THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE SUDAN
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONSHIP

BY

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1983
Dedicated to

the future generation,

the work that carries the
history of my country...
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A.A. Adam
أن النهج الأساسي لهذه الرسالة هو سياق وتحليل لدراسة جمهورية السودان من خلال تحليله بالرسم البياني. من خلال هذا التحليل، يتضح أن هناك علاقة بين "السيادة" و"الإدارة"، وتعتبر هذه العلاقة البارزة في تحليل الهيئات والأجهزة (السياحة والإدارة) في جمهورية السودان.

ومن هذا، يمكن القول أن الرسالة مهمة للدراسة، وتهدف إلى فهم الخطوات لتغيير النظام السياسي في جمهورية السودان. وتعتبر هذه الرسالة مهمة في دراسة النظام السياسي وتشكل خطوات لتحسينه في المستقبل.

ومن الناحية الاقتصادية، فإن الرسالة يتناول بعض الأشكال المتعلقة بالاقتصاد والرغبات في تغيير النظام السياسي. وتعتبر هذه الرسالة مهمة للدراسة وتشكل خطوات لتحسين النظام السياسي في جمهورية السودان.

وهكذا، فإن الرسالة تعبر عن أهمية النظام السياسي في جمهورية السودان وتعتبر خطوات لتحسينه في المستقبل.

وفي النهاية، فإن الرسالة تعبر عن أهمية النظام السياسي في جمهورية السودان وتعتبر خطوات لتحسينه في المستقبل.
وهكذا الحق هذا الإجراء الممارس الى "مسياء الإدارة" الذي يثير السخرية من سلطات القضاء في درجاتهم العليا،

على سبيل المثال: لا يوجد دليل قانوني على أن تطبيق النصوص القانونية يتطلب استخدام القوة الفيبرة الذي يؤدي إلى الانتهاكات والخسائر.

ويجب أن تكون العملية القانونية معلقة على أحكام القانون وضمانات الحق.

وبعد النظر في الموقف، يمكننا أن نقول أن هناك حاجة لمحاسبة المسؤولين المعنيين.

وبعدها، نحتاج إلى المحاكمات والسياسات الرسمية لضمان احترام القانون والحقوق.

تعد هذه الخطوة رائدة في تحسين ممارسة القضاء في المجتمع.
لا يمكنني قراءة النص Arabic.
The purpose of this work is to describe and analyze the development of the civil service in the Sudan which was established at the turn of this century under the condominium up till the present.

The study deals mainly with the relationship between politics and administration. The major hypothesis upon which the study rests is that the two entities (politics and administration) are the two faces of one and the same coin; in fact, they are two aspects of the same phenomenon.

The work comprises five chapters.

Chapter I provides a historical background to the development of the Sudanese Civil Service since the condominium. Chapter II is devoted to the description of the structures of civil service since the beginning of the century.

Chapter III, IV, and V form the heart of the whole thesis. In chapter III we shall be concerned with the definitions of the terms and the sense in which they are employed. "Administration" is dealt with as a "social activity" affecting both government and the society at large. By 'politics' we mean the process by which the objectives of government are determined, the means for their execution are chosen and
The reconquest of the Sudan which was carried out by
the joint troops of both Britain and Egypt, was completed in
1899. The measure was undertaken in the name of the Andrew
of Egypt to restore Egyptian rule in the Sudan. But, right
from the start, and for the architect of the British imperial
policy, this was only a pretext for launching campaigns,
employing Egyptian troops at the expense of the Egyptian treasury.
Lord Cromer, the virtual ruler of Egypt, realized that the
enlargement of Egypt's claims to her possessions of the Sudan would
enable Britain to exclude the 'paraphernalia of internalism' and
would further provide her with a show of legality which other
European powers did not possess. This Cromer found feasible,
for Egypt herself was a British protectorate. The Agreement
concluded was far from being a real condominium aiming at the
establishment of joint sovereignty over the Sudan. Rather,

The Condominium Agreement:—

...
In the whole, the Agreement was an embodiment of British objectives in the Sudan. Chief among these was the establishment of British authority in the Sudan with removal of the Egyptians to avoid "reprising the misgov-ernment of the past."

At the central level, the Agreement aimed at the set-ting up of a dual Anglo-Egyptian administration headed by a British Governor-General (who was the supreme military and civil commander of the Sudan). The Governor-General was assisted by a triple Secretariat of the civil, the finan-cial and legal secretaries.

II. Provincial Administration:

At the local level, following Turkish and Sudanese precedents, the country was divided into a number of prov-inces which were in turn sub-divided into districts, and those were further split into smaller units, each answerable to the division above, through districts and provinces to the general headquarters in Khartoum. (2)

At the head of each province was British military Governor. The Governor was assisted at the district level by Inspectors who were also British officers and at lower level (1). Helli, P.H. A modern history of the Sudan. (London: Hutchinson, London, 1907). p.113

by Egyptian Natives, and Sudanese Sheikhs and chieftains. The leading principle behind this system of local administration was that of provincial decentralisation vis-a-vis the headquarters, in Khartoum. (1) Because of the vast area of the country and the poor system of transport and communications each governor was given a free hand in the administration of his province within the general framework of law. Each province governor was required to report on the conduct of affairs to the Governor General, whose representative he was.

The tribal chiefs, though they had a definite and useful position in the system, were not looked upon, during the first two decades of the colonial rule as key agents of government. The guiding role was direct rule personified in the district commissioner who combined the administrative and political functions in his hands. This situation was transformed during the twenties into the opposite philosophy of indirect rule.

At the centre, the head of administration was a British Governor General in whose was vested the supreme military and civil command. As the country was ruled under martial law, the top echelons of the administration were monopolized by the army.

(1) Ibid p. 30
officer. The civil service system was thus an "autocracy on military lines for civil purposes."

III. The Emergence of the Modern Political Service

The fact that Cremer had a low opinion of the soldier administrators led him to embark on a line of policy, to the effect that

"the Universities, rather than the Army I find the best recruiting ground" (2)

However this process of replacing military officers by civilians continued on a relatively slow pace until the year 1919, when it was seen that the country had settled down and that the emphasis in the administration could safely be shifted from reorganisation to reconstruction. The outbreak of World War I, the immediate result of which was a considerable shortage in the number of army-officers, enhanced the accelerated pace of replacing the military by civilians. Cremer had already insisted that only the "right class of Englishman" should be appointed. In official correspondence Cremer pointed out that it is the very great objection to endeavouring to rule subject races through the agency of low class Europeans. (2)

(1) The p. 64.
(2) Ibid. p. 65.
the young Englishmen should be generously paid.

Under these conditions the Sudan Political Service, as it came to be known, consisted of the most able Englishmen with a reputation for a high standard of efficiency who acquired wide knowledge and a devotion to what they regarded as its best interests (1).

IV. Educational Policy:

However it was a difficult task to govern any country properly, as was realised right from the start, without some administrative assistance from its inhabitants. The whole governing bureaucracy in the Sudan was foreign. Cromer announced: "I do not doubt, therefore, that H.H. [Cromer] will do all in his power to create a class of Sudanese who will before long be capable of filling some subordinate posts. High education is of course, for the time being, quite out of the question, but if we limit our ambition to reading writing, and arithmetic we ought to produce satisfactory results (2).

For the implementation of these objectives outlined by Cromer, the Sudan Government busied itself with the setting up of an educational system geared essentially to the needs.

(1) Holt, P.W. SP-518 P.120
of administration. These needs as envisaged by Sir James Currie, the Director of Education were:

a. The creation of an artisan class.

b. A diffusion among the masses of the people of education sufficient to enable them to understand the essential elements of the machinery of government.

c. The creation of a small administrative class which would ultimately fill many minor posts.

A cadre of competent artisans and clerks was needed to fill minor posts in the administration both in Khartoum and the provinces. The class of tribal leaders was not qualified to provide the required type of artisans and the importation of these in sufficient numbers would not make for economy.

For the implementation of the educational policy laid down by the Sudan government, Gordon Memorial College was opened as a primary technical school in 1932. The development of the Sudan Civil Service continued to be largely bound with the history and growth of Gordon Memorial College which provided the main source of recruits for the service.

Education thus started mainly as vocational and technical. It has as its major objective to direct the educated from recuit by giving them employment (2) The emphasis on

(1) Abel-Inahin, M. op. cit. p. 278
technical instruction was not only because of the need for skilled workers but for the political role it played. (Many carpenters, bricklayers or masons that you turn out will be one unit detached from the roots of the discontented class who necessarily become patriots and demagogues) (1).

The natural outcome of education was the production of a class which wanted to get rid of foreign rule. It should be confined, Groser advised, to those needed for employment. These ideas and stipulations guided the Sudan's educational policy for long time and influenced its pattern and aims.

Another aim which the educational system set out to achieve was the removal of Egyptian cultural and political influence in the Sudan. The discontented Egyptian nationalists were both disliked and feared. The Egyptian officials were deemed by the Sudan administration to be corrupt and unjust. The latter worked on the belief that only by direct contact with the Sudanese could good administration be achieved.

In 1905 the college included a higher school for providing a limited number of Sudanese as engineers and surveyors. In 1923 Sudanese, for the first time, were appointed to fill subordinate administrative posts as sub-officers and sub-officer of administration was opened to train the new recruits. Selection 1. Ibid p.4.
for these posts was primarily based on considerations of character and personality.

A Mide of Changes

The Egyptians were thus removed from the higher echelons of Sudan civil service and had no share in the determination of policies. The legal and educational system, followed the British model and were widely different from their French-influenced counterparts in Egypt. The Egyptian nationalists' resentments were over-ridden. The latter had found little opportunity for overt political action under the strong hand of Lord Cromer and his successors. But life does not stand still. The coming of the First World War was bound to shake the British position. The spread of the doctrine of self-determination aroused by the Great October Revolution in Russia, the declaration of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, the apparent success of the Arab Revolt in 1916 coupled with the growing nationalist resentment by the Egyptians of the formal declaration of their country as a British protectorate, led the Egyptians to revolt against Britain. The outcome of this was the outbreak of the 1919 Egyptian Revolution.

A special commission under the chairmanship of Lord Viscount Milner was invited to Egypt to investigate
into the causes of the "late disorder in Egypt... and to report on the existing situation in the country" the mission's arrival in Egypt coincided with the most intense agitation for independence. Under these conditions the mission was forced to tear up its own terms of reference and committed the British government in London to the abandonment of the protectorate.

As far as the Sudan was concerned, the report recommended that "a centralized bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan." Having regard to its vast extent and varied character of its inhabitants, the report urged that the administration of its different parts should be kept as far as possible in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they existed, under British supervision.

In pursuance to the recommendations of Milner's mission report, the Sudan government embarked on a new policy where decentralization was the key concept. The employment, whenever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, the report argued, would make both for economy and efficiency. It was this report which gave the lead and started the first

formal steps towards decentralization and the association of the Sudanese with the administration.

VI. The Colonial Reaction: De-EGYPTIANIZATION OF THE SERVICE

This new line of policy was energetically pursued from 1919 onwards in two different ways directed to the same object: the de-EGYPTIANIZATION of the administration.

i. In the first place Sudanese natives were selected and appointed to certain governmental posts carrying direct administrative duties. A special course was introduced for the training of Sudanese sub-majors and the number of recruits was increased, the training of Sudanese medical assistants was started in 1922 and two years later the Kitchener School of Medicine was opened. The Military College increased its intake. Artisans, engineers, agriculturists and telegraphists were also trained in greater numbers. A number of consultative municipal councils were constituted in the three towns and Port Sudan.

ii. In the second place legislation was passed regularizing the exercising of native chiefs of certain powers over the members of their own tribes. In the light of this policy 'The Powers of Native Sheikhs' Ordinance was
enacted in 1922, recognizing and regularizing judicial powers which had from time immemorial been exercised by the chiefs of certain nomadic tribes. By 1923 some three hundred sheikhs had received recognition for these purposes. (1)

VII. The Rise of Sudanese Nationalism:

It is clear that the British who had long mistrusted Egyptian intentions and capabilities in the Sudan were anxious to keep a standby control over the country, led by a feeling of trusteeship towards the Sudanese. But the fact that the Sudanese might have become a party in the British-Egyptian contention was possibility which alarmed the British but was realized by the Egyptians. (2)

The two countries (Egypt and the Sudan) bound by language and religious community through history were naturally inclined to a bond of fraternity.

Under such conditions, it was not surprising that the series of Sudanese political organizations that appeared after the war were decidedly pro-Egyptian and anti-British.

(1) Shukri-kahina, K. op.cit. p.67
(2) Holt, P.M. op.cit. p. 129.
having the "unity of the Nile Valley" as their extensible aim. Two organisations can be identified: the League of Sudan Union and the White Flag League which was founded by an ex-army officer, Ali Abd el-Latif, in 1923 with several associates, drawn significantly from the ranks of government officials. The White Flag League, however, received more or less concealed encouragement and financial backing from Egypt. The British response was severe and uncompromising. Abd el-Latif and his associates were dismissed as nothing but half-civilised dupes of Egypt.

Troubles both in Egypt and the Sudan continued. The White Flag League launched a number of anti-British demonstrations in Omdurman and Khartoum. The situation was further aggravated by the mutiny of the military school cadets which coincided with a mutiny of the Egyptian Railway Battalion at Khartoum in August 1924. These disturbances were severely suppressed by the British and the Sudan government was awaiting "excuse for drastic action". This was provided by Stassen's murder on 19th November 1924.

The suddenness and intensity of the events, coupled with the fact that the troubles were activated by the
Egyptians, as evidenced by the investigation, left a deep impression on the government. The government took fright and proceeded to react with unprecedented violence.

VII. The Impact of the Revolt on Civil Service

The revolt of 1926 was found to have far-reaching effects on the development of the civil service.

The immediate outcome of the events was the termination of the limited and short-lived experiment in nationalization. In the circumstances, relations between the government and the relatively small class of the educated cadres, when the government viewed with little sympathy, deteriorated rapidly and a period of intense bitterness began. As the government rightly received that active opposition was stirred mainly by the middle class of officials and officers, it went on to act as if the Western-educated class... was its inveterate enemy, to be checked and circumscribed in the interests of political stability." (1)

The reaction to the events then can be seen in two fields: education and administrative policy. The educational policy which, as we have seen, was geared to administrative needs, was by now dominated by the political outlook of the administration. The services of the well-trained and

(1) Ibid, 283
and long experienced by their teachers was sacrificed for political expediency. This was bound to retard the development of education. No primary schools were established for almost a whole decade. The Jordan College, the head of the educational system, was viewed with suspicion as a breeding ground for disconsolate youth. As noted by A. A. F. M.

"Strong disapproval of education... amongst most of the British officials and an equally strong suspicion amongst the educated educated that the government... was determined to relegate them to technical posts and debar them from any real power in the country."

The principle of admitting the Syrians to the public service which had been inaugurated by Sir Lee Stack was abandoned. Thus, consequence of this policy the School of Administration which was set up in 1913 to cater for the training of junior administrative officers (sub-masul) was closed in 1926. The Military School was shut down. The sending of Syrian teachers to Beirut which started in 1928 was discontinued.

The other aspect of the new policy was the resolving of the long debate as to the future course of administration. The government promptly embarked on a heading road towards

"Indirect Rule", borrowing from the Nigerian experience with some slight modifications. This new policy was planned to serve a two-fold purpose:

1. To counteract the predominant influence of religious leaders and
2. To minimize the numbers and influence of the educated urban class.

The Governor of Upper Province had long warned the Sudan Government against repeating the mistakes made in India and Egypt by creating an educated and, almost by definition, disinterested class of Sudanic people who, "somehow or other, come to have a sense of self-consciously national identity...it is our business to strengthen the solid elements in the country, sheikhs, merchants... before the irresponsible body of half-educated officials, students and town folk take control of the public mind. (1) The rise of this so-called disinterested educated class was assessed by the Director of Intelligence in a lengthy report on the political agitation in the Sudan (1919-24).

"It must be recognised, the Director of Intelligence added, 'that there is now in the Sudan a class, small but vocal and possessing influence out of all proportion to its numbers, which has ideas and aspirations"(2)

(1) Abd-al-Ihab, Mubaddas: op-cit p.119
(2) Intelligence Department: Report of the History of Political and Political agitation in the Sudan, 1919-24 (Archives Khartoum)
In order to function, Indirect Rule required tribal cohesion and strong tribal leadership. It was rightly observed by the British policymakers that the centralising impact of the British Revolution had weakened or even destroyed both of these pre-requirements as people scattered, tribes disintegrated and leaders ruthlessly laid down.

Nonetheless, the government embarked on a policy which distorted and altered the realities of the social structure. In words:

"...the young administrators were bound to search enthusiastically for lost tribes and vanished chiefs and try to re-constitute a social system that has passed away for ever..." (1)

Under this new system Native Administration was accelerated and the power of the tribal leaders were strengthened and consolidated in a concept called "Power at Lower Ordinances".

In fact, Native Administration until 1924, as Prof. Abdo-El-Halim argued, was "primarily thought as complementary to the policy of training educated Sudanese for service in the hierarchy of the central government in both cases, the paramount consideration was the depoliticization of the service. But after the incidents of 1924, the system of Native

(1) Abdo-El-Halim, Nuddathiing op-cit p.201
Administration was looked upon as an alternative to employment of educated Indians in the government service which was deemed to be one of greatly Bureaucracy, the elaboration of which was impossible to contemplate with equanimity.

The principal architect of Indirect Rule was Sir J. D. Maffey, who between February 1926 and February 1928, who views were to a large extent a transplantation of his Indian experience.

In January, 1927, Maffey issued a minute in which he demanded the principle of native administration, the appointment of natives to the public service. Maffey stated, in general, a convenience to the alien Bureaucracy of which it is a part.

The Milner formula is our accepted policy, Maffey urged, "before traditions die", we ought to set an with extension of every direction. We have to be prepared to grant a worthy scale of renumeration to the chiefs. In order to give them dignity and status in the confidence that we shall thereby be moved in the long run free costly elaboration of our own flashy administrative machinery.

In a further minute, Maffey expanded this policy, pointing out the time factor in establishing native administration on the right lines and the prohibitive expense of

(1) Sir J. D. Maffey: "Minute by His Excellency the Governor General, 1, January, 1927, Archives Charters, File No. CIVSEC 1/9/35. (Central Records Office, Kathmandu, Sudan.)"
the alternative system of development on bureaucratic lines.

As said:

"By the judicious and progressive application of revolutionary measures in districts where conditions are suitable... and by ensuring that the native agencies which are to be responsible for those administrative measures... it should be possible not only to strengthen the fabric of native organisation, but, gradually, to reduce the number of sub-manum, clerks, accountants and similar bureaucratic adjuncts in the countryside." (1)

In consonance with this policy, the training courses for sub-manum were ended in 1927 and an ordinance was passed enhancing the authority wielded by the native chiefs over their people as judges. The object of the 1927 Ordinance, unlike that of 1902, was to extend and regularise the powers of the sheikhs. In addition to expanding their judicial powers, it was decided that tribal sheikhs and courts should also be granted certain administrative responsibilities.

This system of native administration was bitterly criticized by the educated class on a number of grounds. It was by definition based on the opposite principle of national unity and the allegiance of the subjects to their country. The preservation of tribal institutions which had almost

*(1) Macgregor's 135.
been destroyed by the violent revolution would hamper the advancement of the country and reduce the role of the educated class in the administration.

However this system was bound to excite and facilitate an life developed in the larger villages and towns and in parts of the country where economic progress began to create more individual freedom and an internal and external migration began to disintegrate many tribes. (1) In response to these limitations the government was forced in the late thirties to replace Native Administration by the relatively progressive ideals of local government.

The appointment of Sir Stewart Symes to the Governor-Generalship in 1934 heralded a significant reversal of government attitudes towards the educated class and towards administrative policy generally. Unlike his predecessors he believed that Native administration was not the appropriate instrument to promote the advancement of Sudanese society. He urged that Sudanese were capable of assuming a greater share in the administration of their country if they had the necessary education. By 1934, when the country was showing signs of recovery from the economic depression, the number of Sudanese appointed to senior posts of Assistant District

commissioners increased; training was started in a number of departments. A new military school was established and the school of administration was re-opened in the next year.

In consequence with this attitude of associating the Sudanese with the government administration, a committee known as the Leggin Committee, was set up "to review generally the progress made... in employment of Sudanese in more responsible posts in technical departments," and to advise and wherever possible make specific recommendations as to how this process of Sudanese employment could be accelerated economically and without undue risks to the public service.

Although the Committee, according to its terms of reference, was concerned with (i) employment (ii) dilution (iii) training, it was critical of the educational system. The Gordon Memorial College, the main feeding source for the civil service, has, judged by the Committee, failed to produce the required number of well-trained technical personnel. There had been no proper liaison, the committee observed, between technical departments and future employers and Gordon College as the producer of future employees. The
The committee further warned against "haste and premature utilization of Sudanese in posts they are unqualified to fill" (1).

Against a background of domestic nationalist ferment and an international conflict which culminated in the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the consequent threat to British imperial interests in East Africa and the Egyptian interests in the Nile, the two countries were bound to reach a reconciliation. The intrinsic outcome of all this was the signing of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance and Friendship. The Sudan was referred to vaguely but benevolently in Article 2 of the Treaty which stated that the primary aim of the two contracting Parties must be the welfare of the Sudanese.

The reaction to the conclusion of the treaty was felt in the three fields of politics, administration and education. Politically, it led to the increase of the nationalist among the educated class because of the purposeful neglect of the Sudanese people. In spite of the stipulation of the Treaty (art. 2/11) the Sudan Government was not prepared to restore to the Egyptians the share in the civil service which they had been deprived of after the

(1) Deakin, M.C. op. cit. p.107
1924 it was decided to employ Egyptians in the service. This need for higher education was therefore imperative. Accordingly, the attention of the government was focused primarily on the examination of secondary and post-secondary education. In 1937 the De La Rue Commission was invited by the government to include the Sudan in its survey of African educational problems. The Commission was critical of the educational system which, according to the Commission, had "tried to make up the accumulated arrears of many years' stagnation." (1)

The recommendations of the Commission to the government were:

(i) to broaden the base of the educational pyramid by expanding elementary education,

(ii) to hasten the development of technical education,

(iii) to improve the secondary curriculum,

(iv) to transform the Gordon College into a group of "higher schools" of Law, Agriculture, Veterinary Science, Science, Engineering and Arts to train the Sudanese to discharge more responsible functions in administrative and technical branches of the public service.

The Sudanese General Committee:

These advancements, significant as they might have been, fell short of the expectations of the progressive

(1) W.E.B. Du Bois, 190
nationalists who were impressed "not by what had been done, but by what had not been done". (1) This state of affairs had underlined the importance to the educated class of presenting to the government a united front which could play the role of spokesman for the Sudanese people. Several years of collective efforts and discussions culminated in February 1938 in the foundation of the Graduates General Congress, which later became the spearhead of the nationalist movement.

The membership of the Congress consisted of the graduates of post-elementary schools who were invariably government officials. Its declared object was vaguely but deliberately reflected in its constitution "to serve the public interest of the country and of the graduates". In a letter to the government byd, Ismail El-ahmedi, the first Secretary of the Congress, outlined the interests of the Congress as charitable and social on the one hand and "in matters of public interest involving the government or lying within the scope of its policy" on the other. The letter went on to urge "as most of us are government officials... are fully conscious of our obligations as such, it is not our intention to pursue lines of activity incompatible with government policy" but we feel that the government...

As aware of our peculiar position as the only educated element in the country, and of the duties which we, in this peculiar position, feel it to be ours."

The government formally welcomed the formation of the Congress in so far as it confined its purposes to philanthropic and social activities, but warned against the transformation of the Congress into a political organisation. These limitations were provisionally accepted by the leadership of the Congress to ensure government approval. However, a parting of the ways with the government was not long in coming. By 1942 the Congress was determined to assert its claim to act as a mouthpiece of the whole country. The moment seemed favourable. The Sudan was directly involved in the Second World War, the Sudan government was seriously preoccupied with the economic and administrative problems brought about by the war, the ranks of the unquestioned British authority were shaken as Britain's power was spent in the war. Under such conditions of external crisis and internal strains, it was natural that the Congress should decide to put forward a political manifest in which it claimed to speak for the Sudanese people. A memorandum addressed to the Civil Secretary on 3rd April 1942, put forward 12 demands with clear politi-
political and constitutional implications. The primary demand placed for was the issue... by the British and Egyptian governments of a joint declaration granting the Sudan...the Right of self-determination.”

(i) the formation of a representative body of Sudanese to approve the budget and the Ordinances.

(ii) the carrying out of the principle of the welfare of the Sudanese and their prior claim to government posts. (1)

The memorandum went on to claim the appointment of Sudanese in posts of political responsibility in all the main branches of the government and “limiting the appointments to government posts to Sudanese.”

The response of the government was uncompromisingly harsh. The claim by the Congress to represent the Sudanese was rejected. By submitting the memorandum it had forfeited the confidence of the government. It was duty and business of the Sudan government alone, the Civil Secretary emphasized in a stiff letter to the president of the Congress... to decide the pace at which the association of the Sudanese in government shall proceed in order that confidence between the government and the educated class could be restored, the Congress must confine itself to the internal and domestic

(1) N.W.-al-Rahim, Radiator: Ch. 69 p.107
affairs and renounce any claim ... to be the representative of the whole population.

A further result was a serious split among the ranks of the Congress between (i) those who were prepared to accept the good faith of the British government and (ii) those who were suspicious of British motives in Sudan.

The latter organized themselves in the Ashuiga Party founded by ashar and calling for “the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown.” The response of the more moderate nationalism was the establishment of the Umma Party championing the complete independence of the Sudan in alliance with Britain.

However, the Sudan government pressed by conditions both at home and abroad, was forced to abandon the traditional notion of “internalism” to the relatively progressive concept of “partnership.” The accelerated pace of socio-economic and political developments which the country was bound to undergo had necessitated the creation of more sophisticated forms of administration, as Sir Douglas Menzies minced in a lengthy note to the Governor General council dated 19, 1942. The
Civil Secretary proceeded to suggest the formation of an advisory council for Northern Sudan. The note was accepted and the outcome was the proclamation of the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan Order in 1943. The measure was taken designed by the Sudan Government to “slipshod off the congress support” (1) But the body created was criticized by the greater sections of the nationalists on the grounds of its excessive restrictions, its composition and its limitation to the Northern Sudan.

The period between 1946-1950 witnessed an accelerated pace of political advance in the Sudan. Two issues dominated the politics of the time, Anglo-Egyptian contention over the Sudan and the developments of Self-Government institutions. During the whole period the British, supported by the Muslim party, took the initiative while Egyptians were only able to criticize but could not prevent developments. Alongside these political and constitutional developments, the nationalist Parties allied with militant labour and student movements formed the core of an anti-British imperialistic policy, stirring up demonstrations and strikes in the big towns of the Sudan.

the formation of a "Sudanisation Committee" to examine the departments' proposals for Sudanisation of the service and to arrive at them. The Committee was composed of three British and three Sudanese under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Barren, the Director of the Establishment Branch. The major task of the Committee was to "discover the fastest rate at which the civil service could be Sudanised without undue risk to efficiency". After lengthy discussions the members of the Committee agreed upon the working rule of that "... a Sudanese may be promoted to a higher post if it is believed that he can maintain the standard of efficiency required by a Sudanese Administration." (2)

The Sudanisation Committee submitted its report in 1948 recommending the Sudanisation of sixty-two percent of the total number of government posts by 1952.

However, the Scheme proposed by the Committee was criticised by the nationalists on the grounds that since the government-related Sudanisation to the school output were


(2) Ibid., p.5.
educational facilities should be provided. The government record, the critics urged, in the field of education was unsatisfactory. Some of the critics maintained that the main object of the report was to perpetuate the existence of the colonial administration until the 1960s.

It should be noted that none of these schemes for closer association of the Sudanese in government succeeded insoftening the opposition to colonial rule. Political troubles continued, culminating in the year 1952 in the formation of the United Front for the Liberation of the Sudan, which was an alliance between the Akef, the Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation (SWTF) and the Sudan communist Party. The Front declared as its basic objectives the defeat of the British imperialism and the achievement of self-determination for the Sudan.

The passing of the Egyptian monarchy in the middle of the same year (July 1952) as a consequence of the Egyptian Revolution was advantageous to the Sudan nationalists' cause. The new regime in Egypt announced its willingness to cease the right of self-determination to the Sudanese, the aim that had long been ostensibly exposed by the British. The Egyptian government of the jutta reached an understanding
with the Independence Front. This made possible the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February, 1953.

According to the provisions of the Agreement a Sudanisation committee was formed:

"To complete... the Sudanisation of the Administration, the police, the Sudan Defence Force, and any other government post that may affect the freedom of the Sudan at the time of self-determination... within a period not exceeding three years." (1)

The Committee was also empowered to review the various government posts with a view to cancelling only unnecessary or redundant posts held by British and Egyptian officials. The Committee consisted of three Sudanese, one Egyptian and one British.

The deliberations of the Committee were characterised by the eagerness of the Sudanese members, supported by the Egyptians, to complete the Sudanisation of every branch of the Public Service as soon as possible. In the circumstances, the Committee was able to accomplish its tasks several months before the deadline. The total number of posts reviewed by the Committee was 1,224, of which 1,069 were held by British officials and 155 posts filled by Egyptians, of which only 725 were declared to be influencing.

The Sudan attained its independence in January, 1956. Within less than fifteen years it experienced four types of government. During the first three years it was ruled by party government through parliamentary institutions. The whole political history of the first Parliamentary period was a continuity not only of the system of government inherited from the colonial rule and moulded upon the British experience but also of the tenor of politics. The period was characterized by manoeuvres of the partisan politicians to win and keep massive support. The traditional parties which mainly included the National Unionist Party, the Umma Party and the People's Democratic Party, were only groups attached to leaders but none of them presented any sound programme.

Soon after the independence of the Sudan formally declared than the National Unionist Party shrink back from its attainable aim of theUnity of the Nile Valley” the immediate outcome of this renunciation was a split in the ranks of the Party. Those who left the party formed the People's Democratic Party under the leadership of the Khartoum. This made possible a coalition between the
Umma Party (the traditional rival of the SLF) and the People's Democratic Party; she formed a heterogeneous government only six months after the attainment of independence. The two parties agreed upon no objective but to exclude Anhadi from power. Almost all the national problems were subordinated to the maintenance of the fragile coalition. The dependence of the economy on one cash crop—cotton continued; the thorny question of the south was subjected to the southern (M.P.s) political opportunism; a permanent constitution which would have reflected the needs and the aspirations of the Sudanese people was not written. The political disputes between the parties were reduced to personal but unfounded battles. The political confusion which developed against a background of economic crisis by mid 1956 culminated in a military assumption of power under the leadership of General Abbud on the 17th of November 1956.

The coup d'état government was left with a number of problems: the political anarchy, the national disintegration between the North and the South, the fundamental dispute with the United Arab Republic on the Nile water, and economic disaster.

It should be noted that almost none of these problems were resolved during the next six years of the military
regime. The massive opposition to military junta was potent enough to overthrow the government in a popular revolution in October, 1964, paving the way for a second Parliamentary phase.

The successive civilian governments from 1966-1969 benefitted little from the failures of its military predecessor. The disturbances continued in the south, the partisans disputes also continued between (and especially within) the political parties for personal considerations. These limitations, coupled with the frustrated hopes aroused by the political leaders during the election campaigns, made possible the taking over of power by a second military junta led by General Jaafar Nidalri.

The whole period from 1956 to the present will be assessed in detail with special emphasis on the impact of the political instability which characterizes the whole period upon the administrative machine in the following chapter of this work.

The climax of Local Government:

The first landmark in the development of Local Government was the promulgation in 1957 of the three Local Government Ordinances. These applied to municipalities...
(e.g. Khartoum and Port Sudan), Townships (e.g. Kassala, El Ubayd), and Rural Areas. None of these were full-blooded local government authorities independent of governors and district commissioners and having the power to provide local services. Moreover, local government in the sense of local self-government based on the election of representatives with corporate existence which make and execute laws for the provision of services was still non-existent. (1)

A further step was taken in 1942 when a series of amendments were introduced to the 1927 ordinance, according to which town councils were granted executive and financial independence. A further development occurred in 1947 when a new Province Councils Ordinance was passed. The Province Councils, the Act stipulated, were empowered to advise the governors as to the carrying out of their powers and duties as the supervising and co-ordinating authorities under local government legislation and

1. to exercise any power or duty conferred upon the governor and delegated by him to the council.

By 1947 all six Northern Provinces had such councils and during the following year a Province Council was established in each of the three Southern Provinces.

(1) Abd-al-Jabbar, Maddathin, p. 207
Following the recommendation of the local government advisory board, Dr. Marshall, a British expert, was invited to "enquire into and report on the policy and practice of the Sudan Government in respect of local government and to make recommendations."

**Dr. Marshall’s Recommendations:**

Dr. Marshall recommended, among other things, the setting up of a network of autonomous local authorities side by side with the Legislative Assembly. These authorities should be autonomous bodies enjoying corporate existence and answerable to the electorate both for the making of laws and for their execution. He emphasised the need for such authorities to have independent tax revenue sufficient to meet substantial parts of their expenditure. The report further recommended a system of grants-in-aid for those services for which the state demanded a national minimum standard of performance (1).

The report formed the basis of the Local Government Ordinance, 1931 which provided for the organisation of Local Government councils on a common basis throughout the Sudan.

*It is worth noting that this Ordinance remained*

(1) *JAH*, p. 209
unaltered until 1971 when a new Act was issued to meet the perceived need for administrative reform at the local level.
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By J. F. C. Hackett
department, but becoming also an ex-officio member of the Governor-General's Council and later the Executive Council (1948 Ordinance).

When the Sudan attained self-government in 1956 bringing with it Parliamentary institutions, the machinery of government was immediately affected. The Governor-General's Executive Council was replaced by a council of ministers, the secretariat with its three main departments disappeared and a number of ministries were created on a functional basis, each headed by a minister and the majority consisting of groups of cognate departments.

IV. The Developments of Civil Service Structures

The grading system of the Sudan Civil Service goes back as early as 1901, when a salary grading structure for the Public Service was established. In 1935 scales were introduced for expatriate grades up to the status of Governor of Provinces. Locally employed staff, however, had their salaries fixed on individual basis until 1920.

The first unified grading system and salary structure was introduced in 1923, which provided for eight main
The Grading system of 1934 continued unchanged until the end of 1934 when the need for revision arose, mainly because Sudanese officials were beginning to fill posts in the Higher Grades which had been previously occupied exclusively by expatriates. Accordingly the Governor General appointed a committee to

“enquire into the present standard of remuneration and conditions of employment... and to make recommendations as to the scale and establishments of the various classes therein”

The committee's report to the Governor General in December, 1934 recommended eleven basic scales divided into three groups and special categories of rates of progression with these scales were adopted.

(See Table 2 below)

(See Table 2)

Lettered Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Scale</th>
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<tr>
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<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>850-1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>600-1,000</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<td>264-452</td>
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<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td>144-350</td>
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<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>78-204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Division</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>56-120</td>
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1934 Salary Scales
For Ist, 2nd and 3rd Divisions
In 1951 a terms of service commission was formed to review the service conditions of 1935 which were considered defective and incompatible with times. The commission was named after its chairman, Mr. Mills. Its terms of reference were:

- to revise and make recommendations regarding the terms of service and superannuation arrangements of officials and employees on the establishment with special reference to:
  a. the feasibility of introducing a simpler system of salary scales;
  b. the need to adjust salaries and pensions having regard to the increase in the cost of living;
  c. the need to adjust salaries in order to rectify anomalies.

In particular the commission was asked to consider and advise upon:

i. the relationship of the salaries and conditions of service of Sudanese and non-Sudanese;

ii. the principles and methods of promotion;

The Mills' Commission in a lengthy report was critical of the 'salary structure' on a number of grounds: its detachment from the conception of function and responsibility in public services, its failure to keep pace with the development of the activities of government that have "multiplied"
many times over the inequality of progression in salary scales.(1)

Accordingly the Commission were firmly convinced that the salary structure in 1935 needed to be completely overhauled. As a result two major steps towards the rationalisation of the scaling system were taken.

Firstly: on the assumption that all future appointments would be held by Africans, the distinction between Sudanese and expatriate scales was suppressed.

Secondly: instead of a structure comprising three divisions, in which the nature of the functions performed was not precisely defined, the Civil Service was classified into three main classes on the basis of functions performed.

The functions of each category were described as follows:

1. Administrative and professional grade (ADP):

   concerned with the formation of policy, with the co-ordination and improvement of the machinery of government and with the general administrative control of the departments. In a relatively small service it is not possible sharply to differentiate between many professional officials and their (1) Sudan Government: Report of the Terms of Service Commission (Kluck), 1933, p. 44).
administrative colleagues, doctors and engineers, for example, are performing duties of an administrative character using their specialized knowledge in the direction of departmental affairs.

11. Sub-Professional/Technical Class (SPWT):

The functions of this class of officials were, the report observed, of a highly variegated nature, but it was intended to include officers holding technical qualifications not entitling them to entry into the administrative and professional class, and to officers who acquired specific knowledge and techniques in the ordinary course of their daily duties. It was envisaged that experience in this grade might merit translation into the above class without acquiring the necessary academic qualifications.

111. Clerical Class:

The functions of this class are largely concerned with the continuous maintenance of the record of administrative activity. Duties include simple clerical work, dealing with particular cases in accordance with well-defined regulations, instructions or well-understood general practice. Occasionally they may be called upon to prepare simple precis or drafts or collect material upon which the
administrator may act or advise. The clerical class were
not to be called upon to exercise discretion.

(see Table (2) below)

In addition, special scales were recommended for non-
commissioned police and prison staff in view of their having
to serve under special codes of discipline and other conditions
of employment different from those of public servants as a
whole.

Table (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Old Termiology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group A</td>
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<td>P.U.'s.</td>
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<td>Group B</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Directors</td>
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<td>&quot; III</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>D.P.H. &amp; P.V.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; IV</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; V</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>Deputy to D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; VI</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Asst. Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; VII</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; A.C.P.</td>
<td>1,500-1330</td>
<td>Asst. Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C.P.</td>
<td>1,200-1150</td>
<td>Asst. Directorate Inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000-1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800-800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Special**

- 600-800 F.
- 800-600 G.
- 400-500 H.
- 300-400 J.
- 100-160 K.

**Clerical**

- 600-810 P/Head Staff Clerk.
- 600-830 G/Staff Clerk.
- 500-820 N.
- 300-200 J.
- 100-160 K.
111. The Central Organs of the Civil Service

1. The Cadre Committee (1919–1922)

In 1919–1920, the Sudan Government, following the example of Egypt, carried out a review of the whole body of regulations governing the conditions of service and establishments in each unit. (1) A new committee, headed by the Chief Justice, was appointed for the purpose. Their recommendations were embodied in the Regulations for the Appointments, Pay, Promotion and Discharge... of officers of the Sudan Government, 1920. These regulations provided for the setting up of a collegiate authority to administer them and to act as an advisory body for the Financial Secretary in certain matters. The regulations stipulated that the Cadre Committee should be that authority. Its membership included the Financial Secretary (ex-officio), the Legal Secretary, the Civil Secretary as well as the Chief Justice and the General Manager of the Sudan Railways (in mass). The Committee, however, was able to extend its jurisdiction to such matters pertaining to conditions of service, grading, rates of pay and examinations.

2. The Establishment Committee

In 1920 when the need for a new structure and regulations had arisen, a special committee on Establishment

Grades and scales of pay was set up. Following the recommendations of that committee, an establishment committee which was a sub-committee of the Governor-General's council came into existence to replace the old Cadre Committee. It duties and responsibilities went beyond those of its predecessor. Its membership included the financial secretary who acted as its chairman, the civil secretary and the legal secretary.

Its functions were defined as follows:

(i) to be consulted and their views obtained by financial secretary before any proposal to amend the Personnel Regulations was laid before the governor general's council.

(ii) the committee should hear appeals by Heads of Departments or by an official aggrieved by the exercise of any powers conferred by the 1950 Personnel Regulations.

(iii) the financial secretary could refer to the committee any matter calling for the exercise of his powers under the Personnel Regulations.

The setting up of the Establishment Committee was a continuation of earlier policies when it was now fit that the responsibility for personnel administration in the civil service should not be concentrated in one

(1) Ibid., p. 115
organization but should be diffused between the departments concerned with the administration, i.e. between the Civil and Financial Secretariats.

With Independence in 1956 and the scrapping of the central secretariats, the Establishment Committee lost its prestige. It lost also a considerable part of its functions to the Public Service Commission which was formed in 1966.

3. The Public Service Commission

The establishment of the Public Service Commission was recommended by the Kikuyu Commission:

"in order to the proper development of the civil services which the coming constitutional development of the country would bring about" and "by which it will be answered that the members of these services shall have high and uniform standards of character, educational background and professional competence" (1)

The Terms of Service Commission also recommended that the proposed Public Service Commission must be constitutional, independent body. For, otherwise, "it would have no little to perform the functions assigned to it as part of the permanent machinery of government" (2)

These functions, the Terms of Service Commission proposed were:

(1) Sudan Government, Report of the Terms of Service Commission 1951, pp. 145
(2) ibid, p. 115
(1) To frame regulations governing recruitment to the administrative, professional, clerical and technical classes,

(2) where competitive examinations are not appropriate, ... to scrutinise the qualifications of candidates,

(3) to assign successful candidates to ministries and departments in accordance with their needs...

(4) pre-entry training,

(5) to keep under review the possibility of creating an executive class of which the proposed departmental staff appointments are the prototypes.

(6) principles and machinery of promotion, translation from clerical class to administrative and executive classes and technical class to professional class.

Following the recommendations of the Mills Commission, the Sudan Self-Government Statute stipulated the establishment of a Public Service Commission charged with the following duties and functions:

(1) To advise the Council of Ministers and the Ministers concerned on the general principle to be observed when making policy decisions relating to such matters as recruitment, promotion, transfer and retirement of government servants, holding examinations for the purpose of

(1) ANS, p. 119
appointment or promotion and enforcing discipline within the entire Civil Service (Article 89).

(2) To recommend to the Council of Ministers and individual Ministers of regulations affecting the salaries or conditions of service of public officials. Creation of new posts to which super-scale salaries are allotted and proposals for the promotion of government servants to posts to which super-scale salaries are allotted.

(3) To investigate and to advise the Governor-General on petitions submitted by classified members of Public Service appealing against decisions adversely affecting their prospects and their general conditions of service.

(4) To give advice concerning the Civil Service to both the Governor-General and the different Ministers when required.

Exercising the power conferred on him by Article (89) of the Self-Government Statute and after consultation with the Council of Ministers, the Governor-General set up the first Public Service Commission in the Sudan on February 8th, 1954. The powers of the Central Board established under the Official Discipline Ordinance of 1927, that of the Council Constituted under the Sudan Government Pension
Ordinance of 1904 and 1919 and the Sudan Fund Ordinance of 1927 had all been transferred to and vested in the Public Service Commission.

These rules, regulations and procedures which were set up and the transferred ordinance were not removed from the jurisdiction of the Commission until 1969, except when some of them were suspended during the first Military regime (1956-1964).

From 1956-1956 the Commission worked as an advisory body to the Governor-General and the executive body.

When the Sudan attained independence in 1965 the same composition and functions of the Public Service Commission granted by the Self-Government Statute were transferred to the Sudan Transitional Constitution of 1966.

After the October popular revolution, 1964, most of the powers removed from the Commission during the first Military regime were re-vested in it by chapter 20 of the Sudan Transitional Constitution (amended), 1964.

The Commission continued as an advisory body to the government until 1968 when it was dissolved by a Republican decree.

(1) Nadia Eman Ahmed: Critical Approach to the Role of the Public Service Commission in the Sudan (Khartoum, 1978)
Order. Its powers were distributed between the Presidency of the State, the individual ministers and heads of departments.

5. **The Civil Services Department (C.S.D)**

The setting up of the Establishment Branch was the real start of an evolutionary process which led in 1956 to the creation of an authority whose jurisdiction extended to the detailed control of the civil service. In that year, following the initiative of the Financial Secretary, the post of 'Director of Establishment' was created. After independence it was placed within the Ministry of Finance.

This state of affairs continued until 1971, when following the formation of a new Ministry for Public Service and Administrative Reform, the Establishment Branch was converted into an autonomous institution known as the Civil Service Department with the task of controlling appointments, conditions of service and other personnel matters and keeping central personnel records of all classified officials.(1) It recommends the basic policies and legislation to govern the management of personnel in the public service and the control of expenditure in (Chapter 1 salaries) in the central government budget. It is also
entrusted with the interpretation and implementation of policies and legislation.

Organization:

The Department is headed by a Director responsible to the Under-Secretary of Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform. In 1963, the total staff was about 749 persons, 218 of whom were university graduates. Six sections comprised the whole Department.

These are:

1. Budget and Terms of Service:

Concerned with the preparation and administration of Chapter (1) of the National Budget (personnel). This section deals with the creation, up-grading, down-grading and cancellation of positions. Besides, this section handles proposals regarding the terms of service of all categories of officials of the disciplinary forces (army, police and prison officials).

2. Appointments and Promotions:

This section is responsible for ensuring that personnel regulations are adhered to in regard to appointments, pay and promotions. According to recent developments,
scrutiny of advertisements for appointments was transferred to a 'Public Service Recruitment Board'.

3. Leave and Allowances:

This section deals with all matters pertaining to leave and allowances of classified officials.

4. Unclassified Personal Section:

The duties of this section are concerned with pay, leave, allowances, transport privileges, hours of work, overtime and other personnel matters regarding labourers and temporary staff.

5. Personnel Records:

This section maintains personnel records for all central government employees. This section prepares and maintains departmental records and in the case of appointments and promotions ascertain if financial authorisations have been made.

6. Organisation and Methods:

This section is established to give advice on government organisation and to study work processes with the object of promoting efficiency and economy in the civil service. Besides, there are also the internal administration...
and the Research Section.

V The Establishment of Ministry of Public Service
And Administrative Reform

In his speech of Sept. 19th, 1971 President Almaz
pledged himself to administrative reform of the Sudanese bur-
archy which was acknowledged to have a major role in the
eco-economic growth of the country. The bureaucracy, Nasser
condemned, has to shoulder grave responsibilities and is faced
with numerous challenges. The blue-print devised by Nasser
included:

I. The definition of goals and jurisdictions of all
government agencies to end duplication and overlapping and to
facilitate co-ordination and co-operation.

II. The laying of a public service law to define
its constitutional position, its goals and objectives, methods
of recruitment, promotion, discipline... etc.

III. Realization of material and moral stability for
employees.

IV. Personal Development

Accordingly, a United Nations Mission was invited
late in 1972, chaired by an Egyptian expert, Dr. Fawzi
... to help the newly established Ministry of Public Service and
Administrative Reform may set an administrative reform strategy and programme. The Danish recommended a quadruple programme for administrative reform including, organizational development, personal management reform, training and a planned approach to administrative reform.

The Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform was established in accordance to a Presidential Order issued in mid-October, 1972, charged with the following functions:

1. Determining the objectives and jurisdictions of Ministries and Department and Public Corporations.
2. Formulating the rules and norms of public service.
3. Developing and implementing national training schemes.
4. Supervising institutions for administrative and managerial training and research.
5. Advising and servicing government with administrative reform. (1)

(1) Critical Appraisal of the Central Personnel Agency
(Civil Service Department)

The establishment of a central agency for personnel administration is regarded by many scholars as one of the

(1) Al-Tawifi, Al agab, Al-Sitt p.191
main features of a modern public personnel system. The rationale behind the establishment of such a body is to ensure equity in recruitment, advancement, transfer and retirement. The absence of such a central agency is bound to lead to disintegration in the whole service.

The central management of the civil service has remained divided since the self-government period. A divided responsibility among three organisations: the Establishment Committee, the Establishment Branch (later the Civil Service Department) and the Public Service Commission. This division of responsibility led to a number of deficiencies. Firstly, it led to a state of fragmentation in the central management of the civil service. It also created confusion and blurred the responsibility for the formulation of personnel policies.

The Public Service Commission, that was created with the object of isolating the service from an accelerated nationalist movement in the early 1950's, suffered from a number of defects. The first defect emerged from the fact that there was no clear stipulation either in the Constitution or the Commission's regulations about the autonomy of the Commission. The study has suggested the consolidation of the

(1) Nagiri, A.N. Special P. 165
(2) Inflas, p.10
powers of the commission synonymous with those of the Auditor General.(1) The second defect lies in the composition of the commissions; neither its chairman nor its members were required to have specific qualifications or specialization. A Susanne student of Public Administration suggested the infusion of the membership of the Commission with highly qualified and specialized persons in public administration.(2)

A further limitation of the Commission emerged from its advisory capacity. As we have seen, the Commission was only empowered to make recommendations to the Executive Branch of government. This provision rendered the successive commissions since Independence ineffective and inefficient in protecting the Civil Service against the intrusions of politics.

Besides, the Civil Service Department was bound to be restricted by a number of limitations. On the one hand, by its excessive emphasis on rules and regulations, the C.S.D. had reduced its role to that of a watchman of the rules and their implementation. On the other hand, the C.S.D. officers in ministries and departments are looked upon as 'outsiders', their advice on personnel development, on policy decisions or programs implementation is hardly asked for. This is partly due to the fact that they are overburdened with day-

(2) Al-Peradfi, Al-Aghab Al-starat, p.173
day-to-day work and partly because they lack knowledge
of the more professional aspects of personnel manage-
ment, in development and utilization of human resources to
help meet organisational goals. (1) A further limitation of
the C.S.D is the fact that the top level posts within it
are still sealed off from highly qualified and well-trained
officials in the ministries and departments. Besides, the
placement of the C.S.D within the Ministry of Finance has
been criticized by reformers of administration on the ground
that it led to the overloading of the financial considera-
tions at the expense of good management. A remedy for such
a situation has been suggested in the effect that the
central personnel agency should be placed as near as possi-
ble to the Chief Executive Office. This, it is argued, has
been the practice in most of the developing states in Asia and
Africa. (2)

(1) Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme:

It is generally agreed upon among scholars of personnel
management that a basic objective of a sound personnel pro-
gramme is to pay each employee wages that are commensurate
with the wages paid to other employees performing similar

(1) 1969, p. 173
jobs. This objective is achieved by what is termed in the literature of Public Personnel as "Job evaluation" which is simply "a description of work activities, into the smallest component parts." (1) The immediate goal of any Job Evaluation device is to fill each job with the individuals who meet the qualification required for that job only.

In the Sudan, the idea behind the Job Evaluation and Classification scheme was not seriously tackled until 1972, when a United Nations Mission was invited to investigate the status of the Sudan Public Service and to devise a program for administrative reform.

The mission was critical of the basic structure of the Sudan Public Service decrying it to be "defective and inadequate in terms of identification and evaluation of occupational pursuits."

"At best... it is a skeletal structure of pay-grades... arbitrarily distinguished and assigned to class structures which are overlapping." (2)

The mission further recommended the initiation of a comprehensive position classification and "Pay Study" to serve as the basis for a sound restructuring of the personnel.


systems in the entire public employment sector.

In 1973, and on the basis of the recommendation of the second Administrative Conference, the Public Service Act, 1973 was issued which stipulated that "all posts in the Public Service are to be evaluated and classified on the basis of the work done, the responsibilities involved and qualifications required". (1)

In December of the same year and in response to a United Nations Mission recommendation a team of three officers was commissioned to England where a special programme of training in Job Evaluation and classification was launched specially for them.

It took the team four years to produce five volumes of 750 pages which included a comprehensive study of the Sudan Public Service. The Union-adopted "Unified system of classification based on qualifications and job orientation". The selected system was praised for its suitability to the Sudan Public Service. This system, the team observed, is simple and flexible. "It makes for equity in as much as it makes it possible to pay the same amounts for jobs requiring people of equal calibre." (2) In a unified system it is further argued, it is easier to transfer people from one occupational group to another and from one department to another.

(1) Public Service Act, 1973 Chapter II, Para 8
(2) Ministry of Public Service/Administrative Reform: Summary Report on Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme, p.2
In November, 1966, Mr. Burton, a British personnel expert, was invited by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform to investigate the status of the Sudan Civil Service and to give advice to the Job Evaluation and Classification Team in processing the data they had collected. After his investigations, Mr. Burton made a comprehensive report on the organization, staffing and pay structures of the Sudan Civil Service.

Organization:

According to Mr. Burton, the organization structure inherited at independence was designed for a very different form of government. He suggested a reorganization of the Sudan Public Service based on a functional distinction between administrative posts charged with overseeing policy and organization and executive posts charged with the operating policy. Such an arrangement will free the professionals for the sort of work for which they were trained and for which they are badly needed.

Staffing:

Like the organization structure, the staff structure inherited at independence was inappropriate for the civil service of an independent country. The grading of staff should correspond to the grading of work and this varies.
according to the levels of responsibility it entails. Different types of work must therefore be identified and staff structure built for them. Then all these structures can be created, on which will accommodate all the levels from all the occupational groups.

Pav

Although drastic changes in pay levels have occurred since independence, the nature of the structure has not materially changed. The new organization and staff structures having been completed, a correspondent, and thus matching structure of pay should be established based on the principle of "Equal pay for equal work".

Eventually, in March 1977, the President of the Republic announced in his "Face the Nation" monthly programs that the new "Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme" (JESC) was ready. It was scheduled to be implemented at the beginning of the financial year 1977, but, owing to financial difficulties, it was postponed to the year 1978 in an atmosphere of strikes by Technicians, Doctors and Railway workers.

The adopted scheme called for the creation of twenty-two salary levels. These twenty-two levels were divided into seven categories namely:

(62)
A. Administrative Posts:
- largely concerned with designing, programming, interpreting and monitoring overall policy towards goals. This category includes under-secretaries, deputy under-secretaries and assistant under-secretaries.

B. Executive Posts:
- for professionals, requiring specialized knowledge such as doctors, engineers, geologists... the duties and responsibilities include application of scientific data, principles and theories.
- for non-professional administrators of department and regional units. The nature of the work of this group requires analytical scientific methods in addition to wide knowledge and experience.
- for those in routine executive posts like clerks, accountants and store keepers etc.

C. Supervisory Posts:
- responsible for the direction of a division or branch with accountability to the establishment management for the quantity and quality of the work done by subordinate employees to assure efficient and economical work operation.
4. Technical Posts:

Posts for which specific technical training is required. The duties involve only technical application of principles with no administrative duties such as chemical institute engineers and technicians of specialized institutes.

5. Crafts:

- Posts involving production activities requiring craft knowledge, such as carpentry, auto-mechanic and plumbing.

6. Non-Crafts:

- Posts involving production activities but not requiring craft-knowledges such as guards, messengers, gardeners....

7. Miscellaneous:

- Posts requiring different knowledge and skill other than those required in the previous categories, such as nurses, mail sorting and despatching....
A corresponding Pay Structure was adopted. This is shown below:

### Table (4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Salary Range in L.C.£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>632-945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>549-829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>475-712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>415-627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>356-552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>314-476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>273-410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>237-356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>207-310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>177-264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>156-234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>135-203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>115-173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>105-154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>99-134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>77-116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>67-101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>58-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>51-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>44-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>36-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30-56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This system was designed to cater for all starting from a junior worker at level one and ending with an Under-Secretary of a ministry who stands at level 18. On appointment to a particular level consideration will be paid to the duties and responsibilities, and the criterion of "equal pay for equal work" will be followed.

The scheme was implemented in the financial year 1975/76. But later in 1976/77 it was again revised and in January 1981 18 new salary levels were designed for the whole Civil Service. It is worth noting that the amended scheme was closely related to the 1951 salary structure. (See the Table (5) below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Salary Range in £s.</th>
<th>1951 Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade One</td>
<td>4900-5400</td>
<td>Under-Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>4420-4720</td>
<td>Director-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4020-4320</td>
<td>Group I-higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>3620-3920</td>
<td>Group II-higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>2980-3380</td>
<td>&quot;LV &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>2740-3140</td>
<td>&quot;LV 5/VLV&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>2150-2650</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>1650-2150</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Min-Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ten</td>
<td>1936-1996</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven</td>
<td>1946-1956</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve</td>
<td>1956-1996</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteen</td>
<td>1961-1986</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteen</td>
<td>1971-2006</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteen</td>
<td>1984-1986</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteen</td>
<td>1994-2006</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeen</td>
<td>2004-2016</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighteen</td>
<td>2011-2044</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the recommendations of a Ministerial committee in 1980, the whole scheme was stopped until an overall review had been carried-out. An authorised informant told the writer that the principles employed in devising the scheme were literally copied from a British scheme. These principles were realized to be incompatible with the realities of the Sudan Public Service. Mr. Burton, the British personnel expert, had long warned against the popular misconception that high evaluation values jobs in monetary terms. (1) But it seems that nobody, including those in the political leadership was ready to listen to Burton's words. A further factor that rendered the scheme a failure was the fact that it was a subject of political compromise between the government on one side and the Trade Unions on the other hand. The terms of politics wreck the scheme.

Recruitment Policy Since Independence

The Sudan Civil Service which emerged at Independence in 1956 was very much modeled after the British experience. The prevailing personnel classification system of the service followed the example of the 'rank' or 'man-oriented' British system.(1) The Sudan Public Service, as we have seen, was divided into three classes.(2) Recruits to any of these classes was closely geared to the educational system. Recruits to the administrative and professional classes are usually graduates of Khartoum University or a recognized foreign university. Members of the Sub-Professional & Technical class are drawn from secondary school-leavers while Junior clerks are selected from intermediate school-leavers.

The Personnel Regulations stipulate certain general requirements which each applicant for a public service job should meet. These are:

1. Sudanese nationality.
2. Age: not less than sixteen years.
3. Medical fitness.
4. Possession of the qualifications necessary for entry to the specific position.
5. Good personal conduct and manner.
6. Experience (for certain special positions).

(2) See above p.42 of this thesis.
This system of recruitment and selection, however, was not free from criticism. Dr. Abu Sin pointed out the unfortunate fact "there is hardly any co-operation or co-ordination between the University authorities and the government departments in forecasting the departments' future manpower needs and the ways of fulfilling these needs".[1]

Boside, Dr. Mutaz El-Bazairi[2] observed that:

"there has been neither a uniform method of recruitment nor a single office or agency responsible for the appointment and placement of personnel." As a matter of fact the appointment and placement of functions have been shared by the Establishment Branch of the Ministry of Finance and Economics, the Public Service Commission and the individual departments and ministries with the latter being the dominant group. Such a lack of single agency capable of coordinating governmental recruitment and placement policies has often resulted in considerable confusion.

The Franklin Commission[3] has long been critical of the recruitment policies in the Sudan and deemed it unsatisfactory on a number of grounds:

Firstly, the power of appointment being dependent on the discretion of one man, however fair the director

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to be, allegation of favouritism and nepotism will almost certainly be made by unsuccessful candidates. Such a situation would be detrimental to the public interest.

Secondly, each Head of Department has his own standards of selection and the quality of recruits to the Service is likely to vary from one Department to another. This would make for lack of parity in standards of selection.

Thirdly, since Heads of Departments are interested mainly in filling their vacant posts, they are not likely to concern themselves with the question whether any candidate would be better fitted for work in some other Department.

The Committee went on to suggest the setting-up of a centralised recruitment agency to ensure parity in standards and evenness in the quality of the intake of new civil servants.

This suggestion was not taken into account by the successive governments until 1972, when the government, becoming aware of the weaknesses of personnel administration, invited a U.N. Mission to examine the situation and make recommendations. The result was a proposal, among others, for the establishment of a Public Service Recruitment Board.
(P.A.B.),(located within the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform). The Board comprised a chairman (at the Under-Secretary level) and four top-level government officials representing the Ministries of Finance, Education, Local Government, and Public Corporations.

The Board was entitled:

I. To advise on the framing of the recruitment regulations for the various public services in accordance with the terms of the broad policies laid down by the Government, in consultation with the Public Service Council.

II. To undertake actual recruitment to posts in the administrative and professional classes.

III. To allocate such selected candidates to various units.

The scope of jurisdiction of the Board covers both the civil service and the public corporations, with the exception of the Southern Region and the Universities.

Thus whenever there is a vacancy to be filled, the Ministry or department concerned informs the Public Service Recruitment Board of the nature of the position and applications are solicited from all qualified persons through advertisements in newspapers and over the radio.(1)

(1) UNA p.398
The selection method used is mostly interviews. The written examination is used in the selection of applicants to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Local Government or when it is specifically requested by the employing agency. Specialists such as engineers, doctors, and agriculturists are exempted from both the interview and the written examination. This is due to the fact that there is a drastic need for them.

The power of appointment to the top-level leadership positions rests in the President of the Republic. Appointments to senior positions (i.e., Groups V, VI, and VII) are made through the decision of the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Affairs after the recommendation of the Minister concerned. The Civil Service Department has to approve the appointments to all other responsible jobs. Appointments to labor (non-responsible) positions is the responsibility of the head of the agency concerned.

The newly appointed employee is required to be placed on probation for 3 years. This condition may be waived by the head of the agency concerned if the recruit has previous similar work experience or if he possesses excellent relevant educational qualifications.

(1) Ijud, p. 199
(2) Ijud, p. 299
H. PROMOTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES

Promotion and advancement in the Sudan Public Service used to follow three methods (1):

a. annual increments
b. efficiency bars,
c. promotion bars.

Increments were (and still are) granted by the head of the department if the performance of the official concerned was satisfactory.

Promotions were also made on a departmental basis, except in the case of the clerical class and the non-professional accountants. Promotions in a super-scale post were made by the Minister concerned. The confidential report of the officers within the scope of promotion together with the proceedings of the departmental board concerned were sent to the Public Service Commission. The final decision laid with the P.S.C. Promotions were usually based on the principle of seniority.

This system remained unaltered until 1973 when a Public Service Act was promulgated. Article 16 of the Act stipulated:

(1) Al-remainder, Al-aghib on Promotion in the Sudanese Civil Service, p. 2
The selection for promotion shall be on the basis of the merit system and consideration shall be given to the performance reports, educational qualifications and seniority.\(^{(1)}\)

The Personnel Regulations which were issued in 1976 provided that:

1. Promotion can only be made to fill an existing vacancy.
2. An employee is promoted only from one rank to the one immediately above except those top-level positions excepted by the President.
3. An employee may not be promoted during the probationary period.

Today, there are three criteria for selection to promotion:

1. Performance (70%)
2. Educational qualifications (20%)
3. Seniority (10%)

According to the present system, or may be seen, greater weight is given to performance. Promotions to high level leadership posts are a monopoly of the President.\(^{(1)}\)

of the Republic on the recommendation of the Minister of
Public Service and Administrative Reform. Approval of pro-
motions of top officials has been under the authority of the
Minister concerned. Promotions to lower positions are the
decision of the agency concerned. A form prepared by the
Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform contains
the following items:

1. Personal data (name, age, date of appointment, salary scale, etc.)
2. Personality traits
3. The official's performance in the current year.
   According to regulation, an official rated as unsat-
   isfactory twice should, subject to appeal, be dismissed.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING

5. The Post-Independence Epoch: New Tasks

It is common-place that almost all new states in
Africa and Latin America have been caught up in the
challenging task of socio-economic development. The Sudan
is no exception. The function of the state has inevitably
expanded from the passive, yet important, aspect of law
and order to the more positive one of social change. This
new and crucial task has necessitated the creation and development of a new state apparatus out of the inherited structures and organisations from the colonial era to meet the new demands that the responsibility of independence placed upon it.

Such a reform was essential as Adu concluded (1), if the civil servants in particular are to become vehicles for change. The civil servants have the opportunity to exercise constructive initiatives in this period of challenge. They can or do effectively only if they are recognised for the efficient performance of the new tasks assigned to them.

But how can administrative institutions be fitted, developed and inspired to assume such an urgent role?

This, Dr. Mustafa El-Bashir (2) held, depends on the fulfillment of a number of conditions. Chief among these are:

1. The creation and maintenance of organisational structures that may adequately activate their members to be productive.

2. The establishment and maintenance by the administrator—


raters of the Co-operation and support of political leadership. On the one hand, administrators are called upon to respond to the policies and programs initiated and sustained by the political leadership, while on the other hand the latter should provide for the administrative institutions perspective training, orientation and direction.

III. confidence and esteem from an informed, contributing and sympathetic populace for the effectiveness of the role of the administrative apparatus in the process of development.

IV. The civil servants, particularly those in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, on their part should have values and attitudes that enable them to bring competence, good judgment and integrity to bear upon their crucial role(1)

The Sudan, like many other emerging nations, has been experiencing, since independence, a rapid expansion of governmental activity in the direction of socio-economic development and, hence, an increasing extension in the field of activity of the bureaucracy. The administrative machinery of government has been committed to new tasks embracing the initiation of socio-economic development programs, the

(1) Ibid, p. 9
determination and assessment of resources and the recognition of ways and means of fostering growth and advancement.

This was not an easy task. The major vexing problem precluding the availability of a capable cadre with the requisite developmental qualifications, skills and values was the colonial legacy. (1) As we have seen, the Sudanese bureaucracy was originally set up by the British and thus, inevitably, was suited to the colonial policies values and traditions. Moreover, the colonial era was characterized by a limited and slow pace of educational development. The colonial system had little concern itself with staff development and training, particularly in the professional and technical fields. This shortage of manpower was not felt until immediately after the completion of the Sudanisation programmes. The immediate and swift Sudanisation process was bound to lead to an acute shortage of skilled manpower and thus a lowering in the standards of the service. The successive Sudanese national governments were forced to shoulder the task of bringing about the required change in educational and training programmes so as to suit them to the

As has been stated by an Economic Commission for Africa:

"Whatever the controversies in background and framework, similarities in traditions, historical developments and circumstances... training of civil servants in an urgent need to adjust training to African needs."

This difficult task was not undertaken until 1960 when the Sudan Government sought the cooperation of the U.N. Eventually two U.N. experts were sent to conduct an on-the-spot survey of developments, needs and institutions in the field and to recommend on the extent and type of assistance needed. In March of the same year the I.P.A. came into existence as a joint undertaking in technical cooperation between the Sudan and the U.N. One basic objective behind the establishment of I.P.A. was "to improve and develop the organization and administration of the public services so that the public policies and programs can be carried out as effectively and as economically as possible." The institute was invited to focus its attention and activity on the understanding and application

of modern principles, practices and techniques of administration.

For the achievement of these objectives, the Institute was given a three-fold function: research, training, and advisory. In the field of research the I.P.A. was designed to collect and organise information about government agencies which would be useful for teaching purposes. According to the survey the I.P.A. was expected to make the expert knowledge and experience within the Institute available to public servants faced with specific organisational or administrative problems. The training function of the I.P.A. was designed to supplement the efforts of the ministries themselves and to broaden the outlook of public servants, to inform them of modern techniques of administration, develop analytical skills specifically related to administrative work and to prepare them for more responsible posts. (3)

Training Programme

A striking feature in the history of the I.P.A. was the annual conference known as the "Round Table Conference". The participants were senior civil servants, members of the academic staff of the Universities, leading managers in the (4) 1938 p. 3
private sector and members of technical assistance missions. The themes usually covered a wide range of subjects, designed to stimulate research for professional and technical knowledge. Within the decade extending from its birth to 1969 the I.D.A. was able to hold ten Round Table Conferences in which a number of topics were discussed covering techniques of development planning, manpower, public administration and economic development, problems of Greater Khartoum, civil service in a changing society... etc.

Sudan Academy for Administrative Science

In 1972 a U.N. mission under the chairmanship of the late Dr. Fadd Sherif was invited to review the overall government organization and to make recommendations on the improvements proposed. In a lengthy report, the mission recommended the establishment of a Sudan Academy for Administrative Science as a component of an administrative reform program. The Academy was designed to support the proposed administrative reform programs by capturing the interest and the commitment of the top leadership of different sectors whose active involvement in leading the process of improvement in their organization is a vital...
ingredients.

Besides the functions designated for the I.P.A., the S.A.S. was recommended (1) to develop communications for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of different training and research institutions in the country.

2) co-operate with international, regional and national organizations working in the field of manpower development in the Indian and Arab and African States.

Organisation:

At its birth the S.A.S. was attached to the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform. In 1980 the S.A.S. was finally merged with the I.P.A. and was given the name of "Indian Academy for Administrative Sciences". The governing Board of the Academy is responsible to the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform. For formulating the general policy of the Academy is the responsibility of the director general who is appointed by the head of State on the recommendation of the Minister.

It should be noted here that although the Academy was established in 1978 it was only able to adopt a plan for training programs in the year 1981/82.

Problems and Limitations:

The training courses that have been organized either by the S.M.A.S or its predecessor the I.P.A., encountered a number of problems. The first problem is the fact that they were set up on an ad-hoc basis without systematic planning(1). Ministries and Departments made little use of them. The previous I.P.A. was mainly concerned with the training of middle and junior cadres neglecting the training of top-level officials. This shortcoming affected the image of the institute. Moreover, the greater emphasis of the institute was on laws and regulations rather than on newer techniques. The establishment of the S.M.A.S was meant to meet these limitations. The latter still lacks a sufficient numbers of teachers with adequate qualifications and experience in training.

The remedy for such a situation is the responsibility of the government, which must identify the real needs and resources of the ministries and agencies and set priorities. Priorities in training are determined, among other things, by the needs of development programmes, the availability of funds and qualified training staff (1).

CHAPTER THREE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

I. The Definitional Problem

As consensus has been reached as to the real nature and content of public administration, a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition is still conspicuously lacking in spite of the wide literature on the subject. As a field of practice, public administration is as old as human society but no one knows when or where men first thought of themselves as comprising a community, as being a public. (1)

There is even a prolonged controversy related to the question of whether public administration is an art or a science: Those scholars impressed with the achievements of the physical sciences have been insistent that public administration can and should be a science; other scholars and practitioners impressed with the fluid, creative quality in actual administration, with such intangibles as judgment and leadership, have been equally insistent that public administration can not become a science, that it is an art. (2)

Endowed public administration has important aspects of both science and art; it is both an area of intellectual inquiry and a process (activity) of administering public affairs. The practical side of public administration is largely concerned with getting things done, while the theoretical side is primarily concerned with values and norms. These two counterbalancing ingredients of the profession that is the theory and the practice—race to keep pace with each other. (1)

For F. Waldo public administration, as a sub-division of the generic concept of administration, has its primary essence in "co-operative human effort that has a high degree of rationality", rationality being defined "as correct calculation to realize given desired goals with minimum loss to the realization of other desired goals." (2)

With Bueckin we find administration concerning itself with "the accomplishment of politically determined objectives."

Feather identifies administration with management as concerning those activities which are designed to make the

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(2) Waldo, Dwight: NEW, p. 5.
enterprise succeed within the framework of structure, the policy and resources. (1)

The definitional problem can be solved, the writer suggests, by singling out the central concerns of public administration as a practice and a study.

These are:

1. The characteristics and patterns of behavior of public administrators.

2. The organization and direction of co-operative efforts in a public setting by harnessing all efforts towards attainment of the ends sought.

3. The institutional arrangements for the conduct of large-scale administration by establishing priorities of work and devising an appropriate organization.

4. Involvement in policy-formation through initiating new policies and implementing determined objectives.

5. Provision of social services.

II. CIVIL SERVICES Defined

The 'civil service' is a term borrowed in the mid-nineteenth century from the British administration of India to describe a system that emphasizes selection on the basis

(1) FROM: W. PROUT op. cit. p. 5
of merit. By the turn of the century both the system and the term had spread to other countries including the U.S.A, Canada, and Australia and eventually to developing countries in every part of the world.(1)

The term generally denotes "a body of permanent full-time public officials with a professional, non-political status and who are not members of either of the judiciary or the armed forces.

The concept of the civil service is now virtually universal but the term is not and others that are used instead have an even wider connotation as in the case of "the Public service" or the "public servants". There is also the "bureaucracy" as well as more neutral terms such as "public officials" and "functionaries".

But whether the members of a civil service system are called "officials' bureacrats" or something else, the system within which they work shows striking resemblances: appointment on a non-political basis, permanent tenure and legal rights and duties usually sanctioned by status. In short, the key-concept of "civil service" is "merit" as opposed to "political favor" (2).

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(1) Bogocki, Marshall E., and Bogocki, Chadye: 52-548, p. 179
III. Bureaucracy Defined.

The term 'bureaucracy' originated in the French 'bureaucratie' when it was first employed by a French Minister of Commerce in the Eighteenth Century to refer to the government in operation. It then spread to Germany in the Nineteenth Century as 'Burekrie' and hence found its way into English and other languages. (1)

According to "A Dictionary of Social Sciences" bureaucracy literally denotes "rule by the office." In popular usage it serves as an invective, derogatory connotation employed to denounce "officialdom" in modern society and more especially in "governments' service.

As a subject for scholarly inquiry, the term is primarily associated with the German sociologist, Max Weber, who was the first to conceive of it as an "unmixed blessing" destined to become the wave of the future in all types of organization, public and private alike. (2)

In his "On the Methodology of Social Sciences" Max Weber set himself to the task of formulating a conceptual construct of certain empirical elements into a logically precise and consistent form which, in its ideal purity, has no existence in

(1) Ready, Verge; Public Administration: A Comparative Per-
actual reality but nevertheless corresponds to concrete features of existing organizations. These are:
- High degree of specialization.
- Hierarchical authority structure with limited areas of command and responsibilities.
- Impersonality of relationships between organizational members.
- Differentiation of private and official income and fortune.

What links these characteristics with one another is the existence of a system of control based on rational rules which regulate the whole organizational structure and process on the basis of technical knowledge and with the aim of maximum efficiency. It is in this exercise of control on the basis of knowledge which distinguishes the bureaucratic organization from feudal administration, where authority is based on tradition rather than on rational thinking.

Pareto had pointed out three approaches to the study of bureaucracy. (1)

Most social scientists define bureaucracy in a way intended to identify those phenomena associated with large organizations.
organisation, a usage that is value-neutral as a form of social organisation with certain basic structural dimensions as composed of a highly elaborated hierarchy of authority super-imposed upon a highly elaborated division of labour.

A second approach has been to define bureaucracy in terms of behavioral characteristics. Friedrich labelled such traits as objectivity, discretion, precision and consistency and conceded them to "clearly and closely related to the assure-taking function of administrative officials". Neurem and other(s) have put more emphasis on the 'pathological' or 'dysfunctional' tendencies in the behavior of the bureaus. The role of the realization of the goals toward which the bureaucracy is supposed to be functioning, Neurem enumerated: 'buck-passing', 'red-tape', unwillingness to delegate authority, extreme secretiveness and a thirst for power.

A third approach has been suggested by Peter Blau, who defines bureaucracy in terms of purpose as an organization that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency.

(1) Ibid p.19
Ferrel Heady pointed out the difficulties inherent in the behavioral approach. The behavior of all persons in a particular cultural context is bound to be molded by its values and beliefs prevalent in that culture. This behavior is thus conceived to be bound in time and place with the result that no generally accepted behavior tendencies are possible.

Instead, F. Heady suggested picking structural characteristics which can be reduced to three: vis: hierarchy, differentiation or specialization, and qualification or competence.

No visible polity in the world can be perceived without a public service or Bureaucracy that satisfies these criteria.

IV. The Marxist Position:

These conceptions of Bureaucracy could not be left without an assessment of the Marxist position. Marx’ ideas on Bureaucracy can only be understood in the general context of his theory of class struggle, the crisis of capitalism and the advent of communism.
Marx based his concept of bureaucracy on a criticism of Hegel's philosophy of the State. Public Administration, as Hegel conceived it, is a bridge between the State and the civil society; the latter representing the 'various particular interests,' the former the general interest. Between the two, the State Bureaucracy is the medium through which this passage from the particular to the general interest becomes possible.

The Marxist analysis accepts this tripartite structure but radically changes its content. For Marx, this formal and legalistic notion of bureaucracy does not represent its nature. The opposition, which Hegel perceived, between the particular interests of the corporations and the common interests of the State is meaningless. The State, Marx concluded, does not represent the general interest but the particular interests of the dominant class, itself a part of the civil society.

Bureaucracy is not a social class, in spite of the fact that its existence is linked with the division of the society into classes. More precisely, Bureaucracy as the State itself is a tool by which the exploiting class exercises its suppression of the exploited population.
Bureaucracy, for Marx, does not occupy an organic position in the social structure for it is not directly linked with the process of production. It is existence and development has a transient and parasitic character entrusted with the task of maintaining the status quo and the privileges of its masters. Bureaucracy thus becomes unavoidable and indispensable in a society divided into classes.

The state as a political organisation of the class dominant in economy is bound to undergo three historical phases

1. The Bourgeois State, which expresses the interests of the capitalists.

2. The Proletarian State, or the People State (V.P.S.), which does not exist externally, in the sense that it expresses the interests of the whole people.

3. Stateless Phase: at the advent of the classless society (the communist society) the state and its bureaucracy will "either cease." In this society, where no exploitation and social division exist, the state will give way to the communist self-administration and its bureaucracy is absorbed.

into the society as a whole.

The Leninist Principles of Administration:

In the Leninist view, the character of state bureaucracy, its organization, forms and methods are determined by the class character of the state, the dominant form of ownership and the requirements of the particular social system. Bourgeois administration, Lenin wrote, like the entire bureaucratic apparatus of the bourgeois states, is alien to the working people and implemented through an extensive network of bureaucratic establishments operating chiefly through co-optation, suppression and violence. (2)

In a socialist state administration implies conscious, purposeful activity having as its ultimate aim the laying of the material and technical foundation of communism, molding and developing communist social relationships and educating the new man.

In setting out the conditions for the normal functioning of the state administrative apparatus, Lenin laid the greatest emphasis on the political leadership of the Party. He called for the establishment of a strong apparatus but again, “all efforts must be turned to achieving our aim: The
the complete subordination of the apparatus to political (1)

Lenin focused attention on the relationship between
the party and the state. "It is necessary," he wrote, "to
delimit much precisely the functions of the Party... from
those of the Soviet Government; to increase the responsibility
and independence of Soviet officials and of Soviet Government
institutions, leaving to the Party the general guidance of
the activities of all state bodies." (2)

Democratic centralism has been envisaged by Lenin
as the fundamental principle governing the organisational
structure and functioning of administration bodies. By central-
ism, Lenin meant the large-scale, planned construction of eco-
nomic and business values which deserved to be called socialist.
By 'democracy' is meant the active popular participation
in administration". (3)

D. Politics Defined

By 'politics' is meant the process by which the govern-
ment objectives are accurately prescribed and defined.

(1) Ibid. p.828.
(2) Ibid. Vol.33, p.293
(3) Ibid. Vol.36, p.129
A major function of government is policy-making. In Appleby's words, "policy is prior to any action". It is a pre-requisite to all management. It is the 'policy' which sets the tasks for 'administration'. 'Politics', Chapman professed (1) has its essence in "determination of ends, the choice of means and the balance of social forces". It embraces much more than "manoeuvring of parties and their relations with particular clientele."

Policy describes what civil servants do when they play a part in determining ends, choosing means and establishing priorities. In the words of Binck "policies are the consciously acknowledged rules of conduct that guide administrative decisions." Policy is distinguished from 'rule' because 'policy' is dynamic and flexible whereas 'rule' is specific and rigid. 'Policy' is also distinguished from 'custom' for the former is the product of conscious effort while the latter grows automatically in the soil of a society. 'Policy' deals with basic issues, basic to the working of the whole administrative machinery.

a scheme of analysis which includes input and output functions.

The input functions are:
1. Political Socialization and recruitment
2. Interest articulation
3. Interest aggregation
4. Political communication

The output functions are:
1. Rule-making
2. Rule-application
3. Rule adjudication

This scheme developed by Almond was the subject of sharp criticism. Chief among these critics was Prof. Fred. E. Higgs, who admits that it is useful for the study of developed political systems but finds it inadequate for the analysis of transitional systems where there are 'inputs' that do not lead to rule-making, and rules which are often not carried-out.

Prof. Fred. Hins proposed his "two-floored" model known as "Prismatic Model".

V. Politics-administration Dichotomy:

Now we have explained the connotations given to the terms 'Public Administration', 'Civil Service', 'Bureaucracy' and 'politics' we move to the more particularized treatment of the nature and content of the relationship between the two entities 'politics' and 'administration'.

The assertion that the 'administration' is only one aspect of the political system, that the role of 'administrators' should be intrinsically confined to the translation of objectives laid down by their political masters, has been a perennial concern of 'government' scholars and civil service reformers.

Ever since Woodrow Wilson wrote his essay on the study of Administration(1) the politics-administration dichotomy school of thought tended to regard policy making outside the scope of administration. 'The field of administration', Wilson wrote, 'is a field of business. It is removed from the hurly and 'stream of politics'.

Hilson was followed by J.J. Goodman who in 1900 published his slender volume 'Politics and Administration' based on the assumption that 'the field of politics and the field of administration are separate areas of public life and... evil consequences resulted from the influence of politics on the business of government'. From that time the politics-administration dichotomy has become a shibboleth. (1)

Peter Hellels viewed the politics-administration distinction in terms of processes. He envisaged an arch.

Instructors, the activities of professional officials and advisors.

Social processes, Rehn, suggests, include a rationalized sphere of settled procedures (administration) and a non-rational matrix (politics) which flow into this settled sphere. Hence politics is an area of change and indeterminism and administration is one of stability and routine.

There is actually, as Peter Self conceded, a large grey area between politics and administration. So defined, politicians and career officials mingle within this grey area and can not be kept to one side of a line.

R.G.D Brown suggests that the differentiation might be made in terms of a "spectrum of contributions ranging from a specific-technical-factual and to a general-political value-end."

(1) Self, Peter Administrative Theories and Politics (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1977) p.152
Peter Self pointed out the inescapable conflict between the politicians' interest in helping his supporters and the administrators' concern with impartial rules and procedures. The history of political patronage, Peter Self wrote, has cast the politicians as villains who will disrupt fair rules for the sake of political advantage.

Prof. C.G. Stahl, viewed the question of the relationship in the context of the tremendous international developments that have marked our age in almost all aspects of our life, both socio-economic and political.

The first characteristic of the times, Stahl, professed, (1) is the extended expansion of government functions and responsibilities everywhere. This fact is "explained by the revolutions in transportation and communication and the companion developments of industrialization and urbanization and the extraordinary degree of specialization and by the increasing reach of all levels of formal education. Such a situation create a host of new problems, new inter-relationships... new perspectives, which compelled new collective regulations, new controls and new initiatives. Government has thus become a more obvious, a more ever-present feature of life everywhere than it has been before.

(1) Stahl, C. Glen, Public Personnel Management, Harper and Brothers, 1986, p. 3
A second phenomenon following World War II is the increasing involvement of every government in international politics through trade, transportation, monetary systems, etc. This situation has been intensified by the rising accessibility of mutual interests between nations between the wealthier and the less fortunate areas of the world.

A third political development is the accelerating frequency of change in government leadership. The political parties, Dahl elaborates, the military junta, the charismatic leaders, do not serve to last as long as before.

In the light of these evolving conditions, Dahl concluded that the infant part of government (public administration) was bound to lose much of its hallowed status distinction from politics.

B.S. Peters (1) pointed out the increasing importance of government as having been a pervasive fact of everyday life for all citizens; no one is completely beyond the reach of some kind of government activity. This pervasiveness of governmental activity is a remarkable phenomenon of the times. It finds its explanation partly in the extended obligation of almost every government worldwide in the

pended state benefits. It has been axiomatic that the function of government has changed from the passive aspect of "keeping law and order" to the more active one of socio-economic development.

Government, on the other hand, has grown as a focus of great social tensions and controversies. Divergent and controversial interest groups of many types inspired by a diversity, or even opposing of social, economic and political expectations put pressure upon their governments for the satisfaction of their demands.

Such a situation has necessitated the creation of more administrative agencies, more qualified officials and employees and more crucial demands for a competent administration.

Related to the growth of government is the indication that the bureaucracy is an increasingly influential political institution, for the bureaucracy, or the administrative system, can not be assumed to operate in a neutral vacuum, but in a viruous and suspicious environment. It follows that administration is increasingly beset with
politics.

Bureaucracy, Kraisner maintains, are "the bloomer of modern political structure. They grew silently and inexorably...convenience and necessity...are their life-blood. They are not loved nor respected, but rather tolerated and depended upon. (1)

The growth of Bureaucratic power has been documented and damned in a number of places. Indeed this power-problem of Bureaucracy has not escaped the attention of the classical bureaucratic literature. Max Weber himself has strayed from his 'ideal-type' to advise the politicians to "resist any effort on the part of the Bureaucrats to gain control" and warned against the danger implied in the assumption that "the conduct of state affairs is a matter of 'administration' and that 'politics' is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateurs or a secondary task of bureaucrats." Never recognized a dichotomy between policy and administration and wanted to draw a bureaucratic line between the roles of the politician and the bureaucratic but he also observed that "every problem, no matter how technical it might seem, can assume political...

significance and its solution can be decisively influenced by political considerations"(1).

Most contemporary scholars hold that bureaucracy is nothing but a "leviathan seeking aggrandizement of its powers and operating as an integrated, monolithic institution. The truth of this assumption is evidenced by the quantitative and qualitative growth of public problems and concerns and the increasing complexity of modern socio-economic life. This complexity is a function of the technological context of modern life.

Such a situation has led to an increase in the anomalies of individual behavior and thus mechanisms of collective action are perceived. These necessities are apparently recognized by the greater section of the populations and the bureaucracy has become the institutional manifestation of these necessities.

**Bureaucracy and the legislature:**

Legislature has been the traditional focus of rule-making for almost all political systems, democratic or non-democratic. But unfortunately almost all legislative bodies in the world have the following shortcomings:

Firstly: They lack both the time and information. They are thus bound to rely upon the facts, data and criticisms, gathered and processed by the bureaucracy as to the workability of policy. The legislators have derived their position from the popular will and not conspicuously from the influence of specialized knowledge; politicians emerge, 'appear', they are not trained, educated and produced. This situation places the bureaucracy at an advantage; its members, trained or made, are Mark-via politicians. Consequently in many cases the initiative for policy or legislation emanates from the bureaucracy, who are in constant touch with the general public and are in a better position to understand the difficulties that arise in the execution of legislation. They have, therefore, to make suggestions and formulate proposals for removing these difficulties and they may have to ask for amendments in the existing law or even new laws.

Secondly: The relative instability of legislatures as compared to the bureaucracy places the legislative body at a disadvantage in any power competition.

Thirdly: Practically the bureaucracy outnumber the political executives. In a one-party system, where the disadvantages of the political executives are minimized, th
the party provides direction for both bureaucrats and
the ostensibly political decision-maker, but even here
institutional loyalties may compete with party loyalties.

Finally, there is the danger to effective polit-
ical central, of the department or ideological interests
of the civil servants that might impede the smooth flow
of work.

B.S. Peters (1) pointed out what he called the
"empire-building" concept which entails a given bureau-
cratic agency seeking not only to survive but also to
"perform functions it considers essential to a high qual-
ity of life for the society". In some cases, Peters
conceded, bureaucratic institutions tend to compete over
scarce resources and for control of policy-choices. This
makes for a limitation of the extent to which any integ-
rated bureaucratic government might emerge.

VI. Politics and Administration in Developing Countries

The politics-administration dichotomy already
mentioned, has been brought into sharp relief by Le Pali-
bora and Fred. W. Rigg by considering the bureaucratic
situation in developing areas. Their discussions are
(1) Peters, P.S. op cit p. 230
based on the assumption that the typically dominant political power position of the bureaucracy is a pronounced threat to balanced political development and hence to the development of a democratic polity. The difficulty, Palembarg observes, in restricting bureaucracy to an instrumental role, not sufficiently appreciated in even more advanced countries... is accentuated in developing nations where the bureaucracy may be the most coherent power center and where in addition, the major decisions regarding national development are likely to involve authoritative rule-making and rule-application by governmental structures" (1) In these countries where economic development is becoming an overriding goal...the probability of bureaucracy becoming deeply ensconced in the function of rule-making and rule-application is enormously increased. The result is in the emergence in many places of "over-powering bureaucracies" with the growth in bureaucratic power inhibiting and perhaps precluding, the development of democratic politics. Moreover, if the traditional and the modern are in conflict, this tension will surely be reflected among bureaucrats. The bureaucrats in the field may ally themselves with local elites and politicians against developmental schemes that...

emanates from national planners at the centre. The situation is further aggravated by meagre financial resources. This holds good to varying degrees in almost all developing countries where a struggle is expected over the allocation of resources or the definition of goals.

Tension between the political leaders and the bureaucracy of the emerging nations stems from the recognition that bureaucrats are never passive tools to be manipulated at will. The post-independence bureaucracy usually find themselves tied up to the colonial tradition of 'oppression', the politicians bent on radical change, are bound to find themselves at odds with the relatively more conservative bureaucracy.

Mazza’s ‘paradoxical view is similar. It reflects a conviction based on the implication of his ‘pragmatic-sala’ model that transitional societies lack balance between political policy-making and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures, the consequence being that ‘the political function tends to be appropriated...by bureaucrats’(1) He compares the power position of the transitional bureaucracies vis-a-vis other political institutions which exercise control over bureaucracies in Western countries.

(chief executives, legislators... political parties and interest groups) and the fact that the other institutions are weak in contrast to the burgeoning growth of bureaucracies. These powerful bureaucracies, Higgs admits, tend to "inhibit the growth of strong executives, political parties, legislatures, voluntary associations...and other political institutions essential to viable democratic government."

A significant problem in many of the ex-colonial areas is not that bureaucracy is too weak but that, as a result of the colonial experience itself, the bureaucracy in the post-independence period is the only sector of the political system that is reasonably cohesive and coherent and able to exercise leadership and power. Political parties tend to be ineffective and voluntary associations failing short of providing effective checks on the bureaucracy. The immediate result of such a situation is that the politicians tend to be passive instrumentalities of the public administrators. Higgs recommends that deliberate measures be taken to curtail bureaucratic expansion and to strengthen central agencies.

Henry Goodnow, generalizing about the power position

of the bureaucratic elite in new states from his study of
the civil service in Pakistan, asserts that in the typical
new states..."political power came to rest in the hands of
an educated native class which occupied the more respon-
sible government posts. The government had a central
ized decision-
making apparatus dominated by the elite group. This or-
ganization had at its disposal the means ‘to coerce, to pro-
gaganda, to reward, to incarcerate...’ More important there
were seldom any effective ‘countervailing forces.’ Modern
organizations equipped to render opposition were lacking.
He does not say that this trend was started by a lust for
power on the part of the bureaucratic officials who regarded
themselves as guardians of democracy. Goodness forces are
more likely a power struggle between an increasingly rigid
governing bureaucracy and increasingly revolutionary opposi-
tion, which will destroy any prospects for evolutionary change.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND ADMINISTRATORS: THE SUDANESE CASE

The conventional concept of separating the two entities of politics and administration, whereby the former is charged with the laying down of policy-guidelines and the latter with the task of executing the plans put forward by their political masters having been examined, we can now turn to the Sudanese situation to see to what extent policy-making in the Sudan has followed this conventional concept.

The intention here is to show the extent to which the political master has exercised his right and discharged his duty of giving leadership and laying down political guidelines for his top officials. This shall be the central concern of the present chapter. We shall see that the application of this convention has encountered a number of difficulties. We shall see that these difficulties originate partly in the social structure of the Sudanese nation, partly in the educational and/or personal background of the politicians and lastly in the nature and character of the political system.
1. The Ecology of Sudanese Administration

The Sudanese people are predominantly divided into tribes or sub-divisions of tribes (clans). The members of each tribe are bound together on the basis of kinship and blood, claiming descent from a common ancestor. They are usually headed by tribal chiefs and elders who have the power to provide protection and solve problems and conflicts between its members. Each tribe is a unit of social belonging and solidarity among the Sudanese, as put by one writer:

"socially each tribe has its own norms and values based upon brotherhood, co-operation, hospitality, kindness to elders. The individual .... is identified by inheritance rather than by achievement. Tribal leaders and large families monopolise political authority and economic means of production.(1)

According to the 1956 census about 570 tribes and many more sub-tribes have been registered.

In the rural areas, tribalism plays a crucial role in the life of the individual and groups. While in the urbanised areas, the population is becoming desribalised although the rural inhabitants are still identified by their tribal affiliation.

One study(1) reveals the fact that the socio-cultural system places heavy pressures on the service in the performance of its role. The native son is expected to support the cause of his tribe. Failure to do so is interpreted as anti-trIBE or antifamily. Although some public officials do adhere to modern bureaucratic norms and practices, many were seen to yield to personalities in their administrative actions. This supports Reddaway's assumption that in a developing country "the new formal apparatus like administrative bureau gives an illusion impression of autonomousness, whereas in fact it is deeply ensnared in... the remnants of other traditional social, economic, religious and political systems"(2).

The extended family is another social institution which characterizes Sudanese society. The family is extended by blood relationships to uncles, aunts, brothers, cousins etc. Members of an extended family co-operate in joint economic, legal and welfare activities. The father or elder brother is placed at the apex of a hierarchy of which children and women constitute the base. It is worth noting that

(1) al-Tayyib al-Malik, In Service of The Sudan Civil Service, Al-Lam, p. 31.

in the Sudan, although this traditional system of tribe
and family has been broken down to some extent by urban-
ization and education, it has not been completely eradi-
cated, as has been pointed out by a Sudanese student of
Public Administration.

"The extended family in the Sudan, is still
the strongest social group. Its members are
naturally responsible for each other. They
exchange power and authority, benefit and prestige(1)

Religious Institutions:

With the exception of the Southern Sudan, the Sudanese
people in the North are almost completely Islamized. Islamic
teachings which grew out of the Quran and Sharia emphasize
social behavior and practices. In the Sudan, and in spite
of the considerable expansion of modern education, the
Khulqiy (Quranic Schools) still exist, especially in the
rural areas.

The Tariga (religious sect) headed by a Sheik is an-
other important institution in the Sudan. The Sheik has
great prestige and enjoys the respect of his disciples. As
we have seen in Chapter (1) of this work, Sudanese politics
(1) Al-Arabi, A.T., "Traditionalism and Modernity in the Sudan.
Bureaucracy", Occasional Papers, Institute of Peace Studies;
1976) p. 17.
at its apex were the British military officers monopolising the senior and high responsible governmental posts, entrusted with policy-making processes as well as directing the execution of policies formulated. (1)

Thus in its earliest stage, the colonial administration in the Sudan functioned as a "ruling bureaucracy" entrusted with the dual task of pacifying the areas that had come, by means of conquest, within the British sphere of influence and furthering the objectives laid down by the architects of British imperial policies, in her colonies. The orientation and personnel were suited to this end.

Another significant characteristic of the service was its commitment to the concept of "political neutrality". All civil servants at all levels were expected to function in a non-political capacity. Consequently no officials were allowed to engage in any kind of political activity liable to influence their performance. (2)


No official report will be printed or sent out of the Sudan except with the approval of the Governor General.

(1) Adn, Ahmad S. : Mulla, p.6
b. A public servant...shall not communicate to
the press...information of which he may become possessed
in the course of his official duty.

c. No communication of any sort relating to the
Sudan shall be sent by an official to the press or for
publication in the journal of any society, association...
except with the approval of the civil secretary.

Such approval will not be given if any political
matter is contained.

Para 20 of the amended regulations of 1923 read:

"Matter intended for publication in the
Sudan press will be sent by the official
concerned to the press section, Intelligence
Department."

An official, Chapter IV of the amended Adminis-
tative Regulations of 1923 stipulated, may not take any
prominent or public part in politics, he may not serve
on the editorial staff...

These stipulations were ostensibly meant to isolate
the administration from the storms of politics. But for
the nationalists this measure was deliberately designed to
alienate the Sudanese intelligentsia and exclude them...

(1) Gov. File No. 35420/1/3/ Central Records Office.

(Tharthar, Sudan, p.3)
from the policy-making process. It was further regarded as a policy menace for the conditions of a country like the Sudan where the greater sections of the educated class were government officials.

However this policy was bound to fail. The two decades following the 1/29 Egyptian Nationalist Revolution witnessed intense political agitation in which the Sudanese intelligentsia, despite their inherent weakness, were the driving force.

III. Politics-Administration Relationship

Under Parliamentary-Democracy:

Since Independence, the Sudan underwent a number of political and/or constitutional upheavals ranging from Parliamentary democracy to an authoritarian military rule and a non-party state. The extent to which the political system tolerates the concept of the impartiality of the civil service, especially at the upper reaches, depends upon a number of factors. This shall be the central concern of the coming sections of the present chapter. As shall see that this varies proportionately with the nature and character of the prevailing political system.
Immediately after independence, political power passed into the hands of those men who were formerly government officials. This having been the situation at independence the new ministers found no difficulty in maintaining a harmonious relationship with their former colleagues at the head of the service. The two elites had very similar educational background and were committed to the British tradition of neutrality of the civil service. Consequently a circular dated 2.11.1954 issued by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior read as follows:

"The public interest demands the maintenance of political impartiality and discretion in the Public Service and of confidence in the impartiality and discretion as an essential part of the structure of Government..." (1)

Nevertheless, this harmony in the relationship between the two elites was eventually reduced by the intervention of the religious leaders, who were in practice the real decision-makers in the political system (2) Due to conditions in Sudanese politics that have long been inherent and deep-rooted, religious apparatus has been a source of recruitment to the political system. On the other hand

(1) Quoted in Abu Sine, About Us, p. 211
The recruitment to the civil service has continued to be based on merit and a test of pre-entry qualifications. Under such circumstances the incompatibility between the two elites was bound to grow and develop into a factor that has limited communication and understanding between the two elites groups, and has precluded effective utilization of civil servants advice with respect to public policy issues and national development in general. Lack of confidence and suspicion grew among the civil servants vis-a-vis their political masters.

A decade later, with the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy in the mid-1960's, the situation was further aggravated. The inevitable expansion of the educational system was bound to bring a new, younger and better-educated generation. This new bureaucratic and technical elite found themselves at odds with the incumbent politicians. In Field's words:

"...if rapid modernization is given top priority in new states, it both requires and acquires new managerial and technical elites, who are bound...to become overweening powerful, assertive and even competitive with existing political leadership." (3)

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(1) Ibid. p. 85
(2) El-Bashir, Patami p. 262
In the Sudan, the political institution has suffered from a number of weaknesses. Control of the government machinery passed to a handful of politicians who were attached to traditional leaders rather than definite and distinct objectives. The parties were organized less as effective tools of socio-economic or political advancement than as organs for electoral activities. The expectations of the masses of the people were aroused by broad but ill-defined programs. Moreover, the Sudanese nation has long been as varied in character as its typography. This typical diversity has made a widely shared consensus on major issues impossible. Consequently, no political party was able to develop into a nationwide organization.

(1) Maddick, Henry: Democracy, Decentralization and Development (Asia Publishing House, India, 1960) p.9
in the circumstances the ministers are led to make decisions that are based upon purely political considerations irrespective of their administrative feasibility. There were incidents where ministers abused their ministerial authority for narrow political gains. This resulted in 'suffocating climate of favouritism, nepotism and large scale corruption' (1)

The bureaucrats, on the other hand, are less sensitive to public pressures. Rather they tend to overvalue their professional standards. In such a situation of conflicting values,

"the administrators regard the politicians' desire to display concurrence in promote political ends without much concern to the best of the public interest; the politicians, on the other hand, often accused administrators of being overcautious...slow and too much concerned with the routine and procedures." (2)

In the circumstances the administrator is required to perform the difficult task of functioning under two types of responsibilities: professional responsibility and political expediency. In other words he is left with the

(2) Abu, Esmahadi, L. edm., p. 40
dilemma of balancing between two kinds of requirements: observing of his professional ideals and values and adaptations to the political environment surrounding.

IV. Political Administration Relationship

Under the Military Rule (1958-64)

Against a background of a complex political turmoil and economic crisis, Abbeed, with the aid of some 13 army officers, usurped power in a bloodless coup on the 27th November, 1958. The head of the new regime was critical of the political scene, declaring as it was by "bitter strife between the political parties which threatened the future of the country".

The military apparatus for controlling the administration consisted of a supreme council of the Armed Forces composed of twelve officers under Abbeed as president. This council was deemed to be the supreme constitutional authority in the country. It formally delegated all its legislative, judicial and executive powers to the President who was also the commander of the Armed Forces.

The military regime proclaimed that one of its objectives was "to end anarchy and corruption in all states"
administration of the province and head of all government officials within the province. He was also responsible for co-ordination and reporting on the activities of government units.

Critical Remarks:

The policies of the Military Regime between 1958-64. towards the politicization of the public service, is that the administrative functions and their direction and control had to remain highly responsive to the regime in power. (1) were bound to heighten the atmosphere of tension in relations with the administrative system. At the local level, the military governors had overall authority but no clear functions were specified for them. At the central level, the policy-making process was excessively monopolized by the Army officers who tended to be reluctant to delegate any responsibilities to give direction to public servants on policy-decisions. Policy continued to be "hit and miss" basis, overall decisions were sometimes taken at random until the drift produced mass discontent and complete frustration"(1) In the words of Peter Lessing:

"The inescapable fact is that the Sudan is reasonably efficiently run in spite of the (2)

"Incompetence of the military leaders and the constant attempts to intervene with the normal work of the departments. It is to the credit of many senior civil servants that they have refused to be intimidated by their military heads and that they have somehow managed not to become blind, ever-bearing bureaucrats."

The rejection of many public servants, especially at the local level, of such mobilization of the service into political activity resulted in mutual distrust and suspicion. The military opened up the offensive by enacting the "Compulsory Pension Act" of 1962 which was enforced against officials who were believed to be politically unreliable.

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Removed Before 1965</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Under-Secretaries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Departmental Direc-</td>
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<td>tors</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Deputy/Under-</td>
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<td>secretaries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Others</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>87</td>
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Source: Report of the Civil Service Reorganization Committee Vol. 2 Appendices.
The final result was accumulated frustration on the part of the civil servants in an atmosphere of insecurity prevailing in the civil service.

Under these conditions, it was not surprising for the civil servants to respond to the call of the judiciary, university teachers, workers and others for a 'political General strike' which followed the outbreak of October Revolution of 1956. The constitutional and political crisis which developed during the October National Government period brought about a higher degree of politicization throughout Sudanese society and ultimately imposed a high degree of involvement in the political process on the part of public officials both at the central and local levels. As stated by Dr. Natawi:

"...the civil servants began to realize and tolerate the inevitability of their political activities and role...The prevailing public attitude... has led and welcomed the political activity of the educated and experienced public officials"(1)

V. The Report of the Reorganization of the Civil Service Committee, 1968:

The plight of the Sudan civil service was not given serious consideration until August 1966 when a five-man committee was appointed.

committee was set up under the chairmanship of the late Karrar Ahmed Karrar, a former administrator and Minister of local government.

Its terms of reference were to:

1. evaluate the present status of the civil service pertaining to its organization, structure and the effective performance of its different departments.

2. make recommendations on the required reforms that were apt to increase the efficiency of the service and assure co-operation and understanding between its different limbs.

In order to carry out its function the committee was given access to all necessary documents, files and memorandums.

The committee was further urged by Syd. Sadiq El-Mahdi to formulate a comprehensive device for redressing the maladies of the civil service.

After two years' work, the committee produced its "Report on the Organization of the Civil Service" which was regarded as the first serious and scientific document on the civil service problems.

(1) "Republic of the Sudan, Report on the Organization of the Civil Service, 1968, p.4"
The recommendations of the Committee included:

1. The establishment of a unified administrative body for the whole civil service.

3. The inclusion of a separate chapter in the then proposed Permanent Constitution for the organs of the civil service.

4. The setting-up of a special committee for the reviewing of all civil service laws and regulations and their amendment in one unified law.

5. The establishment of a permanent central agency for the organisation and re-organisation of the government machinery.

6. The specified prescription of the duties and responsibilities of the different ministries and departments.

7. The concentration of the political and administrative leadership in the hands of the Prime Minister or the President of the Republic. (*1*)

As far as the relationship between the Ministers and their top civil servants (the under-secretaries) was concerned and according to information collected by the Committee, this relationship between the two elites was not clearly defined.

(*1*) Ital. p. 417-447
The existence of a neutral civil service, the Committee counselled, confined to the task of giving advice to the political leadership and rendering socio-economic service with due impartiality, integrity and care, is an inexcusable prerequisite for good government. If mutual confidence and understanding between the Ministers and his civil servants has not been realized, the immediate outcome will be confusion and delay in acting in the public interest.

It is worth noting that none of these recommendations were carried out until 1971, when a Ministry for Public Service and Administrative Reform was established followed by a series of reforms pertaining to personnel policies and practices and the general organization of the Public Service. This culminated in the passage of the Public Service Act and its by-laws in late 1973 and early 1974 respectively.
Political Developments: From 1962—To the Present:

On May 25, 1962, a "Free Officers Movement" seized power in the Sudan against a backdrop of economic crisis and political upheaval both in the North and the South. At the time, a fragile coalescence between the Umma Party and RAP formed the backbone of a deteriorating Parliamentary system that was collapsing under the weight of its failings.

According to a Republican Order, sovereignty in the Sudan was vested in the people and exercised by a ten-man Revolutionary Command Council consisting of nine young army officers and one civilian. No sooner was the government formed than it pledged itself to reach a peaceful solution of the Southern question, to raise the standard of living of the greater part of the populace, to liberate the national economy from any foreign influence and to revise employment policies. The government declared its complete departure from the past. It is worth noting that
Despite its declared commitment to a socialist program, the first two years of the Nyerere regime were characterized by troubles from both the left (communists) and the right (Imam El Hadh). These troubles culminated in two major incidents. In March, 1970 a military confrontation between the army and the police occurred resulting in a heavy loss of life and the Imam El Hadh himself was killed. The immediate result of these incidents was the consolidation of the regime's power. They also left their remarkable impact on the administrative system. Senior ranks of the civil service, the police, and the judiciary were purged of all officials who were associated with the old regime through appointment testing, reactionary policies, or simple corruption or who were suspected of ideological opposition to the newly conceived policies. (1)

However this bloody assertion of authority in Abja, succeeded only in paving the way to a 'political divorce' with the communists who maintained a complex but confused relationship with the regime. On Feb. 12, 1971, in a

a broadcast announcement Jemeti accused the Communists of violating the national interest and called upon the people to crush them. The latter refuted the accusation, emphasizing that their party would remain "to defend the real democratic rights of the people against any kind of dictatorship".(1)

On 19th July, 1971, Mashin Santa, a pre-communist army officer assumes power declaring 'industrial and agricultural reform'. The revolt did not last more than three days when it was crushed.

The response of the regime to the abortive coup was a sharp shift to the right through changes in domestic and foreign policies. Jemeti, feeling betrayed by his former allies, started to 'shore up his personal position'.(2)

This change was based on the conclusion reached by Jemeti to the effect that foreign policy should be contingent upon domestic political considerations rather than foreign priorities. In consequence with this, secret communications were made with the Southern leaders in exile which resulted

(1) Feb. 12th Declaration: issued by the central committee of the S.O.F, quoted in Zalau, Nationalism and communism in the Sudan, Q. etc.

(2) Holt, F.W. and Bolly, M.H. op.cit., p. 200
in March, 1972 in an Addis Ababa Agreement with the rebels which called for regional autonomy for the Three Southern Provinces.

The regime's success in reconciling the South made possible the proclamation of a 'Permanent Constitution' by the middle of 1973.

The 1973 Constitution aimed at the establishment of a paternalistic form of rule in which the office of the President was the core of the whole system. According to the constitution, the decisions of the President were law, which could never be revised by any other governmental institution. The President of the Republic is the Symbol of Sovereignty and national unity, executive powers are vested in him and he participates in making laws. Article 81 stipulates that the President of the Republic is responsible for maintaining the constitution...and guarantees the proper conduct of the public authorities. In accordance to Article 118 of the Constitution, legislative power shall be vested in the People's Assembly together with the President. The President is to be elected by a general 'plebiscite'
to a six-year term, as supreme commander of the armed forces and head of the Public Service. The 'president may rule by decree and declare a state of emergency under which he assumes vague but sweeping powers, including the right to temporarily suspend the Constitution. Public officials are allowed to become members of the Assembly. The judiciary is directly responsible to the President, who appoints its top officials as well as the Attorney-General.

Following the 1971 incidents, the regime turned away from 'Scientific Socialism'. This situation paved the way for the demotion of moderates and the elimination of communist influence.

The Socialist approach to development was finally abandoned after the 'National Reconciliation' Agreement between the regime and the militant political parties including the Umma Party and the Muslim Brothers. Throughout the period prior to 1977 the regime showed a consistent determination to exclude the leaders of the defunct traditional parties from the political arena. For their part...

these leaders organized themselves into a 'National Front' in opposition to the regime. The 'National Front' made several attempts to assume power by force; the most serious among these being the two abortive plots in Sept., 1973 and July, 1976. However, as a result of pressures both at home and abroad, the regime was forced to reach an agreement in 1977 with the National Front which was known as the National Reconciliation. In consequence, the National Front dissolved itself; a large number of political detainees were released and a number of National Front activists were appointed to high offices (1)

behind the setting up of the S.S.U. was to broaden the
Social base of the regime and thus to meet its inevita-
able need for legitimacy, continuity and survival.

The S.S.U. is hierarchical in structure to meet
functional and territorial requirements. The S.S.U. In-
stitutions stand from the bottom up in the following
orders:

1. basic units at the village, city quarter and
place of work level.

2. Division.

3. District.

4. Province

5. National Congress.

From the National Congress branches:

a. the Central Committee.

b. the Political Bureau.

The Central Secretariat and its specialized
committees.
The Central Committee, the highest authority in the organization which is elected by the National Congress and chaired by the President of the S.S.R., who is also the Head of State, is charged with the following functions:

- Establishment and activation of the different organs of the S.S.R. machinery and creation of a strong linkage between the citizenry and the party thinking and ideology.
- Organization and mobilization of citizens for re-inforcement and furthering of the regime's principles.
- Analysis of the main problems in all fields related to citizenry popular activities through specialized committees emanating from the central committee.
- Discussion of the problems associated with the development plan.
- Implementation of the policies adopted by the National Congress.
11. The Political Bureau is the most influential S.S.U. institution. The political bureau is the actual moving force of the regime and the Party. It provides political leadership, studies and analyzes reports submitted to it including the recommendations and policies drawn up by the Central Committee. The Political Bureau is thus a cross-breed of politics and administration.

As we have seen, the S.S.U. is modelled on the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.) in Egypt. This is not surprising since Nasser and his colleagues in the Revolutionary Command Council in the early days of the Nasser Regime publicly proclaimed the Sudanese Revolution to be patterned after the Nasserite line. (1)

According to the National Action Charter which was presented at the inaugural meeting in January 1972 by Nasser

"The Sudanese Socialist Union is the sole political institution....No opposition to its ideology and declared policies is tolerated outside its institution (2)"


(2) The National Action Charter p.2
It is founded on the alliance of the working forces of the people and representatives of the farmers, workers, intellectuals, national capitalists and soldiers.

According to Article 24 of the Permanent Constitution.

The Sudanese Socialist Union shall enhance the values of democracy, Socialism, and National Unity and shall represent the authority of the alliance of the working forces of the people in the leadership of the National Action" (1)

In an address to the S.S.U. congress of 1974, Nimeiri expanded the pragmatic ideology of his regime:

"We do not expose pre-ordained dogmas to guide us in political action. We are not the disciples of any pursuit of political theory. We are resolved to build our country inspired by its heritage, national conscience, objective, prevalent conditions and national characteristics... We will not imitate.

Critical Remarks on the S.S.U.

According to the 1973 Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, the Sudanese Socialist Union is the sole political organization entrusted with the enhancement of democracy (1) The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, Article 4, Issued May, 1973).
Socialism and national unity and heading all the activities of the state. This supreme position in the political realm was not left unquestioned. It has long been criticized by the Sudanese intellectuals on a number of grounds.

Firstly: its leadership has grown out of a heterogeneous mixture of ex-communists, adherents of the P.N.P., of Umma Party, and of the Islamic Charter Front.

Secondly: its composition has drawn upon the Egyptian experience which has, because of a combination of frustrations, failures and disappointments culminated into the establishment of a number of Mishakir (clique) and later into parties.

Thirdly: The history of the S.S.U. has been characterized by frequent reshuffling both of persons and offices.

Forthly: the S.S.U has failed to develop a sense of democracy within its ranks. This is evidenced by the fact that almost all the major policy decisions are made through the initiation of the superstructures of the organization (namely the Political Bureau).

A German Scholar (1) raised the question of the suitability of a political organization evolved in the rather

(1) Hochfeld, Peter E: op.cit p.64
taken, a civil servant must loyally carry-out the policy chosen, even though he may have his own reasons for preferring a different one. Moreover, it is the task of the civil service to have all the necessary expertise and knowledge at the disposal of the Ministry to provide constructive suggestions as they can develop out of this knowledge. In this way civil servant administrators help define policy before the legislative stage is reached and execute post-legislative policy particularly where it involves the machinery for the enforcement of such legislation.

In a parliamentary party system, the civil service evolved as the bed-rock of the executive. Under such circumstances, the civil service is expected to stand for the continuity of policy. This task stems out of the fact that the concern of the service is for the overall national good whatever the political party in power, as has rightly been observed by Harold Wilson, a former British Prime Minister:

"The civil service is extremely agile and politically dispassionate in reading the electoral portents".

(1) Ibid, p.99
According to these convictions, the effectiveness of government depends on the efficiency of the public service and its ability to respond, in practical terms, to its policy decisions. It has been emphasized that public service in the custody of government reputation, since if it is unable to carry-out the government policies faithfully and diligently, it not only frustrates these policies, but it might seriously jeopardize the government's position.

A.L. Aku, an advocate of a neutral public service, argued against the demand for a politically committed service. Under such a state of affairs, Aku, argued:

i. the public loses confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the service.

ii. the service will lose its permanence and continuity: if there is any change of power, then a purge would have to be effected upon those elements who have lost power.

iii. merit and qualification will cease to be the criteria for appointments and advancements. Rather, political zeal would open the door to high reaches.

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(1) Aku, Amahad Ali, *Politics* p. 230
IV. The immediate outcome of all this will be a deterioration in the standards of the service since trained manpower is not exploited effectively for what it could best do. (1)

On the other hand, the opponents of the notion of impartiality of Public Service deny the workability of the principle in the conditions of developing nations (2) among these are some African statesmen. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is reported to have said

"...we can not afford the luxury of administrators who are neutral." (3)

Instead, they call for the merging of the political and administrative systems and flexibility of movement between party organisation and government ministries and departments. This concession is founded on a number of arguments. The fact that in emerging states where the talent rests with the civil service, it is a long to sound political judgement if civil servants are denied influence in party political affairs (4). It is further argued that political commitment on the part of the civil service

(1) Ibid p. 329
(2) Newman op.cit. p. 39
especially in the higher echelons, will prevent the possibility of clash and conflict between the two elites and ensure the harmony and uniformity of action necessary for national development.

In the Sudan and with the advent of the new regime in 1959, the pattern of administration, both at the centre and the local level, has been bound to undergo a drastic change. The leaders of the new regime explicitly expressed the view that politics and administration belong together in the dynamic process of the regime.

The logic behind this new policy was that it makes for effective national development. The essential reason was that "the government be assured of a broad well-organized popular support and that the people are assured a democratic and effective supervision and control of their government..."1) In order to bring this about, the politicization process in the administration was carried out along a number of lines.

At the central level, the SAD, the sole recognized political organization, supervises and controls the People's Alliance.  

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National Assembly and through it the central government. Moreover, each level of government has its counterpart so that the two sets of relationships run parallel. This parallel structure of the S.S.U. and the Government, as a recent study revealed, was intended to ensure a close and continuous link between politics and administration. As put by a Sudanese scholar:

"The party is subordinate to government. Major policies...are shaped by the S.S.U. which is also responsible for guiding the administration at all levels in the execution of these policies. Civil servants are expected to demonstrate a positive commitment to the objectives policies of the S.S.U." (1)

Besides, according to a Republican Order dated 5th May, 1969, the Ministries and Departments are directed to respond to the needs of the political organisation of officials. The seconded officials are assured priority, for advancement in the service, the political activity being the 'spur' of national activity.

Furthermore, in his address to the Public Service Leaders, Nemiri emphasised the fact that the notion of 'neutrality' of the public service is an 'aberration'.

(1) AL-Terawi, Al-Amab Al Administrative Reform in the Sudan with Special Reference to Personnel Aspects, op.cit, p.56.
One designed by the colonial rule to alienate the politically conscious Sudanese intelligentsia, from the nationalist movement. The Sudanese partisan governments had adopted it with the purpose to consolidate the state of under-development. Nimeiri continued the view of the May Regime, the public service is an instrument for the implementation of the people's objectives as represented by their sole political organization, the P.S.U. Under the May Regime, the civil service is a committed service not only to the regime but also to the people.

iv. According to the stipulations of the Permanent Constitution of 1973, the People's National Assembly (P.N.A.) is empowered to exercise supervision and control over the Executive Branch of the government. Article 281 empowered the People's National Assembly to exercise control over the Bureaucracy. The People's National Assembly as a legislative body, can question Ministers, set up committees to investigate any administrative issues in any government department, and moreover, it has specialized supervisory committees.

The overbearing attitude of the regime in assuring political control of the service has been explicitly...
The idea was extensively elaborated in Elkehtî's acclaimed Arabic volume on 'Administrative Revolution and People's Local Government' published in early 1971 which was a collection of the speeches and writings of the then Minister of Local Government.

The Administrative Revolution theory as expounded by Dr. Elkehtî rested on two pillars:

1. Formulate a realistic administrative theory, closely related to the People's living conditions and social set-up. The Administrative Revolution draws upon the concepts and findings of the Administrative Revolution (Scientific Management School) that took place in the last decade, of the nineteenth century and aimed at a consistent between theory and practice. A major characteristic of this theory is that it eliminates the traditional dualism that existed between Politics and Administration. It further harmonizes bureaucratic conceptualization and field practice so that its derivations, policies and procedures are more realistic and down to earth.

(1) Al-\textit{\textsc{beld-\textsc{el}-\textsc{samad}}: Some Aspects of the \textit{\textsc{peoples'}} Local Government System of the \textit{\textsc{sudan}}, Khartoum, Sudan, 1971 p.6
11. Secondly... the prevalence of work methodology easy to adopt and practice so that the administration work is systematized and channelled along well-known and tested methods. This departs from the colonial approach of administration resting upon 'amateurism' and depending upon the personal caliber of administrators (1)

Dr. Bakheit called upon the renewal of the governmental administrative structure at all levels to adopt itself to the 'Political Revolution' declared on the dawn of May 25th, 1952 (2)

As the Government has long been with the past through the decision to liquidate Native Administration, The Act was meant to introduce a new system of Local Government to replace the 1931 Act which was based on Mr. Marshall's Report (3). The old system was dismissed on a number of grounds. In the first place it was dismissed as parochial and incompatible with the times. Under this system, late Mr. Bakheit alleged, local authorities lacked adequate resources to perform their function. It was further argued that the old system encouraged decentralization and the proliferation of central field agencies. (4)

(1) Bakheit, G.H. Administrative Revolution, (Peoples Local Government Ministry, 1951) Al Shatoom, 1974, p. 3
(2) al-Hadi Abd-al-Samad, op cit p. 27
(3) See above p. 26
(4) ibid, p. 134
Furthermore the 1961 Provincial Administration was
discredited as being a 'transient' device, for authoritative
manipulation from the centre.(1)

In general terms, the 1971 act was intended to pro-
mote local popular participation and, to break the grip of
traditional families and conservative political parties on
local affairs" (2) It excluded the elements of Native Ad-
ministration together with those identified with the lines
respectable aspects of party politics. According to the in-
terpretations of the Ministry of Local Government the 'popular
organisations' formed the core of the new system. Moreover,
the Act made a reference to the political role of the local
government institutions and the officials serving in them.
The various local government organs established under the
Act are expected to assume, in addition to their adminis-
trative function, a political role consisting of the pro-
motion and consolidation of the policies, interests and
ideals of the Nuy regime. (3) The officers serving in these
cy detailed understanding is the only practical step to avoid
fulfilling their political and administrative responsibilities.

(1) Al-Issam, El 'Decentralisation for Development: The Sudan
one Experience', a paper prepared for a U.N. International
seminar in Khartoum on 19-28 Sept., 1981; p.5
(2) Howell, Bohn ed: Local Government in the Sudan, p.29
(3) Fatimah al-Hashim: The Political Role of the Local Govern-
ment Officer sudan; p.4
The New Role of the Provincial Commissioner:

In the 1971 People's Local Government Act, the province was regarded as being the comprehensive administrative unit embracing all the administrative and professional duties of the different Ministries. At the head of each province was a commissioner who was the administrative and political leader. The post of Province Commissioner in the 1971 Act was a key-post. Each commissioner was expected to be a qualified and experienced person with reasonably high administrative ability and of sufficient political consciousness, and an ardent supporter of Party Principles. (2) a politically committed government official, making a genuine effort, on his part, to promote and sustain the public image of the regime by expounding and defending its policies, fostering and consolidating the socializing objectives of the Party regime. His activities have been expanded enormously to serve the new-policy aims and objectives.

The comprehensive powers and the distinct nature of functions attached to the Provincial Commissioner emerged.

(1) Tao-al-Sir Qamash op.cit., p.87
(2) The People's Local Government Act, 1971 Chap. III
from two basic sources:

1. **The Constitution** - which stipulated the appointment by the President, of Ministers and deputy ministers, and he would also define their powers.

2. **The People’s Local Government Act, 1971** - which called for the appointment of a commissioner for every province. (Chapter III, Article 6 (1))

The province commissioner is no longer just a representative of the central government. He has to lead and guide all the popular activities aiming at accelerating revolutionary enthusiasm in order to fulfill mass integration and national unity. The commissioner is also expected to see to it that all functional and popular organizations under his direct guidance and control are responsive to the general aims and expectations of the regime. In this capacity, the perpetuation of the political system and the improvement of the political image of the regime are the direct responsibility of the commissioner.

The political manifestation of the role of the commissioner is apparent and real. A prerequisite for his
appointment is that he should be an ardent supporter of the May Revolution. As a secretary general of the S.S.U. in his province, he enjoys a supervisory capacity over all the political organs in the province.

The Commissioner was also empowered to over-rule any decision taken by the Province Council, but he must report to the Council of Ministers. If the over-ruled decision was not revoked within a limited period of time, it shall become absolute.

The Act of 1972 also aimed at the establishment of a pyramidal system with the People's Executive Council at its apex. People's District Councils and People's Rural and Town Councils. Below the Rural councils were Village Councils. In all these councils, the representation of the popular organizations was guaranteed. The membership formation of these councils was much associated with the S.S.U.

Under this system, the local government administrator was entrusted with the following functions:
1. effective execution and rationalization of the policies and objectives of the Government.

2. promotion and consolidation of the political aims and ideology of the Socialist regime.

3. political education and enlightenment of the masses.

4. undermining and combating prevailing tribal, racial, regional, sectarian and traditional loyalties and developing the values and ideals of national consciousness and national unity.

5. help in the establishment and efficient functioning of the basic units of the S.S.U.

6. promotion and consolidation of the political and administrative objectives of the People's local government.

7. assurance of close collaboration between the people's councils and the mass organizations within the administrative framework.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The politics-administration dichotomy that has been examined in the present work brings us to the conclusion that the demarcation line between the two entities is an illusory one. In theory, politicians are concerned with the definition of values and priorities while the administrators are entrusted with the task of translating government objectives into plans. In practice, a clear-cut distinction between the policy-maker and policy-applier is encountered by numerous difficulties. However, there is a consensus among scholars of public administration about the subordination of the administrative system (the bureaucracy) to the political leadership, that the bureaucracy should be basically instrumental in its operations; responding diligently and effectively to the political system.

The growth of bureaucratic power that has been indicated in the course of this thesis is demonstrated
by the British experience. The British civil servants are no longer viewed as simply taking orders from politicians and then putting them into practice. It is widely recognised that the Civil Service plays an active role in the policy-making process.

But how has this come about?

A minister, who is by definition subject to frequent elections, arriving in a governmental department for the first time, may be confronted by a group of top civil servants who have been in their posts for many years and have had access to technical knowledge about the type of policy which the Minister should pursue and its likelihood of success. Moreover, the growth in size of many governmental departments means that Ministers can only consider a small number of key policy issues, leaving the initiative on many others to Civil servants. The civil servants have thus been extremely influential in the policy-making and implementing processes. Some critics, like the late Prof. Macleod, have gone so far as to insist that the relationships between Parliament and government should be amended so that greater "public light" should (1) Macleod, R., Public Administration: an Introduction (London, Pitman Publishing, 1986), p. 32.
be thrown on the activities of individual civil servants and that the latter should be publicly identified and accountable to Parliament.

This process has, in fact, already begun. The House of Commons is keenest than ever to question and criticize civil servants on the detailed implications of policy and administration. It has been a common practice for civil servants to be called before the House sub-committees to explain and justify their actions. This has been carried out, as Mrs. Patel puts it, at the expense of the civil servants' impartiality.

In the Sudan, the working principle during the colonial era was that of an impartial service. For Sudanese, government service both at central and local levels was regarded as strictly administrative. Officials were expected to function in a non-political capacity. According to the 1937 Administrative Regulations, both senior and junior administrative officials were not permitted to identify themselves with any political activity. The concept of 'political neutrality' of public officials was equated with
efficiency and good administration. Accordingly, the principal and perhaps exclusive task of the administrative system was the impartial implementation of policies laid down by the political authority (the colonial government). (1)

After Independence, this notion of neutrality of the public service was accepted by the first National government. (2) A circular issued by the Minister of Interior addressed to the Civil Service stated that "the over-riding consideration must ... be to maintain public confidence in its freedom from all possible bias...and ministers' confidence in its ability to give loyal service to whichever party is in power."(3)

However, this liberal policy was soon challenged by the military junta which took office only ten years after Independence. The tendency of the military rulers towards a neutralized public service which they showed in the early stages of their rule gave way to an overbearing attempt to politicize the service. The

(1) EI-Nashir, Emad; The Political Role of the Local Government Officer. M.C.S.M. P.77
(2) See above p. 120
(3) Ministry of Interior; a circular dated 3.11.1954.
adoption of the Provisional Administration Act of 1960 was in fact "...a deliberate policy on the part of the military dictatorship to achieve a greater degree of political control over the activities and attitudes of the Civil Servants at the local level." (1)

The study reveals the fact that the short honey-moon years of the harmonious relationship between the ministers and the top civil servants immediately after independence were soon interrupted by the accrual of power by the Military Rule (1966). The adherence to the conventional concept of separating the two elites was replaced by the partial notion of the politicization of the service manifested by excessive political control of the service on the part of the military officers who were reluctant to delegate any responsibilities to the civil servants. The policy-making process during the six years of military rule remained a monopoly to the military officers. In an atmosphere of tension that clouded the relationship between the political and administrative system a great number of top administrators either left their posts or were put on early pension under the 1962 Pensions Act, Sec (32(8)).

(1) El-Bashir, Matasi, op. cit. p.61
Following the ousting of the military regime during the October Popular Revolution, the constitutional and political upheavals involved a high degree of politicization throughout Sudanese society. The prevailing attitude... hailed and welcomed the political activity of the determined... public officials. It was under such circumstances that the civil servants... came to realize... the inevitability of their political activity. (1) In such circumstances, the public officials who were almost unanimously organized in the National Professional Front, led the General Political strike which put an end to the Military Rule.

As we have seen, the first and second Parliamentary experiences were characterized by intense inter-party competition and a continuously changing process. The liberal national governments during these two periods paid only a lip-service to the notion of 'neutrality' of public servants at the centre. At the local level, the decisions tended to be dictated by narrow political objectives; members of the local councils were elected and appointed on political grounds... energies and activities were directed to serve the purpose of building and maintaining a base of support for the competing political groups.

(1) Mustafa Al-Saedi: op. cit p 31.
As we have seen the plight of the civil service was not seriously considered until the late 1960's (by Kerrera Committee). According to information collected by the Organisaton of the Civil Service Committee, the plight of the service originated partly in the badly-defined character and nature of the relationship between the political and administrative systems. (1) Mistrust and suspicion, as the Report of the Committee conceded, between the two elites led to confusion within the bureaucracy and delay in rendering essential services to the people.

With the advent of the Say regime, the notion of politicization of the public service was explicitly and openly defended by the leaders of the regime. This overbearing attitude manifested itself in particular at the local level. The theory of the Administrative Revolution as initiated by the late Mr. Habib ahd extensively elaborated by him, was a remarkable departure from the traditional notion of "political neutrality" of the public service. The ideals and concepts of the Administrative Revolution were accommodated in the 1972 People's Local Government Act. The Act was meant to establish a coherent system of local

(1) The Republic of the Sudan: Report on the Organisation of the Civil Service; op cit; p. 312
government taking into account the uneven socio-economic levels attained in the different parts of the country, the vast area of the country which jeopardized administrative efforts exerted from the capital and the necessity for “involvement and mobilization of the masses of the people in the process of social change.” (1) The stipulation of the 1971 Act regarding the office of the Province Commissioner were a peculiar merging of the political and administrative functions of the latter.

The May leaders tended to express the view that “a revolutionary system can not afford to differentiate between political and administrative functions and that the merging and fusion of the two functions leads itself to the efforts for bringing about some co-unity and uniformity of action” (2)

As we have seen the May Regime has been characterized by drastic changes in politics and emphasis. The remarkable inconsistency in the political philosophy of the regime was bound to have negative impacts on the state of the administrative system, a stable framework within which problems can be seen or analyzed was lacking. The

(2) Mutazia el-Sissi: Bureaucracy and Development en-arab. p. 10
government taking into account the uneven socio-economic levels attained in the different parts of the country, the vast area of the country which jeopardized adminis-
tnative efforts exerted from the capital and the necessity for "involvement and mobilization of the masses of the people in the process of social change." (1) The stipula-
tion of the 1971 Act regarding the office of the Province Commissioner were a peculiar merging of the political and administrative functions of the latter.

The key leaders tended to express the view that "a revolutionary system can not afford to differ-
rentiate between political and administrative functions and that the merging and fusion of the two functions lends itself to the efforts for bringing about some cohesiveness and uniformity of action" (2)

As we have seen the key regime has been character-
ized by drastic changes in policies and emphases. The remarkable inconsistency in the political philosophy of the regime was bound to have negative impacts on the state of the administrative system. A stable framework within which problems can be seen or analyzed was lacking. The

(1) Abd-al-Samad: Some aspects of the New Peoplen
Local Government System in the Sudan 1940-68, p. 4
(2) Hatadi al-Bechir: Bureaucracy and Development, p. 10
S.S.U. is viewed by most of the Sudanese intellectuals as a "government imposed" institution where policy-making is closed and restricted to a few people.

On the other hand, the study shows that the administrative system suffered from a number of shortcomings. During the colonial era, the higher echelons of the service were a monopoly of the British. Such a state of affairs resulted in considerable frustration among the Sudanese civil servants. This was bound to leave an effect on the service inherited at Independence. The situation was further aggravated by the Sudanisation process and the swiftness with which it was completed. The Sudanese members, supported by the Egyptians, were urged by the political consideration explicitly stated in the Self-Determination Agreement of Feb. 1953. The immediate outcome of the Sudanisation of the British officials was an acute shortage of trained personnel. Moreover, the Public Service Commission which had been set-up in the exigencies of the self-government period to realise equity in the service lost its prestige after Independence. The central personnel agency remained, since that time, a divided responsibility.
shift of power-centre was bound to lead to changes in political and administrative personnel. The frequent changing of Ministers and administrators does nothing to help in the initiation of long-range socio-economic development programmes. (1) In the circumstance, most of the Bureaucrats, especially those in the upper reaches of the service, lost initiative and were reluctant to provide new ideas.

Another characteristic of the present regime is the over-emphasis it has placed on political reliability. There are incidents where officials who were politically desirable but professionally less qualified were advanced to key-positions, while a number of qualified potential candidates were barred from advancement (2) Such incidents resulted in mistrust and petty-wide and openly expressed frustrations within the bureaucracy. It further increased the tidiness of the bureaucrats and reduced their method of work to one of excessive caution, "sweat sitting" and inaction. Such a situation had led most of the bureaucrats to feel insecure about their future careers. Moreover, the

(1) *Rowan, M.A. op.cit. p. 126
(2) *Ibid., p. 129
The study also emphasized the fact that the civil service in almost all emergent nations is unquestionably faced with a multiplicity of tasks which were not envisaged a few years before their liberation from the yoke of colonialism. The service is bound to shoulder the obligation to adapt itself to drastically changing conditions. These conditions are coupled with meagre resources in terms of manpower and materials. The civil servants, especially in the upper reaches, have got to concern themselves with matters and problems of a variety and complexity that would test the abilities of the most mature civil servant. A service entrusted with such a huge task should be assured impartiality. Politicians (Ministers) are expected to inspire confidence in their top level officials (under-secretaries). They should foster the establishment of those healthy conventions that are essential for ensuring morals, security and discipline in the service. They are further expected to avoid such unhealthily practices as controlling and influencing appointments, promotions, or discipline.
They have to realise that the civil service is not merely a mechanical system responsive blindly to the whim of the politicians. As stated by a Sudanese politician

"...the politician supplies the 'back-bone of policy, where the civil servant provides flesh and blood. Both should work together in harmony...but...political pressure does in fact impede the good intentions and abilities of the individual civil servant."(1)

On the other hand the public servants are expected to understand and appreciate the policies of their country. National policies provide the climate within which the whole government functions. Therefore, there should be a mutual understanding and co-operation between the politicians and the administrators.

The writer is of the conviction that the bureaucracy should be ensured impartially especially in its day-to-day working. This will make for the permanence and continuity of the service and remove it from the storms of politics.

On the other hand the writer is cautious about the fact

(1) The Republic of the Sudan, the Institute of Public Administrative Proceedings of the Sound Table Conference 1960 p. 40
And too strong a bureaucracy will tend to jeopardize the interests of the average citizen in a country where the majority of the population is illiterate and politically unconscious.

An African scholar has long warned against the tendency of the bureaucracy to extend its sphere of power and influence beyond what is deemed to be its legitimate control by the political system. In a developing country like the Sudan, where the political system is relatively weak, the bureaucracy is expected to develop its own organizational characteristics and achieve internal organizational and professional autonomy. A remedy for this, the writer suggests, is to set up a power-base outside the bureaucracy itself.

Closely related to the concept of "political neutrality" of the public service is that of "ministerial responsibility", a central feature of Parliamentary systems. This principle presupposes the responsibility of a minister for laying down policy guidelines for the civil servants to follow. (1) From this follow the fact that he is the

master of policy while the civil service administrator
is its instrument, charged with the major task of implemen-
tial implementation of the policy laid. The political
chief executive holds the responsibility for controlling
the administrative system by giving continual guidelines
for the administrators to follow. The ministers set the
limits for the civil servants and remain responsible
(individually or collectively) for policy decisions in
their respective ministries to the legislature.

According to the notion of ministerial responsibility,
the civil servants are expected to enter sympathetically
into the political aims of whatever government comes to
power, pointing out the stage's difficulties and problems
in the way of the realization of the political aims of the
minister. But once the minister makes up his mind, the
civil servants must do all they can to ensure the success
of the decision. The decision, in the final analysis, is
that of the minister and he will take the praise and blame
for it. (1)

(1) - Schuyler, Augustus
Nevertheless, although the convention is that responsibility for policy rests with the Minister, yet the relationship between the two elites should be that of colleagues working together as a team, co-operative partners seeking to further the public interest and the efficient running of the department.

Adobaye, a Nigerian scholar, pointed out a number of basic rules and a code of conduct which should normally govern the official behavior of civil servants in their day-to-day working. These are: (1)

1. Decisions are taken by Ministers and it is the duty of civil servants to supply the Minister with the information necessary to make a right decision.

2. The civil servant must place before his minister the arguments on both sides of the case, fully and fairly.

3. Once the decision is taken, the civil servant must implement it with due loyalty and diligence, irrespective of his personal preference.

(1) 105
4. The decision once once taken is that of the Minister or the government in power and he must take full responsibility for it. If the decision happens to lose popular support, the Minister must not protect himself by blaming his officials. The Minister is further expected to defend his officials against any public attack.

5. The civil servant must observe absolute silence and be discreet as to what takes place in the office.

6. The civil service is responsible for continuity of policy. It is the custodian of national good irrespective of the party in power. It is for this reason that the civil service is recognized as a corrective of party government.

7. The civil servants are expected to observe the triple maxim of impartiality, neutrality and anonymity. They must be an "on ḥas" and never "on ḥalām".

8. The civil servant administrator is expected in
In the Sudan, the council of Ministers, which was shaped upon the British cabinet system was entrusted with the responsibility of administering and directing the functions of government. The Committee on the Organization of the Civil Service in its comprehensive report in 1968 has been complaining of the poorly-defined relationship between the Ministers and the top civil servants. Such a situation, the Report pointed out, has led to confusion within the service. A study revealed the fact that the Sudanese Transitional Constitution, amended 1964 was silent about the nature and pattern of relationship between the civil servants and the political leadership as they interact in the process of policy making and implementation. (1) The Permanent Constitution of 1973 is not better in this respect.

The study also singles out the fact that the national governments of the new states are faced with the added obligation to provide training in particular to top-level bureaucrats in education, Administration and Development, etc. (1)
administrators with the view of introducing them to the
newest techniques and methods employed in social sci-
ences, since the practical solutions to the problems
of accelerated growth and social change lean very heavily
on a knowledge of the behavioral sciences. The role
played by the J.P.A. and I.A.A.S. has been assessed. It
suffices us here to mention that the I.A.A.S. has learnt
from the problems faced by its predecessor, the J.P.A. Its
image among the donor administration has much improved.
Greater emphasis should be given to the important role of
the administrator as a vehicle of change concerned with
social-economic development and nation-building.

In the Sudan, the ability of the public service to
carry out its developmental task in the most efficient
manner is hampered by several difficulties. Besides the
excessive political control and direction on the part of
the successive national governments, the relationship be-
 tween the bureaucrats and the general public in the post-
Independence epoch has been characterized by a crisis of
faith and confidence. Constant criticisms and charges
have been made against most bureaucracies on grounds of:

(1) Mutania, al-Nasiri: Bureaucracy and Development: The
Sudanese Experience, op. cit. p. 19.
of the social environment on the service. The social structures that have been examined in this work have tended to make them (the public officials) more concerned with some 'private virtues and less rigorous in the application of government standards. (1) Under the circumstances, the public officials are characterized by personal behavior, paternalistic and authoritative attitudes, informal relationships, lack of sense of time and resistance to change. (2)

With the object of meeting these difficulties, an administrative reform should be launched. A sound civil service depends on the fulfillment of numerous requirements: orderly classification founded on educational qualifications and personal talents manifested by achievement on equitable salary plans, adequate opportunities, advancement based on a merit system and a code for defining the rights and responsibilities of the civil service. Recruits, promotions and retirements should be based

(1) Mubarak, al-Beeshir: Survey, Survey and Development: The Sudanese Experience, p.42
(2) Nouman, S.R. op.cit p.209
on well-established grounds of merit. Complementary to this merit system is a solemn adherence to a notion of a politically neutral service. Commitment should not be to the party in power but to the nation. Civil servants in their day-to-day work should not be embarrassed by any political intrusion.

The writer also suggests the formulation of a civil service charter, defining the basic objectives of the service. This moral code may also include the best traditions and standards of a civil service: integrity, honesty, care and courage. Public officials are expected to stand for the highest principles both in public and private life and must be ready to accept the obligations of ordinary citizens. They should also accept the role of servants not masters of their people devoted not to the pursuit of their own interests but of the general welfare.  

A competent civil servant is expected to realize the fact that he is part and parcel of his own society and it would be improper for him to attempt to set himself apart from his relatives or family because of any official position he is holding.

In Ghana, the Civil Service Charter states:

(1) Abu Jia, A.A.F Some Aspects of the Sudan Civil Service Occasional papers, Institute of Public Administration, Khartoum, Sudan, 1964, p.16
As (the civil servant) is a member of a corps dedicated to the service of the community and he should maintain a code of conduct and morals which should not only avoid bringing that service into disrepute but should positively enhance its reputation in the eyes of all with whom he comes into contact.

Tradition, conventions, self-criticism and self-improvement, all depend on technical competence, professional knowledge, confidence in objectives and sympathy with ideals.

Of no less significance is the genuine interest and co-operation of the general body of the citizenry. (1)

The education of the young as well as the adults in the field of agriculture, health and citizenship is of even greater importance. The quality of a nation and the effectiveness of its institutions depend largely upon the quality and level of its citizens.

(1) Fatimah Al-Bashash: Bureaucracy and Development: The Sudanese Experience, p. 11.
The problem of public education and enlightenment in the Sudan has received little attention from the successive national governments. Effective processes for developing and communicating civic knowledge have to be implemented to the extent that it can be seen as constituting part of a comprehensive and integral programme of public enlightenment to bring the people into close association with their government and the government closer to its people.
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