates from our strong belief in our sense of belonging to the Arab destiny. This effort will continue without any limitations as long as we need for it to remain. We exert it in the same manner in the field of African destiny.
To briefly summarize, the foregoing discussion centered primarily on the identification of persuasive strategies found in the political rhetoric of President Mneir in regard to achievement speeches (n = 2). The emphasis as well as the de-emphasis each strategy received was described, and the relationships between exigencies and the use of persuasive strategies were explained.

**Persuasive Strategies in Responses to Coup Attempt Speeches**

**Background**

The relatively limited attempts of the Mneir regime to pursue a rigorous policy in regard to the transformation of the Jordanian society have made the regime vulnerable to attacks by the opposition and increased the likelihood that counter-coups that were would claim to make substantive changes in the political system.

Following the instigation of the Mneir regime, several plots and disputes had arisen, and three major coup attempts succeeded in holding power for a rather short period of time before they had been defeated.

The present section is a discussion of the president's addresses in response to:

1) The communist coup attempt of July 19, 1971, under the leadership of Major Hashim al-Atta.
2) Haseen Hussein coup of September 25, 1975, and
3) The Libyan invasion of July 2, 1976, under the leadership of the retired colonel Mohammed al-Seed.
Three speeches, given on these occasions, constitute a genre of discourse that is different from the previous three categories of speeches analyzed and discussed. The uniqueness of these speeches stemmed from the fact that each was a response to a coup attempt that challenged the regime and created a great deal of instability and most crucially, each accused the Nimeiri regime of inefficiency and a lack of proper policy implementations.

In order for the president to regain the confidence of the public, he must respond positively to the exigencies inherent in the situations. He had to redefine his "rhetorical contracts" and reply to the allegations, charged by his opponents and debunk their accusations.

Analysis of the President's Speech in Response to the Communist Coup - 1977

Situational Context

Immediately following the success of the coup, Major el-Atta broadcast a statement over Radio Omdurman in which he accused President Nimeiri of bold rhetoric and lack of "direction," and claimed that Nimeiri had diverted the "revolution from its course of socialism." These allegations had a considerable bearing on the president's subsequent statements and speeches.

After the coup attempt was aborted, President Nimeiri made a series of statements and public appearances to deny the communist charges and to restore the political order in the country. The speech under discussion was delivered before a homogeneous group of military force personnel at their barracks at el-Shagura, Khartoum.
The speech was broadcast live and rebroadcast more than once so that it could reach as many audiences as possible.

The rhetorical situation of this speech manifested several exigencies that needed to be addressed and altered by rhetorical devices. Among the most important perceived exigencies were the following. First, the allegations and the charges directed by the coup leader demanded a positive reply on the part of the president to defy these charges, redefine the situation to his advantage and to confirm and/or reestablish his revolutionary ideas.

Second, since the legitimacy base of the president had been challenged by a coup attempt, it became necessary for the president to advance and sustain his legitimacy claims in a way that they might be perceived as proper and acceptable by the majority of the people.

Third, both the military and the public had played a significant role in defeating the communist coup attempt.

Consequently the exigency called for the president to express his gratitude and appreciation for that support.

Finally, the dispute between the Nimeiri regime and the coup organizers had divided the Sudanese people into relatively two broad groups: the Nimeiri supporters and the coup sympathizers. This situation called for the president to mobilize the public for more support for his regime so that it could resist any countercoup in the future. The following discussion focuses on the president's rhetorical choices in response to these pervasive exigencies.
Revolutionization Strategy

As indicated in Table 4, this strategy was the fourth ranked most utilized strategy ($F = 40$, $P = 15.7$). In this speech revolutionization was used less than delegitimation, legitimation and even less than theoratization strategy. This sharp decline in the strategy of revolutionization stemmed from the exigencies of the coup that demanded a rigorous utilization of discourse to attack the communist claims for legitimacy.

To affirm the regime's commitments to the declared policies and to show the sharp differences in religious belief between the Nimeiri regime and the communist "conspirators".

President Nimeiri's revolution appeals evolved around two main claims: 1) the contention that the May Revolution was a "mass revolution," that was rooted in the consciousness of the masses who protected it against the opposition and demanded its continuation, 179 and 2) the claim that the "May Revolution" changed the life of the Sudanese individual and achieved a tremendous reformatory change for the benefit of the masses. 180

Legitimation Strategy

As can be seen in Table 4, this strategy was the second most frequently employed strategy in the president's address in response to the communist coup of 1971 ($F = 52$, $P = 20.5$). The President's legitimacy claims seemed intended to generate a considerable support needed for the continuation of his regime. The most emphasized element in regard to this strategy centered on the claims that the regime's power was derived from the "people," and it attempted to
Table IV. Responses to Coup Attempts Speeches.

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<th>Type of Strategy</th>
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pursue "constitutional" precepts that would be set forth by the people and for the people. 181

To re-affirm these propositions the president insisted that: "Your revolution has moved into the direction of ... consolidating independence, achieving self-sufficiency, justice and socialism." 182

To give his appeals a solid base for assent, President Nimeiri assured the audience that: "We were steadfast to our commitments and determined on building socialism." The determination of the president to build "socialism" appeared to be a "right" response to the communist charges.

Delegitimization Strategy

As indicated in Table 4, this strategy was by far the most employed strategy (P = .74, P = .31.). This use, given to delegitimization, emanated from the rhetorical situation of the speech that demanded an appeal to disclose the illegitimate grounds of the communist coup.

The president's effort to attack the opposition was organized around two-fold: To degrade the coup members and to discredit the party to which they belong. President Nimeiri showed disrespect for the coup members and depicted them as "conspirators," "enemies of the people," "atheists," "foolish," "terrorists," "traitors," and "treacherous." 184 In addition, the president went on portraying each member of the coup in harsh words and grouped them all as agents of communism. President Nimeiri charged that:

The mischievous hateful group that attempted to dissolve the Revolution on
July 15 was a strange mixture of people, among them the hateful, the deluded, the naive, the careless and the insane, and all of them are nothing but subservient toys in the hand of a deceptive party -- the communist party.

Mobilization Strategy

As shown in Table 4, this strategy was the third least employed strategy in the president's speech in response to the communist coup ($N = 14, P = 4.9$). At the opening of his speech President Begin praised the role the public and the military undertook in "crushing the defeated elements," and called for the whole citizenry to "stand behind the regime." 186

In essence, most of the president's mobilization efforts were directed at the military force: 1) the military force was urged to "guard and protect the revolutionary achievement the way they protect their hearts and eyes," 2) they were also called upon to participate in the referendum on the presidency that was declared to take place in September 1971, and 3) they were asked to "participate with the public in the completion and in actualization of the political institutions." 185

Unification Strategy

Surprisingly, the strategy of unification was not used in the president's address in response to the communist coup of 15 July 1971 (see Table 4). It appears, clearly, that this omission was an instance in which the president misrepresented the situation by ignoring one of the important strategies that probably needed to be
employed to overcome the division of the people created by the exigencies of the coup attempt.

The fragmentation of the citizens necessitated a highly structured discourse calling upon all the citizens to be united and to support the regime to resist any counterattack that might be staged by any opposition in the future. The minimization of the role of unity was a negative response to the situational components that demanded a positive response to alleviate division and restore the cohesion of the people.

Theorization Strategy

As can be observed in Table 4, this strategy was the third most often employed in the president's speech in response to the communist coup attempt of July 1971 (F = 35, P = 15.0). At the outset of this address, President Nimeiri quoted the following verse from the Holy Qur'an:

God hath purchased of the believers Believers Their persons and their goods; For theirs (in return) is the Garden of (Paradise): They fight in His cause, and slay and are slain: A promise binding on Him in Truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the Qur-an. And who is more faithful to his covenant than God? Then rejoice in the bargain Which ye have concluded: That is the achievement supreme.

By quoting the above verse, the president appeared to show the military men that whoever fights in the cause of God will be highly rewarded in the day of judgment.
The president's most powerful appeals in relation to the strategy of theocratisation came when he depicted the communists as "enemies of God." In contrast, President Huseiri told the audience that: "I am speaking to you from a heart full of faith in God the most powerful..." President Huseiri was contrasting himself as a defender of the faith with the communists who did not believe in God and who attempted to destroy the people's belief by imposing an irreligious form of government upon them.

Dedication Strategy

This strategy was used with moderate frequency (F = 3, P = 12.2). President Huseiri's efforts to enhance his credibility evolved around two facts. First, the president assured the audience that he would remain "loyal" to the country and "dedicated" to protecting its inheritance. The president further told the gathering audience that: "We are steadfast in our commitments."

Afro-Arabization Strategy

The articulation of the Afro-Arab policies was the least employed of all the strategies present in the president's speech following the coup attempt (F = 6, P = 2.3). The president's Afro-Arabization appeals occurred when he expressed his appreciation and thanks to both "African" and "Arab" countries that congratulated him for his victory against the communist coup attempt.
Analysis of the President's Speech in Response
To the Aborted Coup of 1975

Situational Context

The political conflict between the Nimeiri regime and its opposition continued when another group of officers staged a second serious coup attempt on September 5, 1975, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Hassan Musa. Although the coup attempt was the least serious of the three, the incident had a tremendous effect on the president's response to this abortive effort.

Following the defeat of the coup, the president issued a short statement about the incident and assured the audience that he would address them a week from that day. The speech was delivered before a joint meeting of the SSU Central Committee, the People's Assembly, and the People's Regional Assembly on Friday, September 12, 1975.

Although a week had elapsed since the coup was aborted, the situation was still prevalent and demanded a response from the president who waited to gather full information from his national security agencies about the cause of the coup and its consequences.

The exigencies of the situation demanded that the president structure his discourse to define the exigential flow of events. For example, Nimeiri needed to answer such questions as, "Who are the coup members?" "What were their motives?" "What are the measures that would be taken to prevent such an incident?" "Would there be any change in the declared policies due to this conflict?"

Revolutionization Strategy

As indicated in Table 4, this strategy was the third most employed strategy in the president's speech in response to the
abortive coup of 1975 (P = 41, P = 18.4). President Nimeiri's revolutionization appeals revolved around three main claims: First, the abortive coup was intended to demolish the revolutionary achievements: "Their assault," said President Nimeiri, "was not on Nimeiri, but also on every development project, every educational center and every irrigation canal made by the May Revolution."

The second claim was, "the ultimate goal of the abortive conspiracy was the physical liquidation of the revolution manifested in its leaders." 194

The third claim in respect to the strategy of revolutionization was that the revolution would continue despite political plots. President Nimeiri asserted: "The revolution would survive despite the plotting and conspiracy." 195

Legitimation Strategy
As can be seen in Table 4, this strategy was the second most often used strategy in the president's speech of 1975 (P = 59, P = 26.4). The president's rhetorical search for legitimacy encompassed several claims. First, he conceived of his regime as legitimate, "The September 5th eve, brothers, was set at a date for the assault of the rebellion on the legitimate authority." 196

Second, President Nimeiri claimed that the rule in his regime was not a dictatorship practiced by one leader but it was based on the creation of political institutions that derived their authority from the constitution established by the people's will: "Their malice was inflamed when they saw the revolution hand the authority over to the people, and their malice was inflamed when
they saw SNU, the People's Assembly, the People's local government councils assume responsibilities and rule in the name of people."197

Third, the president asserted that he would continue to carry on his previous declared policies: "We will remain, brothers, faithful to our principles of freedom, democracy and socialism. Our reply to the defected elements will always be based on legitimacy and on the constitution and the constitutional, political and popular institutions."198

Delegitimation Strategy

As in the president's speech in response to the communist coup, delegitimation in the president's speech in response to the coup attempt of 1975 was the most frequently employed strategy (P = 79, P = 54.1). President Nimeiri depicted the coup members as: "hired elements," "conspirators," "assaultive," "naive," "wicked," "reactionary forces," "enemies of the revolution," and "malicious and feeble-minded."199

By these depictions President Nimeiri wanted the people to believe that the coup members had no popular grounds upon which they could assume power and rule in the name of the people who defeated them: "Their assault was not aimed at Nimeiri alone, but at the entire people. For this reason the entire people stood in their face."200

To degrade the coup members even further, the president claimed that: "The conspiracy was planned and financed abroad."201 While the president was careful not to mention a country which financed the coup attempt, the message he wanted to get across was that the
coup members were foreign agents and hence lacked the support of the public who stood to defend its nation.

Another prominent feature of the strategy of delegitimation was the repetition of the two key words, "malice," and "assault." These two words were employed in a repetitive and rhythmic pattern in an attempt to attack the legitimacy claims of the coup members and to disclose their anti-nationalistic acts. The president's efforts revolved around instigating the whole people despite their class, race or occupation against the coup circles. President Njimiri charged that:

Their assault was aimed at the minimum wage limits and the social security acts, and service terms for the workers and the professionals. Their assault was against equality of women with men as regards pay for similar work.

Mobilisation Strategy

This was the third least emphasized employed strategy in the president's speech of 1975 (F = 10, P = 4.5). While the rhetorical situation of the coup necessitated a greater use of mobilization appeals to urge the public to support and defend the regime against the conceivably illegitimate coup attempt, the president's efforts to mobilize apparently fell short of meeting the demands of the situation and the exigencies of the coup.

President Njimiri conceived of his rule as based essentially on the participation of the masses.
Their malice was inflamed when they found that the rule in the Hashemite regime is no longer a minority prerequisite nor an inherited or usurped right, but that it is a participation by the entire people through sincere work. 203

The president encouraged the gathering audience to outline the measures that should be taken in order to "prevent the occurrence of what happened and to deny the hirelings any opportunity to attack the revolution." 204

Unification Strategy

As Table 4 indicated, the appeals for national integration were the fourth most employed strategy in the 1975 speech (P = 20, P = 9.3). President Nimeiri's major unification effort centered on the claim that the coup was essentially an attack on the unity of the nation: "Their malice was inflamed when they saw the exhausted and divided Sudan restore its power, unity and cohesion." 205 The president expressed his determination to strengthen social integration: "Our reply to the defeated elements, brothers, will be the furtherance of the national unity and cohesion." 206

In order to give his stated determination for furtherance of national unity a tangible base for believability, the President asserted, "we will not pull back from our objectives, our plans and our programs for the consolidation of the national unity." 207 Thus the strategy of unification as employed in this speech seemed to operate in the desired direction of solidification of the nation's unity and to bind it and its various elements together.
Theocratization Strategy

As can be seen in Table 4, theocratization did not occur at all in the president's address in response to the 1975 coup attempt, and this was the first time wherein the president failed to utilize religious appeals to underscore his political decisions.

Aside from the persuasive dimension, President Nimeiri -- as do many other speakers -- very often started his speeches by saying: "In the name of God the merciful the compassionate," and ended his speeches by saying, "Peace be upon you." On the occasion of this speech he did not make either statement.

Dedication Strategy

As can be noticed from Table 4, dedication to the president's speech of 1975, was less utilized than in his speech in response to the communist coup of 1971 ($P = 15, P = 6.7$). The president assured the audiences that he would remain a "sincere," "faithful," and "dedicated," leader. Most importantly, he viewed the period of his leadership as:

Ever since I assumed the responsibility of leading the revolution, I exerted utmost efforts and devoted my time and thought and the whole of my age in what I thought to be in the benefit of the present and future of the Sudan.

Afro-Arabization Strategy

This was the second least employed strategy in the 1975 speech ($P = 2, P = .9$). "The Sudan position after the crushing of the
conspiracy," said President Nimeiri, "is more militant and potent in the Arab, African and world affairs."

Analysis of the President's Speech in Response to the Libyan Invasion - 1976

Situational Context

The abortive coup of July 2, 1976, the Libyan invasion, took place when the president was returning from a month-long official visit to the United States and France. The coup was led by retired Colonel Mohamed Far Saadi and backed by the National Front under the leadership of Sadiq Al-Mahadi and Shereif El-hendi who organized the opposition abroad. The coup was financed and facilitated by the Libyan government, which allowed the opposition to train their fighters inside Libya. Moreover, when the opposition fighters succeeded in capturing strategic positions in the capital, Al Sadiq El-Mahadi, the leader of the opposition, broadcast a statement of victory through Radio Tripoli, Libya, and accused the Nimeiri regime of corruption, sectarianism, injustice, oppression and despotism.

The speech in response to this most serious coup attempt was delivered on July 13, 1976, during the president's monthly radio and television program "Face the Nation." Surprisingly, while the exigencies resulting from the coup attempt were the ones that needed to be addressed the most, President Nimeiri devoted nearly half of his speech to talking about the objectives and the outcomes of his official visit to the United States and France.

While the president had provided a statement on the day the coup was aborted, many questions remaining to be addressed to modify the rhetorical exigencies of the coup were to be modified. For
example. "Who were the actual leaders of the coup attempt?" "What was the magnitude of the coup?" "What extent was the president's response to the accusations of the coup leaders?" "What was the future relationship to be between the Sudan and Libya?" And, most importantly, "Would there be any change in the president's policies domestically, locally and internationally?"

Revolutionization Strategy

As revealed in Table 4, revolutionization was the third most often employed strategy in the president's speech in response to the Libyan invasion (P = 62, P = 14.6). As can be noticed this time, revolutionization ranked unused behind delegitimization and legitimation strategies. This decline in use of revolutionization strategy may be attributed to the exigencies of the coup, where persuasive effort was needed to defy the charges of the opposition, delegitimize their acts, and to enhance the political order of the regime and to legitimize its existence.

Much of the president's revolutionization appeals took place in the first part of his speech where he viewed his official tour to the U.S. and France as beneficial for the country's "development and welfare." President Mubarak declared to the audience that a number of agreements had been reached between his regime and American corporations pertaining to financing development projects, improving research centers, promoting and developing river transportation, and establishing factories for tractors and agricultural equipment in the Sudan so as to revolutionize agricultural methods.
In response to the exigencies of the coup, however, President Hmezir expressed his determination to pursue change through the assimilation of development projects. The president asserted:

The coward invasion aimed at ... the process of development in our country and we would continue efforts and double steps toward more development for the well-being of the Sudan, our continent, and the world at large.

Legitimation Strategy

Legitimation strategy was the second most used strategy in the president’s address in response to the attempted coup of 1976 (F = 66, P < .05). President Hmezir’s effort to legitimate his political system included two-dimensional acts: first, he viewed his regime as based on political institutions and not governed or directed by certain individuals including himself: "...the Sudanese political leadership is not an individual whose name is Gasfar Hmezir, or any other name, but it is a political and constitutional organizations which are immortal and most powerful."215

The second dimension the president used in respect to the strategy of legitimation was determination to strengthen his political organizations despite the attack of the opposition:

The coward invasion aimed at the leading democratic experiment in the Sudan and we would continue to consolidate our constitutional and political institutions."216
Delegitimation Strategy

This strategy was by far the one most used in the president’s speech in response to the Libyan invasion of 1976 (P = 16A, P = 39.7). The execution of the strategy of delegitimation involved five elements: the denunciation and disclosure of the names of the opposition who planned the coup, the appeal to the Sudanese people to despise the opposition’s actions, the appeal to the Arab community to degrade the Libyan leader, the plea to the African countries, and the appeals to the international community to condemn the intervention of Libyan leader in the local affairs of the Sudan.

The first element was the denunciation and disclosure of the opponent’s names who planned the coup, while in response to the previous coup attempts, President Nimeiri did not mention the names of the individuals who attacked his regime. This time the mentioning of names was clear and forceful procedure. The president first responded to the allegations of Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi:

The agent Al Sadig El Mahadi spoke on the objectives of the foreign invasion which he called the popular movement, saying that it aims at the liquidation of sectarianism and tribalism, as if our people do not know who is Al Sadig El Mahadi. As if our people do not know that he is the ancestor of sectarianism and that he misdirected thousands who left their country to settle in Ethiopia hoping to return in the procession of Jihad to liberate Khartoum from atheists.

The president, then, denounced both leaders of the opposition: “It is ridiculous and funny, brothers, that Al-Sadiq El Mahadi, the
sectorial agent, and Nasseir El Hindi, the smuggler and tribes, are the leaders of the movement which adopt the name of May Revolution.218

While the president exerted tremendous effort to denounce the leaders of the opposition for striking his regime, he did not forget to deplete and degrade the Libyan leader who assisted them in their task. President Nimeiri portrayed Gadafi as "coward," "ill-tempered," "crazy," "dictatorship," "child," "little tyrant," and as a terrorist who finances "adventures and conspiracies."219

The second element that President Nimeiri undertook in relation to the strategy of delegitimization was an appeal to the Sudanese people to stigmatize the actions of the opposition. The president appealed to the audience in the following emotional manner:

Your wives were slaughtered, your youth and elders were killed, the skulls of your children were crummed, the traces of bloodstains of the victims are painting the beds and the graves are evident of the mass killing aimed at spreading ignorance and to paralyze resistance.220

The third element that President Nimeiri employed in the strategy of delegitimization was an appeal to the Arab nations to reprove Gadafi's acts that perpetuated animosity among the Arab countries. The president expressed his reaction to the Libyan invasion:

It could never come across my mind that an Arab country pushes murderers and
mercenaries to slaughter the people of another Arab country in a time which the Arab nation is waging a common war against a common enemy. 21

The fourth element was the plea to the African countries to see Gaddafí as a leader who diverted African attention from a common enemy to fight an African country which was an active force and protective force in the African front:

It never came across my mind, brothers, that a member of the O.A.S. attacks another African state which is contributing in spite of its meager resources against racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. 22

The fifth element employed in the strategy of delegitimation was an appeal to the international community to condeem "the treacherous foreign invasion," which was perceived as constituting a threat to Sudan security as well as to regional and international security. 223 Following a line of argumentative appeals. President Nimeiri expressed his anger: "It never came across my mind, brothers, that a member of the U.N. defies all international laws and performs obvious piracy without shame." 224

Thus, President Nimeiri attempted to reveal to the whole world that Gaddafí was an illegitimate leader who violated Arab and African solidarity, defied international laws, and whose actions should not only be condemned, but in addition, stopped.
Mobilization Strategy

As shown in Table 4, this strategy remained relatively consistent in frequency as used through the president's speeches in response to the three coup attempts under consideration. In the president's speech in response to the 1976 coup, mobilization was used relatively infrequently \((F = 21, P = 5.0)\). Much of the president's mobilization appeals occurred when he urged his popular organization to actively participate in the protection of the regime against the invaders and to allow their members to play "their role in the protection of their areas from strangers and foreigners."  

Unification Strategy

This strategy was the fifth most often used strategy in the president's speech in response to the Libyan invasion of 1976 \((F = 23, P = 5.0)\). President Nimeiri viewed the coup members as anti "unity," and against the solidarity of the people. In addition, President Nimeiri attacked Gaddafi on the grounds that he "converted the unity of the Arab nations into disunity and its cohesion into fragmentation and struggle."  

Theocratization Strategy

As indicated in Table 4, this was the least employed strategy in the president's speech of 1976 \((F = 13, P = 3.1)\). President Nimeiri attributed his victory to the "will of God," The president also charged that the opposition forces were merely acting in the "name of religion."
Dedication Strategy

As can be seen in Table 4, this strategy was the second least employed in the president's speech of 1976 (F = 17, P = 4.0). The president conceived of himself as an "honest," "frank," "noncompro- mising," leader, who strove to protect the country and its achievement against the "invaders."^229

The president also viewed the military men as "brave," and "courageous," for their role in defending the Sudan and its territorial integrity against the coup attempt. President Nimeiri declared:

The Sudan generally manifested in the heroes of the People's Armed Force who fought victoriously till the banner of treason got down before being hoisted."

Afro-Arabization Strategy

As indicated in Table 4, this strategy was the fourth ranked strategy stressed in the president's speech in response to the coup attempt of July 1976 (F = 54, P = 12.7). The proliferation of Afro-Arab appeal can be attributed to the exigencies of the coup where an Afro-Arab country was involved in the conflict between the Nimeiri regime and its opposition.

Much of the president's appeals occurred when he appealed to countries in the area to condemn Gaddafi's intentions behind the coup attempt. "The invasion," said President Nimeiri, "aims at legalization of the Israeli occupation of the Arab land and takes
the same Israeli expansionist path, it also at the violation of Arab solidarity, African solidarity, and the international peace as well.}\textsuperscript{232}

In summary, this section identified the persuasive strategies in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri in respect to coup attempts \( (N = 3) \). The scrutiny in use of each strategy was described and the relationships between situational constituents to persuasive strategies was explicated.

**Characteristics of Political Rhetoric in the Sudan**

The foregoing four sections dealt specifically with an analysis and interpretation of the persuasive strategies found in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri. This section focuses primarily on some of the intrinsic characteristics of the discourse of President Nimeiri.

One of the most striking characteristics of the revolutionary rhetoric of President Nimeiri is the "radicalization of rhetoric."\textsuperscript{233} This phrase refers to the utilization of stock-in-trade terms of Lenin-Marx rhetoric. Since the start of his regime, President Nimeiri has clung tenaciously to the use of revolutionary language to give his government a revolutionary character.

Among the key words/phrases that exhibited a radical language in the president's discourse were: "revolution," "radical change," "new democracy," "socialism," "mass struggle," "exploitation of the masses," "mass-suffering," "enemies of the revolution," "enemies of the people," "revolutionary spirit," "plots," "profiteers," "reactionary forces," "neo-colonialism," and "left-wing."
While the radicalization of rhetoric represents one feature of the political language of President Nimeiri, it is commonly shared by other African leaders who claim to be revolutionaries. Commenting on the shift in oratory in Africa in the post-independence era, Masrui argues that the content and the techniques of political discourse underwent a noticeable change. Masrui contends:

Among the changes which took place was the radicalization of rhetoric. This might be formulated in terms of a transition from Kipling to Lenin, from quotations drawn from Western creative literature to vocabulary drawn from leftist rhetoric."

One cannot read one page of Nimeiri's rhetoric without being struck by the radical language that permeates his discourse. It seems clear that the radical language was used as a currency for gaining compliance and as a symbol for evoking support for governmental decisions.

Another intrinsic characteristic of President Nimeiri is his tendency to coerce the audience to accept policies or to comply with decisions. Coercion as Bacharach and Lawler define it is "the capability to punish or threaten punishment of another. It may take the form of withdrawing or limiting rewards as well as administering costs."

A closer look at the Nimeiri discourse reveals that threat messages, although highly de-emphasized, were a distinguishable feature. In his attempt to minimize corruption in his
administration President Mubairi found no choice but to administer coercion to intimidate the public officials not to extend their hands to public properties:

If some people believe the public sector to be unguarded booty and start squandering it away I declare in the name of the revolution that every hand extended to the money will be rootily cut off. Those who squander the property of the people will be mercilessly punished."

This passage illustrates that communication was utilized as an instrument of coercion. The clarity of these threat messages left no room for misunderstanding and probably appeared more credible to audiences. 237

Another instance of utilization of coercive messages occurred when the president viewed the role of the army as part of the general public, and warned against any attempt to view the army as a privileged class: "Any attempt to isolate the army from the people or throw doubt on the unity of fata between the army and the masses should not be allowed." 238

A third coercive message was articulated in the president's response to the Libyan invasion of 1979. The president threatened to punish the coup members and viewed vengeance as inseparable from both religion and life: "We will not forget our vengeance for this in the principle of religion and life. There is no crime without punishment and no action without reaction." 239 Thus, the structure of his coercive messages functioned explicitly to administer punishment to the opponents who staged the coup attempt.
Implicitly, however, the coercive messages operated to intimidate the opposition not to risk staging coups because the reaction would be so swift and violent.

This dimension of threat is often referred to as "sanction by punishment." As Kilburn and Wetman argue, the sanction by threat "functions by making the target position, after the sanction is implemented, distinctly worse than it was before he engaged in the prescribed behavior. It penalizes, and the target can anticipate a less advantageous new status quo after implementing the sanction than the one he faced before he tested the threat." This appears to be exactly what the president attempted to do. Threats of punishment were organized so as to weaken the opposition and to set the stage for stability of the regime.

The third prominent feature of the revolutionary rhetoric of President Nimeiri is its verbosity. In this study, verbosity refers to the prolixity and redundancy of discourse and involves two elements: prolixity of discourse and the chronic repetition of words.

In regard to the prolixity of discourse, like many other revolutionary leaders, President Nimeiri's speeches are mostly very long. The president spoke for more than three continuous hours without showing signs of fatigue or exhaustion on one occasion. The longest speech analyzed in this study exceeded two hours. Usually, however, Nimeiri's speeches range from half an hour to one and a half hours.

The second element of verbosity is the repetitive use of catchy words and evocative slogans to incite the audiences to comply with
"self-reliance," "productive society," "the revolution will never retreat nor compromise," "noble struggle," "self-sufficiency," "alliance of the working people," "progressive revolution," "progress, prosperity and abundance," and "by production we will build our country."

In addition to the articulation of evocative terms, President Nimeiri tended to repeat these terms. The term "revolution," for example, was often repeated. For example, it appeared fourteen times in one single page, and in another instance it appeared eight times in two paragraphs.

Closely related to the previous feature is the contention that Nimeiri's rhetoric characteristically involved the use of intense language to evoke the emotions of the audience. Language intensity as Sandell defines it refers to "the extent to which the communicator's values and attitude are revealed in his presentation." The political rhetoric of President Nimeiri is highly intense. Messages were condensed with ideologically-loaded words such as "democracy," "socialism," "communism." These intense terms were employed often enough to perhaps inspire the audiences to accept the premises embedded within them.
The most dominant usage of intense language appeared in the president's attack on the opposition, where they were typified as "conspirators," "traitors," "treacherous element," "agents," "insuuses," "corruptors," "gang of treason," "hypocrites," "opportunists," "enemies of God," to name a few.

While there is no general consensus among rhetorical scholars in relation to the efficacy of the use of intense language in specific situations, Nettleshus generalizes that: "Highly emotional language in a message directed toward an audience that already is inclined to side with the source may serve to strengthen those attitudes, but receivers in general tend to react negatively toward extremely intense language."

In summary, the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri, aside from the eight strategies explicated in this chapter, displayed a discourse that was significantly radical, verbose, and evolves around the use of coercive messages and intense language.

To briefly conclude, this chapter identified the persuasive strategies found in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri in respect to four categories of speeches: anniversary speeches, platform speeches, achievement speeches, and responses to coup attempt speeches. The scrutiny in the use of each strategy, along with the relationship between persuasive strategies, and the exigential flow of events, were explicated. The final section of this chapter delineated four intrinsic characteristics of the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri. These were: radicalization of language, intensity of language, verbosity, and coercion.
Notes


Ministry of National Guidance, Text of President Nimeiry's Speech on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of the Revolution (Khartoum: Ministry of National Guidance, 1970), pp. 16-46. Both All speeches were originally delivered in the Arabic language and translated by specialist officers, except the First Anniversary speech and the President's speech in response to the communist coup attempt, which were translated by the researcher.

Ibid., p. 66.

Ibid., p. 67.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., pp. 36-68.

Ibid., p. 6.


The First Anniversary Speech, pp. 10-18.

Ibid., p. 10.

Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid., pp. 11-20.

Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 11.

Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 10.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Ibid., p. 5.


The Third Anniversary Speech, p. 57.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 40.

Ibid., p. 41.
44.Ibid., p. 12.
45.Ibid., pp. 17-20.
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CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary and Conclusions

This dissertation grew from the conviction that the study of revolutionary leaders in power has been relatively neglected by rhetorical scholars. Through an analysis of the discourse of President Nimeiri, 1970-1980, the researcher attempted to explain his utilization of persuasive strategies in relation to situational exigencies.

The study began with an historical and theoretical background needed for a better understanding of political rhetoric in the Sudan. Situational context was explained, a theory of revolution was synthesised, and a strategic view of rhetoric coupled with a situational approach to communication was explicated.

The strategic, situational perspective of communication appeared useful for analysing political rhetoric for two reasons. First, rhetoric in its broader sense can be viewed as "the strategic management of discourse." Thus, the strategic considerations of rhetoric would provide greater insights into how each strategy operates. Second, the situational perspective of rhetoric allows a researcher to account for the degree of emphasis given to each strategy in respect to changing considerations.

Within this theoretical framework, this study was an attempt to explicate and analyse the persuasive strategies in the discourse of
President Nimeiri. Thirteen political speeches were carefully selected for analysis. Two analytic methods were employed: 1) content analysis, and 2) rhetorical theory. First, content analysis was utilized to enable the researcher to approach the speeches quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

Quantitatively, each speech was analyzed as a context unit. Recording of coding units and category units were identified. This procedure was useful for it allowed the researcher to account for the type of strategies employed, the frequency of occurrence of each strategy, and the percentage of emphasis each strategy received in the four categories of speeches selected for study.

Second, qualitatively, the content analysis was supplemented by use of a rhetorical analysis known as "situational communication" which allowed the researcher to interpret the results in terms of the situational exigencies, audience and constraints, wherever they had been on creation, maturation or decay of each strategy under investigation.

The first question this study was designed to answer was this: "What were the dominant persuasive strategies in the political rhetoric of President Nimeiri?" In his attempts to create and maintain political order, more specifically, (a) what was the strategy(ies) that received most emphasis by the President?, and (b) what was the strategy(ies) that was least emphasized? Political rhetoric of President Nimeiri exhibited eight strategies: revolutionization, legitimation, delegitimation, mobilization, unification, theorization, dedication and Afro-Arabization. The following is a brief summary of his use of these strategies.
Revolutionization Strategy

Revolutionization was defined as the strategy by which persuasive messages were created and disseminated to respond to situational exigencies. Inherent in this strategy is the notion that rhetoric is employed as an "agency" through which revolutionary acts are manifested or carried out. Moreover, rhetoric is essentially employed in an attempt to persuade the public to accept decisions and/or to comply with policies. President Nimeiri's effort to revolutionize the Sudanese society revolved around the articulation of the following propositions:

1) The Sudan should be transformed from a backward underdeveloped country to a developed revolutionary one.

2) Developmental programs should be initiated that would push the country from the state of scarcity to a state of prosperity and progress.

3) Reformative policies should be implemented to rectify the economy and eradicate the predominant problems of illiteracy, hunger and illness.

4) Agricultural methods, educational system, and industrial sector should be modernized so as to modernize the social system as a whole.

5) Expectations of the Sudanese public should be raised through promises and rewards, so that they could believe that the revolutionary society of progress, prosperity and happiness is indispensable and possible.
Legitimation Strategy

Legitimation was defined as a strategy by which the president persuaded the public to regard his regime as legitimate and to allow consensus of opinion to emerge. President Nimeiri used rhetoric extensively to perpetuate the following perceived legitimacy claims:

1) A Sudanese National Charter should be formulated that exhibits the regime's ideology and guides its actions toward policy formation and decision implementation.

2) The nation's constitution must be formulated that describes, among other things, the nature of the presidency, sovereignty of the state, freedom, rights and duties of the citizens, the legislative power and executive power.

3) The power base must be widened through the creation of popular institutions, namely the Sudanese socialist Union, the People Assemblies, the people's local committees, in an attempt to solidify the belief that the regime constitutes "government by the people and for the people."

4) A legitimate democratic socialist state should be created in order to delegate the power to the masses and guarantee social and political freedom, justice, and equality within the boundaries of the regime's institution.

5) A one-party system, S.S.U., should be created that represents the alliances of the working people: farmer, worker, military officer, intellectuals and national capitalists.

These six legitimacy claims were constantly evidenced. President Nimeiri used all the discursive devices at his disposal to convince the public that his regime was proper and conducted policies in
accordance with known ideological constitutional principles that were drawn by the people.

Delegitimation Strategy

Delegitimation referred to the president's use of scurrilous language to degrade parties, groups and/or individuals in an opposition so as to diminish their actions and disclose their illegitimate grounds to the public for the purpose of destroying his opponents and turning potential enemies to supporters. The following are the president's most pervasive ways in implementing the strategy of delegitimation.

1) Typifying the opposition in a sharp manner and degrading its members in the eyes of the public. The opposition were so often depicted as "reactionary forces," "traitors," "neo-colonialists," "enemies of the people," "enemies of God," "exploiters of the masses," and the like. All these typifications were used to weaken the opposition on one hand, and on the other hand they operated to inspire the audiences to disengage from the opposition's actions.

2) Villifying the individual leaders of the opposition in order to alienate them from their followers and to demolish their claim for legitimacy. Key vilificatory terms such as "atheist," "traitor," "traited," "hypocrite," "smuggler," "cunning," "embezzler," and the like, were employed repetitively in an attempt to delegitimize the leaders of the opposition.

3) Fixing the blame on the opposition for all ills of the Sudanese society. During his first four years in office, blame focusing was an overriding concern that President Nimeiri constantly
used to delegitimize the opposition. The opposition -- especially
the previous ruling group -- were often blamed for such problems as
the deterioration of the economy, lack of efficient policies,
perpetuation of tribalism, sectarianism, poverty and a lack of
efficient educational system.

Mobilization Strategy

Mobilization was defined as a strategy by which the president
organized the public to act in a prescribed manner such as in support
of the regime's policies and to participate in its institutions.
President Nimeiri's mobilization appeals were aimed at accomplishing
the following:

1) Mobilizing the Sudanese people in support of the regime and
   its political and social achievements.
2) Motivating the public to affiliate and participate in the
   completion and strengthening of the regime's institutions.
3) Encouraging the Sudanese elite to generate what was termed
   the "cultural revolution" for the purpose of reviving the
   Sudanese civilization.
4) Appealing to the populace to work energetically so that
devlopment projects could be actualized.
5) Pleading to the opposition to join the march of the
revolution and participate with their fellow citizens in the
construction of the Sudan.

Unification Strategy

Unification referred to the strategy by which the president
attempts to bring about national unity, national reconciliation,
social integration and furtherance of a sense of togetherness among
the Sudanese people. President Nimeiri's responses to the exigencies
of unification incorporated:

1) An appeal for territorial unity. The president's
communicative effort was to unify the southern and the northern
Sudan, by initiating and achieving an agreement that stopped the
Civil War and preserved the territorial integrity of the country.

2) A plea for social cohesion. Discourse was utilized basically
to induce the audience to be united and reject any kind of social,
tribal and racial fragmentation.

3) An appeal for national reconciliation in an attempt to bridge
the gap between his regime and the opposition. The appeals for
reconciliation functioned to harmonize the Sudanese society and to
create the stability needed for the maintenance of the political
system.

Theorization Strategy

The articulation of religious symbols was one of Nimeiri's
dominant operative strategies. President Nimeiri employs religious
symbols extensively apparently in order to:

1) promote a healthy religious climate in which both Muslims and
Christians in the Sudan could perform their religious duties.

2) reinforce the belief that religions in the Sudan should
function as guides for political actions.

3) draw a sharp dichotomy between his regime as a religious
moral institution and the opposition members, some of whom were
depicted as "atheists" and others who were portrayed as "enemies of God," and/or "exploiting the masses in the name of religion."

Dedication Strategy
President Nimeiri's effort to enhance his credibility and to build a favorable image for his regime and his ruling elite included:

1) projecting himself as a nationalist, patriotic, loyal, religious leader who was dedicated to his people and his country.

2) identifying himself with the ordinary Sudanese citizenry so as to impress them about his honesty, heroism, sincerity, devotion, dexterity and other qualities.

3) perpetuating the belief that his administration, the army, his appointees were as committed, as he was, to the protection of the country's national interest.

Afro-Arabisation Strategy
The utterance of Afro-Arab commitment represented one of the dominant strategies in the speaking of President Nimeiri. This strategy reflected the internal as well as the external policies of the country. The articulation of Afro-Arabization strategy resembles the following elements:

1) Intensifying the belief that the Sudan belongs to both African and Arab worlds.

2) Calling for African unity and Arab solidarity and encouraging the countries in the region to resolve their conflicts with peaceful means.
3) Joining both African and Arab countries in their struggle against colonialization and Zionism, respectively, and supporting their policies in respect to these "noble struggles."

In summary, these eight strategies functioned as attempts to persuade the audiences to accept decisions and/or to comply with messages. While the analytical approach employed separated these strategies for discussion, these eight strategies are interdependent and tend to reinforce and complement each other. To illustrate, the strategy of revolutionization was often juxtaposed with strategies such as legitimation, unification, and theocratization, in order to enhance its magnitude. The president's legitimacy claims were frequently constructed with the perceived illegitimate grounds of the opposition. Mobilization has recurrently been associated with the strategy of unification. Theocratization and dedication were repeatedly employed to crystallize the president's legitimacy claims. Afro-Arabization was utilized to consolidate the legitimacy claims.

The second question this study was conducted to answer was: "Was there any continuity in the utilization of strategies across the speeches selected for study through time and situations?" This question pertains specifically to the role of the rhetorical situations in influencing the creation, maturation and decay of the strategies in each category. It appears that situations have influenced the utilization of strategies in the following manner:

1) When anniversaries were the main concern of the rhetoric, the strategy of revolutionization surpassed in use all the strategies employed in the six speeches investigated.
2) There was a gradual decline in the use of the strategy of
delegitimation over time. Moreover, the delegitimation of the
opposition was highly emphasized only in the first anniversary speech
declined in the following anniversary speeches.

3) Overall there was a relative consistency in the utilization
of strategies over time and according to situations. This relative
consistency was shaped by the generic resemblance of speeches.
Campbell and Jamieson suggest:

If the recurrence of similar forms
establishes a genre, then genres are
groups of discourses which share
substantive, stylistic, and situational
characteristics. Or, put differently,
in the discourse that form a genre,
similar substantive and stylistic
strategies are used to encompass
situations perceived as similar by
responding rhetors.

The consistency in the utilization of the strategies was
especially prominent in the presidential platform speeches (see Table
2 in Chapter III). Unlike the anniversary speeches where
revolutionization was the most often utilized strategy, in
presidential platform speeches, revolutionization was ranked in
second place and was preceded by the strategy of legitimization, the
president's main operative strategy.

Use made of the strategy of legitimization was a reasonable
response to the exigencies of the situation where legitimacy was
needed for constructing of a new political order. The generic
constellation of the presidential platform speeches placed a
considerable constraint on the president to emphasize his expected political order.

As in the presidential platform speeches, legitimation was also the most utilized strategy in the achievement speeches, followed by unification as the second most employed strategy in the unity speeches, and by revolutionization in the People's Assembly speeches (see Table 3).

Unlike the anniversary, platform and achievement speeches, in the president's responses to the exigencies of coup attempt speeches, delegitimation was the central rhetorical act.

Another eminent feature in the president's speeches in response to coup attempts was the relative de-emphasis of the strategy of revolutionization. It was ranked in third place and was preceded in usage by the strategies of delegitimation and legitimation. The explanation for this shift in emphasis resides basically in both the genre of speeches and the exigencies of the situation - i.e., the coup attempts. President Mineiri perceived the situations as demanding, in the first place, condemning the actions of the opposition and depicting them in a rigorous destructive manner so that the public could disengage from the opposition and comply with his legitimacy claims.

A third conspicuous future in the president's speeches in response to coup attempts is that delegitimation was more highly emphasized in the 1975 speech than in the 1975 and 1971 speeches respectively. The greater scrutiny given to the strategy of delegitimation was due to the fact that the 1975 coup attempt was the most serious attempt that challenged the Mineiri regime. In
addition, the coup attempt was a threat to the regime from within --
the active opposition -- and from without the country, where a
foreign nation, Libya, was directly involved in the attempt.

A final outstanding element in the president's speeches in
response to coup attempts was the decline in use of both the
strategies of unification and theocratization in the 1971 and 1975
speeches. The researcher contends that in these instances the
president misrepresented the situation by ignoring both strategies
where their utilization was demanded for the meeting of the
exigencies of the situation.

To briefly summarize, the situational constituents of Nimeiri's
discourse, along with generic constellation of speeches, appeared to
have influenced the creation, articulation and decline in use of the
eight strategies identified. At this juncture the researcher does
not assume a causal relationship to exist between situation and
creation of discourse. Rather, the relation between the two can be
viewed as "practical." Cushman and Tompkins demonstrate:

Rhetoric arises in response to practical
problems, problems about what to do. A
practical problem has a relationship to
a practical context which theoretical
problems do not have. Practical
problems confront certain people whose
point of view, skills and resources
limit the range of principles which can
acceptably be employed to resolve the
problem.

The third question this study set out to answer was: "What were
the intrinsic characteristics of the political rhetoric of President
Nimeiri? The researcher substantiated four intrinsic characteristics of the discourse of President Nimeiri: radicalization of language, intensity of messages, coercion and verbosity.

Discussion

This dissertation encountered the problem of determining the persuasive strategies in the discourse of President Nimeiri through a wide time span and in respect to various situational constraints. Through an analysis of political rhetoric and an examination of contextual environment, the absence and presence of persuasive strategies was observed. Theoretically speaking, the rhetorical situation appeared to have played a considerable role in the emphasis and deemphasis in the use of persuasive strategies identified.

In addition, the study provided greater insight into the rhetorical process through which a leader utilized discourse to achieve political goals. In a larger context, President Nimeiri employed persuasive strategies to:

A -- Create political order through an initiation of new policies and innovative programs to transform the Sudanese society.

B -- Maintain political order through institution building and constitution formulation so that the public could be mobilized and persuaded that the Nimeiri regime was legitimate and worthy of support.

C -- Ingratiate himself with Sudanese society, by perceiving himself and his appointees as patriots committed to rational interest and dedicated to the well-being of the Sudanese people.
D -- Justify his existence by perceiving his regime as "revolutionary." The extensive use of the term "revolution" is probably intended to set up a common perception that his regime is more suitable to the conditions of the country. More specifically, President Nimeiri uses the term "revolution" to frame or to create political reality. The issue of reality creation in politics is well recognized by communication scholars. To illustrate Grober indicates:

In the process of calling attention to situations, people, and events -- or in addition to it -- political elites interpret the political scope. They explain the significance of events, indicate their causes and interrelation with other events, and pass judgments about the merits of particular situations. They also justify their own actions by linking them to sound motives, goals, and developments.

E -- Delegitimize opposing groups and attempt to isolate them from the public while striving to identify himself with the public -- its religion, its culture -- and use persuasive strategies to unify its fragmented elements.

Finally, from President Nimeiri's utilization of political rhetoric, one can generalize that -- like African leaders -- he uses political rhetoric to persuade the audience to accept decisions and to comply with actions. Like African leaders, too, he utilizes coercion to intimidate opponents and/or practices sanctions to direct particular groups to behave in a prescribed manner.
Implications

This dissertation has several implications for the rhetor, for rhetorical scholars, and for African scholars.

Implications for the Rhetor

If persuasion can be used as a vehicle through which political order can be created and sustained, then persuasive strategies need to be utilized properly. To illustrate:

A. This dissertation is an illustration of how persuasive strategies may be structured to meet certain rhetorical exigencies, demands of an audience and others that impinge themselves on a rhetor.

B. Since the exigence of a political system in Sudan requires mobilization of the masses, it is necessary that a considerable effort be directed toward understanding how to mobilize the public so that it can participate effectively and energetically in the resulting transformation process. This study aids in that understanding.

C. This study suggests that expectations of an audience should not be raised beyond what can be accomplished. Raising expectations of an audience extensively would probably result in a deep frustration if these expectations were not subsequently met.

D. The discourse of President Simeiri exhibited a considerable number of intense and provocative terms, such as "socialism," without substantive elucidation. The implication of this is that the articulation of the term "socialism" will not necessarily breed
socialism, nor will its use create a society of "justice, freedom and equality." Socialism is a "doctrine that the ownership and the control of the means of production -- capital, land, or property -- should be administered in the interest of all."  

E. If political rhetoric in the Sudan is used to bring about a desired change, then there are several incident requirements needing to be done before any persuasive attempt could be undertaken, such as initiating a comprehensive cultural program that takes into consideration:

-- eradication of illiteracy that hinders the development process and re-education of the whole population so that the people can be readily able to comprehend the communicative messages articulated to them and to knowledgeably understand the truth of their unsatisfactory existence and the desires of their destiny.

-- solidification of national integration in order to create true national character based on "fusion of emotions and skills and a desire for the novel but also a respect for the self."  

When these considerations are met, the transformation process may be "assisted by the entire political class of the country, all pushing in the same direction and all presenting the promises for a new future."  

Without this cultural program, any persuasive effort will not be fully observed by an illiterate public that does not understand what is being communicated. The implication of this is very conspicuous -- without educating the masses, any development effort
will fall short of total change, and without solidification of national integration, the unity of a nation will be tremendously challenged by the illiterates and by those who cling fanatically to tribalization and regional cliques.

Implications for Rhetorical Scholars

This study breaks fresh ground upon which rhetorical scholars can compare the use of persuasive strategies in the political rhetoric of a Third World leader who uses persuasion to maintain "power," over time, to those employed by leaders in a developed country.

Rhetorical scholars additionally may investigate the degree to which platform speeches, for example, are similar or dissimilar to those employed by Western leaders on some occasion.

Implications for African Scholars

This study systematically delineated eight persuasive strategies and explained their utilization in relation to exigential flow of events, audiences' demands, and situational constraints. These eight strategies may serve as a guideline from which African rhetorical scholars can differentiate between the strategies used by President Nimeiri and those employed by other African leaders.

In addition, this study shows how a particular leader utilized discourse in an attempt to deal with the precarious situation in the Sudan, i.e., President Nimeiri employed persuasive strategies to solve the predominant problems of a lack of modernization, social fragmentation, legitimacy, and a need to transform the social and political system as a whole. The implication here is of to what
degree and to what extent those strategies are present in the political rhetoric of other African leaders with similar societal and political contexts. African scholars need to investigate this area of inquiry.

Limitations and Future Research

The obvious limitation of this study is that not all possible questions pertaining to African political rhetoric were answered here. This researcher generalized that all African leaders may use the eight persuasive strategies under scrutiny. Because this generalization is not based on systematic observation, an empirical test is needed to validate this claim.

Using the same strategic situational perspective of Rhetoric and the same methodology, future research is recommended to analyze the discourse of four African revolutionary leaders: Awerer of Tanzania, Karam of Ethiopia, Nuray of Somalia, and Gadafi of Libya.

The task of rhetorical researchers is still significant. Rhetorical scholars, especially in Africa, can no longer ignore the rhetoric of those leaders while their discourse continues to proliferate the international political scene. To the extent that their rhetoric is scrutinized, communication scholars will be better able to interpret the messages that they produce and the actions that they undertake.

In summary, this chapter concluded the study. It summarized and concluded the findings, discussed the findings in relation to
their theoretical base, explored the implications of the study, and suggested recommendations for future research.
Notes


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