LOCALISATION OF THE POLICE FORCE IN THE KURDISH
A CASE STUDY OF THE POLICE FORCE IN MOROCCAN REGION

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ABSTRACT

The British, no doubt, laid the foundation of the modern police organisation in the Sudan during their rule between 1898-1952. However, the highly centralized pattern of British Colonial rule which prevailed for a long period of time inevitably brought the police force under tight central control and supervision.

In 1971 decentralization was favoured and implemented in the police organisation as well as the whole country at large. A further step of decentralization was achieved when the system of Regional Role was implemented in 1980.

The purpose of this study is to expose the constraints that have faced the implementation of decentralization in the organisation of the police with reference to a certain region, namely Kordofan Region. It is also an attempt to show the effect of this newly introduced administrative process upon the principles, norms and values of police organisation, and to what extent have the organisational objectives and the main organisational and staffing arrangements of the police force in the Sudan been achieved?
The study contains five chapters. Chapter One embodies some introductory theoretical remarks about decentralization in general, and the different points of view about decentralization of the Police Force in particular. Chapter Two has dealt with organizational and staffing arrangements of the Police Force in the Sudan. Chapter Three has traced the implementation of decentralization in the Police Force through the Police Ordinance, Laws and Regulations. It has also embodied a revision of all the local government's acts to show the link between the administration of the Police Force and the Local government system. Chapter Four is a case study of the police organization in Karoofan Region subsequent to the implementation of decentralization and the introduction of the system of Regional Rule. In this chapter an attempt has been made to show the constraints of the implementation of decentralization in that region. Chapter Five embodies the conclusion and the deduced recommendations that one thought to be appropriate.

As to the methodological approach of the study, I have tried to present first the most important personnel items of the organization of the police and
to show to what extent they are affected by the decentralization process which is newly introduced. Secondly, I have traced the administrative history of the organization of the Police in the Sudan to expose the deep roots of centralization process in the organization of the police, and to show to what extent such centralization process has been gradually replaced by the decentralization process, and whether such new administrative process has gained acceptance from all policemen.

For the purpose of undertaking this research, a sample from the population of the police officers has been drawn and a stratification system has been used. I must say that this research project is the first of its kind to be undertaken within the organization of the police in the Sudan. In view of this fact, I have experienced a lot of difficulties with respect to the needed relevant data and information. I have consulted a lot of official documents including records, regulations, notes, and reports, I have also reviewed a great number of theoretical readings and then carried out questionnaires, interviews and meetings. But unfortunately most of these procedures were done
In some other occasions I did manage to find the opportunity to talk to some people whom this research needed their experiences and help, but even at such instance, I was not as successful as I wanted to be. The heart of the matter has been that people were just more than reluctant to speak up their minds freely.

With all such difficulties and limitations I have tried my best to pursue such research project. The main challenge for me in undertaking this research work has been how to supplement my theoretical orientation and my own personal observation as an officer in the organization of the police with the limited information I received from the people most concerned. Whether I have been able to do this is a challenging question for the reader to judge for himself and for the subsequent pages to prove.

However, the main conclusion reached from this study is that decentralization led to the breakdown of the solidarity of the organization of the Police. Important values and norms were breached and the delivery of the police services varied from one region
to another. Police identity was nearly to be lost. The voice was then raised calling for the centralization of the police force, and my recommendations are almost the only of this voice. I hope they should find an opportunity in this new regime to be put in practice.
لا بد أن يكون للأدباء أُبْرَى أن يعالموا الاستعارة على حالات الحضارة.

الذين يعيشون اليوم من ممارسة الاستعارة، في العالم الحديث، الذي يشمل الأفكار والأفكار الجديدة.

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لا يمكن القول بأنه يعتبر في أسلوب الإدارة كتابات أو كتابات.
كثير من النقاد الذين اشادوا بالهندسة الإدارية، فإنها تلعب دوراً حاسماً في إنجاح الإدارة. وهي تقنية حديثة تتيح للإدارة تحكم وبالتنظيم. إلا أن الإدارة الإدارية لم تتقدم بشكل كامل إلى أن تكون في الادارة الإدارية، فإنها تتطلب الكثير من المعرفة في مجال الإدارة. ومن ثم، يمكننا أن ننصح بأن الدراسة المتميزة، في كل المجالات، يجب أن تكون ناجحة. 

إن النتائج في هذه الدراسة تشير إلى أن الإدارة الإدارية في السودان تعاني من بعض الخصائص التي تؤثر على النتائج الإدارية. من بين هذه الخصائص، يمكن القول إنها تتطلب الكثير من المعرفة والخبرة في مجال الإدارة. ومن ثم، يمكننا أن ننصح بأن الدراسة المتميزة، في كل المجالات، يجب أن تكون ناجحة.
شغلا على ملكية أسهم، إلى أن أخذوا من إدارته العامة من هذه الوثائق وقليلات الكلمات لذا كان في ذلك باستمرار أن يثبت في مجال الدراسات الميدانية بإلقاء نظرة على الأسر.

لم يتلقوا رسالة تدفقت على هذة البداية أحد أفراد الشرف. إن إدارته العامة إلى أن أخذوا تأثيره هذة النقطة لينتهبcole (الإدارة العامة) قبل أن تكن تأثيره للإدارة العامة. رد جير شرف الكيمياء السبعة: لإدارة إدارته العامة. وفقاً لشيك، يمكن أن تكون إدارته العامة مباشرة. ومن أجل نفسها بإدارة إدارته العامة مع إدارته العامة. مع إدارته العامة من إدارته العامة. مع إدارته العامة من إدارته العامة. مع إدارته العامة من إدارته العامة. مع إدارته العامة مع إدارته العامة مع إدارته العامة من إدارته العامة.
لم كل هذه حيثيات والإدارات التي تصرف على هذا المستوى، فالسياسات الحالية لا تشمل هذه الإدارات التي تصرف على هذا المستوى. وتتعلق هذه الإدارات بالإجراءات التي تصرف على هذه الإدارات. وتتعلق هذه الإدارات بالإجراءات التي تصرف على هذه الإدارات.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Mutassim M. Hashim for his guidance, invaluable advise, keen interest, unfailing help, encouragement and assistance throughout the preparation of this study. I also owe my greatest debt to Major General Abdulin Abdu kohin, Ex-Kevener of the Police College and Institute, for his consent to be released for the course of this study, and for his continuous help and encouragement.

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My deep thanks also go to Sayed Abdul Waged Al Shadig who typed this thesis with great accuracy and carefulness.

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CHAPTER ONE

DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Definition of Decentralization.

The literature in the field of public administration contains a wide range of definitions of the concept of decentralization. Scholars in the field have, in fact, used various criteria for the explanation and interpretation of the concept. Consequently, the difficulty of arriving at a standardized or commonly accepted definition of the concept of decentralization may remain inevitable.

A United Nations Study Group has come nearest to a definition as:

"The transfer of authority on a geographic basis, through decentralization of authorities to local units of the same department or level of government, or by devolution of authority to local government units or special authority units."

In terms of this definition, the processes by which authority is transferred are basically dictated to involve either decentralization or devolution.

However, some public administration writers are mostly concerned with the transfer of authority itself rather than with the patterns with which such transfer takes. In his definition of decentralization, Leonard D. White concentrated upon the levels of transfer of authority together with the type of authority transferred. He stated that, "decentralization denotes the transfer of authority, legislative, judicial and administrative from a higher level of government to a lower."

H. Maddick and A. Walsh have explicitly stated that, decentralization embraces both processes of decentralization and devolution. However, they did not define decentralization in broader terms as those used by White. They defined both decentralization and devolution as delegation of authority from the center to independent

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and representative local institutions, both of which
White has included in his definition of decentralization,
as we have noted before.

Sir Charles Harris distinguished between
decentralization as a characteristic of the relations
between higher and lower authorities, resting on the same
chain of command, and devolution or, the entrusting of
power and duties by higher authorities, resting on a
different basis

Frank Swirsk used decentralization to denote
the dispersal of power through the structure on a single
local, reserving the term devolution to the transfer of
power between different levels.

A tendency towards a broad meaning of decentraliza-
tion is seen in A.R. Al Kubayy's trial in which he used
the term decentralization to encompass the following
processes: (a) the transfer of authority from the
national capital to local authorities or local
representative bodies, (b) the delegation of authority

1/ Harris, Sir Charles, 'Decentralization' The Journal
of Public Administration, London, Vol. 5, No. 2,
April 1925, p. 31.

2/ Swirsk, Frank W., 'Comparative Urban Research in
Administration and Politics in Cities', Beverly Hills,
within administrative departments, bureaus, and divisions as units and field offices operating outside headquarters; (c) the creation of autonomous and semi-autonomous authorities including public services, nationalized industries, wholly owned public corporations or any other enterprises with a legal personality; and (d) the delegation of subordinate bureaucrats at the lower level of the agency of the power to act in the name of the superior in regard to specified subjects without a formal transfer of the responsibility from him. 1/

However, irrespective of whether these views are similar or otherwise, or whether they have the same or different level of emphasis, decentralization, and so far as this study is concerned, should mean the relative transfer of authority from the center to the local areas where the latter would have relative discretion and authority of decision making and execution within their limits or boundaries. However, matters of national concern remain the prerogative of the central and national government.

Objectives of Decentralization:

The system of decentralization applied by a country, and the policy of the national government with regard to decentralization, are usually expressions or indicative of certain objectives. However, these objectives, for one reason or another, are neither always explicitly stated, nor are the national governments always clearly aware of what they are or what they should be or of the priority which needs to be given to them. However, certain objectives, especially democracy and popular participation, may be propagated as being basic to the government's policy. These objectives should, however, be sought not so much as ideals which are generally or internationally advocated, than as realistic policy measures which need to be realized in factual terms. A formal statement of objectives, therefore, does not necessarily provide a genuine guide to an understanding of real governmental objectives. As one scholar puts it,

"A decentralization policy thus clearly represents an assignment of objectives which can be widely different in nature but..."
which by and large can be
characterized as being ideological,
1/ i.e. based on political ideology,
or more generally, on a philosophical
concept of man and society, or
utilitarian, i.e. aiming first and
foremost at achieving certain results.

In other words, objectives of decentralization
are often unduly generalized and vaguely defined. 
Such generalization and vagueness more than frequently result
in formidable difficulties and ambiguities in the area
of implementation. Hence the explicit and clear
definition of these objectives, would always remain an
extremely important factor in the effective implementa-
tion of decentralization policies and/or programmes.
The forms of decentralization:

Possible variations in the forms of decentraliza-
tion are usually the consequences of variations in th
legal status, the responsibilities, the authority and
the accountability of decentralized types of institutions.

Bearing these elements in mind as important basics of
differentiation, decentralization may inevitably take
many forms. Two of these forms, namely political

1/ Leemans, A.F., Changing Patterns of Local Government,
International Union of Local Authorities, The Hague
decentralization and administrative decentralization are of particular importance to these two forms is due to their intricate relation and interaction with each other.

(c) Political decentralization

Political decentralization is a relatively more complicated and advanced form of decentralization which entails more than a simple dispersion or spreading of administrative functions between and among central ministries or departments of government and local units or authorities of government. It is usually based upon constitutional arrangements in accordance with which governmental powers or functions are distributed between the central government and the governments of the states or the regions, whatever the case may be.

There are basically two forms of political decentralization. One of these two forms is known as the Federal Union System or Federation. States practicing such a system are usually compound states such as U.S., U.K., Nigeria etc... Such a system is essentially a system of government within which powers and authorities are divided between a central or national government
known as the Federal or Union government and states' governments which form the federal union. Each of these two components of the system is legally supreme in its own area of jurisdiction as defined by the federal constitution. In these terms a federal government is, sought to be a limited government in the sense that each component of the system is legally authorized to exercise certain powers or functions. The states' governments are empowered to exercise some certain residual or specified powers independently from the national government. On the other hand, there are certain fields or areas of jurisdiction which are considered as national and the states have no right to deal with.

Federalism is sometimes interpreted to include two types, namely the competitive type of federalism and the cooperative type of federalism. The competitive type stresses the constitutional rights of the component parts of the system, the states and the national government. It also stresses the notion that the states are independent units of the national government. In view of this, there is always a possibility of competition between the two components, as each may tend to seek in
exercise and preserve its own legal power and Consequently, safeguard against the possibility of being encroached upon by the other. This cooperation may lead to disintegration and sometimes to accretion which occurred between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and between Sierra and the National Federal Government in Nigeria.

The cooperative form is interpreted to signify a form of Federalism in which national policy is made through the interaction and the functional cooperation rather than the independence of the two components of the federal system. That is to say, it is a form of Federalism in which the component parts of the system, with each having its constitutionally defined areas of jurisdiction, tend to cooperate in the formulation and execution of policies or programmes of joint or coordinated interest.

In practical terms, however, it is usually a mixture of the two forms of Federalism which reflects the actual practice of a Federal system.

The other form of political decentralisation is known as the regional form of decentralisation or Regionalism. Although Regionalism is frequently interpreted to involve a great measure of administrat
decentralization, and it certainly does, it is, however, basically understood to reflect a political form of decentralization. This is essentially because regionalism involves the establishment of semi-independent legislative and executive organs of government at the regional levels of a unitary state. These regional organs are empowered by law to exercise certain powers and to undertake certain functions, of both a political and administrative nature, under the general supervision and control of the national government. The rationale for such national and sub-national supervision and control is to preserve the political and administrative unity of the state. In these terms, regionalism evidently stands at variance with federalism, because the component parts of the regional system are not recognized either formally or informally as independent units of government. Rather, they are considered as being part and parcel of the national set up enjoying only functional autonomy and exercising legislative and executive powers under the supervision and control of the central government.

(b) Administrative decentralization.

Administrative decentralization is a relatively more simpler form of decentralization involving the
exercise of regional and/or local administrative discretion under the general supervision and control of the national government. It is based on the distribution of administrative functions between central administrative organs and regional or local units or authorities. These administrative functions which are originally central administrative functions, are usually exercised by the regional or local units either through a process of "Decentralization" or a process of "Devolution".

Decentralization or delegation, which are frequently used as interchangeable or alternate concepts, involves the relinquishment of certain administrative functions from the competence of the centre to local personnel or institutions. These functions, however, still remain within the original control of the delegating authority and could be revoked from the jurisdiction of the recipient. Thus decentralization is essentially an administrative technique of delegating authority without guaranteeing local jurisdiction and/or discretion, or preventing interference from the centre. In more specific terms, decentralization is defined as the delegation of authority adequate for the discharge of specified functions to staff of a central department.
who are situated outside the headquarters. The essence of the concept of decentralization is normally explained to involve the delegation of powers by central administrative organs to subordinate local authorities, whether these subordinate local authorities are local government units, offices, individuals, or field units. Normally, the term subordinate units refers to provinces, districts, localities, and other geographical divisions established by the central government, and utilized as subordinate units by its ministries and departments. Such units would be concerned mainly with carrying out policies made at the centre and directives issued by the national authorities under which they inevitably need to operate; there is no transfer of final authority from the central ministries whose responsibilities continue to be final. Hence central ministries or departments have always the right to revise and second actions or activities undertaken by subordinate local units.

One of the most effective advantages of decentralization is that it enables the administrators to be in contact with the people of the local areas and consequently to be

1/ Peacock, Henry, FBST, p. 24.
more than adequately acquainted with the needs and resources of the localities. Thus, of course, will relatively relax the burden of the central government, and at the same time, make possible good communication, both inward and outward. In terms of inward communication, the local people would find that communication with these field officers or administrators is practical, quicker, and more fruitful. In terms of outward communication, the knowledge of the central departments would be vastly increased by these field officers or administrators. In other words, information would flow outwards from the central departments, and inward from the local areas. This flow of information offers the central ministries or departments the opportunity to realize the prevailing needs and resources of the different areas. Consequently, policy may be prescribed in accordance with the specific needs and the available resources of each area. Likewise, the administrators or the officers on the spot, can talk, can explain, can discuss, can invite questions relating to central policy measures, and consequently clear up difficulties. By such discussion, exchange of views and intimate association with the local people, field officers may
most likely to bring about social and economic change. They may also succeed in protecting the rural people from exploitation and aiding them in time of emergencies. From another point of view, such contact with people is of great importance. It enables the field administrators to effectively coordinate central and local governmental activities, and consequently, to minimize the adverse effects of possible overlapping or conflict of governmental functions or activities. It also enables detailed plans to be evolved and infra-structure capital works to be maintained.

Devolution is essentially a non-hierarchical concept, the essence of which is relative autonomy or discretion involving the legal conferring of powers to discharge specified or residual functions upon formally constituted local authorities. In more specific terms devolution means the legal conferment or a legal conferring of powers enabling local authorities or units to undertake specified or residual functions as stipulated by law. This type of arrangement has a political as well as an administrative character. Authority for making final decisions may using local motions for supervising over their execution is vested in a provincial or local council.
Hence, devolution involves an actual transfer rather than a mere delegation of governmental functions and powers, even though such powers are normally limited or circumvented by national regulation.

Devolution is essential for any society for purposes of developing civic consciousness and political maturity. It is this civic consciousness, political maturity which should bring with it, through effective regular participation, a responsive government which translates needs into policies and utilizes or directs local activities to achieve local needs. As one scholar puts it,

"In this, the power to consult, the power to work out, the local relevance of policies and the speed of their implementation is of fundamental importance to the people who have to be brought into a new system of social relations and a new system of economic development." 1/

In this connection it is worth noting that, in the case of non-governmental organizations, decentralized types of agencies may assume different roles depending on the four important elements of decentralization.

1/ Maddie, Harry, C.I.C.I., 3/64.
which were previously mentioned. The main difference in that they are non-statutory bodies, with accountability always moving upward, while the flow of responsibility and authority is downward. The non-statutory status and the upward accountability always preclude them from their assuming autonomous status on the lines of the elected local bodies except in respect of their operational freedom for adjustment to local conditions and local diversities. However, both are likely to suffer from an evil interest in their pattern.

Administration under locally elected bodies is always likely to be exposed to the danger of the excesses of democracy resulting in excess of authority and corruption while under the non-government arrangement, the organization may not be responsive to local needs and may not effectively motivate participation on the part of the people or limit their voluntary efforts, and may also suffer from bureaucratic elements that may provide remedial measure.

It must be noted, however, that whether decentralization is effected through a process of devolution or a process of devolution, it does not involve absolute autonomy. Autonomy is always relative both in federal and in unitary governments. In unitary governments, the supreme and sovereign authority of the national government is explicitly stipulated by law. Consequently, the component parts of such governments, whether they are regional or local units, are inevitably required to undertake their functions and exercise their powers under the supervision and control of the national and/or central government. In the case of federal governments, although a decentralized form of government is built into the constitution or the basic law of the land, the legal fiction that states, republics or provinces have absolute sovereignty may not always be translated into political and/or administrative facts. The control of national government may inevitably continue to have the last word, either by law, or by custom, or even by a show of force.

Factors affecting the decision to decentralize:

As mentioned before, absolute autonomy to be exercised by local bodies, is, to a large extent, a desire or a hope rather than an actual achievement. There
are certain functions which must be retained at the
center while other functions are advisable to be left
to the localities. Decisions to be taken with respect
to national matters concerning or affecting the entire
body of citizens within a country, are always the concern
of the center. This is true in both federal and unitary
systems of government. However, some traditional yet
important functions which are in most cases undertaken
by the center, such as the police services, may need to
be decentralized in order to provide for their effective
management outside their headquarters. In some general
terms, however, there are certain factors that usually
tend to determine the degree to which an agency
centralizes or decentralizes its authority. These factors
fall under four broad headings including the following:

1. Administrative factors.
2. Functional factors.
3. External factors.
i.e. the principal of inevitable eventual responsibility of those at center levels for whatever actions or omissions which are undertaken by those at subordinate levels, usually acts as a general deterrent to the effective decentralization of administrative authority. In view of the fact that, every agency head is answerable for his general administrative program and is held responsible for the integrity and legality of his agency’s operations, and that he is to remain accountable at any time for right or wrong decisions made by him or his subordinates, agencies frequently tend to hesitate to delegate broad discretionary authority to field officials, who are thought to be less readily controlled than officials regularly stationed at the capital. The effects of this system of responsibility are, however, believed to be more acute in some agencies than in others.

Furthermore, some other important administrative factors including age of the administrative agency, the stability of its policies and methods, the competence

of its field personnel, the need for speed and economy in its operations, the extent of its administrative sophistication, the size and volume of its activities and commitments, and the adequacy of its financial resources are all believed to be of considerable significance in the determination of the extent to which decentralization may be sought and effectuated. Of particular significance in this respect is the adequacy of financial resources. This is basically because without adequate financial resources it would not only remain difficult to effectuate decentralization in any meaningful sense, but it would also remain extremely difficult to avoid excessive measures of supervision and control which are normally exercised by central organs in cases where central grant aids are provided to decentralized units of government.

2. Functional Features

The variety of functions which a governmental agency performs, the pressing need for variety of technical specialities, and the need for national uniformity as contrasted with the need for regional and local variations, usually affect the readiness or willingness of the agency to decentralize its operations. Unless there are
affirmative reasons for absolute uniformity with respect to the detailed operations as well as the general decisions of the agency, authority may generally be decentralized to field agents.

3. External Factors:

The degree of the need for support, participation and representation at the grass roots of democracy, and the degree for collaboration with local agencies are usually believed to be very important external factors influencing the decision to decentralize. Also, ideological commitments and political factors are assumed to be important external factors in the determination of the desirable degree and the extent to which decentralization may be sought and affected. Field administration, in practice, is wholly divorced from politics. This is reflected in the smoothness of political interest in the location of field offices, selection of field office directors and the size of the local staff. As to the ideological commitments, most capitalists' countries usually practise decentralization in whatever form they choose. Countries adopting Communist or socialist ideology,
except for Yugoslavia, usually adhere to the principle of 'democratic centralization'. This principle of democratic centralization simply means a centrally controlled government coupled with mass participation in the government process. In the Soviet Union and within the context of the principle, for instance, the Communist Party is considered to be the only party allowed to operate in factual terms and all institutions of government and administration are under its control. In this case, it is obvious that there is extreme centralization and virtually very slight decentralization. If there is any decentralization it is on the operational level, with policy and supervision being the responsibility and prerogative of the higher levels.

The Advantages of Decentralization:

In spite of the fact that the concept of decentralization has been subjected to different interpretation by different scholars in the field of public administration, there is, however, consensus among these scholars with respect to the values of

advantages which may usually be associated with the implementation of decentralization policies or programmes. These values or advantages may be generally and briefly explained to include the following:

1. It facilitates the spreading of the burden of responsibility of the central government by affording the local communities through their representative councils the opportunity to share and participate in public policy making and public policy execution at their respective local levels. This is assumed to eventually result in efficient and effective governmental action as it makes possible the avoidance of possible administrative delays when every matter is brought to be dealt with at the level of the central government and as it affords the central government the opportunity to concentrate on basic themes of public policy and leave the details to be catered for at the regional and local levels.

2. It increases the citizens' interest in government by means of wider popular participation, and consequently contributes to its effectiveness. In other words, decentralization is believed to instigate and

1/ K. Kabeer, Amen, K., Dev. (3)
encourage local enthusiasm and local initiative which are assumed to be basic factors in effective national growth, particularly under the circumstances of so-called Newly Developing Countries where it is presumed that the tendency has always been to depend upon the central and/or national government for the realization of the objectives of national government.

4. It makes possible the provision of varied socio-economic services at the different regional and local levels by bodies which are competent not only by virtue of having closer knowledge of the needs and problems of their respective regions and localities, but also by virtue of being sufficiently interested in and conscious of in investing considerable efforts in the direction of satisfying such needs and resolving such problems.

4. Decentralization is presumed to make possible intensive and effective association or communication with the local population which, in turn, is believed to facilitate the effective formulation of detailed plans and programmes of economic and social development, and

consequently, to facilitate the matching of the policies and plans of the central government with the needs and aspiration of the local population. In other words, decentralization is assumed to lead to effective national planning via a regular flow of information inward from the local communities and outward from the central and/or national government.

5. Decentralization is believed to aid both the national political leadership and the local population in practicing democratic ideals and principles of government by making the governmental process a shared rather than one-sided process in which the local population may be afforded the opportunity to decide upon their own priorities and to be governed largely by local councils.

6. Through active popular participation and involvement, decentralization is believed to make possible public education and enlightenment, and consequently, civic responsibility and consciousness which, in turn, is presumed to aid, among other things, in the effective orientation and training of present and future leaders of the society.
7. Decentralization is believed to lead to a relaxation of conditions favorable to democracy by breaking the active hierarchy at specific levels of government. It, therefore, lessens bureaucracy and encourages democracy within the administrative system.

8. The effective implementation of decentralization is believed to safeguard against possible political interference in the conduct of administrative operations at local levels.

9. Decentralization is also believed to serve from the point of view of the individual involved in the administrative process, as a "self-actualization" of self-control mechanism, which is highly recommended by psychologists for changing and developing human behavior in general and administrative behavior in specific.

A United Nations study has summarized some advantages and values into the following:

1. Decentralization involving effective participation by the people in government, programs, carried out locally, can yield many benefits. First of all, the people will have a better understanding...
of what the government proposes. Through this understanding they will be more likely to adopt the new ideas and practices, use the services offered, contribute their own effort and resources to the programme, give impetus to new institutions and make constructive adjustments in their lives that may be necessitated by the initial changes proposed, thus making the changes enduring. Secondly the envisaged development of lower-level local activities can be made more realistic by involving the people locally in important decisions. All the account will thereby be taken of local knowledge, needs and interests. Moreover, methods appropriate to the circumstances can more readily be devised for fulfilling local needs. Finally, popular participation increases the likelihood that services and amenities, once established, will be maintained and even expanded. Moreover success in fulfilling a community need encourages people to try to meet others. The experience in establishing and surviving a community facility is cumulative and new sources of initiative and leadership arise to draw upon it. 1/ 

In this connexion it is perhaps worth to stress upon an important aspect discussed by many scholars, namely the linear or direct correlation between democracy and decentralisation. This aspect is widely

and deeply affected by Western theories of democracy which continue to give decentralization high credit for the strengthening of democratic institutions in a number of ways. According to these theories, the individual citizen is better able to experience close personal identification with a governmental unit which covers a small area and which executes services having a direct impact on his personal welfare. The type of decentralization which increases the participation of the individual in the affairs of his community and induces him to do more on his own, can be an effective method of democratizing the policies and programmes at the national level.

The Limitations of Decentralization:

Despite all the values and advantages which are normally associated with the implementation of decentralization policies and programmes, decentralization has been cautiously supported by some scholars who tend to question the successful and effective implementation of its objectives and goals. One of the reservations which these scholars hold in this respect is that, the effective application of decentralization inevitably needs able personnel-managers as well as
employees who can genuinely and most willingly accept the delegation of authority, and the responsibilities which it entails. It is believed that, in most developing countries, there is much fear and mistrust between subordinates and superiors. Decentralization always demands that administrators at all levels must share a common understanding of the methods and objectives of their organization, otherwise autonomy may lead to anarchy. Some scholars have even gone so far as to argue that decentralization is not as great as it is supposed to be. They pointed out that the more power is widely dispersed whether functionally or otherwise, the more is the likelihood that decisions will be open to influence from below, and, consequently, the more is the likelihood for bargaining and compromise to dominate over the process of local decision-making and local decision-execution. In their opinion, this is very bad and inappropriate since it will tend to reduce the possibilities of making national decisions. They also believe that a lot of time may be spent in discussing a decision which consequently causes delay of action.

Decentralization and Centralization Compared.

If decentralization is defined as the transfer of authority to the lower levels of government through a process of dis-concentration or a process of decentralization, centralization on the other hand, is the systematic and consistent reservation of authority at the central level of government. However, centralization in the sense that all powers are lodged with the central government, and decentralization in the sense that control and autonomy are given to the subordinate units of government, do not exist in actual terms. Taylor states that, "there is no such thing as absolute centralization or absolute decentralization."

At the same time, nothing can be decentralized properly which has not first been centralized. In view of this, centralization and decentralization are regarded by some scholars as complementary concepts.

Baker states that, "neither decentralization nor centralization can be studied in isolation; since they exist only in relation to each other. Centralization then proceeds from centralization and acts as its main base.

1/ Taylor, Jane W., Area and Administration, Galantewski and Others, Chicago, 1965, pp. 130-144.

As mobilisation has become the desire of most countries, especially that develops' case is clear; all countries require more decentralisation. Yet, in spite of this trend, some scholars noticed that in both underdeveloped and developed countries the trend is towards centralisation. The assumption behind this tendency is that national unity and rapid economic and social transformation may become difficult if not impossible within the context of a decentralised system of government. Centralisation could indeed be favoured when its main purpose is the country's unity, and not merely a monopoly of power by the elite. This trend towards centralisation also stems from the belief that a centralised, unitary system can better achieve political stability without which no development is possible. The nature and magnitude of this developmental task may reinforce the trend towards the large investments required for building up the infrastructure of the economy and its large-scale projects which require a centralised agency to coordinate and direct the effort towards the standing goal.

2/ Chadwick, Henry, op. cit., p. 20.
Centralization is also favored on the ground that the central government is the only institution in a developing society that is capable of accumulating the capital and providing the initiative and resources necessary for comprehensive development and change. In cases where there are private institutions which can play a significant role in development, centralization may still be favored to bring these sectors and their potentialities under public authorities. The bringing together of all public and private resources under a central plan will naturally lead to a faster and more effective development in these countries.

It is also believed that, in the underdeveloped countries where financial resources are inadequate and the technical know-how is scarce, centralization may be the only alternative through which the available resources may be well allocated and efficiently used. Through centralized measures, it is believed, national governments may be better able to achieve just distribution of scarce resources among citizens than by decentralized methods.
As we have previously noted, decentralization has certain limitations. Centralization has also its own disadvantages. One of its great disadvantages, which most scholars agreed upon is that centralization is a handicap to democracy. Since decision-making in a centralized system of government is the concern of the centre, the local areas are then deprived of the right of deciding on matters of their own concern. This means that centralization acts also as a hindrance to popular participation, since the people of the localities would have to accept undebated or unchallenged solutions for their problems. Not only that, but some scholars went further to suggest that the probability of achieving economic development may be considerably lessened under centralization. Riga has stated that,

"a centralized bureaucracy may not help economic development, but it is certain to inhibit the development of general participation in politics and popular identification with national objectives."  

Which of these two concepts, centralization or decentralization, a country may follow depends upon its political, economic, and social conditions. But still as

Minors suggested, decentralization of some functions may be impossible without the centralization of others and vice versa.

Decentralization of the Police Force:

The organization of the police force is highly affected by the political structure of the state. Federal states keep police forces organized within the separate states which constitute the federal government. Totalitarian governments always tend to hold the police forces and administer them centrally. In some other cases, several countries which are not dominated by totalitarian governments, tend to be in favor of having national police forces. At any rate, arguments and controversies as to whether the police force must be national or provincial and/or local, or in other words, centralized or decentralized, are frequently raised. Advocates of a centralized police force tend to express the view that the creation of a national police force would neither be constitutionally opposed nor politically dangerous. They tend to believe that the success of a police state derives, not so much from a nationally

organised police force, then from the totalitarian nature of the government which if it assumes power, would, without doubt, aspire to seize control of the police force irrespective of its form of organisation. In fact history revealed this. When the Communist seized power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, their first demand was for the control of the police force. Also the Soviet Cheka, the Nazi Gestapo, the Fascist and the recently well-known Iranian Savak were all political and not civil police forces.

It is really true, in my opinion, that the danger in a democracy does not lie in a central police that is too strong, but in local police forces that are too weak. People who fear a national police force because of the risk of its political abuse overlook the fact that the government already has control of the largest part of the police force within the capital. A government, if it so wishes, would be able to arrest those who oppose it by such force. However, such action may in some cases be controlled by the parliamentary majority within the democratic states.

One of the most logical arguments supporting a national police force is that in the case of a provincial or decentralized police force, the local police authorities would have their own financial control over the number of men and equipment needed for their local police forces. Some provinces or regions may be attracted by the notion of economy with which they would run their police forces. However, it is wrong that the essential services of the police should be in any way dependent on local wealth. It is particularly appropriate to finance the police by allocating its budget according to a national plan. This would guarantee a smooth running of the essential police services without regard to the actual financial conditions of the localities. Moreover, and some anomalies tend to believe, a local police force may reflect a development of too excessive decentralization and may eventually threaten the prestige and authority of the state government.

Furthermore, it is not only a desirable but it is an advantage for a policeman to serve away from his home locality so as to be able to avoid some of the

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1/ Medick, Henry, Cr.41, pp. 85-86.
possible conflicts and tensions which might occur between his social ties and the ideals or principles of his profession. It is frequently argued that a policeman who works away from his home may be able to carry out his duties more effectively and more freely.

On the other hand, advocates of a decentralized police force tend to stress the view that, such a force would enable the districts to have good police services and at the same time would enable a healthy competition between the local police forces and consequently, contribute to their efficiency. But a store of the police force, such as detection, can be believed to benefit considerably from local police. A good detective police officer is very often a man who succeeds in collecting information, which, in turn, depends on local knowledge and contacts. Both local knowledge and contacts are less preserved in a national force where a policeman might work in districts unknown to them before. Hence, local police requirement is believed to be of great value than a national police requirement, especially in cases where there might be greater opportunities for promotion which often constitute strong incentives.
In addition to this, a central police force may be too uniformistic, rigid for a country whose leading characteristic is a great variation of its districts and the size of its area. Marshall pointed out that a mass police force is always a potential weapon for control purposes. This may be true to a large extent, especially in cases where a centralized police force may develop the tendency to become an instrument of terror and police control. Under such conditions, the head of the police force may become too powerful and may be in a position to pull power from the lawful government. Hence, it may be unwise for the police to be centralized.

However, some people may be strongly attracted by arguments expressed in favor of a decentralized police force, especially those who may have a lingering political fear of a national police force. These arguments, in my opinion, are debatable and controversial. They may be more meaningfully highlighted and explored within the context of a specific country. This is going to be the subject-matter of the succeeding chapters of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE DATA RELATING TO THE STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR MAJOR TRENDS

1. Definition and characteristics of organisations.

Some introductory theoretical remarks:

Organisations are defined as social elements or human groups deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific ends. An organisation is generally characterised by:

1. Scale and objectives to be achieved.
2. Division of labour, authority and power, communication and responsibility to achieve the achievement of specific goals.
3. Fixing of work positions suitably.
4. Set of systems, procedures, methods and rules.
5. Frequent of authority to ensure the effectiveness of the organisation and structure from time to time and direct them towards its goals.

Organisation theorists have classified organisations into various categories including the following:

1. Classical organisations or bureaucratic forms of organisation;
2. Functional organisations;
3. Partially decentralized organisations, i.e., decentralized with reference to specific functions, or any other form like territorial decentralisation, product decentralisation;
4. Free forms of organisation or non-classical organisations which do not conform to any specific structural discipline, but are expected to be adaptable to changing patterns of individual influence and preference towards achievement of organisational goals.
5. System organisations in which social organisations are considered as open systems where there is a dynamic equilibrium between the environment and the organisation which exists within it.

Rule: organisations are mostly typical examples of the classical or bureaucratic forms of organisation.

These organisations are defined to be characterized by:
1. A large number of formalized rules and regulations;
2. The location of authority at the very top of the structure and unidirectional flow of power which breaks no indifference by any one, anywhere down the line;
3. A single decision making centre which controls the entire organisation;
4. A hazy goal structure which lacks clear cut definition, and in the process is dismembered into a variety of tasks and assignments, the functional set of which assume greater importance than the achievement of the organisational objectives.

The bureaucratic model of organisations is perhaps most suited for a large organisation like the police, spreading over vast jurisdictions and comprising many thousands of people. In such bodies, stability and uniformity of action are important. Nevertheless, since authority is at the very top and assigned stations are made far away from the implementation centres, there could be considerable divergence between the efficient performance of a task and the effective satisfaction of an organisational requirement.

Being a unit of the whole organisation, the society, the police organisation has certain objectives to achieve. Police have always sought these objectives.
The basic objectives of the police everywhere are the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, traffic control and regulation, and the maintenance of public order. In addition to these objectives which seem to be universal for the police everywhere, the police has a social role to play. This social role varies from one country to another and differs in its range and form. In London, for example, the police is made responsible for giving the workers an early morning call, and in India, in times of calamity, the police could be deployed even to remove corpses. Some countries which have not yet other social agencies such as prisons, mental and child-therapy agencies, declare the objective of those agencies to be carried by the police organisation. One might argue that the suppression of political opponents is one such objective of the police organisation. In order to protect the state authority, the government may go further to state that, in the colonised countries, the police organisation is not more than an instrument.

construed by the colonists to help in achieving their goals. In some newly developing countries, it is still an instrument of terror spreading fear and repression among the citizens. This, of course, is a gloomy view which may be planted by the political interference of the state in the police affairs. However, the fact remains that the basic objectives of the police organization are the same, which I have previously stated. The principal objectives of the police in the Union have remained to be similar to these objectives discussed before. Throughout the different consecutive police laws from 1970 up to 1984, these objectives remained constant. But the constant change in the concept of service expected from the police in the Union has brought about constant change in the objectives of the organization. This change in objectives is clearly seen in the 1984 Police Act Section 13, in which the police role is tightly linked with the general policy of the state.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the police organize itself into different forms such as departments, units, sections and adopts a lot of methods.

1/ The Indian Police Act 1970, 1977, 1979, 1984, Sections 10, 11, 12, 13 respectively.
that help in achieving these organisational objectives. The familiar methods adopted are beat, patrols, police station, inquiry, traffic regulations by instrument and remote control methods.

The police are guided by general principles that facilitate the attainment of its objectives. Some of these principles which are generally applicable to any organisation of the police include the following:

1. The work should be apportioned among the various individuals and units according to some logical plan.

2. Lines of authority and responsibility should be made as definite and direct as possible.

3. There is a limit to the number of subordinates who can be effectively supervised by an officer, and this limit should seldom be exceeded.

4. There should be unity of command throughout the organisation.

5. Responsibility cannot be placed without delegating commensurate authority, and authority should not be delegated without holding the user to account for the way he makes of it.
The efforts of the organisational units and of their component members must be coordinated so that all will be directed harmoniously toward the accomplishment of the police purpose, the components thus coordinated enabling the organisation to function as a well-integrated unit.

These principles do not by any means comprise the whole of the science and art of administrative organisation. Yet, they may satisfy a lot of questions relating to the effectiveness of the police organisation.

2. The Organisation and Structure of the Police Force in the Punjab.

The Police Force was established during the era of colonial rule (1890-1955) as one force under the supreme command of the Governor-General who, in turn, delegated his powers to the Governor and the District Commissioners of every province. Other police units such as the police force of the Department of Customs and the Port Police, were under the control of the Director of the Department of Customs and the Controller of Harbours and Lights respectively. They, in turn, were held directly responsible to the Governor General for the efficient administration of their respective departments.

1/ Police Ordinances, 1868, Section 4.
All these police units and forces consisted of various numbers of gazetted officers and such numbers of non-gazetted officers and men as might from time to time be determined. The officers and men were of each rank and charge as might from time to time be prescribed. Such organisational arrangements of the police force was later affected by the course of administrative development in the Sudan. Al-`Agab Ahmed Al-Turistil stated that,

"However, with the growth of the administration, the governors lost some of their independence. They came more or less under the control of the civil secretary and were responsible through him to the Governor-General."

This new administrative development was reflected in the constitution of the police force and is stated in the 1938 Police Ordinance, in which the police force was constituted as one force under the supreme command of the Governor-General.


2/ Police Ordinance, 1938, Section 1.
in turn, delegated his powers to the Civil Secretary to whom the governors of the provinces were held responsible. The police in the provinces were under the absolute control of the governors who used to delegate all or part of their powers to the commanders of police at the level of the province.

When secularization took place in 1954, the Police Force became an important department within the Ministry of the Interior. It had then become under the command of the Minister of the Interior who was authorized to run police administratively and technically. The Minister, in turn, delegated his powers to the Commissioner of Police who was held responsible for the supervision, administration, and disposition of the whole Police Force. This organization of the Ministry of Interior never changed, except slightly after 1969. By a 'Ministerial Order' issued in 1973, the Police Force became one of three components of the Ministry of Interior, while the other two were the headquarters of the Ministry and the Department of the Prisons.

1/ The Police Act, 1970, Section 3.
from the army, but this system ceased in 1925 when the first police training school was established.

The available media to secure applicants included post notices, announcements at meetings, and lately radio, television and newspaper advertisements. This last method of recruitment is the most effective and prime method followed.

Selection means choosing the person best qualified for the specific job. The objective of the selection process in the police is to ensure three candidates who have the highest potential for advancing into good police. The process involves two functions: the first is to eliminate unqualified applicants; the second is to rank the remaining candidates in order of their qualifications. Usually the methods followed in selection vary from one country to another.

Selection for the police force in the Sudan was first confined to the military men who had served in the service. Later on, the retired soldiers constituted the main goal.

Allyn, and others, Personnel Selection and Recruitment, Boston, 1930, p. 296.
for the police personnel. When powers were delegated to the governors of the provinces to recruit and select from among their natives, no universal methods were followed. This led to entrance of many non-Burmese into the police force, especially when the acquisition of the nationality certificate was not strictly used. This was also the case even when the 1925 Police Ordinance laid down certain requirements to become basic methods of selection. These requirements included medical examination before enrolment and verification of character immediately after enrolment and within the three months' probationary period. The verification of the character of every recruit should be by reference to both the Finger Print Bureau and the chief of the recruit native village, through the police of the 'Ward' concerned. Following such methods would guarantee the selection of capable and good reputable recruits. All these instructions and methods were generally issued by the Governor-General, and were strictly executed by the police commissioners in the province.

In 1948, the previously mentioned selection methods underwent a slight change when controls were laid on the acquisition of educational qualifications and the
Kikuyu Nationality. The type of educational qualifications needed were left to be defined by the governor of the province, and non-Kikuyu were to be enlisted with the approval of the Civil Secretary. One other condition was that the recruit must be unmarried so as to be able to devote all his efforts to the execution of his duties. Any one of these qualifications mentioned may be relaxed in the interest of the force in special circumstances.

This centralization of discharging selection's methods remained for a long time, and no change took place up to 1971. A slight change took place in case of verification of the character of the recruit, namely references should be to the local authorities instead of the direct contact with the chieftains who were no longer existing. Local government's officers were, no doubt, of less knowledge of their areas and its inhabitants than the chieftains who always seemed to know a lot.

Other conditions and methods of selection were established in the 1971 Police General Regulations and among which attention was highly paid to the acquisition

2/ Police General Regulations, 1971, Ch. 11.
of the Sudanese Nationality and the state of being in
best physical standard. These Regulations discovered
the province police commissioner to exempt applicants who
aspire to enter into the police forces from any or all
other entrance qualifications, such as age requirement,
height, educational requirement, etc., whenever there
was a need to do so. But he had no right to exempt
any body from the two mentioned conditions which were
regarded as basic and very essential, namely acquisition
of a Sudanese Nationality and physical fitness. However,
attention was never paid again to whether the applicant
was bachelor or married.

Among the important methods used in the selection
process, is the method of checking records and clear
finger prints to investigate and check the character of
the recruit. This method was one still is a central
one, and it is very essential members in deciding upon
the admission of the recruit in the service since the
early stage of the probationary period.

After the completion of the organisation of the
police force, some police officers were recruited from the
army. In 1898 thirty one military officers were recruited

1/ Ibid., Sec. 26.
to administer newly established police force. The selection of these officers was the concern of the Civil Secretary, and there was no specific selection method. But when a specialized training school for police officers was established in Padmanab in 1925, educational qualifications became the main requirement needed. These educational requirements were no more than either an elementary school or an intermediate school certificate. When this school was closed in 1937 a new school, called the School of Administration, was directly established and police officers were transferred to be trained there. For candidates who met the minimum educational standards, an additional requirement of intelligence was deemed advisable. Thus an intelligence test was introduced.

New methods of selection sprang up when the Police College was established in 1938. The qualifications and conditions for admission to the Police College were specified by the orders issued by the Commissioner of the police from time to time.

requirement, educational requirements, verification of character, and interview were the major selection methods adopted. Beside these newly adopted methods a written examination composed of three papers was introduced. One of these papers was an intelligence test. All these methods were applied to the secondary school graduates applying to the college. In case of a non-commissioned officer who was to be appointed as an officer, certain conditions were required. These conditions were:

1. To be at least a "Second Class".
2. Not to be more than 43 years old in the month of January following his matriculation.
3. Had served for 7 years or more.
4. Had passed a medical examination.
5. To know how to read and write well

The other conditions were lately added in 1879, which were:

6. To pass the first class proficiency test in service.
7. To pass any interviews and tests required to show his capability to perform the duties of the office.

1/ Ind., Sec. 1.
The condition of being bachelor was not applied in the case of the non-commissioned officers, while it was highly stressed upon in the case of the secondary school graduates applicants.

In an attempt to upgrade the College certificate and level it to the grade of a university degree, written examinations have been ignored in 1984 and the primary selection has been the educational requirements. All other selection methods and techniques are still valid and practised by the police alone.

3. Training

Training is the process of enabling individuals to gain effectiveness in their present or future work through the development of appropriate habits of thought and action, skill, knowledge and attitudes.

Training as a process of fitting out a man for a job was for long recognized and practised by the police in almost all countries of the world. The most important types of police training are recruit training, in-service training and supervisory training. All these types of

training aid in accomplishing the overall task of law enforcement by either helping the policemen to perform current work better, or to prepare them to future assignments.

Generally speaking, police training in the Sudan has been directed almost entirely towards the operational level. The bulk of the force was retired soldiers and in-service military officers, all with military training background. That was no help to the colonial regime to suppress any national political movement and its spread terra.

When the organization of the police force was first legitimized by the Police Ordinance of 1908, the Governor General delegated his powers to the governors of the provinces to issue such regulations about training. Thus, enforcing a little degree of organized training; but unfortunately, the effect of that policy was the confinement of training only to the physical drills and lack of uniformity in training methods and techniques. Efforts were exerted in 1933 to raise the standard of training and a committee headed by Mr. Willy Steady was established to consider the matter.

1/ The Police Ordinance, 1908, Sec. 1.
One of the recommendations of that committee was to train a special cadre to be police officers. The general conditions prevailing at that time made no use of that recommendation. In 1926 the Governor-General, Sir Les Stock, made a further step to develop police training. He introduced Mr. John Swart, an expert in the Indian Police, to study and report on the Sudan Police Force. One of the remarkable achievements of John Swart was the establishment of the police training school in 1928. That school was the real beginning of the organised police training, and it helped to a substantial degree in enlightening, educating, and directing the police men to secure effective performance. The most important effect of it was that it centralised training and required its uniformity. It was also the first step to discharge the police from military training which was previously practised. This was also sanctioned by 1926 Police General Regulations which put it clear that the police must be trained as a civil and not as a military force.

The only military link which remained in police training was the drill issued from time to time for the use of the Camel Corps in the Sudan Defence Force. Both these

1/ Police General Regulations, 1926, Nos. 38, 39, 40.
Drills were centrally issued and no modifications or changes were allowed without the approval of the Civil Secretary. Not only these, but the recruits were required to pass a Recruits' Musketry Course and thereafter an annual Musketry Course, and all these courses were as far as possible the same for all provinces in accordance with the instructions to be issued from time to time by the Civil Secretary.

The Civil Secretary, being at the apex of the police central administration, rightly held the construction of the curriculum, programme, and all instructions concerning police training all over the country. It is also apparent that legal studies were paid no attention and training was mainly directed to bring about capable men who could only do physical work. But later on, need grew greater to have more educated and enlightened police officers. Thus, when the police training school was started in 1937, police officers of high educational standard were recruited and trained together with the administrators, in the school of Administration established in the same year (1937). By 1941, there were fifteen police officers who graduated from this school.
In 1940 the police training school came into existence to carry on police training. It continued carrying on the job till the establishment of the Benson Police College in 1952. This newly established institution became the turning point of police training. It had then taken over the responsibility for training programmes for training recruit police schools in the provinces, and making various courses for the non-commissioned officers. Recruits training and in-service training remained the primary duty of the college. A syllabus committee was established by the Minister of the Interior to give advice concerning the subjects to be studied in the Police College, training and refresher courses for officers in service and training periods for recruits. This syllabus committee was later replaced by the College Council to do the same job.

In 1973 a training department was established with organizational objectives of searching, co-ordinating and facilitating training opportunities. Training was

1/ Police General Regulations, c. 1, 1971 No. 9.
2/ Ibid., s. 1, 11.
3/ Ministerial Order No. 1, 1973, Minister of Interior.
4/ Abdul Latif Al Hussen Al Moula.
then gained great importance and the other central academic institutions were established in 1935. The officers’ training institute and the other rank training institutes, came into being with their own curricula and programmes to be carried out. The role of the Training Department is to schedule refresher courses and training periods. It also guarantees the attendance of the officers and the other ranks to such courses by notifying their units before an ample time of the beginning of the courses. A statistical record of those trained is kept to organise and check the number of those left untrained.

The other important training channels are the university studies for officers and training abroad. The only available opportunities for officers to have university’s studies were offered by Cairo University in Khartoum. Officers used to apply personally and individually, but soon the Training Department took over the burden and controlled this trend. Selection for internal graduates’ studies became the task of the Technical Training Committee established by the Inspector General of the Police. Yet, the Training Department usually prepares and presents the name of those who satisfy the required conditions together with its own recommendations.
Training abroad started in 1957 with limited chances in certain countries, which included Egypt, England, West Germany and India. It was a central activity done by the Administration Department but soon became one of the primary duties of the Training Department. Recently, the range of the foreign countries has been wide to include Saudi Arabia and Sweden. However, Egypt and West Germany remained the constant training pool for the Police Training Department.

Thus, in conclusion, one could state that training of the Police Force in the Sudan started as a central activity, and continues to be an except for recruit training of "Anfar" in the provinces.

4. Promotion:

Promotion means an upgrade from a given lower position to a position of higher grade, involving a change of duties to a more difficult type of work and greater responsibilities, accompanied by change of little and usually an increase of pay. A promotion system is the aggregate of laws, rules and practices which govern the making of promotion in any governmental agency.

Promotion in the police service means advancement to a position of leadership or supervision. When a person joins the service he would have an equal chance with people of equal merit to secure promotion.

Promotion in the Sudan Police Force started with the establishment of the organisation of the police force in 1899. Since then, there were two levels of promotion, one for the officers and the other for the other ranks. The chances for promotion at both levels were linked with the availability of vacancies. It was difficult to forecast vacancies for promotion, and thus some personnel spent a long time in service without being promoted while others were retired in the same rank of entry. The criterion followed in promotion was selection with due regard to seniority. This criterion followed and the scarcity of vacancies made it hard to ensure a steady flow and an even distribution of promotion. This criterion of selection for promotion was normally a joint responsibility of the officers in charge of police units and the center. The promotion needs of the unit were indicated through him and a determination of the units

1/ Wilson, O.W., Police Administration, New York, 1950 p. 360.
2/ Police General Regulations, O.S.O.f., 1955 S.o. 35.
both qualified men for promotion was a joint responsibility of the two.

With the development of the police force and the rapid increase in its number, methods and techniques of selection for promotion also developed. Seniority was also paid regard but the selected person for promotion had to satisfy certain new requirements such as the degree of their personal fitness to shoulder the responsibility of the higher rank as based on their excellence of character, fidelity, zeal, initiative, standard of practical efficiency and qualities of leadership. But when the qualifications of two persons became equal the senior would be promoted. One more promotion's technique adopted was that the Commissioner of the Police was authorized to establish temporary promotion boards composed of three officers or more to look into all recommendations for promotions of officers so as to assist him in recommending the selection of the appropriate candidates. On the other hand, the officer in charge of the unit was empowered to constitute a promotion board composed also of three officers or more.

1/ Police General Regulations, Ch. XII, 1971 Sec. 10.
to give advice in the recommendations for promotion of other ranks within the unit. All these promotion boards constituted by the commissioner and the officers in charge of the units were to follow the official procedures as prescribed in the orders issued by the Commissioner. Also, both the commissioner and the officers in charge of the unit were obliged to keep up-to-date authority lists showing the seniority of officers and numbers of other ranks with dates of their commissions in weeks and date of last promotion.

Thus, we see that the officer in charge of the police unit was the main authority for the promotion of the other ranks locally, and at the same time, he used to participate in the central promotion of the officers by virtue of the performance appraisal reports which he submits respecting the junior officers working under his supervision.

This promotion system laid by the 1973 Police Regulations continued as a main system up to 1979 when no more than mere classification of certain grades concerning promotion were issued. The remained officer was not then permitted to be promoted, though he had the right
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This promotion system laid by the 1971 Police
Regulations continued as a main system up to 1977 when no
more than more clarification of certain points concern-
ing promotion were issued. The suspended officer was
not then permitted to be promoted, though he had the right
to compete for the office, till the settlement of his case. If his case was settled for good, he would then be promoted and could be allowed to regain his seniority. The promotion of a suspended officer, if he was acquitted, would be after the end of the required period of punishment. It was also allowed to bypass the inefficient officers and those who failed to pass the required proficiency test. The levels of rank tests were required after the end of the different courses, each has a certain duration in the officers' Training Institute. The first one for the officers to be promoted to chief inspectors and the other for the chief inspectors is to be promoted to the rank of assistant superintendent. The officers who were in commendation and those who were in custodial or training missions or in leave without pay, were offered the opportunity to compete for promotion. Promotion for the rank of brigadier and above would be by a Republican order based upon the recommendation of the minister of the Interior. Promotion to the rank of colonel and below would be by a Ministerial order based upon the recommendation of the Commissioner. One of the important points which needs to be noted here is that, the 1977 Police Act centralized the authority of promotion in both the office
and the other ranks, but in practice the Commandant used to delegate his authority to the officer in charge of the unit or province to promote the other ranks.

In 1979 a more detailed and separate promotion regulations were issued. These regulations became a guide which must be followed. The procedures already established by the 1971 General Regulations and the 1977 Police Act didn't change much. However, new methods for promoting both the officers and the other ranks were put forward.

Promotion of Officers:

The capacity of a police officer to assume more responsibility is highly regarded, and this performance appraisal is not paid much more attention than was previously the case. At present seventy per cent (70%) is allotted for good performance while only ten per cent is allotted for seniority which was once the only standard for selection to promotion. The remaining twenty per cent (20%) is allotted for academic qualifications with four per cent (4%) for each academic achievement. The minimum standard of eligibility to compete for promotion sixty per cent (60%), less of which no promotion would take place.

1/ Police Promotion Regulations, 1979, Sec. 6.
Duration in office has come to be an important factor in promotion. A specified period of time must be spent in service in a certain rank so as to make the officer eligible for promotion, from that rank to a higher rank. Normally, two years are required for the promotion of a newly graduated officer to the rank of Inspector, while three years must be spent in the rank of Inspector so as to be promoted to the rank of Chief Inspector. The Chief Inspector has to spend three years in service so as to be eligible for promotion to the rank of Assistant Superintendent. The Assistant Superintendent has to spend at least two years in his rank so as to compete for promotion to the rank of Superintendent.

Promotion to Colonel and the other top ranks takes place by recommendation from among the recommended qualified officers. Being the chief executive and the head of the Police Force, the President of the Republic is authorized to promote any officer to a higher rank, regardless of the standards stipulated by the Promotion Regulations, and he alone has such a right. What could be said here is that the main feature of the promotion system of police officers is that it is mainly a central activity or decision.

1/ Ibid., Sec. 15.
b. Promotion of the Other Ranks:

Promotion of the other ranks is the responsibility of the officer in charge of the unit or province who is tightly bound to the vacancies allowed in the Regional Budget. The procedures to be followed are similar to those pertaining to the officers' promotion, and a memorandum was issued by the Inspector General to the officers in charge of the provinces and units to strictly follow the procedures embodied in the Promotion Regulations of 1979. The most important among the 1979 Promotion Regulations is the rating system of the other ranks which is stipulated as follows:

1. Proficiency certificate (class one) = 20 marks.
2. Proficiency certificate (class two) = 10 marks.
3. Central Training Course = 15 marks.
4. Local Training Course = 5 marks.
5. The Minister's Commendation = 15 marks.
6. The Inspector General's commendation = 15 marks.
7. The Police Commissioner's = 10 marks.
8. Secret Reports = 10 marks.
9. Academic qualifications for each academic achievement = 2 marks.

10. Seniority = 10 marks for each year in service.

11. Behaviour = 10 marks

The duration of service in office is also stressed upon and measured. The 'Rafat' has to spend at least three years in service so as to be eligible to compete for the rank of junior constable, and the later has to spend two years in good service so as to be eligible to compete for the rank of senior constable. In some cases, the police commissioner is empowered to make exceptions from these conditions when there is a need to do so. Both the senior constable and sergeant have to spend at least two years so as to be eligible to compete for the post of the sergeant and senior sergeant respectively. Also, the years at least, must pass before the senior sergeant would be eligible to compete for the post of the assistant officer. The province police commissioner has the right to exempt anyone from any conditions of promotion when there is a need to do so.

One of the essential conditions in the promotion of the other ranks is that eligible candidates must pass either a local or a central training course, and we doubt this lays a great emphasis on training and tightly
and thorough, the budget is an important document, for
it provides the legal authorization for actually carrying
out a portion of the plan as well as a means for control-
ing the executive and seeing that its activities conform
to the plan. Usually, the budget contains
a. estimates of services, activities and projects,
b. the resultant expenditure requirements, and

c. the resources needed for their support.
Budgeting as a process is governed by certain procedures
which involve:
1. Formulation
2. Authorization
3. Implementation
4. Control.
All these procedures or, in fact, stages are essential
for the budget to pass through.

Police Budget:

Police budget is a part of either a comprehensive
central government budget, as in the Soviet, or a local
authority's budget, e.g. the 'County Budget' as in
England or the City Budget' as in the American States.

1/ International City Manager's Association, Municipal
Police Administration, Chicago, 1944, p. 29.
The steps followed in its formulation are the same as those which are usually followed in government budgeting. The stage of formulation furnishes an opportunity for the Chief of the Police to explain present and future programmes to develop the force, and translate its objectives into requirements to meet those objectives. Normally the police headquarters or department receives, through the ministry, directives and guides from the central financial authority for budget preparation from three months to a year before the actual adoption date of the budget. There will be in the form requests calling for estimates relating to all phases of police activities, and for a report showing both the total anticipated cost of operating the police departments and any revenues expected for the ensuing year. This report will merely reflect the cost of personnel, equipment and supplies for the coming year. After collecting these reports of the police departments or units they will be presented to the central headquarter of the police, or the local headquarter, or even to the chief executive of the local area, as the case may be. The heads of the police departments and units have to discuss and review their budgets with the chief or the commissioner of the police. The budget will
then be related to the request of other departments and will be fitted with the total budget of the ministry, the county, or the city. In case of a centralized police force, the police budget, being part of the ministry's budget, would be fitted into the general budget of the government.

After the approval of the budget by the legislature and its communication to the concerned departments, several accounts may be set up for the police department. Budgetary controls are established for all departments, and this may involve establishment of a regularized allotment system, a system of budgetary accounting and directives to the police department, on how and when it is to proceed with the spending of its funds.

Lastly, reports of re-evaluation of results must be issued so as to furnish the way for a well studied budget in the coming year.

Police Budget in the Union:

The budget is prepared in the Union with a predominant bias for the line-item objects. Yet, it is a central activity in which various departments participate
in its formulation. The police budget first came into being as part of the general budget in 1859 with estimation of expenditure of twenty thousand pounds. Since there was no police ordinance at the time to specify the police budget, it could be assumed that such expenditure was estimated on the ground that the police force was one of the departments under the control of the Civil Secretary. Even when the 1908 Police Ordinance was enacted no legitimate foundation was established for the police budget.

The Governor-General, who was authorized to issue general regulations for the police forces, delegated his powers to the Governors of the provinces to issue special regulations for the police forces of their own provinces. Such general regulations were about the numbers, enlistment, training, discipline, discharges, pay, equipment, length of service and all other matters and things for ensuring the greatest usefulness and efficiency of the police. Thus police budgeting within the province was the governor's concern, and he, in his turn, would send it to the Civil Secretary and then to the

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1/ Police Ordinance, O.n.15., 1908, Sec. 2.
Governor-General for final approval. This procedure continued until 1928 when the newly enacted Police General Regulations added more instructions concerning payments, but nothing more about the whole policy budget. It was held that all pay of all branches of the police in the province or department establishment would be the same, being fixed at monthly rates to be prescribed from time to time by the Governor or the Head of the Department with the approval of the Financial Secretary, and subject to some general conditions which included:

1. The rates would be consolidated to include rations, no additional rate in lieu would be given.

2. Foreign allowance would be paid to mounted police at the rates prescribed in the Foreign Allowance Regulations.

3. In calculating the amount of pay due for a fraction of a month, one-third of the monthly rate would be paid for each day actually served irrespective of the number of days in the particular month.

1/ Police General Regulations, Cr. Art., 1928 Sec. 5.
It is noticed that the difference in payment appeared for the first time in the 1928 Police General Regulations between the police in the Northern Sudan and those in the Southern Sudan, and even between the police within the same province in the South. The policemen in some districts of Upper Nile Province, for instance, were paid in rates less than those afforded to policemen in some other districts of the province. Unfortunately, this condition lasted up to the stage of nationalization in 1970. Table (1) illustrates how this difference in payment was. This difference in payment went further to include established increment such as good conduct pay for the police in certain provinces in the South such as the provinces of Bahr al Ghazal and Kordofan, and in some districts of the Upper Nile Province as the Governor, with the approval of the Financial Secretary was directed. The good conduct payment was fixed as one dinar per day in the case of noncommissioned officers below the rank of 'Sal', and five dinars per day in the case of 'Anfar'. However, all must have completed three years' service and had been permitted to re-engage for a further

term of service. Further, good conduct pay at the rate of ten percent per month in addition to the amount prescribed before, would be given to non-commissioned officers below the rank of Sgt and "infan" after the completion of five years service. More general conditions established were about the special allowances. These allowances were granted and not acquired, and they were subject to financial sanction in every case unless authorized by Government regulations.

This system of police budgeting continued till the establishment of the Ministry of the Interior, of which the police force was an essential department after modernization in 1958. Since independence in 1936 and up to 1969, the police force was a centralized force within the Ministry of the Interior with a central budget. The Director of Police was held responsible for both the formulation and execution of the police budget in all provinces, and only the provinces' commanders were his consultant. The period from 1949 up to 1969 constituted the first phase of the police budget in which centralization was prominent. Yet, it is worthy to note that the period immediately after independence was the time in which the police budget began to shape itself after the general budget structure with its three chapters.
beginning of its being decentralized due to the amendment of the people Local Government Act of 1971. The provinces' police budget became part of the province budget, the formulation and execution of which was the responsibility of the executive council of the province. The police headquarters had no major role to play. Its only role was a consultative one in which guidelines were usually sent to the provinces embodying general models of police budget and guidance for its formulation. In the stage of budget formulation within the provinces, the headquarters used to send one of its officers to attend the preparation and discussion of justification and explanation of budget proposals. It is to be noted that when each province budget is put to discussion before the Ministry of Finance, a police expert from the budget section attends to give technical advice, but neither he nor the police headquarters has the right to alter or change any fund. Thus, the relation between the police headquarters and the provinces' police remains, as far as the budget is concerned.

1/ Interview with the Police Brigadier General Nasir M. Ekap, Head Department of Police Finance & Supply, Police Headquarters, Phnom Penh, held in February 1995.
is concerned, an advisory relation with no right for the headquarter to estimate or alter the province's police budget. But usually the province's sand their police budget to the Police Headquarter to take notice and no more. Hence, police ordinances and regulations remained passive in regard to the police budget, and the only concerned statement was contained in section eleven of the 1977 Police Act, which identified this advisory relationship between the Police Commissioner and Provinces' Commissioners.

This situation of police budget formulation lasted till 1980, when the Regional Government Act was issued. The Police Headquarter is now deprived even from that consultative role, and each regional police budget has come to be the responsibility of the concerned Regional Government. Each regional police commission is held responsible for the formulation of his police budget and has to submit it to the concerned authority, i.e., the Regional Minister for Administration and Regional Affairs. The budget then would be fitted within the total budget of the Regional Minister and consequently the General Regional
Budget. The Police Headquarters has no financial relationship with the regional police and the only relation that exists is about the equipment fund. Though the equipment fund is utilized in the regional police budget, and directly transferred by the Ministry of Finance to the Department of Store and Equipment, the Police Headquarters is authorized to follow the supply of the required equipment. This follows as designed to ensure the best standard of equipment quality, especially that of the uniform, and to satisfy the concerned regional police.

The budget of the central police departments and sections, such as Central Investigation Department, Training Department, Police College and Institutes etc., in the concern of the Central Police Headquarters. Thus, the Central Budget of the police is for the central departments and units while the regional police budget is embodied in the regional budget of the region concerned, and as relation between the two. Above all remains the fact that though both types of budgets are closely related to the general financial conditions of the country, yet both are technically similar and strictly executed.
A brief account of the administrative decentralization in the Sudan.

In tracing the process of administrative decentralization in the Sudan, it is worth to note that certain factors were of great effect in the whole process. Tribalism, as one of these factors, played a very important administrative role because it was recognized as a local unit of the Central Government. Its role in politics was also immense. Its role in both the political and administrative life was well recognized by the various connective kingdoms scattering all over the Sudan. In this view, tribes dominated the whole life and no kingdom attempted to distort this hierarchical tribal system by creating alternative institutions or centralizing authority. Instead, each tribe was granted self autonomy, under its traditional leader who remained loyal to the central authority and paid an annual fixed tribute to the central treasury. The strength and unity of the tribes

was a good reflection of the unity of the Sudan Government. So when these tribes became weak and got involved into tribal wars with each other, they not only led to the decline of the kingdom, but in fact, made it easier to any foreign invasion to succeed. Mousa ed-Din Bakr of Egypt was the first to take benefit of such conditions prevailing at that time in the Sudan.

During the whole Turko-Egyptian regime which dominated the Sudan between 1820-1889, the country was united for the first time under a modern administration centred at the new capital of Kassala which was founded in 1860. The Turko-Egyptian administration divided the country into provinces; each province was entrusted to a Governor who was made directly responsible to the Governor-General residing in Khartoum. The latter was the supreme ruler of the country and was held responsible only to the Viceroy in Egypt. The Turko-Egyptian regime was wise enough to make use of tribelids in the Sudan. The tribal leaders who were attached to the new regime, were confirmed in their position and became responsible to the provincial Governors for the preservation of law and order and the collection of taxes. In fact, the
the civil and military leader. No formal or informal place was given to the tribal leaders. As trend of decentralization was either shunned or allowed.

The Mahdist regime was brought down by the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898 which later advocated a condominium rule for the Sudan. According to this condominium rule, a system of local government that was centralized but was also highly personal was established. At the apex of the pyramid was the Governor-General.

Each province had its Governor, under the Governor came the district commissioners, who ruled and tricked over the vast areas of the land. Thus, there was an unbreakable direct line of command from the Governor-General to the lowest level. Decisions were taken by a comparatively small body of officials. Later on, a trend towards decentralized government areas, and in 1916, the Governor-General held a conference to consider some further steps to associate the Sudanese more closely with the administration of their country. Provincial councils with executive powers were proposed as the peak of the local authorities should be vested with powers in their own.

rights and not through delegation from the Governor. The conference also advocated sufficient legislative, executive, and financial powers to local councils to enable them to manage their own affairs with minimum interference from the Central Government. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not accepted by the Central Government. The only recommendation of the conference which was accepted by the Central Government was about the appointment of a commission to report on local government in the Sudan. 2/ Dr. Marshall, a British expert in Local Government, City Treasurer of Coventry, was commissioned to do the job. After a six-month survey of local conditions in the Sudan and a short visit to neighbouring African countries, Dr. Marshall submitted his report to the Sudan Government. The report stated the general principles which underlie the form and conduct of local government and made recommendations on such aspects as the structure of local government and the place of the native authorities in it, the institution of the

1/ Report of Sub-Committee on Sudan Administration Conference, Waterstones and Co., Sudan Ltd., Khartoum, 1940.

local government councils, local government finance and the powers and duties of local government.

In addition, the report states some of the objectives for instituting a local government system in a developing country. These objectives included decentralization, the need to adapt the public service to local conditions, the need to give the local population a sense of political and administrative responsibility by experiencing local government, and the need to substitute for the practice of giving each technical department an organization of its own at the local level.

These recommendations were implemented almost in toto in the comprehensive Local Government Ordinance of 1951. Later on, in 1954 a Ministry of Local Government was created to act as a clearing house for the central government for local affairs. The enactment of the 1951 Local Government Ordinance and the establishment of the Ministry of Local Government played a great role in the administration of the police, as clearly when the District Commissioners were subject to this newly established ministry together with the Ministry of the Interior.
It is really inadequate to deal with either centralisation or decentralisation of the police force in the Sudan without regard to the past and current Local Governments’ Ordinances.

Dr. Marshall Report and the Police Administration:

Dr. Marshall found that the police was a centralised force mainly operated by the District Commissioners. The force was divided into provincial units, each of which had a commandant who was responsible for discipline, training, posting and inspection. In some few areas, operational control was by local commanders, but in the main, District Commissioners controlled the day-to-day work. The relation of the police to the District Commissioner was intimate and rather close, because of the peculiar system through which the magisterial authority was sought by the police respeting all investigations. In an utterly case the District Commissioner was concerned first in his capacity as head of the local police, secondly as the magistrate ordering the investigation and thirdly as the magistrate trying the case. These were centralized arrangements for criminal investigation work, otherwise the police work
was centralised on a province basis. The force was thus a state force but control was very much decentralised. The District Commissioner was afforded a large measure of personal authority in police matters.

Marshall, on his part, widely discussed the role and the future of this District Commissioner who was destined to police administration at the district level. He came to realise that the end of the District Commissioner in the Sudan would come, partly because the setting up of local government would deprive him of a large part of his duties, and partly because the community would never be able to afford to have too local governmental agencies. Also, the duplication of the machinery between the ‘warka’ and the local council officer, where such existed, was already the subject of unfavourable comment. Nevertheless, the passing of the District Commissioner would be attended by loss. Yes, whilst it may be possible with care to find other governmental agencies able to absorb his multiform duties nothing could compensate for disappearance of a set of officers, who, over two generations in the Sudan, had interpreted to the people in simple and kind and friendly way the mysteries of a remote government.

However Marshall recommended the establishment of the District Commissioner's office. But a major question sprang out concerning whether or not the disappearance of the District Commissioner the police should be turned into a state force, disciplined and unevaluated from the centre. Marshall himself was against state police force when he stated that,

1. The maintenance of law and order—ultimately the responsibility of the Central Government—is primarily a matter for the local authorities. That this is recognised in the Sudan is proved by the fact that every early in history of the present government the native authorities were made responsible for local public security. It is a pleasure to note the pride which some District take in their good records.

2. A state police force is always a potential weapon of persecution as the recent experience of some African countries show. This is why in many liberty-loving countries the police is a local force, though it may or may not be supported by a nationally controlled reserve.

3. The mechanical discipline of a state force is purchased at expense of law initiative at the circumstance. The chain of control becomes too long and too remote. There is no compatibility between areas and the force becomes too full of paper-work—criticising by the boy, which is already employed against the Sudan force.
The methods of a central force would become too unified for a country whose leading characteristic is the great variation between the districts.

This fear of Marshall to have a state force after the establishment of the District Commissioner's office was quietly removed by suggestions of the commissioner of the police at that time. The commissioners of the police suggested that the local authorities should be made the police authorities on the same lines as in England and Wales. He went further to suggest that the training, discipline, laying down of the conditions of services, and inspection and maintenance of central criminal records would be done by the Central Government which would also maintain a reserve force at strategic points. Local control would be in the hands, partly of local government who would be responsible for directing the day-to-day criminal work, but primarily in the hands of the local authority which would be the police authority and would control the budget, the strength of the force, recruitment and dismissal.

Abid.
Marshall pointed that the implementation of the recommendations of the commission of the police would need larger units of local government while the prevailing local government units were too small. In view of this he offered an alternative suggestion which became one of the major recommendations of his report. His recommendation was that a centralised police force was not recommended, but local authorities should combine to form adhoc authorities especially for police purposes. These would be statutory corporate bodies with full legal powers. They would be elected by the local authorities in the area and they would cover the area of several local authorities. But this recommendation offered by Marshall remained for a long time a good rather than an actual achievement. However, it paved the road for decentralisation of the police force.

2. Decentralisation of the Police Force Through Local Government Acts:

(i) The 1951 Local Government Act:
The 1951 Local Government Act embodied nearly all the recommendations suggested by Marshall. The pattern of Local Government in this Act was a component of the general administrative machine in that it was organized
under the control of provincial governors. According to this act, the Sule was divided into nine separate provinces. These provinces in turn were divided into eighty-six local councils. The establishment of a local council was based upon the stage of socio-economic development capable of meeting the needs of the local population. The powers granted to each locality were therefore specified in the warrant creating it and in accordance with the stage of development reached by it. Accordingly, each local council had to undergo specified stages of development before it could be granted full powers including that of electing its chairman.

After careful reading, one could state that the 1961 act had marked the climax of the British promised evolutionary policy which started early. In accordance with the provision of the act, powers and responsibilities were delegated to the indigenous institutions at a pace and in a manner which was consistent with the growth of the local political and administrative capacities of the community. It is true that in assessing the 1961 act some scholars, particularly African scholars, have tended to suggest
that decentralization rather than devolution is a more appropriate feature of the 1951 system. But as far as police administration was concerned, we see that each province had a governor. Each governor was responsible for the proper administration and security of his province and this included police supervision. The district commissioners within the province were held responsible for the direction and administration of police within their 'Monkeys' and units.

Therefore and in view of what has been mentioned above, one would be inclined to express the view that the local government system of 1951 constituted the first serious attempt at decentralization of the governmental process in general, and the decentralization of the police force in particular. The system could be praised in spite of the apparent supervision and control exercised by the Central Government.

(b) The 1960 Provincial Administration Act:

This act was enacted by the first military regime of 1958-64. It did not face the challenge of local government. But it was motivated by a desire to mitigate the rigor of a dictatorial system by presenting an appearance of popular participation in government.
This Act did not repeal the 1931 Act but it provided for the appointment, not the election, of council members. It provided that the provincial administration be made up of a government representative and a provincial council. The government representative was to be known as the military governor appointed by the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces, and was made the chairman of the provincial council. A province executive authority was to be established by a decree to be issued by the Council of Ministers. It was to consist of the heads of government departments at the level of the province, with the Provincial Governor or the representative of the Central Government as its chairman.

The remarkable feature of this Act was the abolition of the office of the District Commissioner and the earlier form of the provincial administration. There was, however, one very important change in relation to the commissioner of the Police, who was previously appointed by the Minister of Interior. Before that time, the police force, though nominally a central force, had been recruited and organised into provincial units under a provincial commander. The commissioner of the police
was not mentioned either in the Police Ordinance or in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of this, any provincial commandant could disregard or ignore the orders of the commissioner of the police without committing a breach, legal or administrative. After 1860, however, the commissioner of the police and his assistants were explicitly mentioned in the new law as the Supreme officers of the Police Force.

In order to facilitate general effective supervision of the services rendered for the public by the police, the police activities were to be supervised by a Security Board or a Watch Committee appointed by the Minister of Interior under the Police Ordinance in each province and presided over by a military governor. The commandant of the police was appointed as its secretary, and the ex-civil governor and the province judge were appointed as members. The tendency was to subordinate the civil governor, the province judge and the police commandant to the Military Governors. The important point to be noted is that, there was no need for such committees as the responsibility peace and security was that of the governor of the province by virtue of his
position as the Central Government Representative. The Police Commanders were made responsible mainly for crime prevention. However, the statutory recognition of the commissioners of the police set the seal upon the centralization of the police forces. Although it is true that the force was always nominally a central force, it was probably intended that the highest officer mentioned in the law was the Provincial Commandant.

In 1961 the 1960 Act was amended by a decree issued by the Council of Ministers. The amendment removed the provincial councils and transferred their powers to the executive councils with the province commissioners as their chairmen. Thus, the ex-civil governor, the commissioner, regained his previous position as head of the provincial administration and subsequently substituted for Government Representative who was the Military Ruler. The Provincial Commissioner was authorized to preside over the province authority and became chairman of the Security Board. But being one of the heads of the departments the Police Commandant in the province still retained his allegiance to the central authority at Khartoum. Though the Commissioner was required to be held responsible for the preservation of order and
security in the province to the Minister of Interior. He was not given adequate powers which would have made him really responsible for order and security. In fact, the circular of the Minister of Interior regulating order and security (Order No. 1) considerably restricted the powers of the commissioner in this respect.

(c) The 1971 People's Local Government Act

This Act falls into nine chapters with a schedule made up of 14 parts. The form of the administration at the provincial level was laid down in section five of Chapter Two of the Act which states:

"It is with provinces an administration shall be set up consisting of:

a) The People's Executive Council
b) The Commissioner.

The People's Executive Council enjoyed wide powers, including maintenance and preservation of public order. However, and in spite of the political motives behind the enactment of the Act, one could say that the basis of the Act were two fold: First, to revolutionize and reorganize the entire administrative machinery so as to be an instrument for the execution of revolutionary programmes. Secondly, the Act aimed at ensuring
and securing popular participation in local planning, legislation and execution. Henceforth, the underlying concept of the People’s Local Government Act of 1971 was to enable the people to run their local affairs democratically through organized local bodies authorized to exercise delegated and devolved administrative and political powers at the local level. In essence, it was a big step towards decentralization.

The Act also affected, to a substantial degree, the system of police administration. According to the provisions of this Act the People’s Executive Council, being one of the two basic units of local administration, discharged the work of the different ministries and governmental departments in the province except such functions as were excluded by the Warrant. Hence, the People’s Executive Council administered virtually all the services in the province. Control over security was one of the most important and possibly controversial acquisitions of the province administration with the Police Commandant held directly responsible not to the

1/ 1971 People’s Local Government Act, Sec. 170.
2/ ibid., Sec. 170.
security in his province and try to spread the spirit of safety and settlement in the whole province.

(4) The 1980 Regional Act:

According to the 1980 Regional Act, the country was divided into five main regions in addition to the Southern Region along the line of the now old provinces of 1961. Each region was assigned its own area and organs of government. The executive heads in each region were vested in a Governor assisted by a Secretary and a number of Regional Ministers. The Governor, who may be re-appointed, was responsible to both the President of the Republic and the People's Regional Assembly for the good government of the region.

In general terms, the Regional Governments were made responsible for the good government of the regions and the preservation of law and order. In more specific terms, their functions included supervision and control of police within their regions. A Minister for the affairs of the Region and Administration in each region was held responsible for the police administration. He, in his turn, delegated his powers to the Commissioners of

1/ Ibid., Sect. 171.
provinces within his region. The Regional Police Commissioner was subject to him and the police commissioners in the provinces were subject to the Province Commissioners who would be responsible to the Minister for the Affairs of the Region and Administration for the administration of their provincial police. Hence, one could state that under this Regional Rule the administration of the police was further decentralized.

(c) The 1961 Local Government Reform Act

The establishment of the system of the Regional Rule in the Sudan had undoubtedly necessitated the reform of the local government system to ensure better its effective functioning and conformity with the system of the Regional Rule. Consequently, the People’s Local Government Act of 1971, was repealed in 1981 by a new Local Government Reform Act.

This newly established Act of 1981 comprised seven chapters which consisted of 36 articles. Out of these articles, 11 were devoted to the Regional Executive Authority. The powers of the Regional Executive Authority ranged from the right of quality (article 29(2)) to the total dissolution of the area
councils (article 14[2]). The main intention of this Act was to redefine the structure and powers of the local government authorities for two purposes. First, to resolve the problems and shortcomings which faced the 1971 system of Local Government. Secondly, to facilitate and ensure the effective functioning under the newly established system of Regional Rule.

Among the basic features of the Local Government Reform Act of 1981 was that the new provincial Commissioner was no longer the chief executive of local government. Under the new system, he was held responsible for law and order in the province and was empowered to inspect and supervise the police within his province. Although the wide powers enjoyed by the previous provincial Commissioner under the 1971 system over the police and local authorities were cancelled, the Commissioner under the 1981 Local Government Act remained having an immense role to play. Since he was the representative of the Regional Executive Authority within his province, he headed the security committee in which the Commandant of the Police was a member. Furthermore, the police budget was made a part of the provincial budget which was under his control. In view of this, he was in a strong position to enforce his policy upon the police.
of customs department and that of the port were subject
to the direction and control of the Director of the
Customs Department and Controller of Harbours consecutively.
The Governor-General in all cases dominated the whole
police administration to the extent that he was empowered
to issue from time to time general regulations for the
police forces of the whole Feder.
Subject to such
regulations he allowed special regulations to be issued
by the Governors of the Provinces for the police forces
within their provinces; and by the Director of Customs
and the Controller of the Harbours for the police forces
under their responsibility. But though the Governors of
the Provinces were delegated such powers, the regulations
they made were to be consistent with that made by the
Governor-General. This secured, to a great extent, the
unity and cohesion of the force and guaranteed the smooth
running of services delivered by the whole force
within the different provinces bearing in mind that the
centre held each province police budget. See Fig. (1).

1/ The Police Ordinance 1902, Sec. 6.
Fig. 1. The organization of the police according to the 1933 Police Ordinance.
(3) The 1928 Police Ordinance:

The period between 1923 and 1928 witnessed different changes in both the political and social conditions of the Indonesian people. These changes were of course reflected in the Ordinance. Most notable of all changes was the 1924 revolt. This revolt of 1924 gave a great jolt to the British rule in the Malay. After recovering from this blow, the British further strengthened and streamlined the administrative apparatus. The Governor General was then empowered to strengthen his position and to tightly hold the country. The police Ordinance of 1929 allowed him much of that, when it provided that,

"The Police Force shall constitute the force under the Supreme Command of the Governor-General. The Force shall consist of such numbers and categories of officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and shall be divided territorially and technically as shall from time to time be authorized by him."

This, of course, enlarged the powers of the Governor General and gave him the right to divide and dispose the force territorially according to his own view, beside his power to make regulations. Compared with his position and powers under the 1908 Ordinance, these newly

1/ The Police Ordinance 1928, sec. 2.
acquired powers would imply what we could take to be excessive centralization. But in fact, the Governor-General was authorized to delegate his powers to the Governors of the Provinces who were his representatives. However, such delegation was somewhat narrowed and limited by his supreme command. The Governors of the provinces, in their turn, were afforded absolute control over the police forces within their territorial jurisdiction, and they were left with the discretion to delegate all or part of their powers to the Commandant of the police, who was the leader of the police force within the province. In such a case, the Commandant of the police was no more than an administrative instrument to control the police. No, of course, was not a partner in administering the forces nor had he the right of decision making in matters concerning the police force in the province.

It is important to note in this regard that inspite of the political and social changes that occurred in the Queen, the administrative situation of the police force didn't undergo great changes. The 1938 Police

1/ Ibid., Sec. ".
Ordinance remained in action till the rise of the National Governments. Thus, centralization of the Police Force, already laid down by the British, continued up to the time that May Regime assumed political power in 1969. Decentralization was never thought of even in the early years of the May Regime.

The 1926 Police Ordinance was repealed when the 1970 Police Act was enacted and came into force.

(c) The 1970 Police Act:

This Act was the first trial made by the May Regime to develop the Police Force. Although it repealed the 1926 Police Ordinance, it embodied, to a substantial degree, most of its norms and values. Hence, centralization of the Police Force was the predominant prevailing pattern.

One important question which one may need to raise in this respect is, why did the May Regime choose not to alter this pattern while it already chose to repeal the Police Ordinance of 1926? To put the question in other words, did the May Regime choose to centralize the police force in response to objective considerations, or was the choice made for reasons of practical political necessity?
In my own estimation, the centralization of the Police Force was in line with the political strategy of the New Regime which aimed at securing effective political control over the entire process of government including the organization of the police force.

At any rate the 1978 Police Act afforded the Police Force an opportunity to search for and ascertain its identity. Real powers were concentrated in the hands of the Commissioner of the Police. He was charged with responsibility for superintendence, administration and disposition of the Police Force all over the country. He was also made responsible for the control of all expenditures in connection with the Police Force, and was held accountable for all government stores and special property belonging to the Police Force. His powers were delegated to him by the Minister of Interior, who in his turn, was held responsible to the Council of Ministers, for administering not only the Police Force, but the whole Ministry of which the Police Force was a major department.

The Police in the provinces was under the supreme command of the Police Commandant, who acted with a delegated power from the Commissioner of the Province.

1/ 1978 Police Act, Sec. 9.
The Commissioner of the province, however, was never authorized by this Act to supervise or direct the Police Force. The budget of each province's police force was to be formulated by the Police Commandant and referred to the Police Commissioner in Rhetaum. The only relation existing between the police Commandant and the Commissioner of the province was one primarily based upon personal ties and the desire of securing good services to be delivered within the province.

Subsequent to the enactment of 1975 Police Act, A People's Local Government Act was issued in 1971. This new Act was the real turning point for the police administration. It involved a relatively greater degree of decentralization in accordance with which the Police Commandant of the province was held responsible to both the local province commissioner and the People's Executive Council. Under such conditions, Police Forces within the provinces found themselves under complete responsibility to the Commissioner of the province.

In such a case, personal ties between the Police Commandants and the Province Commissioners played a great part in the whole Force's administration. And personal ties would either ruin the Force, or at least, marior
It's carrying out its essential services with acceptable standards. Some Commissioners did not really perceive the role that the police force plays in the community in general and specially in their provinces; while others used to neglect all that. The Commanders of the Police Forces found themselves at a loss, and soon their desire to limit the powers of the provinces Commissioner sprung out in their conference in 1973.

The Police Commanders recommended that the Commissioners of the provinces have nothing to do with the punishment of the police officers since this matter was dealt with in the Police Act. They also recommended that police administration must be left for the security committee and not the Commissioner of the provinces alone. The Commissioner himself must be held responsible to the Minister of Interior in all that concern the Police Force. Certain police departments were thought of as to be central departments and never decentralized. These departments were the Immigration and Passports, Criminal Laboratories, General Security, Training and Transports and Communication Departments.

Concurrent to the coming into force of the Police
Commanders which was held in 1972, the Local Govern-
ment Officers held their conferences later in the same
year in which they ascertained their authority to
supervise and administer the police force within their
respective local areas. In the opinion of the local
government officers such supervision over police activ-
ities was logical and inevitable, by virtue of the fact
that they were held responsible for the supervision over
the activities of all government departments at the
local level including the Police Department. In addition,
they were empowered to supervise over and control govern-
mental expenditure at the local level including
expenditure concerning to police activities. They, of
course, might have had much more in mind they stated,
if they were not driven by a lingering hatred to the
Police Force. However, decentralization soon found its
way and is now not going far with it was later pragmatically.

(d) THE 1977 POLICE ACT

Being the first police act issued after the 1971
People's Local Government Act, a new chain of command was
formed. The President of the Republic assumed responsi-
bility for the supreme supervision and leadership of the
whole police force in the country, (3),(4, 10(1)). The minister of interior acted with a delegated power from the President of the Republic to administer the force. A general police inspector was appointed to be responsible for administering all police affairs all over the country, and to render responsible to the minister of interior.

The police forces in the provinces were put under police commandants. But according to this act, the police commandant was under direct responsibility to the provincial commissioner. The provincial commissioner was authorized by law to head the provincial security board which was held accountable to the provincial executive council for all matters pertaining to security within the province. He was, of course, the head of this council. Therefore, he had full control over the police within his province. This position was further strengthened by the fact that the police general commissioner had to formulate every province's police budget in consultation with each province commissioner. Hence, each province's police force was tightly linked with its own province and to the commissioner. This situation continued, but after more than two years passed when a new People's Local Government conference was held in Khartoum in 1975 which
recommended to go further with decentralization. The Ministry of Interior was dissolved later and a new Police Act was issued.

(1) The 1979 Police Act

Though it was proclaimed to meet the recommendations of the People's Local Government Conference for transferring powers to the local areas; it was a sign of the interference of the President of the Republic into the police affairs. So, the President of the Republic dominated the whole organisation of the police and abolished the police Force, the General Commissioner. The term was inserted in this new Act to denote only the police officers who were responsible for the province's police force. The President of the Republic concentrated all powers into his hands; he was authorized to appoint the police officers, to organise the police Force, to construct the leadership hierarchy, to make rules etc... He appointed an officer under the name of Police General Inspector to be responsible for the Force. Such a position was never mentioned in the 1930 Act. But in reality, it was the same office of the Province Police General Commissioner.

1/ People's Local Government's, Budgam, 1978.
The Police in the provinces became a department, similar to other departments under the direct control of the province. The Police Commissioner in the province was left with wide powers to administer his force without referring to the headquarters since it had no great power over him. The Provincial Commissioner, as far as his office was concerned, became the real and actual Director and Administrator of the whole force and who, in turn, delegated these powers to the Police Commissioner within his province.

We could, of course, say that the 1979 Police Act was no more than a reflection of administrative decentralization that was deeply rooted in the People's Local Government Act. It is obvious that the Police Act always change with the changes introduced in the Local Government Act. So when the 1992 Local Government Reform Act was issued the Police organization took over its new position and realized its role. When it was absolutely absorbed and demonstrated effective functioning under the newly established system of Regional Rule a new Police Act was promulgated.
Director of the region, the Governor of the region

dominated the organisation of the police force and became
very effective in the police administration within his
region. The commissioners of the provinces within the
region were his de jure gate to supervise and administer the
police. They were also the heads of the Security Boards
in their respective provinces. The feeling of sentiment
of the Police General Commissioner of the region was no
longer to the Police Headquarters in Harare, but to the
Regional Government alone. The relation between the
Governor and the Police General Commissioner in the region
was based upon the conception of each of them of the mean-
ing of decentralization and the role they had to play.

However, the symptom of decentralization of the
organisation of the police force appeared clearly in the
1977 Police Act and went on daily till it shaped its
present form in the 1984 Police Act. An important
question might be asked in this respect, namely, whether
this newly introduced administrative process has
accelerated the accomplishment of the organisational
objectives of the police force or has it acted as a
handicap to the progress and advancement of the police
force? The answer to this question would be left to
The stages through which decentralisation of the organization of the Police Force in the Jaffna peninsula, are presumed to apply to the entire country. However, this has not proved to be the case with respect to the Southern regions. In March 1972, an agreement was reached between the Government and the Rayalla Southern insurgents to end the rebellion in the southern provinces which continued for along time. This agreement which came to be known as Indo Lanka Agreement represented a radical departure, with ramifications that few would care to predict. However, for anyone familiar with the aims of the 1971 People's Local Government Act, the Southern Provinces Regional Act of 1973, which was the output of the Indo Lanka agreement, appeared to be less dramatic. This is because, in effect, the new Act was putting a new and powerful link between the three Southern Provinces and the Centre and thus taking decentralisation of authority, a further stage.

In the process, this had deprived both the Central Ministry of Local Government and the Province Councils themselves of much of their former authority. The
province commissioner had become responsible not to the Minister, but to the President of the High Executive Council through the Regional Minister for Administration who was entrusted with the responsibility for the direction and control of the police and prisons as well as the road and regional administration. Clearly, it was a very important post, and one which deprived the province commissioners of much of their authority. Since that time the link between the police in the Southern Regions and the Centre of Khartoum became weak, especially when the regional sentiment rapidly grew with this new occurrence. In spite of the fact that certain items were supposed to be central, such as training, the Regional Police Commissioner used to manage his police affairs locally with the Minister for the Administration, with a sense of relatively greater independence from the center. Even when the Aswa-Saba Agreement was breached in 1983, and the Southern Regions were further divided into three regions, the police administration continued with much independence than before. The relation with the Police headquarter in Khartoum continued to be vague, though
the centre, was, and still, trying to handle the
matter upon bases which seem to be different from
that practiced before.

\[1/\]

\[1/\] An interview with Ibrahim & Karl, Police
Superintendent of the Administration Department
1. Police Organization in the Kordofan Region

The police force was established in Kordofan as a force distributed over the region under the supreme command of a police commander. By 1975, and as an initial step of decentralization, the region was divided into two provinces comprising North Kordofan and South Kordofan. Hence, the police force was divided by these newly-established provinces. Later on, each province established its own police men and police stations according to the demand of the area. When the decentralization process in the Sudan was further and regionally introduced and applied in Kordofan Region as well as in other parts of the country, the police organization to the two provinces grew much larger and the whole police organization enlarged with the establishment of headquarters in the Region's Capital, El Obeid. In 1986, the improved police force for Kordofan Region was composed of 161 police officers and 2,741 non-commissioned officers and soldiers (see Table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Police</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above represents the distribution of police stations across different regions, as of the latest data available as of [insert date].

However, the actual number of police stations in the Central Region is actually less than the reported figures, indicating a possible underreporting or misclassification. This discrepancy might be due to the nature of the data collection process, which might not accurately reflect the actual distribution of police stations.

In addition to other factors, the provision of efficient and effective police services is crucial, especially in regions that require such services. The data presented here provides a general overview of the existing distribution of police stations (see Table 3).
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K. Kordofan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kordofan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


All these stations are scattered all over the vast area of each province of the region, formulating a very severe problem of communication. In the rainy season, efficient communication between most of these stations, especially those of South Kordofan Province, is a tangible dream. Poor means of communication, such as motor cars and motor cycles, stand short of covering the police stations in the region.

It is worthy here to mention that the whole region with its three police units, Southern Kordofan Province, Northern Kordofan Province and the Police Headquarters of the Region, have only seventy four cars in use while there are forty two cars which are not in use, and there are seventeen cars which are disabled. The whole number
POLICE STATIONS IN KORDOFAN REGION

SCALE 1: 600,000

KEY NOTE

- Main Markaz
- Merkez
- Permanent Police station
- Temporary Police station

- Source: HO Police Force of Kordofan Region
of motor-cars, ten, which are in North Kordofan Province and none in the other two departments, were not utilised for lack of main parts though they were recently introduced to the regime. There is only one telex machine centered in the capital of the region. Unfortunately, this telex machine suddenly ceased to operate in the eve of 1980 and was sent to America to be repaired. Hence, the communication problem grew much more severe. Moreover, there is another severe problem which is police housing. The whole forces of Kordofan Region has only 226 junior standard houses. Rents are very high and expensive while both salaries and housing allowance are too low to cater for much high rents.

The problems of communication and housing together with some other more intricate problems which developed consequent to the implementation of decentralization policies and programmes, constitutes, and may continue to constitute, real hindrances to the effective provision of police services in the region.
Executive Council to coordinate the work of local officials and direct the central field personnel working in the province. Under such conditions, the police commissioner, who was the police commandant, was always in contact with the commissioner of the province in matters concerning police activities, and the latter, in his turn, offered his great chances of self-identification and planted self-confidence and mutual respect.

In his tours to the police stations within the province, the Provincial Police Commandant, at that time, used to pay attention to the people's general complaints not specifically relating to security and to convey them to the commissioner of the province, hence, creating a new pattern of relation. Being the chairman of the "Security Board", the commissioner of the province was acquainted with the detailed affairs of the police, and being the secretary of that committee, the police commandant always gained the support of the commissioner of the province in the Executive Council's sessions. Consequently, the police needs were always given priority. One could say that there was good co-ordination between the head executive of the province, the commissioners, and the commandant of the police, who was the head of an
important department of the province. The Minister had to maintain relation with the Ministry of Interior, to which he is held responsible, and with the Commissioner of the province with whom he works.

Unfortunately, this good pattern of coordination didn’t last when a further step of decentralisation was taken in 1980 to implement the system of regional rule to include all the regions of the Sudan of which Khartoum was one. Under such type of decentralisation the Police Force in Kordofan lost coordination with informal (self-education) and formal or executive coordination. The paramount of each police province was directed to communicate with the province Commissioner without reference to the Regional Police Commissioner. Ministerial Circular No. 3 was issued from the concerned Minister specifying that reports of police in each province must be submitted to the Commissioner of that province. Not even a copy of that circular was sent to the Regional Police Commissioner to take note of it. The Regional Police Commissioner was left with no option but to issue directives

Kordofan Region, Ministry of Region’s Affairs and Administration, Ministerial Circular No. 3.
and orders to his subordinates, the provincial police commanders. When he needed to do so, he had to communicate with the Minister of Police’s Affairs and Administration to issue such orders and directives in his name to the commanders of the provinces, and not the commanders of the police in the two provinces. The commanders of the two provinces, in their turn, would inform the police commands with such orders and directives. Both the two commanders, the provincial police commanders, were inferred to be “hired” for the Governor and the Minister of Police’s Affairs and Administration. Thus, there was a complete lack of coordination between these two provincial police commanders and their senior officials, the Regional Police Commanders. Furthermore, the Regional Police Commanders were also inferred to be “hired” to Kharbouz, in the same way, he was new to Kharbouz, with the Minister of Police’s Affairs and Administration, when there was a need of him. Thus, he faced a great difficulty in coordinating with the police headquarters in Kharbouz in relation to matters of police concern. As such, the situation was like that of an army, even when he was not in the army, but inside. His previous work relations with his te
within the whole region.

One more aspect with obvious lack of co-ordination was the process of transference. When the police were a centralized force, transferred police officers would directly come to their new stations within each one of the five provinces of Kordofan region. But later on, under regionalization, transferred officers were obliged to report to the Regional Police Headquarter to be distributed all over the ten provinces. The Minister of the Region's Affairs and Administration missed this right to distribute the transferred officers and enforced his own will. Also, the Governor tended to administer the police force almost entirely by himself and without consultation with his executive representative, the Minister of the Region's Affairs and Administration. Once he terminated his assistant, the Deputy Governor, from Khoroba to stop transference of a mentioned cadet without knowledge of the concerned minister and with no consultation with the Regional Police Commissioner. 1

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1/ Kordofan Region, Ministry of Finance & Commerce.
(4) Politics, Policy and the Police

In an effort to legitimise and stabilise its power, the Nepalese regime aimed to politicise all government institutions. The Police Force, as one of these institutions, was directed to join the nucleus of the People's Socialist Party, the ruling party, and was to legitimize political domination at that time. Subordinates were officially expected to support the party without hesitation for the sake of the "People's Socialist Revolution".

Such political interference and the involvement of the police in politics created the greatest obstacles to the efficiency and discipline of the police force. Subordinates were forced to implement unpopular and ill-conceived measures under government pressure. Under centralisation and region-sampling in particular, this became very obvious especially in Kathmandu Region where the local party of the People's Socialist Union was almost replaced by local police. In enjoying such new status, they always served as an obstacle. This new status encouraged them to interfere in the day-to-day business of governmental departments. The police, as an institution, considered the actual local police that they served to overlook as to how their decisions were the whole system. They always interfered in the detailed day-to-day
(c) Human Constraints:

The human factor is one of the essential factors that help in the achievement of constructed objectives. In some cases where it is not properly catered for, it can handicap the progress and development of work and may even cause the failure of the whole firm or department.

The Police Force in the Sudan, in general, frequently faced a problem of resistance of work. This was due to the poor payment and difficult conditions of work. Kordofan Police Force experienced such a problem. The approved force was 3,072 policemen in the 1955-56 budget and the actual force at work was 2,126 with a shortage of 947 policemen. Taking into consideration this shortage, the decentralization process and regionalism in particular had further intensified the problem.

The large governmental organs, which were later established, needed a large number of policemen as guardsman. Not only this, but the Governor, his Deputy, and very Regional Minister were in need of three policemen for each of them to cater for their daily service of guardsman. This has actually meant that thirty policemen were to be relieved of their office work and be confined to such a service. Beside that, each Minister appointed a car driver from the police force, and whenever he wanted to tour the region a bodyguard of a number of policemen must accompany him. In some cases, he asked for policemen as
...and guard was in normal visits to his people and relatives outside 2. Observe, that was a placed and a show of power which he was always in need of especially when elections were near. All these problems were the consequences of decentralization and regionalization, and which intersected with each other to make a severe human problem.

(a) Economic Consequences:

Finance constitutes a very important drive to the achievement of any development activity. Poor finances may lead to the hindrance of the achievement of any desired development programmes or even stop it. The financing of the system of the Regions including the financing of local government councils was rather weak and short of contributing effectively to the realization of development programmes. Most of the regions, including Konso region, are very poor in resources and do not have the ability to utilize their resources to act plans of programmes. So they tend to rely upon the central grants and funds. Besides, much funds approved by the national government to the benefit of the Regions, there are different sources of the revenues forming the finances of Konso region. These resources are:

1. Revenue obtained from licences, mainly commercial licences, health licences, and the revenue obtained from the licences of motor cars and weapons.
3. Taxes including school taxes, land taxes, values and other taxes, property taxes, general and health charges and entertainment charges.

4. Revenues obtained from rents of public properties.

5. Revenues obtained from buildings' fees.

However, all these revenues are not enough to form a proper budget for a region like Kordofan, and as a result the region has experienced considerable difficulties in meeting its obligations and responsibilities. The first problem was, and still is, the problem pertaining to the question how to enter for the payment of the salaries and wages in time, and how to provide good services for the people in the region. The Regional Government, in an attempt to find a way and solve such problem, began to look for more revenues. There was no way but to levy extra fees and taxes because there were no projects or schemes belonging to the region to benefit from. Consequently, the Government had no alternative except to levy fees and taxes on certain commodities like sugar, petrol and others which are not authorized by the 1930 Regional Act. Moreover, the Government allowed, rather than legitimized, the so called 'Black Market' as a means to lessen the scarcity of

2 An Interview with the Commissioner of the Regional Ministry of Finance, Kordofan, Al Ghid, 23.5.1989.
certain conditions. It became very familiar and usual to see plenty of women in the main market, especially the Industrial Area, engaged for sale with a high price compared with the legal or official prices. It was believed by many people that such activity gained momentum by the passive attitude of the Government, and consequently the police was ordered not to intervene.

It is to be noted that the police force in Kenya Region has continued to operate and to provide its services under such difficult financial situations. In fact, the Regional Police Commissioner has always been faced with the run short of the financial funds of the police budget. However, he has, in several cases, been unable to secure adequate financial supply to achieve and carry out his plans. There are no less than 30 temporary police stations all over the region, most of which must be operated but no funds are available. The police in most areas of the region usually wait for a long time after the required data to catch their salaries. Some allowances such as the Extra Charge Pay remain for a long time unpaid to the police as though they are in great need for it. A quick look at the lately received police budget gives a good example of the poor funds that always stand short or less than required.
In the 1962/63 police budget there were fifty (£50) thousands pounds approved for fuel and twenty thousand pounds approved for maintenance of vehicles. This fund was increased in the 1963/64 police budget to seventy-five (£75) and fifty-five (£55) thousands pounds respectively. This increase was not as much due to increase in the demand of services than it was due to the rise in the price of fuel. In fact, four under section two of the police budget, maintenance and repair, there were only fourteen thousand pounds approved in the 1962/63 budget while it was sixteen thousand pounds in 1963/64 in view of the high jump in the price of maintenace of equipments. Furthermore, it is really embarrassing to have a constant and sizable fund of only one thousand pounds for medical care and police's clubs in both the 1962/63 and 1963/64 budgets, taking into consideration the fact that the approved force constitutes three thousand and seventy one (3,071) policemen. If we distribute this approved thousand pounds between or among the approved force with complete neglect not to the needs of the police clubs, every policeman would have one third of a pound which is not at all enough to satisfy his medical requirements during a whole year.

Although the financial year 1962/63 witnessed a high jump in price, only 323 thousand pounds were then that of 1963/64 budget was approved to meet this jump. New departmental
...service and projects were never thought of for lack of adequate financial resources. Not only this but lack of money in most cases was the cause not to cash the approved fund in the budget. Auxiliary financial resources such as the issuance of the confiscated illegal equipments were no longer allowed and so that the police fund itself was confined to its sole resource of finance, the budget. Hence it is this up to or has remained unable to move freely towards the achievement of its goals.

3. The Relation between the Police and Administration:

Since its foundation, the police forces in the Sudan were administratively linked with the local government administration. This, however, lasted for a long time and continued to make a permanent headache for both sides the policemen and local government administrators. It came out with long-lasting sensitivity between the two which has frequently hindered the smooth running of the work.

In tracing the origins of this problem, it is worth mentioning that in 1952 the Civil Secretary, G. J. Robertson, notified the Governor of Khartoum, that:...

"...The Governor must exercise more control over police matters than he has done in recent years. He must be in much closer touch with his command, and must be..."
province was held responsible for all matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order in the province, and the commandant was to remain responsible for the manner of execution.

The deep roots of this problem in Kordofan go further back to the year 1958, at the opening of the then Police Training School at Al Shendi. It happened that the Commandant of the Police ordered all the police officers in Kordofan Province to welcome the ceremony. The Commissioner of the province quickly prevented the making of that ceremony and ordered all the police officers to return to their sections. Conflict between him and the commandant arose. This matter was settled by the transferance of the commandant from the province.

However, when the role of the province commissioner and the district's commissioner was rather increased in November 1958, the problem was revived. The province commissioners at that time were military officers, and conflict between them and the police officers, though they were minor conflicts, were increased by the factor of distrust. The conflict between the police officers and the administrators spread up again when decentralization was implemented and the administrators regained their old powers over the police.

\[1/\] An Interview with the Ex-Police Inspector Al Kerani, held at Al Shendi in October 1964.
They became responsible for the most important police item, namely finance. A police officer from South Kurdistan Province complained that the local government officer within his area ordered him to pass all police reports whether criminal or administrative through him. When he refused the administrator cut off the supply of fuel and thus hindered all police work. Clashes between him and the local government officer was settled by court. Another stated that the local government officer ordered him to salute him and pointed that he was his boss. When the police officer denied that, Bennett were made to cash any police fund concentrated in the local government officer's hands.

The Regional Governor of Kurdistan who happened to be an ex-military officer, solved the problem by issuing a circular in which he delegated his powers of supervision over the police force to the Minister of the Region's Affairs and Administration, provinces' commissioners, and local government center officers. The Regional Police Commissioner wrote a note to the Governor specifying that those local government officers were official in the Civil Service and their responsibilities were dictated by the People's Local Government Act, which did not include authority
or power over police matters. Police officers were somewhat agitated by this Delegation Order and pronounced their reluctance to accept such an arrangement. Soon a meeting between the Governor and all who were concerned, Regional Police Commissioner, Commandant of El Obeid Police Force, and the Senior Local Government officers, were held to discuss this Order of Delegation. As a result, a committee was established and a note was written about the same matter rejecting the supervision of the senior local government offices over the police. The Governor’s Legal Adviser also stated the illegality of that delegation order. But both the Committee’s note and the advice of the Legal Adviser met a deaf ear. This of course put a great deal of sensitivity upon the interaction between the two sides, the police officers and the local government officers, and, hence friction would most likely develop more problems.
Administrative Decentralization

Decentralization has steadily remained the only process that is expected to deliver all promised benefits of development to most people in the Asian, especially governmental officials. Policemen noted that their problems surfaced in terms of transfers, promotion, poor payment and, above all, poor equipments and work needs which needed to be solved. After the implementation of decentralization, and the system of Regional Rules, all these hopes were realized, and not out.

Policemen were confronted with other problems previously created by decentralization, to the extent that violence was as common as seeking to avoid using decentralization. This is clear from the result of the questionnaire conducted. It showed that 90% of the three hundred police officers questioned preferred a centralized police force. This trend justifies the remark made by some scholars that though decentralization became the desire of most countries, yet the trend is towards centralization.

One of the acute problems resulting from the implementation of decentralization, has been the administrative process. Administrators tend to believe that they are capable of administering all fields including the police field. Police officers on the other hand tend to believe that specialization is required to all fields and administration of a certain field is tightly linked with specialization within the same field. Hence the police force must not be administered from without. The implementation of decentralization entered the dominance of these administrators over the police. Sometimes, the administrators or the Regional Governors were selected from among military officers. However, whether they are civil servants or officers of the Armed Forces, a certain amount of criticism must be provided. A successful general, may prove himself as a leader and a controller of men, but his qualities as an administrator may be less certain. A successful Civil Servant on the other hand, must prove himself to be a good administrator. However, his qualities as a leader and a controller of a disciplined force may remain to some extent uncertain. The head of a big Government Department has of course many thousands of human beings under his control, and there is an element of discipline involved in their management. But
memories of previous ownership would govern the relation and specify what kind of co-operation might exist.

8. The Political Neutrality of the Police Force:

The political influence on the police during the era of the Koei Regime was largely due to the involvement of the police in politics as a partner of the Disciplined Forces Bureau of the KII. The concept of political neutrality is a debatable concept around which there are different points of view. Advocates of police involvement in politics assert that the political neutrality of the police is a facade which sounds well in democratic rhetoric. The very place of the police in the advisory system of justice seems to demand such an involvement. In the enforcement of laws, the police is a vital and powerful instrument for carrying out the policies and programmes of the party in power which is in essence the government established by law. Its failure to do so will be as intolerable as blatant circumventions of the law to advance the party’s political objectives. Not only this but a further step must be taken to allow all the policemen to participate in the political life. They
have the right to join the membership of any party they like as any citizen do. Out of three hundred police officers questioned only seven officers supported this idea.

On the other hand advocates of political neutrality of the police state that the police offer protection and came close to the reason in political authority who tend to make use of the police to get rid of their political opponents. Such use of the police is highly dangerous and creates a situation of neo-dictatorship against the citizens. Sometimes there is even a tendency to recruit to the police force unemployed members of political parties in a systematic manner. The police have to be the guardians of law and order and the people as a whole rather then partisan supporters of politicians in power. Therefore, the police must be politically neutral and far away from politics. Only of the three hundred police officers questioned, supported this idea.

It is really true that the police is an instrument for carrying out the policies and programs of the party in power. But this does not mean that all
policemen have to be, by virtue of their office, members of that party. A party in power to-day might be in opposition tomorrow. Should the police immediately change their political identity with assumption of power by the new party, or should they quit the office? There must be solid bases for the police to stand upon so as to be able to achieve its organisational objectives under the rule of any political party. That base is its political neutrality. Political neutrality guarantees a lot of police organisational values. Mutual respect with the public, justice, confidence etc., are all based and might be, to a substantial degree, afforded by the police political neutrality. The British police system is almost an absolute guarantee against dictatorship of any kind, whether of a person or a party. Even if the police in Britain were neutralised, it could not be used in the way dictators have to use their police. The tool would break in dictatorial hands. He could not murder it because the principles in which it works are too fundamental to be eradicated. So he would have to start again and make a different sort of police from with a different sort of men. That would need time and people would not be likely to sit around and watch him do it.
Thus, the police have to be the guardians of law and order and the people as a whole rather than partisan supporters of politicians in power.

3. Police Financing

Important of all the police organizational arrangements is the police financing. The lack of finance for the police is largely due to the artificial distinction introduced in the financial administration between "productive departments" and the unproductive or the Departments of Services. The Police Force is, of course, a Department of Services. It delivers services to the public within the limits of its approved financial funds in the budget. Whenever the police ask for more funds in the new fiscal year, budget officials may believe that expenditure is unnecessary, or is obviously undue; thus in a difference of opinion concerning substantive policy may exist. Budget officials may eliminate or reduce proposals for expenditure. Thus, when the police say urgent services such as that required in most emergency states, flood etc., they would find that the approved expenditure is far less than the amount of
not in harmony with their needs. Rich regions are financially capable of matching their resources with the local development projects’ expenditure and the expenditure of the departments or services such as the police force. Hence they could finance any additional expenditure the police may ask for without delay, while poor regions which heavily rely on central grants may not be able to cater for this urgent and unplanned expenditure. Thus a great variation is made between the rich and poor regions in the delivery of police services. Rich regions have the ability to supply the police with adequate means and equipment to deliver good police services, while poor regions have not. By such distinction rich regions attract policemen to work in.

It is a real fact that the Middle Province, besides the Railways and Harbour's Police Units, are today very preferable units for most policemen to work in while Dar es Salaam is a horrible underpaid region.

It remains a true fact that housing is a basic need for the welfare of policemen. The problem of police housing is very acute in poor regions and Dar Es Salaam in particular. Police budget should at least embody a separate fund for housing, though for
administrative convenience the fund may remain with the central budget. I think, the basic principle of finance is that the existing services should not be sacrificed at the expense of new services or new development projects, and that they should, in fact, be made more and more efficient. The police is among the important welfare services of the country and also one of the chief essential services. If it is important that various other services, such as railways, the post etc., should be developed and improved, it is equally important, if not more so, that the police services should also be developed and improved simultaneously. Development of police services depends, to a substantial degree, upon the adequacy of financial resources.

Tightly connected with finance is the resistance of people to join the police force. The hard condition of service, the hard nature of work together with poor payment tend to make capable applicants reluctant to join the police force. In rich regions qualified applicants prefer profitable jobs while in poor regions, such as Kordofan, people
used to do low-grade work but most profitable compared with the police. In many less important and less capable than the police force. Therefore, under decentralization and regionalism which tend to encourage the recruitment of people from the locality, these regions would face a severe problem of potential recruits, and this, what happened in Kordofan. Enforced by this reluctance to work in the Police Force, a group of incapable applicants was not admitted in the Police Training School at Khartoum. When they realized that they would have poor payment they all quickly quit the school by night. We know that the police have a lot of tasks to do in society. On the efficient discharge of these enormous tasks of the police depends the whole future of the force. The only hope is to attract the best brains from all educational levels and to make the police force attractive to potential recruits not only by the career offered but also by full recognition of the state service as an honourable profession universally respected and highly esteemed.
Contribution – to Administrative Big Unity

It is fortunate enough that this conclusion grew after the Ninth of April Public Meeting in the Palace, which created an opportunity to change. Views are repeatedly expressed expressing need to continue by the experiment of decentralization for estimations. A gigantic task is now required to be fulfilled with a splitted decision which are not based in the realities of the economic situation of the country because that regions are very poor and rely heavily on the grants from the National Government. In Regionalism laws and orders are enacted to concentrate power into the Governor's hands. Such laws and orders have violated the police law and have created contradictions. Governors have tended to explain these laws to their favour and have consequently diminished the true role of the police. They daily misused the police and directed it to achieve their own visions and ends. This was greatly due to misunderstanding of the police duties, rules, and tasks. They always imposed the police with other government's departments and they often direct its essential equipment, such as cars, either to serve them or to serve other departments of relatively less responsibility.

1/ Al Sabah (Kharjum Daily) June 25, 1935 (In Arabic).
The police responsibilities are superior only to those of the defense department, because, while the defense department is concerned with matters pertaining to external defense of the country, the police are concerned with its internal defense in a very broad sense. The first duty of the state is to ensure to provide enough food for the people and to defend the state from external aggression. It is simultaneously their duty to ensure that the people are alive in socialist peace and good order. In a true democratic state, public security must precede state security. Likewise, an efficient and effective police force is an essential prerequisite for the success of all development activities and the timely and proper implementation of the schemes and projects of the national development plan. Indeed, what is needed now is that the police administration should be linked up, in its new role, with social defense, planning, and other development work in various fields.

The maintenance of an efficient and effective system of police is also of vital concern to the Central Government which has a definite role in police functions in the country. This consideration provides
Cabinet justification for Central control particularly for the administration of the police forces in the Regional Governments. It also highlights the point that police's centralization is inevitable. Police service should be a unified service with one cadre, one controller, if it is to render effective and quick service. Scattered control often at the departmental level.

Centralization of the police forces offers many advantages. Above all, there is security of staff working in certain departments such as massacre, and the regions have none of such services. Hence, through centralization such regions could be provided with the service of this department. Centralization would also facilitate the efficient handling of some administrative matters such as promotion, transfers, discipline etc... Furthermore, centralization would help to adopt uniform standards, uniform and realistic working norms, operation of information service, enforcement of quality control and preparation of expertise feedback arrangements. Besides, centralization would make it possible to induce the latest tools and techniques, provide recently trained staff,
infuse better inter-regional and inter-regional co-ordination and permit rational distribution of resources so that both over-worked and under-worked areas can be rectified.

It may be asked, why the police should bear the regions' burden? However, it may be known that a major part of the burden even now is being shouldered by central side and grants. In addition, the centre shoulders a great deal of responsibility for police education and training. Thus, additional burden, if one, on the centre will be only marginal. It can certainly be shared with the regions, if necessary. But this centralization would facilitate cooperation and modernize police services.

Recommendations:

In view of the previous points discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis the following recommendations are offered:

1. The police must be a centralized force with an unattached system all over the country. The centre has to be responsible for all police's affairs in the regions especially police's budget and has to ensure adequate financial supply to guarantee the execution of its
objectives. Need not go any further. Regional Governments have to be allocated a part of delegated power to supervise the works which the police is suspected to deliver within their jurisdictions, not only through the Security Board.

2. Both the Regional Government Act of 1930 and the People's Local Government Act of 1914 must be reviewed to suit the centralization of the Police Force and at the same time to remove the duplication and contradiction in power of supervision over the Police Force.

3. Since the Ministry of Interior controls the Police Force, it must be a ministry of sovereignty, as it has once been. Therefore, a distribution of its powers to any other regional ministries or departments should be made.

4. The department of the Ministry of Interior must be the Police Force alone. Other departments such as prison and fire brigades must be subordinated within the police organization. Therefore, they must be policed so as to have one large police organization. This system is found in Egypt and some other African and Arab countries. The polices are in them a lack of all
broaden. He must be trained to carry out his tasks in our department of the three departments, the police, the prison, and the fire brigade. Specialization would then be the policy out of in-service training.

6. The Central Government has to emphasize the role of the Police Force within the society and ought to create attractive conditions of service to facilitate their work. It has to be adequately and continuously supplied with food and medical services in the different regions of the country.

7. Administrative interference must be avoided by the police force. Neither the Government nor their Ministers of the Region's Affairs and Administration should be permitted to supervise or interfere with the Police Force. They must not be allowed to intervene in police work and should they have any right to influence the police equipment in other departments.

8. Since the State Security Department has been established in the Regional Police Corps, it must remain his role. He must be the Secretary of the Security Board. Concerning the Regional Government in matters pertaining to national security, it shall only be made through the Regional Police Corps as the Secretary to the Security Board.
EIGHTHIGER.

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الشعبة العربية
كلية الاداب والعلوم الاجتماعية
جامعة العلوم السياسية

استدلال استدلال للحالة الثلاثية في الشروط

Beam at 00000000

أرجو أن تشير إلى الإجابة التي تراها صحيحة في الإجابة.

1. ما هو السبب الذي يتأثر به في الحالة تكون في الشروط؟

2. هل تحقق هذه الحالة؟

3. لا

4. لا

5. لا

6. لا

7. لا

8. لا

9. لا

10. لا

بعد ذلك انهدأ المكتبة فرجة من الشرطة بسذاً

 vg

4. يجب على الشرطة أن تكون مجابهة بعيدة من الحسنين.

5. لا

6. لا

الشروط من المستوى تتفاوت مع ما يعتبر فيه وتحرك

... إلى الأصل السياسي...
أولاً: هل هناك جمهور في السياسة يتميز بخطابه في السياسة بالنسبة للمساواة في المشاركة؟

2/ هل يوجد اتصال بين gestão سياسياً وبين الشعوب في الشارع العام؟ يتم خلال شارع الدولة لدعم التشريع والتشريعات السياسية المخططة؟

3/ إذا كان هناك عدد من الاحصائيات تتضمن مجتمع السياسي والجزء من مصادر الدولة يعني لهذين السياسيين على ادخال الوعي.

4/ كيف يمكننا تعريف ذلك؟

5/ هناك عدد من السياسة في ذلك لتقدم لتعزيز، أو توجيه، مثلاً تغريدة في ظل إذا كانت الإجابة موجهة نموذجًا كان ذلك؟
أتفق أن يكون الجهاز المركزية:

/ مركبات /
/ محاسن /
/ مركبات /
/ محاسن من ماهية الاعتراف الاداري في حسابات
الآلات ومركبات

ب- إذا كنت ترى أن يكون الجهاز مركزية وضع لمن تجني:
/ محافزه داعمة ضد تفاح أخرى غير الجهاز
/ لجهاز مكتبات محالة
/ "لادارة المحال" /
/ "إدارة المحال" /
/ "إدارة المحال" /لا تسعى غير الشركه
/ إذا كنت ترى أن تكون الجهاز لا مركزية لمن تجني:
/ إن شاء الله أمر لمكم الفيلم
/ أن تتبع قرار الادارة غير وزراء الخروج لادارة
/ أن تتبع قرار الادارة هو زير المهام الحالية
/ شعبة الجهاز لمكم الآلات تأتي:
/ اتخاذ الجهاز للصالح العام للمكم ووصيفه
/ يا يدعون:
/ "طلع المرة للاداريين للخلاص على جهاز الجهاز وطلق
المهام وبشكل" /
/ "أثر الشركه في الادارة واستناده" /
/ "الإثبات لادارة في القانون واصطنب لجودة المحاولا" /
/ "عذرية الاعتراف في الادارة وان تاميره وان عضو" /
/ البند (١٠) - ٢٠٢٣ - ١٠ - ٢٥ - ٢٠٢٣ /
6 - هل توجد تدخلات أو نزاعات أخرى تؤثر على المعاملات التي تتم فيها?
أ/ تدخلات بين حاكم الادارة أو وزير أو أداريين.
ب/ لا يوجد تدخلات بين حاكم الادارة أو وزير أو أداريين.

لو كانت الإجابة نعم 1- هي طريقة لتسهيل هذه المشكلة.
وكيفية حلها؟

---

5- كيف تؤثر النزاعات أو الازاعات التي تسبب نزاع بين شرطة الادارة.
أ/ علاقة بين أولي زعم.
ب/ علاقة بين مدرسين مدرسين.
ب/ علاقة بين مدرسين مدرسين.
ب/ علاقة بين موظف محترم.

4- عدد من نزاعات في占领 أذوك وا.

---

3- كيف تؤثر النزاعات أو الازاعات التي تسبب نزاع بين شرطة الادارة.
أ/ تدخلات بين حاكم الادارة أو وزير أو أداريين.
ب/ لا يوجد تدخلات بين حاكم الادارة أو وزير أو أداريين.

---

2- حدد النشاطات النوعية التي تسبب نزاع بين الشيرطة والادارة.
أ/ تدخلات بين حاكم الادارة أو وزير أو أداريين.
ب/ تدخلات بين مدرسين مدرسين.
ب/ تدخلات بين موظفين محترمين.
/ رئيسة وزارة الأوقاف والإدارة / 
/ رئيسة الشروط والخروج / 
/ أي هيئة وأعضاء عريضة (أكرونا)
APPENDIX (12)

اسم كامل الاسم الرسم
بمجرور الدواخل المدلية، مرفوعة
الاسم كرا كان
كتب وحصيلة والتحليلا

لاست吞 مقالية

التاريخ: 28/8/19

من الدايم الدارسين
الollar الدايم الأساسي

البادي، لجني موديس، لا ينادي الأبي.

الحاكم الخروسي
الرمي الدارسيني
الحكم على الدايم - اعتبار

لاستناد، المدح الرسم.

لاجل القاعد أحمد عبد المحسن، حسب تراز السيد
الحاكم هذا، ينوي الجان، ينوي ضردة بالايبن.

ينبغي توجيهات المقالات التي تتضمن نص السيد / الحاكم، من قبل.

الاسم: 9984/8/1
التعليم العالي:

لا يتم تعيين اسم النظام لجامعة مصر في التطورات الأخيرة، حيث يتم التركيز على تحسين البنية التحتية وتطوير التعليم العالي. يتم إجراء إصلاحات شاملة في نظام التعليم العالي، بما في ذلك زيادة الموارد المخصصة للتعليم، وتحديث المناهج التعليمية، وتشجيع الابتكار والبحث العلمي.

هذا التطورات المتواصلة تهدف إلى تمديد فرص التعليم العالي لجميع الطلاب، وتحقيق الابتكار والابداع في مجالات التعليم والبحث العلمي. يتم التركيز على تحسين البنية التحتية للجامعات، وتحديث المباني والمرافق، وتوسيع البرامج التدريسية لتشمل جميع المجالات الأكاديمية.

إن هذه التغييرات تتطلب جهودًا مكثفة من جميع الأطراف المعنية، بما في ذلك الحكومة والجامعات والمجتمعات المحلية، للتأكد من أن هذه الإصلاحات تحقق أهدافها وتعزز فرص التعليم العالي في مصر.
(ف) الماضي

لقد أصدر السيد حافظ أحمدي كرمان في التوقيف رقم (1) لسنة 1884 بموجب الأمر المؤقت بقانون الدواء لسنة 1888 وسماً على سلطة سيادته الزراعية في هيئة (ب) من القانون المسماً بقانون الاراضي الزراعية لسنة 1884. يقال أن السيد كان له الحق في إعطاء نكبة في أي وقت يراه بحاجة إلى المال. أن لم يحصل له ما يحتاج إلى المال، فله استخدام سلطته في ذلك.

(ب) في سياق هذا القانون، نص على أنه في أي وقت يمكن من الزراعة ما يلزم له من المال أو إذا كان لديه ما يحتاج للجودة في أي وقت.

(ج) يجوز له استخدام سلطته في أي وقت.

(د) إذا لم يحصل له ما يحتاج إلى المال، فإنه يجوز له استخدام سلطته في أي وقت.
المرأة والطبيبة قد ندد أن يتم في الأماكن أنها تجاهن بشكل يتضمن
وأنا ينصح بالطبيبة الأخلاقية وهو في الأماكن التي يتضمن
بسرعات المرأة. ولذا فإن المرأة في هذه الأماكن، بسرعات
(2) في حالات الرعاية الطبية، وخارجاً. في الحاضرة، بين
هيئة الزواج، ونظام الأحوار، فإن المرأة، في الحاضرة، بين
زيارتي للمريض، ونظام الأحوار، فإن المرأة، في الحاضرة، بين
فم جملة المرأة في حاضرة، بين الزواج، وخارجاً. في الحاضرة، بين
على المرأة في حالات الراية، وخارجاً، وخارجاً، في الحاضرة، بين
وأنا ينصح بالطبيبة الأخلاقية وهو في الأماكن التي يتضمن
وأنا ينصح بالطبيبة الأخلاقية وهو في الأماكن التي يتضمن

السجل لدى سلالة المديبة من إدارة تجارة الدواية الكروية موصى بالراحة [8] من السيطرة، وهي توجية الدواية الكروية. كل ولاية أنشأت
تقريرًا شبهًا في هذا المرجع، يشير الدواية إلى دائمًا على ما يمكن.
بصفة واحدها: "الراكب المركز".

(2) القضاة التنفيذيون الأول بالشاماتة نورا في الأمة المعينة
اتجاهًا و hüمن التماثل، تم الكبير المكشوف في الحضور.
فيما ما يلي، على الإعدادات للمدينات، وكان ذلك المستقبل
باستخدامه في البريد. كتبت الأسماء المتغيرة بالشاماتة، ولكن ليس مجرد طبي
واسم الكلية، وتاريخة. تأثيرات الأسماء المتغيرة، و اسم التقييمات
لا تُقَدِّمُ لا قانونًا. نتيجة للعديد من التقييمات، وجميع الظروف
الشاملة والشاملة، النشاط، ومسندًا علوم الإنتاج الأيديولوجية
بالشاماتة وكتابة بإعداد التقييمات للناشرين بما يناسبه الاسم.

(3) يُمكن أن يكون الإعدادات على أي سبيلًا ما، وقلمًا، لرأسية
الشيء أو إعدادًا ملدًا بديلًا. طباعة هذه المادة، نذًا، يُمكن
إذا للشاماتة، طباعة الإعداد، تأثيرات الإعداد، سالك و مراعاة المحقبل
بالشاماتة والشاملة، في هذا العمل يتم بالشاماتة، وفي النقصان.

(4) إذا يوجد أي من الشكل، فإن القضاة التنفيذيون
سيبيرمان من النتائج. يمكن إعداد القضاة، ويجب تدللي أمر
أي الشاملة المدفوع في الجلبي، أي في الإعداديات والشاملة، ولكن
تُقَدِّمُ بدون أنه يمكن التمويل، التشغيص، بهذه المبادئ، وأيضًا
سيكون مجردة أخرى ابتداءً من الإعداد المذكور، يمكن للشاملة من
دراسة هذه الإعدادات. ويتم التحقق من ولاية الغالب، وابتسار
الشيء.

إن هذا، سيكون إلى جانب في تلك المداخلات، حينما سارع...
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
كرسيها السيد الحاكم في اجتماعه بمعاهدة المقاطعة
الإيالة، يشير مدير شريعة الإقليم باللاطمة، ورئيس شريعة المقاطعة
الإيالة، لإبقاء وقفة على وضع شريعة السيد الحاكم في
القرارات العام على قوانين الشريعة تحت الحالة (11) (ب) للمبادئ
التشريعية الأوروبية. كل في حدود مشاركته في نماذج الآث: 

بوعض الشريعة (11) من القانون هو "سيكولاً قيادة تسوسات
الشريعة"، وهو في معرفة هذه المادة الإيالة، "بتنشيط احتكار
الثاني"، بمعنى أنه فُقدت قيادة SHALL التكوين الشريعة بوسسية
هذه المادة أن ي+t با نى ذلك نموذج أحكام القانون الإيالة، ومن
أعمال القانون الإيالة. بمجرد أن قادرة في المادة (11) وعربيةً، "سيكولاً قيادة
قوتاً الشريعة"، حيث يذ ا نفس (ب) نمذج.

وكذلك رأس البنكية بأمر من سلطة القيادة وتحديدت
السكونية لكل قوة شريعة تكين شريعة المادة (11) من القانون، و
الذي مُعد الأسنان في النافذة البنكية، يتم تحديد هيئة ضمن قوانين
الشريعة، حيث كتمت وسيلة قوة شريعة لكل سكانية، وبنها قوة
شريعة شارع كرمان، وقوة شريعة شارع كرمان، يتم تجنيد البنكية
قوة قواية السكنية، وقادر النافذة البنكية، يتم (11) لسنة 1.81
منافسة لرائحة شريعة الألماس، رغم لمبادئه.

وقت قانون الشريعة لسنة 1984 "قوانين الشريعة". بأن كل الأوان
المكوني بقية المادة (11) من القانون وهو قوانين التي أدريها.
العيبان أعلاه رجلان لا صوره للدولة بالخدمة قوتها تكون بضمان
الدولة (8) ولا يشبعه لهما عرف لاترارة الدولة في حالياً
الطويل، ويرقات القرارة داخل الانتهاز العقل للمستحكم.
كما كانا يعتقد عليهما قصيرةدة الدولة في كل سياقية
بزينة شرطة الإجرام.

يوضع المبكر السليم أن سلسلة القيادة قوات الشرطة، وهي
فتية جميع في النظام: على مستوى المحافظة، مدير عراقة، المساعدة
المحفظة، على مستوى الإقليم، مدير عام شرطة الإقليم، ومساعد
ذلك في القرارة أفرع جاذبة للقيادة وثبات رأس شرطة البلدية،
لذا في حال توقيع الإجرام العام وهو مشهور: عادة أن تراو
احكام الإجرام. (إي) لأن سلسلة الإجرام العام للضابط
القاضي الأول أي أي ميدان مبكر سياقية عادة وهو ليس جزءاً
من سلسلة القيادة يعمر لمحببة البلدية، وليس يكون سياقية
معاصرة هذا الإجرام العام في مدير شرطة البلدية المستقل يتضمن
القانون عن إدارة قوة شرطة البلدية لمحببة البلدية، وليست شرطة البلدية كالسياق للمستقل للمدير الذي يباشر شرطة البلدية عن كل مستويات
يحمل بعضاً ميدان متصل همهمهم في تحقيق الشرطة والمراقبين
المستقلين.

يرس في تأويل الإجرام بـ *تيومي* حاكم الإجرام الإجرام العائم
على قوات الشرطة في داخل حدود اعتناز البقية، برغبة الإجرام
العام لم يمر في تأويل الإجرام وبرغبة داخل حدود الإجرام
البلدية عن كلا الإجرام ويشتهد هذا التشريع من كلمة الإجرامات
العمل بحمية.

في تأويل الحكم الشمالي المطل برغبة المحاذاة المسبقة.
الإجراءات على يد الدولة، ولم يستثن القانون سلالة عثمانية.

الإجراءات، وكان ذلك عبر إجراءات الديمومة والسداد. و
نهاية النهائية في أوتّ من هذه الأشكال كل. حيث أن خطوة
النظام المشمع على هذه النقطة كل. حيث أن سلسلة
الإجراءات الإدارية تتم مخاطر عدم قام عقر الأقطار في
utta سلسلة الإجراءات. 

بكي الإجراءات الإدارية إلى سلسلة الإجراءات الإدارية، وهو سلسلة
النظام، حيث أن برمز 3 تميز إجراءات حالة من حالة في
نظام. في ذلك السؤال، يعد القانون لسلاسة الديمومة، كما يظهر
النظام، والإجراءات على الأكاديمية. ويعتبر
بين مدى سلسلة المناهج إجراءات النهجية الأعلى. وسير
قوة الفاعلية بعمل إن تبدو تابعية موجهة وسلسلة الأحياء، و
دراة الإجراءات في بيئة كافية. بينما سلسلة إعداد القرار في
واجد، ويعتبره السماحة من القانون. ويوجهه ويدخّل عليه في
هذا

بوجي: الدلالة (82) من تأثير الديمومة يكون العالم لبيئة الأسس.
بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يمكن أن تكون الشروط الداخلي، مما يسمح
الإجراءات التنفيذية وطرة الذي لا يجري الرأي الإنجليزي. بالإضافة إلى
عدد التدابير الموجهة التامة. لهذا، يمكن أن

الطبيع 6 سبتمبر 1964
صناعة 0126
الذي 21
Appendix (VI)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الالتزامات المحددة

مهمة الجانب طرق الدخول - مدينتي البلاد.

الموازنة، المبادرات الاستراتيجية لتنظيم الأداء.

قانون رقم (22) بشأن مبارة سوق المنتجات

لائحة 48٪.

قانون الدعاوى.

بأعمال القضاء 48٪ 11 من 88 عريض


الاستناد:

تحدد سلسلة من الأفعال

أولاً: بحكم قضاء أن الاظمات تؤكد على النمو التالي:

1- حاكم القرية، قريتنا، على شرفنا، هل تعلم أن
2- تعزز سكان القري، شاملة
3- في كل القرى، إتاحة
4- شرفنا، هل تعلم أن
5- صحدودة قرى
6- جميع الأفعال
7- من جميع القرى
8- جميع الأفعال
9- جميع الأفعال
10- جميع الأفعال

ثانياً: مبارة نظامية للجنة أن الاظمات تؤكد على النمو التالي:
أ. مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

رئيس

ب. مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

闪过وا

ج. مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

闪过وا

د. أ. مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

闪过وا

اء. أ. مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

闪过وا

ز. أ. مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

闪过وا

الاجتماعات المنتزمة

كالما: خصص المديرية الليبية لمجلس أمن الاقليم بالآتي:

أ. وظيفة رئيساً لرئاسة مجلس أمن الاقليم

ب. وظيفة مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

ق. وظيفة مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

ر. وظيفة مدير إدارة أمن الاقليم

 sách: على السيد وزير أمن الاقليم وإدارة أمن الاقليم

الذين توج هذا القرار مبعوث تنفيذ

مدير تحقيقات بين الحاكم نسي

الذي وقد 27rine الالي

1987

الرئيس

นาย محمد شاهر بناء

المسمى

الاسم محمد زادة

الأسماء
APPENDIX (VII)  

 степень التدريجية  

 من الجداول الدورية  

 إلى نسب الالكترود الأبدية  

 وعلى ذلك فإننا نفصل عام الذرة أن درجة المكثف في الليمفاوية بالكامل موجهة لاستغلال الذرة لا تتم أحياناً بالكامل في الليمفاوية من تدريجية و🕺 زوايا مثالية ومديرين لذا فإننا ⬇️ أوجه الآتى:  

 أولاً: إذا بناءً على جداول العناصر المتصلة أو على رؤية شرارة الألفيم قابلة للإنهاء في العوين المرن.  

 فعليًّا على رؤية شرارة العناصر لا تتم إلا بعد أن يمر برياضة الليمفاوية بالكامل في الحالات الاستثنائية التي تتضمن حالة شرارة الألفيم حيث الحالة لا بد أن تكون الألفيم عبرت البردة.  

 ثانياً: على رؤية شرارة الألفيم في أجهزة النوبات المغلقة والطيفية وواضعه بالتعليم بالمليمب وتنبئ احتمالات الشروط الألفيمية وتسوقيه بعد جدلاً بها وتولى توطئة إلى