Comparative Administration:
A Case Study
of United States and The Sudan

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Conclusion
Introduction

Comparative studies constitute one method of research and are illuminating and instrumental in developing knowledge and increasing understanding of the subject under investigation.

Comparative studies have been around since the days of the Greeks. "Aristotle . . . . . . . . gave the comparative approach a central place in his methodology. Moreover, the Holy Books e.g., the Bible and the Koran used this approach in their told parables as a powerful means of getting the messages of religion through. Since those days the advantages of this approach "have been sufficiently obvious to commend the comparative method," in different disciplines - political science, for instance, is a case in point of special relevance here.2

If comparative studies have a long tradition and they are well rooted in the field of political science, it is relevant that this should be the case in public administration. It is concerned primarily with the execution of public policies, the process of translating words into action, or achievement of prescribed goals. Since there is no best way of administering public affairs, no effort should be spared to investigate and search for experiences everywhere and compare them to courses of actions in given situations - such comparison would enhance understanding, and reveal the best course of action to be adopted or, in limited situations, adopted.

Comparative administration is relatively new3 when compared with comparative politics. This is due to the fact that political science preceded public administration. Ferrel hady emphasizes that although
comparative administration was not an entirely new venture, "comparison has certainly not been the main thrust in most of the literature on public administration particularly that produced in the United States."

It was not only until the end of World War II that comparative administration studies began in the U.S. It gained momentum in the 1960's. As Heady put it:

The time of greatest vitality, vigor, influence, etc. is the dictionary definition of heyday, describing accurately the comparative administration movement during the period of about a decade beginning in 1962, the year in which Comparative Administration Group received initial funding from Ford Foundation through a grant to the American Society for Public Administration, CAG's parent organization.

By the end of the 1960's the movement of comparative administration, CAG often depicted as its core, gradually fell into oblivion. During this period the movement received much criticism.

- A widespread criticism points out that the comparative administration movement has now had over twenty-five years, "including a decade of rather lavish support," in which to prove itself, and should now be producing results. In Heady's words:

The most frequent complaint is that comparative public administration has not had time enough but has failed to establish itself as a field of study with a generally accepted restricted range of topics to be addressed, and that despite the inclination to theories no consensus has been achieved permitting primary attention to be given to empirical studies designed to test existing theories about cross-national public administration.

Elaborating on this point he states:

Keith Henderson, writing in 1969 about the "identity crisis" in the field, asked what was not within the scope of comparative administration. Calling attention to the diversity of titles in CAG publications, he observed that although "there are certain dominant themes (the developing countries, the political systems, etc.) it is hard to know what the central thrust might be and equally hard to find anything distinctly "administrative" in that thrust. Ideally, the full range of political science, economic, sociological, historical and other concerns is relevant."
- The absence of integration and the lack of ability to offer acceptable theories was criticized by some scholars. For instance, Jerseit contends that "the absence of integrative concepts and central foci in comparative research and analysis" is a critical problem characterizing the works of CAG which covers "a wide range of seemingly independent concerns."8

- Peter Savage focuses on the seeming obsession of students of comparative administration to theorize while simultaneously showing lack of ability to offer acceptable and testable theories. He maintains that the literature of comparative administration "displays a melange of idiosyncratic theoretical formulations and organizing perspectives, many of which have more to do with academic or personal fancy than with any generally acceptable cumulative purpose."9

- Some critics maintain that "students of comparative administration have not kept pace with progress in closely related fields and this helps account for the lag in accomplishment."10

- An analysis of studies in the Journal of Comparative Administration found that the cross-national or comparative studies were the exception rather than the norm: "70 percent of the studies which focused on national or subnational units examined administration in only one national setting, 15 percent undertaking comparisons on a larger scale."11

- The 'ivory tower' image12 of CAG which failed to form a bridge between academic life and practice was criticized by two parallel views. One view maintains that CAG members "had their conferences and wrote their papers, but the practitioners did not seem to take much notice and changes in developing countries did not seem to be directly affected."13 The other position is that "comparative studies have so concentrated on emerging countries and their problems that little is offered of theoretical or practical utility in Western, particularly American, contexts."14
These shortcomings are cited, not with the intention of evaluating the comparative administration, rather because they offer a good example of the shortcomings of criticism as well as what is criticized. Three themes make this point crystal clear.

First, much of the criticism emphasizes that comparative administration is inadequately developed as a social science and laments its inability to frame theories in testable terms. This view tends to treat comparative administration as a discipline (or science) in its own right, lagging behind other disciplines. Such criticism is not doing comparative administration any justice; it is demanding far more than comparative administration can produce. Comparative administration should, by no means, be treated as anything more than an approach that makes use of the methodology of research and employs the theories of public administration. This criticism would have been accepted if it was targeted to public administration as a discipline, and not to an approach based on it.

Second, the bulk of criticism focuses on the performance or the output (i.e., studies produced) of the comparative administration movement rather than the theory. If anything this proves that the approach, in theory at least, is viable and intact. However, the studies produced may not have benefitted from the approach - the criticism that comparative studies were the exception rather than the rule is a good case in point.

Third, by focusing only on the CAG in the American scene, detractors of comparative administration movement are committing the very same mistake they are criticizing. CAG, or studies produced in the U.S. are by no means representative of comparative approach. To do justice critics should consider studies produced elsewhere other than the U.S.
Finally, this discussion proves, if anything, that the comparative approach is at least viable in theory. However studies in the direction may not be as intact as the assumptions of the approach. Comparative studies, if conducted properly, could be of immense utility both practically and theoretically. This paper endeavors to verify this hypothesis.  

The comparative approach should not be regarded as a discipline on its own right - it would be of immense theoretical utility to public administration. As a discipline, public administration is considered to be lacking consensus about its scope, boundaries, and emphasis. In his recent book, *Public Administration, A Comparative Perspective* (1979) Ferrel Ready has the following to say:

"Despite several decades of development, consensus about the scope of public administration is still lacking, and the field has been described as featuring heterodoxy rather than orthodoxy"

". . . no consensus has emerged as to the exact boundaries of the field"

"Sharp differences of opinion do indeed exist among student of public administration on important issues of approach and emphasis."

The comparative approach contributes to stimulating the much desired consensus in public administration. Investigation of administrative phenomenon in comparable contexts and diverse settings, and the objective comparison of findings widens the spectrum of intellectual vision, make established facts more meaningful, encourage a systematic analysis of all that was known in the field of public administration and thus might help framing an orthodoxy instead of the heterodoxy."
The comparative approach as a methodology of research has always helped branches of knowledge formulate their theories and public administration is no exception. In fact the early writings about public administration in the U.S. by Woodrow Wilson and others employed this approach; they studied European experiences and read scholars of Western Europe before they produced their own writings. 19

On the other hand, the comparative approach is perhaps more beneficial in practical terms than in theoretical terms. As indicated earlier, an aspect of administration is primarily concerned with decision making and implementation of public policy. Nations and organizations as well as communities or groups could learn from each other. This important theme is of special relevance since there is no best way of doing things.

However, in order to make use of this practical approach, the present classification of nations as developed/underdeveloped or developing should be changed because it is misleading and of less help to understanding.

"The words 'developed', 'undeveloped', 'underdeveloped', and 'less developed' are often used to denote the social and economic conditions of the people in a given country or region. The concept of development is elusive; it is perceived not only as a condition of life but also as a goal to be attained and as a capacity to grow and change and develop. These three ideas of development are bound together in efforts to understand and deal with the phenomenon of development. The evidences of the condition of underdevelopment are frequently given in terms of poverty." 20

Rarely, if at all, these "three ideas" i.e., condition of life, goal, and capacity to grow, are put together as a basis of classification. In fact,
even if they are put together they are not of much avail. Considering development as a "goal to be attained" it is bound to be everywhere. Any human activity whether involving a nation/state, organization or even a group of people, or an individual person, endeavor to make a better living and develop or enhance its lot. So development as a "goal" is an intrinsic value by the very nature of humans. As such it is not much of a help as a criteria in the classification.

On the other hand, the "capacity to grow" cannot be measured with any degree of certainty, on a long term basis at a given point of time. In most cases it is guess work. A number of examples make this point clear. Suffice to mention Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{21} whose capacity to grow was considered to be negligible in the 1960's; however, by the 1970's the picture completely changed. Applying the "capacity to grow" for Saudi Arabia in the 1960's would be misleading and would be equally misleading if not more so in the 1980's. One would never be able to tell what would happen to these countries in the 1990's.

What remains of these three faceted criteria is "the condition of life." This seems to be the only criteria used in the classification. In the case of countries, this is measured by national per capita income which is "frequently used to distinguish the developed from the underdeveloped countries."\textsuperscript{22}

If we allowed for the shortcomings of this economic criteria (e.g., does not give a clear picture of the condition of life in a given country and the details of the situation), still it would not be an acceptable criterion, because it tends to measure the situation at a fixed point in
in line with the inevitable assumption or connotation that the situation is static. Obviously, this 'snapshot' portrayal does not reflect the reality of life. As Grant puts it, "Development, (then), is not an absolute condition. There is not a fixed point at which a people, region, or country passes from a state of underdevelopment to a state of development. The relative condition of development, rather, is comparative and ever changing - it fluctuates according to what is needed, what is possible, and what is desired. Development is relative also in terms of the possible; it fluctuates according to what is feasible at any particular time."24

More specifically, what these words mean is that one could never tell when a country has crossed the threshold of underdevelopment to development.25 Moreover, they do not define what 'development' and 'underdevelopment' means since "what is needed," "desired," and "feasible" differ from one country to another.

Moreover, this classification served its purpose in the late 1950's and mid-sixties when most of the Third World countries won their independence. Thomas Hodgkin expressed in 1961 what most western scholars are thinking when he contends in 1961 that:

"Our profound ignorance of African history, our lack of comprehension of African attitudes to the contemporary situation, our remoteness from the idea of revolutionary democracy, the distortions in thinking produced our colonial mythology - these, I would suggest, are good reasons for doubting whether we are likely to have any sensible contributions to make to a discussion of social and political change in post-colonial Africa. Such questions are best left to Africans."26
Such a statement was understandable in 1961, so was the classification of countries into developed and underdeveloped but not in the 1980's when the "revolution" of telecommunications has really turned the world into a "small village." In the words of some researchers "Notwithstanding differences in national economic levels, large masses of people in many different countries live in about the same way, share about the same material values, and enjoy about the same amenities of life."28

Thus, it is more constructive to do away with the present "nominal" classification of developed and underdeveloped and apply an "ordinal" classification instead, that is to say, all countries are developing. However, on the scale of development, some are developing at a higher rate than others but all of them are in the race. This would help better understanding of the overall picture of the situation of all countries, and it would enable each country, regardless of its situation on the scale, to make use of experiences of other countries.

This paper discusses the United States and the Sudan as two countries representing the dichotomy of developed/underdeveloped to clarify this argument. The national administrative systems in both countries are compared in Chapter I: their backgrounds, typologies, classifications of their subsystems and their characteristics were examined. Chapter 2 discusses decentralization in both governments; it explores the environments in which they work and their backgrounds, and describes and analyses the practices of decentralization in both cases. Chapter 3 studies local government in both countries, it scans the historical background of both local governments, and then focuses on the dynamics of the two systems and their resources, human
as well as financial resources, and finally deal with the problems of coordination from an intergovernmental perspective. Building on the issues of local resources raised in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 deals exclusively with revenue-sharing in both countries; it moves from the principles of fiscal organization to the background of revenue-sharing and its philosophical and fiscal justification, then the chapter highlights governing legislation and its accomplishments and impacts. Chapter 5 which is concerned with personnel systems, discusses the background, functions and roles of the Civil Service Commission in both countries. Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on a common problem, i.e., poverty, and the approaches of both countries in dealing with it.

By focusing on these issues in the United States and the Sudan, one characterized as developed and the other as underdeveloped, the point is clearly made that both countries can learn from each other. By employing a comparative approach it is hoped that this paper highlights the viability of the approach. Accumulative research employing the same method could be of immense theoretical benefits to public administration.
Footnotes


2) Aristotle's Constitution of Athens is considered to be the earliest study of government employing the comparative approach.

3) Studies concerning systematic management of public affairs are considered to have begun with the works of German Max Weber in Europe, and in U.S. the 1887 essay of Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration" is generally considered the starting point of what was later on recognized as a discipline on its own right.


5) Ibid, p. 15.

6) Ibid, p. 25.

7) Ibid, p. 25.


11) Ibid, p. 27.

12) It is interesting to note that devotees of CAS movement, e.g., its chairman Fred W. Riggs admitted to this ivory tower image in a 1970 CAS newsletter.


15) If that is the case the pros of comparative administration movement should be cited too. Views as Waldo's, for instance, need be indicated. Waldo concluded that "... these efforts, these foci of interest have in the past decade become extremely important: they have developed a large literature, they are carried on in special organizations set up for the purpose of concentrated attention, many of us find them the center of our professional - intellectual life." Quoted from Robert T. Oleszekwiski, Public Administration as a Developing Discipline, Part 1 (Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York and Basel), 1977, p. 143.
16) However bold such an objective may be, it deserves to be tried. One can confidently say it is also achievable, and it is hoped that this paper has done so.


18) The assumption is that orthodoxy is desired. If one considers heterodoxy, as some do, as an element of strength in public administration, then this approach might well help emphasize this heterodoxy.

19) A more recent example of the comparative approach concerns the definition of public administration. Ready maintains that "the inadequacies of a narrow culture-bound definition of public administration became apparent early to those who were interested in comparative study of administration across national boundaries." Ferrel Ready, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective, Marcel Dekker, N.Y. 1979, p. 3.


21) Other examples include Japan, Korea and the Gulf countries after World War II.

22) Recently the criteria used to classify countries into developed and underdeveloped is further refined allowing for other indicators besides the economic ones, such as 'basic needs' and 'quality of life'.


25) These words are not sophisticated enough as to indicate that the hypothetical water-shed between development and underdevelopment is ever changing from time to time, nor do they imply that the whole process is a two-directional way: they imply that a country can move from underdevelopment to development but not vice versa which is a fact of life; Portugal is a good case in point.


27) This includes developed, as well as underdeveloped, countries. A good example that shows that this statement applies to 'underdeveloped' is a personal experience. Last winter I received a lot of letters from my family; they were concerned because of the cold weather that they had seen on T.V.

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Term Paper

Comparative National Administrative Systems
Federal v.s. Unitary
with Special Reference to the U.S. and The Sudan

Submitted to:

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by

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T. Introduction

There is a general consensus that "mankind has endeavored more or less continuously to move from myth to reason as a way of understanding phenomena, and that rational methods of operation have led gradually to more complex forms of organized efforts, culminating in fully developed bureaucracies which approximate the characteristics of Weber's 'ideal type'." ¹ To my contention, the present century witnessed an increasing move toward the other end of the continuum. Perhaps to the extent that justifies writings that describe our age as being controlled by bureaucracies.

The recent background of modern bureaucracy dates back to the French revolution and the advent of Napoleon since "out of this period of drastic transformation at the beginning of the nineteenth century emerged the nation-state as the dominant form of political system and the modern public bureaucracy as the vehicle for conducting the nation's business." ² The concept of personalized (king) state gave way to the 'nation'. Hence, the allegiance of the public official shifted from the 'king' to 'nation at large. Instead of serving the crown he came to serve the state.

Consequently he came to act according to the law, not in accordance with the wishes of the monarch or his minions. Years later Napoleon succeeded in building a bureaucracy emphasizing order, hierarchy, specialization and accountability. Later on Weber characterized this system as bureaucratic.

Throughout the twentieth century advancement and sophistication characterized the discipline of public administration. This sophistication led, among other things to different classifications of bureaucracies;
Later on the typology shifted to administrative system as a whole. In fact these typologies are numerous. A recent typology developed by Farrel Heady is much more comprehensive and convenient.

According to Heady's typology there are two basic types 'classic' and 'prismatic'. The classic type applies to the administrative system of the developed world. It has five distinct characteristics.

1) Public service that fall within this type would be large scale, complex, and "instrumental in the sense that its mission is understood to be that of carrying out the policies of political decision makers." That is to say it tends to have the attributes of Weber's 'ideal type', "including both the structural prerequisites and the behavioral tendencies mentioned by him."

2) Public service would be highly specialized and representative of the occupational and professional categories in the society.

3) There is a noticeable sense of professionalism, both in the sense of identification with the public service as a profession, and in the way of belonging to a narrow field of technical specialization within the public service, such as industrial engineering, telecommunication specialization or food science.

4) Due to political stability, public service is more fully developed. And the administrative/political demarcation, though generally accepted, is "somewhat blurred?" "In functional terms, the bureaucracy continues to be primarily involved in the output function of rule application, to a lesser extent in the output function of rule-making and to a quite limited degree in input functions such as interest aggregation."
5) The bureaucracy will be subject to effective policy control "by other functionally specific political institutions."

The other type modelled as 'prismatic-sala' is used to describe administrative systems in developing countries. Here these administrative systems, according to Hende where five characteristics:

1) "The basic pattern of public administration is imitative rather than indigenous". Those countries, including those that escaped colonization, have tried to introduce some version of modern western bureaucratic administration. "Usually it is patterned after a particular national administrative model, perhaps with incidental features borrowed from some other system." Former colonies administrative systems normally resemble the administrative system of the colonizer.

2) These administrative systems lack the needed skilled manpower to shoulder development programs. Unemployment and underemployment are widespread. Shortage in trained administrators with management capacities and technical competence is evident.

3) Emphasis are on "orientations that are other than production directed." "The most prevalent practices are evidence of the carry-over of deep-seated values from a more traditional past, which have not been modified or abandoned despite the adoption of nontraditional social structures." This affect, among other things, personnel process where we find that nonmerit considerations greatly influence selection, promotion, disciplinary measures and so forth.

4) Another distinguishing characteristic is "the discrepancy between form and reality". In the words of Hende "The gap between expectations
and actualities can be partially masked by enacting laws that cannot be enforced, adopting personnel regulations that are quietly bypassed, announcing a program for delegation of administrative discretion while keeping tight control of decision-making at the center or reporting as actually met production targets which in fact remain only partially fulfilled."

5) Bureaucracy is apt to have a generous measure of operational autonomy, which "can be accounted for by the convergence of several forces usually at work in a recently independent modernizing nation". Policy guidance in colonial times used to come from remote sources overseas and "this pattern persists even after the bureaucracy has a new master in the nation".

The first type i.e., the 'classic' is more general and broad since it encompasses such countries as Britain, France, West Germany and the United States. Considering the political systems -- which is far reaching impact upon administrative systems as to render then distinct types -- we can arrive at two types of administrative systems -- federal and unitary. Carrying this argument further we can distinguish four types of administrative systems by distinguishing between the U.S. political system as 'presidential' whereas federal Germany system is 'parliamentary'; and between unitary France being a 'republic' while unitary Britain is a 'kingsom'.

Heady's typology depends on modernity. To my contention that is not enough. The political system ought to be added if we are to arrive at a more comprehensive typology.
Fortunately, this is not the case with the second type pertaining to developing countries. This type is sub-divided into six subtypes. Briefly, these are:

1) Traditional Authoritarian Systems: The ruling family or cluster of families in such regimes "rely on the army and the civil bureaucracy both as instrumentalists of change which has been invoked as desirable and as inhibitors of unwanted change. The administrative machinery is the principal vehicle for action, but its ability to operate effectively is hampered by its own traditional characteristics and by the difficulties it faces in penetrating the community. Reforms to remedy these handicaps are undertaken reluctantly, if at all."5 An example of this type is Saudi Arabia.

2) Strongmen Military System: In this personalist regime the administrative powers are centralized on the leader who makes major administrative decisions. "Higher ranking bureaucrats are personally scrutinized by him; the bureaucracy resembles a patriarchal community headed by the caudillo."6 Paraguay, Haiti and Sierra are good examples of this type.

3) Collegial Military System: In such regime a military junta usually focus on the inadequacies of the administrative system they inherited but such regimes are limited on what they can do because of their dependence on nonmilitary administrative systems. "Some administrative reform is apt to be launched, and it may involve substantial structural changes along with efforts to modify patterns of bureaucratic behaviors. However a military regime can hope to effectuate changes in
the bureaucratic apparatus; it cannot be supplanted.\textsuperscript{7} An example of such type is Indonesia and South Korea.

4) Bureaucratic Elite Systems replacing Traditional Elite: These regimes have in common "a necessity to adopt to other modernising objectives the political and administrative structures which they inherited; but their approaches to doing so may vary considerably."\textsuperscript{8} Thailand, Ethiopia and Afghanistan are examples of this type.

5) Bureaucratic Elite Systems successor to a Colonial Tradition: In such regimes "a pervasive background factor is a prolonged colonial era during which the colonial power was able to implant its political and administrative institutions in the subject territory so firmly as to provide the decisive point of reference for developments following national independence."\textsuperscript{9} Importantly "in most of these cases, continuity has proved to be greater in the administrative than in the political sphere."\textsuperscript{10} Pakistan is an outstanding example of this type.

6) Bureaucratic Elite Systems with Corporate-Technocratic Orientation: In such regime corporatism and technocracy compose the ideological rationale which in consequence lead to "the acceptance of the goal that the policy should be depoliticized."\textsuperscript{11} Understandably, "the higher level civil bureaucracy, particularly in areas of technocratic expertise, occupies a strategic position. The technocrat becomes the center of attention, being relied on by the regime not only for success in pursuit of developmental goals but also as a valuable source of legitimacy."\textsuperscript{12} Brazil, Peru and Philippine are typical examples.
Having discussed the different types of administrative systems and their general characteristics, it is desirable to focus on specific types. But before that it is necessary to give a background to the types to be discussed. Chapter II provides this background.
II

Historical Background

I. Background to the American Federal System:

The seeds of what came to be known as the United States of America were laid "in 1607" when "the first English colony was planted in Jamestown, Virginia," which after some initial hardships soon proved a success. Attracted by the success, new colonies began to take root, and by 1733 there were thirteen British colonies on the eastern seaboard.

Since their inception, and interacting with the prevailing conditions then coupled with their distant localities in a topographical wilderness, these colonies developed a strong sense of individual identities. The intervening distances restricted inter-colonial intercourse. Furthermore, the geographical difference between the north and the south, gave rise to marked differences in the economics and way of life of the colonies.

Civil War and other internal troubles in England during 1641 - 1653 were instrumental in the growth and/or maturity of these colonies. In other words, "being thrown on their resources, the colonies sought their own markets, undertook their own defence, and by 1660 began to develop local institutions with a distinctive cast. When with the restoration of the monarchy in England there came a perceptible shift in the policy towards the colonies. This period of neglect was long enough to give the colonies a sense of manhood." The New England group, Virginia and Maryland, were by now, "full-fledged commonwealths possessing most of the apparatus of civilized life as developed up to that time . . . (and)
conscious of their peculiar interests and capable of defending themselves against foreign enemy". Perhaps the most significant development of the period was the 'formation of the New England confederacy in 1643', largely for defence against external threats of the French and the internal threats of the Indian tribes.

The confederated colonies of New England kept congenial relationships with the mother country. However, by the mid-seventeenth century, things began to change. New colonies were established between New England and Maryland. The English Parliament laid down restrictive economic and trade policies. These new policies took sometime to generate massive discontent as to justify war against the motherland. Thus "till late in the eighteenth century the Acts of Navigation were honoured more in the breach than in the observance, but the merchantilist system had served the mother country well. To the colonies, however, the system was most unpleasant, especially as it comes after that period of neglect during which the colonies had attained manhood."16

Meantime, each colony has developed its constitutional government contending for a stronger representative system, control of the purse and fuller guarantees of personal liberty. Despite certain differences, "the thirteen colonies had developed along broadly similar lines, particularly with respect to their common English heritage, political philosophy, governmental organization, and attitude toward mother country. English traditions and customs had been modified by the frontier environment, as in adaptation of many rules of the common law to meet American conditions."17 Thus through the passage of time the assemblies of these colonies were learning the art of government. With this ruling class and commanding
The coercive measure of 1774 alongside with the Intolerable Acts previously enacted, prompted the launching of war against Britain which resulted in the Declaration of Independence.

"As political events unfolded after the war, opinions came to diverge." The divergence was accentuated by the increasingly liberal and radical men who assumed positions of leadership at this stage. Such circumstances urged the meeting of the Congress of the Confederation in 1787 at Philadelphia to consider the entire problem of government.

The crowning achievement of that convention was the Constitution of the United States. Following the heated and highly enlightening debates, the delegates drafted a Constitution which, later, was ratified by the states.

As Martin B Irvine put "perhaps the single most important innovation effected by the Constitution of 1787 is the one that receives least notice. It established a national government." This meant that this national government would not act indirectly through the states as did the Congress of the Confederation; it would operate directly on individual
citizens with its own powers. In effect this meant that in addition to obeying the laws of his own state, a citizen would have to obey those of the national government. In addition to paying state taxes he would have to pay national taxes. In short he would have to deal with two governments, instead of one.

For our immediate purpose, the significance of the newly created national government is that an inseparable system i.e., its administrative apparatus, came into existence for the first time.

By 1980's, the national administrative system has left a long history behind. Many factors interplayed in shaping this system. Perhaps of these important factors are:

- The Industrial Revolution and the industrialization which is firmly rooted in the American soil
- The prosperity and the well being of the society
- Urbanization and the American way of life
- Developments in the theories of management and organization (e.g., Webber, Taylor, Fayol, Gulick etc...)
- Accumulation of experiences in personnel management and administrative reforms (e.g., Pendleton Act 1883) and development in behavioral sciences
- The implications of World War I & II and The Great Depression
- Successive Presidential Commissions (Taft, Hoover, etc...)
- Civil Rights movements of the 1960's
- Academic and Scholarly works and the emergence of Public Administration as a distinct discipline
- Technology
colonial rule and/or western impact.

a) Tribalism: In the seventh century the Arabs occupied Egypt and then began pushing steadily southward. By 1504 and in alliance with the Funj\# they were able to defeat the kingdom of Soha and establish el-Sultana el-Zarga (The Black Sultanate) which survived up to 1820.

During this period tribalism played an important political and administrative role and it was recognized as the basic unit of government. "In fact, the Funj Sultanate was a loosely-knit confederation of tribes rather than a state".\#22 No centralization of authority was attempted and no common institutions were created. Instead each tribe was granted autonomy under its own traditional leader on condition that they paid an annual fixed tribute to central treasury.

To control these tribal governments the country was divided into two major spheres of influence. The Sultan himself took direct control of over the southern part of the sultanate.\#23 In the north the

\#An indigenous tribe at the southern central part of the Sudan.

\#This is the region of the Funj tribe.
Chief of Abdullah† was recognized as viceroy over all Arab tribes in the northern part of the country. The Abdullah chief continued to hold this viceroyalty till 1770 when they became completely an independent entity. But the sphere of their control was very limited since the Shangia tribe(‡) had become strong enough to challenge their authority in the north. This tribal division of the Funj Kingdom facilitated the Turko-Egyptian conquest in 1820.

In the west, Darfur was united under Suliman Solong (1596 - 1637) who conquered the plains and welded the tribes together into a one kingdom which stood as the main rival to the Funj Sultanate until the Turko-Egyptian Conquest (1820). There, too, the tribal units were the main administrative organs of the government, but the central government was too strong to relinquish to them the extent of autonomy enjoyed by their counterparts in the east.

In the south the authority of the tribe was still unchallenged because none of the strong central governments of the Funj in the north or the Funj in the west had penetrated to rule that area, and so indigenous elements there had attempted to unite the tribes in any form of government.

During the Turko-Egyptian regime which dominated the country between 1820-1855, the Sudan was united for the first time under one administration centered at the new capital of Khartoum. Under this regime new techniques of communications favoring a strong central government, such as telegraph

†An Arab tribe in the north part of the Sudan
‡An Arab tribe which dominates the Northern Valley of the Nile
§Of an Arab Origin
networks and steamers were introduced. Bureaucratic central government agents in the form of provincial governors and their assistants were posted in various areas to conduct government business. Nevertheless, tribal chiefs did not lose their prominence as government functionaries. They were appointed as village-sherifs, town-sherifs, district-sherifs and paramount sherifs, to supplement the new administrators, and help them with tax assessment and collection and other governmental functions. This tribal institution were vital to the administration since the government could achieve virtually nothing without their cooperation. As one observer noted, "in fact, tribal sentiment was so regarded and accounted for by this regime that some of the prominent tribal chiefs were promoted to the status of provincial governors in their respective areas of support."23

The national regime of the Mahdiya (1885-1898) was a militant regime of strong central control. This was an Islamic state which was "extremely hostile to tribal organizations as political or administrative entities. During this period tribalism in the Sudan received the most severely blows it had ever experienced. Under the Mahdist regime the tribal autocracy was reduced to ordinary citizen status, and given no role in the machinery of government."24 Though this was the case, however, tribal institutions managed to survive. This is because of two reasons; first, tribalism was deeply rooted in the soil of the Sudan; and second, the Mahdist policy did not last long enough to effect those measures since the regime itself lasted only thirteen years (1885-1898). Thus tribalism persisted and, in fact, later flourished during the Colonial rule.
The country was divided into fifteen provinces; each province was divided further into districts under the jurisdiction of Inspectors who were directly responsible to the Provincial Governors, who were answerable to the Governor-General at Khartoum. The Governor-General's immediate advisors were "The Civil Secretary, who was the head of the political service - comprising Provincial Governors, District Commissioners and their assistants; the Legal Secretary and the Financial Secretary." The Provincial Governors had to comply with the directives of the Legal and Financial Secretaries.

Authority of decision-making in this era descended in a hierarchical line from the capital to the smallest and remotest administrative unit in the country; and decisions were made by a comparatively small body of officials.

During this period no attempt was made to include tribal chiefs in the machinery of government. On the contrary, according to the advice of the Government's top consultant on 'native affairs', no power should
been given to any tribal or religious leaders. The government did not want
to give power to any native who might create a new fanatic national leader-
ship to wage another Mahdist or other war against it.

This policy however was revised after World War I when the Milner
Commission (1919) reported that: "Having regard to (the) vast extent (of
the Sudan) and varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of
its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of
the native authorities wherever they exist, under British supervision."26
This was the basic philosophy of the second phase of British administration
in the Sudan — that of Indirect Rule.

The policy of Indirect Rule was implemented in a series of laws in
the decade of 1922-1932. Under these legislations judicial powers were
conferred on nomads' shiekhs within their own tribe at first; later these
powers were extended to the sheikhs of sedentary rural villages. With the
passage of the Native Court Ordinances (1931 and 1932), the system of
Native Administration was firmly rooted throughout the whole country.

This policy was accelerated by two important historical events:
The expulsion of the Egyptian civil servants in the Sudan in 1924 and the
Great Depression of 1929 - 1933. The former necessitated involvement
of more Sudanese in the administration to fill the gap left by the
Egyptians while the latter called for economy in administration. In the
aftermath of the expulsion of the Egyptians a military college was opened
in Khartoum and military officers were no longer sent to Egypt for training.
A limited number of schools were opened with the intent of equipping some
Sudanese with the necessary knowledge which would enable them to fill
jobs of clerks and bookkeeping.

During the course of time gradual economic and social change was taking place. "In Khartoum and Blue Nile provinces, traditional subsistence rural agriculture was gradually replaced by the production of cash crops for international market (with cotton topping the list). Early in the 1920s the Gezira scheme was launched. In the flourishing commercial centres urban groupings emerged with a new case for consumer goods as a result of cash production and the encouragement of export trade, and some local industry arose. Economic change led to social change, which was further encouraged by western education." [2]

In this environment of growth and socio-economic progress native administration was considered incompatible. Another important development at the time was the formation of Graduates General Congress in 1936. This Graduates Congress which originally was formed by graduates of Gordon College soon changed its membership by including substantial section of the population. The Graduate Congress demanded the participation of more Sudanese in the administration.

This is response to the shortcomings of 'native administration', and to the increasing frustration of the nationalist elite of the Graduates Congress, the British began to adapt 'native administration' into self rule through 'local government' - an administration no longer according to the 'tribe' a man belonged to, but according to the 'place' he lived in. A series of ordinances in 1937 enacted modernized principles of local self-government, providing for parallel organizations, differing only in degree, for municipalities, townships and rural areas. This
system of local government was based primarily on the English practice, but since exact parallels hardly existed elsewhere, its application to the Sudanese condition was to a certain extent by trial and errors, and as far as possible by evolutionary methods rather than by arbitrary imposition. Accordingly the 1938 and subsequent legislations remained in effect until repealed and superseded by the comprehensive Local Government Ordinance of 1951.

Other developments at the national level took place. During the Second World War, and partly in response to the rising tide of nationalism, the administration policy changed to "accommodating greater participation by indigenous elements in central government institutions such as the Advisory Council, and the Legislative Assembly." The Advisory Council consisted of high-ranking British officials and notable Sudanese. When it became clear that it fell short of the expectations of the nationalist movement, a Legislative Assembly was adopted.

A larger measure of self-government was accorded by the British in 1953 and full national independence was achieved in 1956. During 1953–1956 'Subannization' of the administration was completed.
III

Public Administration in Two Systems

Administrative System in a Federalist State (U.S.)

"The interplay of competing and often contradictory political, economic, social, and regional forces within our constitutional system and pluralistic society", one practitioner observed, "has produced a smorgasbord of institutional types. There is something to suit almost every taste, no matter how exotic." The number and variety of public agencies readily support this practitioner's observation. Classifications of these agencies are as varied as the agencies themselves. These classification generally agree on three categories i.e., department, executive agencies and independent agencies, but they differ greatly in classifying the rest of the agencies. Except for the first category, different classification normally differ as what to include under 'executive' and 'independent agencies'. For instance, some classifications include the Veterans Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well as the Smithsonian Institutions under 'executive agencies' while another classification might include them under different categories - Veterans Administration and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, under 'independent agencies'; Smithsonian Institution under a separate category. For practical purpose Mnzizer's classification seems to be more convenient. According to this classification the national administrative system of the U.S. falls into six categories.

(1) Cabinet departments, headed by secretaries, are part and parcel of a continuing administrative tradition. "State, Treasury and War
(now Defense) and the office of Attorney General (who heads Justice) date from 1789. The Postmaster General from 1792, and Navy (now in Defense) from 1798. Their total number now is twelve. Some changes pertaining to these departments took place at different times, however, reduced to twelve. Of the recent changes, the creation of new departments and the phasing out of some: Health, Education, and Welfare was established in 1953. This was followed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1965 and the Department of Transportation in 1966. The Post Office lost its departmental status and became a public corporation in 1971.

"The cabinet departments contain many bureaus of long tradition and great political strength, so that some departments have seemed little more than a collection of loosely associated, barely coordinated bureaus. In formal terms, however, there is a neat line of authority from the President to his secretaries to their bureau chiefs and down another few layers, whereby everyone is accountable eventually to the President."

2. Executive Agencies: this term is used to describe "organizations which are essentially like departments, but are not titled 'department' and are not headed by an official called 'secretary'." The Veterans Administration is an example, so is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Smithsonian Institution. A 1939 legislation permitted them to reorganize the executive branch with the condition that no department to be created. "President Roosevelt, undaunted, created the Federal Security Agency, The Federal Works Agency, and the Federal loan Agency under this legislation, and asked the administrators..."
of these agencies to sit with the cabinet. Such agencies differ hardly at all from regular departments in form, but may lack the political and administrative dignity and the endurance of departments."

3. Auxiliary or overhead agencies: Three substantial Federal agencies fall in this category: the Office of Management and Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the General Service Administration. "These three are identified as auxiliary agencies because they seem to be assisting and controlling the 'line' agencies, which appear more directly to be carrying out the actual public programs of government. One hires people, provide funds, and secures a building in order to conduct foreign affairs, assist farmers, or the like."

4. Staff units: those are "concerned with planning, research, drafting reports, offering alternatives to policies urged or adopted by agency subunits, or performing other activities for which a line official is formally responsible but can use help." Though staff officials may be attached to an executive at a high level, they do not have formal authority over the executive's subordinates. "The essence of the staff idea was enunciated by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937, when it sought for the president a small number of aides ... to assist him in obtaining quickly and without delay all pertinent information possessed by any of the executive departments so as to guide him in making his responsible decisions; and then when decisions have been made, to assist him in seeing to it that every administrative department and agency affected is promptly informed."
5. **Government Corporations:** "these are so elusive a category that it is difficult to agree on either number or definition, and the qualities which distinguish them have faded over the years". These agencies are typically headed by a board in a business-type function, and incorporated. They are distinguished by enjoying relatively more discretion than regular government agencies. The Tennessee Valley Authority offers a good example of a government corporation; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is another example. Maimzer acknowledged that "establishment of government corporations often reflects a distrust of public government, as in the creation of the Post Office - decided as grossly inefficient - from a regular executive department into a corporation."

6. **Independent Regulatory Commission:** these "are agencies headed by a board, whose members are appointed for fixed terms with judicial protection against removal without cause, typically with a requirement that the board be bipartisan; they regulate a particular industry or a particular function or aspect of business." A classic example of this group is the Interstate Commerce Commission which was established in 1887. The Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 'National Labor Relations Board' are other examples. "To some extent" Maimzer noted, these regulatory commissions "are the policemen of business, but they also act as at times as the promoter and protector of the businesses with which they deal. They are especially identified with administrative hearings of a trial-like nature with hearing examiners... (they) are praised and blamed for exercising a combination of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. They have been challenged as a threat to presidential control, effective regulation, and the rule of law, but legislators and the regulated interests often have a kind word for them."

Though this classification comes up with only six categories, still it shows the diversity and variety of administrative agencies. The question need to be asked is: who controls this administrative system? According to the constitution the president is the chief executive. He is empowered to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, all officers of the United States, 'whose appointment are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution'. Significantly enough, this includes the power to appoint the head of departments who serve at his pleasure. This appointment and firing power pertaining to the head of departments which are the major entities may be instrumental in controlling the administrative system. On the other hand "decisions as to executive reorganization are basically matters of legislative action. Congress has retained control over the creation or abolition of executive departments, but has usually been willing to delegate limited discretion to the president to make less major organizational changes, subject to congressional review and potential disapproval,"32 Furthermore, the Congress exercise oversight and control over the administration through its specialized committees.

Thus in answering the question asked one can say that the Congress and the President share in regulating and controlling the administrative system.
The beginnings of the national administrative system were characterized by spoils and political patronage practices. This led to active reform movement in the mid-nineteenth century, which culminated in the enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883. Although substantial, this reform measure was limited in its impact, applying only partially to the federal civil service and not at all to state and local levels of government service. However, it did start a process, still not completed through the American public service, of putting selection and advancement on a merit rather than a patronage basis.\textsuperscript{33} The agency entrusted with effectuating these reform measures up until 1978 was the Civil Service Commission. According to the civil service reform of 1978, its functions were divided between the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit System Protection Board.

Since the Pendleton Act, of 1883 the American tradition has been to "offer more specialized and practical examinations on an open competitive basis to those meeting prescribed minimum qualifications. However, beginning in the late 1930s, entry level general subject matter examinations have been offered to university graduates designed to bring promising young people into the government service."\textsuperscript{34} However it should be noted that entry to public service in U.S. is not restricted to lower levels of the scales as in case of career-oriented bureaucracies. In this respect the American system has shown preference "for program-staffing and candidates with specialized capacity."\textsuperscript{35}

Another distinctive quality of the American system concerns 'position' and the necessary requirements for satisfactory performance of its duties. As Healy put it: "From the beginning, the American approach has been to emphasize the position held and the requirements for satisfactory
performance of the duties connected with it, rather than assessment of individual potential for placement in an appropriate rank category."\textsuperscript{36} Consequently, grades reflects levels of 'responsibility', and the "top three 'super grades' have been generally considered to constitute the elite of the civil service... the occupants of these posts are experts in a professional speciality."\textsuperscript{37} The recent Senior Executive Service (SES) of 1979 represents a divergence from "professional speciality' towards 'generalist' idea.

Like other civil servant 'elites', occupant of these top posts are called upon to substantially share in political decision-making and the formulation of new policies. In carrying out this role American bureaucrats, unlike others, do not work behind the scenes. In the words of Handy: "Bureaucratic policy-makers in the United States must operate much more in the public eye, which give greater leeway but also involves greater risks. The civil service has an obligation either to render loyal service or to resign or transfer, but he is likely to be linked with his policy preference in any event, and he may very well be called on to defend the agency's policy position in a congressional hearing, whatever his own position."\textsuperscript{38} Such role is really demanding, at the same time exhibits the competitive nature of the system.

Another feature that characterizes the system is representativeness. Because class distinctions are thought to be less pronounced and methods of appointment and promotion in the civil service, "the upper echelons of the bureaucracy have been considerably more representative, with less of a cast of or elite quality."\textsuperscript{39} However, this assertion should
be considered with caution because women and minorities have generally been underrepresented. To deal with such deficiencies 'affirmative action' programs have been initiated. Although these programs made only "slight progress in improving the representation of women and men from black and other minority ethnic groups," Heady believes that "American record is certainly better than average, despite these group deficiencies in representation" when compared to most national public services.

All in all, American administrative "has gradually become more competent in its composition and more professional in its outlook in response to demands placed upon government for performance, but the service orientation remains and responsiveness to the political organs of government is universally accepted in theory and largely recognized in practice."
II. National Administrative Systems in a Unitary State (Sudan)

A United Nations inter-agency team in 1979 noted that "The Sudan more than most developing countries is an administrative state. In addition to the customary regulatory and public service functions of government, the state operates or controls the greater part of modern-sector production. There are more than 60 public corporations in agriculture, transport, industry and commerce employing in all more than 100,000 people. The central government ministries have about 120,000 employees in all grades, while provincial and local governments employ another 110,000. The armed forces add over 50,000, so that total employment in public service numbers more than 400,000. This represents well over 5 percent of the total labour force, broadly defined and more than half of modern-sector employment - and the numbers have quadrupled since independence. For a country of fewer than 15 million people and with a low income per head, the Sudan maintains a large, expanding and very expansive bureaucracy."  

This large and expanding administrative system could be classified in three broad categories:

1) Regular ministries and departments: these were the old organizations and until recently they claimed the highest number of employees. Unlike the executive departments of the U.S. whose number remained constant, the number of ministries in the Sudan is highly fluctuating. This is especially true about the decade of the 1970s. The number of ministries between 1956 - 1969 ranged between twelve and fifteen. Since 1970 - 1980 their number ranged between fifteen and twenty six. In the end of 1981
These normally would be in groups (I-3) of the civil servant scales; and sometimes group (3) for assistant undersecretaries. These ministries are generally divided into departments, directorates, and sections.

In some ministries departments would be very large retaining comparatively high prestige. Supervision of such departments is exercised by the minister concerned. The Customs and Taxation Departments are good examples.

2) Provincial and local governments: Employees of these governments are in fact central government employees who are seconded to these governments. They are recruited, transferred, promoted, and other personnel aspects are handled by their parent ministries. However, they are counted on to render loyal services to the provinces during their stay there. Supervision of their work, reports concerning their performance and disciplinary measures against them is vested in provincial (non-regional) authorities.

3) Corporations: These agencies enjoy a considerable measure of independence. It is thought that this administrative independence would enhance their efficiency. They normally have a board of directors. Directors of
These corporations are chosen by the President. This group is not profit-oriented, nor do they perform a business-like activity. The Post and Telegraph; Universities and higher education institutes and National Council for Research offer good examples of this category.

4) Public Enterprises: These are profit-oriented agencies and are engaged in a business-like work. This category covers a substantial proportion of the modern sector of the economy. These enterprises range from the large public utilities — the railways, harbors, air transport, river transport, and electric power — to a variety of manufacturing and commercial establishments. The Gezira Scheme and the entire banking system are also included in this category. "Though several manufacturing and commercial enterprises nationalized in 1970 have recently been returned to their former owners, more than 50 such enterprises employing about 40,000 workers continue to be operated by the State and are likely to remain in the public sector." 

A sub-category of this group could be called joint-venture projects. These are development-oriented in which the government participate with foreign investors, especially from Arab countries. Such projects cover different fields of agriculture, industry and transport. Kenana Sugar Company, Arab Cement Company and Wadi El Neil Company are examples of joint-venture projects.

Unlike the American Constitution which is almost silent on the executive branch, the Constitution of the Sudan has a separate Chapter concerning the Executive. It spells out the responsibility of the President as the supreme head of the civil service. Here unlike the
American system where the President and Congress share the power of regulating and controlling administrative agencies, the President of the Republic of the Sudan has unquestionable jurisdiction on the administration. He appoints ministers and all high-ranking officials (grade 1-4) on his own. He need not seek the advice or consent of the legislature or any other body. Ministers and public officials serve at his pleasure. The Auditor-General, who could not be fired during his five-year term only for cause is the only exception. Thus it is safe to say that executive reorganization are wholly matters of presidential action. Even ministries and departmental internal structures are subject to the President’s approval. Expectedly, there are no constitutional protections, as in the British system. Though legislations call for merit system, real protection depends on responsiveness to political officials and ultimately to the president. In the Sudan there is no parallel to American congressional committee that exercise oversight and control over administrative agencies.

These powers were provided for in the Constitution which was promulgated in 1973. However, two years earlier a Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform was created. As its name indicates its chief mission was to bring up administrative reform. It’s to be noted that legislations and regulations governing the public service remained basically the same since Independence in 1956. The newly created ministry focused on enacting new legislations and modernizing old ones. Important among these, the Public Service Act, 1971, Public Service Regulations, 1975, and amendments of different legislations such as Discipline of Employees Act, 1976. Though such legislation, generally, emphasize merit, they are not of much avail. Merit System was
ever since been provided for in laws and regulations, however for societal and cultural factors it is often not adhered to. Furthermore, the ministry itself was abolished in November 1981; the central personnel department was added to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning.

Unlike the American tradition which emphasizes specialized and practical examinations for entry to the public service, Sudan's examinations for recruitment tend to be general in nature. By restricting entry to the public service, Sudan's system shows preference for career-staffing and candidates with general capacity.

In contrast to the American approach which tend to emphasize the 'position', Sudan's approach tend to focus on assessment of individual potential for placement in an appropriate rank category. A shift toward adopting the American approach was attempted in 1978 in the Job Reclassification Scheme, but ill-planning and poor preparation the move achieved virtually nothing. A proposed move toward establishing a parallel of the (SES) was long ago considered but never seriously tried.

However, at the upper echelons of the service virtually no demarcation line between bureaucratic and political officiousness. More correctly this is not only true of the upper ranks but equally true of the whole bureaucracy, though it might be more evident at higher echelons. The reason behind this is a persistent emphasis on the "oneness" of politics and administration. A recurrent theme, advocated and highlighted by the government, is that both politics and administration are faces of the same coin. Consequentially, civil servants are called upon to exhibit a marked degree of political commitment and involvement. They are counted on to
institutions than the rest of the country. Since government employees are expected to be drawn from the educated, a substantial proportion of public servants come from these provinces. In the past most of employees came from these parts; however, recently — through spread of schools and educational institutions a shift toward a more balanced bureaucracy is almost attained.

Unlike the American case, public service in the Sudan has additional task-development. As a developing nation, Sudan counts on its public service to play a major role in affecting developmental programs. The issue of development has been highly emphasized in recent years. With emphasis on development, repeated efforts to reform the administrative system. Most of these efforts have been done through the assistance of various commissions and advisory without the direct involvement and the active participation of the different ministries, departments and corporations in a sustained process of administrative improvement and development.
Conclusion

As the previous chapters indicate, American and Sudan's administrative systems contrast in many ways. Both work within different political systems; one federal, the other unitary system. However, different as they are, a number of lessons can be learned from comparing the two systems. More important, some useful methods, approaches and techniques could be adopted to the Sudanese case.

For instance, chapter III shows that Sudan's public service falls within the jurisdiction of the President. His powers in this regard are exclusive. The American practice of congressional committees that exercise oversight and control over administrative agencies offer a good example, which could be beneficial if adopted in the Sudan. Regarding the magnitude of the President's responsibilities, it seems impractical that oversight and supervision of the public service be vested in that office alone.

I think it is advisable to share such powers with the legislature through specialized committees.

With regard to administrative reform, it is already mentioned that the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform has been dissolved in 1981. The impact of this measure is yet to be determined. However, as a result of this step, the central personnel agency has been added to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. This is welcomed because it would integrate personnel policies with available resources. In this regard, I think it equally, if not more, important to integrate personnel
the regular ministries and departments not to public enterprises. Such a group would have a civil service experience and background which differ greatly from conditions surrounding the operation of public enterprises and managerial requisites for effective and efficient management of such enterprises which are commercial and industrial in nature.

Finally, development programs depend for its implementation on the institution and operation of a reasonably effective system of development administration. Current practices are not encouraging. A comprehensive strategy is highly needed for the institutionalization of sound development-oriented administrative system.

"The government policy is to offer employment for all graduates. However, in recent years, this policy was interrupted by financial and economic difficulties. The impact of this difficult economic situation would be understandable if it affected graduates of humanities, but it is understandable when it comes to technical-trained graduates; it is incredibly understandable if it comes to the much needed agriculturists. Currently there are more than a thousand of them who are unemployed."
NOTES


3) Ibid., p. 189.


5) Ibid., p. 206.

6) Ibid., p. 207.

7) Ibid., p. 208.

8) Ibid., p. 218.

9) Ibid., p. 226.

10) Ibid., p. 226.


12) Ibid., p. 228.


15) Ibid., p. 42.

16) Ibid., p. 43.


20) Ibid., p. 135.

21) Ibid., p. 145.


24) Ibid, p. 15


30) Ibid, p.p. 200-204


33) Ibid, p. 199

34) Ibid, p. 201.


38) Ibid, p. 208

39) Ibid, p. 204.

40) Ibid, p. 204.

41) Ibid, p.p. 211-212


43) Ibid, p. 130.


TERM PAPER

DECENTRALIZATION IN TWO ORGANIZATIONS:
The Case of the U.S. & the Sudan Governments

Submitted to:
Dr. J. M. Stevens

By
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Citizens, in both countries, the U.S. and the Sudan, are subjects to their respective governments. They are legally bound to obey its orders, and the contours of their lives are set by the norms that their governments imposes. These norms are the law and it is enforced upon all who live within their boundaries. Whereas all other organizations are voluntary in character, and can bind the individual only as he chooses memberships of them, governments are not. Once a person is a resident in either country, or in any other country, legally he has no choice but to obey its commands. Government is superior in its legal claim to the demand over citizens of any alternative body.

Government is the crowning-point of modern social edifice, and its supremacy over all other forms of social groupings that its special nature is to be found.

This unique nature of governments makes it difficult to relate them to their complex environment. Governments, like other organizations are subsystems of a broader suprasystem — that is the environment. Environments provide resource input and utilizes the organization's — government — outputs. "Each society has certain fundamental characteristics such as values, people and resources, that greatly affect the nature of its organization and their management."

This argument is especially true of governments where goals and values and the way these governments are managed are determined through interactions with the environmental subsystems.

Governments as being an open system that interact with its environment is difficult to set boundaries to. In the words of Katz and Rosenzweig such organizations "have no clearly observable boundaries and are open to many inputs and outputs. Generally those activities necessary for the organization's transformation process define its boundary." 2

Government activities are diverse, complex and intricate. This in itself reflects the dynamic heterogeneous environments in which governments function. Now the question is: In what environments do governments function?

Scholars think of environment in two ways. They believe that, "in the broadest sense, the environment is everything external to the organization boundaries. However, it may be useful to think of the environment in two ways: (1) the societal (general) environment, which affects all organizations in a given society, and (2) the task (specific) environment, which affects the individual organization more directly." 3

The environmental factors, and thus true of any government, are those conditions external to the political system that influence decisions made by institutions within the political system. This refers to both the 'societal environment' and the 'task environment'.

The societal environment covers a wide range of factors. It includes:
(a) cultural factors such as ideologies, values and norms of the society, views on authority relationships, leadership patterns, interpersonal relationships, rationalism, the nature of social institutions as defined by science and technology.

(b) economic factors such as general economic framework; centralization or decentralization of economic planning; the banking system and fiscal policies, the level of investment in physical resources and consumption characteristics.

(c) political factors which include the general political climate of society; the degree of concentration of political power; the nature of political organization (degree of decentralization, diversity of functions etc.); and the political party system.

(d) sociological factors such as family structure and mobility; nature of social organization and development of social institutions.

(e) technological factors which include the level of scientific and technological advancement in society; degree to which the scientific and technological community is able to develop new knowledge and apply it.

(f) educational factors that include literacy level of the population; the degree of sophistication and specialization in the educational system; and the proportion of the people with a high level of professional and/or specialized training.

(g) legal factors such as constitutional considerations; jurisdictions of various governmental units; and specific laws concerning formation, taxation and control of organizations.
(h) demographic factors which include the nature of human resources available to the society; their number, distribution, age and sex; and the degree of urbanization.

(i) natural resources i.e., the nature, quantity, types and availability of natural resources.

If general environment is the same for all organizations in any given society, then the task environment is different for each organization. For our purpose the (i.e., environment for government) the general environment mentioned above applies, so does the task environment.

Task environment is the proximate one to the organization in question. For government the task environment include:

a) Power-setting as defined by statutory framework and shaped by interactions of government subsystems, i.e., the legislature, the judiciary and the executive branch with its different agencies, and the interactions of these subsystems with political parties, clientele group, constituencies, interest groups and citizens in general.

b) Controllers such as legislature for the executive branch; the Supreme Court for both the legislature and executive agencies; central government to local government as well as state government to local government and so forth.

c) Clientele groups which include interest group, a special segment of the population or citizens in general.
d) Constituencies which mandate individuals to hold certain offices; constituencies would be limited to a limited area as well as the whole country.

v) Allies and adversaries - such roles depend on contingent factors in political system at given times and situations.
Considering these environmental factors (as shown in figure 1.1), and the fact that general environment continually 'break through' the task environment and the dynamic nature of these environments, the obvious corollary is the complexity of this issue. It entails a thorough treatment, however in this short paper there is no way of doing that. Suffice to our immediate purpose is to apply briefly these environmental factors to the case of the U.S. Government.

Considering cultural economic and sociological factors one can say that the U.S. adhere to the capitalist system. As known components of capitalism include 'private and free enterprise' where the means of production are privately owned, making profit is the essential function of business or the private sector. An important corollary of the private enterprise is the sanctity of private property. Furthermore, in a capitalist economy the market, theoretically at least, is open to anyone who wants to enter in it for the purpose of offering a product or service. Under this free enterprise the price of goods and services should reflect the availability and public demand for them. However,
a number of things can interfere with this law of supply and demand - such as monopoly and co-optation between firms.

Also under capitalism it is understood that individuals work not for the collective good but for their own self-interest. It is assumed that people would be motivated by working for their own self-interest.

Besides this materialism-individualism there is a fundamental tenet of capitalism - that is laissez faire. Under this doctrine government, supposedly, should not interfere in the market which regulate and adjust itself. However the realities of today shows that government intervenes through its regulations and loans, aids and so forth.

Considering the task environment we find that the U.S. is a federal state. The system is based on the doctrine of separation between the legislative, executive and judicial institutions. The system works through the means of checks and balances. The legislative (Congress) is to make laws but such laws do not come into force save after they have been signed by the President, (the executive, who may refuse to do so and refer the laws back to the Congress which can put them into force by a two-thirds majority).

The president is the chief executive and some of his decisions are subject to the Congress approval - such as appointments to key positions.
The judiciary is deemed to be independent of the two powers, the legislative and executive, (the judges of the Supreme Court are nominated by the President and approved by the Senate). A chief function of the Supreme Court is to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by the Congress and on the legality of the decisions of the President.

These powers through their interactions establish the power setting. Through their interactions they assume different roles that influence the decision-making process of the government. For instance, the Congress, through the laws and especially budgetary appropriations, acts as a controller to the government. At times it acts as an 'ally' to the government; an 'adversary' at other times. However, within the Congress there are always 'allies' and adversaries to the government. In assuming any of these roles congressmen are influenced by their constituencies, clientele groups, interest groups, etc. On the other hand the chief executive has a different constituency - that is the whole country. The judiciary acts as 'controller' to both the Congress and the President.

It should be noted that besides the federal government there is the state governments that have constitutional jurisdiction over their respective states. The power setting in the states follows the same pattern at the federal level - they have governors (chief executive), Congress (legislatures) and judiciaries.
of the African continent (almost third of the U.S. area). It has a population of 17,387,000 (1979 estimate of the Ministry of National Planning) 22.6% live in urban areas; 77.4% in rural areas.

It is a developing country dependent on agriculture which accounts for some 40% of the GDP and is the dominant sector of the economy. The prevailing values were those of a rural society*. There is nothing like the individualism in the U.S., here people tend to help each other. The importance of this notion is reflected in the self-help programs and peoples local government system of 1971 - its main theme was the participation of local communities in administering their own affairs with minimum, if any, interference of the bureaucracy.

Another important corollary of rural societies is tribalism. In the case of the Sudan tribalism and the colonial heritage interacted in a way that has a far reaching impact on the government. The antagonism between the North and the South offers a good example. This conflict which started in bloodshed in 1955 was only resolved in 1972. The agreement that put an end to this conflict granted the South an autonomous
regional government. This regional government has jurisdiction over the South for all matters except for certain powers that retained to the central government. Eight years later the North was to follow suit. Five other regions were created in the North. Thus by 1981 a new level of government the (regional) was created for the first time. Before there were two levels, the central and local governments.

Considering the power-setting we find that the permanent constitution promulgated in 1973 vest the executive power in the President of the Republic, in fact the President has extensive powers. He appoints the Vice-Presidents, Prime Minister and Ministers who are all answerable to him. He appoints 10% of the People's Assembly (legislative). He is also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and security forces, and Supreme Head of the Civil Service.

Legislative power is vested both in the People's Assembly and the President of the Republic.

The judiciary is an independent body directly responsible to the President of the Republic who appoints and removes from office president and judges of the Supreme Court and all other judges. The Supreme Court decides on the constitutionality of laws and interpretation of the Constitution and Laws. It should be noted the Sudan Supreme Court, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, has no jurisdiction to determine the legality of the chief executive. In such setting it erroneous to assume that the People's Assembly acts as controller to executive or the government, actually it is vice versa since the executive (the president) shares the legislative function with the assembly and he
which stands on its own and belongs to no region. The Regional Government Act of 1980 created a new level of government. Before 1981, each province had its People's Executive Council under a Province Commissioner appointed by the President of the Republic, this council in turn establishes People's Local Councils. Administrative decentralization, so necessary in a country of this size, was one of the main aims of the People's Local Government Act of 1971. The theme of decentralization was further emphasized in 1980 when the Regional Government Act was passed. It creates five other regional governments. Each region is to create local governments within its boundaries. These local governments shall be standardized throughout the country in accordance with the provisions of the new Local Government Act of 1981. In chapter III we will see how the interdependencies of these three levels of government (central, regional, local).
II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1) THE CASE OF THE U.S.

The present American system dates back to the last quarter of the fourteenth century. It was based on the distribution of power between federal institutions in Washington D.C. and administrative institutions in the states which form the union. These states enjoy a great deal of independence and almost absolute responsibility for the administration of their affairs.

Certain factors have contributed to the establishment of the system in that manner. Two most important of these factors were:

a) At the beginning, the settlement of immigrants to the American continent constituted residential colonies independent of each other. This convention continued to develop and grow until deep roots of lawfulness at the time of Independence. It was difficult for any one of the old colonies to surrender its independence and accept acceptance of its entity and character with other colonies.

b) From the beginning, Americans were characterized by continuous movement from one colony to another seeking better chances for living and settlement. Accordingly they had the opportunity to get acquainted with citizens of other states and realize the existence of common interests that tied the population of different states despite the apparent independence of each state and the difference of nationalities.
of original immigrants. (The War of Independence is a case in point).

The two factors, among others, has contributed to the creation of the distinctive American character of supporting the idea of one national government and yet drafting of broad lines for the distribution of powers between the federal government and those of the states. The question is: how things evolved to this end?

When the War of Independence was over, the Thirteen Colonies were free to make their own lives. The Articles of Confederation to which they had subscribed in 1777 "set up a weak central government enjoying only such authority as the Americans might have allowed to the British Crown. Their Congress had neither the power nor the opportunity in so vast a land of creating an ordered society out of the wreckage of revolution and war."

The strongest element behind the American effort had been the small farmers who "had supplied the men for the army and who had in most of the states refashioned the several constitutions on democratic lines." Those farmers dominated the legislature and jealously guarded the privileges of their own states. With the end of hostilities it was feared that the weak Union might snap or wither under the strain of post-war problems. The farmers were heavily in debt to the city classes, thus a gulf was widening between debtors and creditors, between farmers and merchant-financiers.

Under these circumstances demand for revision of the Articles of Confederation grew especially among the people of the towns. And
In 1787 a convention of delegates from twelve of the states met at Philadelphia to consider the matter. The partisans of a strong national government were in a large majority. Most of the delegates were in favor of a Federal Government, but they differ on methods and details.

Ultimately the convention adopted the Constitution which was a concise document defining the powers of the central government. It established a single executive: a President, with right of veto over the acts of Congress, but subject to impeachment; head of the Army and administration. The House of Representatives was to be elected for two years on an equal population basis. The Senate was to be elected by State Legislature, irrespective of the population of the states, for six years. It shares in the appointing and treaty-making powers of the President and thus controls this powerful functionary. The Constitution established the Supreme Court which is composed of judges nominated for life by the President, subject to the ratification of the Senate. It assumed the task of judicial review — namely, a coercive supervision of the acts not only of the Congress, but also of State Legislatures and the Executive orders, to insure their conformity with the Constitution.

Thus a national authority (federal government) had been created, supreme within its sphere. But this supreme sphere was strictly defined and soon further limited; all powers not delegated under the Constitution to the Federal Government were to rest with the states.

(11) The case of the Sudan

Before the Turkish rule (1821-53), the political organization
centralized form of government with a distinctly Islamic character resting on Koranic Law. Administration was intrusted to Faiç and Wali appointed by the Mahdi and later by Khalifa Abdullahi. Due to adverse circumstances however, that state of affairs did not last long enough to take roots.

The conquest of the Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898 brought about the so-called condominium rule. An entirely new form of administration was introduced. At first it was highly centralized with a Governor General assisted by Provincial Governors and District Commissioners. Later on the colonial rule adopted a system of indirect rule in accordance of the theory of "the basis of government through the natural leaders of people." This theory was adopted and elaborated since a bureaucratic and centralized form of government was thought to be highly unsuited for the Sudan. Firstly, because decentralization, at that time, cost less and secondly British administration was totally alien to the vast complex Sudan, the new administration saw fit to recruit and rely upon such prominent
Leading Sudanese who could influence large sectors of the Community.

Thus Native Administration was established by conferring certain judicial and administrative powers on the tribal chiefs. Later on to meet the demands of complex, ever-growing urban centers with their economic prosperity and enlightened public opinion, a local government system was introduced. Three ordinances (municipal, town and rural) were introduced in 1927. The Municipal and Town ordinances provided for the transfer of powers of Local Legislation from Provincial Governor to Local Councils; however, in the case of Rural areas the ordinance empowered the Governor General to confer upon a body of persons whatever powers and duties he sees fit.

Eventually comprehensive Local Government Ordinance (1951) was enacted. According to this ordinance local councils were established throughout the country. These councils were corporate bodies; they had independent budgets and they had the right to elect their own chairmen.

At the Provincial level the situation remained as it was; the provinces administered by Provincial Governors. At the central level the country was administered by a Governor General assisted by three Secretaries, administrative, financial and legal.

By the advent of Independence in 1956, the government comprised of a Supreme Council acting as head of the state with ceremonial powers; a Council of Ministers that represent the executive branch; a Parliament (legislature) that had real control over the Executive
and a Supreme Court that had the jurisdiction to decide on the constitutionality of laws and the legality of the administration acts.

At the provincial and local level, things remained as they were except that national officials replaced the British.

This came to an end in 1958 when the military took over the country. The democratic form of government was abandoned. Provinces were administered by top military officers, however local councils remained intact. Two years later, 1960, the Administration of Provinces Act, 1960, was issued. Amongst its notable features is the abolition of the posts of Governor of the Province and District Commissioners, the delegation of their powers mainly so to the province and local councils, as well as the creation of three new organs in each province, namely a representative of the Central Government, an Executive Council and a Province Council.

The October Revolution of 1964 put an end to the Provinces Administration Act (1960) by abolishing the post of Government Representative and that of the President of the Executive Council. The post of Province Commissioner was reinstated and he, by virtue of office, was to become chairman of both the Executive and Province Councils.

At the central level, a democratic form of government was established, in fact the same Transitional Constitution of 1956 - 58 was readopted.
Again in 1969, the Transitional Constitution was abandoned and a new form of government was established. A new permanent Constitution of the Sudan was issued in 1973. The new Constitution established a single executive, i.e., President of the Republic. Besides being the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the Administration, the President also has legislative powers. The Constitution also established a legislature, i.e., the People Assembly. A judiciary (Supreme Court) was established to determine the constitutionality of laws and the interpretation of the Constitution.

As for the sub-national level, the Constitution stipulated that the state shall abide by the principle of administrative decentralization (see Article 182, appendix). It should be noted that two years earlier, a new local government system was introduced. According to this People's Local Government Act, 1971, People's Executive Councils were created in each province. The new Act empowered these Councils to undertake all the responsibilities specified in the warrants of establishments. With the exception of national responsibilities such as the Armed Forces, Legal Affairs, National Security, Railways and Steamers, Customs, Postal Services, Telecommunications and Irrigations, the new councils are empowered to render all other services. It should be noted that these Provinces People's Executive Councils were to establish Local Councils at all levels (towns, rural areas, villages, etc...) and delegate to them such powers they deem fit.

Another important organization, is the Regional Self-Government
for the Southern Provinces, came into being in 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 which put an end to the so-called Problem of South.

According to the Act the three southern provinces are to constitute a region which is to exercise self-government within a united Sudan. With autonomous legislative and executive bodies, the region is to have a separate budget and is empowered to exercise certain powers relating to regional administration and government.

The Act defines certain areas which fall within the preview of national sovereignty and therefore exempt from regional legislation. Such matters as security, foreign affairs, nationality, currency and mint are singled out, as are matters dictated by economic necessity such as customs and excise, foreign trade, economic planning, air and inter-region river transport, educational planning and public auditing.

Basically similar regional governments were established all over the country in 1981. The Regional Government Act, 1980 stipulated that five more regions are to be created in the Sudan. A new version of People's Local Government Act was passed in 1981. According to this Act, Province People's Executive Councils were dissolved. The powers they used to exercise were distributed between the newly created Regional Government and District Councils.

The interactions of these governmental bodies will be discussed in the next chapter, however, the focus would be mainly on the period
III

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALIZATION

As a matter of fact, centralization or decentralization depends on a larger number of contingencies. For instance, the literature on organization and management support this view. Size and complexity are critical determinants of decentralization in organization. The larger the organization, the more likely it is to be decentralized. This is because, the larger the organization, the more decisions that will have to be made. "Since the top administrators in an organization have only so much time and can obtain only so much information, as organizations get larger they become increasingly dependent upon lower-level administrators to make decisions." Hence, they become more decentralized.

It goes without saying that governments are large and complex organizations, hence the above-mentioned is especially applicable to governments. We will examine the case of two governments.

(4) The Case of the U.S. Government

It is obvious that federal governments by definition are decentralized forms of government. The U.S. Government is no exception. As the Constitution stipulates, the function of the (U.S.) Federal Government extends to governing all the country, whereas the function of the State Government is confined to a relatively small part of the country.
It is agreed that, it is usually desirable to centralize those functions within the organization that continually interact with the environment with the environment. Hence it is only natural that the functions of the federal government include such matters as foreign affairs and national defence.

Furthermore, the significance of decisions determines the degree of centralization. The more significant a decision, in terms of cost and impact on the future of the organization for instance, the more likely it is made by top executives. The functions of the federal government, such as interstate commerce and protection of contracts are cases in point.

The complexity of tasks influences where decisions are made. "The greater the complexity of tasks to be done, the more difficult it is for top administrators to keep current and possess sufficient technical information to make effective decisions. As tasks become complex, they require greater expertise, and decisions about these tasks should be delegated down to whatever level includes this degree of technical expertise." Accordingly, state governments are concerned with such matters as public order, police and education; not the federal government.

Decentralization, mentioned above, i.e., federal versus state governments, is not discretionary; in fact mandatory. The Constitution stipulates the functions of the federal government; the rest belongs to state government. It should not be forgotten that it is the role of the Supreme Court to understand and resolve any problems arising
from this interdependency relationship between these two subsystems: Federal and State Governments.

However, another discretionary relationship exists between State and Local Governments; between Federal and State Governments; and Federal and Local Governments. (See Figure 2 below).

Figure 2.
In addition to the factors underlying centralization or
decentralization (as mentioned earlier, i.e., significance of
decisions; complexity of tasks, functions interacting with the
environment...), discretionary decentralization involves other factors.

As Robbins indicates "when the values of the organization's
top administrators support and indicates trust in subordinates,
authority is more likely to be decentralized." The relationship
between State and Local Government presents a good example in this
respect. The health, welfare and safety of the residents of cities,
towns and rural areas is ultimately the responsibility of State
Governments which in turn delegated these responsibilities to Local
Government in these areas. Certain welfare programs delegated from
Federal to State Governments are examples of discretionary decentral-
ization. Revenue-sharing for instance presents an example of
discretionary decentralization Federal vis-a-vis State Government,
and Federal vis-a-vis Local Governments.

One more word need to be said, i.e., whenever decentralization
is employed control systems are employed too. "If adequate controls
are not instituted the administrator has not delegated but abdicated." Controls are normally stated in statutory frameworks (constitution,
constitutions, laws, etc...) directives, policy guidelines and strings attached to
programs and so forth.

(i) The Case of the Sudan Government

Generally, the ultimate objective that underlies decentralization
truly interested and involved in the Revolution. It gave precedence to local government and displayed great initiative in trying to device the context within which power can be realistically and practically handed over.  

In order to attain this objective People's Local Government Act 1971, was enacted. "Its ultimate aim was to do away with social and economic backwardness, to consolidate national unity and to modernize the administrative framework so as to enable those in charge to grasp the needs of the average citizen and try to meet them."  

Thus, political objectives are crystal clear in the enactment of the People's Local Government Act, 1971, however, administrative objectives should not be forgotten. This is because in a country as vast and diverse as the Sudan, where effective and efficient government is badly needed, there is a wide range of argument in favor of both centralization and decentralization.
The theoretical case for centralization rest on the following argument:
- mobilization of resources in sufficient quantities at the centre
- direction and control policies
- clear and unchecked opportunities for shaping the society and the economy in a way that national rulers considers desirable
- utilization of resources for national development in projects that benefit the whole country

Decentralization can point to another set of advantages:
- mobilization of resources by the population in areas where they live
- direction and control of policies by representatives and officials who are in close touch with the needs of the area and responsive to the wishes of communities
- allowances for diversities between areas to suit the needs and wishes of communities
- utilization of resources for development of projects and programs that reflect particular area priorities and needs

Of course, in matters of practical government the choice between these theoretical alternatives is rarely a clear-cut one. The advantages of aspects of centralization and decentralization taken together are so great that governments seek working combinations between the two. The people's Local Government System in the Sudan attempts to strike this balance.
This system, at its simplest is a pyramid of People's Province Executive Councils (PPEC), People's District Councils, Rural Councils, People's Rural Councils, Town Councils and Village and Residential Area Councils (wards).

According to the Act, i.e., People Local Government Act 1971, the (PPEC) is the only corporate body that has legal authority in the province, the rest of the councils are his creatures.

Contrary to the U.S. case where the Constitution enumerates the functions of the federal government and the vast of functions belong to state government, PLG Act enumerates the powers of the PPEC and the rest belongs to the central government. PPEC powers include:

- political enlightenment; popular mobilization; economic and social development and the consolidation of national unity
- maintenance of public order and making to that effect any resolutions and directives to be followed by the public within the province
- imposing local taxes and fees
- preparing annual budget proposals and submit them to the Council of Ministers for approval
- provision of services except those excluded by law and those services such as the post - that require central government administration.
- It is mandatory for the PPEC to delegate some of its powers and functions to the lower councils established by it
The administration of the province is not the responsibility of the PPEC alone; the Act states that the provincial administration consist of (1) The Province People's Executive Council and (2) The Commissioner.

The Provincial Commissioner, who is a political appointee with ministerial status, is appointed by the President of the Republic. He is responsible to the President for the good administration and execution of government policy in the province; he supervises and coordinates all government departments working under the authority of the Province Council.

The Commissioner, who is also the Treasurer, is responsible for putting into effect the duties of the council; and the execution and control of its resolution.

If it appears to the Commissioner that any decision taken by the PPEC is contrary to the public interest or the general policy of the state, or threatens the general security, or prejudices the rights of citizens, he may suspend any such decisions and report the matter through the Minister of Local Government to the Council of Minister. If the decision to suspend the resolution of act is not revoked within two months, it shall become absolute.

Now, it should be noted that the PPEC decision-making process is highly influenced by:
a) the powerful position of the representative of the central government, the commissioner, who has the power to suspend its decisions.
b) the fact that PPEC budget is approved by the central government; over 50% of it is a grant-in-aid from the central government.
These two factors influence the decision-making process to the degree that the net result is that only those decisions favored by the central are made.

Another result is represented by the centralization at the PPEC in the provinces. Reacting to its relationship with the central government, the PPEC holds on to its authority and enacted a centralized organization contrary to what the PLG Act dictates. PPECs never delegated their authorities to lower councils.

To do with such undesired practices and enhance decentralization a new version of People Local Government Act was issued in 1981; a year earlier, 1980, the Regional Government Act was signed into law. According to these legislations the PPECs were dissolved. Their powers were distributed between the newly created Regional Government and District Councils.

It is hoped that these new legislation would address the shortcomings of past experiment. It is too early to comment on the new organizations since they are not fully established yet, however a notice need to be said.

- The new Regional Government Act has coped with selection of Governors in a way conducive to enhance decentralization. The former 'Commissioner' who used to be appointed by the President, represented the central government; whereas the Governor would represent the people in the region who elect him.

- The financial arrangements with the central government, however remained basically the same - i.e., as was the case of the PPEC and the central government.

The elections of Regional Governors would be completed by next October, 1982; legislatures have already been elected.
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SUDAN

Decentralization in organizations depends to a large extent on the attitude and values of top management or administration toward the abilities of the subordinates to perform the assigned tasks satisfactorily. When the values of top administrators indicate confidence in subordinates, authority is more likely to be decentralized.

Examining decentralization in the Sudan confirms the truth in this concept.

Although the Constitution stipulates that the Sudan should be administered on the basis of decentralization, and the People’s Local Government Act was enacted to effect that end, the attitudes and values of central agencies slowed down the process of decentralization.

- This is particularly evident in the financial relationships between central agencies and the provinces.

The concept of the integrated provincial budget covering all the services offered by governmental department meant that the PPEC and/or Regions had to finance a vast range of services, most of which had previously been financed as part of separate central ministries budgets. The logic of this transfer of responsibilities demands that there be an equivalent transfer of financial authority to the provinces to enable them to meet the increased costs. It is in this transfer of financial authority that problems lie. This is because the transfer of responsibilities is not coupled by transfer of authority - to raise sufficient funds in this case:
of all the agencies asked to make changes under the PLG system, central ministries have had to adjust most drastically. They have lost direct responsibilities for their field staff and been asked to cut down their budgets - something no organization anywhere likes to do. Not unexpectedly there are a number of continuing problems in the roles and attitudes of central ministries as seen from the provincial and/or regional point of view. The role of Ministry of Finance gives an striking example. A number of questions emerge about MF role:

Is MF to sit in detailed judgement on provincial budgets? Is MF to provide planned block grant assistance to provinces with only very broad guidelines?

What basis of knowledge and information is the MF to use in either of the above tasks?

What is to be the nature of the basic relationship between the provinces and MF?

It is the last question that brings up the future nature of MF role and organization. At present provinces and central ministries (and especially MF) appear to see themselves as adversaries and to some extent hostile sides.

Large central ministries such as Health, Education, Agriculture and Natural Resources have had many changes asked from them by PLG system, the net result being the down grading of their independent influence at field level. Their reaction to this loss of status and resources is
often viewed by the provinces to be an unfavorable one. Many central ministries are alleged not to recognize the PLOC System. They do not work through the provincial Commissioner. They do not respond, or only respond after impossible delays, to provincial requests for action or supplies. There is a feeling that they have ceased to take any interest in provincial affairs, and keep their best people at head-quarters which are, indeed, overstaffed and underemployed. Officials who do come to the provinces are transferred suddenly and after periods too short to allow any knowledge of conditions to be build-up and useful work completed.

- There are a number of genuine problems that led to this state of affairs:

> Difficulties in defining the practical distinction between ministerial 'technical inspection' and provincial financial and policy control. This is a difficult element in the PLOC Act as what is 'inspection' and what is 'technical' are hard to separate from financial and policy aspects different field present different degrees of difficulty but, by and large, this is a problem that has not received much attention. One of the results of lack of clear distinction has been a tendency for central ministries to stay out of provincial affairs, not knowing what are their rightful responsibilities and not wishing to be accused of interference.

> Confusion over who takes what role in the initiation and management of certain governmental programs - e.g., development programs.

> As a means of control the Act authorizes Central Minister to inspect activities of PPOC related to activities of his Ministry.
V

CONCLUSION

Taking both cases of decentralization, the case of U.S. and the case of the Sudan; as discussed in the previous chapters one can conclude that the U.S. system is working fairly well; however, in the case of the Sudan certain measures need to be taken to enhance the process of decentralization.

It is generally thought that the outstanding characteristic of the U.S. system is the duality of the legislative, executive and judicial institutions and repetition of some at the state level in such a manner as renders governmental work very expensive. The success of the American system is attributed to the strength of the American economy and abundance of its natural resources. The federal system as exercised in the U.S. may not have been equally successful if it were applied to a developing country, like the Sudan, which does not enjoy the strength of the American economy.

With this in mind, controls should be instituted lest the new created regional government turn to be costly (paradoxically the former provincial councils were less expensive than the new regional governments).

In order to embark on a effective centralization the values and attitudes of central agencies should be changed to reflect more trust and confidence in regional and/or provincial organizations.

Furthermore, the roles of national and sub-national government need to be clearly defined beyond any kind of ambiguity and/or uncertainty.
An important issue that hampered the process of decentralization was the undesired dichotomy of responsibility and authority. To enable regional and/or provincial government to shoulder their responsibilities, they should be given appropriate authorities. (It was noted earlier that these governments lack financial authority to carry out their prescribed duties).

Likewise, within the regions and/or provinces the aforementioned measures should be taken in regard to regional government versus lower local councils.

2) Ibid., p. 127

3) Ibid., p. 130

4) Ibid., p. 132


6) Ibid., p. 207


8) Ibid., pp. 233-234

9) Ibid., p. 234

10) Ibid., p. 234


12) Ibid., p. 27


Local Government in the U.S. and the Sudan:  
A Comparative Survey

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Historical Background

A) Historical Background of Local Government in the U.S.

The antiquity of American local government cannot be refuted or questioned; some of the present local authorities antedated the creation of the federal government and even state governments. The following historical background verifies this statement.

The origins of local government system can be traced to the period of early settlements of Europeans. These earliest settlement in New England were compact and geographically separated from one another. . . . . The settlements were called towns, and their inhabitants undertook to manage their own affairs. ¹ Specifically these towns "decided who might live within their borders; determined property rights, arranged for the support of the poor, the schools, and the church; passed ordinances regulating the behavior of inhabitants, enforced the law within their borders. . . . "²

Decisions regarding these matters were made in the town meetings which were held once a year. Execution of decisions and perhaps some authority to make decisions between meetings were entrusted to a board of selectmen, which comprised from three to twelve members elected at the annual town meeting. They were assisted by the town clerk, constable, and treasurer. Town meetings occasionally established other offices, some of which lasted and some of which disappeared i.e., cow keeper, town drummer, fence viewer, and hog Reeve."³
Thus, this form of local government came as a response to the needs of these settlers. In the words of Daniels, "No colony was local government ever 'created'; it evolved over a considerable period of time in response to needs experienced by the first two or three generations of settlers."^4

During the course of their long history these old forms of self-government began to take the shape of local government as we know it today - i.e., counties, cities, townships, etc. Thus "counties were not established in Virginia until 1634 or in Connecticut until 1664. The outlines of the county system in Virginia grew slowly and were not modified until 1662. The vestry did not appear in Maryland until 1692 when the Anglican church was established. In South Carolina not until a significant portion of the colony's settlement was beyond the immediate reach of Charles Town's control did local institutions develop. The proprietors and society were not clearly separated from the town meeting in New England until after 1675. Significant local bodies did not exist in the Middle Colonies until the overweening power of the proprietors were successfully resisted in New York in 1660s and 1670s and in Pennsylvania in 1690s."^5

These local institutions that emerged during the 17th century had their English heritage. For "when hammering out the institutional framework best suited to their needs, the colonists took refuge in the familiar, even in New York where Dutch influences had more than a generation to develop, the impact of non-English experience was on the social structure and not on the governing institutions."^6

It should be noted that these local institutions remained basically the same. Only "little basic change took place in institutional structure
after 1700; the eighteenth century saw a vast elaboration and development of a seventeenth century model. By the time of independence in 1776 the new nation was predominantly an agricultural one and "only about 3 percent lived in normal communities, and there were not more than twenty-four incorporated municipalities in all thirteen of the new states." In the vast rural area another institution, i.e., the county, started to emerge "by the mid-seventeenth century" to accommodate the different needs of the countryside.

Things began to change in the nineteenth century especially toward the mid-century where dramatic changes of the patterns of settlements took place. During this period rural modes of living gave way to steady urban growth. During this great urbanization movement the factory began supplanting the farm and "urban Americans were building homes, raising office towers, paving mile after mile of streets, and laying mile after mile of new sewers. They were also creating legions of new municipalities, for as the urban population proliferated so did the governmental units of the metropolis."

The proliferation of municipalities was made possible and enhanced by permissive incorporation laws of the 19th century. Before the advent of the 19th century incorporations and urban self-government had been 'privileges' and 'cherished grants'. However, during the nineteenth century things changed and "most state legislatures abdicated responsibility for the grant of municipal privileges through passage of general laws that authorized local voters to decide questions of incorporation. Under the general incorporation laws, municipal government was available to any
community of voters that choose to exercise it."\textsuperscript{11} The important theme here is that local self-government was no longer bestowed by the state but was assumed by citizens who are willing to practice it. Hence the door was open wide to the fragmentation that has characterized local government up to this day.

Such permissive laws began to be enacted as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century. "In 1808 the legislature of Louisiana Territory empowered the district courts of common pleas to incorporate towns if two-thirds of the residents of the town petitioned for incorporation."\textsuperscript{12} Nine years later the legislature of Indiana authorized local residents to establish municipal governments "if two-thirds of the qualified voters in the prospective town favored incorporation."\textsuperscript{13} During the same period Ohio legislature authorized county commissioners to incorporate any town of "forty householders or upwards if two-thirds of these householders petitioned for incorporation".\textsuperscript{14}

Other states were to follow the example of Indiana and Ohio: Missouri "in 1825, Illinois in 1831, Pennsylvania in 1834, Arkansas and New York in 1837, Iowa in 1847, Wisconsin in 1849, Tennessee and California in 1850, and Michigan in 1857.

The rest of the states which did not follow the example of Indiana and Ohio i.e., enacting general municipal incorporation laws, continued to pass special incorporation acts (for each case individually) throughout the 19th century. Even in these states "municipal incorporation became a right available to any aspiring community."\textsuperscript{15} Supportively, "between 1803 and 1848 Mississippi legislature incorporated 105 cities and towns, and
during the single decade of the 1890s it handed out 71 municipal charters. Consequently, the first five years of Alabama's statehood, the legislature rubber-stamped 28 incorporation measures, granting powers of self-government to such abortive urban centres as Hazel Green, Sparta, and Tivana. Likewise, Michigan's legislature continued to enact special incorporation laws throughout the century. 16

Consequently, not surprisingly the number of municipalities soared and fragmentation was the order of the day. The state of Illinois presents a good example of this fragmentation with its 1,066 municipalities in 1910. 9 Teaford was right in assuming that these permissive incorporation laws explain how metropolis divided but they do not explain why. The answer for 'why' lies in the "social and economic factors in American life that provided the motives for this Balkanization." 11

The fact that their huge number dotted the map of America is not only true of municipalities. Likewise, the counties which were 'the products of the seventeenth century' 18 are to be found in every state 'except tiny Connecticut and Rhode Island, and sparsely populated Alaska.' 19 The number of counties in each state "varies from none to 254 in Texas." 20 Thus discrepancy, together with the fact that county boundaries are drawn "irrespective of whether the area enclosed is rural or urban", resulted in an uneven distribution of the population. For example "more than one-fifth

of the population is concentrated in sixteen counties."

It should be noted that since its inception, the county has served as a basic unit of grass-roots government. In older times, specifically before "the advent of the auto and the telephone, the county was the largest government with which the citizen could hope to have a direct, personal contact." Many activities revolved around the county which was the point of focus. This is especially true of rural areas since many programs—governmental and otherwise—such as health, welfare, educational programs; county fairs, business and so forth were carried out there.

Unlike municipalities and townships whose numbers between 1952-1977 have been negatively correlated, the number of counties has been relatively stable and show no correlation with either municipalities or townships. Table I explains this fairly well. As it shows the number of municipalities increased over the years while the number of townships decreased steadily during the same period. On the other hand the number of counties remained almost static during the same period.

To give a more complete picture about local government in the United States, a word needs to be said about special districts. Special districts of different sorts are numerous. As Table I shows school districts outnumber any other form of local government. This is also true of special districts (other than school districts). The number of all special districts amounts to "585" of all governments in the U.S. Some of these districts were created in the belief that having a separate organization for a given activity would foster it. "Others have been created so that a problem involving more than one local authority could be dealt with in unified fashion."
## Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Government</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1957*</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80,171</td>
<td>81,304</td>
<td>91,236</td>
<td>102,392</td>
<td>116,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>80,120</td>
<td>81,253</td>
<td>91,185</td>
<td>102,341</td>
<td>116,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>3,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>18,356</td>
<td>18,051</td>
<td>17,997</td>
<td>17,215</td>
<td>16,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Townships</td>
<td>16,822</td>
<td>17,107</td>
<td>17,144</td>
<td>17,198</td>
<td>17,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School districts</td>
<td>13,280</td>
<td>21,782</td>
<td>34,678</td>
<td>50,454</td>
<td>67,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special districts</td>
<td>26,140</td>
<td>21,264</td>
<td>18,323</td>
<td>14,424</td>
<td>12,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adjusted to include units in Alaska and Hawaii, which were reported separately prior to adoption of statehood for these areas in 1959.

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"Still other" observed one scholar, "evidently reflect a decision that separate organization of activities supported by fees for services in sound policy."

Of the special districts, school districts are the most familiar and common type. Other special districts may include fire protection, soil conservation, library, park, cemetery, mosquito abatement, irrigation, drainage, etc... Some of these special districts are big enterprises. For instance, the transit authority in Chicago "had nearly thirteen thousand employees and revenue of almost $138 million. At the same time, the New York Port Authority reported 5,703 employees and an annual revenue of about $148 million."

Now, we have discussed the background of various types of local government, but we barely mentioned their functions, their organization and legal basis. So a closing note covering these areas is highly desirable.

**Counties:**

Like other forms of local government counties are corporate bodies in the sense that they "are comparable to physical persons and consequently are capable of holding and disposing of property, concluding contracts and being involved in litigation." This legal basis is nearly always provided for by general state laws - hence, counties are uniform within a given state. However, "some other states have 'county home rule' plans, giving to counties the chance to select a form of government from a set of alternatives prepared by the state." This accounts for the variation in county governments.

In turn this variation is indicated by the great variety of names given to this governments: "those in Delaware are called levy counties, in several
states county courts, in Kentucky fiscal courts, in Texas commissioners' courts, in most of Georgia commissioners of roads and revenue, and in Louisiana parish police juries."

Despite the variety, county government, in general, is organized around a governing board and a greatly varied and often complex array of individual officers, boards, commissions, and ex-officio bodies." This governing board is referred to as commissioner or supervisor form of government. "The former" i.e., the commissioner form, noted one observer "centres around a small governing board directly elected by the voters either as large or by districts and with the board members being concerned primarily or exclusively with county government duties. The latter", he continued, "has a governing board, often of much larger size, some or all of whose members serve ex-officio as county board member by right of holding some other office, usually as judicial, township, or municipal officers."

The traditional functions of counties include law enforcement judicial administration, road construction and maintenance, public welfare, the keeping of records, and "in some states school administration." Besides these traditional functions counties, however, began to perform an increasing number of governmental functions. This came as a result of "the transfer to the counties of services once provided by other local governments, particularly the townships." It is also true that "many functions once considered properly those of municipal corporations are now performed by counties, even in rural areas. In fact, some counties, in some states are today performing all of the functions of the municipalities, although the number and variety of functions varies from one county to the next."
Towns & Townships:

The functions, organization and the evolution of the town government has been mentioned earlier. However what might be added here is that a new 'representative' town meeting plan has been developed in many areas in New England states. "Under this plan, the voters choose a large number of citizens, perhaps a hundred or more, to attend the meeting, represent them and vote. Any citizen can attend and take part in debates, but he no longer has a direct vote. This plan is used in such large urban places as Brockton, Massachusetts."33

Likewise, townships are organized in a way similar to that of New England towns and "many of the states even retaining the town meeting which the early settlers carried with them."34 This township government "usually have the right to levy taxes, approve a budget, and adopt such ordinances as state law permits, and, to a lessening degree to tax, elect officers."35

To the west of New England i.e., in the Middle Atlantic states and Midwest townships evolved as a basic unit of rural government. Unlike New England town which were not regularly shaped, the "tendency in the Midwest was to follow the lines established by the surveyors who laid out this vast area on congressional order beginning in 1787, using a 6 - by 6 - mile basic unit of measure called 'Congressional township'. A great many townships are, therefore square in shape and enclose an area of 36 square miles."36

Beside the Middle Atlantic states "townships still remain active for all or major portions of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin. A few townships also remain in Missouri, Nebraska, and Washington."37
organized under the authority of the Tribal chief - the tribe being the basic unit of government. With the Turkish invasion in 1821, a new highly centralized system of administration was introduced. Ultimate authority rested with a Governor-General assisted by governors in the various provinces.

The nationalist rule of the Mahdi in 1883 brought about a centralized form of government with a distinctly Islamic character. Administration was entrusted to 'Emirs' and 'Nalis' appointed by the Mahdi and later by his successor Khalifa Abdulahi. Due to adverse circumstances this state of affairs did not last long enough to take roots. This nationalist rule was over-run in 1898 by the Anglo-Egyptian forces.

The conquest of the Anglo-Egyptian forces brought about the so called condominium rule. An entirely new form of administration was then introduced.

During the early years of the condominium rule the power was highly centralized under the Governor-General who enjoyed exclusive power. He enjoyed full legislative powers, was the supreme military and civil commander, and the head of the judiciary and the executive. The country was divided into twelve provinces under the authority of a governor, assisted by districts commissioners and their assistants. The Governor-General's immediate advisers were the Civil Secretary, who was the head of the political service - comprising Provincial Governors, District Commissioners and their assistants; the Legal Secretary; and the Financial Secretary.

This highly centralized government was efficient in suppressing the localized rebellions and soon bringing stability and firmly establishing the colonial rule.
Having attained its objectives, the centralized direct rule gradually began to give more room for a more indirect rule in accordance with the recommendations of Lord Lugard—a advocate of the theory of the "basis of government through the natural leaders of the people." Describing the theory of indirect rule a Sudanese scholar commented:

"Briefly stated, indirect rule as a principle meant a conservative philosophy that sustained the preservation of indigenous political institutions intact, to serve as a basis for future development, and as a means of adopting what could be adapted to local needs, of civilized norms, practices and institutions. As a method of administration, the system of indirect rule had been developed to consist of a native authority, normally single and autocratic, that was part of the machinery of government with defined powers of judicial, fiscal and executive nature where were exercised under statutory authority. Powers varied in degree according to the stage of development reached by the authority concerned. In the exercise of their powers native authorities were subject to the direction of the administrative officers who acted as appellate, revising authorities. Finally, each authority administered its own treasury fed by revenue from local taxes. The emphasis of the system was on the preservation of 'rule' and upholding the authority of chiefs."39

This theory was adopted and elaborated in the Milner Commission report which categorically stated that a bureaucratic and centralized form of government is highly unsuited for the Sudan. Firstly, because decentralization costs less and secondly because British administration was totally alien to the vast complex Sudan. The Commission's report reads as follows:

"Although it is absolutely necessary for the present regime maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of Sudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralized. Having regard to its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left as far as possible in the hands of native authorities wherever they exist under British supervision. A centralized bureaucracy is wholly unsuited for Sudan. Decentralization and employment, whenever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country would make both for economy and efficiency."40
The recommendation of the Commission was accepted by the Sudan government which saw it fit to recruit and rely upon such prominent leading Sudanese who could influence large sectors of the community. To implement this policy, legislation was passed in 1921 empowering and regulating the exercise by tribal shieks and chiefs — Qadis — of certain 'judicial and administrative' powers over the members of their own tribes. The change was congenial to age-old tradition which had relied on a consultative system of tribal justice. Yet another turning point came about in the same year when advisory municipal councils were established in the large towns; the councillors, mainly the nominees of the provincial governors, were mostly officials.

"Thus the main feature of those days," observed a student of local government, "was the development of native administration. Native authorities became an integral part of the machinery of government with well defined powers and functions recognized by the government and the law. The administrative officers were then expected to guide the native authorities and not to rule directly."4

With Sir John Maffey as Governor-General in 1927, the policy of indirect rule gained significant support. Native courts were set up, tribes were grouped into larger units, tribal chiefs headed by the Nazir came to exercise greater judicial powers in their native courts through the Chief Courts Ordinance of 1931 and the Native Courts Act of 1937. There was a gradual devolution of simple administrative powers from the district commissioners to

A separate legislation was enacted for the Southern Provinces in order to implement the then termed 'Southern Policy'.

the native courts. These powers were later augmented by those of assessing taxes and of collecting them according to the rates prescribed by the central government. Furthermore, native administration was called upon, later on, to supervise some of the services - such as crime prevention and maintenance of peace and order among the tribes; the protection of property in rural areas; simple sanitary and public health and veterinary services.

Clearly their functions gradually but yet substantially increased. And although working under the authority and supervision of the district commissioners, native administration had by then progressed sufficiently to have a separate budget, with an annual balance sheet, with taxes and local revenue, along with salaries and expenditure on local services for which the native administration was partially responsible.

In spite of the momentum it might gain - as was the case in the Sudan in those days - native administration falls short of local government since the former is not a unified entity with its personnel, independent financial resources, executive powers to provide local services or set up a policy. It is basically a tribal affiliation which need not be governed by residential status as in the case of local government.

Furthermore, native administration was bound to fail in meeting the demands of complex, ever-growing urban centres with their economic prosperity and enlightened public opinion. With this in mind, and to deal with the dissenting voice of Sudanese intelligence, the colonial administration had opted to introduce a new system - i.e., local government.

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It should be noted that the new system (local government) was not meant to replace the native administration but rather to complement it. Interestingly, the two systems functioned alongside until 1969 when native administration was abolished except for two regions where it is functioning to this day.
Consequently three ordinances were introduced in 1937, the municipal, town and rural ordinances, which were an amalgamation of two older ordinances; the Public Order (1921) and Public Health (1924).

The new Municipal and Town Ordinances, however, provide for the transfer of the powers of local legislation from the Provincial Commissioners to a body of councillors. Whereas in the case of rural areas, the ordinance empowers the Governor-General to confer upon a body of persons whatever powers and duties he deems fit.

Between 1937-42 the Municipalities and Town Laws were amended to permit the delegation of more powers to the local councils which were constituted by separate warrants of establishment which in turn specified the constitutions of these bodies and the powers delegated to them. Among the members of these councils were tribal chiefs, and a certain number of elected and/or appointed members.

These developments coincided with the growth of the nationalist movement which centered around the 'Graduates Congress'. Those educated militants were
highly critical of the new local government system. As one observer put it
"these local councils were disappointing to the educated Sudanese. They had
in mind full-fledged local government councils approximating the British model.
They felt, correctly, that the rural councils were nothing but the native
authorities in disguise."\(^{43}\)

Responding to the growing nationalist sentiments and the increasing
critical tendencies of the educated Sudanese, the Governor-General convened a
conference, in 1946, to consider some further steps for the closer association
of the Sudanese with the administration of their country. The majority of
participants at the conference were Sudanese. A sub-committee was to study
the development of local government. The recommendations of this sub-committee
were not accepted by the government. However the Local Government Advisory
Board of Sudan continued the studies started by the sub-committee. Two years
later the Board recommended the commission of an expert on local government.
The government accept the recommendation and thus, in 1948 invited Dr. A. H.
Marshall\(^{8}\) to investigate and report on the policy and performance of local
government and to submit his recommendations. After six months of investigation
Dr. Marshall's first recommendation was that a separate department, dealing with
local government affairs, be established to lay down the high policy for
local government and to supervise the application of that policy. The recommen-
dations were adopted and the Local Government Ordinance (1952) was enacted. It
came into force, together with earlier ordinances (Municipalities, Towns and
Rural Areas) with proviso that the later were to expire by July 1957.

\(^{8}\) City Treasurer of Coventry, England.
The new ordinance grades the local government councils into five categories according to their economic and social status, the degree of enlightenment, etc.:  

(a) Councils with full powers, independent budget as well as the right to elect a chairman.  
(b) Council with full powers, independent budget with chairman appointed by the Provincial Governor.  
(c) Areas where powers are conferred upon the district commissioners but have independent budget and advisory councils.  
(d) Areas with advisory councils that derive their powers from the district commissioner but have independent budgets.  
(e) Areas where the district commissioner is the sole representative of the central government and which have no independent budgets.  

Thus graded, the councils were set up by separate warrants of establishment, acquired legal status, specific financial resources which were later renounced by the Central Government Appropriation of Taxes Ordinance (1954). With the right to appoint employees, provide local services as set in a schedule attached to the Ordinance and to legislate on local matters, each council is to appoint an executive officer who is answerable to the council. The officer is to act as an advisor to the council on the legal aspects of its duties and powers.  

There was no change in the system of local government between the advent of independence in 1956 and the military take-over in 1958. Seeking to gain more control over local government, the military regime issued the Administration of Provinces Act in 1960. Amongst its notable features is the abolition of the post of Governor of the Province and District Commissioners,
Consequently the only act that remained in force was the 1951 ordinance.

With the coming of the present administration in 1969 it emphasised the "handing over of power to the masses," defined as "those truly interested and involved in the Revolution." To put this slogan into effect it convened a conference in 1970 to discuss local government. On the basis of its deliberations and recommendation a new legislation was adopted - The People's Local Government Act (1971). The new Act abolished the 1951 ordinance. It featured among other things:

- the creation of one corporate body in each province, the Province People's Executive Council which served as the only budgetary unit in the provinces.

- The PPEC were empowered to create local councils at all levels within their respective provinces. This resulted in the proliferation of local councils whose number raised from 66 (under 1951 ordinance) to more than 5,000 units spread over a wide spectrum of quarters, villages, markets and industrial areas.

A popular uprising which toppled the military regime and restored civilian rule based on multi-party system.
the amalgamation of both popular and official activities at all levels of People's Local Government institutions.

Ten years later, in 1981, a new version of People's Local Government was enacted. This came as a result of the 1980 administrative arrangements, namely the inception of Regional Government. According to the 1980 Regional Government Act, the country was divided into five more regions. Each region was to be administered by a regional government headed by a Regional-Governor (chief executive) assisted by a cabinet of Regional Ministers; a legislature; a judiciary, and local government councils in the provinces comprising the region. According to this new arrangement, the new local government act of 1981 brought about new changes in the system of local government. Most important among these:

- for the first time local government councils are to be established, supervised and controlled by the Regional Government. The Central government activities and communications are limited to Regional governments.
- the PPECs are done away with; and district councils were to become once again corporate bodies with independent budgets.
- the system of indirect elections are done away with. Moreover central and local government officials do not sit with elected local council members as ex-officio members. In other words the previous system of councillors and ex-officio members making decisions and implementing them collectively is abandoned.

* A sixth region already existed in the South since 1979.
under the 1971 system are done away with.

Now, having discussed the background of local government, the platform is set for a close look of the dynamics of the system and how it works. The coming chapters attempt to do that.
II

Dynamics of Two Systems

1) The Case of the U.S.

The previous chapter traced the development of local governments, its proliferation and growing complexity. These developments are inseparable from the changes experienced by the society at large. This in turn placed greater demands on local government, which "are required to spend an increasing portion of their time on economic problems, the social concerns of various individuals and groups, and the growing inter-relationships among the political, economic and social system within the community." The magnitude and complexity of local government tasks need no further emphasis. For instance "even smallest city provides the basic service of police protection, drainage and flood control, and refuse collection and disposal. No other agency, public or private, offers all these community services, each of which requires special kinds of personnel skills, facilities, equipment and procedure. The list of city services rendered by larger municipalities can easily reach a hundred or more."  

In shouldering these diverse and intricate responsibilities, local governments interact with different parties. The dynamics of this interaction can best be understood by examining the relationship of three local government units with the different parties - the federal and state governments, other local government units and citizens; as well as the relationship within local governments.

a) Local government relationship with state and federal governments:

The nature of local governments as corporate bodies is an important
factor that governs their operations, the courts of the corporation." 46 Another student of local government extends the legal basis to include "the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and federal court decisions." 47

The relationships provided for by the chart are further enhanced by the realities of America's twentieth century. In the words of Adrian

"Americans today remain attached to the early principles of the federal system and of grass-roots government, but modern means of transportation and communication, the growth of a nationwide economic organization, the almost nomadic tendencies of contemporary Americans, and other factors have contributed to the breakdown of political barriers. The popular concept of each level of government serving a specialized purpose and operating largely independently of government at other levels has had to be extensively modified in the twentieth century, especially after the Great Depression, in order to fit the characteristics of society as we now know it." 48

This interrelationship is best exemplified by the continuous flow of efforts 'upwards' and 'downwards' to influence decision-making.

'Upwards' flow refers to efforts of federal and state governments to
influence decision-making at local governments level. The influence
of states on local government could be fully grasped and appreciated in
the light of the universal fact that local governments are the creatures
of state government. On the other hand, federal influence on local
government is evidenced by strings attached to federal loans, grants
and, to a lesser degree, revenue-sharing; as well as federal supervision,
standards, regulations, federal advice and expertise and so forth.

Generally, the 'downwards' influence is easily recognized and under-
stood. 'Upwards' influence is less obvious. It refers to the continuous
efforts of local governments to influence decision-making in Washing-
ton and the States. This is done, in part, by lobbying. Populous cities,
in particular are much more active in this process either through
their political leaderships or specialized organizations such as the
United States Conference of Mayors and the American League of Cities.

Another way 'upwards' influence is through "the continuous inter-
action through common interests, and often a common political party,
of officeholders at all levels". This can be further explained by
the fact that "legislative districts have traditionally - although there
are many exceptions - been based upon the county or groups of counties.
This has led in many cases to close working relationships between county
officers and state legislators. The county officer who wants or opposes
a particular piece of legislation, therefore, frequently has direct
access to the critical decision makers".

Furthermore, influence of local government is consolidated by
sympathetic attitudes of officeholders at the federal and state levels.
Such sympathy, oftentimes, is related to the background and experience
of these officeholders as previous local officials. "Many a United
States Senator and Congressman is a former governor or mayor, or has held some other state or local office. Many legislators are former county or municipal officeholders. Few persons are elected to the governorship without previous experience in some other state or local office.\textsuperscript{51}

b) Intergovernmental relationships:

Enhanced patterns of communication and transportation at a time when government is getting more complex, have led, in recent times to the consolidation of local government efforts to solve their mutual problems. Some scholars put it this way:

"In most states municipal governments historically have been the providers and deliverers of "hardware" services. Such as police, fire, public works and utilities. County governments, on the other hand, have been the providers and deliverers of health, education and welfare, or "soft" services. These traditional lines of differentiation have broken down during the decades of the 1960's and 1970's. The primary reason for this breakdown include urbanization of counties, demands by city dwellers that their government deliver both "hard" and "soft" services, and the targeting of federal manpower and other "soft" programs to cities. This initial targeting began in the Great Society era of the sixties and expanded into other areas of federal funding during the seventies."\textsuperscript{52}

This joint effort falls generally into three forms: i.e., corporation, contraction, and annexation and consolidation. Cooperation could be formal or informal. "The most significant part of informal cooperation"\textsuperscript{53} reported one study, "consist of personal contacts among
operating officials. State associations of municipal officers, many of which have regional subdivisions, are of great importance. Among others, there are state associations of mayors, managers, selectmen, finance personnel and law officers; and officials concerned with the functions of police and fire protection, public works, planning, health, welfare, education and libraries. Such associations bring local officials together in order to discuss common problems and find common grounds for cooperation. On the other hand, formal cooperation involves the pooling of equipment or resources of two or more local units to accomplish a common objective. Such kind of cooperative arrangements take the shape lending of fire fighters, police or communications equipment of one city to another during emergencies such as floods or big fires etc. For example, "pooling of fire-fighting personnel and equipment has produced substantial benefits for five small Illinois communities with populations ranging from 21,000 to 70,000 residents. Fire departments in three of the participating cities reported an annual combined savings of $675,000 in personnel expenses and $65,000 in equipment and maintenance costs".54

In addition to cooperative work, local units frequently make contractual agreements with each other for the provision of certain services within a prescribed area. An example of such an agreement is the provision of all water and sewer service by a city to a large area beyond its boundary, because "the city's plants have the capacity, its personnel have the expertise, the source of water is the same and the area is a natural drainage basin".55 Some scholars conceptualized this approach as follows:
The basic concept is for City A to provide certain services, such as fire, police, public works, planning, and traffic engineering, and to contract with City B to provide City A with such services as property appraisals, sanitary landfills, crime laboratories and training facilities. City A might provide services one through ten; City B, services 11 through 20; and County A, services 21 through 27. Similar arrangements could be made according to functional groupings such as public works, traffic engineering, police and fire, or according to geographic boundaries.  

An extreme case of interlocal relations is represented by governmental consolidation. "It is the most comprehensive approach to the problem of efficient and effective interjurisdictional financing and service delivery. However, it requires such major change and is so fraught with politics and self-interest at all levels that it is difficult to accomplish." Examples of successful city/county consolidation include "Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida; and Lexington-Pike County, Kentucky."

So far, local governments' relationships with federal, state and other local governments or what might be termed as 'external' relations have been discussed. Now, what we might call as 'internal' relations i.e., relationships of local governments with citizens, the relationships of chief executive and administrators of local governments with councillors and relationships of administrators with technical officers within a local unit, need to be discussed.

As for the citizen's relationship with his local government, one might, rightfully, maintain that such relationships are so varied that no generalization
is possible. Such relationships differ from one local unit to another; even within the same unit they differ according to the issue in question. For instance, social relationships in small towns and farm societies are generally close and personal and thus residents of these communities are more likely to have access to their local government officials. Furthermore, residents are likely to be much more involved in their community affairs. On the other hand, social relationships in crowded cities are impersonal, and fragmentary; and resident's involvement in their community affairs is far less than the case in small towns and farm societies. As Coleman put it: "Within large cities, there is usually considerably less to involve the residents in civic affairs than there is in a small self-sufficient town. In a large city, a man's work is outside his neighborhood; often his children go to school outside that neighborhood and in the extreme case, the neighborhood itself is hardly distinguishable as a unit. Thus, in the large cities, involvement in controversy is usually least widespread, often confined to a few activists."

Consequently, such prevailing situations are reflected in public policy issues and positions of council members. Thus in small towns and farm societies it is more likely there be general consensus about public issues besides the fact that residents have more influence with political decision makers. Whereas in large cities it is less likely there be consensus; and "conflict becomes a part of daily public life (in the large city), and public policies that are hammered out are likely to represent uneasy compromises, not supported by a stable majority of either citizens or council members. In these cities, conflict among the citizens is normally reflected by conflict on the council - and this in turn leads to factionalism on the governing board."
However, such situations could be found in small communities too; especially when the issue in question is highly controversial. The 1999 long emotional struggle of the village of Skokie against American Nazis is a case in point.1

Except for some counties, which have elected officials to administer county affairs, local governments employ executive officers to supervise their administrative affairs. This may take the form of manager - council plan; or as some mayors do, by employing chief administrative officer; or some other form. In all these cases these administrators serve at the pleasure of the appointing councils or mayors. So they are expected to be responsive to the appointing officers; and they are normally so. However, in certain cases and under different circumstances they do take positions conflicting with those of council members or mayors. In such cases they are likely to rely on public support which council members and mayors cannot ignore, or they may adhere to the ethics of their profession and quit their jobs if it amounted to that. A major factor for such struggle is the conflict over the responsibility of policy making roles. Since the thirties, the role of administrators in policy making has been increasingly recognized and accepted. "Academicians and practitioners alike have agreed that it is both unrealistic and undesirable to attempt to separate policy making or political decisions from administrative activities. Most attention, however, has focused on the implication of this conclusion for the role of administrators, however, and the fact that they

Another important ingredient of the dynamics of local government concerns the relationship of chief executives with department heads and/or technical officers. A group of researchers noted that "the executive reform movement sought to enhance executive influence and control over municipal line agencies. Our data indicate that municipal department heads regard the chief executive as having more impact on them than the other major municipal policymakers, the city council." This is clear in the case of the mayor-council form where the mayor is independently elected. However, in the case of manager-council plan where the manager is selected by the council, the case is less obvious. This is due, in the case of managers, perhaps to their expertise, budget preparation powers and their overall supervisory powers. A group of researchers asserted that "apparently, as the literature suggests, the budget preparation powers and expertise of managers make the council more dependent on their recommendations than vice versa; and their exercise of coordination and direction signals to the departments that the manager rather than the council is in charge of day to day activities." To these powers
one may add the power to appoint and remove department heads; and the power of mayors to veto acts of council as major sources of influence.

All the above-discussed relationships make up the dynamics of local government in the U.S. To provide for comparison, the dynamics of local government system in the Sudan needs to be discussed.

3) The Case of the Sudan

Unlike the case of the U.S., local government in the Sudan has been until 1981/82 the creature of the central government. The provinces used to deal directly with the central government.

The province-centre relationship was not a balanced one. More correctly, it was never intended to be. Provinces remained the strong grip of the central government over provincial and local affairs. The financial relationships, which will be discussed in the following chapter, bear witness to this. Suffice to say here that in 1977/78 central aid to local governments amounted to 67% of their expenditures; in 1976/77 it amounted to 66%. Thus with more than two-thirds in aid, central government can exert greater influence and control over local government.

Furthermore, the centre control over provincial affairs is manifested by the fact that the provincial commissioner was the representative of the central government. He enjoyed vast powers under the act of 1971. He shared with the provincial council the administration of the province (Article 3, Chapter III of the Act, 1971). More than that he had the upper hand over the provincial council. He had the power to suspend the decisions of the provincial council if he deemed such decisions to be against the public.

*These figures are taken from the Economic Survey; 1978/79 issued by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Khartoum, Sudan p. 116.
powers of budgetary preparation it had exhibited undue control over the provinces. Sometimes it made the provinces pass legislations unfavored by the councils or the people of the provinces. The provincial budgets approval powers were later transferred to the Ministry of Finance. But the former practice continued and even worsened. This is because provincial commissioners and high ranking provincial staff, usually drawn from the former Ministry of Local Government, find it more easier to deal with their peers and associates in the Capital, than the officials of the Ministry of Finance.

As for the rest of the central ministries their attitudes and reactions were no better. Under the People's Local Government System they were to relinquish part of their powers and responsibilities to the Provincial People's Executive Councils. The net result being the downgrading of their independent influence at field level. Their reaction to this loss of status and resources is often seen from the provinces to be an unfavorable one. Many central ministries are alleged not to have recognized the PLG System. They seemed not

*The 1974 Popular Participation Acts are cases in point. Using his powers under (Chapter 9 of 1971 Act) and his personal influence with the provincial commissioner, the then minister forced the provincial councils to pass these acts, originally drafted by the ministry. Due to the taxation burden they were highly unpopular. But since they were passed by the provincial councils there was no way to repeal them but by either the council of Minister or the People's Assembly. Because of the Minister powerful personality and influence with the councils the only woman to repeal these acts was the People Assembly which finally did so.
to have worked through the Provincial Commissioners or kept them informed of changes pertaining to their activities in the provinces. The ministries used not to respond or only respond after impossible delays, so provincial requests for action or supplies. There was a feeling that the central ministries had ceased to take any interest in provincial affairs outside the capital where they kept their best staff; indeed their headquarters were overstaffed and/or underemployed. Officials who do come to the provinces are transferred suddenly and after periods too short to allow any knowledge of conditions to be accumulated and useful work completed.

All this is supposed to have changed and a new set of relationships are in the making according to the new version of People's Local Government of 1981. Since the new system has not yet been fully established, the new set of relationships remains to be seen. However, some notes can be said at this stage.

- According to the new Act provincial governments are done away with.
- Instead district council and their creatures (town, rural, village and ward councils etc.) came to refer to local government.
- Being created by the newly established Regional government district councils were to have no direct relationship with the central government. Their relationship would be confined to the Regional government. This is a major change in the trend of local government relationships.
- Likewise, the provincial commissioner no longer enjoys the vast powers of the former system. His powers pertaining to local government councils

*Elections of local councils and related arrangements are supposed to come to completion by October, 1982.
anticipated to create some complications of council-region relation.

This would be appreciated if we take into account the fact that in each region there is a minister entrusted with local government affairs, the administration of the region. The roles of the regional minister of administration and the provincial commissioner are not clearly defined.

The fact that regional ministers selection clearly reflects district representation as tribal affiliation might have further impact, yet to be determined, on the dynamics of local government system.

Interlocal relationships:

According to the 1971 Act provincial councils were the only corporate bodies in the provinces. These councils were asked to delegate some of their powers and functions to the lower councils (district, town, rural etc...). This resulted in a 'vertical' relationship. All the sub-provincial councils were striving to get delegated powers and financial resources from provincial councils. Since councils of the same level have no power or resources, or if they had, they have no say on these resources, 'to give to other councils',...
no 'horizontal' relation existed between these councils. In addition, these councils have no jurisdiction over others. For example district councils have no jurisdiction over town and rural councils; rural councils have no jurisdiction over village councils and so forth. This led to emphasis on 'vertical' relationship, i.e., between provincial councils on one hand and lower councils on the other hand.

Though the provincial councils were asked to delegate some of their powers and functions to lower councils they almost never did. Even in the few cases they did the delegated functions were only nominal and/or meaningless since they were not accompanied by the necessary financial powers and resources. Such practices were against the philosophy of the People's Local Government System which aimed at getting the government closer to the people in their communities by decentralizing the decision-making power throughout the country.

The new version of People's Local Government of 1981 attempts to cope with his handicap. According to this legislation district councils became corporate bodies. Again they were asked to delegate appropriate functions and financial powers and resources (Article 7, Chapter II). It is hoped that district councils would be more successful in this respect than the previous provincial councils. The wording of the abovementioned article is specific and strong in its call for the delegation of powers and functions with corresponding financial resources. The practical of the new council remains to be seen.

A new set of relationships i.e., 'horizontal' is encouraged by the new legislation. According to Article 34, Chapter 7 the provincial commissioner with the consultation of district council's chairman, is empowered to form coordination-committees to see for good relations between the councils.
As for citizen-council relation one may say that up to 1981 this relation underwent two phases; the initial phase 1961 - 73 which witnessed greater enthusiasm and participation. Such enthusiasm is evidenced by the self-help program which contributed more than 25% to local government revenues in 1972.65 The popular participation and enthusiasm was a result of the vigorous political campaign that accompanied the enforcement of the act; on the other hand it was also generated by the great expectations that the then new local councils would accommodate genuine home-rule concepts.

Later in 1974 - 1981 things changed drastically when much of the fascinating aura of the local councils has disappeared and people came to realize that real powers rest with the provincial councils and not the lower councils. Dissatisfaction began to build-up and later developed into distrust of these councils especially when it came to the rationing of scarce commodities. A high-ranking local government officer noted that, "the probity of some leading councillors at different levels of local authorities has been put under serious test when they were entrusted with the task of distributing some scarce commodities amongst the masses of the population. Many, if not all, local councillors have unfortunately failed this test."66 However convincing these factors, they fall short of explaining the question of popular acceptance and effectiveness of local councils. Other factors built-in the system are useful in explaining this matter.

The main problem in maximizing provincial level effectiveness as the People's Local Government System did, is that confidence in and acceptance of

*As early as 1973/74 local councils were entrusted with the distribution of scarce commodities such as sugar, fuel, oil etc.... it is alleged that since then local councils attracted those seeking profits,
sub-provincial councils by local populations was threatened and therefore effectiveness reduced. This is an international problem; recent local government reforms in Britain, for example, have created larger and better equipped councils, but already criticisms are growing that the new units have lost any capacity to understand and respond to the wishes of local populations. It is claimed that people feel they can no longer influence matters that affect them and a more effective standard of service no longer substitute for the capacity to influence matters. Complaints are of the lack of responsiveness of officials and the difficulties of getting in touch with the level of local government which makes decisions; of the standardization in larger units which cannot allow for important local differences; of the inability of council members to handle interests of a large range of citizens and their increasing separation from the interest of their constituents.

This same situation has developed in the Sudan before 1981 where provincial governments were highly centralized. There has been the same problem for the individual citizen. The provincial councils have had less time for the special problems of the individual. But perhaps more important were the problems of special interest groups. In the Sudan, like other developing countries, the social and economic characteristics of the population, geographical diversity and difficulties of communication and transportation, together with the previous pattern of local government have caused the emergence of marked sectional interests, both economic and social. These sectional interests, both important sectional interests, both sources of the facts of life that have to be lived with. Handled badly they can be a source of major problems; handled properly they can be a major source for development and improvement. One of the main institutional factors determining the role played by sectional interests is the powers of
local councils.

A number of factors support the view that provincial councils were not able to handle sectional interests as effectively as lower level local councils. Conflicts between sectional interests are often of a very local, small scale nature and are best worked out in a local council with the time, background knowledge, interest and powers to produce acceptable solutions. Similarly, one of the characteristics of area or tribally based sectional interests — competition and hostility to other such interests — can be contained by a council where interests can decide on some of their own affairs. Thirdly, one of the positive characteristics of sectional interests — that because of feelings of common interest i.e., within the same sectional interest, members would always be willing to contribute money and labor in efforts that serve the local group — can best be utilized for the benefit of community at large by the existence of a local council with real powers of direction and decision. Lastly, the growth of a sense of 'community' is always encouraged by the reassurance that sectional interests can be decided upon by local councils by themselves without risking getting lost in the wider interests of provincial councils or any upper level of government.

It is hoped that the new (of the 1982) district councils constitute this much desired local units and attain what the previous provincial councils were not able to.

Finally, a word about relations within local councils i.e., between administrative officers and councillors and administrative officers and

*The term refers to the cadre of local government officers, comprising deputy, provincial commissioner, and officers in charge of different levels of local government councils.
AO's have been (and still are) the officials to whom the people give most recognition and to whom they come with problems and requests. The visibility and prestige of "Hakimeen" is the main reason. They are the people who used to appear with Native Administration leaders, who issue instructions, licences and supplies, who call in the police and deal with personal and tribal disputes. In the eyes of the people, the provinces these roles have not changed.

Councils still look to AO's for leadership and guidance; some AO's go so far as to make a similar claim for town, rural and village councils: that those councils would do nothing except perhaps deal endlessly with the problem of supply, without AO's leadership, encouragement and in some cases threats on other issues. The dilemma here is a difficult one for AO's: unless AO's withdraw to some extent then local councils are unlikely to assert themselves, but the risks in not providing leadership are of the breakdown of parts of local government.

*An Arabic word which citizens, especially in rural areas, use to refer to AO's. It means 'governor'.*
- Provincial authorities in practice still hold AO's responsible for effective working of local councils. This is partly habit and partly because there is no other identified and trusted agency. If, for example a local council is seen to be taking an unfair attitude to a section of its people or to be enriching its own members and their families, then it is the AO who is first expected to do something about it. He can hardly do so and stick to his role as one among equal members. (according to 1971 Act).

- AO's still control most of the resources and facilities available to local councils. They have the offices, most of the transport and control of available office staff. (Part of the reason why AO's used to act as Local Council Secretaries (before 1981) is because they have an address, office and supporting staff - clerks, typist, bookkeepers etc...). Very importantly, they were the chief financial officers of these local councils. Where Technical Officers (public works engineers, public health officers, educational and school officers etc...) are not present or not there at a sufficiently senior level, the AO's are in charge of the services and staff of that department, receiving and spending monies and supplies and supervising the activities of these departments.

For all these reasons and up until 1981 AO's were effectively carrying out a different job from that intended by the 1971 Act. While they may not have taken over decision-making and made local councils advisory, they were the chief managers of council's affairs, principal advisors on policy and main executive agents in carrying out decisions.
to such an attitude:

- Though the status of AO's under the 1971 Act, is not the same as that of the Provincial Commissioner in relation to TO's, AO's did appear to have a primary place in that Local Government system. In part this is due to the inherited position of AO's in the eyes of the people and in part to their advantage of controlling resources in local councils; (the legal powers of AO's under the 1981 Act will be a strong factor in this respect). It may also be helped by the fact that many TO's are ex-administrators, share the same attitudes and rely more on AO's; interestingly, this is almost true of many high ranking officials and some ministers in the new regional governments). Whatever the reasons the result has been marked resentment of the AO's position of AO's by TO's; distrust of the system that gives them this apparent dominance.

- The former budgetary pattern in the province brings out some objections from TO's. Though many TO's appreciated the flexibility and speed of response that came with the former integrated provincial budget, some
technical departments feel neglected. They were suspicious of excessive 
MO's control over priorities through the PC and through influence 
MO's exercise in the preparation of sub-provincial council estimates. 
New district councils have their own budgets and financial powers 
(under 1981 Act), these suspicions are anticipated in increase. 
The contrast is made with the old system (of 1951 - 1971) where 
technical departments had separate budgets controlled from Khartoum 
and TO's were their own masters.

- Many TO's do not enjoy the responsibilities placed on them by 
  membership of local councils. They do not wish to look beyond their 
  own fields and offer opinions on wider issues or do they welcome 
  debate with other council members. As a consequence many TO's take 
  little part in council proceedings, thus indirectly strengthening 
  the influence of MO's.

- At lower levels many TO's have no understanding of or interest in 
  the objectives and procedures of the PLS system. They may never 
  have had it explained to them or seen themselves as technical 
  specialists when it does not concern. Many feel they provide 
  technical services which cannot be understood and appreciated by 
  outsiders and should not be debated by them. Others such as Medical 
  Officers are very busy and resent the time involved. In all cases 
  the result is an increase in dissatisfaction.

So far we have discussed the dynamics of local government systems in 
both countries. The discussion would be advantageous in explaining the input 
of the dynamics in determining local government resources which the following 
chapter addresses.
III

Resources of Local Government

I. The U.S. Case

A) Financial Resources:

As mentioned in the first chapter, urban and urban population have been rapidly growing and urbanization with its characteristic way of life, in a period of escalating costs, has put increasingly severe pressures on local government's ability to provide the required services. This severe burden on local government finance is further aggravated by the fact that "revenue sources have remained relatively unchanged." The financial crises of New York City in 1975 offers a good example of the increasing inability of local jurisdictions to meet citizens demands of services.

Charles R. Adrian and Charles Prais traced expenditure patterns since the early years of the present century and have come up with valuable observations which, in my contention, put the picture of the local government finance in a better perspective. They noted that:

1) New functions of government have appeared, such as urban redevelopment, public housing and parking lots.
2) Old functions have expanded and changed in concept. This includes recreation, highways, health and welfare programs.
3) Federal and State governments have assumed an increasing share of local government expenditures.
4) The States have gradually been becoming collection agencies for local governments. In other words, the States collect
the money and then disburse it to their local governments. This pattern resulted, in part, from legislators' recognition of local government needs for additional revenue combined with reluctance to delegate adequate taxing powers to local governments.

5) Local expenditures have represented an increasingly large proportion of the GNP. This increase has been significant though not enormous.

6) Increases in municipal expenditure in the last generation (since 1945) have been greater than in previous generations.

Now the question is: how do local governments finance these new and expanding functions? Or, in other words, what are the sources of revenue of local governments to meet these increasing expenditures? Part of the answer is stated in the aforementioned observations, i.e., from State and Federal governments. The other part is taxes—mainly property tax and to a lesser degree sales, excises and income taxes.

Property Tax:

It is the oldest tax that originated during colonial times when "ability to pay could be best measured in terms of property, or total wealth". During that period property tax served as a good measure for ability to pay because of the correlation between property owned and income gained. However, today, this is not the case, for "large incomes are sometimes possible from relatively small investments", besides the fact that a large proportion of property is not tangible or visible, such as stocks, bonds, jewelry, mortgages and so forth.
Another accusation centers on the poor administration of property tax. This, in part, is due to the lack of competence and training on the part of assessors. Some of them are elected to office, others are political appointees. In both cases, political considerations, more than others, are the determining factors for selection of assessors. However, "in the largest cities, trends toward professionalization have encouraged the development of a trained staff. Assessment in large cities is usually technically superior to the type of job done in small places."

Finally, some scholars conclude that property tax "is not so inequitable or so poorly administered as it once was, but it is still not a uniformly applied tax."

Other taxes:

Confronted with increasing costs of services, local governments began to look for other sources to supplement revenues generated from property tax. Of these taxes is the sales tax.

"The sales tax became popular during the Great Depression because it yielded well even to such times. It became the backbone of many state tax
systems and has had limited use as a secondary tax for city governments. A common trend is to exempt necessities such as food, in order to lessen the regressive tendency of the sales tax.

Another recent source of local government revenue is the income tax. Because the income tax is the major source of revenue for the federal government and the fact that many states have turned to this tax, local governments have "found the field largely untapped." However, some local governments have generated significant portions of their revenue from income tax. For instance, Philadelphia's income tax (adopted in 1939) "has come to produce about one-fourth of the city's revenue." The income tax, compared to the property tax, is said to be more equitable because it considers that not all property is equally a basis for taxes. As co-authors of 'Governing Urban America' put it: "The income tax, in a complicated modern world, can be much more equitably administered and is less subject to evasion than is the property tax."

Local governments earn some of their revenue from business taxes. These may be "levies to pay for the cost of supervising a business directly affecting the public health, but some of them are higher levies and are designed to produce revenue beyond the cost of inspections... Other taxes may be levied for which there exist no regulatory activities under the police power."

Public utilities and other businesses have their share in the revenue of local government. "Some cities levy a local cigarette tax. Some resort and convention cities, such as New York and Atlantic City, tax hotel room occupancy. Mount Clemens, Michigan, another resort centre, levies a tax upon every mineral bath taken within the city limits. Some tax admissions to public events."
general revenue, and utility fees. Together these local sources provide 33 percent of all funds for local government. Unlike federal governments, local governments rely very little upon individual income tax (less than 2 percent), and unlike states, they rely little upon sales taxes (4 percent).  

Thus, what remains to be discussed of these sources is the assistance from federal and state governments.

Concerning on intergovernmental finance, Lee and Johnson accurately observed that "too often discussion of intergovernmental finance concentrate exclusively on financial assistance and neglect the more important factor of direct expenditures. Federal expenditures are not made in a vacuum but, rather, have varying geographical impact. The same is true for state expenditures. The location of facilities becomes particularly important." Accordingly, hospitals, parks, highways, military bases and installation and other facilities have direct impacts on the areas where they are located - local jurisdiction being among these affected.

The aforementioned co-authors developed the argument by asserting that "beyond the physical items are various loan and grant programs to individuals
and corporations that greatly affect jurisdictions. At the federal level these includes Social Security, Medicare, support to farmers, small-business loans, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. States also take large welfare and other human services.  

Besides, local government obtain direct monies from federal and state government in the form of loans, categorical and block grants and general revenue sharing etc etc. States provide local government with about a third of their revenues whereas federal government provide them less than 10 percent.  

As to the recipient local jurisdiction it is noticed that, in 1973-74 for instance, most of State aid went to school districts (Figure 1) constituting  

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<tr>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>Counties</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Local</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cites</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Townships</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special districts</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School districts</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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Since there is another paper dealing with intergovernmental finance, the discussion here would be brief and general in nature.
nearly half the revenue of these districts (45.6%). The rest of state aid was distributed between other local government with special districts getting the least (only 7.5% of their revenues). But this is offset by the federal aid which constituted 17% of special district's revenues. A matter that many special districts are the type of local government most dependent on federal aid. The rest of federal aid went to other types of local government - constituting 12.4 percent of city revenues; more than 7 percent of school district's revenues.

As a matter of fact these figures, by themselves, are not of much help. Assistance to local governments vary from one state to another; even vary from one local jurisdiction to another within the same state. Some states provide much greater assistance to local governments than other states; some states may provide a given service and thereby make direct expenditures, whereas other states may fund local governments to provide a service. Unlike other states Hawaii operates a statewide school system. New Hampshire provides only 14 percent of local government general revenues, compared with New Mexico at 51 percent. Comparable figures are California at 37 percent and Kansas at 24.85

Finally, considering both federal and state assistance one can rightfully say that state assistance has been comparatively more predictable than federal aid. This is important for it "facilitates budget planning at the local level, because jurisdictions from year to year have knowledge of what state funds will be."86 This leads to an inseparable question of manpower human resource planning since personnel expenditures "are typically the largest portion of any government's operating budget and may well be the largest portion of total
expenditures, including capital and operating expenditures.87

B) Human Resources:

The magnitude of local employment need not be underscored. It has shown dramatic increase since World War II. "Local government employment," one scholar noted, "has shown even more marked growth, rising from less than 3 million in 1947 to 9.1 million today. Local government employees after World War II accounted for slightly less than half of the public work force, whereas now they account for about 60 percent."88

Table II shows the distribution of local government employees according to the type of government, 1977. To show that nearly half those employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local government units and employees, 1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
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<td>Townships</td>
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<td>School districts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special districts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

employment is in education. 82

"These average figures", one scholar counseled, "should be interpreted
with care, because they can obscure the great variation in size among
governments of the same type. While cities have an average of about 130
employees, some cities are far above that figure and others are far below.
The city of Los Angeles, for example has about 45,000 employees, a figure that
is greater than the population of most cities in the country. These variations
must be kept in mind for they greatly influence the nature of specific public
personnel systems. Small jurisdictions will tend to have less formalized
personnel procedures than large jurisdictions have. 90

Another determining factor that controls local government personnel
system is compliance with the statutes of their respective states, federal
legislations, the Constitution, and their own charters. In the words of Lee,
"local governments have been created by their respective state governments and
must follow their state's statutes. States and local governments are required
to adhere to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and pertinent national
laws. Local personnel systems are not independent, but rather are subjected
to extensive controls by the federal and state governments. Thus local governments follow the practices of their respective states.

"About one-half of the states have no merit system except one applying to a few agencies, generally those where Federal grant programs make a merit system a condition of eligibility. Other states have merit systems for a considerable portion, but not all, of their employees. Several states have comprehensive merit systems, as do many cities and some urban counties. Hence in local government units, in states that depend upon patronage system such as Texas, spoils systems are likely to be widespread. However, some positions, usually those requiring specialized technical knowledge, are filled on a merit basis, "for competent people cannot otherwise be recruited for the complex jobs of contemporary government." Thus both patronage and merit systems may exist in one jurisdiction. In the words of Adrian, "the parallel existence of these two approaches to personnel is sometimes a confusing matter to observers." New Castle County, Delaware is a case in point.

New Castle County is fortunate in having a hard core of very competent and loyal civil servants. This circumstance exist despite the almost rampant political patronage considerations which are widely acknowledged to be principal, if not, indeed, the principal consideration in the recruitment, retention, promotion and discipline of public personnel.

On the other hand, local government units, in states adopting merit systems, are likely to have widespread merit practices. States such as Michigan, California, New York, New Jersey and Wisconsin have a comprehensive merit system. "The Civil Service Commission in Michigan," for instance, "is constitutionally independent. It can increase salaries of civil servants without
consulting the governor or legislature and, in 1956, controlled 97.5 percent of all state jobs. In Michigan and like states, local government units usually have their own civil service commissions. "It is common to have a three-member civil service commission appointed (usually by the mayor) for overlapping terms, not more than two of the members being of the same political party. An executive secretary is normally hired to handle the actual administration of its activities." These commissions make rules pertaining to examinations, transfers and promotions; conduct examinations, performance appraisals, keep lists of eligible appointees and other pertinent functions of personnel management.

However, in recent years "students of public administration have often criticized the use of civil service commission to head personnel recruitment. It is argued that the commission competes with the chief executive for control over employees. The resultant conflict is thought to be harmful to administration and morale." This has led to a growing tendency "toward the establishment of a personnel department under a single head, the personnel director, who is responsible to the chief executive. (There may be an advisory civil service commission)." This form of organization is often adopted in large local units using council-manager plan as a form of government. "It is more easily accepted in such cities than elsewhere, because the manager is himself a professional careerist." Small local units, however, may not be able to employ professional personnel directors. In such cases, the mayor, manager, clerk or some other official usually act as personnel officer.

The other factor that influences local government personnel systems, besides national laws, is federal aid programs. Though the importance of
federal aid to local government need no further emphasis, one may add that "the importance of federal aid has complicated all forms of planning at the (state and local level(s). A chronic problem for these governments has been not knowing whether and when federal monies will be made available." This uncertainty necessarily affects personnel planning. "If people are to be hired under the grant, they cannot be brought onto the payroll until the grant has been finally approved."

Such degree of uncertainty vary from one aid program to another. Categorical grants, for instance, are restrictive in nature with many strings attached to them and the process of obtaining such grants is relatively complicated and time consuming. Thus uncertainty associated with these grants is relatively high.

Parallel to categorical grants, is general revenue-sharing. This program specifies the amounts of monies to be distributed each year. Hence, this program is more convienent to recipient government in that it facilitates their planning process - personnel planning being part of that process - because uncertainty is almost virtually non-existent.

"Between categorical grants and general revenue sharing are block grants. These grants are more restrictive than CRS but less restrictive than categories. One example is the community development program, established by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. That program provides considerable latitude to recipient governments in community development efforts. The program provides for distribution of funds on a formula basis, but unlike general revenue sharing, the jurisdiction must apply for the monies."
...and increase the employability of persons with little or no skills.

These purposes are different from those of other federal grant programs intended to assist in the provision of a service, such as grants for education or transportation.105


"A major revision of this legislation came in 1973 with the passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)."106 Titles I, II and XI of the Act are more relevant to public personnel system at state and local levels. "Title I of the Act established a block grant program allowing state and local discretion in the provision of on-the-job training, classroom training, work experience, counseling, and public service employment. Title II earmarks monies for public-service employment in jurisdictions with high unemployment."106 And Title VI, which was added in 1974 "authorized additional

public service jobs." The different purposes of Title II and Title VI - both of them provide for the creation of government jobs - should not be overlooked. "Title II was viewed as a permanent measure to provide transitory employment for the unemployed, not only were persons expected to obtain financial help by being hired by government but also they were expected to learn skills that would increase their employability in the private sector. Title VI, in contrast, was viewed as a temporary economic stimulus. By putting the unemployed to work, their increased buying power would stimulate private sector production of goods and services."107

Now the question to be asked is: what is the impact of CETA on local personnel systems? One scholar noted that recipient governments have been willing partners in the federal government's policy to use them to stimulate the economy and help the unemployed. The money came at a time when need was great for these governments."108 Consequently what happened in effect is that CETA employees were used, in many instances to "avoid cut-backs in services or restore cuts that had been made."109 Thus the quality of those employed under CETA program determined, to a large extent, what could be achieved. However, those workers were often criticized for lack of skills and productivity. It should be noted that "many CETA jobs undoubtedly have been a make-work type. In other instances, CETA jobs have been created in agencies without expectations of any increases in production, thereby reducing the workload of regular employees and reducing government efficiency."110

Concerning the provision of Title I pertaining to on-the-job training in order to increase employability of CETA workers, what can be said is that such efforts were negligible. Employability was not increased because no training
was received. As Lee put it: "CETA workers generally have received on training in governments jobs but rather simply have been put to work. Therefore no claim can be made that training in governments jobs has markedly increased their employability, although any experience probably improves employability."111

Another formidable problem faced by recipient governments is how to integrate CETA jobs with their own regular jobs. Ironically, "some jurisdictions have been forced to lay off their workers while at the same time they have had federal money to hire people."112 To overcome such situations these governments tended to transfer their employees from local payrolls to CETA payrolls. But "in 1976 Congress amended the legislation to allow no more than half of all previously existing CETA jobs that become vacant to be filled with laid-off government workers; newly created CETA positions were to be reserved for the 'hard-core' unemployed."113

Lastly, uncertainty about the continuation of CETA posed another problem bearing on local personnel systems. Each year its continuance has been questioned by the Congress. And "when the uncertainties over CETA are combined with the uncertainties with categorical grants, (state and) local governments may be effectively precluded from program and personnel planning."114

Another related legislation is the Full Employment and Balanced Growth of 1978. In its original version this bill would have guaranteed local governments, as well as state governments, jobs to those who could not find private sector jobs. However the version passed included no provisions for its implementation and particularly there was "no provision for creating state and local jobs for the unemployed."115 Hence, one can say that it was not intended to have tangible effects.
The Case of the Sudan:

A. Financial Resources:

As in the case of the U.S., local government in Sudan depend for its revenues on its own sources, i.e., taxes, and aid from the national government. Article 23 (Chapter 6) of the People's Local Government Act of 1985 stipulates that local revenues shall consist of:

a) Revenues from taxes referred to in the Local Government (Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinance, 1954 or any other law substituting it, provided that local councils shall have the right to determine the rates of such taxes.

b) Local fees and rates levied on services provided by the council.

c) Revenues of commercial businesses in which the council may share.

d) Appropriations determined by Regional Authorities.

f) Fines and fees imposed by People's Courts.

g) Loans in accordance with Article 26.

h) Donations.

Item (a) refers to the main sources of local revenues, that is, taxes. These include:

- Animal tax:

  The importance of this tax differs from one province to another according to the number of animals in each province. It is of primary importance to the

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"It is interesting to note that the articles dealing with local finance in the 1981 Act were virtually copied from the 1971 Act, which in turn were merely a copy of those of the 1951 Ordinance. Though the three acts differ in many respects they are almost identical on the issue of local finance; even the wording is typical in all the three of them. Although many studies and conferences pointed out that a major defect of the 1971 system lies in finance, the 1981 Act, to the surprise of almost every student of local government, merely copied the articles of the 1971 Act."
central, western and some southern provinces. White Nile and Blue Nile provinces (centre); Northern and Southern Darfur and Northern and Southern Kordofan (west); and Upper Nile; Bahreil-Gash, Junglei and the northern parts of Eastern Equatoria (south). Animals on which the tax is levied are cattle, camel, horses, sheep, goats, donkeys and mules. The rate levied on each kind of animal differs from one province to another; however there is a ceiling established by the Appropriation of Taxes Ordinance, 1954.

The assessment of this tax involves the enumeration of animals owned by each individual, and applying the fixed rate according to the type of animal. Traditionally enumeration and collection of the tax has been carried by the lower echelons of Native Administration authorities, namely Omdas and Sheiks. However, after 1972 enumeration was entrusted to the 'revolutionary organizations of the Sudan Socialist Union' in collaboration with Omdas and Sheiks; and collection entrusted to the Administrative Officers.

In recent years Animal tax faced many problems and arrears have been accumulating in nearly all the provinces depending on this tax for their revenues. Many reasons led to such a situation; among these:

a) The dissolution of Native Administration had adverse impact on Animal tax in that the administration of this tax became no longer a function

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*The fact that it is a primary source of income to 10 provinces (total 18) shows the importance of Animal tax.*

**Later on, around 1975/76, enumeration, assessment and collection became once again an exclusively administrative function.**

*Other reasons include natural factors such as the draught that engulfed many parts of Africa including the Sudan in 1972/73 which led to disastrous losses of livestock. Social factors and attitudes toward the 'government' are also included.*
Information concerning the wealth (i.e., animals owned) of these individuals, lost prestige and status, low pay and morale together with resentment of intrusion and involvement of unfavored elements (political member of S.S.1) in this area of specialty may explain the poor performance of Omads and Sheiks regarding animal tax.

b. Enumeration is not carried-out in the specified regular periods, and when it is carried-out it is often-times unrealistic, unfair and far from being accurate. More seriously, perhaps, assessment is done on arbitrary basis. For instance, in 1971/72, a directive issued by the Ministry of Local Government raised the projected annual revenues of Animal tax threefold across the board!

c. The collection of this tax, by administrator, poses a number of problems. Unlike Omads and Sheiks, Administrative Officers necessarily lack that intimate knowledge of individuals enjoyed by Omads and Sheiks. Furthermore, their accessibility to individuals, in many cases, is hindered by natural factors, (forests, deserts and mountains are formidable obstacles for motor vehicles.)
d. The costs of administering this tax, in many cases, are so high as to
negate and discourage efforts to collect it. While Omdas and Shiks
depend on personal contacts with the people in their neighborhoods and
villages, Administrative Officers had to drive for long distances, some-
times thousands of miles, so as to get in touch with tax payers. A
simple arithmetic calculation of the cost of such an operation: the
cost of fuel and oils, spare parts and vehicle’s maintenance, the overtime
pay to drivers, accompanying clerks, bookkeepers and policemen, and allowances
of the Administrative Officer — calculation of all these costs prove the
tax.

e. Administrative officers often complain of lack of judicial power to effect
their decisions pertaining to tax collection. Previously, this was no
problem. It is to be recalled and NA had judicial powers which really
made a difference in tax collection.

Although the revenues obtained from Animal tax have decreased in recent years,
still it remains one of the important taxes for local government. Furthermore, one
might add that it is going to gain more importance in the coming years, at least
for some local councils. This is because the provinces where the tax is a primary
source of revenue, livestock, are concentrated in certain parts of the province
and are not evenly distributed between the districts of the province.

Though no serious studies concerning the administration of this tax are available,
however indicators show that, at least in some parts of the country, the costs are
so high as to render the tax unjustifiable. A quick study conducted by two of my
colleagues and me in Nyasa Rural Council, Southern Bahr, in 1976 reached the same
conclusion.

*El-Diem District, Southern Darfur, offers a good example. This district used to
contribute about 70% of the total Animal tax revenue of the whole province. According
to 1981 Act it became a corporate body with its own budgetary powers. So, one can
imagine how important Animal tax to such a district would be.
how much could be collected since that depends on many unforeseen factors, such as the amount of rainfall, the amount of crops produced and so forth.

There are two ways for collecting this tax, 1) a traditional way whereby local committees assess the amount of crops on the farms and then the rate is applied; 2) a recent way is by posting tax collectors in the markets where they charge the buyers according to the weight of the crop. The traditional way is difficult to administer, entails complicated procedures and often-times unjust because assessments are arbitrary depending on the judgement of local committees who sometimes discriminate on the basis of friendship, kinship and tribal affiliation. However one advantage of this traditional way is that it likely leaves no room for evading the tax. The recent widespread way is easy to administer and fair (crops are weighted) but has its shortcomings. A major disadvantage is that it is relatively easy to evade by smuggling the crop to other local councils where there is no Suchar Tax or the rate is lower. Another disadvantage concerns the burden of the tax which is put on the buyer (not the producer as the law stipulates) who add it to the cost and sell the crop to the consumer - this ultimately
the taxpayer is the consumer, not the producer.

Irrigated Land Tax:

This tax is levied on areas irrigated by the Nile and its tributaries. Taxable lands are classified into two categories: a) those irrigated by pumps and, b) those irrigated by traditional means. Those irrigated by pumps are further classified as small area schemes and large area schemes. For small schemes the tax is a fixed amount (1.0,1.50) per feddan; for large schemes it is 12.5% of the value of crops produced. For lands irrigated by traditional means a ceiling is fixed at 1.50; each local council is to decide the rate of the tax.

This tax is often criticized for being regressive and unjust, and lack of flexibility. More seriously, revenues from this tax have been deteriorating over the recent years, thus adding more pressures on local governments that depend on it as a primary source of revenue.

Other taxes include Date Tree tax which is confined to the Northern and Nile provinces in the Northern part of the country. Also Local Rates tax, levied on houses, is confined to metropolitan areas and large towns. It constitutes about 70% of the revenue of metropolitan Khartoum, the capital. Building tax is levied on new buildings (whether being commercial premises or private houses), and Entertainment tax, levied on admission tickets to movie houses, theater concerts, football grounds and stadiums and other sorts of entertainment.

Local governments obtain part of their revenues from fees on licences (small business & trading licences, public health regulatory licences, liquor,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Revenue</th>
<th>Self Revenue</th>
<th>Central Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>137.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The increase in the figures after 1971 can be explained by the fact that prior to that year the provinces were considered as field agencies of the Ministry of Local Government, thus those figures, in addition to other amounts, constituted the budget of one ministry, the Ministry of Local Government. After 1971 and in accordance with the provisions of the People's Local Government Act which came into force in that year, the budgets of all field agencies were pooled in the Provincial Council Budget which emerged as the single budgetary unit in the province. Hence, the provinces no longer represented the Ministry of Local Government, rather the whole central government. In addition to that, six provinces were created in 1973-74; the costs of establishing these new provinces which were undeniably high contributed to the increase of local government budgets after 1974.*
### Table IV

**Self Revenue and Central Aid as Percent of Total Local Government Revenues (Selected Years)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Self Revenue (%)</th>
<th>Central Aid (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from table ( Maul )
Grants-in-aid:

Unlike U.S. local government which depends mainly on its own sources, local government in the Sudan depends on national aid as a major source of revenue. Table III shows local revenues and central aid (selected years). The figures of central aid fairly exceed half of the total revenue of local governments. Central grants-in-aid constituted almost 80% of local government revenue during 1966/67 - 1970/71. (Table IV). During 1974/75 and 1975/76 local governments obtained close to half of their revenue from their own sources; however the share of their own sources dropped to one-third of their total revenue in 1976/77 and 1977/78 causing the central aid to rise to two-thirds of the total revenue of local governments (Table IV). All told, the dependence of local governments on grants-in-aid is a universally accepted fact in the Sudan. This dependence on central aid causes many problems to local government and seems to be the source of never-ending complaints.

There is less evidence to support such an argument which ignores the basic factors conducive to low revenues from local taxes. Local taxes, by their nature, are low yielding taxes compared to those retained by the central government, like the income tax. The taxing power of local government are, in effect, minimal; ceilings are imposed on each tax by the central government. These ceilings were set long time ago (at least three decades ago), and many an effort by local governments urging the central government to raise the ceiling of these taxes, turned to be of no avail. Besides, there are genuine reasons - discussed earlier - that make revenues obtained from local taxes low.
Central government officials accuse provincial and local authorities, perhaps unjustly, of 'carelessness' and poor performance in collecting local taxes. They maintain that local officials, knowing that central is forthcoming, do not make the necessary efforts to collect the taxes. They also maintain, perhaps justly, that local governments exaggerate in their budgetary estimates in anticipation that the central government would provide them with the necessary funds to finance their budget.

This is true in many instances. For example in 1975/76 Southern Darfur Provincial Council approved a L.S. 7 million budget; its own sources accounted for L.S. 1.5 million! Later it was reduced by the central government to L.S. 3.5 million. Another highly unrealistic and exaggerated example is offered by the Red Sea provincial budget of 1976/77. The Provincial Councils approved a budget of approximately L.S. 11 million; the share of the province's sources amounting to L.S. 1.2 million!! This exaggerated estimate was also reduced by the central government.
On the other hand, local governments have their complaints. These include:

- The absolute size of the grant: Grants are much less than expected. Generally this is accepted as needs are far greater than resources in the Sudan; but the complaint is of lack of visible evidence of central ministries reducing their budgets with their reduced responsibilities and of corresponding increase in the transfer to the provinces.

This was the trend before the enactment of the People's Local Government Act of 1981. According to this act regional governments, not the central government, are supposed to aid their respective local governments. The fear is that local governments complain may continue since these regional government are still at their establishing stage and, perhaps more importantly at least, the foreseeable future, they have meager sources of revenues and depend heavily on central government aid.\^\footnote{Article 85 of the Regional Government Act, 1980 stipulates that regional revenue shall consist mainly of aid from the central government and taxes imposed by the the regions. But item (b) of the same article severely restrict the taxing of the region. The regions can not levy almost any tax - direct or indirect - without prior consent and premision of the central government.}

- The form of the grant: The previous pattern of providing tends on the basis of approval of individual items was another source of frustration. This of course, is a way of maintaining very detailed and comprehensive central control, but it is also the source of much wasted effort, delay and insensitive allocation of resources.
The timing of the grant: Great frustration was usually aroused in the former Provincial Councils and the provincial teams by the practice of fixing the level of the grant after the elaborate and time-consuming provincial budgets have been completed. The level of grant given bears very little relation to estimates which were often made meaningless as a result and have to be done all over again or, more likely, ignored and money allocated on almost a day-to-day piecemeal basis. Apparently guidelines offered by the centre - the then Ministry of Local Government or the Ministry of Finance - were either not present, not available at the right time to be useful, or simply meaningless in practice. The result was that the provinces were groping in the dark.

These past (before 1981) uncertainties may be far less than the assumed current uncertainties. This is because prior to 1981 local governments used to know about grants-in-aid during the approval process of their budgets by the central government before implementing these budgets. However, according to the 1981 act local governments
are required to approve their budgets and implement them without having to seek the approval of any other level of government. (Article 22 of the People’s Local Government Act, 1981). These local governments may know about the regional aid before they approve their budgets; they may well know after they have approved their budgets. Given the later case, uncertainty and its ramifications are pretty obvious. Such uncertainty would certainly have adverse affects on local planning and setting of priorities.

- Negotiations to secure grant support and budgetary approval: This is not longer a problem as it used to be, because local governments, now approve their own budgets. However, on the issue of securing grants, regional government are counted upon to issue guidelines to their respective local governments. So far nothing of this kind has been done.

6. Human Resources:

Unlike the U.S. case, Sudan has no local personnel systems. One may talk about local personnel and/or personnel practices; but not local personnel system. This is simply because there is nothing of that kind. Responsibility for recruitment, training, posting, promotion and other aspects of personnel manage- ment of all government employees except for some low paying labor jobs, lies with central ministries in Khartoum. From a local government point of view this arrangement is not working satisfactorily.

The main problem is in the delay and failures of central list staff to come to the outlying hardship provinces. Establishments of officials are simply not filled even when a local unit has, in its budget, the funds to pay for salaries.
In other cases delays in taking up positions can run into months and gaps between outgoing and incoming officials create great strains on fellow staff and in the work of the local unit. In S. Darfur, for example, at the beginning of 1976, the Finance Department at Province HQ, had 24 accountants short on an establishment of 30. This may have been the worst case and accountants are in short supply nationally, but the situation is very common in somewhat less extreme form. Particular shortages are of teachers, technical officers, clerks and bookkeepers as well as accountants.

There are genuine reasons for the reluctance to come to hardship provinces. There are severe shortages of government housing and transport; living cost are very high and there are difficulties over essential supplies; health and educational facilities are poorer than those in Khartoum; opportunities for development, training and promotions are limited compared to those in the capital; also there is a general feeling of isolation and in many cases separation from families is unpleasant.

All this can hardly be accepted as to constitute a clear picture. What is needed, here, is to apply what is broadly stated above to a specific segment of local officials. In other words it would be more useful to discuss working conditions and responsibilities and career patterns of a group of local officials. Administrative officers offer a typical example.**

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*This list is by no means exclusive; administrative officers in some cases, too, are in short supply. The districts of Darfur Region, for instance, have such a problem. In 1981 the Governor had to discuss this problem with the President. As a result 30 MOEs were assigned to these districts; the expressed need amounts to 90 MOEs.*

**Administrative officers are taken as an example partly for convenience since it is not practical to consider the case of all local officials; and partly because they constitute the backbone of the local government system in the Sudan. In addition, they are perhaps more than any other group have something in common with all other officials and professions at the local level.
The historical place of AO's in local government in the Sudan has been one of power and high status since the Condilinium period. The local government service, i.e. AO's, had varying relations with political systems (civilian as well as military) ever since, but retained much of prestige and status from the Condilinium period. It remained a separate disciplined service within government, relatively small in numbers and with very high standards for entry and promotion. Perhaps it would be fair to describe it as an 'elite' but one which is dedicated to service to the local population in rural areas. With this in mind, the text of the chapter discusses their working responsibilities and conditions and career patterns in the light of the People's Local Government System which was introduced in 1971 and reformed in 1981.

a) Working responsibilities: AO's are still the officers whom government mainly relies on in rural areas. They are responsible for law and order and the maintenance of security, for investigating and stopping tribal disputes, for calling in the police and maintaining good relations with tribal leaders.

- AO's are still the principal agents in tax collection. The transfer of added responsibilities to local governments from the centre - according to the 1971 act and more recently according to the decentralization measures of 1979/80 and the 1981 act - and the problems over equivalent transfer of resources mean that taxation is of more importance than ever. The growth of economic activity, especially in crop production, and the increase in the population make the possible returns from taxes higher but the problems of assessment and collection harder. The abolition of Native Administration particularly has increased the difficulties in tax collection.
had given them no special legal powers even though they have usually been elected secretaries.

The overall result of the failure to form partnerships has been for AOs to retain their former responsibilities with added difficulties and less enabling powers.

The question of legal powers has, to some extent, been settled; AOs now are the chief executive officers of local councils; they are secretaries, treasurers and supervisors of council's employees by virtue of their offices (Article 12 item 13) of the People's Local Government Act, 1981). Though the problem of legal powers is solved and policy-making is separated from execution - the latter becoming the domain of AOs, difficulties for AOs to resolve are still there. They are still counted upon to lead local councils and educate councillors in the art of policy-making. Given the calibre of councillors and the prevailing attitudes, this is no easy job to do.

- Another difficulty concerns partnership with the Political Organ - the Sudan Socialist Union. The SSU role is to generate new ideas, keep in close touch with the people, educate them in the policy of the
Government and stimulate them to make efforts to help themselves. Officials must respond to the SSU, note their suggestions and follow up their complaints. In many ways this does make the AO’s job harder, since the SSU is really checking on his effectiveness and it often causes difficulties and misunderstandings.

There are new areas of responsibility that have been given to AOs lately:

- The creation of the local supply and rationing system has brought extra work as AOs are responsible for most aspects of allocation. As supply is the chief subject of interest in councils and amongst the people, AOs are under great pressure, hearing complaints and petitions, trying to enforce price control and stop abuses in the rationing system.

- The People’s Local Government System’s great emphasis on self-help activity has also created new tasks for AOs. There is, first, the pressure to encourage the starting of self-help schemes, especially when many people are getting tired of always being asked to do things for themselves which they consider Government should do with the taxes they pay. Secondly, there is the need to persuade residents of rural areas to take up useful schemes of a size and type that they can handle. Thirdly, AOs have to see that initial enthusiasm for self-help does not break down after a few weeks. So often people become tired, money, materials and labor run short, or there is no interest in running a project once it is completed. It often falls to the AO to try to persuade provincial and/or district authorities
b) Working Conditions: The work of AOs in the rural areas has never been easy. The problems of distance, climate, difficult tribes, poor facilities and living conditions have always been there. A number of difficulties have, however, been added as a result of the creation of the new regions in 1980.

- The creation of the new regions in old provincial headquarters has created great pressure on all facilities and resources. A part from shortages of housing, office space is small, vehicles few and support staff is in short supply. Available funds are being stretched over many new responsibilities and many new staff, and though it has increased, finance is not keeping up with expansion.

- The creation of new council districts has caused similar problems. Consequently AOs and NGOs are having to meet an expanded range of responsibilities with very limited resources. Many new council...

*Before 1981, provincial councils provided these grants. Now this responsibility is assumed by regional governments. These governments have emphasized the importance of local development schemes, and expressed their willingness to provide more grants to local councils.*
headquarters were formerly low-level government offices and have not yet been improved. The build-up at the region's capital has often attracted manpower away from lower councils and may have diverted supplies and resources they could have used.

- AOs compare their duties and living and working conditions with their colleagues in Khartoum and/or large cities. They see a gap opening up in which they have more to do under great difficulties. Officers in the capital, at middle and low level at least, seem to have fewer pressures and personal responsibilities to face. This continual comparison in working conditions is not good for local officers' morale.

c) Career patterns:

(i) Recruitment patterns: The decade of the 1970s have seen a change in the recruitment pattern for local government. Before 1970 numbers taken were small and almost exclusively drawn from the graduates of the University of Khartoum; since then recruitment has changed. The PLG system now provides more AOs than could be obtained from the University of Khartoum, some members of recruit have come in from the Cairo University Branch of Khartoum and more recently from Omdurman Islamic University. The majority of young AOs in the field now are drawn from these two institutions, and there have also been significant numbers of former army officers.

UU. of X. is considered the most prestigious educational institution in the country. It ranks high above the rest of the other universities and institutions.
Posting and Transfers: Most AOs, and to a lesser extent IOs, feel considerable dissatisfaction with present postings and transfers.

- A first complaint is that there seems to be two classes of AOs:
  - those that never leave Khartoum and/or the more developed central and coastal provinces, and
  - those that spend time in the capital and other relatively easy postings with service in hardship areas and spend his whole working life there.

- Such is the concentration of activity and opportunities in Khartoum that an officer who does not spend time there at frequent intervals loses many chances. He will not be able to make an impression on his superiors in his ministry and may therefore miss promotions; he may have problems in his pay and allowance which may not be sorted out unless he can be there personally or has a relative or a friend to act for him; he may miss opportunities for overseas scholarships as his name does not get put forward. These are apart from the personal disadvantages of not getting his children into good schools; not having access to fully equipped medical facilities; not, perhaps, building a house, and not being able to, generally, enjoy the cultural and social life of the capital.

- The role of provincial commissioners and regional authorities in transfers is not clearly known. They are known to make recommendations and are suspected of keeping back officers whom they can trust and getting rid of those they do not like. The better an AO's performance then the more chance he will be 'trapped' in a hardship area.
- The Ministry of Local Government (now named Chamber of Decentralized Government Affairs) pays no attention to the three preferences AOs express in their applications for transfers. Apart from it begin a waste of time to specify, it is also demoralizing to ignore.

- There is no linear criteria for transfers. Is it a matter of time served, promotion, need in another province or all these together? Are transfers part of an overall career plan?

- There are no firm disciplinary measures taken against officers who delay or refuse transfers, especially out of Khartoum. In practice, this affects TDs more, as AOs by and large accept that they must serve in rural areas. Reasons such as lack of housing and transport are important but they do not justify refusal of transfers. Often times provincial administrations are severely weakened by lack of officials who do not come or are not replaced.

- Lengths of postings vary greatly. Some AOs are moved so rapidly and frequently that they never have time to settle down with their families; others feel that they have been forgotten in remote places.

- Promotions: This is the area in which AOs think themselves most at a disadvantage in relation to TDs.

- AOs maintain that, almost alone among professionals, they have to wait for vacancies before they get promoted. Stepping into someone else's shoes makes promotion slow and unpredictable. If an AO is not noticed by his superiors, as he may likely be in a remote rural area, then he may be held back for years. The huge expansion of the number of junior AOs will make their chances even smaller.
Regional senior staff influence promotion boards in the Ministry in Khartoum? What measures of effectiveness employed when an AO's work is not seen as is the case in remote areas? What part good relations with councils and the SSU play in promotion?

One important long-term question that may provincial officials think should be considered in promotion as an incentive and reward for hardship posting. If the shift of government activity into the districts and regions is to be meaningful then this should be considered. Officials would move more willingly if service there would receive more reward in promotions. More senior posts in the provinces will improve the quality of manpower there and perhaps increase the transfer of resources from the centre.

Finally, one more word concerning living conditions and compensatory fringe benefits is highly desirable.

*This refers to 1972 decision made by the Minister by which some AOs were promoted. They skipped over three or four grades of the scale. Most of these AOs were freshers in the service who were made senior officers according to that decision.*
Our laying provinces are relatively under-developed and life there is quite hard. Government housing is in very short supply; as a result officials have to rent commercially. Housing allowances, if granted, are too small to cover commercial rents.

- Living costs in the provinces are very high. Shortages in essential goods are frequent and prices are usually very high. Normal salaries and allowances do not go very far in coping with this problem.

- Provincial officials and particularly 4Os are transferred very frequently within the provinces. Government housing is inadequate and poorly furnished while difficulties in transport make personal possessions hard to move. Furnishing government houses or paying an extra allowance should be considered.

- Compensatory fringe benefits for hardship posting is an important question which has not yet been seriously considered. Since more responsibilities are turned on to the districts and the regions, then the highest quality of officials are required. With the disadvantages of work there in comparison with Khartoum and central provinces, extra allowances may have to be paid both to attract people and to compensate them for hardships suffered.

All these aspects of financial and human resources are, in one way or another, a result of failure in communication or coordination which the next chapter addresses.
ment of any modern developed federation. Considering the magnitude, complexity and the 'peculiar' environment of local government and their diverse and often conflicting attributes, the likely outcome would, understandably, be conflicts and problems of coordination that defy the efforts of the ablest administrators. In the words of one practitioner:

Often men and women with successful records in private or semiprivate organizations - who recognize the fundamental importance of local government and who, as citizens, strive to improve it - end up surprised, frustrated, and disappointed. Often they do so because they are unfamiliar with environmental factors peculiar to local government.

Although there are similarities between local government and other social institutions there are many dissimilarities that challenge the abilities of the most able people from nongovernmental sectors. I refer to such external factors as diversity of views within a democratic society, citizens attitudes, the media and the law.

With all this in mind, it should be clear that treating all forms of conflict and/or problems of coordination in local government, is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, the focus would be on problems of coordination from an intergovernmental perspective. That is between governments; not within governments.

An appropriate start would be to discuss problems of coordination between
one local government and another. It is noteworthy here to add that the aforementioned argument does apply once more. The magnitude and diversity of local government generate diverse and numerous forms of conflict and problems of coordination between local governments. However, we would confine our discussion with problems of coordination connected with merger and annexation of jurisdictions.

A good example of coordination (or lack of coordination) is offered by the case of two Illinois cities, Bloomington and Normal.

David S. Anderson is the 'municipal manager' for the adjoining central Illinois cities of Bloomington and Normal, with a combined population of 75,000. In July 1973 each appointed Anderson its city manager. This unique experience capped a decade of cooperation and conflict between the two communities including two consolidation referenda that were defeated substantially in both jurisdictions. Anderson spends half of each day in each city, and each pays half of his salary and benefits. Despite his experimental, even tenuous, fence-straddling role, Anderson has been actively exploring ways to reduce costs by such measures as consolidating departments of the two cities.

This striking example could be viewed as vindicating both coordination and lack of coordination! The fact that both cities have one manager presents a strong case for existing coordination. On the other hand the fact that both cities appointed the same person to serve as city manager for each of them represents a compromise between the option of remaining as separate entities and the option of consolidation which, in any case, is the tension of coordination. Consequently one can confidently say that lack of coordination in a more global sense which, perhaps, is more relevant in this particular case — still persists. The manager’s efforts of consolidating departments of the two cities strongly support this conclusion.
lack of paved roads made the long-term prospects bleak. The data collected and the analysis he made confirmed his suspicions; as a consequence he recommended to the city council annexation of their city to Ann Arbor. Being convinced, the council initiated a coordination effort to convince the somewhat reluctant administration of Ann Arbor; later a coordinated campaign to gain the public approval was launched in both cities. The public approval was attained in November 1956 and "on 1 January East Ann Arbor passed out of existence and became part of Ann Arbor." The annexation prove to be advantageous to East Ann Arbor. Years later, its former (and the only) manager noted that he have since been back to East Ann Arbor. The streets were paved following installation of waterlines and the surrounding area has been pleasantly developed with a mixture of homes, retail business, and industry. It was, as the administrator of Ann Arbor put, the first annexation that he knew of that was at the same time an urban renewal.

Whereas the former example of Bloomington & Normal shows the consequences of conflict and lack of coordination, the example of East Ann Arbor shows the achievement of coordination efforts and ultimately the benefits of consolidation and/or annexation. It might well be said that the later example shows both aspects, however the negative side may, implicitly, be indicated.

A third example proves that annexation and merger, as one might be led to believe, is not a 'vaccine' that eliminates all problems of coordination. A practitioner who was responsible for the merger of two cities* noted, among other things, that in mergers a tendency to establish many departments whose heads report to the city manager "creates too broad a span of control with little or no coordination and control."123 What he depicted as 'lack of coordination' run as follows:

Previously property assessment had been the responsibility of the two commissioners of the revenue. The charter called for a city assessor appointed by the city council.

In Virginia two constitutional officers are responsible for city billings and collections - the commissioner of the revenue and the city treasurer. These elected officials had different sets of administrative policies.

In Jamesburg accounting was performed by the city manager's office and the city treasurer's office; in Suffolk, by the comptroller's office and city treasurer's office.

Purchasing was informal and decentralized. In Jamesburg departments heads (and the sheriff on automotive equipment) had primary responsibility; in Suffolk, each responsible departmental employee had coupons that he or she filled out and signed, authorizing a vendor to fill the order and bill the city.

Neither city had a finance director.

Nothing need to be added to this stark situation of lack of coordination.

If anything, it proves that annexation and mergers tend to have, if not generate, *

*The practitioner referred to is Peter S. Lyden who was responsible for the merger of Jamesburg (which until July 1972 had been a county) and Suffolk, Virginia, 1973-74.
problems of coordination that need to be resolved if anything is to be accomplished.

The examples discussed above concern problems of coordination between more than one local unit on the same level. The question now how about a local unit and other governments on other levels? Needless to say complexity and interdependency characterize the U.S. political system. Relationships in such a system are bound to generate and reflect problems of coordination if only because of the great number of units and officials involved in these relationships.

Discounting the number of governments in U.S. from the total number of units involved in intergovernmental activities, the remainder would still be a large number since "any unit may have several agencies or departments engaged in intergovernmental activities." A 1979 General Accounting Office report referring to problems of coordination in intergovernmental relations noted that in addition to the 80,000 governmental units, other entities involved include "55 federal agencies, ten federal regional councils (for coordinating federal field operations), and 521 state districts created in part to establish local information exchange and coordination concerning federal grant applications."

It is clear now that the number of governmental units on other levels a local unit may have to deal with is not a small one. The bearing of such a number on coordination is pretty obvious. Furthermore, because it is the human element, i.e., officials in this case, that determines the nature of these relations and the degree of coordination, it is desirable to have a

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"The number of all governments is discounted because we are considering a single local unit relationship with other units. And since a local government deals with its state - i.e., not all other states - the number of states as well as local units is discounted so as not to get a distorted picture."
president, vice president, 100 senators, and 435 representatives. All 537 are considered important 1 GR actors. Clearly a local unit may not have to deal with the whole number of these officials. It may deal with 306c officials at its respective state as well as the 537 national officials. The sum, 843, is a huge number. When we add the numbers of bureaucrats and professionals involved in running intergovernmental programs the picture would be magnified to a degree that details would not be missed.

The addition of professional program administrators bring along with it another problem of coordination. That is competition between generalist officials at the local level and program/professional specialists at other levels. Moreover, involvement professional program administrator may encourage competition between functional programs within a local unit. This is because professionals generally tend to identify with like-professionals regardless of the level in which they serve. These interlevel loyalties are criticized by elected officials.

as 'vertical functional autocracies'. Other epithets used to label these patterns are: balkanized bureaucracies, feudal federalisms, and bureaucratic baronies.\textsuperscript{127}

"These terms", argued Dell S. Wright, "emphasize both the program specialists' degree of autonomy from policy control by political generalists and also the separateness and independence that one program area has from another. Hence, interprogram, interprofessional, and interagency competition is encouraged.\textsuperscript{128}

This type of competition could create formidable problems of coordination for a given local unit. That is by bringing competition to the local unit—i.e., within different programs carried by that local unit and between professionals/specialists administering those programs.

This type of competition and lack of coordination within a local unit—though a product of its intergovernmental relations with other levels—is comparatively easy to solve than problems of coordination with other units at other levels. This is because these kinds of problems lie within the boundaries of one government, local government in this case, that has jurisdiction over its sub-units, agencies, programs and those responsible for administering these programs.

On the other hand, problems of coordination involving a local government with other government and/or its sub-units and agencies at other levels are much more difficult to resolve.

One scholar described such situations as follows:

In the intergovernmental area, where there is no dominant structure and decisions are made and carried out interorganizationally by entities with a great deal of independent power, coordination must often be achieved by partisan mutual adjustment in which no central mind or decision-maker exercises any coordinating responsibility. This type of coordination takes place through a variety of bargaining, information sharing, and other linking relationships, in which not every program is adjusted to every other program yet which results in decisions which are intelligently related. In intergovernmental context independent and interdependent jurisdictional actors relate to each other without rules that assign to each of them a position relative to all the others and without a dominant common purpose.\textsuperscript{129}
The creation of new provinces in 1973/74 and 1976 where by seven of the provinces were divided into two provinces each; one province divided into three provinces and one province remained intact. The new provinces, which once constituted one province, began to compete with each other—sometimes severely enough as to provoke central government intervention—in order to assert themselves and prove that they are worth the effort. It goes without saying that these competitions could have been resolved through coordination between these provinces. The following examples make this point clear.

*Efforts of the OMR, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, regional Councils of Government, other regional commissions and other numerous governmental agencies as well as the growing body of literature on intergovernmental relations offer good examples.

Darfur, Kordofan, Kassala, Northern, Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr el-Gezal provinces were divided into two each: Southern and Northern Darfur, S. & N. Kordofan, Red Sea and Kasala, Nile and Northern, Jungiel and Upper Nile, E. and West Equatoria, Bahr el-Gezal and Bahr el-Gezal respectively; Blue Nile was divided into three provinces: Gezira, White Nile and Blue Nile; Khartoum Province remained intact. Thus instead of the nine provinces, prior to 1973, there are now eighteen provinces in the Sudan.
One of the difficult tasks provincial authorities have to deal with is tribal disputes where "Assabia", an Arab term that refers to the passionate, irrational and enthusiastic commitment to one's kin, to the extent of being loyal to the popular motto of 'help your kind whether right or wrong', is widespread. Generally it is noticed that tribal disputes within province are comparatively easy to deal with than those involving another province. Normally, these disputes are settled through interprovince conferences; the agreements reached require joint effort of the provinces concerned, in delimiting livestock routes, setting water access rights, collection and paying compensation to the fighting parties and demarcation of grazing boundaries. These agreements are implemented either by the existing administrative framework or, as sometimes is the case, by creating tentative administrative bodies such as joint courts and joint administration. The more coordination exhibit the longer joint administration carry on their missions, the lesser the recurrence of tribal disputes and vice versa. The recurring disputes

Generally, tribal disputes are common in the western provinces, the southern provinces and southern part of the central provinces. Tribal disputes, generally, originates in conflicts over basic interests such as pasture, gum-arabic, agricultural land, and infiltration of a group into a land of another group. However, sometimes an ordinary dispute between two individuals from different tribes may well develop into a tribal dispute due to the built-in 'Assabia' and the tribal social set-up in general.

Normally they are created in areas where conditions are favorable and where conflict is 'a serious nature, especially at a 'hot point' like Bahr al Arab - the river in the southwestern part of the country dividing the western provinces (S. Darfur & S. Kordofan) from the southern provinces. Such an administration besides settling timely disputes, coordinate the disputing interrelated and interdependent interests. By so doing they are thought to enhance the process of social integration and strengthen national unity.
by the Sudan railways. Since there is no other railway agency and this only
one has a single-trak railways system and suffers from many problems that
severely curtail its capacity of transport, one can really imagine the severe
problems – faced by the provinces – caused by the shortages in those goods and
the fluctuations both in volume and times of arrival of those commodities. Such
situation can be further aggravated, as frequently happens, when one province
takes all or part of shipment belonging to another province. This usually
takes place in cases of neighboring provinces where the one that the railway
line come through take the goods of the province which have no railwayline
within its boundaries; or in case both have railwaylines passing through, the
one the railway come through first, take the goods belonging to its neighbor
province. Often times such practices were serious enough that central
government was called upon to settle the matter.

Many times these conflicts arose from false interpretation of the law by the
offending provinces; in such cases and other serious cases the central government
intervenes to settle disputes. Some provinces, like S. & N. Darfur, for instance,
have written agreement to avoid such a situation; nevertheless, conflicts arise
from time to time where different interpretation to these agreements are given
by each party; but on the whole these agreements are instrumental in coordinating
the relationships of the two provinces. Provinces that have such agreements
have better relations than the have-not provinces.
The transport of S. and N. Darfur employees offers another example of lack of coordination. Because governmental employees receive free transport to their home towns or villages, and where these towns and villages are not reached by the railway, provinces issue warrants to a local contractor to transport these employees and later on charge their governmental units or agencies. Since they used to be one province up to 1974 many of residents of the N. Darfur work for S. Darfur and vice versa. During their vacations, these employees and other governmental employees belonging to either of these provinces but working in other provinces find it painstaking to commute to their home towns and villages. Each province refuses to transport the employees of the other and residents of the other working somewhere else. It is ironical when one realizes that both provinces employ the same contractor to do the transportation.

As a matter of fact, conflicts or lack of coordination between the provinces could be traced in many areas (such as paving inter-provinces roads, joint commercial, agricultural, employment, communication, or education schemes)

\[If\ such\ conflicts\ and\ lack\ of\ coordination\ could\ be\ labeled\ as\ horizontal,\ i.e.,\ between\ one\ province\ and\ another,\ then\ a\ 'vertical'\ type\ is\ also\ present,\ i.e.,\ within\ a\ province\ between\ the\ lower\ councils,\ even\ within\ the\ boroughs\ of\ a\ given\ council.\ A\ striking\ example\ is\ offered\ by\ two\ rural\ councils\ in\ S.\ Darfur.\ Nyala\ Rural\ Council\ &\ Kass\ Rural\ Council\ were\ parts\ of\ the\ Central\ District.\ In\ 1976\ both\ councils\ competed\ for\ the\ location\ of\ a\ new\ primary\ school.\ As\ a\ result\ of\ disagreement\ each\ council\ ended\ up\ building\ its\ own\ school.\ Both\ schools\ were\ located\ in\ the\ same\ place\ across\ the\ borderline\ between\ the\ two\ councils.\ Because\ the\ children\ at\ school\ age\ were\ split\ between\ the\ boundaries\ of\ the\ two\ councils,\ each\ school\ was\ not\ able\ to\ find\ enough\ pupils\ to\ enroll.\ In\ addition\ the\ education\ authorities\ had\ no\ teachers\ equipment\ and\ resources\ to\ run\ both\ schools.\ In\ sum,\ both\ schools\ were\ in\ shambles.\]
down and no pattern and/or characteristics of their interrelations can be traced at this point of time, however, a brief comment is nevertheless desirable.

Two points could be highlighted:

a) The absence of the provincial government as supervisor and coordinator between other local units may have negative impacts on the problem of coordination:

- Competition for resources and inequalities in an area can no longer be balanced and compensated for from a provincial pool.

- Sectional and/or tribal groups now have alternative centres (the new councils) through which they can further their interests, and thus a sense of provincial community - or even a larger community - can no longer be built-up.

- A large area and population - as in the case of the province - allows the concentration of a large volume of resources, therefore permitting a greater effort in, the much needed, development and modernization. Such is no longer the case.

- Larger projects of greater benefits to the province as a whole were
local councils (Article 34 of the People’s Local Government Act; 1981). However, the role of these committees could not amount to or compensate for the role of the Provincial Commissioner who has the legal powers, status, interest and expertise that the coordination committee certainly could not have all these combined.

Another important type of coordination problem concerns local government relation with the central government — more recently (1981) the regional governments.

The preceding chapters discussed the centre-province relationship; they highlighted the complaints and the problems facing the provinces. Financial relationships with the centre are of vital importance to the provinces since they secure more than half of their revenue from the central government. Complaints concerning the timing, volume and forms of grant-in-aid as well as the role of the Ministry of Finance — as conceived by the province — are for the most part, problems of coordination or lack of coordination — to be more precise.

One development that could have helped in centre-province financial relationships would have been improvements in the patterns of negotiations over approval of budgets and grants-in-aid. However, the major development could have been attained if the MF ceased to act as a central unit negotiating with the provinces and became a central coordinating agency for budgets.

*Before 1981 the centre-province financial relationships were characterized by too much of a division in attitudes, the provinces proposing and the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government sitting in absolute judgement on allocations, often without adequate reasons or explanations for their decisions.*
prepared by provincial councils with the help of the staff of the MF working as members of these councils.

Of course, problems the provinces had with the centre were not financial problems only. As mentioned earlier central ministries seemed to have been reluctant in providing the provinces with the needed staff, resources and supplies. A number of genuine problems contributed to this lack of coordination and cooperation - such as:

- **Difficulties in defining the practical distinction between ministerial 'technical inspection' and provincial financial and policy control:**

  This is a difficulty in the PLC Act of 1977 as what is 'inspection' and what is 'technical' are hard to separate from financial and policy aspects. Different fields present different degrees of difficulty but, by and large, this is a problem that has not received much attention.

  One of the results of the lack of clear distinction has been a tendency for central ministries to stay out of provincial affairs, not knowing what are their rightful responsibilities and not wishing to be accused of interference.

- **Differences in priorities between central ministries and provinces:**

  It is to be expected that the central ministerial perspective will differ from that of provincial councils. Provincial councils' preferences in one province may, for example, be in education, veterinary services and health care; this gives other ministries a low profile in priority. Unwillingness to staff and supply provincial offices that are not appreciated is understandable.

- **Uncertainty over central-provincial responsibilities for staffing:**
'Secondment' from central ministries to the provinces is not clear-cut. The relative influence of the Provincial Commissioner in transfers and recommending promotions still has not clearly been established. Provincial allegations that staff never leave the centre and are too rapidly transferred are answered by charges that Provincial Commissioners keep back good staff and get rid of those they do not like. There is a need for improved definitions of the role of the PC as well as the central ministries on the issue of secondment.

- Confusion over who takes what role in the initiation and management of development programs: Generally, development projects are initiated, financed and managed by central ministries and public enterprises. But there has to be some relationship with the authorities in the province concerned and this is not clear. The questions need answering are:
  * Where does the first responsibility lie for suggesting development projects?
  * When are provincial authorities brought in?
  * Who has the decisive voice in deciding on the nature of the project and the plan for action?
  * How do provincial and central authorities work together in management and control?

The former Ministry of Local Government as the Ministry in charge of provincial affairs was counted upon to resolve such problems as well as financial relations problems. The general role conceived for the Ministry was one of coordination. There were a number of different views over this role:

(i). One view held that the MLC should act as coordinator between
(ii) Another view maintains that the NLC is needed as coordinator for the central government. Assuming that the idea of fairly detailed central control of provincial affairs is accepted, the Central Government must have an agency that can gather the data, seek the explanations and coordinate detailed government policy directives, passing on information from provinces to ministries and reactions to the information received.

(iii) A third view conceived the role of the NLC as coordinator between the centre and the provinces. Supporters argue that a coordinator or an agent of compromise is required, reconciling demands from different provinces in a form that would be acceptable by central ministries, and the same way shaping central government policy in a form that would be acceptable to the provinces.

Another completely opposing view, at least to the first and third views, maintain that the NLC is a barrier to coordination and thus it should be immediately or gradually abolished. The argument is that responsibility for provincial administration lies with Provincial Commissioners and the Provincial
Commissioners and the Provincial Executive Councils; Provincial Commissioners should deal directly with central ministries; PCs can put their needs more effectively and they have the ministerial status to be influential; the NLC intervention in these matters just acts, at best, as a delaying mechanism and at worst, as another ill-informed obstruction that provinces have to overcome to get what they need.

All this is supposed to have ended in 1981 with the enforcement of the new version of the People's Local Government Act, 1981 and the Regional Government Act of 1980. According to these legislations local government no longer maintain direct relations with the central governments; their relations are confined to the regional governments. What kind of relationships (i.e., whether coordinated and cooperative or do they lack coordination) local governments are now developing with their respective regional governments are yet to be seen. However, a brief note can be cited here.

- One of the main causes of problems in the former centre-province relationships was lack of knowledge of the other side's position. This should not be the case in region-local relationships. If lack of effort (because of distance and lack of time on the part of the centre) by the centre before 1981 was relatively excusable, it is now utterly unexcusable on the part of the regions, if that is the case. There are two needs now: to keep the region informed of the situation outside the regional capital, and to make sure the local councils knows the region's plans.

- the PLOL of 1981 is not clear about the role of the Provincial Commissioner and his relations with the local councils. Though his jurisdiction regarding the local councils is confined to reporting
... what their conduct of business to the regional government (Article 100, Section 3 of the FLG Act, 1981), he has other means to exert greater influence over the councils and their relationship with the regional government. Item 10(c) Section 3 of the same Act empowers him to supervise the chief executives of these councils, the recruitment procedures of all the council's employees and the assessment and reporting on their performance; he is appointed on the recommendation of the Regional Governor — by the President who decides his emoluments (Article 4, Section 2 of the same Act); added to that the inherited prestige of the Office. All these together besides his political powers as Secretary-General of the S.S.U. in the province and the informal relations he could manipulate, gives the Provincial Commissioner greater influence over the local councils and their relations with the different regional ministries. If the Provincial Commissioner's role and relationship with the local councils are not made clear and distinct from those of the regional ministers, it is feared that this may result in many problems of coordination in the future.

There are now 62 regional ministries in each of the five northern regions, each headed by a regional minister who is also appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Regional Governor. Officially the regional ministers have the same status of the Provincial Commissioner.
Conclusion & Recommendations

Local government systems in both the U.S. and the Sudan—as well as in other countries—are integral parts of the overall socio-economic and political set-up in both countries. Because the overall socio-economic and political set-ups in both countries vary, so—inevitably—does the local government systems.

Disregarding such general statements—that is to say by focussing on the previous chapters, one can come up with a number of concrete dissimilarities between the two local government systems. A careful reading of the preceding chapters shows that both systems differ in many ways.

- The historical background and evolution of both systems is quite different. Whereas local government in the U.S. dates back to the seventeenth century, it is only in the twentieth century that the Sudan came to experience local government. It is the natives who developed the different types of local government in the U.S.; in the Sudan this is, for the most part, done by an alien power—the British (until the mid-century, 1956).

- Local Governments in the U.S. are quite numerous (amounts to 80,000); the numbers of local governments in the Sudan is comparatively small (less than 100).\(^n\)

\(^n\)This is not to say that there are no similarities; actually it is the similarities that induced the coming up with the following recommendations.

\(^n\)These only corporate persons are counted (their boroughs are not included). The number of the new District Councils ranges between 80-100.
- The typology of local government differs in both countries. Local governments in the U.S. fall into more than one type - i.e., general purpose type, like cities & counties; and single-purpose or specialized types, like school districts and special districts. Local governments in the Sudan are all general purpose governments.

- Local governments in the U.S. have diverse forms of government (mayor plan, strong mayor plan, weak mayor plan, council-manager plan, commissioner plan). In the Sudan local governments have one uniform form (an elected council with an administrative officer as an executive assistant other civil servant employees).

- Local governments in the U.S. are frequently - and accurately too - referred to as 'creatures of the state'. Using the same analogy, we can say, that local government in the Sudan - up to 1981 - have always been the creatures of the central government. The People's Local Government Act of 1981 conferred the power to establish local government on the newly created regional governments. Still, one can argue that since regional governments themselves the creatures of the central government, then local government too are, indirectly, the creatures of the central government. ※

※Both local and regional governments have Constitutional basis (Articles 182, 183 184, Part VII). However, local government Constitutional basis dates back to the promulgation of the Constitution in 1971, while regional government Constitutional basis came through an amendment in 1980. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that though regional governments have their own legislatures and executive branches, they are controlled by the central government; the President is empowered to dissolve regional legislatures and remove regional governors (Articles 62, Chapter 11 and 13, Chapter 11 respectively; The Regional Government Act, 1980). In addition regional governments depends heavily on central government for their revenue; what they can give is grants to local government would be central government monies. They could be thought of as mere channels.
Local governments in the U.S. have "Separate Personnel Systems", to use the U.N. classification of local personnel systems, whereas local government in Sudan depends on the "Integrated National and Local Personnel System."

Local governments in the U.S. have comparatively vast range of powers that render them more autonomous than local governments in the Sudan. A good example is offered by their legal capacity to decide on matters of annexations and mergers with their peer local governments. Such power is denied to local governments in the Sudan. Anything that has to do with the boundaries of a local unit is decided upon—until 1981—by the central government. After 1981 this power was handed to the regional governments. It should be noted that the boundaries of the provinces, which are amalgamations of a number of district councils (each usually not exceeding eight councils), are still decided upon by the central government.**

**A U.N. publication, Local Government Personnel Systems (U.N. Sales No. 67.11. H.1), classifies local government personnel systems into three types: (1) "Separate Personnel System" where "each local authority has power to appoint and dismiss its own personnel, and the personnel is not transferable to any other jurisdiction by a central body"; (2) "Unified Local Government Personnel System" where "certain categories of personnel of local authorities form a single carry service for the entire country which is distinct from the national civil service", and (3) "Integrated National and Local Personnel System" where "personnel of national or state government and that of local authorities form parts of the same service."

This is because any change in the provinces' boundaries is going to affect the boundaries of the regions which are an amalgamation of two or three provinces.
It is possible to expand the list of differences between the systems of local government in the U.S. and the Sudan; however, those cited above are sufficient enough as to indicate how different both systems are. The point is that though both systems differ in many respects, some lessons can be learned and - even better - some recommendations can be suggested. These recommendations are worthwhile to adapt to the Sudan since they can - in my contention - bring about tremendous improvements in the local government system. These recommendations include:

(i) As indicated earlier local governments in the U.S. are of more than one type; they range from general-purpose units to single-purpose units. On the other hand, local governments in the Sudan are all general-purpose units. In some cases this proved to be an ineffective type or totally unsuited in special situations - as in the case of nomads. Hence it is desirable to use a flexible typology in the Sudan as that of the U.S. Instead of all local governments being general-purpose units it is recommended to adapt the concept of special districts units too - that is to say not for the purpose of carrying out a specific function or a single purpose but to serve a particular target group of the population or special groups in the society - such as the nomads. Some precedences, such as joint administration, through organized on ad hoc basis and do not last long enough, are encouraging experiences.

(ii) Comparatively local governments in the U.S. enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy and have substantial power and some functions - to a large extent -

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*Nomads constitute a significant proportion of the population of the Sudan - about 12% of the population according to the 1955 census. It is regretted that the recent census of 1973 is not made public.*
and exclusively their own domain.

Similar arrangements need to be adopted in the Sudan if local government is to pursue its objectives effectively, and these delegated authority should not be retracted by interference or unnecessary review of the central government or by the exactions of highly centralized financial, personnel, supply or other regulations.

(iii) Related to the last point is the question of finance. It is noticed that local government in the U.S. have real taxing powers and the property tax - the one they mainly depend on - is a relatively high yielding tax. Local government in the Sudan should have real taxing power. Also assigned taxes should be reasonably high yielding taxes so as to match the responsibilities of these local governments (this not the case right now).

Local government in the Sudan obtain more than half of their revenue from grants-in-aid paid by the central government. The experience of the U.S. inter-governmental assistance program if adapted to the Sudan can bring about great improvements. Possible measure may include a similar revenue-sharing program, matching assistance programs, adoption of formulas as basis for giving assistance and providing local governments with needed information concerning these grants such as timing, application procedures, catalogues and so forth.

(iv) In the area of personnel both countries have different personnel systems regarding local government. The U.S. local government has its own personnel system while local government in the Sudan depends on the central or national personnel system. What may be recommended here is an adoption or a blend of both the 'separate' and the 'integrated personnel system'; that may relieve local
government in the Sudan from problems facing it in this area. This can be done by granting local governments the power of recruitment and control of personnel up to a specified scale. Such measures would provide each local government with its own personnel; risks should be avoided in local, yet it should extend to senior officials; practically local governments do not have the means, resources and capabilities to control senior staff; if, supposedly, they can do that, then there would be a danger of depriving poor councils of senior staff. Other measures may include the institutionalizing of the influence of local governments over promotions with national safeguards, and giving local government the necessary powers to compel as well as to solicit transfers.

(v) Though problems of coordination face local governments in both countries, it is noticed that efforts to cope with these problems are greater in the U.S. and, perhaps, more successful than the case in the Sudan. Such efforts are represented by the formation of councils of governments, regional leagues and groupings of similar local units, associations of local governments, contractions between local governments for the provision of certain services, and common lobbying and pressure groups for securing assistance or averting legislations or actions taken by other levels of government and so forth. Such organization and practices if adapted can prove to be valuable to local government in the Sudan.

Finally, it is noteworthy here that other recommendations could be cited but they are left essentially because they are related to aspects peculiar to the local government in the Sudan and they bear no resemblance to the U.S. local government experience and they have not been discussed in the paper. It is thought that it would be wise to confine the recommendations to those areas that are common in the experience of both countries, since the paper, after all, is a comparative study.
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Term Paper

A Comparative Study: General Revenue Sharing in the U.S. and the Sudan

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Since the political system in any country is the dominant factor that determines the structural fiscal organization it is advisable to begin with examining the political structure in both countries.

The United States adopts a federal system where we have more than one level of government. Besides the federal government, we have the states and local government units. The Constitution specifies the sphere of power and authority of each level. To be precise the Constitution "provides for federal government powers (especially Article I, Section 8) and reserves all other powers to the states. Local governments have fewer constitutional protections, because these governments have been created by the States."

Thus each government has the authority to manage its financial resources. Each government decides which service to provide and at what quality, within its area. In other words these governments work on their own, though strictly speaking state governments and local governments sometimes work as agents of the federal government.

In determining which service to provide and the quality of this service, these governments were actually bound by their capacities to raise revenue. This revenue in turn is determined by many factors such as the source of revenue—taxes, population, size of area, and prevailing economic trends.

In terms of fiscal capacity, the federal government has the upper hand. This is because of its reliance upon personal and corporate income taxes which "has a more elastic tax structure in which revenues increase with any
increase in economic activity.\textsuperscript{12} On the other hand, state and local government rely on sales, user, and property taxes. It is noteworthy that 'while state and local revenue sources are relatively inelastic, the demand for services provided by these governments is quite elastic.'\textsuperscript{13}

Strictly speaking demands for services were interrelated through the different levels of government. In other words 'there are today relatively few governmental functions that are carried on exclusively by one level of government.'\textsuperscript{14} This interrelation brought with it the element of 'leverage' which affects the fiscal decision-making i.e., through this leverage one level of government persuades another government to provide a certain service or demand a specified standard of a given service. It is interesting to note that only federal and state governments enjoy this leverage capability. The federal government has leverage upon state and local governments; the state governments have leverage upon local governments.

This leverage is not an end in itself; in fact it is a means of striking a desirable balance of development throughout the country. The chariot of the leverage enjoyed by the federal level is the federal aid to state and local governments. Though the federal aid has many forms: block grants, categorical grants and revenue-sharing, we would confine ourselves to revenue-sharing which is our main concern here.

Unlike the U.S.A., the Sudan adopts a Unitary System of government. However, within this unitary system there is a degree of decentralization
which was highlighted recently. The passage of the People's Local Government Act, 1971 was a landmark in decentralization in the Sudan. Two years later, 1973, the constitution stipulated that the Sudan should be administered on the basis of decentralization (Article V). Accordingly the country was redivided into eighteen provinces. Each province is administered by a People's Executive Council and a Commissioner. The PPEC being a corporate body with perpetual succession and has the power to make contract to own lands (PLG Act, 1971, Chapter III, Section 8). Each PPEC has the power to establish local councils as may seem fit.

So at this stage there were two levels of government, the central government and the provincial governments. However, in 1980 the Constitution was amended (Article 7) to provide for a new form of sub-national government i.e., Regional Government. In the same year the Regional Government Act, 1980 was passed into law. Also a new version of the People's Local Government Act was enacted in 1981. According to the new legislations the PPECs were abolished and five regional governments were created (a sixth region - The Southern Region - was created early in 1972). Each region comprises two or three provinces. Each region was empowered to create district level councils as it may deem fit. However, it is important to note the

*The Northern Region comprises the Northern and Nile provinces; the Eastern province comprises the Red Sea and Kassala provinces; the Central Region comprises the Gezira, Blue Nile and White Nile provinces; Kordofan Region comprises N and S Kordofan provinces; Darfur Region comprises N and S Darfur provinces; the Southern region comprises E and W Equatoria, Upper Nile, Northel Darfur, El Buheyrat and Junglei provinces. Khartoum Province remained by itself and a special legislation for its administration was enacted in 1981.*
People's Local Government Act of 1981 stipulated that these district local councils should be corporate bodies with perpetual succession and have their own budgets (Chapter II, Section 6). Thus according to the new legislations three levels of government emerged: the central, regional, and local governments.

Though political justifications were emphatically behind these new arrangements, economic factors were there too. In fact these arrangements aimed at the development of the rural and regional areas in order to cut down the existing economic and social disparities and attain social justice. As is seen it is a bold goal; but according to the responsibilities assigned, these governments were to provide all services other than defence, foreign affairs, public audit, judiciary, immigration, currency, inter-regional water supply, export and import trade, national and natural mining resources, and educational planning which were reserved to the central government.

The provision of such services is subject to the revenue these governments can raise. The central government relies mainly upon income tax; import and export taxes; excise duties; and capital profit tax.

Whereas the regional and local government rely upon revenue obtained from regional or local commercial, industrial and agricultural project; local taxes, e.g., rates taxes on animals, date trees and certain types of agriculture; and loans and donations.

Through the years regional and local revenue never amounted to 50% of regional and local expenditure. Central aid amounts to more than 50% of
sub-national expenditure, e.g., in 1974/75 it amounts to 53% of sub-national expenditure; in 1975/76 it amounts 57%; in 1976/77 it reached 60%; in 1977/78 it was 67%. Given the low revenue of sub-national governments, coupled with their burdensome responsibilities, one can securely say that the central aid was there to stay.
History of General Revenue Sharing: Its Philosophical and Fiscal Justifications

The idea of revenue sharing was not new as some might think. Some scholars believe that revenue sharing originates prior to the Civil War:

"...it is apparent that general revenue sharing, in its broadest concept, is in reality a very old idea in American federal relations and that examples of legislation embodying the general revenue-sharing philosophy prior to the Civil War can be found. ...perhaps the most interesting of early 'revenue-sharing' experiments was the Surplus Distribution Act of 1836."5

The aforementioned act attached no string to the use of this grant; in fact each state spent the money on its own; "The state of Maine made a per capita distribution of its share of money."6

This experience was an exception because the subsequent grants were not without strings and/or conditions. Each grant following the 'surplus distribution' was conditional and intended for a specific purpose.

The Morrill Act of 1862 was considered a landmark in federal aid being 'The first categorical grant'. It entailed that each state should use the federal grant (land) to establish a college emphasizing agriculture and mechanism. An important aspect of this act is that it narrowly defined and/or specified the use of federal grant. A similar grant which introduced new federal controls was the Hatch Act of 1887 which provided annual money grant for agricultural experiment stations. Compliance of states with federal requirements came with the Second Morrill Act, 1890. At the
wake of the 20th century federal emphasis on control and supervision was highlighted. Along with these emphasis came the 'direct matching' from state sources as a new condition. This matching condition was applied to the Forest Fire Prevention Program in 1911. It was also applied to the Smith-Lever Vocational Educational Act of 1914 and the highway program in 1916. This matching requirements was intended to stimulate state activity and commitment to areas of particular interest to the federal government. After World War I these program witnessed extensive expansion. The total federal aid to state and local government rose from $33 millions in 1920 to $235 million in 1932, in 1936 it amounted to $948 million; since 1948 it grew steadily over the years, from $1,861 million in 1948 to $3,843 million in 1957, to $12,960 million in 1966, it reached $35,940 million in 1972 (7). (Table 1 appendix).

The increase of grants in this period, after World War I, was coupled by steady increase in urban population. The percentage of urban population grew from 51.2% in 1910 to 65.5% in 1940; in 1950 it reached 59.6%; in 1960 it amounted to 69.9%; and it reached 73.5% in 1970. This growth of urban population compounded the financial problems at the local level. In the words of a congressman:

"Minorities crowded into decaying urban areas cry out for better housing, schools and hospitals. City dwellers demand more police protection and facilities for the elderly. Suburbanities want clean air and water, and efficient transportation. Residents of small town see their schools deteriorate, even as the taxes on their home increase, and they too ask for help from somewhere."
He went on to say:

"Two particularly costly age groups - the old, needing health care and welfare, and the young needing education and recreation - are increasing much faster than the rest of the population."

Local governments failure to adequately address the mounting problems of population growth lead to a fresh look at general revenue sharing as a means of solving these problems. In other words "general revenue sharing is usually seen as an alternative to past attempts to deal with local government problems."

General revenue sharing has its philosophical basis. It was considered as in instrument of decentralization; as a means of reversing the flow of political power back to the states - "not simply give [to service to the 'states' rights' but give substance to local self government."

This period witnessed growing discontent with big national government. Some went as far to describe their discontent as 'sickness' of big government. Politicians, as assumed, recognized this discontent. For instance President Nixon expressed his intent:

"...a streamlined federal system, with a return to the states, cities, and communities of decision making powers rightfully theirs."

Underlying this philosophy an assumption that within certain areas of domestic programmatic needs, the closer the decision making process to the citizen the better.

If general revenue sharing has its philosophical basis, it has its fiscal justifications too. As mentioned before the growing problems of urban America has generated increasing concern to solve these problems. The
matching requirement along with the increasing demand for services compounded the problems at the state and local level. Thus revenue sharing was seen as an appropriate solution to these problems. It was hoped to cope with what is often cited as 'fiscal imbalance'. That is to say state and local governments were confronted by ever increasing demands at the same time being equipped with the "least flexible and desirable means of raising revenue." On the other hand, federal government resources appeared to be in excess of its needs. Thus revenue sharing was thought to relieve state and local government of their 'fiscal crises' and bolster their capability to deal with their pressing needs. These philosophical and fiscal justifications formented to bring 'the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972' into being.

8) In the case of the Sudan there is no program called revenue sharing. Thus I would treat the term 'revenue sharing' in its broadest sense, i.e., to mean central aid to local government.

Up to the mid-century, the Sudan was strictly a unitary state with field units outside the capital. So at this stage there is no point in speaking about revenue sharing.

The year 1951 marked the establishment of local government councils in the Sudan for the first time. By the passage of Local Government Ordinance, 1951, 86 local government councils were established throughout the country. According to 1951 ordinance, local government councils were required to prepare an annual balanced budget. The revenue of these councils consist of assigned taxes such as a) Animal tax, b) Land tax, c) Date tree tax, d) Ushur, e) Tribute and Poll tax, f) House and hut tax.
These taxes were not flexible and the formulas of some of these
taxes were rigid. Besides all of these taxes were not to be found in one
council. Thus financial difficulties in those councils were understandably
anticipated. As a matter of fact from 1951 to 1971 out of 86 councils only
were councils managed to realize surplus. A supportive argument could be
traced in the case of central government which managed to realize surplus
after World War II. In other words:

"During and after the Second World War, the government has not only
managed to meet its rapidly increasing current expenditures but has been
able to increase its revenues to the extent that large surpluses have
been realized." ¹⁴

Taking all this into account central aid to local government councils
is indispensable. The central aid to local councils was intended to help
poorer councils meet their obligations by covering their budgeting deficits.
Another important aim of aid was to subsidize services of national interest,
for example, "up to 40 percent subsidy went for sub-grade education, some
33 to 75 percent for judicial and administrative staff; 50 percent for
through roads and 33 percent for local roads."¹⁵ Some of these grants
were conditional, the intention being to meet central government standards
in some services. In fact section 43 of the Local Government Act, 1951
reads:

'A Council which is unable to improve the rate of attendance in
in schools or unable to keep its buildings to the standard required
may be deprived of such grants.'
These central grants were intended as a means of control too. This would be fully appreciated if we took into account that local council's budget were subject to approval by the Civil Secretary (later on by the Ministry of Local Government).

The central aid continued with the same characteristics and philosophy up to 1971. However, in 1960 the Provincial Administration Act was enacted. Important to note, here, that:

a) Local government councils, created in 1951 remained intact. The Act of 1960 confined itself to provincial level only.

b) The major innovation of the act is the administrative structure of the province. Of concern to our present purpose is that the power to approve local councils' budget's was conferred upon provinces instead of the Ministry of Local Government.

The second point, (b), had no impacts upon local councils revenues as might be thought. This is because the provincial councils have no real power over this local councils. Added to that these provincial councils were chaired by the then 'Military Governor' who was answerable to the then 'Supreme Council' for the Armed Force which ruled the country from 1958 to 1964. More than that the provincial councils have no revenue sources of their own; they depend on 'grants from the central government which may be by assignment of a tax or taxes and from the produce of any other tax which is declared by law as belonging to province councils, and from any other rate, charge, due or fee which is lawfully payable to the province council.'

So what these province did in practice was passing over of local
councils' needs to the central government.

Thus the central government maintained grants to both levels. We have already dealt with grants to local councils. At the provincial level, field agencies used to have separate budgets which were part of their individual parent ministries budgets; as for local provincial functions the central government used to appropriate a per capita grant based on the numbers of the population in each province.

This practice went on until 1971 when a new local government act was enacted. A major change brought in by this act, was that the only level enjoying corporate status was the People's Province Executive Council. Thus the province became an integrated budgetary unit. Accordingly the central government had to deal with the provinces only not the local councils.

It is noteworthy that the philosophy behind that Act of 1971 was political. The intention being to help people administer their own affairs on their own, i.e., not to await decisions to come from Khartoum, the capital. (It is interesting to note that as a result of this act the number of local government councils reached 5,000; according the previous ordinance they were only 86). Surprisingly, the power of decision making, conferred on local communities by the 1971 act, was not buttressed by financial powers. With the emphasis being political, no change touched the financial arrangements of the provincial government. These financial arrangements were copied from the previous ordinance. So with the provincial sources of revenues being as they were, the central aid was expected to continue - even accelerate as a result of increasing demand of provincial population.
A new development took place in 1981 when a new revision of the People's Local Government Act was enacted. The previous year, 1980, the Regional Government Act was passed into law. According to these recent arrangements the central government was to deal with the regional government; the regional government was to deal with local government. The outcome of these intergovernmental fiscal relations remains to be seen.
a) Prior to 1972 the number of federal aid programs were "approaching 600". The proliferation of these grants according to Anita Hart "has unquestionably put an unhealthy premium on grantsmanship. It has also created a quite understandable sense of frustration on the part of the state and local officials who are trying to face real problems but whose efforts to use federal aid are hindered at every turn - or so it seems to them - by excessive restrictions that do not take local needs adequately into account."

Prior to 1972 the complexity of federal aid to the state and local government and the intricate system of these programs, accompanied by increasing demands on services at these levels, along with what is termed 'new federalism' brought 'revenue sharing' into fruition in 1972.

Revenue sharing, intended to give more discretion to state and localities, engendered massive support at all levels - national, state, and local. On the national level President Nixon, in his recurrently expressed strong commitment to reverse the flow of power and resources back to the states and localities, proposed general revenue sharing in 1969. However, after three years of controversy, modifications, maneuvering and political manipulations, revenue sharing emerged into law under the name of The State and Local Fiscal Act of 1972. The main fixtures of the act may be summarized as follows:

- The amount of $30.2 billion, two-thirds of which is to go directly to local government is to be distributed to the states and localities. The annual distribution would be as follows:
1972 $5.300 billion
1973 $5.375 billion
1974 $6.125 billion
1975 $6.275 billion
1976 $6.425 billion

- each state is allowed to receive the larger allocation by applying either the House of Senate distribution formula. (The House formula is based on a) population, b) urbanization, c) per capita income, d) income tax collection, and e) general tax effort. The Senate formula is based on a) population, b) general tax effort and, c) per capita income).

- As for localities:
  - Each county receives an amount accounting for population, tax effort and relative income. No county or municipality would receive less than 20% or more than 145% of the average per capita allocation of all local governments in a state. The amount to be determined by the ratio of its tax collections to tax collections by all governments in the county.

- Municipal government's share is to be based on population, tax effort, and relative per capita income.

- Local government may use general revenue - share funds - "only for priority expenditure", including public safety, environmental protection, public transportation, health, recreation, libraries,
social services for the poor and aged, financial administration and
'ordinary' and 'necessary' capital expenditure concerning states.
The act didn't require the use of revenue for priority items, however,
it may not be used as matching funds for federal grants in-aid
programs.
- General revenue sharing funds may not be used for any activity or
program discriminating on basis of race, color, sex or national
origin.
- Local governments were required to submit reports about its use of
these funds.
- Unlike previous aid legislations the act contains no detailed strings
on how to spend the revenue sharing funds.

8) Sudan: (i) Local Government (Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinance, 1954:
The Local Government Act of 1951 stipulated that local government councils
obtain this revenue by grant from the central government; this might be by
the assignment of certain taxes. The act stipulated other means, however,
these assigned taxes constituted the major source of revenue of these councils.
The central government used to issue resolutions specifying those taxes.
However, in 1954 local government (Appropriation of Taxes) was enacted. So
the taxes assigned to local government councils were specified by law. The
taxes prescribed by the law were:
 a) Land Tax: this tax was imposed since 1925; it is levied on agricultural
land. The rate depends on the means of irrigation; whether the land
irrigated by pumps or traditional means. The amount of be paid as a tax
was 1.5 L.J. per feddan in the case of lands irrigated by small pumps; 12%
of the value of the produce if the pump was more than 6" in size or the land
irrigated by traditional means.

b) Annual Tax: This tax is imposed since 1950, it is levied on different animals at different rates. This act specified the maximum amount to be paid according to the type of animal; each local council has discretion to determine the rate, within this specified maximum rate. These maximum were as follows: for camels 1 L.S. per head; for cattle 5 L.S. per head; for donkeys 25 L.S. per head; for goats 10 L.S. per head, for mules 5 L.S. per head; for sheep 15 L.S. per head.

c) Date Tree Taxes: It is levied on date trees mainly in the northern province. The maximum amount is 0.06 L.S. on each date tree.

d) Ushur: It has been imposed since 1924, it is levied on lands irrigated by rainfall or Nile flooding. The maximum prescribed by the law is 15% of the total product.

e) Property Tax: It is an important revenue source for local councils, in some big towns it amounts to more than 70% of the town's revenue. It is imposed since 1954 the rates of this tax has been subject to change from time to time. It is levied on the estimated rent of the property.

f) Tribute and PSU Tax: It was levied on a tribe or an individual. It has been abandoned since 1970.

g) Building Taxes: It has been imposed since 1918. It is connected with the property tax. It has been suggested that the central government occupied of premises should voluntarily put itself in the same position as other rate payer; but this suggestion was never put to practice.

h) Entertainment Tax: It is on all types of entertainment, (such as movies, parties, etc.). It is levied according to the cost of admission
tickets. I treated this ordinance in a relatively detailed manner, because of its paramount importance to local government revenue in the Sudan since its adoption up to date as we will see. All local government acts following this ordinance law 'copies' in the aforementioned taxes with the same prescribed arrangements as the main source of local government.

(1) People's Local Government Act, 1971

Under the former local government ordinance of 1951 the budgetary units were the local council. However, the People's Local Government Act of 1971 changed this. The Provincial Councils become the only budgetary units. As for lower local councils the act stipulated that provincial councils may delegate some financial powers to the then councils but it must retain the overall responsibility for financial commitments of the various governmental departments and councils under its jurisdiction.

"The Revenues for the People's Executive Council resembles those enumerated in previous 1951 ordinance. Section 13, Chapter 5 of Local Government Act, 1972 deals with province revenue. It reads:

"The Revenues for the People's Executive Council shall consist of the following sources:

a) Revenues from the taxes referred to in the Local Government (Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinance, 1954 or in any other law, provided that the People's Executive Council shall have a right to determine the amount of such taxes on condition that such amount shall not be less than what is determined in the 1971/1972 budget".

b) Local fees, and rates and licence fees according to what may be prescribed by local orders to be made by the People's Executive Council."
c) Revenues of commercial business carried on by the People's Executive Council.
d) The proceeds of any taxes assigned by the Central Government.
e) Appropriations determined by the Council of Ministers to enable the People's Executive Councils to fulfill their obligations.
f) Fines and fees imposed or fixed by People's Courts.

It is clear that the sources of revenue of these provincial councils resembles those specified by the previous ordinance of 1951. To be precise these sources were the same in every aspect. In the words of Dr. Allassan, "In terms of revenue and expenditure, there is nothing new in this system".

(iii) The Regional Government Act, 1980:

According to this act the country was reshaped administratively. Five regions were created by the act; a sixth region was created earlier in 1972. Each region was defined by the law is composed of two or three provinces. Thus a new level of government emerged. Accordingly there are three levels of government, central, regional and local.

As for Regional Government Revenue the act stipulates:

(i) Revenue obtained from the Regional, Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural projects.

(ii) Funds approved by the national government to the benefit of the region.

(iii) Loans and donations.

(iv) Direct and indirect taxes levied by the region.
Apparently, the major source of revenue of those regions would be direct and indirect taxes levied by the Regions. But this is not the whole story; the regions were curbed in this respect by item (2) of the same section which reads:

"The Region shall not without the previous permission of the central government levy or collect the following taxes and fees:
(a) Taxes on export and imports
(b) Excise Duties
(c) Capital profit tax
(d) Pension deduction and after public services benefit
(e) Any taxes or fees on any commercial dealings, national services or investments or any other services or any officials of the national power
(f) Any taxes on fees on any commercial dealings, services investments or any other services or any official of the Regional Government
(g) No taxes or fees shall be levied on inter-regional goods or services
(iv) People's Local Government Act, 1981:

One might confidently say that this act, in many ways, is a swing back to the 1951 ordinance. According to this act the provinces were no longer budgetary units. Local government district councils are the budgetary units - "corporate bodies; have independent budget."

The revenue of these local councils consist of:
(a) Revenues from the taxes referred to in the Local Government (Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinances, 1954, provided that the council determine the amount of such taxes.
(b) Local fees and rates upon services provided by the council.
(c) Fines and fees imposed by People's Court.
(d) Revenues of commercial business and investment in which the council may contribute.
(e) Financial assistance from regional authorities.
(f) Loans in accordance with Section 26.
(g) Donations and gifts.

Clearly, those sources of revenue were the very same ones stipulated three decades ago, by the Local Government Ordinance of 1951.
IV

General Revenue Sharing: Accomplishment and Impacts

A) The Case of the U.S.:

Federal aid in any form, is intended to enable states and localities to devote more resources to activities for which they are held responsible but which they are unable to support from their own resources. We have seen in the preceding Chapters how revenue sharing emerged as an alternative to other forms of grants - categorical and block grants. Of course it is erroneous to think that other forms of grants were abandoned after the adoption of revenue sharing. Other forms of grants still do exist. However, general revenue sharing is much more accredited for a variety of reasons; to mention one: its greater discretion to states and localities over financial decision making and its predictability since the amounts to be received by states and localities is made known for some three or five years before its actual transference to these governments. In this way one might say it addressed complaints about previous program aids being lacking consistent pattern.

As mentioned before these sums are to be distributed to states and localities by applying either the House formula or the Senate formula. (Table 2 shows the distribution of the $5.300 billion of 1972 on the basis of both formulas). (Table 3 shows general revenue-sharing funds received by states in 1973, besides revenue it shows revenue-sharing dollars per capita.

4The amounts of revenue sharing distributed annually (between 1972 - 1976) were indicated in the preceding chapter - i.e., in the discussion of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, 1972. It is noteworthy that the Act was renewed in 1976 and 1980.
in each state and state government share as percent of states expenditure. Some information in regard to large cities is shown in Table 4.

Ultimately, general revenue-sharing has positive impacts. To begin with, unlike before, federal aid has been predictable. This in turn facilitates planning process by states and localities. Supportingly, revenue sharing is much accredited for its discretion to states and localities; such flexibility is needed for sound planning. Its increasing amounts through the years is expected to deal with the voiced complaint that "as income increases, per capita federal grants neither consistently increase nor decrease, suggesting that grant programs do not redistribute income in favor of either wealthy or poor states." 18

Also citizen participation and the impact of such participation on decision making is thought to be a positive impact of revenue-sharing. In the words of co-authors David Captuto and Richard Cole:

"...general revenue-sharing differs from other major federal-local grant-in-aid programs in that general revenue sharing requires no participation of citizens prior to the expenditure of those funds. Yet, it is found that about half of the cities responding to our survey had allowed or encouraged some degree of citizen input. ....just as important, we find that at least concerning the expenditure of general revenue-sharing funds, such participation may make a difference. 19

A major positive impact of general revenue-sharing is represented by the greater discretion states and localities enjoy under the program. It reduced direct and/or detailed federal involvement in the administration of certain programs at state and local levels. Such a manner helps remedy overcentralization and make home-rule, a highly appreciated
principle, feasible.

Dealing with the impacts of revenue-sharing, some scholars tend to emphasize, in implicit critique, the fact that these funds were used to maintain or expand operating programs than to reduce or stabilize taxes. Such approach, in my opinion, casts a blind eye or underestimates the political factor behind revenue-sharing, i.e., underlying decentralization and broadening the scope of decision making process at the state and local level. Perhaps, this act of power sharing explain the overwhelming support revenue-sharing has among local officials.

B) The case of the Sudan:

As indicated earlier, there is no program called revenue sharing as in the case of the U.S. Hence we treated the term 'revenue sharing' in its broadest sense, i.e., to mean central government aid to the local government. With such conception revenue sharing started in the Sudan with the creation of local government in 1951.

It is noteworthy that from the beginning local government relied on central aid. However, this reliance increased throughout the years. Table 5 shows how local government share in general government current expenditure decreased from 30.3% in 1955 to 26.3% in 1959; by 1967 it reached 17%. This indicates the increasing role of the central government in financing general governmental expenditures (of course including financing local government as well). Perhaps recent figures are more helpful in showing the increasing reliance of local government self revenue amounted to 47% while central aid 53%; in 1975/76 Local self revenue decreased to
43\%, while central aid reached 57\%; in 1976/77 local self-revenue decreased further to 34\% while central aid increased to 66\%; in 1977/78 local self-revenue decreased slightly from the previous year and thus amounted to 33\%, while in the same year central aid reached 67\%. It is clear, the percentage of central aid is continuously increasing. Table 6 shows estimates of main sources of revenue of local government revenues for fiscal years 1973/74, 1974/75, 1975/76, 1976/77, 1977/78. As the table indicates the figure of central aid are made more higher than those of local governments own sources. Table give more details about local government self-revenue and central aid for the norther provinces.

This increasing reliance of local government on central government is not desired. A number of problems are to be found in this aid system that have negative impacts on centre-local relations.

To begin with, the volume of grants seem to be problematic; these grants are thought to be much less than expected. However, since needs are far greater than resources in the Sudan, this is generally accepted but criticism is there. Local government complain that there is no visible evidence of central government ministries reducing their budget with their reduced responsibilities (as so People's Local Government and Regional Government Systems dictates) and of corresponding increases in the transfers to provinces and regions. Another view is that central ministries are using PLG2RG Systems to reduce their efforts in the outlaying provinces and concentrating near Khartoum the capital. The Ministry of Health, for example, retains direct responsibility for certain hospitals
in Khartoum and may devote more resources to them instead of transferring budgetary allocations to the provinces.

Another aspect is the timing of grants. Great frustration is aroused in the provinces by the practice of determining the amount of grant after an elaborate and time-consuming provincial budget has been completed. The level of grant given bears very little relation to estimates which are often made meaningless as a result, and have to be done all over again. Apparenty guidelines offered by the centre are either not present, not available at the right time to be useful, or simply meaningless in practice. The result is that provinces are groping in the dark.

Another point concerns the forms of grants. The current pattern of providing funds on the basis of approval of individual items, vote by vote, is another source of frustration. This, of course, is a way of maintaining very detailed and comprehensive central control, but it's also a source of much wasted effort, delay and insensitive allocation of resources. Approval of the budget by the centre does not start until provincial estimates are finalized; drastic changes, as is the case now, mean that initial planning is completely wasted, that morale amongst officials and provincial councillors is lowered by disregard of their views, and that delay is caused in readjustment.
Conclusion

Critical Appraisal and Recommendations

As we have seen through the preceding chapters, local government or sub-national governments in the Sudan are heavily dependent on the central government. Such dependence, in such a developing country is undesirable, because, as expected, would result in defeating the principles of local government of decentralization of decision-making process; and hamper socio-economic development of the country at large. Hence, no effort should be spared to improve the situation.

In this respect, one is tempted to say, the root of the issue lies in the financial system of the country as a whole. I say this because the figures and percentages of central aid to the provinces from 1975 on, for example, are at best estimations. The fact that accounts of the provinces are not audited since 1975 is a well-known story. This also applies to other governmental units. So with such lack of information on revenues and expenditure the financial condition would be obscure to the extent that no appraisals or comments could be drawn. So it goes without saying reform through budgetary process is the order of the day. In fact such budgetary reform is prerequisite if improvement of the situation is to be attained.

If budgetary reform is desired at the national level, it is equally, if

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In an interview ith El-Shafa newspaper on November 6, 1981, the Auditor General stated that he is proposing to the Presidency cancelling of uncollected debts in the Southern Region because their accounts have not been audited for more than 15 years.
not more so desired at local level. At this level budgets are prepared, approved, and executed on ad hoc basis. Such a process is carried out by those who are least informed about budgeting techniques and process. To attain budgetary reform, local governments should rely on budget experts. These governments should train their finance and management officers in budgeting and fiscal decision making if they are to arrive at a clear picture of their financial condition.

A clear picture of financial conditions at national and sub-national governments make assessment of central aid and/or revenue sharing feasible. However, some recommendations on revenue sharing or central aid to local government in the Sudan, could be made at this stage.

To begin with, laws that govern local government revenues and financial affairs should be reformed and modernized. We noticed that these laws were based on the Local Government Ordinance of 1951. A close examination of local government revenue as stipulated by the Local Government Acts of 1971 and 1981 shows that these revenue sources were almost, if not the very same, stipulated by the 1951 Ordinance. Needless to say, in terms of revenue, what is meant for 1950 is obviously inappropriate for 1981.

Furthermore, it is high time to reform the taking system of local government, since taxes are the major source of revenue of this government. We have seen that most of these taxes were imposed, with specified maximums in the first quarter of the century. Some of these taxes are difficult to assess and collect. In fact, in some local councils the expenditure of

As a local government officer, I was involved in budgeting at provincial and local councils levels. I noticed how budgets are decided upon on an ad hoc basis. Councilors and finance officers are untrained in budgeting.
collecting some taxes (e.g., animal tax) exceeds the revenue of the taxes. So reform of the taxing system is long due. Such reform is expected to increase local revenues and in turn local governments dependence on central aid.

One more point concerning the existing grant-in-aid system is highly desirable. Concerning the volume of grants, communications between the centre and provinces should be improved to address the complaints of the provinces. Also the timing of the grant should be fully considered. That is to say the Ministry of Finance has to make clear well in advance of the annual budgetary cycle (say in December of the current fiscal year) how much central support would be available for the provinces.

As we have seen, the current pattern of providing funds is resented since it presents an undesirable detailed and comprehensive central control on the provinces. A shift from the existing form of grant to another form which gives provinces and local government more discretion, as the revenue sharing in the U.S., is highly recommended. In this respect, the study of taxing system now undertaken by the Ministry of Finance in collaboration with a I.M.F. team is greatly welcomed.


9) Ibid, p. 22.


14) Dr. Mukhtar Al-Assam, Decentralization in the Sudan, (Ministry of Culture and Information Press), Khartoum, 1980, p. 17.


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10) Mukhtar Al-Assam, Decentralization in the Sudan, (Ministry of Culture and Information Press), Khartoum, 1980.


Public Administration 375

Term Assignment

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS:
A Comparative Study of the Case of the U.S. and the Sudan

Submitted to:
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by

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Winter Term 1982
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Civil Service Commission as an institution is associated with the merit system. The merit system itself is relatively modern invention. Its invention came with the "advent of industrialization and the modern nation-state". In this respect Germany was considered the first modern nation to use the merit system. Then France & Britain followed suit. The United States was among the last of the major industrialized nations to inaugurate a civil service based on merit. The merit system emerged as a revolt against the patronage system or the so called 'spoil system'. Under the spoil system appointments, promotions and removals in the public service were based on political affiliations, party allegiance and family ties and/or social standing. Such practices were considered inappropriate. Thus merit system emerged as an alternative to the patronage system.

The merit system is traditionally concerned, among other things, with the principal that public employees are to be recruited by competitive examination and promoted on the basis either of tests or some system of rating employee performance. It is also concerned with the principal that removal of public employees should be based on misconduct instead of on political reasons.

The agency usually entrusted with administering the merit is the 'Civil Service Commission'. The commission is to determine fitness of candidate employees by the use of open, fair, honest impartial, competitive examinations. The commission is also entrusted to safeguard security of tenure of public employees. Also the commission is to safeguard the Civil Service against political intervention. In short, generally, one might say that civil service
commission is intended as a means of realizing competent, healthy public
service. In order to enable the Commission safeguard Civil Service against
possible political intrigue, patronage malpractice and favoritism, and to
enable it to discharge its duties in general, it is considered to be outside
the administrative hierarchy, nonpolitical and free from direct interference
from either the executive or legislative branches.
II

Historical Background
of the Civil Service Commission

A) The Case of the U.S. Commission:

The history of the U.S. Civil Service Commission is inseparable from the history of civil service reform. This is because the civil service commission came into being as a result of Civil Service reform.

The first attempt of reform resulting in establishing a Civil Service Commission, could be traced back to the year 1871. In that year a rider that authorized the president to make rules and regulations for the Civil Service was attached to an appropriation bill. On the basis of this rider President Grant appointed a Civil Service Commission. He "authorized the commission to establish and implement appropriate rules and regulations." Board of examiners were established in the departments. Under the supervision of the commission some thousands were examined, several hundred of whom were actually appointed. However these efforts were short lived. The Congress deemed these efforts as a threat to its patronage powers. Thus being reluctant to relinquish part of its power, the Congress refused to appropriate funds for the work for the commission. This denial of funds led to the termination of the commission in 1875.

Inspire of the termination of the Civil Service Commission in 1875, there were strong sentiments for reform. Less than a decade ensuing what a comprehensive reform act was passed. This took place in 1883 whence the Pendleton Act was enacted. It was considered to be "a fairly complete and firm legislative foundation for the development of a civil service based on examination and merit in the English sense...". Concerning administrative arrangement i.e., the establishment of a Civil Service Commission, Pendleton Act was built on the foundations of above mentioned Act of 1871.
Conduct or examinations — a prerequisite for holding a civil service position. The commission is also required to keep necessary records, make investigations and reports to the Congress through the President. Since its establishment in 1883, the Civil Service Commission went on functioning until January, 1979. Through its course of life the Commission remained generally intact in spite of some attempts to affect it. Scholars, generally divide the history of the Commission into five phases.

The first phase began in the years following its creation. The main concern of the Commission during this period was safeguarding the Civil Service against political intrigues and patronage encroachment of spoilsmen.

By the turn of the century the notion of 'efficiency' began to attract interest. During the second and third decades, 'scientific management', called for the "development of scientifically derived standards and the standardization of positions." Thus, during this second phase, emphasis shifted from depoliticization as a major concern of the Commission, toward insuring that examinations were related to job requirements.
The third phase was to begin in the first part of the thirties. During this period "the Commission was given authority for position classification, efficiency ratings, and retirement administration."\(^7\) This tendency to centralise personnel management by the Commission was regretted. In the words of the 1937 President's Committee on Administrative Management, "many friends of the Commission...feel that the more constructive types of personnel activity cannot be carried effectively by an agency which necessarily must give so much attention to the enforcement of restrictive statutes".

The report of the aforementioned committee instigated the fourth phase. This phase, characterized by reverse tendency of centralization, witnessed two important executive orders and a 1949 legislation. The first of these executive orders was issued by President Roosevelt in 1938. The order required departments to establish a division of personnel supervision and management. In 1947 President Truman issued an executive order emphasizing decentralization. According to this order agency heads were held responsible for planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling all personnel management programs in their respective agencies. Two years later, 1949, Classification Act was passed into law. As a result of these arrangements "agencies are currently responsible for position classification, evaluation, promotion, a good deal of recruitment efforts, and a host of other personnel functions."\(^8\)

The fifth phase is characterized by what is often called 'identity crises', as a result interchanging, often conflicting, roles of the Commission. A diverse flow of criticism poured in the face of the Commission.
Some thought it too responsive to special interest, e.g., veterans. Others found it applying restrictive regulations to bureau chiefs and other federal employees. Others criticized the Commission for failing to use its authority in such areas of equal employment opportunity. There are no better words to describe the situation of the Commission than its chairman's "Why do we exist? What is our identity? What is our purpose? Whom do we represent?"

Such a situation, coupled with the Commission's scandalous practices pertaining to the merit system, lead to its abandonment by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. According to this act the Civil Service Commission was replaced by the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Protection Board.

B) The Case of the Sudan Commission:

Unlike the U.S. Civil Service Commission, the Sudan Civil Service Commission has no long history behind it. In fact it came into being in the fifties of this century. The seeds of Sudan Civil Service Commission was to be found in 1950 when the Terms of Service Commission was appointed.

The Terms of Service recommended the establishment of a constitutional, independent Civil Service Commission. The Terms of Service Commission proposed that the Civil Service Commission be a small body of three or five members.

On the basis of the recommendations of the Terms of Service Commission, the Sudan Self-Government Statute of 1953, (Articles 89-97) authorized the Governor-General to appoint a Public Service Commission with the consent of the Council. According to the aforementioned statute the Civil Service
The first phase began with the appointment of the Commission and ended in 1956. This period could be labeled 'pre-independence era'. The Commission at this stage consisted of five members; three of whom were Sudanese (including the chairman); the other two were British. The terms of reference of the Commission, as mentioned before, were stated in the Sudan Self-Government Statute, 1953.

The second phase came with Independence in 1956; it ends in 1958. During this period the Commission continued its functions as before. The terms of reference and provision concerning the Commission were transferred to the Sudan Transitional Constitution of 1956. The two British members were replaced by Sudanese.

The third phase was the period of the Military rule 1958-1964. During this period the Commission lost most of its functions and powers to other agencies. The Public Service Commission Act, 1958 transferred most of the Commission's responsibilities concerning appointments, promotion, transfer, and retirement to the Council of Ministers. The Official's Discipline Ordinance of the 1927 was amended. As a result of this, the disciplinary powers of the Commission were transferred to other agencies. So sum up the Commission no longer retained its independence.
The fourth phase came with the October Revolution, 1964. During this period the Commission regained most of its usurped responsibilities. The Sudan Transitional Constitution was amended (Article 10) toward this end. These restored powers and functions were the same as those stipulated by the Self-Government Statute of 1953.

In 1969 began the fifth phase. Since that year the Commission was subject to many changes. To begin with, the Civil Service Commission was dissolved in 1969. Three years later, the Public Service Council and Public Servant Committee of Appeals were established. These two bodies inherited the functions and responsibilities of the Civil Service Commission. Both organs were to have provisions in the Constitution of the Sudan, 1973 (Article 205). The Council's function is to advise the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform on recruitment, wages and salaries, compensation, budget estimates, training, and administrative reform. The Council also, is to practice the powers of councils under the Retirement Provident Fund Ordinances. On the other hand, the Committee of Appeals, as the name implies, is concerned with grievances of employees.

Once again, in December 1981, the Council and the Committee merged in one body named Public Service Commission. According to the recent reorganization the Commission is to advise the President of the Republic on public service laws, regulations, and conditions of work and recruitment. An appeal committee was made sub-unit of the Commission. The Appeal Committee is to be under the chairmanship of the Commission's chairman. These arrangements were provided for by an amendment to the Public Service Act, 1973.
functions and roles of the Civil Service Commission safeguard public service against patronage encroachment and political intrigue. The Commission was required to make investigation on matters pertaining to the enforcement of these regulations and rules. An annual report to the Congress through the President was to be prepared by the Commission.

In executing its function, the Commission is supposed to serve the President in providing managerial leadership. In other words, the Commission is responsible for "establishing personnel policies and advising and assisting agencies on personnel management functions." All at the same time, the Commission was to serve as a 'watchdog' over employees' rights (merit system), besides performing a variety of adjudicatory functions.

We have seen in part II how emphasis changed from time-to-time in performing these functions. From safeguarding public employees against spoilsmen to attempts at developing scientific personnel administration; to centralization and later on decentralization.

However, the Commission's functions and role could be summarized in the words of Shafritz as follows:
1. To recommend legislation;
2. To encourage departments and agencies to improve their personnel management;
3. To promulgate government-wide personnel policies and standards under law;
4. To develop personnel programs;
5. To centrally operate certain personnel services;
6. To provide technical assistance to agencies;
7. To evaluate the effectiveness of personnel management in the agencies;
8. To adjudicate employee appeals;
9. To assure compliance with civil service laws and merit principles.

Later when the Commission was dissolved in 1978, these functions were divided between the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board.

B) The Sudan Civil Service Commission Functioning as Constitutional Body:

Unlike the case of U.S. Civil Service Commission, the Sudan Civil Service Commission was a constitutional body. It has been created on the basis of Constitutional provisions. It was first created according to the provisions of the Sudan Self-Government Statute, 1954. This took place before the Independence. However, two years later the same provision of the Statute were transferred to the Sudan Transitional Constitution. Except for the period of the Military Rule (1958 - 1964), the country was governed by the Sudan Transitional Constitution until 1969. In 1969 the Sudan Civil Service was abandoned. Three years later the Commission was reformed. The
was amended (Article 101) to provide for the functions of the Civil Service Commission. This Article (101) reads:

"The Commission shall be consulted by the Council or the Minister concerned, and shall make recommendations to the Council or the Minister in respect of the principles to be observed in the following matters in regard to the Public Service:

a) Recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer and retirement;

b) the holding of examination for entry into service or promotion;

c) the enforcement of discipline."

The following Article (102) of the Transitional Constitution provided that:

"The Council or the Minister concerned shall submit the following matters to the Commission on which may make recommendations to the Council or the Minister concerned:

a) Proposals for regulations affecting the salaries or conditions of service of Government Services.

b) Proposals for the creation of new posts to which superscale salaries are to be allocated."
c) Proposals for the promotion of Government servants to posts to which super-scale salaries are alloted."

As is clear, the abovementioned provisions rendered the Commission a mere advisory body. But that is not the whole story; the Commission has disciplinary function. Article (105) of the Transitional Constitution reads:

"Save as law otherwise provided the Commission shall exercise and perform:

a) The power and duties vested in the Central Board of Discipline under the Officials' Discipline Ordinance, 1927.

b) The powers and duties vested in all or any of the Councils constituted under the several Sudan Government Pensions and Provident Fund Ordinance."

Added to that, the Commission has an appellate function. Article (106) of the Transitional Constitution provided for this function, "any governmental servant greived by any decision made against him may submit a petition to the Commission."

These constitutional arrangements went on until 1969 when the Transitional Constitution was abandoned. The Commission was dissolved too. However in 1972, the Council of Ministers issued a resolution whereby a Council of Public Service was established as an assistant agency to the Ministry of Public Service and administrative reform.

A year later, 1973, this Council was recognized by the adopted Constitution
as a constituent of the Public Service Commission. The other constituent
was the Public Employee's Committee of Appeals. Article (205) of the
Constitution of the Sudan authorized the President of the Republic to
appoint a Civil Service Commission. The Commission is to be composed of
a) the Public Service Council, and b) Public Employee's Committee of
Appeals. The same article stipulated that regulations governing the
formation and functions of the Commission are to be determined by
legislation. Thus, the Public Service Ordinance, 1973 stipulated the
function of the Public Service Commission as follows:

1. to advise the Minister of Public Service and Administrative
Reform on the following matters;
a) the policy concerning recruitment, wages and salaries,
allowance, and compensation;
b) estimations of the budget pertaining to personnel;
c) classification of positions;
d) plans for administrative reform;
e) desirable amendments of Public Service laws and regulations.

2. to exercise the powers and duties vested on any Council
constituted under the several Sudan Government Pensions and
Provident Fund Ordinances."

a) The Public Employee's Committee of Appeals:

1. To judge on public employee petitions provided that
   those employees were not graded in super-scales.

2. To set regulations governing the procedures of its work.
IV

The Commissioners Role as Central Body
In the Personnel System [Sudan]

During the period, 1954-1969, the Public Service Commission performance is generally considered to be weak. This was due to political intrigue and interference. In fact it is thought that political interference is inevitable since there is no clear cut demarcation between politics and administration especially at the upper level of government. The tendency of political interference was disadvantageous to the Commission. This political interference discarded the Commission since one of its primary objectives is to safeguard public service against such intrigues.

Thus the Public Service Commission which was to act as a 'watch dog' to the merit principle, and as a regulatory agency ended up as an advisory body. Furthermore, in practice, during this period, advice of the Commission was not asked for; at best attention was not paid to its advice. So what happened in practice, is that most of personnel policies and practices were in fact formulated and administered by different ministries and departments. To give an example, the conduct of examination for entry to public service was vested on the Sudan Examination Council. The Council was an independent body; the Commission has no jurisdiction over the council.

After 1969 the Public Service Commission, as prescribed by the law, was to act as an advisory body. The Commission's disciplinary role was brought to an end in 1969 when the Transitional Constitution, which provide for such role, was abandoned. Thus the Commission role, as a central body in the personnel system, was much reduced so a advisory body. To be precise,
besides its primary advisory role, the Commission was to exercise the powers and duties vested in any Council constituted under Sudan Pensions and Provident Fund Ordinance; added to that its function as an appellate body.

Though the Commission role was reduced, it continued to function as a central personnel agency. However, strictly speaking the real central personnel agency is the Establishment Office. It is in this office personnel policies and practices were formulated and administered. In fact, compared with the Commission, Establishment Office has the upper-hand regarding the administration of the personnel system.
Conclusion

Governments, in developed and underdeveloped countries alike, are the biggest employers in their societies. The public employees, the core of governments, carry out governmental activities with unmarveled expertise. In short they are the heart of the government.

Considering the crucial role of government employees, it goes without saying that well conceived plans should be set to recruit and attract the best candidates. It is, also, of importance to develop a sound system of selecting and ascertain that only those who are highly qualified are appointed and placed in positions in which they are best fitted. Having selected the best it is of paramount importance to give them fair salaries taking into account the competition presented by the private sector. Furthermore, comprehensive training programs geared toward enhancing the skills of employees, raising their morale, and preparing them for promotions and career development, should be set forth. Besides, satisfactory plans for periodic evaluation and appraisal of employees' performance in order to identify the most competent and promote them, should be set. In addition to that, a complete program for maintaining the morale and discipline of the employees should not be underscored. Not to forget in this respect setting of plans for the retirement of those employees.

In other words, to maintain a competent, visible and efficient public service, a personnel agency should be created to undertake the formation and implementation of the abovementioned plans and achieving this goal.
In some countries the personnel agency take the form of a public service commission; in others a departmental agency. As we have seen both countries, U.S. and the Sudan, experienced the Commission's form of personnel agency.

However, the Commission has its shortcomings, that, to my contention, outweigh its advantages. To begin with, the idea of centralizing the public personnel administration in the hands of a commission seem to raise questions about the constitutionality of such an act since the administration of personnel systems is the responsibility of the President or the head of the state. Furthermore, if the Commission is to function it is desirable to be an independent or quasi-independent body. Such an arrangement proved to be unrealistic since it normally functions on delegatory powers. Added to that it is difficult, if not impossible, to insulate administration from politics. This is especially true of developing countries where socio-economic development is a political process to the extent that it is dependent upon economic policy making.

Another point, is that the commission has its rivals since it is not the sole personnel agency or control other personnel agencies. The Establishment office (Sudan) is a case in point. The existence of such rivaling agencies defeat the desirable idea that uniform personnel policies and regulations be applied throughout the Public Service. It also hurts the Public Service image when it comes to overlapping or even conflicting personnel practices. Such fragmentary practices when coupled by an advisory form of Commission, as in the case of the Sudan, tend to increase the role of the individual governmental departments.
Management and a Merit Protection Board. It is hoped that Sudan would follow suit.
FOOTNOTES


3) Ibid, p. 17.


8) Ibid, p. 42.


POVERTY IN PERSPECTIVE:
THE CASE OF THE U.S. AND THE SUDAN

Submitted To:
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CHAPTER III

A. POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE U.S.A.

B. POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE SUDAN

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION
The question of poverty seems to be a formidable one. This is due to the complexity of the issue. Scholars and researchers who studied the problem of poverty seem to disagree on all but one aspect of the question, i.e., its complexity. As one of these researchers put it, "poverty has a formidable ally in our own ignorance of what we must do to root out poverty. When one stands 'eyeball to eyeball' with poverty, preparing for mortal struggle, he will admit, if he is candid, that he does not know exactly what is best to do or how to do it."1 Needless to say, adequate understanding is a prerequisite to knowing what to do and/or how to do it. Lack of understanding regarding the problem of poverty is frequently voiced. Reporting on one seminar of leading poverty experts held in the late 1960's, for instance, Daniel P. Moynihan, concluded, "There was no common understanding as to what the nature of poverty or the process of deliberate social change."2

Perhaps, the complexity arises from the fact that poverty does not fit neatly into any of the major disciplines. Economist, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists, among others, are all concerned with the problem of poverty. However, each approaches the problem from different perspectives. Economists, for example, tend to emphasize economic growth and income maintenance, whereas sociologists emphasize opportunity rather than income. Thus, it is difficult to arrive at a definition and measurement of poverty.

The following varied definition highlights the complexity of the question. Recognizing the limitations of cash income as an indicator of economic status, economists developed a new concept and definition of poverty. This concept starts from the basic model of consumer choice. It stresses the distinction between preferences and constraints,
and argues that the notion of poverty should be limited to the more objective constraint side of consumer theory. Accordingly, poverty is defined as a severe constriction of the choice set. Elaborating on this concept economists, like Moon and Smolansky, conclude that "the economic concept is defined in terms of the external circumstances that conditions a person's behavior, especially the behavior he displays in economic transactions: buying consumption items, selling productive services, securing professional advice, etc."³

Another concept economists adhere to is the cultural concept. To Professor Boulding, "Poverty is not a condition of the individual person, but is always a condition of a society or of a subculture within a society."⁴ He believes that "within wide limits, poverty is a state of mind more than it is a state of income...my main thesis that poverty is a product of social systems. Some cultures and subcultures breed poverty as surely as a waterfent breeds rats."⁵ Thus, the cultural concept focuses on the internal attitudes and behavior patterns that a person brings to any particular set of circumstances.

Others tend to define poverty as relative deprivation, relative in regard to the rest of the society. Accordingly, "people are poverty stricken when their income, even if adequate for survival, falls markedly behind that of the community."⁶ A broader relative definition of poverty stricken refers to those "individuals and families whose resources, over time, fall seriously short of the resources commanded by the average individual or family in the community in which they live, whether this community is a local, national, or international one."⁷

Besides the relative definition there is an absolute definition. An absolute standard attempts to define some basic set of resources necessary for adequate survival.
Another definition maintains that the poor are "those who are not now maintaining a decent standard of living; those whose basic needs exceed their means to satisfy them."\(^2\)

A more comprehensive attempt at defining poverty is offered by Oscar Oranati. He maintains that poverty is variously defined as being subjective, objective, or relative, involving insufficiency or inequality or both.

"Subjective poverty refers to the individual's feeling rich or poor, according to the range of currently available goods and services he might reasonably expect to enjoy."\(^9\)

In terms of inequality, the poor are defined as "making up some part of the bottom of the income distribution, some kind of lower fifth, eighth, tenth or whatever fraction might be chosen."\(^10\)

In terms of insufficiency, Oranati defines poverty as the "condition of persons whose resources have been insufficient to satisfy minimum needs."\(^11\)

"Objectively poverty can be measured in terms of the proportion of currently agreed upon basic necessities that income can buy. Most necessary to human health and well-being, everybody will agree, are basic food, shelter, and clothing."\(^12\)

As seen, the above mentioned definitions are varied and each, depending upon the researcher's background, stresses a different thing. None of these definitions by itself provide a satisfactory definition of poverty. Regarding the economic and the cultural definition, for instance, one can say that any program aimed at fighting poverty will, in general, influence both economic poverty and the culture of poverty, but not in equal proportions or with equal directness. As for the
relative definition, it recognized the notion of place, i.e., relative in regard to the rest of the society and ignores the notion of time. The inequality definition is hard to accept since it is natural that inequality of income always exists.

So it would be wise to consider all these definitions in approaching the problem of poverty. However, for our immediate purpose, it is sufficient to define the poor as those whose resources are insufficient to cover what is for that society and at that time the subsistence minimum. This definition applies both to individuals and families, as well as countries. The question now is poverty inevitable and can it be eliminated? Chapter II attempts to answer this question.
The United States is the richest country in the world today. A glance at Table 1 (Appendix 1) shows vividly the enormity of its wealth. Its GNP per capita in 1978 was $9,390; its average annual growth rate 2.4 (1960-78). Its physical quality of life is one of the highest with adult literacy rate 99%, and life expectancy at birth, 73 years (1978). In short, its Gross National Product exceeds $1 trillion.

Considering such enormity of wealth, one might mistakenly assume that there is no poverty in the U.S. In spite of its wealth, "hunger and malnutrition exists, but not because the nation lacks food. Millions are condemned to rural shacks and urban slums, but not because the nation can not build houses. We cannot blame the meagerness of nature, nor can we blame a low level of technology. Such old justifications for poverty have no validity in the United States today."13

The bare fact is not only that poverty exists in the U.S., but it affects all ethnic groups, all ages and every region in the country. The poor "can be found in the tar-paper shacks of Appalachia, the migrant-labor camps of Florida, Texas and California, the Mexican-American slums of the southwest, the declining neighborhood of the aged, the Indian reservations of every section of the country, and the ghettos of every major American city."14

Though the pockets of poverty seem to be almost everywhere in the country and affects tens of millions Americans, they are mostly invisible. As Michael Harrington has put it, "the people of other America do not, by far and large, belong to unions, to fraternal organizations, or to political parties. They are without lobbies of
their own; they put no forward legislative programs. As a group, they are atomized. They have no face; they have no voice."\(^{13}\)

Harrel R. Rodgers maintains that they are invisible "because we want them to be. Poverty is an affront to the American image of unlimited beauty and opportunity."\(^{16}\) These words explain why the issue of poverty remained dormant until the sixties. As a matter of fact, poverty existed in America since early days of the republic. However, the concern about it came only after World War II, as late as the 1960's. It should be noted, that the New Deal programs were not aimed at eliminating or alleviating poverty, rather, it was a response to the exceptional circumstances of the Depression which threatened the very existence of the capitalist system itself. However, the New Deal voiced the sufferings of millions, but not for long. Concern about these sufferings faded away with the Depression. Massive unemployment of the Depression had disappeared during World War II; thus, the issue of sufferings lost its political potency. Affluence seemed to be everywhere. "...the median real income of American families rose by 40% (between 1950-1960)..." "Life styles changes drastically, as millions of white middle-classes families, abetted by Federal highways and home mortgage programs, fled the cities for the suburbs. Outdoor barbecues. Patios. Two cars. Four-bedroom homes. Two bathrooms. Washing machines. Drying machines. Freezers. Air conditioners. Boats. Vacation homes, and even swimming pools. Not every suburban family had everything, but most had something and aspired to more. Pursuing the good life, who would think of care that millions still lived in rat-infested slums?"\(^{17}\)
The political repressiveness at that time contributed to the disappearance of poverty as a public issue. "For in the heyday of McCarthyism and the witch hunt, conformity was the watchword. Working to correct flaws in American society, or even calling attention to them, was dangerous. Critics were labeled communist and subversive and threatened by the blacklist and jail. Clearly the atmosphere was not conducive to an emphasis on poverty."

Given such an atmosphere and the prevailing sentiment, no wonder attention to poverty came as late as the 1960's. By then the political atmosphere of repressiveness gave way to more liberalism. Influential works about poverty were published (e.g., The Other America; Our Invisible Poor) which drew attention and added considerably to public concern about severe poverty, hunger, and deprivation in the United States. The poor had become increasingly visible, in their massive demonstrations in Washington, D.C. and other cities which focused national attention on racism, unemployment, hunger, and poverty; in welfare rights organizations; in unionization campaigns; and in the flames of protest in the ghettos of major cities throughout the country.

The poor who were recognized in the 1960's live under conditions that are not only hard to believe but evoke sheer shame and horror once revealed. The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs of 1968, include testimony of the poor that give first-hand accounts of the panorama of human misery. One witness (household head) before the Commission testimony portrays vividly and shockingly how poor families are inadequately fed. "Maybe if I have four potatoes I will fry them and given them all to go around. Sometimes we don't eat. When the check comes I don't have maybe $3 left."
With those $3 we have to eat. Sometimes we eat and sometimes we look at each other."

Another witness testified, "I don't have enough to buy food. That is the reason why I am sick with high blood pressure, heart trouble, because I don't have money to buy the kind of food that I am supposed to have."

Most poor cannot afford private medical care and are not covered by insurance. Many cannot afford the transportation to free medical facilities or there may be no medical charity available to them. Such miserable situations are revealed by the following testimony. "It took me nine months... to get a man in the nursing home. He fell and broke his hip and injured his foot. He was ninety-two years old. When we finally got an opening... he had died because the foot had already become infected, gangrenous, and it was too late."

Millions of the poor live in homes that are obviously unfit for human dwelling. In the words of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, the shanties and shacks found in rural areas look like remnants from an earlier era. One rural resident who lives with her daughter and eight grandchildren described her housing as "a four-room house, and it rains into it. Have to get up at night and put a dishpan to keep the rain off the children."

This is also true of urban housing of the poor whose outward appearance is often deceptive. The testimony of an urban mother reveals the reality, "the house is in bad condition and everytime it rains the water comes in. I've called public housing many times and they just tell you over the phone, 'What am I to do about this?' And the roof leaks, and the water comes through the windows. This is a
contaminated and a health hazard. My children are sick all the time."23

Such devastating conditions of living result in poor quality of life and present formidable barriers to educational and occupational achievement. A striking self-explanatory example is found in the piercing words of a witness..."you have the situation where one member of the family is in school today and the other member isn't, and when one asks, 'where is you brother today?' he is told, it is not his turn to wear the shoes today."24

A medical team sent by Field Foundation in 1967 to study the medical conditions of Head Start Children of Mississippi concluded that "They are living under such primitive conditions that we found it hard to believe we were examining American children of the twentieth century."25

The aforementioned testimonies and statements reveal the severity of the plight, but, perhaps, Dick Notz's words summarize the situation much more expressively. He maintained that researchers in 1967 concluded that:

1. We knew more about the nutritional status of persons in thirty-one underdeveloped countries of the world than of Americans, rich or poor.

2. We were better informed about the nutritional content of the food fed to our dogs, cattle, and pigs than about human food.

3. The diet of the poor in Mississippi was uniformly worse than had been that of the average southern family with less than $2,000 annual income in 1955, twelve years earlier.

4. Poverty children lagged from six months to two-and-a-half years behind their peers in physical development; 34% were badly anemic, 33% suffered severe shortage of vitamin A (or which fortified milk is a primary source), and 13% lacked adequate amounts of
vitamin C.26

Now we know that poverty still exists in prosperous America, and its ugly face plagues the country. But the question raised in Chapter I is still to be answered. Is poverty inevitable?

The answer is yes and no. Yes, if one thinks of poverty in terms of inequality. In this framework, history taught humanity that poverty is but natural. This idea became deeply etched in men's minds to the extent that it seemed to conform to reality.

In terms of sufficiency as stated at the end of Chapter I, the answer is no. According to that definition, poverty could be eliminated in the U.S. if it chose so. Through history, never a country has enjoyed the wealth of the U.S.; never was a country used technology and/or has been endowed with plentiful natural resources as the U.S. In short, the U.S. wealth makes eradication of poverty feasible if it chooses to do so, through redistribution of income.

However, given the philosophy underlying the American system, poverty is anticipated to persist amid plenty in the U.S. Several built-in factors contribute to poverty in America. Poverty is the logical result of capitalism, discrimination and bias, and geographic isolation. There might be other factors but these were by all means the primary ones.

A. Capitalism:

Capitalism as an economic system in which one class of individuals owns the means of production, hire another class of individuals who own nothing productive but their power of labor, and engage in production and sales in order to make private profit, is conductive to the persistence of poverty. Analysing the elements of capitalism makes this point quite clear.
1. Private and Free Enterprise:

In a capitalist economy those who use the means of production receive all the profits. In such an economy the best profits might be obtained by catering to the needs of the wealthy and the middle class, ignoring the unprofitable needs of the lower income or poor groups.

An important corollary of the private enterprise doctrine is the sanctity of private property. Citizens of the U.S. are taught at an early age that personal property is essential to individual dignity and liberty. This is instrumental in convincing citizens to accept the legitimacy and privilege of great wealth and providing business with a defense against regulation by government of the way it uses its property.

Furthermore, free enterprise is supposed to function according to the law of supply and demand. However, a number of things can interfere with this law as in the case of monopoly. In such a case firms can set prices at a profitable level without worrying about offering a better product and/or price.

2. Materialism - Individualism:

Under capitalism individuals work not for the collective good but for their own self interest. In other words, personal greed is considered functional. Accordingly the market favors those who compete successfully and reap the profit.

An important corollary of this materialism - individualism involves the notion of greed as a motivator. Greed may motivate people, but it can also cause them to do things that are quite harmful. Yet example, a capitalist, driven by his personal greed, may gain an edge on the competition by paying workers extremely low wages, by ignoring unsafe
working conditions, or by polluting the environment. Such actions are likely to keep some people poor and cause others to be unhealthy.

Another corollary involves the virtue of self reliance. Under pure capitalism, economic insecurity is considered necessary to force people to be self reliant; thus welfare programs are not welcomed in a capitalist economy.

A third corollary concerns the capitalists belief that the economic system rewards individuals equitably. According to this notion, people receive the wages they deserve. If they receive very low wages, it is because either they have limited skills or they fail to work hard enough. Of course this is not always true. Many factors can interfere with equitable economic rewards. Suffice to mention discrimination which denies some people their just opportunities and/or compensations.

3. Elite Rule:

A by product of capitalism is elite rule. The realities of political leadership in the U.S. is supportive of this argument. The overwhelming majority of political leaders in America "emerge from the richest 20 percent of American families." The obvious corollary is that these leaders do not share the characteristics of the poor, nor do they identify and/or understand the needs of the poor. The remarks of the majority leader in 1977 after he toured East Harlem and South Bronx areas of New York City, were very illuminative: "It's far worse than I ever imagined. I thought I understood the problems of the cities but I didn't fully comprehend them. I don't understand them and very few of the members of Congress really do..." In addition to that because the poor have very limited influence in the political system, there are few real pressures on political leaders to be concerned with the poor.
4. Discrimination:

Hundred of years of discrimination against large numbers of American citizens, economic exploitation, and sexism which still survives, contributed to poverty in America.

Though minorities and women have made some progress toward equality in the last two decades, the ghost of past suppression still haunts the present.

5. Geographic Isolation:

The fact that millions of citizens live outside the social and economic mainstream contributes to poverty in the U.S. People isolated in rural areas, especially in the South and in Appalachia, have fewer job opportunities, the worst educational systems, and the poorest health care, because these sections of the country do not fully share in the prosperity and growth of the rest of the country.29

This is also true of millions of blacks who migrated after World War II to urban areas in the North and South. Their dreams of making a better life have never been fulfilled.

B. The Context of Poverty: The Case of the Sudan

Unlike the U.S., Sudan belongs to the family of low income countries. Its GDP per capita in 1978 was $120 with an average annual growth rate of 0.1% (between 1960-77). The percentage of adult literacy in 1975 was 20%. Life expectancy at birth (1978) was 46 years. These figures confirm the fact that for Sudan as a low income country, perhaps, ranks at the bottom of low income countries.

Given this fact, I think there is no point of speaking about the poor in the Sudan as in the case of the poor in America. So my approach
is to consider the country, Sudan, as a poor or developing country and treat it likewise.

Now the question to be asked again, as I did with the case of the U.S., what factors that contributed to the poverty of the Sudan? A number of factors have contributed to that end, but most primary factors were colonialism, lack of resources and institutional heritage.

1. Colonialism:

Perhaps colonial rule which lasted for almost sixty years, contributed more than any other factor to the issue of poverty. A main concern of colonial rule was subjugation and maintenance of law and order. The meager services provided during this era were designed to meet this end. Railways, for instance, were built for strategic purposes and/or to strengthen the control of the colonial rule. Few schools were built to provide the necessary supporting staff (clerks, bookkeepers, typists, etc.). Behind this were economic measures, i.e., to substitute the costly, and perhaps the Egyptians who held these posts since the early days of colonial rule. Cotton was introduced by the colonial rule. The main reason was to generate the necessary revenues to meet the expenditures of colonial rule. In short, everything done during that era was intended to meet that end — law and order; development and the well being of people had no room in the colonial diction.

Further measures were taken to ensure that no native would escape the vicious circle of mere subsistence. Trade, a possible outlet of this circle, was governed by a number of restrictions to affect that policy. Restrictions were imposed on the number and nationality of traders allowed to operate in specified areas. No surprise, those
2. Lack of Resources:
   a. Natural Resources:

   Clearly the Sudan is blessed with relatively favorable land to population ratios (population 17.4 million; area 1.5 million km², 1978). However, the quality of land of vast areas were typically poor because of the interaction of topography and climate. In these vast areas rain is scanty or non-existent. Where rainfall is bountiful, year-to-year fluctuations are great, and the intra-season pattern frequently uneven and unpredictable; both aspects hinder rainfall agriculture. In some areas "soils are derived from old acid parent rock which is calcium and plant nutrients. And if green cover is removed, the high heat of the tropical sun and/or heavy spasmodic rainfall easily threatens the thin layer of humus on which plant life depends. When that happens the soil readily turn into infertile laterite." There are, of course, significant exceptions to the endowment of poor soils, in the shape of alluvial soil along the Nile and the rich volcanic soils of Jebel Marra (see map, Appendix ).

   Finally, tropical heat and absence of frost permit life and reproduction of bacteria, insects and plants to go on throughout the year, thus complicating the problems of pest and weed control. Unlike most of the African countries, Sudan has no mineral resources. That is why it depends mainly on agriculture.

   b. Human Resources:

   As a result of the colonial rule policies, Sudan was impoverished when it won its independence in 1956. Backwardness was
there everywhere and/or engulfing all sectors of the economy. In the area of manpower deficiency was preeminent. Examining Table 2 (Appendix - ) of education indicators for 1960 reveal the factors behind this deficiency -- (it should be noted that the effort of post-independence 1956-1960 substantially raised these figures).

Students of development have always regarded lack of skills and experience to man the modern public and private sectors as the major constraints on socioeconomic development. In this regard Sudan is not an exception.

Implicit in this argument is the assumption that development and spread of the modern sector -- including agriculture, industry, education, transportation, etc. -- would more or less automatically solve other types of human resource problems, such as health, nutrition, etc.

Accepting this argument all governments, since independence emphasized education and training in order to man modern sectors with competent and skilled personnel. It should be noted, that by the early 1970's when the country had been equipped with a relatively substantial number of skilled manpower, a fairly substantial number had emigrated to the oil producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya, and U.A.E.), thus aggravating the process of development.

3. Economic Structure:

At independence, Sudan, like other African countries, had a small open economy with the foreign trade approximately accounting for 20 percent of the national product. Typically the export trade was characterized by heavy dependence on a few primary commodities, namely cotton, arabic gum, and sesame. There were very few industry links,
since the overwhelming bulk of the processing of these exportable agricultural products had been in Western Europe. Agriculture has always been the dominant sector, accounting for 40 to 60 percent of the national product. Economic infrastructure such as railways, roads, dams and irrigation schemes, power and water utilities, and so forth were either in poor shape or non-existent at the time of independence.

4. Institutional Heritage:

It is recognized that the geographic boundaries of the Sudan, together with other African states, were the accident of colonial history and frequently not congruent with any indigenous cultural and/or linguistic demarcations. (Later on this led to border conflicts, ad hoc immigration and influx of refugees -- thus hindering the process of development). A study of the World Bank maintains that, "Nationhood, in the form of the apparatus and practices of a modern state, came to Africa very fast and created formidable new challenges to expand traditional, which tended to be limited to kinship groups and tribes, to embrace the nation." This is especially true of the Sudan where the advent of statehood preceded the crystallization of a full blown national consciousness. This had important consequences for the functioning of modern public institutions. The extent of moral loyalties and allegiances commanded by tribe and kinship group exceeded those extended to public institutions. Perhaps, these traditional ties underlies the recurrent tribal disputes that not only hamper the development process, but more importantly, threaten national unity.

A more important corollary that has had serious consequences, was the conflict of the North and the South of Sudan. That bloody conflict which had continued for seventeen years (1955-1972), expectantly had
among other things, a negative impact on the development process of the country.

Now that we have discussed the factors that contributed to poverty, what were the efforts made to alleviate it? The answer to this will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

A. Poverty and Plenty: The U.S.A.

Now we know that poverty exists amid plenty and we have discussed the factors that contributed to this fact, but the questions to be asked are: What is the extent of poverty in the U.S.? Even more importantly, what is done to resolve it?

Concerning the extent of poverty, it is noteworthy that in spite of the huge volumes of data about poverty there is no consensus as to the size of poverty or the number of poor in America. This is because the size of poverty is determined by the way one defines poverty. We have seen in Chapter I different definitions of poverty. Hence each definition produces different figures about the extent of poverty. Furthermore, using the same definition yields different figures. For instance, the absolute definition produces different figures since the bottom line or the threshold of poverty differs from one researcher and/or bureau to another.

Table 3.1 (Appendix C) makes this point very clear. It includes two separate definitions of poverty, a subsistence definition and an adequacy definition. The figures vary according to the definition applied. Table 3.2 (Appendix D) which, using a different threshold of poverty, shows different figures too. However, for convenience we will rely on figures compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Census. Accordingly, Table 3.3 (Appendix D) shows that the percentage of the poor ranges between 22.2% in 1960 to 12.8 percent in 1994.
The number of the poor in the U.S. in 1960 was 39.85 million (see Table 3: (Appendix 1). The year 1960 is relevant to the question of poverty because since then politicians began to express their concern about the extent of poverty. Students of poverty seem to agree that Kennedy was among the first to voice his concern about poverty during his campaign for the presidency in 1960. During his tour on destitute West Virginia he implored the public "to help eradicate such human suffering." Once in office, Kennedy quickly expanded the food commodity program and initiated a pilot food stamp program. And during the summer of 1961, President Kennedy ordered various federal agencies to develop a case for full scale attack on poverty.

President Johnson decided to expand on Kennedy's efforts, thus in 1963 he declared a War on Poverty. Different legislations were enacted starting with the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. New strategies were aimed to break the cycle of poverty and to make the poor more independent by upgrading their skills and earning power and by involving them in the fight against poverty. New bureaus and offices were established to run the new antipoverty and aid programs. For practical reasons it is appropriate to deal with these programs collectively. Hence one can say that these programs are of three basic types:

1. Social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Compensation. Social insurance programs are based on employee and/or employer contributions and benefits are wage related.

2. Cash assistance programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).

3. In-kind programs such as food stamps and medicaid, which provide a non-cash service.
These programs differ as to the aid they offer to the poor. Table 2.3 (Appendix C) which shows how public-oriented social welfare expenditures are disbursed to various income quintiles (cash and in-kind aid to businesses not included), indicates that in 1976, 31.9 percent of all social insurance expenditures went to the poorest 20 percent of the citizens. 61.7% of all cash assistance went to the poor as did 53% of all in-kind benefits. A superficial look to these percentages may be deceptive. For instance, the 61.7% of the cash assistance is relatively high compared to 31.9% of the social insurance, but considering the total amount of both types of programs reveals the reality. The total of cash assistance was $18 billion while the total of social insurance was $124 billion.

Many scholars believe that the war against poverty was never really fought (especially during the period of the late sixties and the early seventies). Helen Ginsburg concluded that, "the lack of a new and more adequate income maintenance made the War Against Poverty considerably cheaper than it would otherwise have been, doubtless an important consideration for the Johnson administration. For it soon became apparent that the costly war, an all-out war, was going to be waged against the Vietnamese, not against poverty."[3]

Another scholar believed that "the War on Poverty never got off the ground, because funds were diverted to the undeclared war in Southeast Asia. Donovan calculated that "the funding for OEO from fiscal years 1965 to 1973 cost approximately $15.5 billion. Expenditures for the war in Vietnam during the same period totalled some $120 billion."[46]

This might be true, but not for long. Table 2.3 (Appendix C) shows that the major social insurance programs in 1976 cost $93.5 billion
(74% of all social welfare expenditures) and $110.2 billion (75% of all social welfare expenditures) in 1976. Cash assistance expenditures in 1975 totalled $15.2 billion (12% of expenditures) and $16.2 billion in 1976 (11% of expenditures). In-kind programs cost $17.7 billion in 1975 (14% of expenditures) and $12.0 billion in 1976 (14% of all expenditures).

These figures show a rapid growth of social welfare programs -- contrary to early practices and beliefs of scholars above mentioned. However, it should be noted that though welfare expenditures accounts for an increasing large share of the total federal budget, welfare programs designed primarily to deal with needs of the poor do not constitute a very large share of the total. For example, "in 1976, cash assistance expenditures by the federal government constituted about 3 percent of the total federal budget. In-kind federal expenditures for food stamps and medicaid accounted for another 4 percent. The broadly oriented social insurance programs such as social security, medicare, and unemployment compensation accounted for 31.5 percent of the total federal budget."

Though the programs primarily designed to deal with the needs of the poor constitute a relatively small share of the total welfare expenditures, still they command a large sum of money in absolute terms. Hence, one is tempted to ask about the impact of these programs on poverty.

Scholars differ on how many poor who are helped through these programs to cross the line of poverty. Each of them come with some figures that are incompatible with other studies and statistics. However, for convenience we are not going to go into these details of varying figures. Suffice here to rely on the data of the U.S. Bureau of Census. Table 5.5 (Appendix 1) shows poverty standards for a family of four.
(non farm) from 1959 to 1976. It shows that the percentage of poverty between 1959-1962 was almost static, about 22%. Between 1963-1970 it ranged between 19% and 13%. And between 1971-1976 the percentage remained almost the same around 12%.

If we add the farm families, whose living conditions are not as susceptible to change as non-farm families, we expect the percentage of poor families (farm and non-farm) to be somewhat higher. With this in mind one can embark on a conclusion that the percentage of the poor remained almost the same over the years in spite of public assistance programs. The question is why?

There are different reasons for this. However, we will concern ourselves with the main ones. To start with, one can say that there is no overall program designed to deal with the poor. Instead, a whole series of individual, frequently duplicative, programs have been created in serial installments by various levels of government in response to a particular problem or in response to some of the needs of a particular segment of the total poverty population. Often benefits are not geared to needs, rather to the individual’s fitness into the eligibility criteria of programs.

Another reason is administrative. Each of these programs has its own eligibility standards and its own methods of defining income and poverty. Responsibility for administration of these various welfare levels of government, federal, state, and local. Responsibility is spread in a “complex and often dysfunctional way.” For example, the Social Security Administration administers Social Security and SSI, the Department of Agriculture administers food stamps, and HHS administers AFDC and Medicaid.
Table 7 [Appendix] demonstrates that programs lack horizontal equity — persons with the same degree of need do not receive the same degree of aid. This inequity results from the categorical nature of much welfare aid, from state and local variations in welfare benefits levels, and from variations in the way rules are interpreted by localities or even by individual welfare offices.

Also, these programs lack vertical equity. Those with the most severe needs do not receive aid before those with less severe needs. "In fact, aid often goes to families whose needs are far less severe than those who never receive any aid." Furthermore, because state welfare guidelines are not pegged to the Social Security Administration poverty guidelines for the major assistance programs, some persons who would not be considered poor by the federal standards receive aid.

Another reason is the severe regional variations in levels of aid. The South which has the largest number of poor, spends less per recipient than does any other region. Despite the fact that federal contributions to state welfare expenditures are proportional to state expenditures, with a higher federal contribution in states with low per capita income, still state contributions in the South are so low that federal adjustments cannot compensate for state discrepancies.

One final reason is the philosophy underlying aid which is rooted in the American system as a whole. As discussed earlier, the system permits existence of poverty and makes no special effort to eradicate it.

B. Poverty and Development: The Sudan

Given the poverty conditions of the Sudan, as demonstrated in Chapter II, the obvious question is: What is done to alleviate it?
The answer was simple: Economic growth which was the order of the day at independence. The answer is easy to profess but far from easy to exercise.

It took Sudan five years after independence (1956) to formulate its first socioeconomic national plan. Political reasons were behind this delay. Priorities at the day of independence were diverted to other pressing issues: Sudanization of the administration, constitutional arrangements of the transition of power to nationalists, the recent armed conflict in the South and political parties maneuvers to foster support of their political programs. Thus until 1958 when the military took over, socioeconomic development was out of the question.

It took the military almost three years to consolidate its power and come out with a national development plan, 1961/62-1970/71. Now the question is, what was the impact of this Ten Year Plan on the growth of poverty?

In answering this question, it should be noted that for lack of data concerning the plan in question, the answer would be in general terms. Above all, it should be stated that two important factors which accompanied the execution of the plan should be taken into account:

1. The implementation of the plan was seriously interrupted by the October Revolution, 1964. With civilians administration priorities changed and many modifications in the original plan were effected, the contrasting political environments (military, civilian) during the span of the plan should not be forgotten.

2. The bloody conflict in the South (1955-1972), with its drain on the resources of the country besides its political implications
accompanied the implementation of the plan to the end.

Having these factors in mind one might embark on the following conclusions:

1. Due to the lack of expertise on the part of the administrative apparatus then, (1960/61) and lack of skills in planning techniques, the plan formulated was a mere collection of various projects lacking coordination and unsecured financial resources. It formulated no major trends of economic and social development.

2. During 1961/64 annual plans were designed on traditional budgetary basis, i.e., on revenues and expenditures for the forthcoming fiscal year. There were no goals and/or objectives, thus ignoring a core ingredient of planning.

3. With the advent of civilian rule in 1964 things changed. The original Ten Year Plan was molded to reflect the new priorities and objectives. Thus, one can assert that the country has been developing within the period 1965/68-1969/70.

4. During 1965/66-1969/70 the economy and social services had expanded. The gross domestic product has been increasing annually at the rate of 4.7%. The GDP per capita increased by 9.6%.

5. During the same period new government sponsored industries were built, agricultural potentialities increased, networks of schools, health services and industries expanded, construction of Rosetres Dam was completed, etc.

6. The volume of capital investment in 1964/65-1969/70 was by 15% less than in the previous five years. The plan of capital investments remained systematically unfulfilled and was implemented only by 66%. Annual implementation of the plan ranged from 48 to
86%. Foreign sources of financing were utilized by 56%. The plan of capital investments was not provided with actual domestic sources of financing. Actual provision by domestic sources, including financing by banks (additional cash issue), stood for 74% of the total amount of annual plans for the five year period.79

7. During 1965/66-1969/70 ministries and departments concluded agreements for loans and technical assistance. Often availability of domestic financial resources and construction capabilities were not taken into consideration. Lack of coordination between departments getting loans and technical assistance led to concentration of work volumes incompatible with domestic financial and administrative capacities.

8. Lack of efficiency, effectiveness and delay in implementing various projects increased the cost of these projects. Roselives Dam, N. P. Station and irrigation system cases in point.

Shortly before its end, the Ten Year Plan was terminated by the new administration that came to power in May 1969. With the advent of the new administration drastic changes took place in all phases of socioeconomic systems of the country. Highly publicized programs were set with the aim of alleviating the conditions of poverty — such as the anti-thirst and war against poverty. A hasty Five Year national development plan (1970/71-1974/75) was formulated, followed by a Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83).


   The Five Year Plan which was formulated in the first year of the current administration has had the following objectives:

   a. To secure increases in the gross domestic product at an average
annual rate of 8.5% as against 4.7% in the previous five years.

b. Increase the agricultural production volume by 77.3% in terms of the gross domestic product.

c. Increase industrial production volume by 57.4% in terms of the gross domestic product, introduce new types of products and meet entirely domestic requirements through growth of national industrial production.

d. Increase the volume of public capital investments in developing education and a culture by 60%, health by 82%, and public utilities by 58%, apart from the investments of local councils and ministries.

e. Secure growth of the gross domestic product per capita up to L.S. 47.6 in 1974/75, or by 31% more than in 1969/70.

During the implementation period important considerations took place. In brief these considerations were:

a. During the first year of the plan foreign aid was sought from the centrally planned economies countries. However, a year after the short lived 1971 coup, the focus for aid turned toward the West and the U.S.

b. During the first year of the plan many private sector enterprises and businesses were either confiscated or nationalized. Two years later, realizing the negative impact of such measures on investment and growth, corrective measures were taken.

c. During this period, in 1972, the problem of the South was resolved after seventeen years of fighting. The drain of the human and social and economic resources of the country was stopped. Furthermore the political climate and the standing of the country in international relations was greatly enhanced. (This is an
important factor in terms of foreign aid, since then West Europe and the U.S. increased their aid).

d. During 1970/71-1974/75 certain measures aimed at organizing the society were taken: The Constitution was adopted 1973 (see Appendix A), the People's Local Government Act, 1971 was enacted emphasizing the process of development (see Appendix B), the Sudan Socialist Union was formulated, and a ministry of planning was created to coordinate the efforts of development which since 1973 became the high tune.

With these considerations in mind, we can examine the administration of development in broad terms. Regarding the growth rate of the economy, the original Five Year Plan

a. The original Five Year Plan (1970-75) aimed at an increase in GDP at an annual growth rate of 7.6%. However, the registered annual growth rate ranged between 4 to 5% in real terms during 1970-75. It is self explanatory and almost the same figures of the previous five years (4.7%).

b. The original plan aimed at increasing agricultural production volume by 77.3% in terms of GDP. Table 7. (Appendix B) shows that agricultural share in the GDP in the base year 1969/70 was 36%, thus by simple calculation the target increase of agricultural production volume should raise the share of agriculture in the GDP to 61.7%. However, the actual share in 1974/75 was only 39%. A figure well behind the target.

c. The plan aimed at increasing industrial production volume by 57.4%. What actually happened is that its share in the GDP dropped from 10% in 1969/70 to 9% in 1974/75 (see Table 8. Appendix B).
d. The plan aimed at increasing the volume of public capital investment by 60% in education and culture, health by 82% and public utilities by 58%. The share of these services combined in the GDP in 1970/71 was 16%. By the end of the plan, that is in 1974/75 their share in the GDP amounted to 19% (see Table Appendix). An increase of 3%.

e. Actual investment during the plan (1970/75) was 82% higher than the preceding five years (1965/70). Instead of causing, together with other factors, the plan to meet its targets the results stated by a governmental document was that, "the Plan's original targets were achieved in monetary terms, in fact exceeded by 22%, it should be borne in mind that during the Plan period there were marked cost escalations affecting all sectors of the economy which inflated monetary investment figures considerably."1 A statement revealing half the truth!

2. The Six Year Plan:

As professed the plan principally "aims to achieve an accelerated and balanced growth in the Sudanese economy combining development with social equity. The social equity objective is considered extremely important since it implies development and progress in all regions and for all people."2

More specifically the plan aimed at "achievement of a substantial increase in per capita income in real terms through development of both of the modern and traditional sectors. The plan aims at annual growth rates of 7.5% in constant prices, with agriculture continuing to be the pivot of development and the leading sector of the economy. Development in other sectors would be interlinked with agricultural expansion."3
Macro-economic projections show agriculture was supposed to share in the GDP by 37%, 2% less than what was the case in the previous five year plan (1970-75), industry by 16%, 1% higher than during 1970-75, (see Table3.) (Appendix7).

The new proposed projects account for L.5. 3310 million, agriculture claiming 27% of the total, industry 18%, transport and communications 24%, and social services and public administration 31%. However, Volume I of the plan states, "since the total resources expected to be available for public sector investment were limited to Ls. 1570 million, the investment proposals of the various sectors had to be scaled down drastically."

The above mentioned were, broadly speaking, the main objectives of the Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83). Since the plan has not yet come to its end, no data concerning its performance is available. Hence, no appraisal is possible, however two strong indicators point out that the objectives of the plan were not achieved. These indicators were:

1. The speech of the President last November (1981) in which he announced that the country is suffering from severe economic and financial strains, and the formation of a new cabinet, which criticized the former poor performance especially in administering the economy.

2. The World Bank studies which maintain that the GDP growth rate during 1977-80 was only 4.2% and Sudan's debt has risen sharply, (L1.2 billion).
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The previous chapters discussed poverty conditions in two countries. Both countries have different standings and thus coping with the question of poverty differently, each in its own style.

In the case of the U.S., as demonstrated, poverty could be eliminated. But since there is no consensus of eradicating poverty, programs were designed to break the cycle of poverty. In this respect these programs were generally successful though not to the degree desired by poverty-stricken people.

On the other hand, Sudan strives to alleviate the conditions of poverty that plague the whole nation. Though the country’s efforts were on the right direction, they were not that successful. If the Sudan is to achieve a strong economy and accelerated growth rate and development, certain measures need to be taken.

First, the planning system and the decision-making mechanism regarding development programs have to be revised. The on-going practice of approving development plans is cumbersome. Plans have to be approved initially by the President, then the Council of Ministers, then the Central Committee of the S.S.U., then the Congress of the S.S.U. and at last by the People’s Assembly. A more simple, practical and visible mechanism is highly recommended.

The current practice of concentrating development projects/should be revised. Rural development should be emphasized. Unseparable of this emphasis, in the need to give regional and local governments a say in the formulation of development plans concerning their areas.
A prerequisite that should be given high priority is to correct the severe financial imbalances and wipe arrears in foreign payments. This is important because the financial situation today obstructs any development efforts. By correcting the financial imbalances through structural adjustments, the normal pace of development could be resumed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57.3  | 41.5  | 39.1  | 41.8  | 27.4  | 33.2  | 35.7  | 42.7  | 45.3  | 42.5  | 42.9  | 49.0  | 46.8  | 46.1  |

46   | 32    | 15    | 27    | 28    | 25    | 22    | 23    | 27    | 28    | 26    | 28    | 27    |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Poor (in thousands)</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>39,490</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>39,851</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>39,828</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>38,625</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>36,436</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>36,055</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>33,185</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>28,510*</td>
<td>14.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>27,769*</td>
<td>14.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>25,389*</td>
<td>12.8*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These numbers incorporate a slight revision in the definition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintiles</th>
<th>Social Insurance</th>
<th>Cash Assistance</th>
<th>In-Kind Transfers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low 20%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second 20%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third 20%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth 20%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 20%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dollars in millions</td>
<td>$134.0</td>
<td>$18.0</td>
<td>$41.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The upper limits of each quintile are as follows: low 20% ($1,812), second 20% ($7,872), third 20% ($13,994), and fourth 20% ($21,682).

Social insurance includes Social Security and Railroad Retirement, government pensions, unemployment insurance, worker compensation, veteran's compensation. Cash assistance includes veteran's pensions, Supplemental Security Income, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. In-kind transfers include food stamps, child nutrition, housing assistance, Medicare, and Medicaid.

Components may not add to totals because of rounding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Millions of Poor</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>$2,973.</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,022.</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,084.</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3,089.</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,128.</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,169.</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,222.</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,317.</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966*</td>
<td>3,317.</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,410.</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,553.</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3,743.</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,968.</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,137.</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,275.</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4,540.</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,038.</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974*</td>
<td>5,038.</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,500.</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,815.</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

*Revision in Census Calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFDC</th>
<th>SSI</th>
<th>Food Stamps</th>
<th>Medicaid</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of Benefit</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>Coupons</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
<td>67% earned</td>
<td>50% earned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction Rate</td>
<td>100% unearned</td>
<td>100% unearned</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>NOTCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible Unit</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Individual or family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Definition</td>
<td>All programs use a net income definition, but all use a different set of exemptions and deductions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting Period</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>1-2 months (varies with household)</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets Test</td>
<td>Varies by state</td>
<td>$1500 market value</td>
<td>$1500 equity value</td>
<td>varies by state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Control</td>
<td>HEW-state</td>
<td>HEW</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>HEW-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>HEW-state</td>
<td>HEW</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>HEW-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>249(a)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Mining</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; Water</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Services &amp; Administration</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product at</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>99(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Prices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Including an estimated additional Ls. 40 million in the published national accounts of 1969/70, which the Statistics Department maintains to have been underestimated originally in respect of dairy products.

*b* Figures do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Source: Department of Statistics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>1976/77(a)</th>
<th>1982/83</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing &amp; Mining</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; Water</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetics, Finance and Real Estates</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government &amp; Other Services</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP at M.P.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual 1976/77 data are not yet available. Structural relationships of 1974/75 for which actuals are available were maintained for 1976/77.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of GDP</th>
<th>1974/75&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1976/77&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1982/83</th>
<th>1976/77-1982/83 Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual Million</td>
<td>Ratio to GDP %</td>
<td>Ratio to Ls Million</td>
<td>Ratio to Rs Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Mining</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; Water</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Finance and Real Estate</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cont. and Other Services</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP &amp; F.C.&lt;sup&gt;(c)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1422</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP at M.P.</td>
<td>1511</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>At 1974/75 prices.

<sup>b</sup>Although not actual, 1976/77 has been used as the base year. It maintains the same structural relationships of the actual year 1974/75 and provides a more up-to-date picture of the price level.

<sup>c</sup>Net indirect taxes are included in the sectors.
Article 15
Family is the foundation of society, based on reciprocal responsibility and guided by religion, morals and citizenship, and shall be protected by the State against causes of weakness and disintegration.

Article 17
Self-help emanating from people's free will is an innate characteristic of the Sudanese Society and shall be consolidated and coordinated by the State.

Article 18
The State shall endeavour to develop and modernize the society through scientific planning and care for the promotion of skills, scientific research, and academic and applied studies.

Article 21
The State shall take care of the Sudanese rural areas and shall develop them economically, socially, and culturally and in particular the State shall combat famine, thirst, epidemic and endemic diseases, and shall act towards the settlement of nomads.

Article 24
The State shall provide a system for social security against disasters sickness, orphanage, old age, unemployment and other causes of disability.

Article 27
The State shall provide care for mothers and children, and enact legislation necessary therefor.

Article 28
The State shall provide care for veteran fighters, families of martyrs and persons disabled by war.
Article 29

Eradication of illiteracy and promotion of adult education shall be a national duty towards which official and people's energy shall be mobilized.

Article 30

The Socialist system shall be the foundation of the economy of the Sudanese Society so as to realize sufficiency in production and fairness in distribution, and to secure decent living for all citizens and prevent any form of exploitation and injustice.

Article 31

The Sudanese economy shall be directed to realize the objectives of development plans in order to achieve the society of sufficiency and justice and the State shall own and manage the fundamental means of production in the economy.

Article 32

The Sudanese economy shall consist of the activities of the following sectors:

The Public Sector: Which shall be a pioneer sector and shall lead progress in all fields for the purpose of development, shall be based on public ownership and be subject to people's control.

The Cooperative Sector: Which shall be based on the collective ownership by all members participating in cooperative societies. The State shall care for the cooperative societies and the law shall regulate their formation and management.

The Private Sector: Which shall be based on non-exploiting private ownership. The State shall protect and encourage it and organize its functions to play a positive and active role in the national economy.

The Mixed Sector: Which shall be based on the joint ownership between the State and the Private Sector.

Article 36

Work is a right, a duty, and an honor. Every able citizen shall perform it with utmost honesty and the State shall endeavor to provide it. The State shall enact laws regulating working hours, holidays, compensation, and all other conditions of service in order to secure for those engaged in manual or intellectual activities the necessary guarantees during the service and in post-service benefits. No person shall, on grounds of need, be forced to perform work not suitable to his age, sex, or health.
Economic Development

1. Establishment and promotion of rural and home industries.

2. Preparation of economic and social development plans according to the conferred powers and submission of the necessary recommendations for the economic development plan of the province to the Ministries concerned.

3. Regulation of statistics in all fields and provision of necessary and reliable statistics.

4. Enlightenment of citizens of the details of the approved subsidiary and social development schemes, and the preparation of such citizens for adaptation to the conditions required for the implementation of the development schemes.

5. The carrying out of studies and the undertaking of researches which aim towards the development of the province in economic and social fields.
4. Herman W. Miller, op. cit., p. 42.
5. Ibid., p. 42.
7. Ibid., p. 41.
8. Ibid., p. 44.
10. Ibid., p. 141.
11. Ibid., p. 141.
12. Ibid., p. 141.
13. Ibid., p. 127.
16. Harrel R. Rodgers, Jr., op. cit., p. LL.
18. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
19. Ibid., p. 147.
20. Ibid., p. 147.
22. Ibid., p. 149.
23. Ibid., p. 149.
24. Ibid., p. 151.
26. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
29. Ibid., p. 57.
31.
32. Harrel R. Rodgers, Jr., op. cit., p. 3.
33. Helen Ginsberg, op. cit., p. 131.
34. Harrel R. Rodgers, Jr., op. cit., p. 4.
35. Ibid., p. 34.
36. Ibid., p. 90.
37. Ibid., p. 91.
38. Ibid., p. 91.
40. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
42. Ibid., p. 31.
43. Ibid., p. 33.
44. Ibid., p. 36.
Scribography


Conclusion

It is argued in the introductory chapter that the comparative approach in public administration is tremendously beneficial in both theoretical and practical terms. Now, the question to be asked is: what the preceding chapters revealed in this respect and to what extent that point was made clear?

The practical utility of the comparative approach is made clear in the previous chapters. The recommendations at the end of the chapters show that the Sudan could benefit from the experience of the U.S. by adopting and/or adapting certain measures that were considered a success in the U.S. On the other hand, what benefits the U.S. could make by drawing on the Sudan's experience, was not equally emphasized. Hence a few words need to be said that there are mutual benefits for both the U.S. and the Sudan in applying the comparative measures.

Regarding regulation and control over the administrative system and the accountability of the bureaucracy, it was pointed out that the chief executive in the Sudan, the president, has exclusive jurisdiction over the administrative system; matters of administrative organization were vested in that office. In the U.S. the situation is different. The first chapter concludes that control over the administrative system is shared between the President and Congress. The experience of the Sudan could be of use to the U.S., i.e., strengthening the President's control over the administrative system and its organization and regulations. The powers of the chief executive in this respect should not be exclusive.
A related issue to national administrative systems concerns the question of representation. The U.S., like other nations, faces this problem; affirmative action programs were designed to cope with this deficiency. The success of these programs is considered to be "slight". An apt and an appropriate case in point that needs to be considered in such context is an experience offered by the Sudan. What is referred to is the 1972 agreement between the North and South. This agreement in its essence is an elaborate administrative arrangement whereby the South is granted an autonomous regional self-government together with the representation of southerners in the national administrative system as a whole. It stands as a classical example of the success of administrative measures in achieving desired ends—representation being one. Considering the ways and means as well as the administrative arrangements sustained by the agreement, the U.S. could gain some insight and may very well identify some measures that would help in dealing with the problem of representing minorities (there are certain analogies between the Southerners—before 1972—and minorities of the U.S. today).

Another area where the U.S. can benefit from the experience of the Sudan is local government. As a matter of fact, local governments in the U.S. are as numerous, fragmented and complex as one can imagine. Proliferation of local units was made feasible and enhanced by the states’ permissive laws which left the question of incorporation to the voters to decide upon with little or no restriction. A logical sequence of this proliferation is the complexity, both in form and structure, which characterizes local government. All these features interacting with other problems—prominent
effective city-wide, old-line political organization, eager to respond to the individual’s needs, nor does it have true community or neighborhood elective government with the power to be either responsive to the people or accountable to them in meeting their needs.”

"Another strain of criticism", the argument goes on, "points to the impact of organizational change on the citizen’s direct role in government. Professionalism, credentialism, separation of policy-making from administration, and no-partisanship – all have been effectively used to reduce the citizen's influence on government." In effect this has led citizens to demand decentralization since "for the average citizen, exerting an influence on the delivery of services is much more important than making a vague distant impact on a high-level policy deliberations." Campbell, then summarized the pros and cons of both alternatives, centralization and decentralization of metropolitan governments. He recommended a third alternative which represents a "new form of metropolitan government – a form which combines centralization (metropolitan government) and decentralization (local community control).....the recommendation recognizes that the
decentralization case is as strong as the one for centralization, and argues that only by combining these will it be possible to create a system which will lead to better, more responsive government, and more humane social policies.  

Campbell did not end his essay at this stage. He offered suggestions for implementing the recommended alternative. Drawing on the experience of Greater London Council, the suggestions ranged from employing a two-tier system to the discussion of a division of responsibilities, the optimal size for community-level jurisdictions, models of representation in these tiers, and the question of boundaries.

It is to be recalled (Chapter III) that Sudan's local government system is very much similar to the model offered by Campbell and other advocates of reform. The philosophy behind the system assumes that the fully-fledged or autonomous local government is both desirable and undesirable! Desirable because it "acts as an outlet or safety valve for local pressures"; undesirable because it "encourages tribalism and sectarianism." So what was adopted is a "blend of centralization and decentralization" which was considered as the best means for the involvement of the people in the actual administration of their localities, as well as providing the prerequisites of effective government. As a result, a pyramidal structure (or multi-tier) was employed. Division of responsibilities was made relatively clear-cut and specific between the tiers. Mechanisms of cooperation and coordination were built in the system (for detailed discussion, see Chapter III).

On the other hand, the system differs from the American system which is characterized by fragmentation, proliferation and complexity, by its homogeneity, relatively fewer units and relative simplicity which makes it
easier for the average citizen to understand the system and deal with it.

In short, all of these similarities between the local government system in the Sudan and the alternative offered by advocates of reform as well as the dissimilarities commend the Sudan local government model as an interesting case study which could very well be beneficial to local government in the U.S.

In the area of revenue-sharing (broadly defined in Chapter IV as central aid to local government) it is noted that federal assistance to local government is very complex and cumbersome. It comprises many programs and grants (categorical grants, block grants, and general revenue-sharing). Each has its own eligibility rules and conditions and/or strings – far less professed in the case of revenue-sharing (for detailed discussion see Chapter III).

On the other hand, though, central aid to local government in the Sudan has its shortcomings; its comprehensiveness could be preferred to the many forms of programs and grants as is the case in the U.S.

This could be a welcome experience in the U.S. situation. The favored revenue-sharing compared to other grants is indicative in this respect. Linked to this is the budgeting system. It is an important issue that needs a study on its own merits; however, for practical purposes this is not feasible at this stage. But a brief word is in order.

Both countries, U.S. and the Sudan, are facing fiscal as well as economic troubles these days. Their approaches to these problems differ considerably. To begin with, in the Sudan the government is required to propose and execute a balanced budget while in the U.S. this is not the
case. This is important as far as the economy is concerned: "for good or bad, government finance impinges greatly upon the economy. Government is large, and the sheer bulk of governmental expenditure alone necessarily affects the economy." As a matter of fact, the responsibility of government nowadays, towards the economy is universally accepted. In the words of Lee and Johnson, "Today government, particularly the federal government, is legally responsible for setting explicit policies that will provide for a healthy economy."

Traditionally, governments dealt with their economies by either direct intervention or, non-intervention. Nowadays, however, "Adam Smith's Laissez-faire theory of the invisible hand has been largely discarded in favor of governmental intervention. But this is not to suggest that governments deal with their economies in the same fashion. Rather, governments' intervention vary in degree. Capitalist countries employ less interventionist policies while centrally-planned countries may be thought of as being on the other end of the continuum; other countries are in between. As a capitalist country, the U.S. tools to affect the economy are "either discretionary or automatic. When discretionary action is taken, some policy making has occurred that results in decisions to intervene or not to intervene in the economy. The automatic or built-in features on the other hand, require no action on the part of decision makers." Elaborating on the concept of automatic stabilizers Lee and Johnson asserted that:

the automatic stabilizers are countercyclical in that they tend to lean against prevailing trends, combating both expansionary and contractionary periods. To the extent that stabilizers are effective
in controlling undesired fluctuations in the economy, the need for discretionary governmental intervention is limited. Non-governmental stabilizers include both corporate and personal savings. Recessions are resisted by individuals and corporations who utilize savings to maintain established levels of activities; conversely expansionary trends are resisted. As income raises greater proportions of income are placed in savings rather than being used for consumption.  

The U.S. relies on these automatic stabilizers because they are "effective" and only resorts to discretionary intervention when automatic stabilizers prove insufficient. It should be noted that even in such cases, intervention is limited. On the other hand, the Sudan relies more on intervention, not on automatic stabilizers; this intervention is not limited. To put both countries' practices in perspective, one may think of the U.S. at one end of a continuum while the Sudan moves or less towards the middle with a tendency of moving back and forth toward both ends. The lesson to be learned from the experiences of both countries is that they should consider each other's practices, and like countries, in dealing with their economies.

Related to this is the issue of poverty. As discussed in Chapter VI both countries face the problem of poverty, though their approach varies; while the Sudan emphasizes income distribution, the U.S. does not. If the U.S. is to eradicate poverty—that thrives amid plenty—it would have to consider income distribution.

Finally, in the area of personnel, it is noted that the civil service in the Sudan is covere by the merit system; besides, the question of modernizing the laws governing the manpower of human resources, public service included, is pursued with vigor. In the U.S. it is noted that the reform brought about by the Pendleton Act, 1883 applies only partially to the federal civil service and not to all states and local government services.
Furthermore, the American experience reveals that updating the laws governing personnel and manpower is comparatively slow. It took nearly a hundred years to revise and modernize the Pendleton Act of 1883, (this was accomplished in 1978). Clearly, in this respect, the experience of the Sudan could be of use to the U.S.

It is hoped that the above discussion has proved that countries can learn from each other regardless of whether they are classified as developed or underdeveloped. The key point here, is that learning is not a one-directional process, but rather a reciprocal one.

It should be pointed out that in order for comparative studies to serve their purposes, they should be more comprehensive. This study, like any other has its limitations. It would benefit from greater comprehensiveness in its subject matter and scope.

Regarding the subject matter, a number of topics could have been discussed. Such topics include public policy-making and public decision-making, the relationship of the bureaucracy with the Legislature and the chief executive, and the role of the chief executive in both countries. Examining these areas within a systems framework would be appealing.

Other areas would be comparing the states (U.S.) and the newly formed regions (Sudan) within the administrative framework. Also, specific examples of problem areas (e.g., planning and coordination) should be discussed, as well as the different approaches to dealing with these problems.

Regarding the scope, the value of this study would have been greatly enhanced if it were not confined to two countries. Multi-national administration studies need to be emphasized if the comparative approach is to be of utmost value.
This last point leads to the theoretical benefit of the comparative approach advocated earlier. It must be understood, that the comparative approach is nothing more than a methodology that uses the tools of its parent discipline, public administration. The theoretical utility of this approach is based on this idea. As indicated in the Introduction, comparative studies have always helped disciplines and fields of study formulate their theoretical assumptions. Public administration is not an exception. Comparative studies in administration can, thus, be of enormous theoretical utility to public administration. This can only be done by extensive and comprehensive research. It is extensive in the sense of more accumulative research, comprehensive in the sense that research should cover all areas of public administration and experience of as many nations as possible.

Public administration is said to be lacking consensus about its scope, boundaries and emphasis. The comparative approach can be of help in this regard and offer some answers. This could be accomplished by developing models for studying national administrative systems. A possible model may be based on the assumption that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to try to isolate the administrative system from other systems. In order to have sustained overall national system, the administrative sphere - though it may be analytically considered as autonomous from the rest of the societal spheres - requires the context of a multi-dimensional process of social development in which no segment or dimension of society can lag behind. On this basis the following model is suggested for the comparative approach to be employed studying and making observations on national administrative
systems and public administration in various nations:

1. The broadly shared characteristic of a general spirit or attitude toward equality. Equality here means (a) that administering involves citizen participation and popular involvement in decision-making; citizens should have input in deciding on public issues; (b) that rules and regulations should be of a universal nature, applicable to all and more or less impersonal (impartial) in their enforcement; (c) that recruitment to public offices should reflect achievement standards of performance and not the asccriptive considerations of a traditional social system; the assumption in a modern administrative system is that people must have displayed appropriate merit to gain public office and that office holders in general should have met some competitive test of competence and selection.

2. The second important theme deals with the capacity of administrative systems. Capacity in this case relates to (a) the outputs of the administrative system and the extent to which the administrative system can affect the society and economy; (b) governmental performance and the conditions that affect such performance; (c) all the sheer magnitude, scope and scale of governmental performance - advanced systems being presumed to be able to do a lot more and touch upon a far wider variety of social life than the less developed ones; (d) effectiveness and efficiency in the execution of public policy, the assumption being that developed systems not only do more things than others but also do them faster and with much greater thoroughness; there is a trend towards professionalization of
government: concern with efficiency and effectiveness leads also to universally recognized standards; and (e) rationality in administration and an objectivity orientation towards policy, that is, government actions are guided more by deliberations and justifications that seek to relate ends to means in a systematic manner - planning becomes possible.

3. Third, administrative differentiation and specialization. This dimension refers to the analysis of institutions and structures in regard to administrative development. It involves (a) the differentiation and specialization of structures, with offices and agencies tending to have their distinct and limited foundations, and with an equivalent division of labor within the realm of government; (b) increased functional specificity of the various administrative roles within the system; and (c) the integration of complex structures and processes, i.e., differentiation is not fragmentation and isolation of the different parts of the administrative system but specialization based on an ultimate sense of integration.

These three dimensions of equality, capacity and differentiation, as a requirement of a viable administrative system do not suggest that they necessarily fit easily together. In fact there have usually been acute tensions between the demands for equality, the requirements for capacity, and the processes of greater differentiation. Pressures for greater equality can challenge the capacity of the system, and differentiation can reduce equality by stressing the importance of quality and specialization of knowledge. 20

Employing this model or other similar models raises the question of
the need for future research. A number of suggestions are offered in this regard.

Some scholars call attention to choices "among different levels of analysis" ranging "from whole social systems through descending levels of inclusiveness to units such as institutions, organizations, and even individuals." They argue that reliance on one level "decreases the prospects for understanding complex systems."22

Others consider bureaucracies as the core of future research studies. Neary maintains that "bureaucracy as a common institution in political systems continue to be most frequently recommended as the target with the greatest promise for research efforts."23

A third possible area is organization theory which "can be brought to bear fruitfully in the analysis of organizational units of interest to comparative administration researchers, whether these are whole national bureaucracies or bureaucratic subunits." Proponents of this idea call for emphasis on organizational change and development in the light of concepts and assumptions of modern organization theory.

Related to this is the idea advocated by those having a development administration orientation. They propose that focus be on the process of "institution building" and organizational design and "the effects of alternative organizational arrangements, with special attention to environmental factors not intrinsic to the organizations themselves."23 Freisat, an advocate of the same idea, suggest a modification of the institution-building model "intended to focus less exclusively on developing societies, place more emphasis on cross-cultural comparison and draw more heavily on research in organization theory for propositions regarding organizational structure,"
behavior, leadership, goals, etc.,\textsuperscript{26} Another area that is receiving increasing attention is public policy-making. Few cross-national studies were conducted; this urged scholars to call for "comparative policy-analysis as an additional field for pioneering work which might serve both scientific and practical purposes."\textsuperscript{27}

In identifying these areas of future research caution should be taken against any interpretation or suggestion that this represents an attempt to attain separate disciplinary recognition for comparative administration. Heady summarized this point better when he said,

\ldots I concur with the cardinal point that it is neither necessary nor feasible to strive for restoration of the degree of autonomy and separation once characteristic of the burgeoning comparative public administration movement. The time has now come to blend the comparative perspective with the traditionally parochial national emphasis of study and research in public administration. This promises to remedy some of the deficiencies in depth of analysis attributed to comparative administration, but also it will enrich general public administration by widening the horizon of interest in such a way that understanding of one's own national system of administration will be enhanced by placing it in a cross-cultural setting.\textsuperscript{28}

With such understanding comparative administration research in the above mentioned areas would pay useful dividends in broadening the sweep of questions considered in public administration and help yield consensus about its scope, boundaries and issues addressed.
Footnotes

1) The literature on American public administration lends support to this idea. It indicates that recent trends in the 20th century showed marked growth of the powers of the executive.

2) Officially the agreement is referred as the "Regional Self-Government Agreement for the Southern Provinces, 1972". It put an end to the bloody conflict between the North and the South that lasted 17 years. Its preparation, accomplishments and impacts merits a separate study on its own. It represents a success example that could be beneficial to other nations having similar problems; immediate examples that come to one's mind are Britain and Spain.


4) Ibid, p. 74.


7) Ibid, pp. 75-76.


9) Ibid, p. 28.

10) The discussion about the federal budget deficits in 1982 and the projected deficits in 1983 and the coming years is a case in point - in the course of discussion the current administration proposed adoption of the concept of balanced budget.


16) Lee and Johnson had this to say, "Economic observers concur that the automatic stabilizers while useful, are insufficient tools for regulating the economy," p. 325.
Perhaps because the private sector is not that strong.

This is not to suggest that both countries are on the same level. For detailed discussion of the definition and contexts of poverty and how both countries deal with it, see Chapter VI.

The model borrows from sociology; it is based on models of social change. The underlying rationale is the conviction that administrative systems and public organizations are in fact social systems.

By accommodating for those subtleties in employing the model, it may very well serve as an alternative to the classification (developed/underdeveloped) challenged earlier in the Introduction.


Ibid, p. 35.


Ibid, p. 38.


Ibid, p. 42.
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7) George F. Gant, Development Administration: Concepts, Goals, Methods, (The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin), 1979.


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