Keio University
Faculty of Law

Ph.D. Thesis

Conflict of Identity and Foreign Policy in the Sudan

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Introduction

The war problem in the southern Sudan has been with us intermittently since the independence of the country in 1956. One of the root causes of the problem is the fact that northern and southern Sudan are culturally and ethnically different. The problem is by far the most difficult and complicated problem facing the country today.

There is a general agreement that the war has left deep scars on all aspects of life in the Sudan. Many Sudanese believe that were it not for this problem, Sudan would have been one of the most developed countries in the area today. The close link between the problem and political instability is undeniable. The problem is seen also as responsible for the lack of consensus regarding the national identity. No wonder, therefore, that the problem and in a wider sense the multi-ethnic nature of Sudan has a strong influence on the country’s foreign policy. This is particularly so in Africa and the Arab world, since the two major divisions in the country’s ethnic map are the Arabic speaking Muslim north and the non-Arabic speaking largely non-Muslim south. As we shall see in the course of this study, this is in fact an oversimplification of the situation. But, generally speaking the war problem in the south created the impression that Sudan is
torn between its belonging either to Africa or the Arab world. Although this impression is largely misleading, the fact that Sudan's foreign policy is more biased toward the Arab world, in the sense that more attention is paid to relations with Arab countries, cannot be denied.

My personal experience as a diplomat for the last twenty years is, of course, one of reasons for choosing this subject. As a young diplomat attached to the Sudanese Embassy in Nairobi in the early 1970s, I was involved in the ambitious operation of the repatriation of refugees from East Africa and the rehabilitation of the Southern region after seventeen years of war and devastation. The operation itself was a model case of international and regional cooperation. I was also lucky to join the African Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Khartoum upon my return from Nairobi in the period from 1976 to 1978. That was the time when Sudanese relations with African countries were at their best after the peaceful solution of the war problem in southern Sudan. Sudan's success in Africa reached its climax during that period when the OAU held its annual Summit in Khartoum in July 1978. During the two years I spent at the African Department I was responsible for matters of Afro-Arab cooperation, and I was able to attend a number of meetings that allowed me to watch closely the efforts of Sudanese diplomacy to play the role of a link between Africa and the Arab world. I was also privileged to rejoin the African Department, albeit in different
circumstances and for a short period in 1989.

However, the most important reason for choosing this subject is my conviction that despite its importance, it is not yet ade-
quately explored by scholars inside or outside the Sudan. A number
of valuable books were written about the background and develop-
ment of the war problem in southern Sudan. But, very little
literature, if any, was written about the impact of this problem
on Sudanese foreign policy. In fact, research about Sudanese
foreign policy is still very limited and published works on the
subject are almost non-existent.

The war problem in southern Sudan, being the most important
problem facing the country, received a lot of attention from
scholars. Professor M.O. Beshir is one of the leading authorities
in the field. His two books Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict
and Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace dealt with the
historic background of the problem and attempts at its solution
in the Round Table Conference in 1965. Professor Beshir was the
rapporteur of the Conference. He edited another book on the subject
under the title Southern Sudan: Regionalism and Religion. The
book is a collection of articles written mainly by southern
Sudanese scholars after the Addis Ababa Agreement and dealt with
developments in the South since the advent of colonialism at the
turn of the century. The southern viewpoint was also included in
a number of works by southern scholars and politicians, the most
articles by a number of contributors including scholars such as Ali Mazrui, Peter Russel and Storza McCall. A more recent southern viewpoint is expressed in L.L. Mawut's 'The Southern Sudan: Why Back To Arms'. The book analyses reasons behind the outbreak of war in southern Sudan in 1991. The pre-colonial history of the region was dealt with in two important works; one by Richard Gray, 'A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889' and the other by Robert G. Collins, 'The Southern Sudan, 1885 - 1990'. A large number of books and articles have actually been written about southern Sudan but very few, if any, touched on the link between the problem and Sudan's foreign policy.

As for Sudanese foreign policy in general, writers usually deal with the matter as one chapter of their books on the Sudan. Therefore, information about and analysis of Sudanese foreign policy are scattered in a number of memoirs and books about Sudanese politics. With the exception of a few Arabic books on Sudanese-Egyptian relations, published works about the subject are very difficult to find. However, a small number of unpublished Masters and Ph.D. theses dealt with Sudanese foreign relations. Some of these theses have been used as reference material in this
Some articles were published in leading periodicals about the foreign relations of the Sudan. But in spite of the fact that all of them touched on the subject of the war problem in southern Sudan and its link to the country's foreign policy, only a handful of them were mainly devoted to that matter. And with the exception of one or two articles, the link between the war problem and foreign policy was tackled only from the narrow angle of foreign intervention.

To conclude, one can say that despite the importance of the subject, writings about it are far from satisfactory. A lot of effort is needed to explore the impact of war on the different aspects of Sudanese life. It is worth mentioning here that a good job was done during the National Dialogue Conference for Peace held in Khartoum in September and October 1989. The sub-committee studying the impact of war on different aspects of Sudanese life was able to collect a huge amount of statistics about the subject. The present study is only an attempt to explore the impact of conflict on but one aspect of life in the Sudan.

To overcome the scarcity of literature in the field, I had to depend on a variety of sources to collect data necessary for the study. Original documents were the main source of information. Publications and statements by different actors were studied and analysed to support or refute an argument. The Sudan National Archives (SNA) with its rich library was a great help, specially
for the period from the early '60s to the early '70s. Books and articles were yet another source of information particularly in the case of the first three chapters. Daily newspapers were very useful in covering the period since independence regarding developments of Sudanese foreign policy. For the period from 1985 to 1989 I depended mainly on the daily bulletin issued by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry and covering all aspects of Sudan's foreign relations. Since the bulletin and the newspapers are published in Arabic, I had the liberty of translating quotes and titles of articles without using transliteration sometimes. Of special importance were the discussions I had with a number of scholars, diplomats and politicians when I had the chance to attend sessions of the National Dialogue Conference for Peace and the Diplomats' Conference which were held in Khartoum at the end of 1989. These informal discussions helped to sharpen many points and ideas mentioned in the study.

The subject of this study is but one aspect of the multi-ethnicity of the Sudan. The study itself is an attempt to fathom the depth of this subject. If I succeeded, all the credit goes to Allah Almighty and those people who helped to bring this study to light, and if I failed then all the blame is mine. I hope that this modest contribution will induce others to study more about the subject and about Sudan in general.
Chapter One

Ethnicity and Foreign Policy

A Conceptual Framework

Ethnicity and the ethnic group

Tracking the history of the appearance of the term in major English language dictionaries, Glazer and Moynihan argue that ethnicity as the character or quality of an ethnic group is rather a new word.¹ However, the ethnic group itself is a very old concept that existed in societies at all levels of development and throughout recorded human history.

Ethnic groups have always been a major field of study for anthropologists and sociologists, who are mainly concerned with the culture traits of ethnic groups and the behaviour of their individual members. The resurgence of ethnicity in industrialized societies - a rather recent and amazing phenomenon - led to a sudden increase in studies that emphasize the political content of ethnicity as well.

In the course of time a large number of definitions for the term 'ethnic group' has been offered by social analysts. It is our intention to discuss here a few examples of these definitions to help us understand the general trend in the field, and construct the boundaries of the term as we intend to use it in this study.
In the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, H.S. Morris defines the ethnic group as, "a distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be, bound together by common ties of race or nationality or culture." The first part of this definition conceives of the ethnic group as a sub-group that possesses unique culture traits within a larger community. This conception is termed as 'old usage' by Glazer and Moynihan who argue that even the majorities such as the WASP in the United States, are in fact ethnic groups. But, the sub-group conception seems to be deep-rooted among American social analysts. For example, discussing the main features of an ethnic group, Martin N. Marger describes ethnic groups as, "subcultures, maintaining certain behaviour characteristics that, in some degree, set them off the mainstream or normal culture." The genesis of the sub-group conception could be traced back to the American experience where, with the exception of the forced emigration of the blacks from Africa, all other groups emigrated to the New World voluntarily in search of better economic opportunities. This voluntary immigration made it easier for the newcomers to adopt the culture of the dominant group and, when their ethnicity comes to surface, to portray themselves as a sub-group within the larger American society. Although these groups refused to melt completely in the American 'pot', not even in the darkest
hours of crisis, has anyone of these groups seriously considered invoking the right of national self-determination.

A different conception is found in the writings of European social analysts. There the ethnic group is not conceived as a sub-group within a larger society but "... as either coterminous with society conceived as a state or in some way close to being coterminous." An example of the European conception is the article of E.K. Francis in which he argues that the ethnic group is not "limited to ethnic fragments and minorities within a larger culture." In another part of the same article, he refers to the concept of an ethnic group as a nation when he states that, "An ethnic group, if we understand Delos [French sociologist J.T. Delos] rightly, would almost be identical with a nation which has not yet become fully conscious of itself."

In the European experience the term 'ethnic group' is closely linked to the principle of national self-determination. The spread of nationalist feelings and ideas all over the continent after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars gave rise to the question of oppressed ethnic groups who sought to secede from the Ottoman and Austria-Hungary empires and form their own nation-states. The disintegration of these empires in the First World War, coupled with the call to assert the right of national self-determination all over Europe, led to the attempt at the Peace Conference in Paris to redraw political boundaries in a manner to coincide as far as possible with ethnic boundaries. However,
preparing them for self-rule. But, in the wake of the Second World War, the oppressed majorities in the 'Third World' invoked the right of national self-determination and eventually achieved their political independence, albeit through a protracted and bloody struggle that cost millions of lives.

Having touched briefly on the two conceptions regarding the definition of the term 'ethnic group', we would like to turn now to the main features of an ethnic group included in the variety of definitions provided by social scientists. As it is the case with many concepts in the field of social sciences, the term 'ethnic group' is very ambiguous and despite the large number of definitions, or may be because of that, there is still a lot of controversy as to what really an ethnic group is. Moreover, our task is not made any easier by the fact that, like nation and nationality, the term 'ethnic group' is shrouded with ambiguous and subjective concepts. But, many phenomena in life have both objective and subjective qualities and it is our duty to try to strike a balance between the two qualities to be able to get a clearer picture. Emphasizing one quality at the expense of the
other will lead only to distortion and misunderstanding.

A main feature of an ethnic group is what Gordon refers to as, "the shared feeling of peoplehood". In spite of the fact that it is highly subjective, this feeling of distinctiveness and sense of peoplehood, which usually develops as a result of a long common history, is so important that some writers consider it the basis of ethnicity "reinforced by racial, religious and cultural differences." Equally important is the fact that a given group is a distinct ethnic group if it is so considered by other members of the society. As E.C. Hughes correctly indicates, an ethnic group is one "because the people in it and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs talk, feel and act as if it were a separate group." Tangible culture traits that actually distinguish one group from the other are not necessary for this belief held by the 'ins' and the 'outs'. Purely imagined differences lead in many cases to the same result.

Another important characteristic of an ethnic group is its unique culture traits. All social analysts consider culture as one of the basic factors that differentiate between ethnic groups. Culture is defined here in a sense to include those features characterizing the social life of an individual and reflects on the individual's behaviour such as language, religion and other cultural symbols. However, for self recognition by an ethnic group a referent is needed and this is usually provided when the group gets in contact with other groups. Without this kind of
Contact it may not be easy for the group to recognize its unique-
ness. As Connor puts it, "the sense of being unique or different
requires a referent, that is the concept of 'us' requires 'them'." 11

Contacts between ethnic groups are made even easier today as
a result of the revolutionary development in means of transport
and communication. In many parts of Africa and Asia previously
isolated groups are getting in closer contact with the outside
world and are able, as a result, to recognize not only the dif-
f erences between them and other ethnic groups within the same
country, but also the similarities they have with groups outside
their own country. Unlike the subjective sense of peoplehood,
unique culture traits are objective and tangible features that
can be easily recognized as different from one group to another.

A third characteristic of the ethnic group is the ascriptive
nature of its membership. Ethnicity is something that one acquires
at birth, and one is not free to change one's ethnicity whenever
one likes. To emphasize this point E.C. Hughes has this to say,
"If it is easy to resign from the group, it is not truly an
ethnic group." 12 Even in the most segmented societies, such as
the eighteenth and nineteenth century Dinka of southern Sudan or
Acholi of Uganda, change of ethnic identity was not an easy task
to accomplish. There were of course many cases of small groups or
individual immigrants adopting the culture of the dominant group,
such as white immigrants from Europe to the United States or
African tribes crossing borders into neighbouring countries. But,
ethnicity is interwoven with the fabrics of self-identity and "an individual can deny or abandon this ethnic identity only at great psychic risk;..."11

A fourth feature of the ethnic group that usually influences the political content of ethnicity is that of territoriality. Ethnic groups usually, but not always, occupy a distinct territory within a larger political unit, a phenomenon that some writers refer to as geo-ethnicity. This is often the case in Europe and Canada where ethnic groups such as the Basques, the Welsh, the Flemings and the French Canadians occupy defined territories. On the other hand, in the United States and Australia the case is different and members of ethnic groups are more dispersed within the community. In Africa, the coincidence of ethnic regional distribution and social cleavages was and still is at the roots of the majority of secessionist and communal conflicts in the continent. The concentration of the Ibo in south-eastern Nigeria, the non-Muslim African minority in the three southern regions of the Sudan, and the Eritreans in the northern part of Ethiopia are believed to be important factors behind the bloody conflicts that inflicted these countries.

Feelings and affiliations resulting from territoriality are not restricted to rural areas. With the fast pace of urbanization in the Third World, this phenomenon is also found within large urban centres. People coming from the same tribal or regional background tend to live in the same residential area in big towns.
In many cases, tribal names or names of areas in the region of origin are given to these residential areas as a symbolic and affectionate connection with the homeland. This fact adds sometimes to the intensity of the ethnic problem. For example, the massacres of Ibo tribesmen in the large urban centres in northern Nigeria are believed to be one of the precipitants of the civil war in that country. As we shall see later, some social analysts hold the view that urbanization helps to increase rather than decrease the intensity of ethnic identification.

Above is but a few of the characteristics of the ethnic group as they relate to the political content of ethnicity. It will only be presumptuous to claim that this brief account is exhaustive. Social analysts have in fact mentioned a variety of characteristics covering a wide area ranging from complexion and physical features to such abstract values as ethnocentrism. It is quite obvious, however, that to qualify for the term, an ethnic group needs not meet all conditions set by social analysts. To the Egyptian Coptic or Christian Lebanese religion plays a major role in group identity, while it is language that is more crucial for the Kurdish identity in Iraq and Turkey. For other groups it may be the colour of the skin that is of paramount importance. More important is the fact that ethnic identity is very fluid sometimes according to the social context. A northern Sudanese may be identified as Arab in the south, while in the north he may be identified on tribal basis. Yet, in other situations he may be
identified as African.

W.W. Isajiw differentiates between two types of definitions for the ethnic group to which he refers as the 'abstract' and 'specific' definitions. He argues that, "It is one thing to ask what ethnicity is, in general, regardless of place, but it is a different matter to ask what ethnicity means in North America, in Europe, among tribal societies, or among the second generation immigrants."¹⁴

The role of ethnicity in various societies, as conceived by social analysts, is no doubt influenced by the definition they adopt. For example, assuming that ethnic conflict like all forms of conflict results mainly from competition for a larger share of the scarce societal resources, and defining the ethnic group as a sub-group of a larger society, led many American social analysts to emphasize the role of the ethnic group as an interest-defined group. For instance, Glazer and Moynihan argue that, "One of the striking characteristics of the present situation is indeed the extent to which we find the ethnic group defined in terms of interest as an interest group."¹⁵ Although the role of the ethnic group as an interest-defined group pursuing tangible economic, social and political interests is increasingly gaining recognition, the subjective nature of ethnicity is still significant and the apparent change in the role of ethnicity is no more than a shift in emphasis whereby "the weight of tension has shifted from emphasis on cultural symbols as such to an emphasis on interest..."
broadly defined by members of the group.\textsuperscript{16} While this shift is easily recognized in industrialized societies, African ethnicity (usually referred to as tribalism) is still closely identified with primordial sentiments. There the concept is largely linked to things such as nation-building, integration and national identity.

The large differences in the role of ethnicity in developed and underdeveloped societies have led some writers to question the wisdom of using the same term to describe the situation in both groups of societies. John Porter argues that, "the ethnic identity of a Hutu or an Ibo must surely be of such profoundly different psychological quality and social consequences from that, say, of an Italian American or a Ukrainian Canadian that the subjective states involved are scarcely of the same order. It is questionable whether both can be considered primordial.\textsuperscript{17} Even within the advanced societies themselves ethnicity is not an absolute concept that manifests itself with the same intensity at all times. Cohen emphasizes this fact when he says, "it is common sense that the ethnicity of a collectivity that manifests itself in the form of an annual gathering of a few of its members to perform a dance or a ceremonial is different from the ethnicity manifested by, say, the Catholic in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{18} No doubt that manifestations of ethnicity by different groups and the role of ethnicity in various societies may take different forms, but it is very difficult to decide, on basis of this fact, how ethnic or unethnic is a group or an individual. Despite the

\textsuperscript{- 17 -}
great variations that the expression of ethnicity may take from one situation to another, we believe that at the core ethnicity is one and the same.

For the purpose of this study we intend to treat the southern Sudanese as a sub-group within a larger society. However, the nature and functions of this sub-group, which we shall discuss later, is quite different from that of sub-groups in industrialized societies. At one time, leading factions in the political movement in southern Sudan were calling for the application of the right of national self-determination, which brought them closer to the European concept as we have discussed it earlier. But, for practical reasons this option was dropped when the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) signed a peace accord with the Central Government in March 1972.

Salience and role of ethnicity

Talking about the phenomenon of the resurgence of ethnicity in developed societies, Glazer and Moynihan have this to say about the ethnic group, "Formally seen as survivals from an earlier age, to be treated variously with annoyance, toleration or mild celebration, we now have a growing sense that they may be forms of social life that are capable of renewing and transforming themselves." Using terms such as resurgence and revival gives the impression that at a certain stage ethnicity had, in fact, died out in industrialized societies. However, this may be a miscon-
ception about the vitality of ethnicity, arising from emphasizing the wrong factors. Some writers argue that functionalism that dominated anthropology and sociology until the 1960s, meant the study of ethnic groups in isolation and overemphasized the concept of assimilation.20

In political science and related fields Connor argues that, "Scholars associated with theories of 'nation-building' have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of minor impediments to effective state-integration."21 Nation-building theorists, according to Connor, tend to treat ethnicity slightly. To substantiate this point, Connor listed ten of the leading works on nation-building, mostly written in the first half of the 1960s, none of which includes even a major subheading on the matter of ethnic diversity.22 The belief that ethnicity will fade out as societies modernize was a common one among scholars at the time. As Rotchild eloquently puts it, "the conventional academic wisdom used to claim that modernization and development would defuse and dissolve this allegedly primordial sentiment of ethnicity or, at a minimum, would relegate it to a species of folkloric trivia."23 Furthermore, Connor suggests that most of nation-building theorists are directly or indirectly influenced by the writings of Karl Deutsch, despite the fact that his perception about nation-building "is not always clear and appears to have undergone significant fluctuations."24
In fact, misconceptions about ethnicity and its role in society were by no means restricted to the academic circles. In the 1960s the majority of African politicians showed a lot of impatience in regard to the persistence of ethnicity after independence. Some of them adopted policies that clearly reflected this impatience when they tried to integrate separate ethnic groups through the force of law. In most cases, these ill-conceived policies led to deterioration in the situation and the goal of national integration seemed to slip even farther.

Needless to say that recent empirical data have proved beyond any doubt the persistence of ethnicity not only in underdeveloped Third World societies, but in western industrialized societies as well. Of the 150 or more sovereign states only about fifteen could be considered as essentially homogeneous. But, even a country like Japan, counted among the most homogeneous in the world, has its ethnic Korean minority in addition to the small indigenous Ainu group. Listening to radio news from Canada to the Philippines, and from North Ireland to South Africa, ethnic conflict seems to be the dominant theme. In today's world the facts of human demography are simply too intricate to allow for such a neat and clean sweep of state borders exactly congruent with ethnic boundaries. Yancey et al argue that contrary to the common belief, industrialization and urbanization help in fact to consolidate ethnicity rather than destroy it. In view of the experience of the European immigrants in the United States, Yancey
at al conclude that new immigrants usually concentrate in indus-
tries expanding at the time of their arrival in the United States. 
This concentration, they go on arguing, leads to similar economic 
status, common social and economic interests, high degree of 
interpersonal association, and residential concentration—four 
factors that help to maintain and consolidate the group.

Salience of ethnicity is now an accepted fact in both 
internal and international politics. Ethnicity continued to sur-
vive even in the most developed communities because it performs 
functions that other forms of social organization cannot perform 
in today's complicated world. In the words of Burgess, ethnicity 
"combines interest with a symbolic tie." \(^{28}\) This affective content 
of ethnicity seems to give it the upper hand over other forms of 
social organization.

At the state level many factors help in consolidating the 
role of ethnicity. The decline in importance of factors such as 
class and ideology paved the way for the persistence of ethnicity 
as an important means for mobilizing individuals in pursuance of 
group interests. The liberal ideology stressing individual rights 
failed to address group interests expressed by minorities in 
many parts of the world. \(^{29}\) To rectify this situation, theories 
about elite accommodation and consociational democracy were form-
ulated. These theories stressed collective rights and enhanced 
the role of ethnicity as a vehicle for preserving the rights of 
minority groups. On the other hand, the effective role of ethnicity
as a means of group mobilization increased its importance for politicians who seek to promote group or personal interests. The efforts of these politicians to win votes of strategically concentrated ethnic groups is one of the factors that help to add to the importance of ethnicity in democratic advanced societies. In Africa, the exploitation of ethnicity to promote personal interests is so common among the élites that they were described at times as "the worst pedlars of tribalism."30

Notions such as the 'welfare state' and 'socialism' contributed to the increase in the role of the state in both advanced and developing countries. This fact gave rise to a new kind of ethnicity, specially in industrialized countries, where culture traits of an ethnic group such as language and religion are emphasized not for their own sake, but as a way of achieving economic and political benefits. While this fact indicates that ethnicity is capable of transforming itself to adapt to new situations, it also proves that the increasing role of the state as investor and distributor of wealth helps to strengthen the role of ethnicity. In such cases, leaders of ethnic groups are expected to carry out negotiations with the government on behalf of their groups.

In Africa, despite the fact that at the time of independence all African leaders raised the banner of national integration, which they interpreted as an end to divisions along ethnic lines, most of them ended up by following policies that consolidated
These movements are playing an increasing role in international politics. Terrorist actions are now widely used to attract international attention or to directly influence foreign policy decisions by targeted states. Ethnicity, however, need not be violent to express itself in international politics. Multi-ethnic states usually follow foreign policies that reflect their multi-ethnicity, whether their constituent groups live in conflict or in harmony. Moreover, the well-publicized activities of nationalist and separatist movements in the United Nations and international conferences is yet another feature of a changing world system with an increasingly rising number of actors.

A combination of factors has helped to augment the salience of ethnicity at the international level. In the following few paragraphs we will try to discuss briefly some of these factors.

The nation-state has been the centre of the international system for more than a century now, and it is still a major unit in the system. However, since the end of WW II other actors started to play a growing role and the nation-state is no more the sole unit in the system. A writer like Abdul Aziz Said goes to the extent of regarding concepts such as 'national interest' and 'nation-state' as artifacts of a remote international environment and he goes on arguing that, "the state is essentially a territorial form of organization in a century where security is no longer a function of geopolitics, but one of technology." He pursue his argument further by saying that today's inter-
national system is dominated by no more than twenty or thirty national and transnational actors, despite the proliferation of new states after WW II. A few states are in fact strong enough to set the rules of the game, and the majority of states in the Third World are more or less neglected. 'The nation-state as a unit of analysis,' Professor Said concludes, 'makes differences of degree so vast as to constitute differences in kind. Ethnic groups, on the other hand, appear to be far more comparable everywhere on earth's surface, and therefore a real as opposed to juridical construct for analysis.' One may find it difficult to agree with Professor Said regarding the imminent demise of the nation-state, but one cannot deny the fact that the relative decline in the importance of the nation-state is one of the main reasons behind the appearance of the ethnic group as an actor in international politics.

Despite the relative decline in the role of the nation-state, the principle of national self-determination on which the whole system is built is still a dominant factor in international relations. In the European political thought the idea of self-determination is linked to revolutionary and democratic notions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is basically linked to concepts such as the natural right, social contract and government by consent of the governed. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars played a great role in the spread of nationalism ideas and the link between these ideas and the principle of
national self-determination. The principle gained international recognition when it was included in President Wilson's famous fourteen points after the First World War. It was further entrenched in international documents after the end of WW II and "today, many international jurists agree that national self-determination is no longer solely a moral demand and a political principle, but in many circumstances a legal right recognized by international law."\[33\]

The application of the right of national self-determination has led in the nineteenth century to the building of states like Italy and Germany out of smaller ethnic units. The twentieth century version, however, was more related to the dismemberment of larger units and the appearance of smaller ones instead.\[34\] This trend led to the emergence of what came to be known as the micro-states, thus giving credence to claims by many ethnic groups who look for their own separate states. If a few hundred thousand Fijians can have their own state, why not ten million Iboes. Today's ethnic groups in Africa, Asia or Europe are no less entitled to nationhood than the ethnic nations that were born as a result of the dismemberment of the Ottoman and the Austria-Hungary empires, so goes the argument. Many arguments and counter-arguments could be put forward regarding the right of these groups in an independent state, but denying their right to nationhood may be very difficult to defend on moral grounds. Under prevailing circumstances in Africa, where secession is treated as

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taboo, a large number of the minority ethnic groups are convinced to give up the independence option, but continued instead to struggle for the right of being treated as nations within a multinational state. However, despite the fact that many ethnic groups in Africa have opted for lesser objectives, invoking the right of national self-determination is still "likely to be considered a possibility in a historical era that retains the coincidence between the state and the nation as a powerful ordering myth for political societies."  

Most of the controversy and misunderstanding in this field may be arising from the confusion between the terms 'nation' and 'state' which are sometimes used interchangeably. Regardless of this controversy there is no doubt that ethnicity, a pre-requisite for establishing a nation, is greatly enhanced at the international level partly because of the general acceptance of the principle of national self-determination that forms the basis of the nation-state system.

The discrepancy between political and ethnic boundaries in many parts of the world led to a situation whereby a limited number of countries, if any, are totally free of ethnic conflict. As a result of the failure to apply the principle of national self-determination in a just and comprehensive manner after the First World War, several ethnic minorities were left stranded in a number of European countries. In Africa and Asia borders were drawn by colonial powers to suit their own administrative needs
with total disregard to the existence and aspirations of the indigenous ethnic groups. The natural consequence of these arbitrary borders is that the same ethnic group is sometimes divided between two or more countries. This is the case of the Ewe who straddle borders between Togo and Ghana and the Somalis who are dispersed over a wide area in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The existence of the same ethnic group across international borders is one of the main reasons behind regional tensions in Africa.

The tremendous progress in the field of communication and transportation has influenced in many ways the intensity and duration of ethnic conflicts and added to the importance of ethnicity at the international level. This technological development made it easier for even the most isolated ethnic group to get in contact with the outside world and helped to increase levels of contact between foreign parties and different actors within a given state. As John F. Stack Jr. puts it, "vastly expanded communication and transportation networks reduce the control a state exercises over its internal environment." Hence, the proliferation of transnational actors including ethnic groups, control of mass media by developed democracies who are trying to propagate their liberal theories about individual rights, provides outlets for even the smallest ethnic group to address the international community and air its grievances. Violent and non-violent actions by an ethnic group in one part of the world, given publicity
in international mass media, can have a powerful demonstration effect on ethnic groups in other parts of the world. This could be easily explained by the large increase in hijacking incidents since the late 1960s. Connor argues that this demonstration effect is so important that, "perhaps an even more important factor in explaining the recent upsurge of militant ethnic consciousness in advanced as well as less advanced states involves not the nature or density of the communication media, but the message." 17 Many ethnic groups, realizing the passion of international mass media for big news, resort of terrorism as a means of attracting world attention.

With the progressively shrinking world where interdependence is the name of the game, there is an increasing tendency toward linkage between the foreign policy of a given state and its domestic situation. Issues that were treated in the past as merely domestic are now considered of regional and international significance. Apartheid, for example, is no more an internal matter that concerns only the government of the Republic of South Africa and the oppressed black majority there. It is an international issue that occupies foreign policy decision-makers everywhere. Until recently the common tradition of non-interference in the affairs of other states was carried in Africa to the extreme of turning a blind eye to incidents of gross human rights violations. But, this is no more the case and since the start of the 1980s more concern is being shown regarding domestic developments in
in other states, despite the fact that the principle of non-interference is still emphasized. In such an atmosphere, ethnic groups have better chances to express their views, and their claims are sometimes supported not for the sole purpose of destabilizing neighbouring countries but in accordance with lofty ideas concerning minority rights.

As a result of interaction between the different factors we have discussed above, the role of ethnicity is greatly enhanced at the international level and its link to foreign policy decisions is proved beyond any doubt. In the following section we will try to discuss in a rather detailed manner the actual role played by the ethnic group in the process of foreign policy decision-making in developed as well as developing countries. Since the purpose of this study is to discuss the connection between ethnic diversity and foreign policy in an African context, more reference to African foreign policy decisions will be made.

**Ethnicity and foreign policy**

As we have suggested in the previous section, in today's shrinking world interdependence is a major factor in international politics. In such circumstances it will be very difficult to separate between domestic and international politics. Foreign policy is directly influenced by internal developments, while at the same time internal developments are not immune to outside influence. Gone are the days of 'the splendid isolation'; what
process of decision-making.

On the other hand, the bureaucratic-organizational school is advocated by scholars such as Graham Allison and J.N. Rosneau. To this school, foreign policy decision-making is such a complicated process that it cannot be the exclusive prerogative of an individual or an elite group whatever its position in society may be. In fact, by spreading the responsibility of decision-making, this model gives more weight to the role played by the ethnic group. The advocates of this school admit that their model is more applicable to the developed countries where politics and decision-making are more institutionalized. Nevertheless, it is argued by Korany that a major pitfall of this model is that bureaucrats are, "... considered an autonomous group, virtually isolated from the structure and processes of their society." 42 Needless to say that ethnicity is now considered as a major factor in the structure of any society.

Realizing the shortcomings of the psychological and bureaucratic models, foreign policy analysts tend to use a combination of both. In view of the lack of a comprehensive theory, it can only be hoped that with the passage of time, "... data-based generalizations will be numerous enough to achieve a more credible theory of foreign policy decisions in the Third World." 43

Since ethnicity is believed to be one of the major factors behind conflicts in the world, it is only natural that it exerts considerable influence on foreign policies of many countries.

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This influence can take many forms and three of them, namely the role of ethnic pressure groups, the impact of ethnic conflict and the consequences of large human movements across international borders are of special interest to us here. However, although we are going to discuss these forms under separate sub-headings, we deem it necessary to stress at the outset the close link between the three of them.

a) Ethnic pressure groups:

As we have seen above, both the psychological and bureaucratic school recognize the role of ethnic pressure groups in foreign policy formulation. This role is specially important in multi-ethnic or multi-national states. In the United States, for example, foreign policy decision-makers are confronted with the fact that some citizens "couple loyalty to America with bonds of affection for one foreign country or another." At times of international conflicts involving their country of origin, these American citizens tend to organize into pressure groups that seek to influence American foreign policy toward these conflicts. The real political clout of American senators and congressmen and the lack of strict discipline within the two American political parties are factors that distinguish the American system from other multi-national democratic systems such as Canada or Australia, and help to strengthen ethnic and other foreign policy lobbies in Washington.

Cases of successful ethnic lobbying in the United States are
many, but suffice it here to mention a few of them. The success story in the history of American ethnic pressure groups is that of the Jewish lobby during the period that saw the creation of the State of Israel. Most of the advisors of President Truman, including his Secretary of State, were of the opinion that the recognition of the Jewish state was not in the national interest of the United States. But, due to active lobbying by the Jewish groups and in view of domestic political considerations, President Truman decided to ignore the advice of his associates and fully support the creation of Israel. This American unconditional support that evolved recently into a full strategic alliance was maintained primarily as a result of the active and influential Jewish lobby.

Another case whereby an ethnic group was able to influence American foreign policy is that of the Greek-Americans during the crisis in Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. The Greek-Americans led by the American Hellenic Institute were successful in bringing about the arms embargo resolution that went into effect on February 5, 1975. This resolution proved to be very harmful to the American national interest because it infuriated Turkey and led to the hampering of good relations between the United States and this strategically situated NATO member. At one stage Turkey threatened to close down American military facilities in its territories. Other congressional measures such as the 'Captive Nation Week' resolution of 1959 that was passed in solidarity with
peoples under communist rule, and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 regarding Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union are further proof of the strength of ethnic pressure groups in the field of foreign policy in the United States.

Ethnic groups play similar roles in other multi-national democracies such as Australia and Canada. However, due to differences in political systems, ethnic groups there do not have the power and influence that their counterparts possess in the United States. Nevertheless, in Australia, for example, ethnic groups play a significant role particularly in issues off the main stream of Australian foreign policy where the kinds of demands they place on decision-makers are "much more multifarious, though of smaller general impact."36 There are some cases in Australia when immigrants from Viet Nam and Eastern Europe communist countries are so active that they led to the embarrassment of the Australian government in its dealings with the governments of those countries. Canada, on the other hand, tries to have a carefully balanced aid policy toward Anglophone and Francophone Africa, in view of its domestic ethnic construction.47 This balanced policy was reflected in another area when Canada hosted the Second Francophone Summit in Quebec in September 1987, and only six weeks later it hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Vancouver.

Analysts of foreign policy of African states usually stress the idiosyncratic nature of this policy, where personal qualities
and psychology of political leaders are emphasized.\textsuperscript{48} The foreign policy of an African state is seen as an exclusive right of presidents and prime ministers, with very little or no influence from the public opinion and pressure groups, thus fitting more easily in the psychological-perceptual model we have discussed earlier. It is in fact an oversimplification to draw such neat generalizations about a continent as wide as Africa with more than fifty independent states of various sizes and different backgrounds. Therefore, the psychological-perceptual model may explain foreign policy decisions in some African countries but not in others. Moreover, it is not wise to rule out any possibility of a role by public opinion, particularly ethnic groups, because even when these groups are not active in the field of foreign policy, "in many multi-ethnic states considerations of how a given foreign policy will and should affect the domestic ethnic balance continuously and decisively influence foreign policy formulation."\textsuperscript{49} In the recent history of Africa there are in fact very few cases where African leaders have for a long period of time "consciously followed policies abroad that served hopelessly to divide their people at home."\textsuperscript{50}

To support this viewpoint a few examples of successful efforts by pressure groups in the area of foreign policy in Africa could be cited here. For example, the tremendous pressure by the murohbat\textsuperscript{\textit{m}} Muslim leaders in Senegal is believed to be one of the main factors behind the decision by President Senghor not to
recognize Biafra despite continuous pressure from France. In fact, most of Muslim African French-speaking countries supported the case of the Federal Government in Nigeria, in spite of the obvious French sympathies with the separatists in Biafra. Another case in point is the active lobbying by the Action-group party against the British-Nigerian defence pact in 1963. The party was successful in mobilizing public opinion to pressure the government who eventually arrogated the agreement. Although one cannot claim a major role for ethnic groups in foreign policies of African countries comparable to that played by similar groups in the United States and other multi-ethnic democracies, one cannot but recognize that this form of pressure politics is gaining ground in many African countries.

b) Ethnic conflict:

Ethnic conflict is a common phenomenon in today's world. As we have seen in the previous section when we discussed solience of ethnicity, very few states are free of ethnic conflict although the intensity of conflict vary greatly from one case to another. Ethnic conflicts are believed to 'have peculiar characteristics that place them in the area where domestic and international politics interact'.

The link between ethnic conflict and the right of national self-determination generally leads to a growing interest in the conflict by outside powers. The very fact that ethnic conflict
raise questions pertaining to the legitimacy of the government concerned calls for reaction from other members of the international community. Although attempts at invoking the right of national self-determination could be observed in developed as well as developing societies, the situation is usually more serious in the new states where the lack of an overarching national identity helps to intensify the conflict. Katanga, Siafra and Bangladesh are few examples where the link between ethnic conflict and the right of national self-determination had led to intervention by outside powers.

Ethnic conflicts are usually based on prejudices held through a long history of contact between ethnic groups, and they tend to expand over long periods of time. Because of their comprehensiveness and due to the transgenerational nature of ethnic affiliations themselves, ethnic conflicts are very hard to die out. Despite the fact that violent conflict may be relatively short in duration like in the case of Biafra, it is usually very intense and the facts underlying the conflict itself are generally of long term nature. The perpetuity of the conflict, whether in an active or dormant form, encourages its parties to look for outside assistance thus inviting foreign intervention. A network of contacts which could be activated when needed is usually established, and some members of this network may even develop, for their own reasons, a special interest in the continuation of the conflict. These are many cases in Africa where parties to
a conflict were able to reactivate a network of contacts, wholly
or partially, years after the cessation of hostilities and despite
political and ideological reorientation of some of its members.

The lack of coincidence between ethnic and political borders,
specially in the Third World, is not only a main reason behind
incidents of ethnic conflict, but plays a major role also in the
fact that these conflicts spill over international boundaries.
Conflicts involving ethnic groups divided between two or more
states are likely to have regional and international dimensions.

The traditional conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in both
Rwanda and Burundi, for example, greatly affects relations between
these two African neighbours. On the other hand, the mere exist-
ence of ethnic Somalis in four different African countries led to
a serious situation that ultimately involved the two super
powers. Addressing the problem of borders in one of its first
conferences, the OAU adopted the well-known resolution of the
inviability of international borders as they were inherited at
the time of independence. But, despite this far-sighted decision,
Africa was not spared the agony of regional wars that are caused
by border incidents, or the interference by some of the OAU mem-
bers in the affairs of others.

Outside intervention in ethnic conflicts does not necessarily
take a negative form, such as siding with one party of the con-
flict against the other or intervening in the internal affairs
of another state by inciting disgruntled groups. There are some
cases in Africa where this intervention took the form of mediation between the conflicting parties or cooperation among neighbouring countries.

Ethnic conflicts can also affect foreign policies of African countries in an indirect way. Protracted ethnic conflicts result in weakening the affected countries socially, economically and politically. The behaviour of such weakened countries in regional and international affairs are usually erratic and unpredictable. Moreover, the existence of ethnic conflict may lead a country, in some cases, to follow an adventurous foreign policy particularly if neighbouring countries are suffering from similar ethnic situations. Accusations and counter-accusations regarding the exploitation of neighbours’ ethnic difficulties are not so uncommon in Africa. To give but one example, since the start of the 1980s Ethiopia has been supporting disgruntled elements in both Sudan and Somalia with the hope of pressuring both countries to cooperate in solving Ethiopia’s own ethnic problem, or keeping them busy enough not to extend any meaningful assistance to anti-government elements.

c) Immigrants and refugees

It is a generally accepted fact that the movement of large numbers of people across international borders is a major factor behind the ethnic composition of receiving countries. Consequently, this kind of movement is an important ingredient in relations
among states. In today's complicated international picture the
effect of mass movements may not be confined to relations between
the host country and that of origin, but it may as well be ref-
elected in the host country's foreign policy as a whole. Discussing
this point, Glazer and Moynihan reached the conclusion that,
"immigration policy is foreign policy." [3] This phenomenon is
not a new one in international relations. For instance, the re-
sion of the Japanese government to legislations by the State
of California at the beginning of this century, aimed at
restricting the immigration of cheap Japanese labour to the West
Coast, and the effect that these legislations had on Japanese
American relations is an indication as to how immigration can
directly influence relations between states. Moreover, these
legislations are believed to have affected the strategy of the
Japanese delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris at the end
of the First World War.

As we have already seen immigration from Europe to the
United States, Canada and Australia is a major factor behind the
ethnic composition of these countries and is directly related to
foreign policies adopted by them. In recent years, great numbers
of immigrants are moving from the Third World to these countries
and other developed countries in Europe despite the increasingly
strict immigration laws. Most of these movements are due to the
worsening economic conditions in Third World countries, and they
pose serious foreign policy questions, of both short and long
term nature, to decision-makers in host countries.

The picture in Africa is quite different. With the exception of the Republic of South Africa and countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique where white settlers came from Europe, most of human movements were intra-continental. Until the beginning of this century these movements were largely voluntary. The nature of African societies, where no strong taboos or sanctions against mixed marriages exist, was a great help in the acculturation and assimilation or at least peaceful co-existence.

However, as a result of the introduction of the nation-state concept by the European colonial powers, this natural human movement among African societies was largely blocked. Moreover, the quest for conformity within the African nation-states gave rise to the refugee problem, one of the worst problems facing Africa at present.

The majority of refugees in Africa are concentrated in the most unstable regions in eastern and southern Africa. The refugee is a very special type of immigrant. He is destitute; he leaves in a hurry with no proper preparations; he is usually a member of an ethnic group that is in conflict with the government of his country of origin; and he tends, at least in the initial stage of his flight, to take refuge in a neighbouring country. Needless to say that the refugee problem is closely linked to the foreign policies of the countries affected. In the short run, the sudden influx of refugees poses some very serious security, economic,
social and political problems for the countries involved. In the long run, the existence of refugees may lead to further complications in the ethnic composition of the recipient community.

The 'Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problem in Africa' was adopted by the OAU on September 10, 1969. The main purpose of the Convention was to deal with the legal, economic and political problems related to refugees in Africa. Relations between the country of origin and that of asylum is one of the most important issues dealt with in the Convention. The deliberations leading to the adoption of the Convention were, to a great extent, influenced by the experience of many African states in the early sixties when interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries was not so uncommon. The concern of African leaders with the destabilizing nature of the existence of refugees in neighbouring countries is clearly reflected in article 2(6) of the Convention that calls for resettlement of refugees as far as possible from border areas, and in article 3(2) that reads as follows:

"Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from attacking any State Member of the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio."

On the other hand, the humanitarian nature of the refugee problem enabled African states to attract, through concerted
This chapter is meant to be the theoretical basis of our study about ethnicity, conflict of identity and foreign policy in the Sudan. I have, therefore, discussed in some detail various definitions of the term 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' in addition to the main features of the ethnic group, to help us draw the boundaries of the term as we intend to use it here. I concluded that with due regard to the special circumstances in the Sudan, I intend to treat the southern Sudanese as a sub-group within the larger Sudanese community. Despite the fact that the right of national self-determination has played a role in the historical development of the southern Sudan political movement, invoking this right was dropped as an option in the early 1970s, and in this study the region will be dealt with as part and parcel of a united Sudan.

Salience of ethnicity in both developed and developing societies was also discussed and reasons for this phenomenon were explored. Salience of ethnicity was discussed at the state and international levels. The role of ethnicity as a major social force that greatly influences domestic and international politics.
was emphasized.

In the last section of this chapter I discussed the link between ethnicity and foreign policy. A special attention was paid to the foreign policies of African countries, but the role of ethnicity as a determinant of foreign policy in advanced countries was also discussed. Ethnicity seems to play an important role in the foreign policies of African states despite the fact that ethnic groups there are not so active in this field. The influence of ethnicity on foreign policy in Africa is a neglected area that needs to be further explored.
Notes

3) Glazer & Moynihan, op. cit. p. 4
5) Naevolod W. Isajiw, "definitions of Ethnicity" *Ethnicity*, 1, 2, July 1974 pp. 111 - 124
7) Ibid.
12) Hughes & Hughes, op. cit.
14) W.W. Isajiw, op. cit.
15) Glaser & Moynihan, op. cit. p. 7

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16) N. Elaine Burgess, "The resurgence of ethnicity: myth or reality" Ethnic and Racial studies, 1, 3, 1978

17) John Porter, "Ethnic Pluralism in Canada: Perspectives" in Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit. p. 292


19) Glazer & Moynihan, op. cit. p. 4

20) M.E. Burgess, op. cit.

21) Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World politics, 24, 3, April 1972

22) Ibid.


24) Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" op. cit. The following discussion owes much to the arguments of Mr. Connor in this invaluable and highly enlightening article.


26) Joseph Rothchild, op. cit. p. 14


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28) M.E. Burgess, op. cit.
29) Joan Porter, op. cit.
32) ibid. p. 4
33) B. Neuberger, op. cit. p. 5
36) John F. Stack Jr. op. cit. p. 21
37) Walker Connor, "Nation-Building ........." op. cit. p. 331
39) Bahgat Korany, "Foreign Policy Models and Their empirical relevance to third-world actors: a critique and an alternative" International Social Science Journal, 26, 1, 1974
42) B. Korany, How Foreign Policy, ...., op. cit
43) Ibid. - 49 -
45) C. Bell, M. Collins, J. Jupp & W.D. Rubenstein. Ethnic Minorities and Australian Foreign Policy, (1983, Australian National University, Canberra)
46) Ibid.
47) Astrid Suhrke & Lala G. Noble, op. cit.
49) Suhrke & Noble, op. cit. p. 3
50) Aluko, op. cit. p. 6
52) Suhrke & Noble op. cit.
53) Glazer & Moynihan, op. cit.
Chapter Two

Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism
in the Sudan

Jihd-al-Sudan or 'the land of the blacks' is the name that the medieval Arabs gave to the area occupied by the black races in Africa. Historically this term was applied to the area immediately south of Egypt and the Sahara and extending from Somalia and Ethiopia in the east to Senegal in the west. The Republic of the Sudan is the only country in Africa today that keeps the historical name. But, historians still use the term in its wider sense sometimes, thus creating some confusion. To avoid this confusion, the term will be applied in the course of this study only to the Republic of the Sudan within its recognized international borders, and attention will be drawn whenever the term is used in its wider sense.

Sudan is the largest country in Africa with an area of 2.5 million square kilometres. The country is bordering eight African states: Egypt and Libya to the north; Chad and Central African Republic to the west; Zaire, Uganda and Kenya to the south; Ethiopia to the east in addition to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea. This strategic location and the sheer size of the country allowed Sudan to enjoy a median position between extremes. For example, lying between Egypt with its total depend-
ence on the Nile and Uganda with its heavy rainfall, Sudan enjoys a variation of climatic conditions. Moreover, facing the Red Sea only in the extreme northeast, Sudan is not a landlocked country but some areas in its hinterland are farther from the sea than those in landlocked countries such as Rwanda, Burundi or Zambia.¹

The central and strategic location of the country, combined with a number of factors including topography, climate, politics, etc., helped to make the Sudan a converging point for waves of migration from inside and outside the African continent, hence the description given to it by many writers as the microcosm of Africa. Within the borders of Sudan today more than one hundred languages are spoken and no less than fifty ethnic groups with almost six hundred sub-groups are living.² Representatives of four of the five races that are believed to have inhabited Africa since the Palaeolithic period: the Bushmanoid, the Caucasian, the Negroid and the Pygmy have possibly occupied parts of Sudan at one point of time or another during its long history.³

The general picture in Sudan today is such that the north is mostly Arab and Muslim while the south is mostly African and non-Muslim. A closer look, however, reveals the over-simplification included in this statement. There is a great deal of variations and contradictions within each part of the country and the picture is, in fact, much more complicated. As we shall see later, neither the north nor the south could be considered as a monolithic entity. While Islam is a major unifying force in the north, many groups still retain their unique culture traits including language despite their total Islamization. In the south, ten years of regional

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autonomy from 1972 to 1982 have shown that ethnicity rather than regionalism is the basis of identification.

Ethnic and cultural pluralism in the Sudan led to a severe conflict of identity that crippled the country for more than thirty years since its independence in January 1956. This conflict will be the subject matter of the following chapter. In this chapter, however, it is our intention to trace back in history the emergence of the major ethnic groups that form the constituent elements of Sudan today and discuss the dynamics behind the ethnic composition of the country as it stands at present.

In view of the great differences between the northern and southern parts of the country, it may be easier for the purpose of this study to discuss them separately. However, since the Arab penetration into Sudan after the seventh century A.D. is, perhaps, the most important single element that led to the present complicated ethnic and cultural map of the country, the first section of this chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the ethnic picture in Sudan before the coming of the Arabs in the seventh century. We hope that this discussion will help put Arab migration into perspective and enable us to better understand the present situation.

1-Sudan before the seventh century

When the first contact between the Arab Muslims and northern Sudan took place after the conquest of Egypt in the mid-seventh century, the country is believed to have been inhabited by three
major ethnic groups: the Nubians on the Nile, whose Christian
kingdoms of al-Maqurra and Alwa extended from the southern borders
of Egypt deep into central Sudan; the Beja, occupying the arid
areas between the Nile and the Red Sea; and the Negro tribal
groups who inhabited parts of the southern Christian kingdom of
Alwa and sparsely populated large parts of southern and western
Sudan.

In the following few pages we will discuss briefly these
three groups, their origins and distribution in the Sudan before
the seventh century.

a) The Nubians

Today, Nubia refers to the area of southern Egypt and northern
Sudan. However, during its long history Nubia was able to expand,
culturally if not ethnically, to cover wide areas to the south and
the north of its present borders. Excavations in the area in the
late 1950s and early 1960s before the completion of the Aswan High
Dam revealed that Man inhabited the area of Wadi Halfa on the
borders with Egypt almost 50000 years ago, and that these pre-
historic Sudanese were able to develop a distinct culture that could
be recognized by historians and archaeologists thousands of years
later.4

There is no agreement among scholars regarding the origins of
the Nubians, and the numerous waves of migration to which the area
was exposed in the last five of six thousand years does not make
research in this field any easier. However, A.J. Arkell argues that
there are two main physical types of people in Sudan today; the

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Brown or Mediterranean and the negro, and he classifies the Nubians together with the Beja and the Arabs as members of the former. 5

Archaeologists speak of a group of people they call the 'A group' that inhabited Nubia during the First Dynasty period in Egypt and whom they consider as belonging to the Brown or Mediterranean race. Graves of the A group excavated inside modern Sudan indicate close relations with Egypt of the First Dynasty. The A group was followed by a B group which is not basically different in ethnic terms but much inferior culturally. Between 2240 and 2150 B.C. another group designated as the 'C group' appeared in Nubia. The C group people are believed to have come to Nubia from the south, a fact that led some historians to classify them as negroid. But, Arkell argues that, "It is, however, quite possible that the C group were related, physically and culturally, to the A group. Physically both people belonged to the Brown or Mediterranean race, and despite published statements to the contrary, there were only the slightest negroid characteristics in any of the C group skulls." 6

The C group culture was not restricted to the area of Nubia and many of its traces are found as far south as the Nuba mountains in southern Kordofan and as far north as Kom Ombo in Egypt. It may be very difficult to conclude, on the strength of these facts, that these areas were under direct control of the Nubians, but it is quite obvious that contacts with them were established at one time or the other. There are also some indications that the C group people may have originated in southern Libya. 7

During its long history Nubia was exposed to various forms of
influence from the outside world, a fact that must have left a deep impact on the ethnic composition of the area. The strongest influence came, no doubt, from Egypt but Nubia was exposed at times also to cultures and migratory waves from the east, west and south. Since the time of the Middle Kingdom there was a steady infiltration of Egyptian elements and later Egypto-Arab elements that helped to counter-balance and decrease in importance the negro factor in the area. Nubia was culturally Egyptianized during the Eighteenth Dynasty (1580 - 1350 B.C.) but it is doubtful that immigration from Egypt during this period was strong enough to change the ethnic picture in the area. This acculturation, however, was so complete that Kashta, a Nubian king, succeeded in establishing the Twenty Fifth Dynasty (750 - 654 B.C.) that was able at its zenith to control the whole of Lower Egypt and parts of modern Syria.

About 440 B.C. the political capital of Nubia was moved southward to Meroe, while the religious capital remained at Napata. The movement of the political capital to Meroe was a step of great significance. Moving farther south helped Nubia to come out of the shadow of Egypt and start developing its own culture characterized by a mixture of Egyptian, Libyan, Nubian and Negro elements. It is also probable that the movement southward made the new culture more exposed to negroid influences. There is even an argument that the ultimate fall of Meroe was due, in the first place, to movements by negroid tribes that pushed up from Kordofan and the Gezira.

One may assume that when the Muslim-Arabs first contacted Nubia in the mid-seventh century, they found a Nubian race that
was essentially of pre-dynastic Egyptian and Libyan origins. However, during its four thousand years history prior to its contact with the Muslim-Arabs Nubia was at times strong enough to expand southward and at others weak enough to be attacked by people from the south. This fact has consequently led to a remarkable mixture with the negroid races to the south.

b) The Beja

The Beja is a Hamitic-speaking race that occupies the area between the Nile and the Red Sea. They are believed to have replaced an earlier primitive group of hunters who inhabited the region around 4000 B.C. Some writers try to explain the negroid element in the Beja of today as an influence of these early inhabitants who are now extinct, but this negroid element is most probably a later introduction among the Beja since it is more apparent among the southern tribes.

The discovery of gold as early as 3000 B.C. made Beja country very attractive for outsiders. There is a possibility that the first expedition with the purpose of exploiting the gold deposits in the area arrived there during the Fifth Dynasty (2575 - 2425 B.C.). The pharaohs of Egypt followed the policy of sending political opponents, captives, criminals and misfits to work the gold mines under appalling conditions. As a necessary precaution these expeditions were usually accompanied by large garrisons to protect the mines and possibly to guard against any escape attempts or mutinies by the mine workers. The Beja at the time were probably a small...
group scattered over a wide area, and the existence of the large garrisons around the mines must have scared them off and led consequently to very small, if any, mixture with Egyptian mine workers.

The Egyptians continued to exploit the mines as long as they could depending on favourable political and economic conditions. But, there were times when the mines were abandoned and closed down.

Around 300 B.C. Egypt fell to the Ptolemites who showed deep interest in the gold mines in Beja country as well as the Red Sea trade, specially trade with the hinterland. A. Paul argues that, "... the three hundred years of Ptolemaic exploitation of the gold mines and the Red Sea trade were productive, in so far as the Beja are concerned, of far greater and more obvious results than the much longer period of similar exploitation by Dynastic Egypt. The Greek mercenaries whom the Ptolemites employed to garrison and administer the mines and ports, and the merchants who traded in them, were an adventurous type, and the legend of them is still green along the coast as the Rum, a white race of giant stature, who intermarried with local tribes and developed the country with energy and ability, digging cisterns (traces of some of which can still be found), encouraging agriculture, and adapting themselves generally to the life of the country." In spite of the praise that Mr. Paul showers on the Ptolemites, it is quite doubtful whether they have actually left any impact on the Beja specially in ethnic terms. If they did intermarry with the Beja they must have been completely assimilated in the local popu-

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lация since no Greek traces are now discernible among the Beja.

One of the most effective waves of immigration to the Beja country is that of the Sabaeans, who crossed from southern Arabia to the African coast around 1000 B.C. The Sabaeans crossed into what is now known as the Tigre Highlands. Finding an area sparsely inhabited by southern Beja tribes and very similar in climate and topography to their own, they decided to settle there. The new immigrants were able to impose on the indigenous population not only their language and their religious beliefs, but also the feudal conception of society imported from their homeland, some measure of their artistic ability, and a not inconsiderable admixture of their blood as a result of intermarriage and concubinage.\(^{13}\)

The influence of the Sabaeans was so profound that even at that early stage southern and northern Beja started to develop on different cultural and ethnic lines. At present the northern Beja are still using a Hamitic language while their southern brethren have for a long time adopted the Tigre, a Semitic language.

During the Roman era a mysterious race, identified by contemporary European historians and adventurers as the Blemmyes, appeared in the Nile Valley. Some writers suggest that the Blemmyes are identifiable with the modern Beja, while others consider them a totally different race. A third group argue that the Blemmyes are in fact a barbaric Beja race of primarily nomadic habits dominating a fairly highly-cultured subject people.\(^{14}\) However, in view of the scarce information regarding this mysterious race, its origin may remain only a matter of conjecture for some time.
c) The Negroes

The third major race inhabiting Sudan before the coming of the Muslim-Arabs in the seventh century is the negro race that is believed to have occupied the larger part of what is known today as the Republic of the Sudan.

It is very difficult to state with any accuracy when Man first appeared in the Sudan, but archaeologists and anthropologists say that the first inhabitants of Sudan were most probably primitive Bushmen who lived on hunting. The Bushmen are believed to have inhabited most of Africa before being pushed southwards by the negro race. The negro race itself started to multiply probably around 5000 B.C., almost at the time when climate conditions in the continent were undergoing a drastic transformation that led to the creation of the Sahara, which in turn deeply influenced the course of human development in Africa.  

Archaeological excavations around Khartoum have shown that the inhabitants of the area during the Neolithic Age were heavy built negroes whose physical features are not similar to those of today's negroes. These early inhabitants lived on fishing and hunting and their pottery was found along the Nile from Kerima to Kosti, and between Wadi Howar in Dar Fur and Kassala, which clearly indicates that they inhabited almost all the area of northern Sudan. Another site at Kh Shaheinab about fifty kilometers north of Omdurman, excavated in 1949 yielded a kind of pottery similar to that of the early Khartoum negro but considerably developed. It is unfortunate that the inhabitants of Kh Shaheinab site did not leave any human
remains to enable us to decide whether they were negro or not, but Arkell says that, "... it is probable that, since the pottery patterns are related to those made by the negroid people of early khartoum, there was still at least a negroid element in the popu-
lation." 16

It is still too early to reach any conclusions about the old history of Sudan because excavations are very limited, and most of the archaeological activity is concentrated in northern Sudan. Very few excavations, if any, were carried in other parts of the country. Therefore, it will be next to impossible to speak with any certainty about the distribution of ethnic groups in pre-historic Sudan, and how these old groups are linked to the ethnic composition of the country today. However, the three groups we have discussed in this section are still well represented in the Sudan and they are still playing an important role in its social and political life.

This was, to a great extent, the ethnic picture of Sudan at the mid-seventh century. In the following section we will discuss the arrival of the Muslim-Arabs and the complications it added to this picture.

II Arabisation and Islamisation of Northern Sudan

although we have conveniently chosen the mid-seventh century as the point in time when Arab influence in Sudan started to spread, that was by no means the beginning of contacts between the two. Geographical proximity of the African coast to Arabia, the existence of strong states in southern Arabia and their familiarity with sea-
Eering, and periodically harsh climatic conditions in Arabia have
at various times combined to push the Arab tribes across the Red
Sea to Eritrea and Sudan. We will start here by discussing pre-
Islamic contacts between Sudan and Arabia, and later we will discuss
contacts after the coming of Islam.

(i) Pre-Islamic Contacts

The Sabaean and Himayrite kingdoms of southern Arabia have
a long history of contacts with Africa across the Red Sea.
Accordingly, Philip Nitti argues that, "Along the whole coast of
East Africa there was an infusion of Arabian blood of far earlier
origin than the Moslem invasion."17

As we have seen earlier when we were discussing the Beja, the
south Arabian were credited with bringing into the Tigré Highlands
advanced social and political systems that, some writers argue, are
determinant factors in the eventual creation of the Axumite Kingdom.
This Arabian early presence was further consolidated after the
collapse of the famous Ma'arib Dam towards the middle of the sixth
century A.D. But, the relationship between Ethiopia and southern
Arabia was not a one way traffic and there were many instances in
history when the Ethiopians were ruling vast areas of southern
Arabia. The term Ethiopia is usually employed by medieval Arab
writers to include the whole East African coast including Sudan,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and possibly Somalia.

Some Arab traditions claim that the Himayrite King Abraha
Dhul-Mannar invaded Bilad al-Sudan around the end of the second
century A.C. This tradition gained support from no less than the
famous Arab historian Ibn Khaldun who argues that the North African Berber tribes of Kitama and Sanhaja are remnants of this invasion. Professor Hasan is doubtful about this claim by Ibn Khaldun but concludes that, "... these legends may retain a memory of Himyarite migration from the Yemen."18

Although details of specific historical facts such as those we have just mentioned may need more substantiation, there is no doubt that trade between Arabia and Egypt continued since pre-dynastic times and the Red Sea ports have always played a major role in this trade. Moreover, nearly two thousand years before the Christian era, inscriptions of the Twelfth Dynasty mention prosperous trade with the Arab Beduins of the Sinai Desert, yet another possible route of Arab migration into Egypt and Sudan.

In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that long before the advent of Islam in the seventh century Arab elements have actually infiltrated into Sudan through three major routes; through the Eritrean coast from the southeast, through Egypt from the north, and directly through the Red Sea from Arabia. As MacMichael indicates, "It may therefore be regarded as more than probable that the ever-increasing infiltration of Arabs from these three directions, and their converging movements up and down the common highway of the Nile, whether in search of trade or pasture, had by the beginning of the seventh century led to implanting at various points of a definite, if racially indeterminate Arab strain in the population of northern Sudan."19
Post-Islamic Contacts

Regarding the numbers of Arab immigrants to the Sudan, the Egyptian route was by far the most important. Therefore, the political situation inside Egypt and the position of the Arab tribes there are two important factors in determining the size and speed of the Arab inflow into the Sudan. The process of Arabization and Islamization can be discussed under three phases; the first two are related to developments in Egypt, while the third is closely linked to events inside Sudan itself.

The first phase extends from the mid-seventh century to the mid-ninth century and was characterized by the prominence of the Arab element in Egyptian social and political life. The second phase extends from the mid-ninth century until the eventual fall of the Sudanese Christian kingdom of al-Maqrira at the beginning of the fourteenth century. This phase was characterized by the continuous rise in the influence of non-Arab elements in Egypt. The third phase starts with the conversion of al-Maqrira and the fall of its capital city Damiya, that represented the last stumbling block in the face of Arab penetration into Sudan.

First Phase: 642 - 662 A.D.

The Muslim conquest of Egypt started with a small army of about 4000 men under the leadership of Amr ibn al-As in December 639. This army was later reinforced by a 12000 men strong fighting force and the invasion was completed when Alexandria fell to the Muslims in November 641. The oppressive Roman rule and their bitter
conflict with the indigenous Coptic Church made the job of the Muslims easier. They were received by the Egyptians as liberators and the tolerant policy they followed, allowing the Copts to keep their churches, crosses and above all their land, won them the hearts of the local population.

To keep the fighting qualities of the Arab tribesmen who formed the backbone of the fighting Muslim force, and possibly to avoid conflict with local population the Khalifa (Caliph) Umar ibn al-Khattab prohibited any acquisition of land by members of the Arab tribes. This policy was later on relaxed but it helped to a large extent in keeping the nomadic nature of many Arab tribes in Egypt, and it is these nomadic tribes that migrated to Sudan in later years. As MacMichael correctly argues, "It would of course be those of the tribesmen who settled in the large towns or took to cultivation of the river banks who chiefly intermarried with the older Coptic population and remained in Egypt: the more nomadic tribes would naturally be more exclusive, and incidentally less eligible, in the matter of intermarriage, and such of them as penetrated in later years into the Sudan were probably still as purely Arab as when they entered Africa."20 As we shall see later, some argue that these nomadic tribes keep their ethnic purity even today.

Once the conquest of Egypt was completed an expedition was sent to Nubia under the leadership of Abdullah ibn Sa'ad ibn Abil-Sarb who attacked Dongola in 641. However, the Muslims were met with stubborn resistance and many of them fell victims to the
dexterous Nubian archers, unable to defeat the Nubians decisively. Abdullah negotiated for an agreement known as the Baqt. The term 'Baqt' came to be used later to mean only the annual tribute specified in the agreement.

Abdullah, who succeeded Amr ibn al-As as governor of Egypt, attacked Dunqula again in 651/2, probably in response to Nubian breach of the agreement and their attack on Upper Egypt. Once again the Muslims failed to achieve a decisive victory, but it was the Nubians who asked for peace this time. It seems that the Muslims insisted on a written document and a more comprehensive Baqt was signed between the two. In view of the importance of this agreement that formed the cornerstone of Arab-Nubian relations for hundreds of years, we reproduce here its full text that runs as follows;
slave of a Muslim or kill a Muslim or a dhimmel or attempt to destroy the mosque which the Muslims have constructed in the centre of your city or withhold any of the three hundred and sixty slaves, then the truce and the security shall be abolished and we shall revert to hostility until God decides between us and He is the best judge.

The agreement continued to govern relations between the two sides for more than six hundred years. Its importance stems from the fact that, despite some periods of worsened relations, it provided the atmosphere that allowed the Muslims to trade peace-fully with Nubia. And, although article (3) clearly stipulates that the Muslims should not settle in Nubia, it is quite doubtful if this was the case for long. Therefore, many historians agree that the agreement was one of the factors that led to the eventual Arabization and Islamization of Sudan.

Relations between the Muslim-Arabs in Egypt and the Beja is yet another important chapter in the process of Arabization and Islamization of Sudan. When the Arabs arrived in Egypt in the mid-seventh century they became aware of the Beja and the menace they could cause to Upper Egypt from the east. A certain Ubaydullah ibn
al-Habhab was dispatched at the beginning of the eighth century to fight the Beja and he was able to defeat them and sign an agreement according to which the Beja will have to pay a tribute of three hundred camels a year, and enter Egypt only as travellers and not as settlers. However, it seems that this agreement was not enough to pacify the troublesome Beja and tense relations between the two continued.

In 831 A.D. the Beja attacked Upper Egypt but they were defeated by the Muslim leader Abdullah ibn al-Jahm and a new agreement was concluded. According to the agreement the Arabs were allowed free movement into the Beja country and the right to practice their religion with no harassment. The Beja, on the other hand, were allowed to enter Egypt only if travelling or trading with the nomad Arabs. This agreement, however, was not able to put an end to Beja rebellion and discontent. In 854 the Beja stopped paying the annual tribute and raided Upper Egypt. A big muslim expedition was sent on a punitive mission and the Beja were totally defeated, their chief arrested and later sent to Baghdad to meet the Khalifa. The incident was concluded in 855 by signing a new agreement that accorded the Arabs the right to settle in Beja country and work the gold mines there. Despite their inferior position compared to the tremendous muslim force to the north, the Beja proved to be very difficult to pacify. This may be due, in part, to their segmentary social organization and the mountainous nature of their territory.

Above is a brief review of the first phase of contacts between
Muslim-Arabs in Egypt and the inhabitants of northern Sudan. These contacts were undertaken during the Umayyad Dynasty and the first part of the Abbasid rule against the background of the supremacy of Arab elements in Egypt who represented the military and political elite there. The influence of the Arabs started to decline with the advent of the Abbasid rule that came as a result of a coalition between Arab and Persian elements. This decline was reflected in the historic decision by the Abbasid Khalifa al-Mutasim (833-842) to halt the payment of pensions to all Arab tribemen in Egypt and replace them with Turkish warriors in the military.

Three major features could be noted here as reflecting the nature of these early contacts between the Muslim-Arabs and Sudan. First, the raids carried by the Muslims against the Nubians were greatly punitive in nature. As Professor Hasan argues, "Dismayed by the disaster that had befallen their co-religionists, the Nubian continued to harass the Egyptian border. It was this constant menace that prompted 'Amr to send out raids against Christian Nuba, and it is clear that this was not part of a deliberate policy to spread Islam further south. Indeed, there is hardly any evidence to show that the Muslim governors of Egypt even showed any missionary zeal towards the Sudan." The first raid against the Nuba, coming soon after the fall of Alexandria, may also be an outcome of hot pursuit by the Muslims of defeated elements of the old regime who may have tried to take refuge in Upper Egypt.

Second, with the exception of the sporadic clashes that took place between the Muslims and their neighbours to the south, the contacts continued to be peaceful and cooperative. Some Arabs were
attracted by trade opportunities with the Sudan and the prospects of gold mining in the Beja country. This form of peaceful cooperation continued to characterize Arab penetration into Sudan throughout the following phases as well.

Third, contacts in this phase were very small in size and impact. This is mainly due to the small numbers of Arabs crossing into the Sudan. In the first two hundred years after the conquest of Egypt no less than eighty three Arab governors ruled Egypt and each one of them was accompanied by 10000 to 20000 of his own tribesmen. Moreover, many Arab Khalifas, specially during the Umayyad period, encouraged Arab immigration to Egypt. By the time of the establishment of the Tulunid Dynasty in Egypt in 868, almost all the Arab tribes were represented in the country. However, as we have seen earlier for the larger part of these two hundred years the Arabs were members of a privileged group who did not have the urge to cross the borders into Sudan except in very small numbers. Moreover, the valiant resistance by the Nubians and the continuous harassment by the Beja must have discouraged many would-be immigrants. Needless to say that despite the powerful and dynamic Islamic culture, these small numbers of Arab immigrants did not leave a strong impact on the Sudan at the time. However, we should not belittle the efforts of these pioneers who set the stage for much wider and more effective Islamic and Arab penetration as we shall see later.

\textit{The Second Phase: 868 - 900}

In 868 Abul Abbas Ahmed ibn Tulun established the first non-Arab dynasty in Egypt under the Turkish mamluks (slaves). With
the new order of things the Arabs, who had fallen into entire
disfavour, became extremely discontented and began to emigrate
south and west to the Sudan and the Berber countries, to escape
the heavy hand of the alien." This helped to set an example
which was followed by many Arab tribesmen in the next six hundred
years or so.

The Tulunids were succeeded by many Muslim states in Egypt,
including the Fatimids. But, under successive rulers the Arabs
were continuously alienated and marginalized, and the region of
Upper Egypt where the Arab tribes were concentrated continued to
be a hot-bed of rebellion. Government change in Egypt has always
taken place at the centre of power in Lower Egypt, and it was only
can common sense that the deposed and discredited groups take refuge at
the periphery in Upper Egypt. Sudan, being a natural extension for
Upper Egypt, had in its long history received many of the defeated
and the disgruntled. This phenomenon started very early in the
Arab history in Egypt when two of the sons of the last Umayyad
dynasty, with many of their followers, entered Nubia to escape
Abbasid massacres. However, the refugees were later persuaded to
cross the Red Sea into Arabia.

The decline in Arab fortunes in Egypt came at a time when the
gold deposits in Wadi Allaqi in the Beja country became increasingly
attractive for Arab entrepreneurs and larger numbers of the Arab
tribesmen started to settle there. This 'gold rush' was accelerated
by the agreement signed in 855 between the Beja Chief and the
Muslims. As we have seen earlier this agreement allowed the Arabs
to settle in Beja territory and work the gold mines. The agree-
ment was, in fact, no more than the legalization of an already existing situation.

The famous Arab geographer al-Mas'udi, who visited Egypt in the mid-tenth century, gives some valuable information about the situation of Arab tribes in the Sudan. Talking about the Arabs in the Beja country, he reports that many Arab tribes including Rabi'a, Mudar and various Qahtanites from Yemen have settled there and intermarried with the Beja. Incidentally, he describes the Beja as pagan except for the Hadareb who, some sources argue, are in fact an Arab tribe that came to the Beja region earlier, intermarried with the Beja and acquired their language. If the theory about the Arab origin of the Hadareb is true, this will be one of the few cases in Sudan where a whole Arab tribe was assimilated by the indigenous population and adopted their culture. The only other known case is that of the Banu Kanz or the Kunuz, who settled in Nubia and adopted the Nubian language.

The Nubian chiefs, at the time of al-Mas'udi's visit, are said to have claimed Himayrite origins. This interesting fact indicates that by the mid-tenth century, either intermarriage between the Nubians and the Arabs was so commonplace that the Nubians claimed Arab origins through their Arab ancestors, or that Arab origins were held in such high esteem that these Nubian chiefs took the trouble to claim them. Either way, it is clear that after three centuries of contacts Arabization was able to gain ground in this region.

There is no better indication as to the extent of the Arabization of the extreme northern part of the Sudan, even before the
time of the visit by al-Mas'udi, than the account of the adventures of Abdullah ibn Abdul Hameed al-Umari. Al-Umari came to the 'land of the mines' in the Beja country in the mid-ninth century and settled in a camp of Mudar Arabs. In clashes with Rabi'a's Arabs he was defeated and forced to move westwards to an area closer to the Nile, there he was involved in an internal conflict within the Nubian royal family when he committed himself and his allies of the Arab tribes of Qays Aylan and Sa'd al-Ashira to the cause of one faction against the other. At one stage al-Umari was strong enough to challenge and defeat an army sent by Ahmad ibn Tulun the undisputed ruler of Egypt. Professor Hassan comments that, 'Al-Umari's adventures clearly evidenced not only an attempt to check the Beja and to discover new mines but also a spontaneous movement of hundreds of Arabs freeing themselves from government control. Al-Umari almost succeeded in establishing the first Arab principality in that region. It is no exaggeration to state that his success stimulated further migrations which followed the same pattern.'

How complete the Arabization of this region was in the ninth and tenth centuries, is very difficult to say. But, judging from the present situation in Nubia and Beja country, one may confidently conclude that despite its advanced stage, the process was not complete. The strong position of the Arabs at the time was probably due to their economic and military strength rather than their numerical superiority. It is very clear that the Arabs were in full control of trade and mining activities and that some were able even to acquire land in the extreme north of Nubia. When
ibn Sulaym al-Aswani, the Fatimid emissary, visited the country late in the tenth century he reported the existence of some Arab traders as far south as Soba, the capital city of the Christian Kingdom of Alwa. He also reported that Arab tribes were settled in northern Nubia close to Aswan, and that south of them but north of the second cataract (modern Wadi Halfa) the Nubians have already converted to Islam. This observation by al-Aswani is true in many parts of Sudan today. Although Arabization and Islamization have always moved hand in hand in the Sudan, the Islamization frontier has always been farther to the south.23

Relations that the government in Egypt had with Nubia during this phase left a deep impact on the process of Arabization and Islamization in the Sudan. The Beja, the other major ethnic group in the country at the time did not have any form of organized government and its relations with official Egypt were limited to sporadic raids on Upper Egypt and punitive retaliatory expeditions. Despite the importance of Beja-Egyptian relations, part of which we have discussed in the previous section, we will deal here mainly with Nubian-Egyptian relations.

During the first Mamluk era that extended for a hundred years and was dominated by the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids, relations with Nubia followed almost the same pattern they did during the previous two hundred years of Arab rule. Ahmad ibn Tulun the founder of the Tulunid state wasted no time in contacting Nubia and within three months of his accession to the throne in 868 he sent a force that consisted mainly of Fali'a and Juhayna Arabs with the purpose of punishing the Nubian king for his unwarranted
incursion on Egypt. It is believed that many of these Arab tribesmen preferred to settle in the Beja country and work in the gold mines after the expedition to Nubia was over. In the Tulunid and following eras the Arab tribesmen readily joined expeditions to Nubia, most probably, as a means to escape the oppression of the government.

Fatimid attacks on Egypt from the west started in 914 and the Fatimids strived to forge an alliance with the Nubians to open the southern front. Their efforts were successful and in the last three decades of the Ikhshidid rule the Nubians attacked Upper Egypt at least three times. Historical records are not very clear about the nature of this alliance between the Fatimids and the Nubians, but by that time it had already been an accepted pattern that the Nubians will attack Upper Egypt whenever they detect any signs of weakness within the Egyptian government.

Once they succeeded in wresting power from the Mamluks, the Fatimids sent a mission to the Nubian king. Two demands were made by the Fatimids during this mission; the first regarding the resumption of the annual tribute (Baqt) and the second asking the Nubian king to adopt Islam. The first demand was readily met but the second was politely refused. This was the first time that the government in Egypt had openly asked the Nubian king to embrace Islam. But, no action was taken against the king as a result of this refusal.

Relations between Egypt and Nubia continued to be cordial all through the Fatimid era. The Egyptian asked for and to a great degree received the co-operation of the Nubian king to stem the
increasing Arab influence in the area. In spite of the fact that they claimed to be the descendants of Fatima the daughter of the Prophet, the Fatimids ideological orientation as Shi'ites put them at odds with the Sunni Arab tribesmen in Upper Egypt. Although no persecution of the Arabs was ever reported, they clearly did not win the hearts of the Fatimid Khalifas and their inflow into the Sudan continued as usual.

The Ayyubids ruled Egypt for eighty years from 1172 to 1250. Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, the founder of the Ayyubid state found himself involved in conflict with the Nubians right from the start of his rule. Black soldiers of the Fatimid army took refuge in Nubia, regrouped and with the help of the Nubian king attacked Aswan. Two expeditions were sent by the Ayyubids in 1171 and 1172 and yet a third one in 1174. At one stage Salah al-Din seriously considered the annexation of Nubia, to which he probably had plans of retreating if ousted from Egypt by his overlord Nur al-Din Zanki. He sent an emissary to Dundi to assess the economic feasibility of conquering the country. The emissary's report, however, was not encouraging and the whole idea was dropped.29

After the fall of the Ayyubid state in 1250, the Bahri Mamluks took over in Egypt. The rise of these Mamluks marked a turning point in Egyptian-Nubian relations. Their rule was characterized by repeated intervention in Nubian affairs that ultimately led to the virtual domination of Nubia. Internal squabbles over succession and feuds among members of the royal family, some of whom sought Mamluk support, gave the rulers of Egypt a golden opportunity to intervene in the Nubian sphere of politics.30

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In 1272 King Dawud of Nubia attacked Aydhab and Aswan in response to the demand by Sultan Baybars for the payment of the annual tribute that was probably stopped during the last troubled years of the Ayyubids. Three years later Prince Shakanda, a nephew of King Dawud, sought the help of Sultan Baybars who could not let such an opportunity slip out of his hands. A large Mamluk army invaded Nubia in 1276, deposed King Dawud and installed Shakanda in his place. An epoch-making agreement was signed between Shakanda and his Mamluk patrons. According to this agreement the northern part of Nubia between Aswan and the second cataract was annexed by the Sultan, and a jizya (poll-tax) was levied on the Nubian Christians.

This was the first time that a Muslim Egyptian government had actually extended its southern borders to include some parts of Nubia, a fact that reflects a qualitative change in policy toward the region. However, this was not a new idea altogether and the region formed part of Egypt in Pharaonic times. The Arabs failed to mention it in their first agreement with the Nubians in 652 mainly because of their unfamiliarity with the traditional history of the area.11

Another departure from traditional Muslim policy towards Nubia is the application of the poll-tax. This tax is usually paid by Christian and Jewish subjects in exchange for the protection that they receive from the Muslim state. The application of the tax clearly moved Nubia from the independent status it had enjoyed so far to a status of a Mamluk protectorate.

The agreement of 1272 revealed the designs that the Mamluk
government had for Nubia. A few years later an office for the Nubian affairs was established in Cairo and in 1288 the Mamluks decided to station a garrison in Dungula. The Mamluk sultans continued to interfere in the affairs of Nubia and in 1316 they installed Sayf al-Din Abdullah Barashambu, a nephew of King Dawud, as their own handpicked king of Nubia. The installation of King Barashambu was a turning point in Nubian history since he was the first Muslim king to take power in Dungula. Barashambu; however, did not keep this position for long. But, the challenge did not come from a Christian but from another Muslim Nubian prince: Kanz al-Dawla ibn Shuja'a who succeeded in depositing Barashambu and the king's office in Nubia was admittedly Islamized. Consequently, by the beginning of the Fourteenth Century Christian Nuba had virtually ceased to exist and the process of Islamization and Arabization of Sudan entered a new phase.

III. The Third Phase: Since the Fall of Dungula

The Islamization of the king's office in Dungula in 1316 did not mean the immediate Islamization of the whole kingdom. One can imagine genuine resistance to the process, specially from the Church, and some individuals must have remained Christian for some time. However, the onslaught of Islam was so strong and the weakness of the Church helped much in the spread of the new religion.

"The Church in the Sudan always remained exotic and never became indigenous in the sense that Islam is to-day."

Despite the long history of Christianity in the Nubian Kingdom the Church has always remained a foreign institution, with foreign priests, using
a foreign language, and far detached from the general public. Isolated from Alexandria during the thirteenth century, the Nubian Church lost its spiritual inspiration, failed to develop its own theology, and was in a decadent condition that was no match to the vigorous Islamic onslaught. Under such conditions, one may assume that the Islamization of the king's office was soon followed by the wide spread of Islam in the kingdom.

The conversion of the Christian kingdom removed a major block that stood in the face of the spread of Islam and the migration of the Arab tribes down the Nile for hundreds of years. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were a period of massive movement by Arab tribes that took them to all the areas constituting what is presently known as northern Sudan. Records about these movements are few and scattered; the only two sources of information about them are "a limited number of contemporary medieval Arabic writings" and "a large body of Sudanese genealogical traditions which in their present form were compiled at a much later date." 31

It seems that few Arab tribes have actually entered Sudan as one unified group; the only exceptions being tribes such as the Juhayna and the Bani Ja'd. In most cases, the Arabs moved into the Sudan as individuals or in small groups. The general pattern was that individuals and small groups originally from diverse Arab tribes come upon entering Sudan, under the protection of an already established Arab tribe or a well known leader. As a result, most of the tribal names mentioned in connection with Sudan in the medieval Arab writings have long disappeared. Instead, Arab groups
of Sudan today are new creations that derive their names from ancestors who were born long after the fourteenth century.

Arab tribes in modern Sudan are usually divided by scholars into two main groups; the Ja'aliin or Abbasí group who claim descent from al-Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, the uncle of Prophet Mohammad, and the Juhayna group which is in fact a mixture of tribal groups that include the Juhayna, the Fazara, the Balyyy, the Rufa'a, and all non-Ja'aliin Arab tribes of the Sudan.

The Ja'aliin is mostly a sedentary group living on the banks of the Nile and represented by such tribes as the Shaiqiyya, the Subotab, and the Ja'aliin proper. Some members of this group such as the Batahin, the Bidaqriya, and the Jawama'a settled far from the Nile and led a nomadic life that set them aside from their brothers who live on the Nile.

The Juhayna group, on the other hand, was not attracted by the comforts of settled life on the banks of the Nile and they preferred to continue the style of life their ancestors had in their original habitat in Arabia. The vast and rich pastures of central and western Sudan provided suitable homes for members of this group. In the northern parts of the savannah belt and on the southern borders of the desert Juhayna groups such as the Shukriya and the Kabaish are camel owners. Those who migrated to the wet and muddy plains of Dar Fur and Kordofan such as the Baggara and Rizayqat "have deserted the camel for the bull which, however, they ride upon and generally treat as if it were a camel." 34
Each of these two main groups is divided into several tribes which are in turn divided into smaller sub-groups. Therefore, it will be next to impossible to trace the history and routes of the immigration of each of these sub-groups. Generally speaking, however, Arab movements inside the Sudan took some specified routes. Arab immigrants came mainly from Egypt, settled temporarily in Nubia and Beja country. From Nubia Arab groups took mainly the route down the Nile and settled on its banks in the Shaqilyya, Manaseer, Rubatab and Ja'allin areas. From the Beja country Arab immigrants took most probably two routes; westwards to the Nile and southwards across the River Atbara into the Butana region. These early movements are believed to have taken place between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. Arab immigrants were greatly assisted by the fact that the areas in which they settled in central Sudan were on the fringes of the two Christian kingdoms of al-Naqurra and Alwa. Located between the two kingdoms this area was almost a no-man land.

Western Sudan was approached by Arab immigrants from three different directions. The first waves came as early as the twelfth century down the western desert from Dongola. Later the same route was taken by the Bidayriyya nomads during the ascendency of the Shaqilyya in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The second route into western Sudan was that taken by both Ja'allin and Junayna tribal groups across the White Nile from the Gezira before and during the expansion of the Funj Kingdom into Kordofan in the seventeenth century. A less significant route, in view of the
Thirty-three centuries and is still going on in many parts of the country. This slow pace is one of the factors behind the peaceful nature of the whole process. No displacement of the indigenous population was reported except in a limited number of cases. The matrilineal system of succession that prevailed in the Sudan before the coming of the Arabs was an important factor in the peaceful Arabization of the country. The Arabs made use of this system when they took into marriage the daughters of indigenous tribal chiefs. As the custom dictates children born as a result of these marriages succeeded to their grandfathers' positions and the whole institution was first Islamized and then Arabized. This process was repeated almost everywhere and famous Islamic kingdoms such as that of Tagali in the sixteenth century and Bar Fur in the seventeenth century were Islamized in this way. Some writers, however, argue that the process of Arabization was peaceful and complete due to the fact that most of the areas in which the Arabs have settled were sparsely populated when they arrived in them, or at best very sparsely populated.\textsuperscript{36}

Islam was and still is a very important factor in the process of the Arabization of the Sudan and the picture will not be complete
unless we discuss the history and pattern of Islamization in the country.

The first propagators of Islam in the Sudan were the ordinary traders and laymen who came to the country in the early years of Muslim contact with the Nuba and the Beja. The nature of Islam and the simple procedure of its adoption made it very easy for the indigenous population to embrace. As Tringham correctly observes, "The character of African Islam is such that its acceptance causes little internal disturbance to the natural man and his social life and customs," 37 That was the kind of Islam which was first introduced in Sudan, and was successful to build on local cultures to the extent that it was easily accepted by the people of Sudan as an indigenous religion, a feat that Christianity failed to achieve despite its long history in Nubia.

Those early traders and investors, who were specially successful in Nubia and Beja regions, were teachers of Islam by example. If the present is any indication to the past, the following comment by a modern writer about the process of Arabization and Islamization in southern Funj region in southeastern Sudan may shed some light on the pattern that the process took in those early days also. Wendy R. James had this to say, "I am suggesting that the notion of the 'modern situation' in the southern Funj rural areas does not rest upon abstract influences such as education, trade, radio, and Muslim proselytism but on the circulation of merchants, who as the locally dominant people carry these values with them and influence rural communities on a personal level." 38 In another part of
her article Miss James describes these merchants as “hardworking honest men, of little education themselves but of generous and sociable nature, often speaking the local language, and who may become greatly respected and admired.” These are probably the characteristics of those early traders and investors also, and this was the manner in which they propagated Islam.

The transfer of power at various levels from the indigenous leaders to the immigrant Arabs through the matrilineal system of succession, that we have referred to above, is yet another important factor in accelerating the Islamization of the country. The most important among these transfers was no doubt the one that took place in Dongola at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Tringham concludes that, “... the fall of Dongola was perhaps the most important single factor influencing the rapid spread of Islam in Africa.”

Two centuries after the fall of Dongola, Arab immigrants were strong enough to defeat Alwa, the last Christian kingdom in the Sudan, and enter into an alliance with the mysterious Funj to establish the first Islamic kingdom at Sinnar. The Funj Kingdom controlled the larger part of today’s northern Sudan through the creation of loose alliances with local chiefs. The establishment of the Funj Kingdom was a turning point in the history of the Islamization of the country.

The Funj sultans endeavoured to attract as many learned men from different parts of the Islamic world as possible, especially from al-Hijaz and Egypt. Policies aimed at encouraging such men to
settle in the Sudan and teach Islam were followed. These preachers, popularly known as 'fakis', were granted free land for cultivation, exempted from taxes, and received grants from the government. Moreover, their spiritual guidance was sought by both the rulers and the ruled. Although the majority of the population at the time were Muslim, ignorance about Islam was so prevalent that, "... there flourished neither schools of learning nor reading of the Quran; it is said that a man might divorce his wife and she be married by another man the selfsame day without any period of probation..."\textsuperscript{41}

This appalling condition of ignorance and the government's policies we mentioned above, encouraged many Muslim preachers to come to the Sudan. Many of them who came from Morocco and the other countries of the Maghrib, may have seen in the rise of the Kingdom of Sennar in 1504 a consolation for their great loss in al-Andalus after the fall of Granada a few years earlier. The general intellectual atmosphere in the Islamic world at the time was dominated by Sufi mysticism and the majority of the preachers who came to Sudan were of Sufi inclinations. However, the Sufist fraternities (tariqas) introduced by these fakis were very effective in teaching Islam to nominal Muslims and spreading the belief in new areas. Their kind of Islam was readily accepted by the general public because it was less exacting than the orthodox Islam propagated by scholars and jurists. "Despite their limitations, the fakis presented the heterogeneous and fluid Sunni community with an element of continuity and stability through centres of religion and the wide influence they enjoyed through Islamic faith (and

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increasingly Arabic) they offered a positive cementing factor and through loyalty to themselves they superimposed a wider loyalty to Islam. Again, despite their limited cultural attainments, it was they who continued to nurse the Islamic culture in the newly Islamized regions, and they were the real missionaries in other territories.\textsuperscript{42} Despite the sharp differences between 'popular Islam' as propagated by the fakirs and orthodox Islam taught by scholars and jurists, the dividing line between the two groups is not that clear. Realizing the ability of the sufi tariqas to better communicate with the ordinary citizen, many scholars and jurists decided to work from within these tariqas; this helped greatly in increasing the knowledge of the people about their religion.

In spite of their important role in spreading Islam and developing a method of self-identification that superseded the narrow tribal base, the sixteenth century tariqas were very small in size, largely localized, and mainly revolving around the person of one fakir. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century a new type of tariqas appeared in the Sudan. These are the larger and more centralized tariqas that appeared in many parts of the Islamic world during the eighteenth century as a result of "a sufi resurgence that embraced the southern provinces of the Ottoman Empire ..."\textsuperscript{43}

Two of these tariqas, the Sammaniyya and the Khatmiyya, entered the Sudan around that time and started to gain support at the expense of older and smaller tariqas. The introduction of these structurally centralized tariqas signified the first steps
towards centralization in the country. This trend was further strengthened by the conquest of Sudan by Muhammad Ali in 1821 and the establishment of the Turkish rule (Turkiyya), and the first step in the long and slow process of the emergence of modern centralized Sudan was taken.44

The new tariqas, specially the Khattmiyya and later the Mandiyya, assumed an important role not only in religion but also at the political and social levels. The tariqas were very effective in creating a national identity that superseded tribal and regional loyalties in northern Sudan. But, in view of their religious nature and orientation they failed to attract non-Muslims and thus proved to be an obstacle in the way of creating a new national identity that embraces the different ethnic and cultural groups in all parts of the country.45

The process of Islamization in the Sudan, just like that of Arabization, continued for centuries and built on local systems that prevailed in the country before the coming of Islam. Therefore, we can still find in many parts of Sudan remnants of social customs and habits that were practiced by the people for, possibly, thousands of years. In the Nuba region in northern Sudan and southern Egypt, for example, the Nile is still linked to social ceremonies such as marriage, death and circumcision. There is a general belief that this practice may have its origin in the old times when the inhabitants of the area used to worship the river.46 Such non-Islamic practices are even more detectable among tribal groups whose conversion to Islam is not as old or as profound as that of the Nubians.

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Arabization was not an even process that covered the whole of Sudan equally. As we shall see later the southern part of the country has developed its culture separately with the minimum of Arab influence. In this section, however, we intend to discuss as briefly as possible the varying levels of Arabization among various ethnic groups and within different regions of northern Sudan.

It is a general belief among historians that the Arabs, upon entering Sudan, settled first among the Beja and the Nubians. However, while central Sudan and parts of western Sudan are completely Arabized, we still find that the Beja and the Nubians keep many of their old cultural traits including the language. We find this strange phenomenon in spite of the fact that these two groups are totally Islamized and they even claim Arabian origins.

Not many attempts were made to explain this phenomenon, but Professor Hassan offers two related reasons. First, he argues that both the Beja and the Nubian regions were not rich in grazing land and they were not in a position to compete with the rich pastures of central and western Sudan as an attractive area of permanent settlement for the nomad Arabs. Second, building on this reason he argues that very few Arabs had actually settled among the Beja and the Nubians, and that the number of Arab settlers there was definitely too small to transfer the inhabitants of these areas into Arabic-speakers.47

However, Professor Hassan contradicts himself when he argues that after all intermarriage between the Arab immigrants and the
Beja is not that insignificant, he says, "The best example of Arab intermarriage with the Beja was that of the Rabi’a and their allies who intermarried extensively with the Hadariba. Indeed by the middle of the eighth/nineteenth century the Arab influence was so predominant among the Hadariba that Ibn Fadl Allah called them Arab." Needless to say that for a contemporary Arab writer to describe the Hadariba as Arabs, they must have been speaking the Arabic language and displaying other traits of Arabic culture. In view of the large numbers of Arab immigrants who passed through these areas and the activity of the Arab tribesmen in the mines of the Beja country for hundreds of years, it will be very difficult to accept the explanation given by Professor Hassan. There is no doubt that a lot of research needs to be done in this field.

Another controversial point, particularly concerning the Arab tribes who settled in central Sudan, is that whether these tribes are Arabized Nubians as Professor Hassan and many Sudanese scholars argue, or ethnically pure Arabs as they themselves claim and some writers argue. Depending on medieval Arab records many Sudanese scholars argue that the so-called Arab tribes of northern Sudan are in fact culturally rather than ethnically Arab and they are an outcome of extensive mixture with the indigenous population who were essentially of Nubian stock. Northern Sudanese are, therefore, described by these scholars as Arabized Nubians. On the other hand, members of those tribes themselves are very proud of their Arabian origins and some of them keep genealogies that verify these origins. Supporters of the theory of ethnic purity claim that when these
groups came to the Sudan after the seventh century, the areas in which they settled were not populated and no actual admixture with the local population ever took place.51

Despite the sharp differences between the two camps, they seem to agree that in any given region the number of Arab immigrants is the determining factor of the degree of Arabization there. While the supporters of the ethnic purity theory put forward their doubtful claim concerning the non-existence of the indigenous population: Professor Hasan, talking about central Sudan, had this to say, "... sheer superiority of numbers and the long-standing contacts between the immigrants and the Nubian people may explain why this region is the most Arabized part of the country."51

Although talking about ethnically pure Arabs, anywhere in the world, is far from reality; the fact that in northern Sudan there are some groups which are more Arab than others cannot be denied. However, the most important point is that members of Arab tribes in northern Sudan consider themselves and are considered by others as Arab and treated as such.

With the exception of the Rashide and the Zubaydiyya who entered Sudan in the mid-nineteenth century, no large Arab migration into Sudan was reported since the end of the fifteenth century. However, internal migration is a continuous process and the last few years saw large scale movements by tribal groups, both Arab and African, as a result of the drought and the civil strife. This recent phenomenon is not yet properly assessed or studied, but it may prove in future to be of great significance concerning
the ethnic and cultural construction of the country.

Despite this long history of migration, the Arabs were not able to penetrate the whole area of modern Sudan. In addition to the south, Arab immigrants found it very difficult to penetrate indigenous groups in mountainous regions in western and south-eastern Sudan. The Daju and Birgidi in Darfur, the Nuba in the Nuba mountains in Kordofan, and the Ingessana in Jabal(Mount) Kukur of southeastern Sudan could be cited as good examples of this category. Dar Fur in the extreme west of the country is in fact one of the least Arabized region in spite of its almost total Islamization. Many ethnic groups here are negroid in features and African in culture. Some of these groups such as the Midob of Jabal(Mount) Midob and the Tunjur are believed to be of northern Sudanese Nubian stock. They came to Dar Fur probably as a result of Arab pressure. Others such as the Zagawa lived in Dar Fur for hundreds of years and they have been mentioned by medieval Arab writers like al-Mas‘udi and Ibn Khaldun. The origins of most of these groups are controversial, but it is quite clear that they are essentially negroid despite some degree of intermarriage with neighbouring Arab tribes.

On the other hand, many tribes of Arab origin in Kordofan and Dar Fur such as the Misseria and the Rizayqat have intermarried with the indigenous negroid groups to the extent that they cannot be easily distinguished from them at present. Talking about the Rizayqat Mas’ud Michael says, "Breeding from slave women, DINKA, MANDALA(or BANDALA) and SHATT for the most part, has markedly affected the racial purity of the RIZAYQAT."
To conclude this section we can say that although northern Sudan had in its long history been exposed to strong Arab influence and despite the fact the Arab element constitutes a majority there, the reality is that many non-Arab ethnic groups still exist and the north is in fact a combination of different elements. The degree of Islamization and Arabization varies greatly from one place to another and varies sometimes even within the same ethnic group. This reality is clearly felt in the complex social and political atmosphere in the country. In the following section we will discuss the ethnic history in southern Sudan and see how it adds another complication to the already complex picture.

4) The South

Arab penetration southward was not regular, but generally speaking no strong and racially effective Arab influence was felt to the south of latitude 12° N and tribal groups there developed their culture separately. Climatic and topographical factors are believed to have been behind this fact. Not familiar with the wet weather in the South, and unable to cross the formidable barrier of the swamps that characterized the area, the Arabs found themselves discouraged to penetrate any further. With very few exceptions, this situation continued until the mid-nineteenth century when direct and wide ranging contacts with the South were established after the Turkish invasion of northern Sudan in 1821.

Archaeological and historical research in the South is very limited and information available are far from adequate. Depending
on the little information available to us, an attempt will be made here to discuss the origin and development of major ethnic groups in the southern Sudan, and relations they had with northern Sudan before the Turkish conquest at the start of the nineteenth century.

Several hundred ethnic and tribal sub-groups live in the South and they are usually divided into three separate large groups: the Nilotic, the Nilo-Hamitic and the Sudanic. However, since space and time do not allow a detailed discussion of all ethnic sub-groups we will deal here with only four of them representing the Nilotic and Sudanic groups. The Nilo-Hamitic, as their name clearly indicates, share many features with the Nilotics.

(I) The Nilotics

The Nilotics, also known as the Nilotes, is a large group occupying wide areas in east Africa covering parts of Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Anthropologists divide them into Eastern, Western and Southern Nilotes. The main habitat of the Eastern and Western Nilotes is on the Nile and its tributaries in Sudan and Uganda, while the Southern Nilotes including such tribes as the Maasai, Kalenjin and Nandi, live in Kenya and Tanzania. Another major Nilotic group living in Kenya is the Luo, who represent together with Dinka of southern Sudan, the two largest groups among the Nilotes. It is very difficult to trace the history of all Nilotic sub-groups; we will, therefore, concern ourselves here only with three largest Nilotic sub-groups in the Sudan, namely the Dinka (Jieng), the Nuer (Naath), and the Shilluk.
Proto-Nilotic language was probably spoken some 5000 years ago. But, the original habitat of the Nilotes is still a matter of conjecture and it will possibly remain so for some time in view of the condition of research in this area. Two locations are being offered as the cradle of the Nilotes; one closer to the Ethiopian-Sudanese border in the area of the Sobat River, and the other to the south near Lake Turkana in the triangle joining Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. The matter is even more complicated due to the fact that the Nilotes have actually split into separate groups that occupied different areas as we have seen earlier. However, this matter needs not hold us any longer and two basic facts can be mentioned here. First, the Nilotes original habitat lies to the east of the Nile. Second, they are believed to have initially migrated to the south and west of this habitat.

The proto-Western Nilotes, the ancestors of the modern Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk, have probably occupied "...part of the plain between the Sudd region and the foothills of the Ethiopian highlands south of the Blue Nile..." The proto-Dinka-Nuer group had possibly divided from the Jii group around or before 1000 B.C. This is probably the time when the Dinka-Nuer group started to move westwards to their present habitat. Such conclusions, built only on linguistic research, are to some extent supported by local tradition that these people have come originally from the east. However, no clear picture about actual routes and dates can be easily drawn without further archaeological research.

In 1979 and 1981 excavations on mounds located in areas
occupied at present by Dinka, Atuot and Shilluk were carried by
the British Institute in Eastern Africa. Although these excavations
were very limited in scope they, nevertheless, yielded some inter-
esting facts. It has been noted, for example, that occupation of
this area could not have started more than 4000 years ago, and
before that the whole area was under permanent flooding. Moreover,
in Jokpel site in Atuot and Dinka Agar country it was noted that
towards the end of the first millennium A.D. the area was occupied
by a people "who appear to have been relatively tall and slender
but contrary to modern Nilotic custom did not practice dental
evulsion, had a distinctive form of burial in which the orientation
of the body seems never to have varied." It is unknown if these
people are the direct ancestors of those who occupy the area today.
However, Atuot are believed to have arrived in the area between
1500 and 1620. On the other hand, Dinka Agar traditions indi-
cate that when their ancestors came to the area they found
a different group of people that they call the Jur. These fact may
lead us to the tempting but speculative conclusion that the people
who occupied the area before 1000 A.D. may not even be of Nilotic
stock.

The above brief account indicates that the area occupied by
the Western Nilotes was exposed throughout its history to large
scale human movements that resulted in changing the ethnic picture
from time to time. Other Nilotes also were on the move, mostly
to the south. At the time when the Arab immigrants were pressing
hard on the Nubians and the Beja in the north during the ninth and

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tenth centuries, Nilotes were moving southwards into northern Uganda. The Kenya Highlands Nilotes (the Nande and the Kalenjin) have probably settled around Lake Turkana between A.D. 450 and A.D. 1100 before moving to their present homeland; some accounts say that the Maasai have left the Lake Turkana vicinity as late as the fifteenth century. The Kenya Luo, on the other hand, are believed to have reached their present habitat on the eastern shores of Lake Victoria between A.D. 1500 and A.D. 1600.

In southern Sudan large human movements led to the creation of an ethnic map according to which the Dinka were largely living in Bahr-al-Ghazal and Upper Nile regions, the Nuer in Bahr-al-Ghazal and the Shilluk in Upper Nile. The Equatorial region is mostly populated by Sudanic small groups except in eastern Equatoria where Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites are also living. This highly simplified picture, however, conceals many complications and contradictions which are directly related to the political and social situation in the southern region as a whole.

The Dinka is the largest ethnic group not only in southern Sudan but in the country as a whole. Stretching over a wide area they are divided into a large number of smaller sub-groups. They are in fact "a loose confederation of tribes each bearing a distinct name." There are even some cases in regional and tribal conflicts when Dinka groups found themselves on opposite sides. In many instances tribal alliances have necessitated that a Dinka group fights against its own fellow-Dinka on the side of other ethnic groups such as the Nuer. Despite this reality, however, all Dinka
"share a common physical appearance, a general cultural uniformity, and a common sense of Dinka identity." As a result of this sense of common identity and due to their ethnocentric orientation the Dinka remained largely impervious to outside influences.

The migration of the Dinka to their present country is not well documented and one of the important reasons behind this fact as Francis Deng says, "is the people's own vagueness about their history of migration." However, from oral traditions collected by Mr. Deng two facts regarding Dinka migration can be understood. The first is that the Dinka came from the east, in spite of the fact that one of the traditions claim that they originally came from areas as far north as Shandi (north of modern Khartoum). The second is that Dinka migration is usually associated with the search for better grazing land. However, Mr. Deng points out that search for grazing land is an explanation of Dinka migration "as a kind of self-justification and exaltation of their present land as the best."

Another explanation of Dinka migration, specially in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, is offered by R.C. Kelly who links Dinka migration to the Nuer expansion during those times. When the Nuer left their homeland looking for new grazing land first in the sixteenth and then in the nineteenth century, it was only natural that they clashed with and displaced their immediate neighbours the Dinka, who were forced to look for new pastures to the west.

The Nuer (Nasth) is the group that is closest to the Dinka.
culturally and socially. They are so close that in fact what is being referred to as Nuer religion or culture is in many cases of Dinka origins.\textsuperscript{65} It is probable that the Nuer diverged from the Dinka two thousand years ago, long after the divergence by the ancestors of the closely related Shilluk. The Nuer have probably arrived to their homeland in the Jabal-Gnazal triangle at a later date.\textsuperscript{66} As for the language "Nuer and Dinka are not mutually intelligible, but as closely related Western Nilotic languages they share a considerable common vocabulary, the proportion of which grew in each language as the two people grew closer.\textsuperscript{67}

The geographical and cultural proximity led to direct and extensive contacts between the Nuer and the Dinka. For the last few hundred years these contacts have generally taken the form of violent clashes because of Nuer expansionism. The most impressive Nuer expansion took place in the nineteenth century. Between 1820 and 1843 the Nuer were able to expand their territory from about eight thousand seven hundred to thirty five thousand square miles.\textsuperscript{68} Almost all this expansion was at the expense of the neighbouring Dinka. In their expansion the Nuer cut right through Dinkaland splitting many of the Dinka tribes such as the Ngok, Twij and Lueich into eastern and western branches. Kelly argues that the Jikany migration that started the Nuer expansion of the nineteenth century was not an unprecedented phenomenon and that it "paralleled that of the Atwot several centuries earlier. In both cases a Nuer group passed through (or around) adjacent Dinka tribes and established an enclave on the periphery of Dinka territory more than one hundred
miles from Nuer homeland. Moreover, in both instances there was
a subsequent expansion of the homeland Nuer toward this enclave.69

On the strength of Mr. Kelly's remarks it seems that Nuer
expansion is a repeated phenomenon that follows a certain pattern.
Two different reasons were offered to explain the real motives
behind Nuer expansion. The first is social; the Nuer custom of
paying bride-wealth in cattle led to accumulation of cattle wealth
by the members of the Nuer tribe. Nuer's unsatiable appetite for
owning cattle stimulated expansion in two ways. Looking for ways
and means to increase their stock of cattle, especially after spread
of epidemics or natural disasters, Nuer attacked adjacent Dinka
cattle owners. On the other hand, owning large stocks of cattle
led to over-grazing of Nuerland; looking for new pastures took
the Nuer far beyond their borders.70 The other reason given by
scholars to explain Nuer expansion is ecological. They argue that
Nuerland at the start of the nineteenth century was over-populated.
To relieve this congestion the Nuer resorted to violence and
acquisition of Dinka territories.71 It has also been suggested
that the floods of 1820 were the actual precipitant of the Nuer
expansion during the nineteenth century.

Nuer and Dinka relations were not always violent and warlike.
There were many instances of peaceful co-existence and co-operation
and assimilation between the two groups. During their nineteenth
century expansion the Nuer are believed to have assimilated many
Dinka. "Dinka men frequently attached themselves to the households
of prosperous Nuer on their own initiative, performing menial tasks
until they were either formally adopted or given a Nuer wife." The British colonial authorities learned this fact the hard way through the failure of their 'tribal borders policy' that aimed at establishing separate administrative regions for the Nuer and Dinka in Upper Nile. As the Mongolla Province Monthly Intelligence Report of September 1918 concludes, "the tendency of the Nuer and Dinkas is to fuse with one another. This has always occurred in the past in the intervals of fighting. To support the idea of a tribal boundary is merely to strive to keep open a sore which could otherwise tend, with proper treatment, to heal itself."

One of the important outcomes of the Nuer expansion during the nineteenth century is the Nuer's ability to assimilate large numbers of Dinka. However, the Dinka still outnumbers the Nuer by three to fourfold. Relations between these two large Nilotic sub-groups have always loomed prominently in the political and social situation in southern Sudan, and their impact is clearly felt even today.

The third Nilotic sub-group which we are going to discuss here is the Shilluk sub-group. The Shilluk occupy the northern part of the Upper Nile Region and they relate as we have mentioned earlier to the Dinka and Nuer. The original habitat of the Shilluk cannot be decided with any certainty, but since they belong to the Nilotic group they must have come from areas further to the south. Mercer says that the Shilluk appeared in the area probably around the sixteenth century as "a small Luo-speaking group of overland immigrants..." Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries the Shilluk, using small canoes, raided their neighbours both to
the north and the south. The canoes provided them with agility and a high degree of flexibility that enabled them to stage successful attacks against their enemies. Mercer argues that high population density and the threat of famine have always been important factors in Shilluk life and that this fact "highlights the importance to the Shilluk of raiding as an alternative source of supply; in particular it points to the importance of the northward raids down the 'Bahr Scheluk', which were probably the most regularly successful of Shilluk raids and which could supply grain as well as beestas." 75

Unlike the segmentary Dinka and Nuer communities, the Shilluk developed, since the sixteenth century, a centralized system with the reth as its supreme head. Every reth is considered by Shilluk tribesmen as a reincarnation of their legendary leader Nyikang, to whom the establishment of the Shilluk state is attributed. The reth, therefore, "...was also considered by his subjects as the spiritual head of state,..." 76 The reth reserved the right to confirm in office settlement chiefs after being elected by the people. This right gave him the power to control the chiefs. By the nineteenth century the reth's economic position grew stronger as a result of having the monopoly of trading in ivory, and he was able to maintain a private military force that was very important and politically effective within the shilluk state. 77

Proximity to the north and the nature of the Shilluk state made relations with the north, specially with the Punj Kingdom, of great importance. These relations will be discussed later in this chapter.
chapter. Suffice it to say here that the Shilluk were able, since the sixteenth century, to establish a centralized state that is comparable to the Funj Kingdom in the north despite great differences in size, power and organization.

(ii) The Sudanic Group

The Sudanic tribal sub-groups now occupying the southeastern area of southern Sudan are believed to have immigrated into the country in three major waves. The first wave, possibly coming from the Lake Chad and the Chari River region, entered the Uele basin well before the sixteenth century. At that time as Baxter and Butt argue, "... the Uele area was peopled by groups of pygmies, known variously as Aka, Tikki, and Efe. But their density could only have been very slight and, to an invading agricultural people, the country would have been as good as empty."

The major two groups among these early immigrants were the Bong-Baska and the Moru-Ma'di. Their southward advance was checked by the dense equatorial jungles in the Congo-Nile watershed, and they were forced to change their course and move north-eastward into the Sudan and eastward into Uganda. A small branch of this group, the Kreish, moved as far north as southern Dar Fur and settled in the area known at present as Dar Fartit. These early immigrants settled in small agricultural units, but they continued to be harassed by other Sudanic and Bantu groups coming from the south. Moving north-eastwards to avoid this harassment, they came...
into direct contact with the Nilotes in Bahr-al-Ghazal and their movement was once again halted.

The second wave of Sudanic immigrants came in the eighteenth century and was led by the Mangbetu. Despite the fact that the Mangbetu came from the south, they were Sudanic-speakers and they are believed to have originated somewhere to the west of the Sudan. By the nineteenth century they were able to establish strong military kingdoms that resisted for a considerable period of time the continuous Avungara attacks.80

The last and perhaps the most impressive wave is that of the Azande, who are believed to have entered the Sudan in the eighteenth century under the leadership of the Avungara chiefs. The original homeland of the Azande is not known for certain, but their traditions claim that they have emigrated from the shores of a large lake under the pressure of people clad in white woven cloth, probably Arabs. Depending on this tradition and the fact they speak a Sudanic language, many scholars concluded that the Azande may have come originally from the area of Lake Chad. However, present day Azande are "an agglomeration of invading Sudanic and indigenous tribes of different origins, languages and cultures who, during the last two centuries, have been moulded into a more or less common social patterns by the extraordinary military and political domination of the Ambomu conquerors, under the leadership of their ruling clan, the Avungara."81

During the reign of Gira (1755 - 1780) the Avungara established a unified kingdom that dominated the political scene in the area
for over a hundred years until the arrival of the European colonial powers. No clear law of succession, however, was adopted by the Azande kingdoms and on the death of the king his domains were divided among his sons. The strongest among the sons usually expands his territory at the expense of his weaker brothers. This practice helped to serve two contradictory purposes. On the one hand, the desire of the princes and their endeavours to increase the area of their domains helped to expand the boundaries of the kingdom as a whole. On the other hand, the absence of a clear law of succession led to conflict within the royal family that resulted eventually in the decline of the kingdom. Azande states were multi-ethnic in nature because they tended to absorb tribal groups that they conquered. Another important feature of these states is their hierarchical organization that clearly defined rights and obligations of all officials from the king downwards. These two features are believed by many to be the secret behind the survival of the Azande states for a long time despite the instability and internal conflict that characterized them.

We have so far discussed some of the major ethnic groups and sub-groups in southern Sudan, and their historical development. This account reveals the fact that southern Sudan has historically developed on lines quite different from those on which the north has developed. Needless to say that this fact helped to cast a dark shadow on relations between the two parts of the country when they eventually came into direct contact in the mid-nineteenth century. To put these contacts into historical perspective, we intend, before
closing this chapter, to discuss south-north contacts before the nineteenth century.

3) South-North Contacts before the 19th Century

The invasion of northern Sudan by Muhammad Ali's forces in 1821 ushered in a new era that came to be known in Sudanese history as the Turkiyya. Interested in the discovery and control of the sources of the Nile, the new regime sent its first expedition as early as 1839 and contact with southern Sudan was established. The Turkiyya was eventually successful in bringing southern Sudan under control and for the first time in its history Sudan, as it is known today, was brought under one government.

Very little is known about north-south contacts before the nineteenth century and it is generally assumed that the two parts of the country have developed separately. Contacts were mainly limited to border areas where tribal groups and sometimes states on both sides developed a limited form of relationship. The bulk of the south was virtually outside the caravan network that linked northern Sudan to Egypt, Arabia and even parts of West Africa. For centuries the south was separated from the north by large swamp lands, inhospitable weather, and difficult ecological conditions. This separation led in fact to a total isolation of the south, and even when some traits of Meroe's old culture found their way to central Africa, it is believed that they have taken a route that by-passed the swampy south and southern Sudanese tribes were not in the least affected by this great culture. Moreover, the Dinka,
the largest ethnic group in southern Sudan, has only an insignificant and distant recollection of contacts with outsiders before the nineteenth century. They call the group they contacted the Lueel, an indication that they were brown in colour. Excavations in mounds previously occupied by the Lueel reveal that they were skilled potters. However, the origin of this Lueel is not yet clear and it is unknown if they came from northern Sudan or from another place.

Apart from these early and limited encounters the most important north-south contacts took place between the Shilluk and the Funj Kingdom. The Funj Kingdom was established at the beginning of the sixteenth century as an outcome of a coalition between the Abdullah Arabs and the Funj—a negroid race whose origins are still shrouded in mystery. Almost at the same time the Shilluk state was founded under the leadership of the legendary Nyikang.

Being geographically proximate, the sphere of influence of the two states overlapped and a relationship characterized by conflict developed between them. The Shilluk carried sporadic attacks on the southern fringes of the Funj Kingdom and between the seventeenth and nineteenth century they were feared as 'river-waraders' who dominated the White Nile as far downstream as Eleis. Eleis (modern al-Kawa) was a very important town on the White Nile that acted as the gate-way of the Funj Kingdom to Kordofan and Darfur. Sultan Sadi Abu Dign II (1614–1642) was reported to have raided the Shilluk strongholds around Eleis,
possibly, in reprisal for Shilluk attacks, in this atmosphere of conflict with his formidable neighbours to the north Chief Nyikang forged an alliance with the Nuba of Kordoša by marrying one of his daughters to a prominent Nuba chief.\textsuperscript{85} Just how effective this Shilluk-Nuba alliance was in changing the balance of power in the area is not easy to say and history records are not clear about this matter. The Shilluk influence in the area increased with the decline of the Funj power; by the end of the eighteenth century they were in virtual control of Eleis. European travellers who visited Sudan at the time reported that the Shilluk were collecting custom duties from people and traders using the town.

There were times when the Shilluk-Funj relations were characterized by cessation of hostilities and even cooperation. This is usually the case when the two sides were faced by a common threat such as the Dinka expansion during the first half of the seventeenth century. \textit{Sultan Basili II and Roth Dutwat (c.1635 - 1650) concluded an alliance which was kept alive by successive reths of the Shilluk.} \textsuperscript{86} Despite the comment by Professor Hasan that this alliance was kept alive, it is more probable that the alliance was only a marriage of convenience. It is quite possible that Shilluk attacks on Funj territory resumed once the Dinka threat disappeared. An important fact supporting our assumption is that, despite its centralized power structure, the Shilluk state did not practice much control over small outlying Shilluk settlements, and many of the raids carried by these settlements were not actually sanctioned by the rath. No large scale trade relations between the Shilluk and
the Punj existed, and when Shillukland was eventually brought within the nexus of Muslim trade at the start of the nineteenth century, this "seems to have been made by way of the Nubashills and Kordofan, and not by way of the Nile valley."87

Their expansion to the north being checked by the successful Shilluk-Punj cooperation, the Dinka started to expand northeastwards instead. There also they were faced by the formidable Punj army. Nevertheless, by the second half of the eighteenth century the Dinka were able to expand their territory north of the Sobat River and the Abialang Dinka (and later the Padang and the Dunjol) moved and settled in areas that were part of the Punj domains. This Dinka expansion was largely assisted by the fact that between 1760 and 1780 the Punj army was preoccupied by inter-tribal rebellion in northern Sudan.88 No detailed accounts of these Dinka-Punj contacts are readily available, but one could assume that these contacts were far less important than the Shilluk-Punj contacts.

In Bahr-al- Ghazal the Dinka were able to establish contacts with Muslim Sultanates of Dar Fur and Bagara Arabs in both Dar Fur and Kordofan. Here also the extent and development of Dinka relations with their northern neighbours are not well documented, but they are believed to have centred around slave raids and trade.

All in all, north-south contacts before the nineteenth century took place only in border areas and were very limited in space and size. It is believed that these contacts did not leave any substantial impact on either side and, by and large, the two parts of the country remained ethnically and culturally separate.
6) The Present Ethnic Situation

The above discussion reveals that while northern Sudan ethnic picture was totally transformed as a result of the massive Arab immigration since the seventh century, southern Sudan remained almost unaffected. Consequently, two culturally and ethnically divergent communities exist in the country today. The path of the Sudan towards national integration is extremely restrained by this fact, and the country continued to suffer under a continuous civil strife in its southern part since independence in 1956.

The continuous war concealed the complicated ethnic reality in both parts of the country, since the situation has always been projected by the international media as the Arab-Muslim North against the non-Muslim African South. This, of course, is an oversimplification of the ethnic situation in the Sudan, but this oversimplification is a natural outcome of the polarisation taking place in the country as a result of the war. While neither the North nor the South is a unified block, each of them shows a fair degree of unity in the face of a well-defined external enemy. But, a closer look reveals that contradictions within each of the two regions are no less significant than those between them.

In the South there are at least three major ethnic groups and several hundred sub-groups. To the dismay of many southern leaders, it is still the tribe rather than the region that constitutes the basis of self-identification. Small tribes, especially the Nilotics of Equatoria Region, are as suspicious of the Dinka as they are of the North. The fear of Dinka domination by smaller southern
tribes is believed to have been the reason behind the call by many of them, in the early 1960s, for the redivision of the south into three regions. The same reason is also regarded by many observers as the logical explanation for the decision of the Anya Nya II forces to fight on the side of the central government against the Dinka-dominated Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military arm the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

In the north, on the other hand, although Islam and the Arabic language are considered as unifying factors, there are still some small pockets of non-Muslims and non-Arabic speakers. The mid-1960s witnessed the proliferation of regional political organizations in northern Sudan; most prominent among them are the Nuba Mountain Federation and the Beja Congress. The common denominator among these organizations was demands for a larger share of power for their respective regions, but there were many calls for the revival of indigenous cultures and the protection of ethnic minority rights. Even though only the Nuba organization has survived through the 1970s and 1980s, ethnic and regional awareness is on the rise in many parts of northern Sudan.

The ethnic picture being so complicated, some argue that the majority-minority dichotomy in the Sudan is a mere fallacy. There is, in fact, they go on arguing, a multitude of majorities and minorities that are overlapping sometimes. For example, while the Muslims constitute a majority in the country the Arabs do not. On the other hand, the Dinka in their own right form a considerable majority in the south and they behave as such.
In Dar Fur the Islamic sultanate that succeeded the indigenous ones in the seventeenth century was closely related to the famous Islamic sultanates of West Africa. Fur traditions claim that Ahmad al-Ma'qour, the great grandfather of the Fur sultans, came originally from Tunisia. Regardless of the truth about this tradition, the Fur Sultanate has always identified itself with the Islamic sultanates in Wadai and further west. Being an Islamic sultanate, Dar Fur was of course in no position to ignore contacts with the holy places in Arabia or the Islamic Khalifate in Istanbul. Moreover, Dar Fur maintained very good trade relations with Egypt through the famous Darb-al-Arba'ain (the route of the forty days) that still links Dar Fur to Egypt. However, the bulk of Dar Fur's diplomatic activity was directed towards the Islamic West African sultanates.

As for the south, no centralized states have developed there except for those of the Shilluk and the Azande that we have discussed earlier. It is not certain if these states had any organized diplomatic contacts with similar or larger states in other parts of Africa. It is also most probable that their diplomatic activities were limited to a small geographical area and in view of the continuous state of instability in which they lived, these activities must have been largely concerned with the immediate security needs of the states. However, the isolation of the south and its separate development are important factors behind the reality that once it became aware of itself as a social and political unit, it readily and naturally identified itself with
the surrounding Africa environment.

It can be realized from the above discussion that, before the nineteenth century, each of the three centres of power in Sudan followed a policy that is peculiar to it. The Funj policy was naturally a Middle East oriented one, while that of the southern states was potentially African oriented. Dar Fur, on the other hand, followed a policy that reflected the special conditions of the Sultanate. The legacy of these distinctions can still be traced to varying degrees in the three areas.

These differences in policy orientation are not theoretical issues, but tangible problems that are directly related to the question of national identity which is at the core of the crisis facing Sudan today.

Summary

In the course of this chapter we tried to follow the process that led to the complicated ethnic picture of today's Sudan. After reviewing briefly the ethnic composition of the country before the seventh century, we discussed at length the Arab immigration into the Sudan. This Arab inflow, we concluded, was the most important single factor behind the complicated ethnic picture in the country today. The history of the Arab inflow was traced from the seventh to the fifteenth century when the ethnic structure in the country took, with very few exceptions, its present form. The process of the Arabisation of northern Sudan was greatly assisted by the
spread of Islam there. Therefore, the process of Islamization was also discussed in this chapter. Since Arabization does not advance as fast as Islamization, there are many areas in northern Sudan where local groups were able to keep many traits of their indigenous cultures and much of their negroid physical features despite their total Islamization. We have also touched upon the controversy about the degree of Arabness of the northern Sudanese; some scholars claim that they are in fact Arabized Nubians, while the tribesmen themselves claim to be purely Arab.

In the south we discussed the major ethnic groups and the history of their immigration that resulted in the ethnic composition of the region as it stands at present. Despite the fact that the south is entirely inhabited by a negroid race, great differences between ethnic groups exist and the picture is no less complicated than that of the north.

Relations between the two parts of the country before the nineteenth century were also discussed and we reached the conclusion that the south and the north have developed quite separately. When the country was brought under one administration after the Turkish invasion in the early nineteenth century, two ethnically and culturally different communities had been in existence.

The historical background we dealt with in this chapter explains the ethnic situation as it exists today. The conflict that afflicted the country since its independence is a natural outcome of this separate development. In chapter three we will discuss
this conflict, known as the Southern Sudan Problem, in more detail and in the following chapters we will attempt to explore the impact that this problem has on Sudan's policy towards its Arab and African environments.
Notes


3) G.P. Murdock in his book, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture, (1959, McGraw Hill, New York) argues that since Paleolithic times Africa has been inhabited by the representatives of only five races: the Negritoid, the Caucasian, the Mongoloid and the Pygmyoid.

4) Voll & Voll, op. cit, p.27


6) Ibid, p.46

7) Ibid, p.49


9) Yusuf Fadil Hasan, The Arabs and the Sudan: From the Seventh to the Early Sixteenth Century, later on referred to as (The Arabs...) (1974, Khartoum University Press, Khartoum) p.4

10) Macmichael, op. cit, p.31


12) Ibid, pp.36-37

13) Ibid, p.39

14) Ibid, p.55

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16) A.J. Arkell, op. cit. p. 29
19) Macmichael, op. cit. p. 11
20) Ibid., p. 168
21) In his book *The Arabs...*, Professor Hasan is of the idea that there was no agreement as such but a truce of non-aggression, since there was no victor or vanquished.
22) The text preserved in al-Mqrizi’s "Kitab al-mawā'id wa'l-
l'tib ar bi dhikr al-chittat wa'l astur" was quoted in Y.F. Hasan, *The Arabs...*, pp. 22-24
23) Y.F. Hasan, *The Arabs...*, op. cit. p. 18
24) Macmichael, op. cit. p. 160
25) Ibid., p. 168
26) For a detailed account of the adventures of Al-Umari see Y.F. Hasan, *The Arabs...*, op. cit., pp. 52-55
27) Ibid., pp. 55-56
28) It is believed that while 70% or more of the country’s population are Muslims, ethnic Arabs may be less than 50%. Many tribal groups, specially in Western Sudan, profess Islam but are ethnically African and still keep many African culture traits including the language.
30) Ibid., p. 108
31) Macmichael, op. cit. p. 182

37] Tringham, op. cit., p. 249


39] Ibid.

40] Tringham, op. cit., p. 80


42] Ibid.

43] Ibid.

44] Voll & Voll, op. cit., p. 38


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47) Y.F. Hasan, The Arabs..., op. cit., pp. 139 & 142

48) Ibid., p. 138

49) For further discussion supporting this theory see Y.F. Hasan, The Arabs..., op. cit., Mansour Khalid, op. cit. and Awn-al-Shareef Qasim, Generous al-Lahib al-'Antiya fts-Sudan, (1972, ad-Dar as-Sudaniyya lll-Kutub, Khartoum)

50) Abbas Muhammad Malik wrote his book 'The Abbas Arabs in the Sudan' op. cit. mainly to refute the theory of the Arabized Nubians and prove the ethnic purity of the Abbasí Arabs in the Sudan.

51) Y.F. Hasan, The Arabs..., op. cit., p. 146

52) Macnichael, op. cit., p. 290


55) Ibid.


Voel & Voel, op. cit., p. 10

F.M. Deng, op. cit., p. 122

Ibid., p. 127

R.C. Kelly, op. cit., p. 20

Aidan Southall, “Nuer and Dinka are People: Ecology, Ethnicity and Logical Possibility,” *Man (n.s)*., 11, 4, 1976 pp. 463-491


R.C. Kelly, op. cit.

Ibid., p. 23

Ibid.

For a further discussion of this point see Southall’s “Nuer and Dinka...” and Johnson’s “Tribal Boundaries...” op. cit.

D.H. Johnson, op. cit., p. 187

Ibid., quoted in page 197


Ibid., p. 414

77) Ibid.


80) Ibid, p.21
81) Ibid, p. 11
82) R. Gray, op. cit., p. 9
83) P.M. Deng, op. cit., p. 129
84) P. Mercer, op. cit., p. 407
85) K. Okeny, op. cit.
86) Y.F. Hassan, "Souther Sudanese....," op. cit.
87) P. Mercer, op. cit.
88) R.C. Kelly, op. cit., p. 21
Chapter Three

The North-South Divide

There is a general agreement among historians that modern Sudan came into being with the Turkish invasion at the start of the nineteenth century. Al-Turkiyya (the Turkish rule) is usually associated with the introduction of modern governmental institutions into the country.

In the few decades preceding the Turkish invasion in 1821, the Funj Kingdom of Sinnar that controlled most of northern Sudan since the sixteenth century was in a miserable state of chaos and disintegration. The kingdom's decline started since the late seventeenth century when tribal groups in outlying regions, such as the Shaliqiyaa in the north, were able to secede and establish their own independent kingdoms. When the Turkish troops advanced into Sudan under the command of Ismail Pasha, a son of Egypt's Viceroy Muhammad Ali, there was virtually no central government in the country that could claim the loyalty of the majority of the population. Ismail Pasha was met with courageous but inadequate resistance from small tribal groups who were no match to the modern and organized invading forces. This resistance was promptly and
ruthlessly crushed and, with the exception of Dar Fur, the Turkish rule was firmly established all over northern Sudan.

Al-Turkiyya era is also of paramount importance to the subject matter of this study, because during that time a certain degree of success was achieved in bringing together the two parts of the Sudan under a single authority. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, the two regions have in fact developed quite separately and have for all intents and purposes remained as two socially, politically and culturally distinct entities.

Coming together as a result of foreign invasion is not the natural course of events that peacefully moulds two distinct ethnic groups into a unitary nation-state. In the one hundred and forty years following the Turkish penetration into southern Sudan relations between the two parts of the country were generally turbulent and characterized by conflict. Since independence in 1956, a clear conflict of identity developed and the north-south divide has overshadowed other contradictions in both the south and the north. It is our intention to discuss in this chapter the development of south-north relations since the Turkish invasion in the nineteenth century. To make our job easier, we will divide this period into four major phases and try to discuss south-north relations during each one of these phases. Special attention will be paid to the development of these relations in the last phase since the achievement of self-rule in 1953, because it is the purpose of this study to explore the connection between identity conflict and the foreign policy of independent Sudan in Africa and the Arab World.

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l) Al-Turkiyya: the initial contact 1821 - 1884

The Turkish invasion of northern Sudan took place in 1821, but the first attempt to establish contacts with the south was made almost two decades later. It is generally accepted that the invasion of Sudan was prompted by the desire of Muhammad Ali to obtain slaves and minerals. Slaves were intended to provide manpower for the armies that Muhammad Ali was building to pursue his expansionist policies in the Middle East; while profits from minerals, specially gold, were expected to finance many of the Viceroy's military and economic projects.

For the first two decades the Turkish rulers concentrated their efforts in northern Sudan and large numbers of slaves were obtained from sources such as the Nuba mountains, the pagan tribes south of Sinnar, and tribal groups living in southeastern Sudan on the border with Ethiopia. The harsh and deplorable methods used to collect slaves from these areas enabled the Turkish administration to achieve considerable success in this field. It is very difficult to know the exact number of slaves collected during this period, but in a span of only five months between January and May 1824 it was reported that a total of four thousand slaves were sent to Egypt.

The Turkish were not as successful in achieving their second objective of mining for gold and other minerals in the country. There were many rumours about the abundance of gold and other minerals in some parts of the Sudan; but in spite of the fact that

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Muhammad Ali was able to obtain the services of some renowned European geologists. Preliminary exploration proved that the amounts available were not encouraging. Failing to achieve its objective, the government attention was turned to the possibility of exploring the White Nile. The exact reason behind increasing interest in the White Nile is not very clear, but the strategic importance of the sources of the Nile to any government in Egypt cannot be overemphasized. Moreover, vague reports about a rich African kingdom at the source of the White Nile may have been another incentive.

In November 1839 an expedition left Khartoum under the command of a certain Captain Salim with the purpose of exploring the White Nile. Captain Salim was accompanied by some Europeans who published their memoirs about the expedition upon returning back to Europe. Their writings aroused interest about the area in Europe and helped to set the stage for, "stronger, more immediate impulses of European commerce and evangelism, which in the decade following Salim's discovery seized the initiative in the southern Sudan." Although Salim's expedition was not able to go beyond Gondokoro (near modern Juba) and was restricted mainly to a narrow strip of land close to the banks of the White Nile, it represented an important historical event for both the indigenous population and the outside world.

Muhammad Ali and the European traders in Cairo and Khartoum soon realized the importance of the newly discovered area as a source of ivory; fierce competition to exploit its riches started between the two. Ivory and ivory products were very much in demand
in Europe at the time, and 'Between the eighteen-forties and eighteen-seventies both the price of ivory on the London market and the quantity imported more than doubled, and the trade obtained a recognized and valuable place in the world economy.' Believing that at last he had a good chance to achieve one of his objectives behind the invasion of the Sudan, Muhammad Ali imposed a government monopoly on ivory trading. The decision was strongly resisted by the traders and, with the help of European consuls general in Cairo, strong pressure was put on Muhammad Ali to repeal his decision. European pressure was successful in eventually breaking government monopoly on ivory trade and a Firman to that effect was issued by the Sultan in Istanbul.

The initial contacts of Captain Salim and the European ivory traders with the local tribal groups in southern Sudan were generally peaceful and amicable despite some incidents of misunderstanding. These contacts took the form of barter trade whereby European traders get ivory in exchange for coloured beads and other cheap items. Needless to say that exploitation was the backbone of this trade. However, this trade was restricted to a small area on the banks of the Nile and neither European traders nor Turkish administrators ventured deep into the bush, and the larger part of the indigenous population remained largely unaffected.

Peaceful contacts did not continue for long. No sooner had the sources of ivory on the Nile banks started to dry up than the European traders started to apply violent methods to obtain ivory from the interior. By the 1860s some European traders were already
employing large numbers of northern Sudanese as private armies.

Clashes with local groups led to the arrest of some of their members who were later sold as slaves. To reduce costs some of the traders paid their employers in slaves. However, slave raids at this stage remained to be no more than an adjunct of the ivory collection process. Moreover, with the decline in the value of beads as an exchange currency European traders started to use cattle. Keeping in mind the place of cattle in tribal culture in southern Sudan, traders could obtain them only through raiding or theft since southerners do not sell their cattle willingly. To recover their stolen cattle tribal groups attacked not only traders but other tribes as well, thus leading to more instability in the region.

This traumatic experience of the first contact with foreigners is a major factor behind the fear and suspicion with which southern Sudanese view intruders. Fear and suspicion were further exacerbated by the development of the slave trade in the following years. The slave trade, that formed a major feature of the second half of al-Turkiyya, left a deep impact both socially and historically on north-south relations. Slavery has always been practiced in the south, albeit within the framework of tribal tradition. Prisoners of tribal wars have always been treated as slaves and were sometimes sold to members of victorious tribes or other friendly tribes. However, it was only since the advent of al-Turkiyya that slave raids were systematically carried on a wider scale and that slaves were sold outside the region. The eighteen-fifties and eighteen-sixties saw the appearance of the zariba (compound) system in Bahr-
Gondokoro until April 1871. Although he came to Gondokoro with the purpose of establishing good government, Baker found himself involved in clashes with neighbouring tribes to procure provisions for his men in the station. Tense relations with the local people continued through the whole period of Baker's stay in Gondokoro and diverted his attention from more urgent business. Therefore, Baker's mission was a failure and when his contract ended in 1873, "Bunyoro and Buganda were far from being annexed to Egypt, and in the area under nominal control few fundamental changes had been achieved."

In their efforts to combat the slave trade, the Khedives in Egypt employed a number of governors for the southern Sudan the majority of whom were Europeans. They even appointed at one stage al-Zubayr Bahama, the notorious slave trader, as governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal hoping that this appointment will curb his activities as a slave trader. However, the man whose name was most connected with the fight against the slave trade was Charles Gordon, the British General whose fate was connected with events in the Sudan from the early 1870s until he was killed by the Mahdiists when they liberated Khartoum in January 1885. As Governor of Equatoria and later as Governor-General of the whole country Charles Gordon was deeply involved into the anti-slavery campaign.

Gordon succeeded Baker as Governor of Equatoria in 1874. During his term in office he followed a tolerant policy towards the slave traders. He argued that time was not suitable for confrontation and that economic development will lead to the eventual decline of the slave trade. He decided to open the region for
investors; he even employed some slave traders to carry out this policy.

However, when Gordon came back as Governor-General in May 1877 he showed more enthusiasm in his fight against slave traders. One of his most controversial policies in this regard was his decision to evacuate all the jallaba (northern Sudanese peddlars) from Bahr-al-Ghazal. As we shall see later a similar policy was followed by the British during the condominium. Gordon considered all the jallaba to be slave traders and he thought that by expelling them from Bahr-al-Ghazal he will put an end to the slave trade in the area. At the time when Gordon decided to expel the jallaba the process of integration between the Arab tribes and the local population in the area was in a fairly advanced stage; some scholars argue that Gordon’s decision had killed this process in the bud with drastic consequences for the present day Sudan. For example, Abbas I.M. Ali argues that, ‘Had Gordon not harried the ‘northerners’, and specially Zubair’s troops, the process would have gone a long way to destroy many of the differences which helped, and help, to create and complicate the ‘southern problem’. It is very hard to argue as to what course historical events would have actually taken, but it is quite interesting to notice that the idea of separate development for the two parts of the Sudan was inherent in British thinking since the time of Gordon.

Above is a brief account of the forty or so years of north-south contact during al-Turkiyya. Coming out of centuries of virtual isolation the indigenous population of southern Sudan were
war the situation and increase the fear and suspicion of the natives. It is quite unfortunate that most of the fighting against the local groups was done by northern Sudanese employed as private armies by the European traders. The first wide ranging contact between northern and southern Sudanese was, therefore, characterized by violence and treachery; subsequent events did not help much in erasing this first impression.

The most unfortunate event during al-Turkiyya was, no doubt, the development of slave trade in southern Sudan. Once again, this abhorrent trade was encouraged by European ivory traders who used to pay the employees in slaves. However, the tragic consequences of this trade, that are still felt in today’s Sudan, stem largely from the sad fact that the chief accomplices were northern Sudanese.

The slave trade left its impact on south-north relations at two levels: historical and social. Although the historical fact has been used at times by some both in the north and the south, there is a general agreement that this fact should not be allowed to haunt relations between the two parts of the country. The social impact, however, is more serious and will probably linger on for a long time to come. As a result of the slave trade northern and southern Sudanese hold negative images about each other, and these images represent one of the major reasons behind the fact that even the smallest incidents are sometimes blown into big crises.

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While the political aspect of the north-south problem can be settled peacefully through negotiations, eradication of prejudice and misconceptions needs more patience and a lot of education. There is no doubt that the sad historical fact of the slave trade is to blame for the negative images that northerners and southerners hold about each other, but at the same time the policy followed by Charles Gordon to evacuate all northerners from Bahr-al-Ghazal is, at best, negative and did not help in any way to draw the two regions closer to each other.

Al-Turkiyya saw also the first steps by the Church to penetrate southern Sudan; in 1851 the Catholic missionaries were assured the support of Khedive Abbas in Cairo to establish themselves in southern Sudan. The first attempts were not very successful but they set the stage for a wider and more aggressive activity by the missionaries during the Condominium. The impact of the missionaries during al-Turkiyya was negligible, but during the Condominium they were entrusted with the education of the southerners a fact that led to the appearance of a Sudanese intelligentsia that is clearly split on north/south and Muslim/-Christian lines.

Despite the fact that al-Turkiyya was successful in opening large areas of southern Sudan to the outside world and although great efforts were made to bring the two parts of Sudan under one administration, no attempt was made to promote national integration. With the south mainly under European governors and the north under Turkish and Egyptians, and with the poor conditions of transport

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and telecommunications, Sudan had for all intents and purposes been governed by two separate administrations. Al-Turkiyya could, therefore, be considered the period in which the north-south divide has actually started.

2) Al-Mahdiyya: the years of trial 1885 - 1898

The outbreak of the Mahdist revolution in northern Sudan in 1881 was welcomed by many southern tribes who saw in Muhammad Ahmad Al-Mahdi their hope to get rid of the hated Turkiyya rule. For example, the Dinka were so enraptured by the religious powers of Al-Mahdi that, "they echoed the name of the Mahdi as the Guided One and assimilated it into their own religion. The Mahdi, as a spirit, became viewed as the Son of Deng - a powerful spirit among all Dinkas." Contacts were established between Al-Mahdi and some southern Sudanese tribal chiefs long before the liberation of Khartoum in January 1885. Initial reception of Al-Mahdiyya by southern tribal groups provided a good chance for the development of natural relations between the two parts of the country and the achievement of national integration through the efforts of the Sudanese themselves without any foreign interference. In the following few pages we will attempt to trace the development of events and try to evaluate the final outcome of the policies of Al-Mahdiyya in the south.

After his initial clashes with the government forces in Abu Island in August 1881, Al-Mahdi moved his headquarters to Jabal Qadat in Kordofan. In the following three years before the final
assault on Khartoum, Kordofan remained the major battleground of the Mahdists and government forces. Bahr-al-Ghazal, being so close to Kordofan and in view of the fact that it was the most exposed to Islamic and Arab influences among the southern regions, was the first to feel the impact of the Mahdist revolution.

The quick victories by al-Mahdi against the stronger and better armed government expeditions won him the admiration and support of both the slave traders and the local tribes in Bahr-al-Ghazal. Despite their obvious contradictions and mutual mistrust the two groups were temporarily united by their Antipathy towards al-Turkiyya. Moreover, the ease with which al-Mahdi scored his victories encouraged many tribes to revolt against the government. The Dinka, one of these tribes, was even using the Mahdist war cry and carrying into battle a green flag sent to them by al-Mahdi,13

Slave traders and freed slave soldiers (Jihadiyya) provided al-Mahdi's army with much needed military expertise. Some of al-Mahdiyya's renowned army commanders such as al-Zaki Tamal, Handan Abu Anja and Muhammad Uthman Abu Qarja were either slave traders or Jihadiyya.14 In Bahr-al-Ghazal a famous slave trader, Karam Allan Kurkusawi, became the representative of al-Mahdiyya. By early 1884 Karam Allan was able to bring Bahr-al-Ghazal under his control and was already contemplating the attack of Turkish strongholds in Equatoria. However, plans for invading Equatoria were postponed as a result of a rebellion among the Jihadiyya, who formed the larger part of Karam Allan's troops. The real reasons behind this rebellion are not known, but it was a clear indication
that relations between the Jihadiyya and their ex-masters were
tense. In June 1885, Keram Allah was forced to abandon his attempt
to invade Equatoria and retreated to Bahr-al-Ghazal as a result of
another mutiny by his Jihadiyya.

At the same time, the death of the charismatic leader of the
revolution only five months after the liberation of Khartoum
plunged the new Mahdist state into its first major crisis. Although
al-Mahdi took the precaution of nominating al-Khalifa Abdullah as
his successor, a severe power struggle took place upon his death.
The Mahdist leadership was split into Awlad-al-Bahr (the Nile
dwellers) and Awlad-al-Gharb (the Westerners). To secure his
position, the Khalifa followed the policy of summoning to Um
Durnman both his opponents and supporters; the former to be put
under strict surveillance and the latter to provide the needed
support. The south was directly affected by this power struggle
when al-Khalifa ordered Keram Allah to evacuate Bahr-al-Ghazal and
proceed to Um Durnman - the Mahdist capital. These orders were
later on modified when Keram Allah was instructed to move to
southern Darfur to quell a rebellion by the Rizayqat chief Madibbu.
In the following few years very little attention was paid to the
south and by 1885 the Mahdist troops were virtually withdrawn from
there.

However, three years later things changed dramatically when
al-Khalifa realized that the existence of the last Turkiyya strong-
hold in Equatoria under Emin Pasha was a threat to his government.
He was specially worried when information arrived that the British
were planning to advance towards the Nile from East Africa. Al-
Khalifa sent his commander Umar Salih to invade Equatoria in 1888
with two objectives in mind: destroying the last bastion of al-
Turkiyya and exploring the possibility of recruiting southern
Sudanese for the Jihadyya troops. In order to achieve his
objectives Umar Salih had, apparently, received strict orders from
al-Khalifa not to disturb the local tribes and try to win their
support. As a result the Mahdist commander followed a tolerant
policy: it was this policy in addition to the valour and fighting
qualities of the Mahdists that won them the admiration and support
of some southern tribes such as the Bari.

The Mahdists were successful in their first objective of
ridding the country of the last remnants of al-Turkiyya; but they
did not achieve much success in their second objective of recruit-
ing southern Sudanese for their Jihadyya troops. Cultural and
social differences seem to have been an insurmountable obstacle.
In a letter to al-Khalifa, Umar salih has this to say, "There is
no possibility of any recruitment or increase of the army, as is
the case in other places in the Arab countries. Those Negroids
when we conquer cannot stand our customs, nor can they practice
our rules, for they find our life very strange. This religion of
ours is very difficult for them to understand and follow and so
they desert us." It goes without saying that under such circum-
stances it was impossible for the Mahdists to win converts to
their cause.

In 1892 the forces of the Congo Free State appeared in the
Southern Sudan as a new element that greatly alarmed al-Khalifa and
his government. Once again al-Khalifa's attention was drawn towards the threat coming from the south and while previous requests by Umar Salih for troop reinforcements went unheeded, al-Khalifa started since 1892 to send more troops to face the Belgian threat. In February 1897 the Congo Free State forces were able at last to deal the Mahdists a strong blow in Rajjaf; the Mahdists, however, withdrew to Bor under the leadership of their new commander Arabi Dafa' Allah and continued to harass the Belgians even after the fall of Um Durman in 1898.

During their ten years in Equatoria the Mahdists were "strong enough to defeat the Negroids but never sufficiently strong to establish their hegemony over them, the Mahdists were compelled to raid again and again not only to maintain their own position but also to secure even the most essential supplies." It should be noted that of their ten years in Equatoria the Mahdists were fighting against foreign forces for a total of seven years, first against Emin Pasha and then against the Belgians. It is doubtful if the remaining three years could be described as tranquil and peaceful. Therefore, the main feature of the Mahdist rule in Equatoria was instability.

The Mahdist presence in the south could be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase extends from 1883 to the end of 1895 during which the Mahdists were confined to Bahr-al-Ghazal; the second is the period of ten years that we have just discussed during which al-Khalifa tried to establish his authority in Equatoria.

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Despite the warm welcome by the southern tribal groups, some features of the initial phase of the Mahdist presence in the south had a negative impact on south-north relations. The most prominent among these features is the fact that support for al-Mahdi came from a totally unacceptable quarter: the slave traders. It will be presumptuous to talk about any national feelings among these tribes in the sense that it embraces the whole country; but within the confines of their local environment they must have pinned high hopes on the Mahdist revolution to free them from the agonies of slavery and slave raids. Seeing that the representative of al-Mahdi in Bahr-al-Ghazal was one of these slave traders and realizing the high position of slave traders under his command, many of the southerners were disillusioned. Moreover, the commitment of these slave traders to the noble principles of the Mahdist revolution is highly doubtful and they treated the natives with arrogance and haughtiness. Therefore, al-Mahdiyya was considered by many tribesmen in Bahr-al-Ghazal as mere extension to al-Turkiyya. The Dinka refer to both eras as the time 'when the world was split.'

Another feature of the first phase that is closely related to the one we have discussed above is the lack of discipline within the Mahdist troops. Karim Allah was twice forced to change his plans about invading Equatoria as a result of rebellion within his Jihadiyya troops. A wide gap existed between the commanders who were mainly ex-slave-traders and the rank and file who were mainly ex-slaves. This precarious relationship led to many disturbances and a lot of instability during the Mahdist existence in Bahr-al-
Ghazal and may have been one of the reasons that prompted al-
Khalifa to withdraw his forces from there.

In the true tradition of Islamic revolution al-Mahdi called
upon his supporters to migrate to Jabal Qadir when he moved his
headquarters to that area in preparation for his long struggle
against the government. Answering his call, many of al-Mahdi's
sympathizers moved from Bahr-al-Ghazal to Jabal Qadir. Added to
the subsequent withdrawal of Karam Allah from the region, this
exodus is believed to have led to the weakening of the Islamic and
Arabic factor in the area. Some of the tribes of Bahr-al-Ghazal
such as the Dembo, the Shatt and the Silluk-Luo had, in the words
of Collins, "become thoroughly Arabized and were, in fact, ruled
before the coming of the Egyptian Administration (al-Turkiyya) by
a powerful Dungulawi merchant named Qinawi, whose manners, dress
and religion they readily imitated." In retrospect, this migra-
tion by Mahdist supporters had led, in the end, to the same
situation that resulted from Gordon's policy of expelling the
jallabs from the region a few years ago. This trend, however, was
reversed when many southern troops who participated in the wars
of al-Mahdiyya returned to the south after 1898 and settled in
separate compounds (Malakiyya) in big towns and started to act as
an agent for Islamization.

The second phase of the Mahdist presence in the south was
longer in duration and different in nature. The invasion of
Equatoria this time was prompted by the need to face a foreign
threat. To win the support of the local population, which was very
essential, the Mahdist representative followed a tolerant policy
and tried to forge alliances with southern tribes. However, the Mahdists displayed total ignorance about the southern Sudanese society and its culture; they were, therefore, destined to repeat the same mistakes committed by al-Turkiyya. Unaware about customs and religious beliefs in the south, the Mahdist representative Umar Salih was surprised to discover that Islam and Mahdist ideology were of little appeal to the majority of southern Sudanese. Like their predecessors, the Mahdists tried to consolidate their power by playing tribes against each other. But, the only outcome of this policy was more suspicion and fear. The whole period of al-Mahdiyya in Equatoria was, therefore, characterized by instability and continuous conflict.

Yet, the most negative feature of the Mahdist policy in the south is directly related to the nature of the Mahdist state itself. With the exception of contacts with the Islamic sultanates in West Africa, the Mahdist state was essentially Middle East oriented. The Mahdists viewed themselves as saviors of the Islamic World and considered the Ottoman Khalifate in Turkey to be their chief adversary. Despite some missionary work in non-Muslim societies with which the Mahdists came in contact, al-Mahdiyya was basically a reformist movement that aimed at reviving Islam within the existing Muslim communities. This messianic outlook kept al-Khalifa totally occupied by his contacts with the Middle East. Under such circumstances, southern Sudan was ignored and al-Khalifa tried to establish his authority there only when he realized the possibility of a foreign threat. As a result of this neglect the south was treated only a battleground to settle accounts.
with foreign powers or as a source of recruits for the expanding Mahdist armies. Needless to say that such a policy did not help, in any way, the relations between the two parts of the country.

3) The Condominium: separate development 1899 - 1952

The British interest in the Sudan started in the nineteenth century when they realized it importance to the security of Egypt. During al-Turkiyya, British interference in Sudanese affairs took indirect forms such as their pressure on the Khedive to curb the slave trade or their maneuvers to appoint some British nationals as administrators. In 1882 the British took full control of Egypt at a time when the Turkish Administration in the Sudan was under heavy pressure from the Mahdist revolutionaries. However, during that time the British preferred to follow a passive policy towards the Sudan in view of the miserable state of the finances of the Egyptian government.22 Even after the liberation of Khartoum in early 1885, the British did not try to recapture the Sudan because they did not see any threat to Egyptian security by the technologically backward Mahdist state.

This situation did not continue for long: the push of the French and Belgians towards the Upper Nile raised the worries of London. In March 1896 the British decided to invade Dongola, ostensibly in a bid to release pressure on the Italians after their defeat at Adwa, but with an eye on French and Belgian movements in southern Sudan. The fall of the Upper Nile to any European power was seen by the British as an unacceptable threat to their
interests in the area. The speed with which the British proceeded to Fashoda soon after the fall of Um Durman in 1898 and their confrontation with the French there reveal the strategic importance of the area to them. In fact, it is generally argued that the French advance towards the Upper Nile is the major precipitant of the British reconquest of the Sudan.

Southern Sudan has always occupied an important place in the thinking of European politicians and missionaries during the nineteenth century. The French saw the area as an essential link between their West African territories and their colonies in Somalia and Djibouti on the Indian Ocean. The British, on the other hand, considered the control of the Nile from its source in Central Africa to its mouth in Egypt as a strategic achievement. Moreover, southern Sudan represents a vital link in the British Cape to Cairo plan. To the missionaries, the Upper Nile area was viewed as the frontline in their confrontation with Islam; their success in this region was seen as the best means to check the spread of Islam into Equatorial Africa.

When the British came to the Sudan as the stronger partner in the Condominium, they inherited a social environment in which politics and religion were inseparable. During the fourteen years of the Mahdist rule the country was governed according to the strict code of Islam. Religious zeal bordering on fanaticism was the order of the day. "Having defeated the royal remnants of the Mahdists in 1898, the British were ever cautious not to rekindle the religious fervour that had led to the death of Gordon."
Believing that Islam is a major factor behind the Mahdist fanati-
cism and keen to keep the southern Sudan free from such dangerous
influences, the British seemed inclined since the start of their
rule to fight the spread of Islam and any manifestation of Arab
culture in the region.

As in other parts of Africa and the Third World, missionaries
worked hand in hand with the colonial authorities in the Sudan.
Nevertheless, the situation in the Sudan was a bit different
compared to that in other parts of Africa; some caution seemed
necessary when dealing with the issue of religion. The demand of
the missionaries to work in northern Sudan was rejected by Lord
Cromer, the architect of the Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan, in
view of the fact that this will amount to an unnecessary provoca-
tion of a hostile Muslim community that was still boiling with
religious fervour. In a private letter to Lord Lansdowne, Cromer
has this to say about the situation in the Sudan, "I have no
objection to giving missionaries a fair field amongst the black
pagan population in the equatorial regions, but to let them loose
at present amongst the fanatical Muslims of the Soudan would, in
my opinion, be little short of insane."25 Therefore, it was
decided as a matter of policy that the activities of the mission-
aries should be restricted to the southern Sudan.26 Despite strong
misgivings by Lord Cromer and other senior officials in the
colonial governmet towards the missionaries, the Church was
regarded as a good instrument for the implementation of the British
policy in the region. The role of the missionaries in fighting
Islam and Arab culture. On one hand, and in reducing administrative cost by providing education for the southerners, on the other, was welcome by the colonial authorities.

An official British 'Southern Policy' was formulated in its final form only in 1930, but the major principle of developing the two parts of the country on separate lines was apparently adopted since the early years of the Condominium. As early as 1904 the British authorities closed a school they themselves started in Wau, the capital city of Bahr-al-Ghazal, because "the appointment of a Muslim teacher would result in the establishment of Islam which was not the desired goal." The Governor-General at the time, Sir Reginald Wingate, indicated that Islam should not be encouraged in Bahr-al-Ghazal and if the local population have to learn a foreign language then it better be English. The government policy of introducing English was not successful at that time, because the natives preferred to send their children to the many Qur'onic schools (khalwas) that existed in the region.

The period before 1930 saw also the adoption of many policies that aimed at the separation of the two parts of the country. In 1917 the Equatoria Corps, manned solely by native southerners, was established to replace the old garrison that was composed mainly of northern Sudanese. In 1918 it was decreed that Sunday instead of Friday will be the weekly resting day throughout the south; at the same time English was adopted as the official language in the region. Starting from 1921, annual joint meeting that brought together northern and southern provincial commissioners

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were suspended. Instead, commissioners of the three southern provinces continued, either to hold their own separate meetings in the south or to have joint meetings with their counterparts in East Africa. In 1922 the Passports and Permits Ordinance was followed immediately by the notorious Closed Districts Ordinance, declaring the three southern provinces, Dar Fur and parts of Kordofan, Gezira and Kassala provinces as closed districts. These ordinances empowered the Governor-General, the Civil Secretary and the commissioner of the province concerned to prohibit any person, foreigner or Sudanese, from entering any district designated as closed. The ordinances were freely used in later years to prevent northerners from entering the south and discourage southerners who look northwards for better standards of living. In 1925 the Permits to Trade Order was, ostensibly, issued to regulate trade activities in the southern region but was used, in fact, to exclude Egyptian, northern Sudanese and other Muslim traders and replace them with Greeks, Christian Syrians and Lebanese.28

The 'Memorandum on Southern Policy' introduced by the Civil Secretary on January 25, 1930 stated for the first time in a single document the basic objectives of the British Administration in the south. The document, simply known as the 'Southern Policy', was the basis of the government's southern policy for fifteen years until 1945 when it was replaced by a new strategy. In his memorandum the Civil Secretary states that:29

"The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or
To carry out the 'Southern Policy' some guidelines which have already been followed by the government for some time were re-stated. In brief, these guidelines are as follows:

i) the gradual elimination of the northern Sudanese adminis-
strators, clerks and technicians in the south and their replacement
by southern Sudanese;

ii) control of immigrant traders from the north through
restriction of their trade permits and their replacement by Greek,
Syrian and Lebanese Christian;

iii) fundamental necessity for British staff to familiarize
themselves with the beliefs and customs and the languages of the
tribes they administer;

iv) every effort is to be made to make English the means of
communication to the complete exclusion of Arabic where communica-
tion in the local vernacular is impossible.

Building on the fact that northern and southern Sudan are two
culturally and ethnically different entities, the British 'Southern
Policy' aimed in the first place to separate the south and develop
it on lines quite different from those on which the north was
developing. Although the British held the idea of developing the
south separately since their conquest of the country in 1899, the
major principles of the 'Southern policy' did not materialise until
the 1920s. The Egyptian revolution of 1919 left a deep impact on northern Sudan where voices calling for the revival of Sudanese nationalism started to be heard. Fearing that such feelings may spread into southern Sudan, a strong tendency of separating the region and joining it to a Central or East African union appeared among senior British administrators.

Despite the argument by some senior officials that the ultimate objective of the 'Southern Policy' was unity in diversity, the implementation of the policy leaves no room for the imagination as to what the real intentions of the British were. The governors of the southern provinces showed considerable enthusiasm in their efforts to follow the guidelines contained in the memorandum of the Civil Secretary. Many of the jallaba were deprived of their licences or deported to the north. For example, the number of jallaba in the western district of Bahr-al-Ghazal dropped from twenty three in 1910 to only four in 1911.30

Some British administrators seemed unsatisfied with the physical removal of northern Sudanese and they went on to fight all symbols of Arab culture. Southerners were prohibited from using Arabic and Muslim names at the time when missions were permitted to baptise them with Christian names. Sales of Arab clothes were strictly forbidden. In a letter to a Greek merchant in January 1935, Raja District Commissioner has this to say, "I notice that in spite of frequent requests to the contrary, large quantities of 'Arab' clothing are still being made and sold. Please note that, in the future, it is FORBIDDEN to make or sell such clothes......
The 'Southern Policy' was not carried out without opposition from the Sudanese themselves. However, most of this opposition came from the northern educated Sudanese who saw the policy as an attempt to dismember the country, or at least use the backwardness of the south as a pretence to delay its independence. The national association of the educated Sudanese - the Graduates' Congress - presented a memorandum to the Civil Secretary in 1942, in which it called for the abolition of the Closed District Ordinance, the unification of the educational system in the whole country, and lifting of restrictions on the freedom of movement by Sudanese nationals. Dismantling of the 'Southern Policy' was at the top of the demands of the Sudanese nationalist movement in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Opposition came also from the other partner in the Condominium: the Egyptian government. Whether because of this opposition, or due to the failure of the policy itself, or may be as a result of the changing international environment, the British colonial authorities decided to review their policy in 1944.

In August 1945, the Governor-general presented to the British and Egyptian governments three alternatives regarding the future of the south. These alternatives were:

a) Integration of the south into the north.

b) Integration of the south into East Africa.

c) Integration of parts of the south into the north and other parts into East Africa.

The wish to integrate parts or the whole of the southern region into East Africa was not a new one, "in the middle years of
British colonial rule in the southern Sudan, the suggestion to 
in incorporate these peoples into the political and economic sphere 
of Eastern African colonies was made repeatedly. In each instance, 
the respective authorities in Kenya and Uganda expressed no 
interest at all in the suggestion. With the reluctance shown 
by the East African colonies and the decision to drop the option 
of an independent southern Sudan, the British authorities were 
left only with the alternative of integrating the south into the 

north.

To prepare the south for eventual integration with the north, 
a conference was held in Juba - the capital of the southern region- 
in June 1947. In view of later developments, the Juba Conference 
proved to be one of the most controversial issues in north-south 
relations. Even forty years later we still find people today arguing 
about the real purpose of the conference and the interpretation of 
its outcome. The conference, that brought together northern and 
southern Sudanese representatives, was organized by the Civil 
Secretary to discuss the issue of the participation of the south 
in the Legislative Assembly. The issue was a sensitive one since 
the Assembly was the first nation-wide body that includes repre-
resentatives from both parts of the country. The political and 
intellectual elite in the north had been relentlessly working for 
this objective since the early 1930s.

In view of the political developments at the time it was only 
natural for the northern intelligentsia and politicians to see the 
decision by the south to send representatives to the Legislative
Assembly as a desire to integrate with the north. This is an interpretation usually contested by southern Sudanese, but still held by a wide sector in the north. In his memoirs, Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary at the time, says about the purpose of the conference, "I looked upon the conference solely as a means of finding out the capabilities of the southerners, and it was therefore quite inaccurate for some people to say later that at the Juba Conference the Southern representatives agreed to come in with the North." In fact, the outcome of the conference was no less complicated than the issues discussed, and it is rather difficult to reach, on the basis of the conference's minutes, a definite conclusion as to what was the real desire of the southern representatives. Yet, in a note presented to the Governor-General in July 1947, Sir Robertson seems to contradict his above mentioned statement when he says, "Southerners endorsed the view that they should not be separated from the Northern Sudan,..." This endorsement, however, was not unqualified according to Sir James Robertson who reports that the southern representatives were suspicious and fearful about possible domination by the north.

A strong opposition to the new policy came also from the Christian missionaries, and some of the British administrators in the south. The new policy included some safeguards to protect southern interests, but these were later on dropped altogether as a result of strong opposition by northern political parties during the self-government negotiations in 1952.

The British 'Southern Policy' was a dismal failure, since it did not succeed in preparing southerners for shouldering their...
responsibilities whether within a united Sudan or as an independent state. Very little was done, if any, in the fields of education and economic development. Therefore, when the colonial authorities decided to bring Southerners and Northerners together within the Legislative Assembly, they were contemplating a long transitional period during which the south could be prepared for eventual integration with the north. However, events in the early 1950s proved the British to be wrong and steps towards self-government were faster than anticipated. The pressure by the Sudanese nationalist movement and the 1952 coup d'état in Egypt paved the way for the signature of the self-government agreement in February 1953. As a result of this agreement the Sudan was ushered into a new phase and the two parts of the country were left face to face to settle their problems by themselves.

Before discussing the north-south relations in independent Sudan, a brief comparison between al-Turkiyya and the Condominium policies towards the south is due here. Of its 135 years as a modern state, Sudan had been under foreign rule for 121 years; 64 years under al-Turkiyya and 57 years under the British who led a condominium that included Egypt as well.

The two colonial systems were different in many ways. The former colonial power was a Muslim state, albeit highly influenced by western ideas; the latter was a big European power that was Christian by religion. Al-Turkiyya was exploring new horizons when it ventured into southern Sudan, while the British came to an area which was already known to the outside world for more than fifty
years. At the time when al-Turkiyya approached the south there was no competition from other foreign powers; the British arrived there during the European scramble for Africa that pitted major powers against each other. In fact, the British had to ward off both the French and the Belgians before establishing their authority in southern Sudan.

These differences influenced to a great extent the policy followed by each power in the region. In the absence of foreign competition, al-Turkiyya viewed the south only as an important link in its endeavours to control the sources of the Nile or as a source of revenue in the form of ivory and later slaves. Being the first to arrive, the Turks had no knowledge whatsoever about the customs and culture of southern tribes; no serious attempt was made to study southern culture or impose Turkish culture on southerners. In fact, the Khedive in Cairo entrusted the administration of the region to Europeans and allowed Christian missionaries to work among the pagan tribes. The government did not try to spread its authority far from the large administrative centres on the White Nile and most of the countryside was either unpenetrated or was under virtual control of powerful traders.

The British, on the other hand, came to the region well aware of its strategic importance to their interests in Central and East Africa. This fact was clearly demonstrated by the British-French confrontation at Fashoda in 1898, an incident that threatened to turn into an international crisis. The British interests in the region were wider and more complicated than those of the Turks.
Consequently, their approach towards the administration of the region was quite different. Like the Turks who preceded them, the British initial contact with southern Sudanese ethnic groups was characterized by cultural conflict. The subjugation of these groups took the best of three decades. Unlike the Turks, however, the British employed renowned anthropologists to study southern Sudanese culture in an attempt to build their policies on sound scientific bases. The British were also successful in establishing their authority throughout the whole region. The most important aspect of British administration in southern Sudan was, no doubt, their attempt to impose their own culture on the indigenous population. Christian missions were given a free hand while traditional beliefs were neglected. The British policy was to promote English rather than any other local language as lingua franca in the region. Moreover, a deliberate policy was followed as we have seen earlier to exclude any Arab or northern Sudanese influence.

In spite of the fact that the circumstances, objectives and policies of al-Turkiyya and the Condominium in southern Sudan were very different, the ultimate outcome was almost the same. Whether by neglect as in the case of al-Turkiyya, or by design as in the case of the British, the ultimate outcome was the establishment of separate administrations in the two parts of the country. Although al-Turkiyya was credited by many historians with bringing the two parts of Sudan into one united modern state, its lack of interest in southern affairs left the region under the mercy of ivory and slave traders and the discretion of its European governors who were virtually independent from the Central Government in Khartoum.
4) The National Government: since 1953

After nearly sixty years of British rule Sudan was able at last to attain self-government when an agreement to that effect was signed in February 1953. A brief transitional period followed after which the country attained full independence in January 1956. During their stay in Sudan the British imposed their tutelage on both parts of the country and made sure that north-south contacts could only be conducted through them. As Professor Mazrui argues, the British policy of converting the south into a Bantustan had helped to delay hostilities for a while, but the memories of the past and specially those of slave raiding were kept alive. Therefore, the withdrawal of the British removed this element and the Sudanese were left to solve their problems by themselves. In the following few pages we will try to discuss the development of south-north relations since 1953 under four separate phases.

i) The wrong start 1953 - 1964

The decade of the 1950s started with some rapid developments regarding self-government for the Sudan, but ominous signs pertaining to the future evolution of south-north relations. In October 1951 the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the agreements of 1899 and 1936 that govern the relations between Egypt and Britain in connection with their sovereignty over the Sudan. A bill was introduced in the Egyptian parliament proclaiming King Farouk as the 'King of Egypt and the Sudan'. A constituent assembly for the Sudan was to be established and a cabinet for the country
was to be appointed by King Farouq. Important areas such as defense and foreign affairs were considered the prerogative of the Egyptian government and the Sudanese cabinet was supposed to deal only with local matters. The decision, that came in the wake of the failure of Egyptian-British negotiations about the future of the Sudan, alarmed not only the British but also the Sudanese nationalist movement. The condescending and paternalistic manner in which the decision was taken alienated the majority of Sudanese, and ushered in a period of growing efforts towards the goal of self-government.

Infuriated by the Egyptian decision, the Umma (Nation) Party and its allies in the Independence Front sent a delegation to Cairo in May 1952 to stress their demand for total independence. Serious negotiations between the Sudanese delegation and the Egyptian government of Prime Minister al-Hilali Pasha continued for two weeks. However, the two sides expressed diametrically opposing views regarding the problem of sovereignty over Sudan. While the Egyptians proposed that King Farouq should be vested with sovereignty over the country at least temporarily, the Sudanese were adamant in their demand for total independence and the withdrawal of both Britain and Egypt. Negotiations were deadlocked and ultimately suspended on June 12, 1952. No more rounds of negotiations were held in view of the troubled political situation in Cairo, that was finally settled by the Free Officers' coup d'état of July 1952.

With the fall of the monarchy in Egypt the call for the unity of the Nile Valley under the 'Egyptian Crown' was a matter of the past. The policy adopted by the new regime under General Muhammad
Najib towards the Sudan included two important departures from that followed by previous Egyptian governments. Egypt announced its full support for the principle of self-determination by the Sudanese and agreed to the separation of the two questions of Sudan and Egypt in its negotiations with the British. Insistence by past Egyptian governments on matters of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan and the withdrawal of the British from Egypt as preconditions for any agreement on the future of the Sudan have always blocked any possible solution. With the new Egyptian policy the settlement of the 'Sudan Question' was only a matter of time.

Sudanese political groups were invited to Cairo for discussions about the country's future. Extensive negotiations took place in October 1952, and the Egyptian government was able first to conclude and agreement with the Umma Party and the Independence Front on October 12, and then with the Unionist Front on November 1st. The Egyptian government played also a vital role in the unification of all the unionist parties under the National Unionist Party (NUP). Representatives of all political groups including the Independence and Unionist Fronts were once again invited to Cairo in January 1953. An accord, that formed the basis for the self-government agreement of February 1953, was reached between these groups and the Egyptian government on January 10, 39

An ominous sign during these discussions in regard to the future north-south relations was the complete absence of southern Sudanese, whether as individuals or as organized groups. A major reason to explain this absence was given by analysts as the fact
that southerners did not have any organized party or political group at the time. However, the failure of the Egyptian government to invite southerners to Cairo and more important the failure of the northern Sudanese political groups to include southerners in their delegations, or at least consult with them before travelling to Cairo was a tragic mistake. The intensive political activity that involved the Egyptian government and northern Sudanese political groups coincided with the failure of the British authorities to extend the life of the Legislative Assembly beyond October 1952, believing that a general election will take place before the rainy season in 1952. As things turned out elections were not held until December 1953 and the Parliament was convened in January 1954. Therefore, as Sir James Robertson puts it, "From October 1952 until January 1954 there was no representative body in existence which could speak for the Sudanese as a people, and because of this lacuna the Southerners, and the country people generally, lost any opportunity of influencing events." These were, of course, not just any events because that was the period when the future of the country was decided.

These facts were used some years later by separatist groups in the south to support their claims, arguing that no social contract involving the south exists and, in fact, the south had never given its consent and support to the creation of the Sudanese nation-state. The impact of the neglect of the south by the northern Sudanese political groups was further magnified by the behaviour of these same groups during the transitional period and
right after independence as we shall see later.

As it is usually the practice in other places, general elections in the Sudan have always been seasons for offering promises that are conveniently forgotten by politicians once they take office. The 1953 general elections were no exception to this rule. Broken promises and malpractices during these elections helped only to confirm the Southerners' worst fears about the north. To win votes in the south, the major northern political parties used two methods that proved to be very harmful for north-south relations; they offered promises that they could not keep and they exchanged accusations that fanned the flames of hatred between the two parts of the country. The Chairman of the NUP, for example, made the reckless promise that when the Sudanization programme is carried out in the south priority will always be given to the Southerners and that they will be assured of 25% of the Sudanized jobs all over the country. As things turned out, these promises were totally ignored when the Sudanization programme was eventually carried out by an NUP government.

Moreover, the Umma Party and the NUP made accusations that did not only harm the other party's image but helped also to confirm southern suspicions about the north. The Umma politicians labelled the NUP as the party of the jallaba whom they accused of milking the south dry. On the other hand, NUP leaders described the Chairman of the Umma Party as the descendant of the slave traders and cautioned the southern voters that he will reintroduce the abhorrent slave system if elected. This was a pattern that was,
unfortunately, repeated in one form or another during the short
history of independent Sudan. Northern politicians have always
looked at the south from the standpoint of political squabbles and
rivalries in the north. Whether in democratic or military regimes,
the support of the south was, more often than not, sought to
strengthen the position of one group in the north against the
other.

Article (8) of the Agreement Concerning Self-Government and
Self-Determination for the Sudan (1953) establishes a Sudanization
Committee with the purpose of substituting Sudanese nationals for
foreigners in the country's civil and military services. The British
administrators in the Sudan strongly opposed the immediate Sudan-
ization of all important posts because they thought, as in the
words of Sir James Robertson, "that this would mean deterioration
in standards of administration, for Sudanese replacements of ade-
quate ability and experience could not immediately be found for so
many posts."44 However, the tide was too strong for these British
administrators to resist, and their proposal to keep some advisors
specially in the judiciary, the Army and in the south was brushed
aside. As Professor M. 'Abdel Rahim correctly states, "the over-
riding political consideration explicitly stated in the Agreement
and in the Committee's terms of reference was given priority over
all other considerations"45 Nevertheless, when the final report
of the Committee was presented to the Parliament in early August
1955 it was very clear that the Sudanization programme suggested
was mainly guided by pure administrative principles with no regard,
whatevsoever, to the political situation in the country. Jobs were allocated and promotions were made in accordance with qualifications, seniority and experience. Southernners were appointed to only six out of about eight hundred Sudanized top posts; educated southerners and a large sector of ordinary people were disillusioned. The outcome of the Sudanisation programme was cited by the 'Commission of the Enquiry on the Southern Sudan Disturbances' that investigated the rebellion by the Equatoria Corps in 1955, as one of the major precipitants of that rebellion. The 1955 rebellion is generally considered as the genesis of the separatist movements that dominated the political scene in southern Sudan during the decade of the 1960s.

Another important reality of the transitional period that continues to cast its shadows on the south-north relations is the difference in views between the two sides regarding the future form of government for independent Sudan. Generally speaking, southerners called for a federal system that allows the south a certain measure of autonomy while the northerners insisted on a unitary state. This situation stemmed from the fact that separate policies followed by the government during the Condominium had led to tremendous differences in levels of development in the two regions. When it was decided that the two regions should be brought together in 1947, the north was by far the more advanced and better organized. Fearing domination of the south by the stronger north, the British included in the Self-government Statute of 1952 the right of the Governor-General to veto any resolution by the Legislative Assembly that he sees as detrimental to southern interests.
The British tried, albeit to no avail, to include the same right in the 1951 'Agreement Concerning Self-Government and Self-Determination'. With this background it was only natural for the south to express its fears and demand a federal system as a guarantee against any possible northern domination.

However, it was not the difference in views about the form of government that really influenced the north-south relations in a negative way, but the mishandling of the issue by the government at the time. Fears of northern domination led some southerners to call for the postponement of the country's independence until convincing guarantees were worked out. Seeing this call as a mere British ploy, northern political parties campaigned very hardly for the declaration of independence on schedule. To solicit the support of the south, northern political leaders promised that the demand for a federal system will be given full consideration. In fact a committee was formed late in 1956 to consider a permanent constitution for the country. However, of the 46 members of the committee only three were southerners. Needless to say that the southern members were easily outvoted inside the committee; the three withdrew from the committee altogether in December 1957 when it was obvious to them that the committee will reject their demand. Coming soon after the Sudanization episode, the rejection of the federal option by the committee helped only to deepen further the southern mistrust of northern politicians.

In November 1958 a controversial and mysterious transfer of power took place. It is generally believed that Prime Minister
Abdullah Khalil of the Umma Party had, for unknown reasons, invited the leadership of the army to take over. The handover was most probably motivated by the power struggle among the three major northern political parties. Some argue, however, that it was in fact a northern conspiracy against the south and other peripheral regions. This claim may be far-fetched, but the policies of the military regime helped greatly to increase southern fears.

The military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud was dominated by assimilationists, who viewed the problem in the south as a mere creation of the British 'Southern Policy' and thought that a solution can only be found by reversing that policy. Efforts of spreading Arabic and Islam were intensified. Moreover, the military nature of the regime led to a strong emphasis on the security aspect of the problem. Abboud's policy was, therefore, built on two pillars: cultural conformity and oppression through the use of force.

One of the first decisions by the military regime, pertaining to the south, was the unification of the weekly rest day in the whole country in February 1960. Friday, instead of Sunday, is now the official rest day all over the south. This was a clear attempt to reverse the decision by the colonial authorities in 1918 changing the weekly rest day in the south from Friday to Sunday. The government decision was met with strong protest specially from Christian priests and school children. Leaflets calling for the boycott of work and classes on Sunday were distributed. But, the government's reaction was swift and harsh. In spite of the fact
that the government tries to present the decision as one of administrative necessity, in the south it was viewed as an attempt to restrict religious freedom and to impose Islam on the southern Sudanese.

These suspicions were further deepened when the government issued the 'Missionary Societies Act' in 1962. Aimed at regulating missionary activities in religious and social fields, the Act was seen by the missionaries as an uncalled for interference in their internal affairs. To the ordinary citizen in the south the Act was portrayed as yet another attempt by the government to fight Christianity. This was specially damaging to north-south relations in view of the fact the government was very active in the propagation of Islam in the south. Needless to say that the government attempt to achieve national unity through cultural conformity was ill-advised and helped only to drift the two parts of the country farther away from each other.

Another decision that added to the immensity of suspicion and mistrust is that of expelling all foreign missionaries from the south in March 1964. In fact, this was not the first time that missionaries were expelled from the Sudan. During the First World War in 1916 and again after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 the British authorities expelled some of the Verona Fathers whom they considered to be on the side of the enemy. However, the decision by the military regime in 1964 was viewed in the south within the context of the policy of the government there that was seen as favouring Islam against Christianity. All government
efforts to link the decision to the security situation in the south and its attempts to reveal interference by foreign missionaries in Sudanese internal affairs fell on deaf ears and did not win the government policy any support inside the region.

As a result of the government's oppressive policies the remnants of the 1955 rebellion started, as early as 1960, to organize into small fighting units against government forces in the south. The first steps were taken at that time towards forming the Anya-Nya Movement that spearheaded the fight against the Central Government during the next twelve years. However, attacks against government posts did not take place until late in 1963 and the last year of the military regime saw the intensification of security operations in the south. At the same time when the military wing was being organized, southern Sudanese formed their first political organization in Uganda in 1961 under the name of the Sudan Christian Association (SCA). The name of the organization and the fact it was headed by Fr. Saturnino Lobure, a southern Sudanese priest, were clear indications that it was established as a reaction to the government policy decisions we have just discussed. However, it was not long before the southern politicians realized the limitations of a religiously based organization especially in the south where only a small fraction of the population is in fact Christian. Therefore, in 1962 the SCA was disbanded and a new organization was formed under the name of Sudan African Closed Districts Union (SACDU), reflecting a wider racial and cultural base. Later the name of SACDU was changed into Sudan
leaders to reach a compromise about the future form of government. Moreover, the military regime that followed built its policy on two wrong premises, that unity can only be achieved through cultural conformity and that a conflict based on genuine cultural and social differences could be settled through the force of arms. The wrong start through the first decade of independence helped only to deepen fear and suspicion and hamper efforts towards a peaceful solution.

ii) The dialogue 1965 - 1972

The second democratic era opened with a note of hope for the southern Sudan. Sir-al-Khatim al-Khalifa, an educationalist with vast experience in the south, was chosen as Prime Minister for the caretaker government that took over from the military in October 1964. More important was the appointment of one of the leading southern politicians as the Minister of Interior, the highest post ever to be held by a southerner.

On November 10, less than two weeks since he took office Prime Minister al-Khalifa spelled out his government's policy towards the south. He declared the government's rejection of military solutions, its full recognition of racial and cultural differences that exist between the north and the south, and its commitment to a negotiated peaceful settlement. A month later the government announced a general amnesty as the first step in its peace offensive.

Thus, the stage was set for contacts both inside and outside
the country leading towards the Round Table Conference that was eventually held in Khartoum in March 1965. The conference was participated in by all the political parties in both parts of the Sudan in addition to representatives of the self-exiled southern Sudan political movement. The conference was the first opportunity for southern and northern politicians to face each other and candidly discuss their differences. It was also attended by observers from seven African countries. The objective of the conference was stated by the Prime Minister in his inaugural speech as follows:

"to discuss the Southern Question with a view to reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the regional interests of the south as well as the national interests of the Sudan."

To achieve this objective representatives of two southern political parties, five northern political parties, the Professional Front—an organization of civil servants and professionals that led the people’s struggle against the military regime during the October uprising—and seven independent southerners discussed south-north relations for two weeks in the presence of observers from Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania and Algeria. It was quite obvious from the start that the conference was divided into two camps: the north and the south. But, while the major northern political parties were almost unanimous in their demand for a unitary state with a certain degree of decentralization, the southern leaders were divided in their positions. The extremists called for independence for the south while moderates indicated
that they will be satisfied with the establishment of a federal system for the whole country.

The debate inside the conference came as a shock to many northerners who did not realize, until then, the immensity of bitterness held by some southern politicians. Aggrey Jaden, one of the extremists inside SANU, was not at all optimistic about any future reconciliation between the two parts of the country. In the conference he expressed this pessimism as follows:

"... there are in fact two Sudans and the most important thing is that there can never be basis of unity between the two. There is nothing in common between the various sections of the community: no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests, no local signs of unity and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single community."

Jaden's address was greeted with shock and aversion in many circles in the north; it was seen as missing the whole point behind holding the conference. However, the speech was, no doubt, an eye opener as to the degree of mistrust and suspicion held by the majority of southerners towards the north. This is in fact one of the most important, if not the most important, outcome of the Round Table Conference. For the first time since independence, the northern Sudanese had the chance to fathom the depth of the problem and to realize its gravity. It was quite clear that all was not well, as the military regime used to tell the people, and that there was a lot more to the south-north conflict than the eye can see.
The conference was concluded on March 29, without achieving its main objective as stated in the Prime Minister's inaugural speech. Much of the blame for the failure of the delegates to reach a peaceful settlement lies with the extremist group within the southern politicians. As things turned out it was very clear that members of this group were hostage to their own prejudices and misconceptions, they failed to capture the spirit of reconciliation that followed the overthrow of the military regime. Some of them were even negotiating in bad faith since they did not believe in peaceful solutions. However, we should not forget that the majority of southern delegates were very genuine and constructive; their efforts towards real conciliation were frustrated by the extremist group inside the conference and in the war front in the South. Nevertheless, efforts by moderates were not completely in vain and a general understanding that rejects the two extremes-separation and the status quo - emerged, though not explicitly stated in the final resolution of the conference.

The conference was regarded as a failure because it did not reach a peaceful settlement for the problem. In retrospect, however, this judgement may be too harsh specially if the outcome of the conference was considered within the wider context of the continuous search for peace. The conference was only the first step in a long process that is going even at present.

In its final resolution, the Round Table Conference appointed a twelve-man committee to consider the future form of government suitable for the country and report about necessary constitutional
reforms. The committee's business was greatly interrupted by political developments in the country. The split within SANU between the moderates, who decided to stay inside and operate as a legally recognized political party, and the extremists who preferred to remain as exiles, created the problem of who should be seated in the committee as representing the organization. The continuation of Anya-Nya attacks on the government forces in the south tied up the hands of the southern representatives inside the committee. But, most important was the difference in views with the coalition government of Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub that took office in June 1965; as a result, the committee's effectiveness was highly reduced and its activities were greatly hampered. However, despite these obstacles the committee was able to cover a lot of ground and present its final report in June 1966.

While the dialogue was going on in Khartoum the security situation in the south did not show any signs of improvement. Taking advantage of the conciliatory atmosphere and the cease fire that followed the October popular uprising, the Anya-Nya rebel forces were able to reorganize and arm themselves; there were many reported incidents of the Anya-Nya terrorizing northern Sudanese living in the south. Unlike the caretaker government of Sir-ali-Khatri al-Khalifa, the elected government that took office in June 1965 followed a hardline policy towards the rebellion and security operations were stepped up. The government strategy was to isolate the rebels; military, political and diplomatic actions were taken to carry out this strategy. Only one month after Mahjoub's coalition government came to power the new policy of confrontation...
was amply demonstrated by incidents in Juba and Wau on the 8th and 11th July 1965. A total of 430 persons were believed to have lost their lives in these incidents. In July and August 1965, the Prime Minister toured Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya in an effort to win the support of the three African governments in his attempt to isolate the rebels. Thus, during Mahjoub’s term in office there was a lull in the efforts towards a peaceful solution for the problem in the south. Nevertheless, as we have seen earlier the dialogue continued within the Twelve Man Committee.

In July 1966, shifting alliances among major political parties in the north brought down Mahjoub’s coalition government and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was sworn in as the new Prime Minister. Once he assumed his duties al-Mahdi declared his intention to resume peace efforts; he lavishly praised the Twelve Man Committee and its report. He also called for a conference of all parties in October 1966 to settle the outstanding issues in the report of the Twelve Man Committee. All Sudanese political parties participated in the conference with the exception of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and two minor Islamic parties. The conference was able to reach a compromise on two of the thorny issues, namely the division of the country into a number of regions and the procedure for the election of regional governors.

With the completion of the work of the Political Parties Conference, north-south dialogue was shifted to the National Constitution Commission. The commission started its meetings in February 1967. Unlike the case in 1957, this time the south was
well represented in the commission, but the suggestion by the southern representatives that decisions inside the commission should be taken by consensus was rejected by the northern majority. Two important issues directly connected to the north-south identity conflict were extensively discussed inside the commission and were referred later to the Constituent Assembly. These issues were, the identity of the country whether it is African, Arab, or both; and the role of religion in politics. As for the identity of the country the northern political parties emphasized the Arab-Islamic nature of the state, while southern political parties emphasized its Africanness. On the issue of religion and politics the NUP, the Umma Party and the Islamic Charter Front proposed that Sudan should be declared an 'Islamic Republic', but this proposal was met with opposition from southern representatives who threatened to withdraw from the Assembly. A compromise was reached according to which Sudan was to be declared as a 'Democratic Republic based on Islam'.

The issue of the constitution was still unsettled when a coup d'état took place in May 1969 and all democratic institutions were disbanded. It is quite interesting that even today these two issues are still at the centre of the political debate in the country.

The coup d'état of May 1969 was carried out by the Free Officers Organization, a group of young army officers who were deeply involved in the 1964 October popular uprising. Most of these officers were left wing progressives who were highly influenced by Egypt's Nasser and his version of Arab nationalism. Being members of the same generation that led the October uprising, the young
officers' views about the problem in southern Sudan were similar
to those held by the October transitional government. Despite their
military training they believed that the problem can be solved
only through dialogue. However, because of their strong Arab
nationalist and leftist tendencies their first peaceful overtures
towards the south were met with indifference from the southern
political and military leadership.

A little over two weeks after assuming power Jaafar Numeiri,
the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, announced the
policy of the new regime towards the problem. In a policy statement
on June 9, 1969 Numeiri recognized the historical and cultural
differences between the north and the south and announced his
government's firm belief that national unity must be built on
these realities. He proposed a system of regional autonomy within
a united Sudan as the ideal solution for the problem. Building
a broad socialist democratic movement in the south was seen as
a pre-requisite for the achievement of the desired goal. A southern
Sudanese, who was a member of the Communist Party, was appointed
to the newly established Ministry of Southern Affairs and entrusted
with carrying out the government programme. For the following two
years, however, government efforts were not successful in making
any progress and the security situation in the south did not show
any tangible improvement.

The first chance towards a major breakthrough came in July
1970 when Joseph Lagu was successful in uniting under his leader-
ship both the political and military wings of the Southern Sudan:
Liberation Movement (SSLM). This important development gave the south a united voice to speak with and made it easier for others to mediate in the conflict. In May 1971 a joint mission of the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches visited Khartoum and offered to mediate between the Government and the SSLM. Things started actually to move forward after the aborted communist coup in July 1971. After the coup, the communists who were the main supporters of the regime since 1969 were removed from the centre of power in Khartoum and a group of pragmatic technocrats took their place. Moreover, the appointment of Abel Allier, a highly respected southern lawyer, as Minister of Southern Affairs helped greatly to improve the atmosphere for contacts between the Government and the rebel movement. One of the most difficult problems to overcome during the initial phase of contacts was the mutual mistrust that developed between the two sides as a result of the long history of fighting. Therefore, negotiations were carried in total secrecy, but even after the signature of the Accord in Addis Ababa the leadership on both sides was accused of capitulation. The suspicion was so deep that when the agreement was made public rumours circulated, specially in the north, about the existence of secret protocols.

The Addis Ababa Accord was concluded between the Central Government and the SSLM in February 27, 1972 and was signed by President Numeiri as the Regional Self-government Act on March 3. The Accord was a culmination of seven years of south-north dialogue that started with the Round Table Conference in March 1965. On the basis of the Addis Ababa Accord the south was granted regional
autonomy within a united Sudan. The Regional Self-Government Act accorded the Regional Government the right to manage all the affairs of the south with the exception of areas such as national defense, external affairs, currency and coinage, educational planning ... etc, that were considered to be the prerogative of the Central Government.

With the Addis Ababa Accord the May regime went the extra step to bring north-south dialogue to its logical conclusion. The role of religion in politics, the identity of the country, geographical divisions and the election procedures of regional governors are four issues that divided northern and southern representatives in all previous attempts towards a peaceful settlement. The constitution of 1973 that incorporated the Addis Ababa Accord settled all of these issues to the satisfaction of the south by accepting, with few modifications, the southern point of view.

The Addis Ababa Accord was a brave political step that brought seventeen years of continuous military confrontation to a halt. However, the suspicion and mistrust between the two parts of the country were deep-rooted which means that the implementation of the Accord needed even more courage and magnanimity than its conclusion. It is quite unfortunate than ten years after Addis Ababa north-south relations deteriorated to the extent that, once again, they found themselves drifting towards civil war.

III. The tense peace 1972 - 1981

The peace settlement was greeted with enthusiasm and elation in both parts of the country. High hopes were pinned on the Accord
and government propaganda helped to raise expectations. However, it was not long before the euphoria had settled down and practical problems started to spring up. In the following few pages we will try to discuss briefly some of these problems.

One of the most sensitive problems tackled by the Accord was the integration of the Anya-Nya rebel forces into the national army. It is no easy task to integrate two armies that have been bitter enemies for seventeen years in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion exacerbated by ethnic and cultural differences. Article (1) of Chapter (II) of the Protocols on Interim Arrangements attached to the Southern Sudan Provinces Regional Self-Government Act (1972) and dealing with the temporary arrangements for the composition of the armed forces in the southern region reads as follows:

"These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the People's Regional assembly."

This article was misinterpreted by the Anya-Nya forces who argued that integration into the national army should start after five years during which the Anya-Nya should remain as independent units. This misunderstanding gave rise to some serious incidents that betrayed the amount of mistrust held by the Anya-Nya forces even after the agreement.

The first of these incidents took place in October 1973 when a technical committee was supposed to select some of the absorbed
Anya-Nya for training in the north. The committee visited three camps in Bor, Rumbek and Bussere but failed in each case to perform its duties because of strong opposition by troops stationed in these camps. Fearing that their transfer to the north was meant to weaken their position, the Anya-Nya troops resisted in a manner reminiscent of the famous 1955 mutiny in Equatoria. These incidents, though limited in scope, were a good indication that suspicion and mistrust were still alive and that these troops were not yet ready for integration. The most serious incident, however, took place in Akobo in March 1973; an absorbed Anya-Nya unit refused transfer to the north and shot and killed the commander and seven soldiers of the unit that was supposed to replace it. Many members of the rebel unit took to the jungle with their arms. It should be noted here that all of these incidents were put down by the Southern Command even though that this meant at times pitting Anya-Nya officers against each other. There was no question about the dedication of the top Anya-Nya leadership to the the hardly won peaceful settlement. The opposition to integration would have been an isolated problem that the passage of time would have solved, if not for developments in other areas that negatively affected south-north relations and left the country in a state of tense peace.

The Jonglei Canal is another point of controversy between the two parts of the country. The canal was first contemplated by the Condominium as early as 1904, mainly to divert the large amount of water lost in the sudd area for exploitation in agricultural projects in Egypt. However, the version that the Sudanese government started to implement in the early 1970s "had been substantially
shaped by Sudan decisions directly influenced by Southern politics. The present version includes the drying up of the sudd swamps to be used as agricultural subsistence projects for the tribes in the area. The flow of water through the canal is expected to help reduce seasonal flooding, that is considered to be the major factor behind repeated famines in the Upper Nile. Many development projects were promised in the area to improve the traditional way of life specially in the fields of agriculture, livestock, fisheries, local industries and social services. But, despite all the attractive economic projects linked to the canal, Jonglei did not win the support of the southerners. One of the main factors behind this is the suspicion with which southerners looked at the scheme as benefitting only northern Sudan and Egypt. In late 1974 rumours circulated that as many as two million Egyptians will be settled in the canal area, and as a result student demonstrations broke out in Juba and Malakal.

The acceptance of the absurd rumours by a large sector of the southern Sudanese was a clear indication that skepticism about northern intentions is still very strong. The Jonglei Canal was, in fact, used by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) propaganda as a political weapon against the Central Government. The SPLM accused the government of siphoning southern resources (water) through the canal for the sole benefit of the north and Egypt. Whether because they actually believe that the canal symbolizes northern exploitation of the south, or whether because it offers them the maximum possible propaganda value, the SPLM targeted Jonglei and was successful in stopping excavation in
November 1983.

An equally contentious issue was the oil reserves at Bentiu. Oil was discovered by Chevron at Bentiu of the Upper Nile Province in 1979. In 1980, a suspicious attempt in the north to redraw north-south borders was included in the Regional Government Act. This attempt gave rise to protests by southern members of the National Assembly who saw the move as a plan to detach oil-rich areas from the south and join them to the north. The error was later rectified through the direct intervention of the President, but other problems related to the exploitation of oil reserves continued to threaten north-south relations. For example, despite protests by the Regional Assembly, the Central Government decided to establish a refinery in the north (Kosti) for the crude discovered in Bentiu. The southern leaders argued that it is more logical for the refinery to be established at Bentiu itself. The whole idea was later dropped and a pipeline to Port Sudan (also in the north) was thought to be the better alternative. However, the oil exploration activities by Chevron were also targeted by the SPLM and brought to a total halt in early 1984.

The whole fiasco about the oil deposits is yet another indication to the degree of mistrust that the two regions hold against each other. There are some in the north who are never able to give up their doubts that the south is preparing for ultimate separation and that the Addis Ababa Accord was only a step in that direction. They usually quote incidents of harassing northerners in the south after the agreement and disputes regarding spheres of
authority between central and regional ministries, to substantiate their claims. On the other hand, many southerners see any move by the Central Government as a sinister attempt to control the south. The southern feeling of mistrust is clearly expressed in a statement by the Solidarity Committee, opposing the division of the south into three regions in the early 1980s. The statement says, "Nothing has been, and will be done or supported by the North that is for the good of the South." 61

The most serious issue affecting north-south relations during the tense years of peace was by far the division of the south into three smaller regions. The issue was initiated in the south itself where small tribes, weary of Dinka domination started to campaign at the Centre for the division of the region into smaller ones. In 1981 President Numeiri raised the issue at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), but strong opposition by southern members aborted the attempt for discussing the issue at that meeting despite the strong support of the motion by Joseph Lagu, the leader of the SSIM before the Addis Ababa Accord. The supporters of the idea did not give up and they continued to press hard for its acceptance. By October 1981 they seemed to have convinced President Numeiri who dissolved the Regional Assembly and the High Executive Council and appointed a caretaker government under an army general. The duty of the caretaker government was to supervise a referendum about the division of the south and the elections for a new regional Assembly.

The division issue was highly controversial and it divided the south on communal basis. Generally speaking, Equatorians were
the strongest supporters of division. But, they were by no means the only supporters of the idea. An interview with the Governor of Upper Nile Region indicates that even among the Nilotic ethnic groups there are some who feel uneasy about Dinka domination.

Some politicians opposed to the division formed the Council for Unity of Southern Sudan. They saw the whole issue as an attempt by the north to weaken the south and they tried to put pressure on the government to change its attitude towards the issue. Their efforts were partially successful when the President decided in February 1982 to dissolve the caretaker government in the south and hold elections for a new Regional Assembly.

Division was the only issue in the election that was held in April 1982 and candidates were divided into two main groups: the divisionists and the unionists in addition to a small group that called itself Change Two. The final results indicate that unionists won 49 seats, divisionists 34, and Change Two 28. A closer look at voting patterns reveals that divisionists have won overwhelmingly in Eastern and Western Equatoria, a clear indication that divisionist tendencies were very strong there. Election results clearly reflect the complexities of ethnic pluralism inside the south itself. Political maneuvers that followed the elections enabled the divisionists to secure the support of the Change Two group and form the new regional Government. Once the divisionists came to power the division of the south into three regions was only a matter of time. In June 1983 a presidential decree was issued dividing the south into three separate regions. The decision
represents the last straw for those who thought that President Numeiri was undoing the Addis Ababa Accord little by little.

(i) The relapse 1981 - ?

The increasing mutual mistrust that characterized the north-south relations during the late seventies and early eighties added to the frustration resulting from the lack of any genuine economic development in the south since the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Accord. The Regional Government failed to generate adequate income for its operations and continued to be completely dependent on the Centre. Moreover, almost 60% of the total income was spent on the state control apparatus rather than on economic and social development. The hopes that accompanied the conclusion of the Accord were all but frustrated. In the south no tangible economic benefits were felt, and in the north the fact that the Central Government had to subsidize the regional budget created the feeling that even after the end of the war the south is still a heavy burden. Added to these disturbing realities was the general feeling that although they were able to manage their own affairs, southerners were still unable to adequately influence decisions at the Centre. Combined, these factors helped to create in the south an atmosphere conducive to rebellion. As Dr. John Garang puts it, "... the marginal cost of rebellion in the south became very small, zero or negative; that is, in the south it pays to rebel."64

Many anti-government movements appeared in the south in the early 1980s. The largest and most influential among them is, no
doubt, the SPLM whose military wing the SPLA was formed in mid-1983 at the time when the controversy about the division of the south was at its peak. However, this time the south took to arms with venom and the armed conflict expanded to areas unknown in the first civil war before 1972. In the five years since 1983 the war claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, primarily among southern Sudanese. The loss of life was not only through actual combat but mainly through policies of starvation followed by the antagonists.

The SPLA is believed to have more than forty thousand men under arms. Firmly based inside Ethiopia, the movement is well equipped and able to fight a prolonged war. Towards the end of 1983 the SPLA took the initiative in its war against the Central Government by engaging with the army at Malual Gahoth in November of that year. In the following five years the SPLA was successful in bringing life in the region to a complete stand still. As a result, the majority of southern Sudanese were forced to leave their homes and take refuge in neighbouring Ethiopia or in the north. The SPLA was also able to attack area in northern Sudan and was even successful, with the help of the Ethiopian air force, to occupy for a short period of time the two border towns of Kurmuk and Gissan late in 1987.

In his last days President Numeiri tried to open dialogue with the SPLM, but his offer was rejected. In April 1985, Numeiri was overthrown and a new transitional government was established. A general feeling prevailed that the SPLM, which emphasized in its propaganda the objective of overthrowing Numeiri, will lay down its
arms and join others under a new democratic Sudan. Contacts with
the SPLM started soon after the inauguration of the transitional
government, but the SPLM's reaction was not as quick as antici-
pated and peace efforts continued at a snail's pace. Some blunders
on both sides during this period helped only to strengthen the
position of the sceptics. However, the SPLM and the National
Alliance for National Salvation (NANS) - an organization that led
the 1985 popular uprising - signed a peace declaration at Koka Dam
in Ethiopia on March 24, 1986, only two weeks before the end of the
transitional period. The declaration called, inter alia, for lift-
ing the state of emergency, the repeal of the September 1983 Shari'a
laws and the abrogation of military pacts with other countries.

The declaration came at a time when a new government, with
perspectives and priorities different from those of the NANS, was
being installed in office. Despite the fact that his party was
represented at the Koka Dam meetings, Sadiq al-Mahdi - the new
Prime Minister - had some very serious misgivings about the decla-
ration. He argued that the state of emergency cannot be lifted
unless preceded by a cease fire, that the Shari'a can be repealed
only when an alternative built on Islamic principles is adopted,
and that Sudan is not party to any military pacts that impinge on
the country's sovereignty. This position was reiterated by the
Prime Minister recently when an agreement, similar in terms to the
Koka Dam Declaration, was signed between the SPLM and a major
coalition partner in November 1988.
Nevertheless, the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi continued contacts with the SPLM in an attempt to iron out differences. Mediation by internationally recognized figures such as Nigeria's ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo paved the way for such contacts. The first meeting between Prime Minister al-Mahdi and Dr. John Garang took place in Addis Ababa on July 30, 1986. However, only two weeks later the government suspended contacts with the SPLM indefinitely in the wake of the shooting down of a civilian aircraft over Malakal, the capital of the Upper Nile Region, on August 16; more than sixty passengers and crew lost their lives in the incident. The reckless action by the SPLM and the boastful attitude with which it announced its responsibility for the attack created some bitter feelings in the north and brought the peace process to a halt. Besides, the SPLA occupation of Kurmuk and Gissan in late 1987 and the behaviour of some of its soldiers during the occupation of the two towns, torpedoed peace contacts that were under way at the time as a result of al-Mahdi - Garang meeting in Kampala.

The problem in the south is the major challenge facing the government and Sudanese political leaders at the moment. But, despite a general agreement among all political forces in the country about the necessity of holding a constitutional conference, proposed by the SPLM in early 1985, to discuss the future form of government suitable for the country, there are still large differences in positions regarding the agenda of the conference. In the few past months international pressure was stepped up against
to both the Government and the SPLM to settle their differences and allow international relief to reach the southern Sudan where hundreds of thousands are dying of starvation. Nevertheless, the war still continues unabated and positions taken by different political groups are still wide apart.

Before concluding this section it may be worthwhile to hold a comparison between the SPLM and the Anya-Nya that spearheaded the fighting against the Central Government during the 1960s. Since its inception in 1960 the Anya-Nya had always been the centre of resistance against the government. Many exile political organizations were formed and dissolved during the 1960s, but all of them had the purpose of promoting the Anya-Nya cause and claimed to be representing the movement outside. Despite the fact that in the second half of the 1960s many political organizations had been established, no one of them tried to form its own military movement and the Anya-Nya continued as united as ever. As we have seen earlier, this internal political conflict was settled in 1970 when the political and military wings were united under the SSLM. We hope that comparison between the SPLM and the Anya-Nya will put the present conflict in perspective and help us to understand better the reasons behind the failure, so far, of the two conflicting parties to reach a peaceful settlement despite the absurdity of this war.

Many observers in northern Sudan believe that the SPLM is no more than an extension to the Anya-Nya, but a closer look reveals many differences between the two. Some differences are
basic and ideological, others may only be circumstantial.

The Anya-Nya and its political wing have always been seces-
sionist in nature. They were basically an outcome of the struggle
by the south to be recognized as different from and equal to the
north. This fact greatly influenced the outlook of the Anya-Nya and
its perception of the south-north conflict. The literature of the
Anya-Nya argues that the south was not consulted when the Sudanese
state was founded in the 1950s and that its wishes have been com-
pletely ignored by subsequent governments. North-south differences
were usually exaggerated and similarities and common features were
totally ignored. When Joseph Lagu was successful in uniting the
military and political wings of the movement, the new organization
was given the name of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
clearly betraying regional biases. The SPLM on the other hand, tries
to project itself as a truly national movement that was incident-
ally started in the south. Right from the start the SPLM tried to
emphasize its commitment to the unity of the country. Paragraph
(22) of the SPLM Manifesto reads as follows:

"The immediate task of the SPLM is to transform the
Southern Movement from a reactionary movement led
by reactionaries and concerned only with the South,
jobs and self-interest into a progressive movement
led by revolutionaries and dedicated to the socialist
transformation of the whole Sudan. It must be
restated that the principal objective of the SPLM
is not separation for the South. The South is an
integral and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently by colonialism, and its further fragmentation can only be in the interest of her enemies."

This paragraph clearly indicates that the SPLM is against all secessionist movements in Africa. It is true that the early statements by the SPLM leaders could hardly be defined as national in content since they were concentrating mainly on the problems of the south. Even in his address to the Sudanese people on the founding of the SPLM, the six precipitants for the start of the struggle against the government enlisted by Dr. Garang were all regionally biased. However, as time passed statements by the leaders of the SPLM started to pay more attention to problems in other parts of the country. For example, the policy statement by Dr. Garang on July 12, 1988 tackled problems such as the worsening economic crisis, deterioration of production in the Gezira and foreign intervention in western Sudan. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the SPLM is quite different from the Arwa-Nya, to the general public in the north it is still a southern movement and as A.M. Leach puts it, "Even the non-Arab groups in the north have not rallied to the SPLM, aside from some elements among the Nuba and the Ingessana. As a southerner, Garang cannot attract a broadbased movement in the north. In fact, the longer the conflict continues, the more resentment is building up against the SPLM," the national image of the SPLM is also compromised by the behaviour of the rank and file of the SPLA and the propaganda spread by its radio station.
Ideologically the Anya-Nya military and political leadership was nationalist and pragmatic. The lack of controversial ideology such as Marxism, that was very popular among secessionist and liberation movements in Africa at the time, is believed to have assured the unity of the Anya-Nya throughout its conflict with the Central Government. The Anya-Nya had a very simple and clear objective and that was, "to liberate the southern Sudanese people from northern-Arabicised- Sudanese domination with the ultimate aim of establishing a sovereign African state. In its internal and international propaganda the Anya-Nya had been consistently emphasizing this theme. In contrast, the SPLM declared its commitment to socialism as a philosophy to build a new Sudan, as stated in the paragraph of its Manifesto quoted above. However, apart from the declaration that it intends to adopt a socialist system that is compatible with Sudanese local and objective conditions, the SPLM remains ambiguous on this point. The close links that the SPLM has with Ethiopia drive many northerners to believe that the SPLM is in fact aiming at building a communist state in the Sudan. The leftist orientation of the movement has also raised some doubt within the south itself.

The attitudes of the two movements towards the so-called African minorities in the north reflect basic differences. With its simple objective of liberating the southern Sudan, the Anya-Nya did not feel any necessity to coordinate its policies with rebel groups in the north. For example, in the late 1960s the Nuban leader Rev. Philip A. Gabboush fled the country and tried to
join the Anya-Nya but he was not welcomed. Once again in 1977, Rev. Gabbush tried to stage a coup d'état in Juba but he was not successful. Commenting on the coup attempt, Deng Awur has this to say, "It is generally believed that the attempt was masterminded by Rev. Phillip Abbas Gabbush, a Nuba politician and who by our politics is a Northerner." In its seventeen years history the Anya-Nya was never reported to have seriously attempted to enter into an alliance with any of the northern political forces. The attitude of the SPLM towards this issue is exactly opposite. Believing that all the regions are victims to the misguided policies of successive governments in Khartoum, the SPLM started to look for allies in the least developed regions of northern Sudan. Unlike the Anya-Nya the SPLM has always tried to exploit contradictions within northern Sudan. SPLM efforts were not limited only to the neglected regions, but since 1985 it has even tried to make use of contradictions among leading political forces in Khartoum itself.

The conception of the two movements about the final solution for the problem in southern Sudan is yet another area where large differences could be found. These differences are directly related to the nature of each movement, whether it is national in its outlook or regional. As we know, the Anya-Nya accepted regional autonomy in 1972 as a solution to the problem. The movement was content with managing the affairs of the south without making big issue of the restructuring of the country's balance of power as a whole. The south was given very little role, if any, in the
process of decision making at the centre. This was, in fact, one of the major drawbacks of the Addis Ababa Accord that eventually led to its destruction. The SPLM, on the other hand, have not yet reached a settlement with the Central Government and any talk about what form this settlement will probably take is only speculative. However, statements by SPLM leaders indicate that they have learnt the lessons of the Addis Ababa Accord. They insist that regional problems can only be resolved by restructuring power at the centre. The strategy of the SPLM regarding power-sharing is still vague, but it is obviously determined to shake the very basis of the present formula.

In spite of the fact that both movements have started in the South, one look at their structure reveals that they represent different ethnic interests. The Anya-Nya was established in Equatoria and was led mainly by Equatorians. The large Nilotic tribes such as the Dinka and the Shilluk were not deeply involved in the conflict. The small tribes of Equatoria have always been over-represented inside the Anya-Nya. In contrast, the SPLM was formed and controlled by the Dinka, the largest ethnic group in the South. Dinka control is, in fact, one of the accusations made against the SPLM and one of the reasons that small tribes feel reluctant to join the movement. This structural difference may be partly explained by historical factors. The Anya-Nya was formed by the remnants of the 1995 rebellion that was largely restricted to Equatoria. Nilotic tribes remained generally unaffected by the rebellion. On the other hand, the SPLM was formed in the wake of
the division of the south in 1983, a policy that was actively opposed by the Dinka as we have seen earlier. However, structural differences between the Anya-Nya and the SPLM should not be exaggerated because issues raised by both movements appeal to a wide sector of the southern public and they usually help in uniting the south against the north.

Another important factor is the change in international sentiment regarding non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states. While in the 1960s Sudan Government could deal with the problem in the south as an internal matter, this is not that easy at present. The role played by television and other mass media in reflecting the tragedies of famine and war, and the interest aroused by their coverage of events in many parts of the world reduced greatly the ability of the Government to deal with the problem as merely an internal matter. Mounting international pressure have greatly affected the attitudes of both the Central Government and the Rebel movement.

Prospects for peace in the Sudan seem to be very dim at the moment despite strong international pressure. But, even if peace is achieved in the near future, which is still a possibility, the basic ingredients of the north-south divide will still be there. Identity conflict needs generations to settle and Sudan's only hope is unity in diversity. While identity conflict will probably continue for a long time to come, we just hope that it will take a peaceful form whose different cultures can interact to create a national consensus around an accepted Sudanese identity.
Summary

We have tried in this chapter to discuss, as briefly as possible, the history of development of north-south relations since the mid-nineteenth century. We have discussed these relations through four different phases in the history of modern Sudan.

Al-Turkiyya was the period in which south and north Sudan have been brought into direct contact for the first time. Negative features such as cultural conflict and slave trade that accompanied this initial contact left their deep scars on north-south relations. The ignorance of al-Mahdiyya about southern Sudanese culture and its dependence on the hated slave traders helped only to further complicate the situation. The Condominium policy of separation led to a development gap so wide that at the time of independence political and economic life in the country was completely dominated by the north. The history of independent Sudan is a continuous attempt to correct this imbalance. However, the failure of the northern dominated governments to accommodate genuine southern demands is a main factor behind the violence that characterized north-south relations for the larger part of the last thirty years.

The underlying factor in the south-north divide is the identity conflict that looms very high in relations between the two. In the following two chapters we intend to explore the connection between this identity conflict and Sudan's foreign policy in Africa and the Arab World.
NOTES


4) Ibid, p. 28


6) R. Gray, op. cit., p. 69

7) Abbas I.M. Ali, op. cit., p. 39

8) R. Gray, op. cit., p. 88

9) Ibid, p. 103

10) Abbas I.M. Ali, op. cit., p. 114


15) R.O. Collins, op. cit., p. 57

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21) R.O. Collins, op. cit., p. 23


25) Quoted in M.A. Rahim, op. cit. p.72

26) J.W. Burton, op. cit.

27) D.D. Majok, op. cit.

28) For more details about the British southern policy before 1936, see M.O. Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background ..., op. cit, chapter five, and M.A. Rahim, op. cit, pp. 70 - 83

29) For a full text of the memorandum see M.O. Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background..., op. cit. Appendix I

30) Ibid. p. 50

31) Quoted in M.A. Rahim, op. cit. p. 78

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33) J.M. Burton, op. cit.
34) Ibid.
35) Deng Awar Wenyin, "When will we learn from history?" Sudan, 11, 2, February 1986, p. 14
37) Ibid. p. 108
39) For a detailed account of the discussions between the Sudanese political groups and the Egyptian government during this period see M. 'Abdel Rahim, op. cit. or Ahmad Ibrahim Diab, Tarawir al-muqawama al-watania fil-Sudan 1938 - 1953, "The National Movement in the Sudan 1938 - 1953" (1984, Institute of the Arab Research and Studies, Baghdad)
40) Sir James Robertson, op. cit. p. 48
42) S.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background..., op. cit. p. 72
44) Sir James Robertson, op. cit. p. 150
45) M. 'Abdel Rahim, op. cit. p. 220
46) S.O. Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background..., op. cit. p. 72

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48) For a brief but illuminating discussion of this Act, see F.M. Deng, Dynamics..., op. cit. pp. 39 - 40
49) M.O. Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background..., op. cit. pp. 34 - 35 and 54.
51) For further details about the Round Table Conference see M.O. Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background..., op. cit. specially chapter 10
52) The full text of the Prime Minister's speech is reproduced in M.O. Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background..., as Appendix 15
53) Quoted in F.M. Deng, Dynamics..., op. cit. p. 41
55) M.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, (1973, Khartoum Bookshop, Khartoum)
56) For a detailed account of the contacts leading to the Addis Ababa Accord see a book issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the title, Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achievement, (1973, Khartoum University Press, Khartoum)
57) Ibid. The full texts of the Southern Sudan Provinces Regional Self-government Act (1972) and the attached protocols are listed as appendices 6, 7 and 8.


60) Africa, February 1984, p. 6

61) Quoted in L.L. Mavut, op. cit. p. 27


63) Interview with Daniel Koot Mathewa, Governor of Upper Nile Region, Sudanow, 9,11, November 1984


66) The full text of the Manifesto is published in Horn of Africa, 8, 1

67) A.N. Lesch, op. cit. p. 427

68) E.N. Wakoson, op. cit. p. 129


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Chapter Four

Conflict of Identity and Sudan's Foreign Policy

As we have seen in the previous chapters the convergence into Sudan of different peoples from different parts of Africa and the Arab world, and their admixture with the local population have led to a complicated ethnic and cultural picture. This fact, coupled with the reality that Sudan lies on the frontier between Africa and the Arab world, led to some sort of identity conflict as to whether Sudan is African or Arab. We have proved in earlier chapters that, in fact, we see no conflict between the two ingredients of Sudanese nationality. However, justified or not, this fact has deep impressions on Sudanese politics and is closely related to the country's foreign policy, specially in Africa and the Arab world.

One of the favourite themes in Sudanese foreign policy is the desire by all governments to play the role of a bridge or a link between Africa and the Arab world. This desire was expressed as early as 1937 when the Sudanese Foreign Minister at the time addressed the Parliament stating that one of the most important objectives of the government was to promote contacts between African and Arab countries. This wish was repeated many times by consecutive Sudanese governments since then. In fact, if able to achieve its desired goal of unity in
diversity, Sudan could play a positive role in Afro-Arab cooperation. But, as M.O. Bashir argues, the continuing conflict in the South greatly hampers the ability of the Sudan to play this role. Moreover, this conflict has always been an embarrassment to the Arab world and provided the opportunity for attempts by others, such as Israel, to further complicate differences between African and Arab countries.

This chapter will be mainly devoted to the discussion of Sudan's foreign policy in Africa and the Arab world. It is our intention to prove the close relationship between developments in Southern Sudan and the country's foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. Regardless of the fact that there is war in the Southern Sudan or not, the ethnic composition of the country whereby part of the population is more inclined toward Africa while the other part is more inclined toward the Middle East, continues to influence Sudanese foreign policy in these two important areas.

Since its independence in January 1956 until the advent of the National Salvation Revolution in June 1989, Sudan has been ruled three times by democratically elected governments and twice by military regimes. With the exception of a very short period of radicalism in early 1965, Sudanese foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East was generally moderate in nature and conservative in orientation. The policy was built mainly on the principles of non-alignment, good neighbourliness and non-
interference in the affairs of other countries.

Our hypothesis is that, in the case of the Sudan there is a close link between the conflict of identity that is a characteristic of Sudanese politics and the country's foreign policy, specially in its immediate environs in Africa and the Middle East. We intend to discuss Sudan's foreign policy toward the two areas in a chronological manner with special emphasis on decisions and incidents that we regard as supportive to our hypothesis. For convenience, we will divide the period since the independence of the country into a number of phases mostly concurrent with the different regimes that ruled over the Sudan. However, the content of policy may not be the same in each phase while we may find similar policies being followed in two or more phases.

January 1956 - October 1964

During this phase Sudan was ruled by a democratically elected government for almost three years from January 1956 to November 1958 when a coup d'état took place bringing the country under military rule for six years until October 1964. Generally speaking there were no great variations in the content of foreign policies followed by the civilian and military governments in this phase. Both of them adopted a moderate foreign policy that was non-aligned and adhered to principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in the affairs of other countries.

Relations with Egypt have always been a major factor in
in Sudanese foreign policy. The unity of the Nile Valley - comprising Sudan and Egypt - was the first important foreign policy issue facing the Sudanese nationalist movement even before independence. The close links between the nationalist movements in the two countries is an important historical fact that played a major role in Sudanese domestic and foreign policy. The first serious attempt to resist British colonial rule in the Sudan at a national level was the 1924 uprising led by the White Flag League. It is generally agreed that the uprising was greatly influenced by the 1919 uprising against the British in Egypt.

As if to prove this point the British decided, in the wake of the 1924, to reduce greatly contacts between Sudanese and Egyptian nationalists. A major objective of the White Flag League was the unity of the Nile Valley and its flag was drawn the Nile River against a white background.

Despite British attempts to stop contacts between Sudanese and Egyptian nationalists, many young Sudanese continued to flee to Egypt for education. Students leagues formed by these young Sudanese taught them a lot about politics, and when they went back to Sudan these young men were very influential in forming political movements that turned later on into parties. The development of modern Sudanese nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s was greatly influenced by Egyptian nationalist ideas. Sudanese nationalist leaders looked northward for inspiration. At the time, African nationalism was still at an embryonic stage.
educated in Egypt, the Sudanese nationalist leaders considered Egyptian literature as one of the major sources of their knowledge about world affairs. This fact, coupled with the reality that they consider themselves as Arab, led the educated Sudanese to identify with Egypt and the Arab world, a fact that was and still is reflected on Sudanese foreign policy. On the other hand, education was kept at considerably low levels in the South, and nationalism in the modern sense appeared there at a much later stage. As we have mentioned before, the Sudanese nationalist movement was completely dominated by the more educated and better organized northern Sudanese.

Towards the mid-1940s the Sudanese nationalist movement was split into two rival groups, mainly on the issue of unity with Egypt. The independence movement raised the slogan of "Sudan for the Sudanese" and called for total independence, while the unionist movement raised the slogan of the "Unity of the Nile Valley" and called for some sort of association with Egypt after independence. Unity with Egypt was the most important issue in the 1953 elections that preceded the transition period preparing the country for self-determination. The National Unionist Party (NUP) under the leadership of Ismail al-Azhari championed the unity cause and campaigned vigorously during the elections. On the other hand, the Umma Party (UP) campaigned for total independence of the Sudan and was generally considered as an ally of the British. Therefore, it is no exaggeration if we say that
the first general elections in the Sudan were dominated by a foreign policy issue. No mention of identification with Africa was evident in the programmes of the two major parties. Nevertheless, both parties recognized the fact that Sudan belongs geographically to Africa and that having good relations with African countries was mentioned as an objective of foreign policy.

Azhari's NUP came out victorious at the elections held in November and December 1953 winning 46 of the 92 contested parliamentary seats with only 23 going to its rival the Umma Party. Thus, the NUP won a comfortable majority that would have enabled it to fulfill the slogan it raised during the elections regarding the "Unity of the Nile Valley". However, contrary to expectations and to the dismay of the Egyptian Government, Azhari and the NUP opted for the total independence of the Sudan. The sudden change of heart by the NUP remains to be one of the great mysteries of Sudanese politics and many explanations were offered. In an interview with al-Ayam daily, the Secretary General of the NUP Mr. Mubarak Zarroug gave the following reasons for the sudden change of policy:

1) The adoption of the "Unity of the Nile Valley" slogan was only a tactic to drive out the British. No serious plans were ever considered to actually carry out the slogan:

2) Unity with Egypt will only reduce the Sudan to the status of an adjunct to Egypt:

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3) the chance for independence and sovereignty should not be allowed to slip out of our hands;

4) the dictatorial nature of government in Egypt is not compatible with conditions in the Sudan, and the new Sudanese government does not want to be involved in policies such as the removal of Muhammad Najib and the oppression of the Muslim Brothers.

These reasons, specially the first one, have been generally accepted as an explanation to the change of heart by the NUP. Other reasons such as pressure from the military, strong opposition by other political forces and the high handedness of the Egyptian government were also given. However, an important incident took place only two months after the said interview with Mr. Mubarak Zarroug and a few months before the actual declaration of independence inside the Parliament. The mutiny by the Southern Sudanese troops in Juba and Torit in August 1955 was instigated by technical factors, but it was a clear indication for things to come. The mutiny was characterized by strong undercurrents of hatred and mistrust towards the northern Sudanese. It was the first violent expression of a sentiment among the southern Sudanese that refuses anything related to the Arabs - as they describe the northern Sudanese. It may be far fetched to conclude that the decision by the NUP to support total independence was influenced by the mutiny that was swiftly brought under control. However, as later developments in the South indicate, the senti-
ment refusing any closer links with the Arab world grew even stronger as southern Sudanese nationalism developed. In fact, the link between the situation in the southern Sudan and the slogan of the “Unity of the Nile Valley” was not lost to a respected newspaper such as al-Ayan. Commenting on a decision not to hold a referendum on the issue, the paper editorialized, “does not that put an end to tensions that already exist between the North and the South.”

In his first foreign policy statement in the Parliament after independence, Prime Minister Alhadi had this to say:

“Our links with the Arab League are built on the historic blood relations we have with the Arab world. Our objective will be the promotion of these relations with the peoples and governments of the member states, and the consolidation and development of cooperation with them.

At the same time we will work for the promotion of relations and common interests with neighbouring African governments and peoples to whom we are linked with kinship, brotherhood and good neighbourhood. The resolutions of the Bandung Conference on the Afro-Asian Solidarity and Cooperation will always receive our respect and support.”

The statement identified the natural areas in which the Sudanese foreign policy operates, namely the Arab world, Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement. The Prime Minister tried to strike
a delicate balance between the commitment of the Sudan to both Africa and the Arab world, a theme that characterized Sudanese foreign policy on paper at least since independence.

One of the first foreign policy decisions by the new Sudanese government after independence was the decision to join the Arab League. The Sudan joined the Arab League on the 19th of January 1956, less than three weeks after the official declaration of independence at the beginning of that month.

In the fall of 1956 the Sudanese government faced its first foreign policy problem when Great Britain, France and Israel decided to launch an attack on Egypt to punish President Nasser for his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. During the Suez Crisis Sudan behaved as a truly committed Arab country; it issued statements on the 16th of September and the 31st of October condemning the aggressors. When the war broke out in the Sinai Peninsula the Sudan decided to close all Sudanese airports and the country's airspace in the face of British and French flights. A national committee for solidarity with Egypt was established and volunteers were recruited to fight on the side of their Egyptian brethren in the Canal zone. A state of emergency was declared and the army was put in full alert to face any possibilities.  

In Africa, not much was done despite many statements by officials regarding the role of the Sudan, as one of few independent African countries, in support of the African liberation
war. On the issue of African unity Sudan attended the first conference for African independent states in Accra. However, nothing came out of that conference as regards the commitment of the Sudan to the issue of African unity as envisaged by President Nkrumah, the host of the conference. Moreover, Sudan preferred to stay out of all African groupings before the birth of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. Sudan joined neither the radical Ciaabiane group nor the conservative Monrovia group.

On November 17th, 1958 - less than three years after the independence of the country - General Ibrahim Abboud toppled the civilian government and brought the Sudan under military rule. The first statement by General Abboud on Radio Omdurman concentrated on domestic politics as the main reason for the seizure of power. But, the statement reiterated at the same time Sudan's commitment to both Africa and the Arab world.

Early in 1958 Sudanese troops were sent to the border area with Egypt to reconfirm Sudanese sovereignty; the matter that was known as the Halseyib Incident was even brought to the attention of the UN Security Council. Relations with Egypt were at their lowest ebb when the coup d'état took place in the fall of 1958.Normalization of relations with the northern neighbour was set by the Abboud government as one of its major objectives. Abboud paid a visit to Egypt and in 1959 an agreement was signed between the two countries regarding the division of the waters of the Nile. The agreement paved the way for the construction of
the Aswan High Dam, Egypt's most ambitious development project. Relations with Egypt remained very cordial until the fall of the military regime in 1964 in spite of the obvious ideological differences between the two systems.

Generally speaking, Abboud's foreign policy was low key. The General himself showed very little interest in foreign policy and this area was dominated for six years by his Foreign Minister. Mr. Ahmad Khair. For Mr. Khair, the main objectives of Sudanese foreign policy were to safeguard the unity and integrity of the country and to attract as much foreign assistance and trade as possible for the purposes of economic development. The war in southern Sudan was pivotal to the African policy followed by the Foreign Minister, because he thought that too much involvement in the affairs of African countries will give others the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of the Sudan and help to bring the war into the limelight.  

The Sudanese attitude towards the Congo Crisis in the early 1960s was a clear proof of this policy. Sudan was quick to send a small contingent as a part of the UN peace keeping force in the Congo. However, despite tremendous pressure from Egypt and other radical African countries, Sudan was adamant in its refusal of any further involvement. Egypt and its supporters realized that Sudan is the most suitable route to supply Patrice Lumumba and his forces with arms and logistics. The detached and passive role of General Abboud brought him under attack not only from African
radical countries, but also from a large portion of the Sudanese intellectual community which was very sympathetic towards Lumumba and his faction. In fact, Sudan was depicted by some African leaders as the 'sick man of Africa', and Abboud's passivity was even blamed for the murder of Lumumba. ⑨

Abboud's policy of minimum involvement in African politics paid dividends, and African countries were generally silent about the development of affairs in southern Sudan. However, some factors pertaining to internal and international atmospheres helped this policy to be a success. In the early 1960s governments of the few independent African countries were very busy consolidating their position and looking for national consensus after the departure of the colonial powers. At the time there was a general belief that national integration and nation-building could be achieved only through abolishing tribalism; secessionist movements received very little sympathy, if any, from African leaders and peoples. The sad experience of subversive activities by some leaders in neighbouring countries in the name of African unity were still vivid in the minds of many Africans. Moreover, with their countries suffering from one form or another of ethnic conflict, no African leader was intent on giving the chance to others to interfere with his country's affairs. This mood was clearly reflected in the famous resolution regarding the non-violability of inherited borders that was adopted in the first OAU summit conference in 1964.
Internally, the rebel movement was very weak and unorganized. The harsh and suppressive methods followed by Abboud's government reduced the rebel movement to mere bandits using 'hit and run' tactics. Organizationally weak and lacking a unified leadership, the rebel movement was not able to translate the tremendous sympathetic feelings in neighboring countries into actual military and diplomatic support.

With the exception of very few attempts at addressing the United Nations and other international organizations, Southern Sudanese politicians were busy with their political squabbles forming and reforming governments in exile. One of the few glimpses of international activity was the petition sent by the Sudan Closed District Union (SCANDU) to the Secretary General of the UN in 1963. The petition asked the UN to, "...investigate political conditions in the Southern Sudan and enable the Southern Sudanese to decide their political future in accordance with the principle of self-determination." The petition indicated that the regime of General Abboud was successful in its policy of concealing the reality of the situation by keeping others from interfering in Sudanese affairs. It says that despite the oppression of Southerners by the government, this fact "has been skillfully covered and has not found publicity in world circles." The petition goes on to state that the military government was successful in concealing facts not only from the international community, but also from its own citizens. Northern Sudanese,
claims the petition, know almost nothing about the real situation in the south.

With the fall of the military regime the situation changed in many ways. As a result of the popular uprising in October 1964 emergency laws were lifted all over the country, including the war torn southern Sudan. The rebel movement was given a golden chance to rearm and reorganize and its members, clad in arms, were free to roam the streets of southern Sudanese towns. As we shall see in the following section, the activities of the rebel movement saw qualitative transformation after the fall of 1964.

October 1964 - May 1969

It is believed that the popular uprising that helped to bring down Abboud's military regime was precipitated by a number of reasons. In spite of the fact that the uprising was actually triggered by an incident in Khartoum University during a debate session held by some university students to discuss the situation in the southern Sudan, reasons for discontent have been simmering under the surface for six long years. As we have mentioned earlier, the regime's foreign policy in African and the Middle East was considered by a large portion of Sudanese intellectuals as reactionary. Despite repressive policies followed by the government, many of these intellectuals tried to make their position known. To cite but only one example, police forces were deployed to suppress a demonstration by university students protesting about
the passive role of the military government during the Congo Crisis in the early 1960s.

The October 1964 uprising was a spontaneous movement that was led mainly by students, professionals and workers. Traditional political parties, such as the NUP and the Umma, were taken by surprise at the outbreak of the uprising. Nevertheless, the political parties reacted very quickly to exploit the strong popular sentiment calling for the restoration of liberal democracy to consolidate their position. But, in the first few months after the uprising political developments were dominated by the Professionals' Front, an organization formed at the outbreak of the uprising to coordinate actions by students and trade unions.

In the transitional cabinet formed on October 30th, 1964 the Professionals' Front representatives occupied seven portfolios, while the political parties received only five cabinet posts. In view of the strong influence the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) had on students', professionals' and workers' organizations, the new cabinet had strong radical leanings. However, the new government came under strong pressure from traditional forces when it started pondering about a new elections law that will give workers, professionals and peasants 50% of the seats in the new parliament. On 18th February 1965 the short period of radicalism was brought to an end when the government was forced to resign and a new cabinet dominated by the traditional parties was formed.
and were given medical treatment in Sudanese hospitals. The
professionals' Front decided to send medical teams to help the
Congoese 'revolutionaries'; registration campaigns were started
for Sudanese citizens who wanted to contribute to the liberation
of the Congo. Moreover, in December 1964 the Defence Minister of
the Congoese rebels visited Khartoum and was warmly welcomed by
the Sudanese government and press. An article by columnist Reshir
M. Saeed, editor-in-chief of al-Ayam daily, reflects the mood at
that time. In a part of his column Mr. Saeed says, "The Congoese
revolutionaries asked for assistance from the Sudan and their
representatives had an audience with the Prime Minister. We have
not the least doubt that Sudan will fully support the revolution-
aries in accordance with its strong belief in the principle of
national self-determination, its total refusal of both the dic-
tatorial regime of Mr. Tshombe and intervention in African affairs
by outside powers in addition to its firm stand on the side of
freedom fighters. We call upon our government and people to spare
no effort in solidarity with the revolutionaries. We hope that
we will celebrate, very soon, the victory of freedom and justice
in the Republic of the Congo."

However, despite this revolutionary zeal some elements that
opposed such radical policies existed even inside the transitional
government. In December 1964, Foreign Minister Muhammad Ahmad
Mahjoub - a notable conservative and Umma Party leader - addressed
the General Assembly of the United Nations denying that any arms
had passed through the Sudan to the Congolese rebels and confirmed Sudan's recognition of the legitimate Congolese government. Nevertheless, such voices were not so strong in the first four months following the popular uprising in October 1964. In a statement to the press less than one month after the UN speech by the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister Mr. Sir al-Khatim Khalifa reiterated his government's support for revolutionaries all over the world and revealed that Sudan provided aid to Congolese rebels and allowed supplies from other countries to pass through its territories. In fact, this policy was continued even by the second October government that was formed in February 1965 and was under the influence of traditional political forces. The Information Minister in the new government confirmed in a press conference held on February 25th, 1965 that his government will continue the same policy of support to the Congolese revolutionaries.

As for the Eritrean separatists, support came from a spectrum of political forces inside the Sudan. Abboud's policy toward the Eritrean question was governed by his total adherence to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others. There were even instances when Eritrean leaders exiled in Sudan were rounded up and handed over to the Ethiopian government. The situation changed completely after the popular uprising in 1964. The radical forces that controlled the government after the uprising saw it as their sacred duty to support Eritrean rebel in
their fight against the reactionary pro-American regime of Emperor Haile Selassie. At the same time, Muslim Brotherhood and traditional political parties in the Sudan pledged support to the mostly Muslim Eritreans who were fighting against domination by a Christian government. Support to the Eritreans came in many forms. Offices were open in Khartoum by the Eritrean rebel groups, refugees were accepted in Sudan and training facilities were provided, but most important was the fact that Sudanese territory was used as a convenient route for arms supplies and other types of assistance from sympathetic Arab countries. The new policy was a manifestation of a strong popular sentiment of suspicion and mistrust towards the Ethiopian regime of Emperor Haile Selassie. As Howell and Hamid correctly observe, "Large scale US military aid to the Ethiopian armed forces and apparent mistreatment of Muslim minorities made that mistrust all the greater."

The radical foreign policy of the first and second October governments affected also Sudan's relations with its western neighbour Chad. Since its independence in 1960, Chad had suffered from an internecine conflict that resulted from resentment by Muslim elements against Christian dominance of the government under the rule of President Tombalbaye. After October 1964, the so called 'Government of the Islamic Republic of Chad in Exile' was established and believed to have started functioning from Khartoum. The Islamic Chadian resistance derived support mainly
from the Muslim Brothers, but the repressive policies of the Tombalbaye regime and its close links with France led to support of rebels by leftist elements as well.

In retrospect, the radical African policy followed by the Sudanese government after October 1964 proved to be extremely naive, counter-productive and off the main stream of Sudanese foreign policy since independence. With the Anya Nya rebels already strengthened by the lifting of emergency regulations, deterioration of relations between Sudan and its immediate African neighbours was only adding oil to the fire.

During the military rule under General Abboud neighbouring African countries provided the Anya Nya rebels with the minimum possible moral support, and they were very discreet about that matter. As E.N. Waksen states in his highly informative article about the origins and development of the Anya Nya movement, "... the only country in the world known to have openly given military aid to the Anya Nya was Israel." 17 However, as a result of the support provided by the October government to the Congolese Simba rebels, Tshombe's regime started to flirt openly with the Anya Nya. Training camps were opened in areas adjacent to the Sudan-Congo borders, and mercenaries employed by Tshombe provided highly needed expertise. The passage of arms through Sudanese territory to the Congolese rebels proved to be a double edged weapon. The Anya Nya made their largest arms catch to date in 1965 when they ambushed a military convoy between the small town of Yei in
southern Sudan and the borders with the Republic of the Congo. They captured a large amount of arms destined to the Congolese rebels. Moreover, as E.N. Wakoson says when talking about sources of Anya Nya arms, "Following the defeat of the Congolese Simba and their influx into the Sudan, they exchanged their weapons for food, clothes, etc. . . . The mercenaries brought by Tshombe's regime to fight the Simba provided the Anya Nya with quantities of arms."

Relations with Ethiopia also went through hard times as a result of the active support by the October government to the Eritrean separatists. In retaliation, the Ethiopian government stepped up its support to the Anya Nya rebels. They were provided with training facilities and bases on Sudanese-Ethiopian borders. Consequently, in January 1965 the first attacks by the Anya Nya from inside Ethiopia were reported. Moreover, deterioration in Sudanese-Ethiopian relations could be easily detected in the increase of border incidents. Early in 1965 the Ethiopian government started to distribute agricultural plots among Ethiopian farmers in al-Fasher area inside Sudan. Ethiopian armed forces were reported to have violated Sudanese territories in support of Ethiopian farmers. The situation deteriorated quickly and armed forces of the two countries were deployed on both sides of the border. In spite of the fact that no serious clashes took place, tensions continued to affect relations between the two neighbours. In June 1966, Sudanese authorities detained more than
three hundred Ethiopian farmers who trespassed into Sudanese territory. Later, these farmers were indicted, imprisoned and deported. Unlike the situation with the Republic of the Congo, worsening of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations was not restricted only to the mutual support of anti-government insurgents in the two countries; border disputes and clashes helped to complicate the picture even further.

The government of President Tombalbaye in Chad was greatly disturbed by news of establishing an office for Chadian exiles in Khartoum in the wake of the popular uprising in October 1964. The support of the largely Muslim Chadian opposition came mainly from the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) whose daily newspaper al-Mithaq carried anti-Tombalbaye news and articles. Tombalbaye reaction was strong and prompt. In a speech he delivered at Fort Lamy in June 1965, he accused the Sudanese government of harbouring rebel Chadian groups, threatened to retaliate against Sudanese citizens in Chad and hinted at the possibility of giving support to the Anya Nya rebels in southern Sudan. Matters worsened further in August 1966 when Chad accused Sudan of being behind clashes that took place between Chadian government forces and rebels. On August 20, Chadian armed forces attacked a Sudanese border village killing some of its inhabitants and raiding their cattle. Accusations and counter-accusations were traded between the two countries and late in August 1966 the government in Chad closed the country's borders with Sudan and restricted the movement of
Sudanese citizens within a five kilometers radius of their residences. 392 persons were believed to have lost their lives as a result of Chadian attacks on Sudanese border villages and the Sudanese armed forces were put on full alert. In October 1966, the dispute was settled when an agreement was reached between the two countries through the good offices of the President of Niger. The articles of the agreement dealt with matters such as the establishment of a committee to discuss border incidents, the lifting of restrictions on Sudanese nationals in Chad and the promise by the Sudanese government to hand over criminals in accordance with the extradition agreement between the two countries.

The October government resigned after the general elections held in the country in April 1965. An elected government, dominated by the NUP (later renamed the Democratic Unionist Party) and the Umma Party, continued to rule the Sudan until May 25th, 1969 when a coup d'état brought the military back to power. The resignation of the October government brought to an end a short period of radicalism in Sudanese foreign policy. The newly elected government reviewed foreign policy decisions taken by its predecessor and great efforts were made to correct mistakes and mend fences with neighbouring African countries. In the Middle East, although the new government continued to oppose the ban on British war planes heading for South Yemen, the country started to move closer to the moderate camp in the Arab world led at the time by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Only three months after taking office the newly elected Prime Minister went on a 12 days tour that took him to Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. One of his main objectives during this tour was to explain the policy of his government towards the war problem in southern Sudan. In Ethiopia the Prime Minister went out of his way to reassure the Ethiopian government about the good intentions of Sudan. He reiterated his government’s position that supports the unity and integrity of its eastern neighbour. In the other two countries Sudan was specially worried about the growing sympathetic attitude towards the Anya Nya and the visit was meant redress this matter. The Foreign Minister, who was accompanying the Prime Minister during the tour, emphasized the fact that all the countries they had visited were very understanding and supported the government’s policy towards the war problem in southern Sudan.24

Relations with Ethiopia continued to fluctuate during the era of the democratically elected government. But generally speaking, the Sudanese government continued its efforts at mending fences despite sporadic border incidents. High ranking officials of the two countries exchanged visits from time to time. Stopping subversive activities originating from both countries was the most important issue discussed during bilateral contacts. A joint consultative committee was established and in a communiqué after its session in Addis Ababa from December 28th, 1966 to January 3rd, 1967 the two countries pledged that, "their respective
territories not to be used for subversive activities directed against the national interest of either party. 24 However, despite agreements and visits by high ranking officials the Eritrean and southern Sudan conflicts remained unsolved and continued to be a major source of tension between the two neighbours.

Tensions in Sudanese-Chadian relations were reduced considerably as a result of mediation efforts by President Harani of the Niger. As for relations with the Congo (Zaire), their deterioration was brought to a halt in November 1966 when the Sudanese government decided to terminate the activities of the Congolese rebels in Khartoum. Over 99 Congolese rebels were given one month notice to leave the country. 26 Those who decided to stay, specially in the capital of southern Sudan Juba, were treated as refugees and not revolutionaries.

Sudan's new policy of conciliation with neighbouring countries started to pay dividends. The Kenyan authorities rounded up and arrested many of the leaders of the southern Sudan rebel movement, while the Congolese government decided not to allow anyone of them to enter its territories. 27

The Sudanese government continued its diplomatic activity in regional fora as well. Sudan attended the First East and Central African Summit Conference in Nairobi (March 31st - April 2nd 1966), and its delegation was successful in explaining to the African leaders the government's policy toward the war problem in southern Sudan. The joint communiqué issued after the confer-
ence had this to say about subversive activities. "The Conference agreed that refugees should not to be accorded facilities to publicize in the local press and should not be given financial or military aid or allowed to undergo military training in the member state territories." The outcome of the conference was seen as an important victory for Sudanese diplomacy, specially if we keep in mind the deep worries of the Sudanese government about the flow of arms to the Anya Nya rebels before the conference. The Sudanese Prime Minister expressed such fears in a meeting with the American Ambassador to Khartoum in August 1965 when he hinted at the fact that American arms destined for the Congo may end up in the hands of the Anya Nya. Accusations were also made against Uganda and some other unspecified African neighbours.

Another important outcome of the East and Central African Summit was the agreement between Sudan and Uganda to establish a joint committee to deal with problems arising from activities by rebels in border areas and the existence of Sudanese refugees in Uganda. On the basis of this agreement Sudan was reported to have paid Uganda compensations for damage incurred by its armed forces who entered Ugandan territories in pursuit of Anya Nya rebels.

The Sudan continued throughout this phase to give relentless support to the liberation movements in African countries under colonial rule. Sudan was one of few African countries that
Resistance was destroyed in a few days. On the political front President Nasser decided to take responsibility and resign his post and the whole Arab world was in a state of paralysis. As Howell and Hamed put it, "With almost every Arab capital distressed and angry, the Sudan took the lead in rallying Arab states to the cause of unity." When Egypt entered the 1967 Arab-Israeli war a large portion of its armed forces was engaged in battles against the loyalists in northern Yemen. Relations with Saudi Arabia were at their lowest ebb. Realizing that such circumstances were not conducive to the united Arab action needed to overcome the devastating results of the June war, Sudanese Prime Minister M.A. Manjoub went on a mediation crusade to bring together President Nasser and King Faisal. The crusade was successful and the first Arab summit in three years was held in Khartoum at the end of August 1967. The Israeli Defence Minister at the time was quoted as saying that he was waiting on the telephone for a call from the Egyptian President offering total surrender. However, the Arab summit in Khartoum was very adamant in its refusal of defeat and was seen by many observers as the Arab answer to the Six Days War. The most important outcome of the summit was the success of Sudanese diplomacy to reconcile the two influential Arab countries of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The improved relations between the two Arab countries characterized the years between the Arab defeat in 1967 and the Arab victory of October 1973.
May 1969 - April 1985

This phase was the longest period under one government since the independence of the Sudan in January 1956. Consequently, the analysis of Sudanese foreign policy during this phase will occupy the largest part of this chapter. However, we have to state at the outset that President Numeiri was the only constant factor during this period. Sudanese domestic and foreign policies took large swings from radicalism to conservatism and Numeiri's alliances with different political forces, whether inside or outside the country, were clearly reflected in his foreign policy decisions.

The Free Officers group inside the Sudanese army, of which Jaafar Numeiri was a leading member, was largely influenced by Nasser's Free Officers Organization in the Egyptian army before the coup d'état of July 1952. President Nasser was in fact the hero of many of the officers who took power on the 25th of May 1969 under the leadership of Colonel Jaafar Numeiri. It was only natural that these young officers will try to copy Nasser's experience in both domestic and international politics. In the initial stages of the May regime Arab Nationalists and Nasserites played a major role despite their small and insignificant presence in the Sudan.

Being so close to Nasser's Egypt, the new regime carved a radical path in foreign policy. The first foreign policy
statement by Prime Minister Babiker Awedalla indicated that the Sudanese relations with any country will be decided on the basis of that country’s position on the Palestinian Question. In spite of the fact that it has no borders with Israel Sudan considered itself to be one of the frontline states. In September 1969, Colonel Nu‘meiri - the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) - attended the summit of the frontline states in Cairo. The group included radical Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

On the 1st of September 1969 the conservative regime of King Idris of Libya was overthrown by a young pro-Nasser officer. Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi led a group of young officers to establish a radical military regime in Libya. Ideological affinity between the three systems in Egypt, the Sudan and Libya led to one of the most serious attempts at Arab unity in which Sudan was directly involved. The Tripoli Charter that aimed at total political unity between the three countries was signed by the three leaders on the 27th of December 1969. The Charter dealt with matters of cooperation between the three countries in all fields with the ultimate aim of uniting the three systems. A unified leadership was established and summit meetings were to be held every four months. On the other hand, joint committees at ministerial and technical levels were formed to strengthen cooperation between member states. However, right from the beginning differences started to emerge between the slow and
cautious Sudanese approach towards the aim of unity and the hasty and enthusiastic Libyan approach. In his weekly column in al-Ahram, Muhammad H. Heikal argues that the 'Tripoli Charter' was not up to the ambitions of the peoples of the three countries because of reservations made by the Sudanese leadership.34

The young Libyan leader called for immediate political unity between the three countries arguing that there is actual unity at the grassroots among all Arab peoples; it is only the leaders who lacked the political will to effect this unity. Therefore, he goes on arguing, unity should come from the top. Sudan, on the other hand, argued that there are genuine obstacles in the face of Arab unity even at the grassroots and that desirable unity can only come from the bottom upwards. In an interview with Radio Khartoum President Numeiri had this to say about unity talks between the three countries, "We are not in a hurry to achieve unity immediately. We have agreed to strengthen our economic, political and military relations as a first step. Unity will then be a natural outgrowth of that cooperation."35

This difference in approach towards the goal of unity was cited in a later date as the main factor behind deterioration in relations between Sudan and Libya that continued to characterize the whole era of Numeiri's rule. In an address to the Nation on June 10th, 1974 President Numeiri stated that the real reason behind the worsening of relations between Sudan and Libya was the Sudanese position on the Tripoli Charter. The President

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explained that his government was and still is of the opinion that achieving Sudan's national unity is the first step towards a broader Arab unity. However, inside Sudan even this mild approach towards Arab unity was met by opposition from various political forces. In addition to southerners who are always wary of any involvement by Sudan in such schemes, a strong protest came from the SCP who had some serious doubts about the attitude of Egyptian and Libyan leaders towards communist elements in their countries. Unity was seen also by the Sudanese communists as a means of boosting the position of Arab Nationalists - their rivals inside the Sudanese government at the time. Opposition to the Charter came also from the Free Officers inside the Sudanese army, some of whom were contemplating a coup d'état to block any move towards political unity with Egypt and Libya.\textsuperscript{36} It is even argued that differences in points of view regarding the Tripoli Charter was a major reason in deepening of conflict between Numeiri and his communist allies that led eventually to the dismissal of three members of the RCC in November 1970.\textsuperscript{37} These three were the leaders of the communist backed coup d'état in July 1971.

Nevertheless, despite this opposition the government continued to take further steps in the direction of unity with Egypt and Libya. Meetings at various levels were held, agreements for cooperation in fields such as defence, foreign policy and economics were signed. But, real progress was very slow and
a lot of time was spent on matters of organization and procedure. President Nasser and Colonel Qaddafi visited Khartoum on the first anniversary of the May Revolution in 1970, and the three leaders pledged more efforts toward achieving total unity. But, in September that year President Nasser, the hero of the young revolutionaries in Sudan and Libya, passed away after a sudden illness and work toward total unity between the three countries lost its most important driving force. The loss of late President Nasser was felt in two areas. President Sadat - Nasser's successor - was not able to play the conciliatory role that Nasser played between the opposing Sudanese and Libyan points of view regarding unity between the three countries. Moreover, the obscure and unknown Sadat was not in a position to provide the young leaders with the inspiration that they so amply received from Nasser.

The loss of Nasser, however, did not lead to a halt in attempts toward unity. Eager for support from other Arab states, the newly installed President Sadat continued contacts with Libya and Sudan within the framework of the Tripoli Charter. Less than two months after the death of Nasser a summit meeting was held in Cairo (4-8 November 1970) that brought together the three leaders. An agreement was reached during the meeting that the Presidential Council is to be assisted by a Higher Planning Committee, a Unified National Security Council, a Permanent Follow-up Committee, and sub-committees at ministerial level.
for political, economic, cultural and information affairs. Ambitious objectives such as the coordination of both foreign and domestic policies were set by the summit meeting.

In November 1970, a coup d'état took place in Syria and the new Syrian government under Lt. General Hafiz al-Assad announced its intention to join efforts with the Tripoli Charter states toward the achievement of Arab unity. The announcement was warmly welcomed and Syria became the fourth member of the Tripoli Charter.

On April 13, 1970 a meeting of the four Heads of State was held in Cairo. The meeting was later moved to Benghazi (Libya) without President Numeiri who had another commitment and the Sudan was represented by a member of the RCC instead. On April 17th, the Benghazi meeting reached an agreement to establish the Union of Arab Republics between Egypt, Syria and Libya. Sudan welcomed the move and promised to join the new creation on a later date when circumstances permit. At the beginning of September 1971, a referendum was held in the three member countries and the constitution of the Union of Arab Republics was supported by huge majorities.

The Sudanese government gave as a reason for its withdrawal from plans for the establishment of the Union the fact that it was still engaged in building political institutions inside the country. It is argued that without the existence of these institutions, Sudanese people will not be able to express their free
However, without doubting the sincerity of the government, other reasons could also be cited for the explanation of Sudan's withdrawal. As we have mentioned earlier the SCP was dead against any moves in the direction of unity with Egypt and Libya. In view of what happened to the communists in Egypt under the rule of President Nasser it was only natural that the SCP will oppose such unity. Moreover, relations between the SCP and Colonel Qaddafi cannot be described as cordial since the severe attack by Colonel Qaddafi on the SCP and other Arab communist parties when he visited Khartoum on the occasion of the first anniversary of the May Revolution. The opposition to the Tripoli Charter by the SCP was very mild at the beginning, but many events took place between December 1969 and April 1971 that reflected the widening gap between the RCC and its major supporter the SCP. As early as April 1970, Mr. Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub the Secretary General of the SCP was exiled to Egypt after conflict with the RCC. In November 1971, three members of the RCC known for their sympathy with the SCP were relieved from their posts after being accused of passing over RCC secrets to the SCP. After the dismissal of its three members, the RCC went on to carry out a massive purge campaign against communist elements in the govern-
ment. Only members of the dissenting faction of the SCP that
decided to cooperate with the RCC were saved this fate. During
this campaign the Secretary General of the SCP was detained and
later on escaped from detention with the help of some members of
the inner circle of President Numeiri himself. Therefore, for
ideological reasons and for the sake of mere survival the SCP was
against any attempt toward a unity that will only lead to the
consolidation of the position of the Arab Nationalists in the
Sudan.

On the other hand, conflict between the RCC and the tradi-
tional political forces in the country was intensified during
this period. In March 1970, the government forces raided Aba
Island where Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi - the spiritual leader of the
Ansar sect - and many of his followers and supporters, including
some Muslim Brothers, were preparing for a long armed struggle
against the government. Hundreds and probably thousands of the
Ansars lost their lives during air raids on the Island. Imam al-
Hadi himself was killed near the Sudanese-Ethiopian borders while
trying to flee the country. A strong opposition front encom-
passing the Umma Party, the DUP and the Muslim Brothers was
formed and training camps were established inside Ethiopia. Sup-
port for the opposition came also from some conservative Arab
countries. It is widely believed that the government received
Egyptian support in its attack on Aba Island. This fact, coupled
with historical mistrust held by the Umma Party against Egypt.
led to deep suspicions within the opposition front toward any attempts of unity. As we shall see later, these suspicions were further consolidated when a defence agreement was signed between Sudan and Egypt in 1976.

In the meantime, the government initiative of 9th June 1969 on the problem of southern Sudan was met with great scepticism and made very little headway. One of the main reasons for the lack of enthusiasm towards the initiative among southern politicians was the imbalanced foreign policy followed by the government. The Tripoli Charter was as an uncalled for bias toward the Arab world at the expense of Sudan's links with Africa. With its relations with the major political powers in the north in shambles, the government was desperate for allies in the South. Therefore, the RCC was very keen to find a solution to the war problem in southern Sudan. The RCC realized that any further involvement in issues of Arab unity will not be helpful in winning the support of southerners for attempts at solving the national unity problem in the country. Except for few articles by rebel leaders outside the country, southerners did not have any chance to oppose openly government's foreign policy decisions in the non-democratic atmosphere prevailing at the time. However, it was not difficult for the government to guess where the southern sympathies lie.

The military government realized that an active African policy upholding principles of good neighbourliness and non-
interference in the affairs of others is a necessity for any solution of the war problem in southern Sudan. In his first statement to the people on May 25th, 1969, the Chairman of the RCC criticized the toppled civilian government for its inability to pursue an active African policy that helps to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the country. The new government's offer to grant regional autonomy to southern Sudan, that was included in its first statement about the problem on 9th June 1969, "... implicitly assumed cooperation with neighbouring countries for its success." In March 1970 a reorganization of the Foreign Ministry was carried out and for the first time since independence a full fledged African Department was established. The choice of Muhammad Omer Beshir as the head of the new department was quite indicative. Mr. Beshir was the secretary of the Round Table Conference on the problem of the southern Sudan in 1965. He is also the author of a number of books and articles on southern Sudan. The appointment of Mr. Beshir shows the intention of the government to link between its active foreign policy in Africa and attempts to find a solution for the war problem in the south.

In view of its revolutionary orientation, the new government found itself a member in the radical club of African states. Links with countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Guinea were strengthened, and a hardline policy was followed regarding racism and colonialism in southern Africa. Support for liberation move-
ments was stepped up and Sudan paid all its arrears to the OAU Liberation Committee. However, learning from the experience of the October government and not ready to repeat mistakes it committed in foreign policy as a result of radical naivety, the new government decided to adhere to the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in the affairs of others. In spite of ideological differences, Sudan went on to promote relations with conservative neighbours such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire and Central African Republic.

Official visits was the main tool in Sudan's diplomatic offensive in Africa at the time. In July 1969, less than two months after the coup d'état that brought Numeiri to power, goodwill missions were sent to Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Nigeria, Cameroun and the CAR. The main objectives of these goodwill missions were to explain the takeover and the policies of the new government. In September 1969, President Bokassa of the CAR visited the Sudan accompanied by a large delegation. Talks between the two sides concentrated mainly on matters of trade and commerce. In January 1970, the Summit Conference of the East and Central African States was held in Khartoum. The Conference was attended by fourteen African governments and dealt with a wide range of issues including economic cooperation, the support of the liberation struggle ... etc. The Conference expressed concern about the situation in the Middle East and called for the implementation of Resolution 242 of the Security Council.
It has also been reported that some African leaders attending the Conference have given promises that they will stop infiltration of southern Sudanese rebels through their borders with Sudan. Official visits were also exchanged between the Chairman of the RCC and some African leaders. To cite some examples, General Numeiri visited the CAR (June 1970), Zaire (December 1970), Chad (February 1971) and Ethiopia (November 1971). The Chairman of the RCC received in Khartoum General Gowon of Nigeria (August 1970), President Mobutu of Zaire (February 1971) and President Bokassa of the CAR (May 1971). Two major themes could be easily discerned from the contacts of the RCC Chairman and his counterparts in African countries. The joint communiqués issued at the end of Numeiri's contacts with African leaders usually referred, on the one hand, to the pledge not to allow subversive activities to be launched against any country from the territories of the other. On the other hand, a call for the implementation of Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council in November 1967 and calling for the withdrawal of Israel from Arab territories it occupied during the Six Days' War has always been included in these communiqués. The two themes reflect Sudan's worries about the activities of the Anya Nya rebels in some neighbouring countries, and the desire of the government to promote Arab causes among African countries - two of the major objectives of Sudanese foreign policy at the time.

However, Sudan's relations with an important African neighbour went through a turbulent period in 1971. Idi Amin took office...
in Uganda after toppling the government of President Milton Obote in January 1971. Only a few days after taking office, Amin accused Sudan of preparing to invade Uganda to help restore the deposed President. The allegations were promptly and emphatically denied by the Sudan. On April 20th of the same year Uganda handed the Sudanese government a protest note claiming, inter alia, that:

a) Sudan provides training for 500 anti-Amin troops;
b) ex-President Obote is given freedom to recruit and train rebels to overthrow Amin’s regime. 14

Once again, Sudanese authorities denied these charges in a statement issued by the Foreign Minister on April 21st, 1971. The statement reiterated Sudan’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others, and its wish to have good relations with its neighbours, in spite of the fact that Idi Amin’s accusations may be somewhat exaggerated, it is an open secret that ex-President Obote shuttled freely between Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam during 1971.

Three reasons could be cited as an explanation of the deterioration in Sudanese-Ugandan relations during the first year of Idi Amin’s rule:

(1) Sudan enjoyed very good relations with the government of President Obote which was very cooperative in the pursuit of any Nya rebels who used to flee into Uganda after clashes with government forces inside Sudan. Obote’s government was also successful in controlling political and military activities by
the Anya Nya among the 168,000 southern Sudanese refugees who lived in Uganda at the time. Therefore, Obote was given a warm welcome in Khartoum after the fall of his government, a move that was greeted with suspicion by the new regime in Uganda.

[22] Sudanese intelligence sources concluded that Idi Amin had close links with the Anya Nya rebels in view of the fact that his mother comes from the Kofar tribe, one of the rebel tribes that straddled Sudanese-Ugandan borders. In fact, Idi Amin did very little to expel these doubts after taking power. On the contrary, he warmed up toward the Anya Nya rebels who were given larger freedom of movement. However, this warmth did not continue for long and its actual impact on the battle-field was doubtful.

[33] Idi Amin received part of his military training in Israel, and it was common knowledge that he carried out his coup d'état with great help from Israeli military advisors stationed in Uganda. The contacts between Idi Amin and the Israelis were viewed with great suspicion in Khartoum. It is believed that, "Amin courted the Israelis during and shortly after coming to power, and most certainly collaborated with them in supplying arms to Southern Sudanese Anya Nya fighters before he came to power." However, the honeymoon between Amin and the Israelis did not last long.

In March 1972 the mercurial Amin decided to expel the Israelis from Uganda, a move that led to the improvement of relations between Uganda and the Arab world. It was a good omen for Ugandan-
Sudanese relations that the expulsion of the Israelis from Uganda came at a time when the Central Government in Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement were successful in signing a peace agreement in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Relations were normalized completely a few weeks after the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement when Idi Amin and the Sudanese Vice-President Mr. Abel Ali Elt attended an official ceremony of re-opening the common borders between the two countries.

Needless to say that relations with Uganda is one of the most important areas of Sudanese foreign policy in Africa. In addition to the fact that Uganda occupies a strategic position on the Upper Nile, the instability in southern Sudan emphasized the necessity for Khartoum to look for good relations with the government of the day in Uganda.

On the domestic front, the rift between the RCC and the SCP that we referred to earlier took a sharp turn to the worse in February 1971. In a speech on 8 February 1971, RCC Chairman Jaafar Numeiri accused the SCP of 'treating on all our peoples values and morals', of 'fastening to oppose any noble objective irrespective of what it is as long as it was not sponsored by the party', of 'defeating production', of 'spreading insidious views on the regime through leaflets and demonstrations', and of 'exercising the personality cult'. The RCC-SCP conflict continued in the open: many communist activists were detained and the RCC went on carrying its plans to establish the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) as the only political organization in the
Imperialism in Africa and the Middle East. Consequently, Sudanese foreign policy started to follow an increasingly pro-American line. Therefore, Sudan started to move closer to the moderate Arab camp and the pro-Western African group of nations. Relations were further improved with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

Coupled with these changes in Sudanese foreign policy were attempts to find a peaceful solution for the war problem in the southern Sudan. The moderate posture of the Central Government and the ascendency of the pragmatic technocrats at the expense of Arab Nationalists in Khartoum convinced the rebel SLM to sit down and negotiate a settlement to the problem. Sudan exploited its new contacts with Ethiopia and church organizations such as the KCC and the AACC, who acted as mediators between the government and the SLM. Many observers argue that the Addis Ababa Agreement signed between the government and the SLM in 1971 was a natural outcome of the great changes in domestic and foreign policies of the Sudan after July 1971.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Addis Ababa Agreement was warmly welcomed as a great African achievement. In spite of their economic difficulties, African countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, the Cameroon and Tanzania offered cash donations for the Special Fund for the Southern Sudan established to help in the repatriation of refugees and the rehabilitation of the region after seventeen years of war. Many African NGOs provided aid in kind for the same purpose. The Addis Ababa
Agreement itself was lavishly praised by delegates to the 9th OAU Summit Conference held at Rabat (Morocco) in June 1972. The Agreement helped to create a great deal of goodwill toward Sudan in the African continent and was instrumental in the development of good relations between Sudan and its African sisters. On the other hand, the Addis Ababa Agreement provided Sudan with the opportunity to play its long desired role as a link between Africa and the Arab world. As R.P. Stevens argues, "While the importance of the Sudan's role in affecting the African attitude towards the Middle East question cannot be determined, the Addis Ababa Agreement preceding the Rabat Conference (OAU 9th Summit Conference held in Rabat June 1972) relieved the Arab states of their most embarrassing obstacle to enlist African support." Incidentally, the two years following the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement saw the break of diplomatic relations between all but a few African countries and Israel. This is not to imply that there a direct link between the two, but there is no denying the fact that the peaceful settlement of the war problem in the southern Sudan removed one of the main reasons for tension in East Africa that was repeatedly exploited by Israel to draw a wedge between Africa and the Arab world.

The period immediately following the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement saw a qualitative shift in Sudanese foreign policy towards neighbouring African countries. As we have seen earlier, the period before 1972 was characterized by concentration
on two issues; the attempt to stop subversive activities by Anya Nya rebels from neighbouring countries and the endeavour to rally African countries for the support of the Arab world in its conflict with Israel. With the resolution of the war problem in the Southern Sudan, Sudanese foreign policy makers concentrated more and more on issues of cooperation and coordination with neighbouring countries.

Relations with Ethiopia improved substantially, partly because of the role played by Emperor Haile Selassie in the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The outstanding issue of border demarcation was settled in July 1971 when an agreement was signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries. As a result of this agreement, the Yashaga problem that brought the two neighbours so close to an armed conflict in 1965 was settled for good. The two sides agreed to set up a committee to carry out the actual demarcation of borders and try to settle problems pertaining to the contested agricultural land.50 Agreements about river transport and border trade were also signed. One of the most important signs of cooperation between the two countries was the pledge of Sudan to curb subversive activities by the Eritreans through common borders. In fact, Sudan government made several attempts to find a solution for the Eritrean problem on the lines of the Addis Ababa Agreement. However, such a solution did not materialize probably because of the different nature of the problem. Emperor Haile Selassie was invited, in March 1973, to attend
the first anniversary of the Addis Ababa Agreement in recognition of his role in its conclusion.

The relations of Sudan with two other neighbouring countries - Uganda and Kenya - were directly affected by the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The two countries were playing host to a large number of Sudanese refugees and their cooperation was a pre-requisite for the success of the repatriation of these refugees. Moreover, many of the southern Sudan rebel leaders and political organizations were based in the two countries. The peaceful solution of the war problem in southern Sudan helped to set the stage for an era of constructive cooperation between the Sudan and its two southern neighbours.

After the temporary deterioration in relations between the Sudan and Uganda after the take-over by Idi Amin in January 1971, things started to improve with the expulsion of the Israelis from Uganda in March 1972. Sudanese-Ugandan borders that remained closed for a long period, for security and political reasons, were reopened in May 1972 paving the way for further cooperation in various areas. During the seventeen years of war in the Sudan, Uganda kept "a detached but sympathetic eye on the developments there. With her own problems of possible secession and demands for regional autonomy, she could not afford to encourage secession or regionalism in neighbouring countries." However, this cautious policy did not spare Uganda the agony of embroilment in Sudanese problems from time to time. Therefore, the Addis Ababa
Agreement was warmly welcomed by the Ugandan authorities and its impact on relations between the two countries was felt immediately. As a result of the cease-fire and the reopening of the borders, trade between Sudan and its two southern neighbours increased tremendously. The peaceful solution of the war problem in southern Sudan provided the atmosphere for greater mobility by traders between Sudan and its East African neighbours. The Southern Region was dependent on Uganda and Kenya for a large part of its imports, particularly foodstuffs, and Mombasa was the Region's closest outlet to the sea.

In June 1972, Idi Amin paid an official visit to the Sudan and a new era of good relations between the two countries was started. In the joint communiqué that was issued at the end of the visit President Amin expressed his warm welcome of the Addis Ababa Agreement, that he described as an African victory, and pledged his full support for the Sudanese government in its efforts to make the Agreement a success. The following years were characterized by cooperation between the two countries in all fields. Committees for economic, political and security cooperation were established. In later years this cooperation was expanded to include another neighbour; Zaire.

*Personal observations by the author who was a staff member at Sudan Embassy in Nairobi between 1972 and 1975, and who was involved in some trade dealings between the Southern Region and Kenya at the time.*
Kenya played host to some Anya Nya leaders who were free to practice political activities among refugees before the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The easy access to the international mass media was a great attraction to rebel leaders. Similar to its neighbour, Kenya was very discreet in its contacts with the rebel leaders. Nevertheless, the existence of Anya Nya leaders in Nairobi and the support they received from church organizations and the international press remained a thorn in the side of Kenyan-Sudanese relations.

Things changed completely after the conclusion of the Agreement. In fact, the All Africa Council of Churches, whose headquarters were in Nairobi, played an important role in the conclusion of the Agreement. Moreover, Nairobi being the major centre for international mass media in East Africa was the source of most of the international reports about the Agreement. Such reports played an important role in the success of the tremendous effort for the repatriation of the refugees and the rehabilitation of the Southern Region.

The peaceful settlement of the war problem in southern Sudan helped in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the development of good and productive relations between Sudan and Kenya. In June 1973, the first meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee between the two countries was held in Nairobi. The joint communique issued at the end of the meetings called, inter alia, for the intensification of cooperation with particular reference to the
1) Further expansion of the already existing trade and economic relations;

2) the facilitation of transit trade;

3) exchange of trade and cultural information;

4) cooperation at all trade and economic meetings and conferences both at regional and African levels.\(^3\)

An agreement was reached at the meetings for cooperation to develop joint highway projects linking Mombasa and the Southern Region. A joint committee was formed and at a later date the two countries submitted a joint application to international financial institutions for financing the Lodwar-Kajoeta-Juba road project.

During the same period the Tripartite Ministerial Consultative Committee between Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia was also held at Nairobi. The three countries agreed to work for the promotion of cooperation in economic and cultural fields. However, regarding border issues the joint communiqué issued at the end of the meetings on June 21st, 1973 had this to say. "The parties taking note of the fact that the Sudanese and Kenyan sides have not yet finished the examination of the agreements governing their common boundary, have agreed to postpone determining the trijunctional point of their frontiers until agreement has been reached between Sudan and Kenya.\(^4\) The problem arose as a result of disagreement between Sudan and Kenya regarding the contested Ilemi Triangle. The Triangle was a part of Sudanese territories, but was under the administration of the East African Colonial
authorities only for matters of convenience. The area is one of the major bones of contention between the two countries even today.

The conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement led not only to the normalization of relations between Sudan and its immediate neighbours, but also to a greater acceptance of Sudan by other African countries. Moreover, the conclusion of the Agreement and the promulgation of the country's permanent constitution brought to the fore the issue of identity. The new constitution identified the Sudan as both African and Arab. Controversial issues such as language and religion were also settled to the satisfaction of the southern Sudanese. Consequently, a more balanced Afro-Arab foreign policy was adopted. However, the new posture of Sudan was regarded in some Arab quarters as overemphasizing the African factor at the expense of the Arab factor in the Sudanese national identity. For example, the Addis Ababa Agreement was attacked in the Libyan press as an indication to the withdrawal of Sudan from its Arab commitments. In May 1972, the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi addressed a public rally in Khartoum indicating the strong suspicions held by his government toward the Agreement. Libya represents an extreme position in the Arab world, but many Arab circles expressed doubts about the intentions of Sudan. They saw the Sudan as turning inwards and showing less interest in Arab issues, especially Arab unity. To refute such accusations, Foreign Minister Dr. Mansour Khalid quoted the late President Nasser as saying, "... any attempt at achieving national unity. in any
Arab country, is an important step towards Arab unity." In the same interview Dr. Khalid argued that rather than leading to the withdrawal of Sudan from the Arab world, the Addis Ababa Agreement was, in fact, a great service to the general Arab cause. The Agreement, he went on arguing, removes one of the main pretexts for Israeli penetration into the African continent.

What we have discussed in the last paragraph proves the close link between the situation in southern Sudan and the country's foreign policy in Africa and the Arab world. As Dr. Mansour Khalid argues the peaceful solution of the war problem in southern Sudan, "... is a good case of an internal policy decision which had both far reaching external repercussions and could not have been possible without certain foreign policy decisions." The conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement led to an important shift in Sudan's foreign policy priorities. After 1972, the government was more concerned with internal matters and foreign policy was employed to serve the objectives of national unity and economic development. Sudan started to follow an increasingly pragmatic foreign policy.

A major foreign policy decision at the time was the resumption of relations with the United States. Ties between the two countries were severed in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The large contribution by the U.S. Government to the Special Fund for the Southern Region was seen as the major factor behind the decision to resume diplomatic relations. Sudan's decision was
attacked by some Arab countries including Egypt. It was obvious that Sudan's new pragmatic foreign policy puts national interest ahead of ideological commitments.

The first real test of the new Sudanese foreign policy came as early as September 1972. On the 20th of that month five Libyan transport planes were impounded at Khartoum airport while on their way to Uganda carrying military cargo and personnel. The aircrafts were compelled to return back to Libya. According to Sudanese press reports the planes took off from Cairo as part of military assistance by Libya to Id. Amin in his conflict with Tanzania. Worried about the danger of upsetting the new fragile stability in the Southern Region, Sudan followed a completely 'hands-off' policy in regard to the Uganda-Tanzania conflict.\[^{57}\] Sudan's position was explained clearly in a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry on the Libyan planes incident. The statement says:

"The Government of the Sudan is deeply concerned with the fact that such a large force was trying to pass through our airspace without permission. No word about these planes was heard from Egypt, Libya or Uganda. This incident comes at the most unfortunate time while Sudanese efforts of mediation between Uganda and Tanzania were in progress.

The Sudan has suffered greatly in the past when
The Libyan and Egyptian disappointment was only natural. They did not expect the Sudanese reaction. Id. Amin was considered at the time to be a major ally of the Arab world because of his decision to expel the Israelis only a few months ago. Reactions of the Libyan government and the Egyptian press were very strong. Colonel Qaddafi sent a cable to President Numeiri consisting of only two Arabic words, the meaning of which is, "May Allah forgive you." The cable was implicitly referring to the fact that only a year earlier Qaddafi saved Numeiri's neck by forcing down a British Airways plane carrying two of the leaders of the aborted communist backed coup of July 1971. The two were later on handed over to President Numeiri and executed.

Accusations and counter-accusations regarding the incident were traded between Egyptian and Sudanese press. In an editorial,
al-Sahafa Sudanese daily says, "While we are doing our best to mediate between the two sides, the attempt to send arms to Uganda through our country could only be viewed as an act of sabotage." The Sudanese press argued also that if Libya and Egypt were trying to help Idi Amin because of his position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, we should also remember that Tanzania is one of the strongest supporters of Arab and Palestinian causes in Africa. On the other hand, the Egyptian press claim that the Sudanese decision was taken under heavy American pressure, which is rather unlikely given the short period of time between the entrance of the Libyan aircrafts into the Sudanese airspace and their landing at Khartoum airport.

It may be far fetched to talk of the Libyan and Egyptian reaction as a general Arab policy, but it is rather interesting to notice the contrasting position by some African countries. Even Uganda's reaction was very mild compared to that of Libya and Egypt. Tanzania, of course, was the country that showed the most positive reaction. In a message to President Numeiri, the Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere described the decision to force down the Libyan planes as a wise decision that does not serve the interests of Uganda and Tanzania only, but the interests of the African continent as a whole. Moreover, the Foreign Minister of Tanzania who visited Sudan was quoted as saying, "By turning back the Libyan planes, President Numeiri has taken an important and courageous decision that proved his dedication to..."
the cause of peace. This wise decision was welcomed not only in East Africa, but also by the peace-loving peoples all over the world. We really thank the Sudanese President for this wise decision. President Numeiri received a letter of support from the All Africa Trade Union. The 'Times of Zambia' daily aired its support for the Sudanese decision and attacked the line taken by the Libyan government and the Egyptian press; and the Nigerian 'Sunday Sketch' was quoted as describing the Sudanese decision as an important contribution to the cause of African unity.

The statement by the Foreign ministry indicated in a clear language that Sudan does not want to repeat past mistakes when arms destined for the Congolese rebels ended up in the hands of the Anya Nya. Not only that, but as we have seen earlier the naive revolutionary policy followed in 1965 led to worsening of relations between Sudan and its African neighbors with negative impact on the battle-field in southern Sudan.

The incident came to accelerate the deterioration in Sudanese-Egyptian relations that had its roots in the withdrawal of Sudan from efforts to form the Union of Arab Republics in early 1971. Moreover, it had been reported that President Sadat of Egypt was very furious about the fact that President Numeiri did not consult with him when Sudan decided to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. earlier in 1972. This was regarded by many Sudanese, inside and outside the government, as Egyptian high-handedness. Implicit accusations of Sudan turning into an American pawn and
withdrawing from the Arab world appeared in the Egyptian press early in 1972. The matter was officially raised by the Foreign Minister when he visited Cairo in June 1972. Many observers see the Libyan aircrafts incident as a test balloon to check Sudan's commitment to Arab causes.

The decision to turn back the Libyan aircrafts was a clear proof of the commitment by Sudan to its new foreign policy. Although the incident itself only added to an already worsening relations between Sudan and its two Arab neighbours to the north, the decision to refuse any involvement in the Tanzanian-Ugandan conflict reflected a departure from the mainstream Arab policy at the time. Idi Amin was regarded as a friend of the Arab world and a Muslim leader who needed support from his Muslim brothers. This support came from radical as well as moderate Arab governments. Therefore, Sudan's decision was seen at the time as incompatible with the general mood in the Arab world, and was considered by many observers as putting the country's African commitments ahead of its Arab commitments.

Another test of Sudanese foreign policy came in March 1973. On the first of that month a group of Palestinian members of the Black September Organization crashed into a party at the Saudi embassy in Khartoum and took as hostages a number of diplomats including the Saudi Ambassador and his family, the American Ambassador, the Jordanian Charge d'Affaires and the Belgian Charge d'Affaires. In exchange for the hostages the group asked
for the release of Palestinians in detention in Israel, Jordan, West Germany and the United States. Tediou negotiations with the group were carried by the First Vice-President, albeit to no avail. The group executed the American Ambassador, the Belgian Charge d'Affaires and an American diplomat before giving themselves in to the Sudanese authorities on the 9th of March.

The incident took place on the eve of Sudan's celebrations of the first anniversary of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The celebrations were held in Juba, the capital of the Southern Region, and were attended by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Information released afterwards revealed that attempts were made by anonymous callers to make sure that the Ethiopian Ambassador will be present at the Saudi embassy party. Given the circumstances it was very difficult for the Sudanese authorities and press not to link between the incident and the position of some Arab countries, particularly Libya, regarding the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Al-Ayam daily said in an editorial,

"Why Khartoum? and why on the eve of our celebrations of the National Unity Day? and why at an embassy of an Arab country?

We have said it many times in the past, and we will say it today, for the Palestinian revolution to survive, it will have to distance itself from conflicts and contradictions between Arab countries. The Palestinian revolution series should not
act as stooges to any Arab country. They should not allow themselves to be used as tools of pressure on behalf of any Arab country in its conflict with other Arab countries.\textsuperscript{65}

An article by the editor-in-chief of the same paper was even more explicit in its accusations. He says, \textit{inter alia},

"In my opinion, the incident could not be sepa-
rated from allegations by some Arab countries
that Khartoum has decided to isolate itself from
the Arab world and the Arab cause, and that it
turned south toward its African neighbours. That
Sudan is now more concerned about developments
in its southern region. Therefore, the master-
minds behind the incident may have thought of
it as a means to bring back Sudan into the Arab
fold or, alternatively, to punish the country
for looking southward......

They (the Palestinian group) wanted to spoil the
celebrations in the South. But why? Once again,
because some Arab countries thought that the
resolution of the war problem in southern Sudan
will lead to the isolation of the Sudan from the
Arab world......\textsuperscript{66}

When the ordeal was over President Numeiri addressed the
country talking about the incident and disclosing a number of

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societies. His address was very bitter when he talked about the involvement of the PLO in the incident. He considered the action to be an unwarranted betrayal by the PLO. After all, it was President Numeiri who risked his own life in September 1970 to rescue Yasser Arafat, who was besieged in Jordan. Ironically, the creation of the Black September Organization that carried the terrorist operation at the Saudi embassy was an outcome of the crisis of September 1970. In his address President Numeiri revealed the fact that, "The head of the PLO (Fatah) office in Khartoum was the mastermind behind this operation as documents retrieved from his office indicate. He fled the country on the day of the incident on a Libyan Airlines flight after receiving a table from Tripoli asking him to be there by the 1st of March."67

The President was specially bitter because the PLO decided to betray him while he was celebrating the first anniversary of Addis Ababa Agreement, the most important achievement of his political career. He agreed with the reasoning that the incident was meant to be a punishment for the Sudan because of its alleged withdrawal from the Arab world. In spite of the strong support for the Palestinian cause, many of the Sudanese deplored the bad timing and the use of Sudanese territories for terrorist actions.

American diplomats seemed to be the real target of the operation, and their death led to some troubles in Sudanese-American relations. The government tried to reduce the damage by sending two senior cabinet ministers to the United States to offer
condolences on behalf of the President and people of the Sudan. Moreover, a promise was given that the Palestinians will be given just but harsh sentences. However, after a much delayed trial the Palestinians were sentenced to life on June 24th, 1974. On the same day President Numeiri commuted the sentence to seven years and decided to hand over the convicts to the PLO who was supposed to carry out the sentences, being the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The prisoners were later on transferred to Cairo. On the next day the United States recalled its Ambassador in Khartoum for consultations, and the Sudanese Charge d'Affaires in Washington was summoned to the State Department and told that the decision by President Numeiri was unacceptable.

But, deterioration in Sudanese-American relations did not take crisis proportions and matters were back to normal by the end of 1974.

The interpretation of the incident at the Saudi embassy by the Sudanese government implies that it was carried out to punish Sudan for the solution of the war problem in the South and the alleged turn by the country towards Africa at the expense of its Arab commitments. The timing and the attempt to ensure the presence of the Ethiopian Ambassador at the party may give credence to the government's interpretation. Nevertheless, other reasons may be responsible for the choice of Khartoum for this particular terrorist action. Some of these reasons could be listed as follows:

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(1) The terrorist act may have aimed to punish Sudan, not for the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement but for the close relationship that developed with the United States. The aim to damage these relations was very clear and the existence of two Americans among the slain diplomats was not a coincidence. Sudan was one of the first Arab countries who decided to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. in spite of the intimate American-Israeli ties. Many young Palestinians considered such a move a betrayal to their cause at a time when Palestinian nationals are being murdered by Israelis using American arms and money.

(2) The targeted diplomats may have been chosen for specific reasons related to the Palestinian cause, and it may have just happened that they were in Khartoum at that particular moment. In fact, one of the murdered American diplomats was accused of many misdeeds against the Palestinians during his tour of office in the other parts of the Middle East. Moreover, the policies of the countries of the slain diplomats towards the Palestinian question must have a lot to do with their death.

(3) Terrorist acts are being planned almost daily, but they are only carried out when circumstances allow. Khartoum may have been chosen to carry out this act because the planners felt that lax security arrangements provide a good chance for its success.

As of 1974, the Sudanese government decided to enter into a new attempt for unity with Egypt, albeit in a diluted form compared to the Tripoli Charter it signed with Egypt and Libya.
more than four years earlier. On February 11th, 1974 Presidents Sadat and Numeiri signed an agreement of a programme of action for political and economic integration. The programme called for the formation of two important committees with the aim of promoting cooperation between the two countries. The Higher Ministerial Committee was established as the executive organ of the programme. It comprised Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Irrigation, Transportation, Agriculture, Information, Education, and Religious Affairs. The Committee's terms of reference included dealing with matters of cooperation in all fields and reporting to the two Presidents every six months. Joint-venture projects were to be studied and carried out. The Committee was later expanded to include most of the ministries in the two countries. On the other hand, a Higher Political Committee consisting of three members each of the political bureaus of the Sudan Socialist Union and the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt was formed to coordinate political action in the two countries. The Political Committee was supposed to meet every three months.

In addition to the two committees, a Joint Congress for the Parliamentarians in the two countries was also established as the legislative arm of the integration programme. No presidential council was formally set up but the two Presidents met regularly to review progress and endorse agreements concluded by the various committees. Moreover, in April 1974 a Secretariat for Egyptian Affairs was established in Khartoum to be headed by
a Secretary General with the status of a State-Minister. The same was repeated in Egypt in July of the same year. The two Secretariats were later raised to the status of full ministries.

Within the framework of the Higher Ministerial Committee eight sub-committees were formed to study programmes and projects covering all fields of cooperation. More than twenty agreements, protocols and programmes of action were concluded. The two sides seem to be concentrating on economic cooperation with particular emphasis on agriculture and irrigation. The most ambitious joint project to be carried out was the Jonglei Canal in southern Sudan. The main objective of the Canal was to reduce the waste of water in the Sudd area in southern Sudan where Bahr-al-Jabal, an important tributary of the White Nile, loses almost 50% of its volume of water estimated at 16 billion cubic meters. The two governments decided in April 1974 to carry out the first phase of the Jonglei Canal project, which is expected to provide Sudan and Egypt with a total of four billion cubic meters of additional water resources. The two governments agreed to share the costs and benefits of the project on a 50/50 basis.

The economic and political integration between Sudan and Egypt witnessed a qualitative shift when the two countries signed a defence pact on July 15, 1976. The pact was signed less than two weeks after the 2nd of July incident in which the opposition National Front tried, with help from Libya, to overthrow Numeiri's regime. The first article in the pact states that attack on any
of the two countries or its armed forces is regarded as an attack on the other; the two countries are expected to jointly take measures to repel such an attack. As a result of the agreement, a Joint Defence Council consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence in the two countries was established, to be helped by a Joint Chiefs of Staff Council.

In 1982, Egypt and the Sudan went a step further toward economic and political integration by adopting the 'Integration Charter'. An agreement to this effect was signed between the two countries, according to which integration affairs were to be handled by three organs; the Supreme Integration Council, the Nile Valley Parliament and the Integration Fund.

Article (5) of the Charter determined membership of the Supreme Integration Council which is composed under the chairmanship of the two presidents and includes at least four other members from each country to be chosen by the presidents. This is a clear departure from the integration programme of 1974 that did not establish a presidential council. The Supreme Integration Council is to be assisted in its job by a number of technical committees. A Secretariat General for the council was also established with two headquarters in Khartoum and Cairo.

Another important development was the creation of the 'Integration Fund'. The fund was expected to study and finance joint-venture projects. It was given the right to establish banks of companies and contact financial institutions in order to
attract required investment.

The signature of the 'Integration Charter' helped the two countries to overcome a number of shortcomings regarding the organization of the integration process. On the other hand, it helped also in building the process on a more sound legal basis.

Learning from previous experiences of Arab unity attempts, Sudan and Egypt decided to follow a cautious functional approach toward economic and political integration. To confirm this point, the Sudanese Vice-President al-Rasheed a.-Tahir, addressing an Egyptian-Sudanese joint parliamentarian meeting in Cairo, stated that:

"The revolutionary leadership in both countries have, through its true national sense, understood the bitter experiences of the Arab Nation in its search for political unity. The leadership in our two countries have realized that Arab unity is not a constitution announced from the top, nor is it empty slogans repeated by the national mass media. Real unity is the outcome of popular will, and it has to be built on a clear philosophy and pursued in an organized manner."

On the other hand, some observers saw the Sudanese-Egyptian economic and political integration as a move within the context of the historical 'Unity of the Nile Valley', implying that the
two countries consider this a better framework than that of Arab unity. However, official documents do not support this interpretation. The basic document of the integration programme had this to say:

"- The peoples of Egypt and the Sudan, in carrying this responsibility, open new horizons for joint Arab efforts that appreciate past experiences and work to build a new future for Arab citizens.

- Parallel to these, the two peoples believe that their effort is part and parcel of the general effort toward achieving the goal of Arab unity.

- The two Presidents are convinced that this programme will achieve its desired goals only through creative cooperation with other Arab countries."

Moreover, in their endeavour to refute any accusations that they were trying to establish an alliance that could be directed against other Arab countries, authorities in Egypt and Sudan emphasized the fact that integration between the two countries is a step toward total Arab unity. This is quite understandable in the circumstances of the col war that existed in the Arab world at the time.

Despite the fact that southern Sudanese politicians participated in the organs of the integration programme, it was an open secret that southerners in general were not happy with steps
taken toward closer cooperation with Egypt. As we have mentioned earlier, southern Sudanese are usually very suspicious about closer links between Sudan and other Arab countries. Later developments proved the deep suspicion and mistrust held by southerners. A few examples could be cited here:

(a) Southern Sudanese showed their opposition to the Jonglei Canal project, which is considered as a cornerstone of Egyptian-Sudanese integration. They argued that the project will benefit only the northern Sudanese and Egypt. A spokesman for the SPLM in London described the project as a grand design to siphon southern Sudanese water resources for the benefit of the North and Egypt. In fact, the project was one of the main targets of the SPLM/SPLA who was successful in bringing excavation operations to a halt after kidnapping some French technicians working on the project. Moreover, the deep mistrust of southerners was also reflected in the fact that rumours were circulated after the signature of the integration programme that the South will only stand to lose as a result of this agreement. As Lazarus L. Makur puts it, "It was rumoured that since Egypt has shortage of suitable land for agriculture and has an explosive population, the thinly populated but extensive agricultural Southern Sudan would be an ideal outlet for Egyptian surplus population." In fact, rumours circulated in October 1974 that two million Egyptian nationals will be settled in the South as a result of the Jonglei deal found fertile soil and riots erupted in Juba, the capital of...
the Southern Region.

(b) Many southern Sudanese parliamentarians participated in the joint meetings of the Sudanese-Egyptian Parliaments within the framework of the integration programme. However, these parliamentarians opposed calls by other members from both sides to consider Islamic Shari'a laws as the source of legislation in both countries. In an attempt to put an end to the southern Sudanese fears, the parliamentarians confirmed the principle of respecting minority rights. The historical opposition of the southern Sudanese to any attempts to apply Islamic laws in the Sudan does not arise only from their fears that these laws will delegitimize them to the status of second class citizens, but also from the fact that adoption of Islamic laws will further cement Sudan's links with its Arab brethren. As one of the southern Sudanese scholars puts it, "...., what the Southern Sudanese should have done (and should still have to do) to restore the original equilibrium, was to work hard to detach the Northern Sudanese from his external racial connections, ....".

(c) The strong opposition of the SPLA to the defence pact signed between Egypt and the Sudan in 1976 is built on the belief that any such agreement is by necessity directed against the southern Sudan. This agreement and a similar one alleged to have been signed by the Transitional Military Council (TMC) with Libya are seen as tools to strengthen northern Sudanese grip on power in Khartoum. In his first official contact with Khartoum
in September 1985 Dr. John Garang, the leader of the SPLM/SPLA, called on the government to, "Cancel two agreements made by Field Marshal Jaafar Nimeiri with Egypt, that is the Defence Pact and the Economic and Political Integration Treaty: ...." In later documents issued by the SPLM/SPLA or signed with other Sudanese political parties and organizations, the latter part regarding the Integration Treaty was dropped but insistence on the abrogation of the Defence Pact continued.

In fact, the integration programme and charter were criticized by opposition in the northern Sudan as well. They were seen as repeating the same mistakes of previous attempts at unity by neglecting popular will. The Integration Charter was signed by the two Presidents and the general public was not given the chance to express its views about the charter or the methods of its implementation. Moreover, the charter and especially the defence pact was regarded as a tool to consolidate powers of the highly unpopular regime of President Numeiri. On the other hand, it was also considered a tactic to reduce the impact of the isolation of Egypt in the Arab world after the signature of the Camp David Accord with Israel.

The question of integration with Egypt, and Arab unity in general, has always been an important issue in Sudanese politics. In spite of the great benefits to the Sahan from cooperation with Egypt and other Arab countries, northern Sudanese in general and scholars in particular realize the deep suspicion held by souther
Sudanese toward such cooperation. Consequently, contradictions between the desire of the Sudan to achieve national integration and its attempts toward Arab unity are emphasized. M.O. Beshir tackles this problem with a lot of caution when he says, "National unity in the Sudan, and methods to achieve this goal are no less important to the country than integration with Egypt or Arab unity in general." In fact, many Sudanese regard achieving national unity to be an important pre-requisite for any attempt toward integration with other countries.

April 1985 - June 1989

At the end of March 1985 another popular uprising took place in the Sudan. Public demonstrations and strikes continued until the sixth of April, when the army leadership decided to interfere and topple the regime of President Numeiri. A Transitional Military Council (TMC) headed by the ex-Minister of Defence, Lt. General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dhohab, was formed. The TMC was entrusted with the legislative powers in the country, and a civilian cabinet was formed as the executive arm of the government. The cabinet was formed by the National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS), an organization comprising professionals, workers, students and political parties. The NANS spearheaded the popular uprising against the toppled regime of President Numeiri.

During the transitional period, preceding the installation
of the democratically elected government in April 1986, the for-
eign policy decision making process involved two different organs;
the TMC and the cabinet. In spite of the fact that joint meetings
were held regularly, there were many instances that reflect lack
of proper coordination.

When the transitional government took office in April 1985
Sudan's relations with both Africa and the Arab world were not
in good shape. The outbreak of the war in southern Sudan in the
last years of Numeiri's rule had negative impact on Sudanese
foreign policy in Africa. On the other hand, Numeiri's support
of the Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel and his conni-
vance at the transfer of the Falasha Jews form refugee camps in
the Sudan to Israel won him the enmity of the radical camp and
the aloofness of the moderate camp in the Arab world. Therefore,
one of the main items in the National Charter adopted by the NANS
on the 3rd of April 1985 called for the improvement of relations
with neighbouring countries, particularly Libya and Ethiopia.

The transitional government was faced by two serious problems.
Despite high expectations that the fall of Numeiri will lead to
a peaceful settlement to the war problem in southern Sudan, devel-
oppments proved that the problem is more complicated than it was
thought to be, and that the mere declaration by the government
that it was ready to re-instate the text and spirit of the Addis
Ababa Agreement was not enough for the SLM/SPLA to lay arms
and sit down at the negotiations table. On the other hand, the economy
was on the brink of collapse after sixteen years of corruption and wrong policies. The situation was further complicated as a result of the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries and the drought that hit the country as part of the general phenomenon in the whole of Africa.

The solution of such problems necessitates contacts and coordination with the outside world, particularly neighbouring countries. Contacts were immediately established with Libya and Ethiopia, two important neighbours with whom relations were far from cordial during the last years of Numeiri's rule. Moreover, the two countries were strong supporters of the SPLM: Libya provided large amounts of arms and ammunition to the movement while Ethiopia provided training camps and a radio station. In its effort to isolate the SPLM, the TMC started contacts with the two countries in addition to other African neighbours. These moves were naturally criticized by the SPLM as missing the real target. In his letter to the Prime Minister in September 1985, Dr. John Garang says, "Whereas friendly and neighbouring countries can help, such efforts are of little value if there are no objective conditions for peace within the Sudanese body politic." 84 The diplomatic crusade by the TMC was, in fact, half successful. As a result of TMC efforts Libya stopped it; assistance to the SPLM and called on Garang to end his rebellions, but Ethiopia continued its support. 85

In the Arab world the new change in government was generally
policy issues.

Traditionally, the two main coalition partners held different views on the issue of ties with Egypt. Whereas the DUP advocated closer links with Cairo, the UP has always rejected what it calls the paternalistic Egyptian attitude and asked for more equality in relations. Three major issues have characterized relations with Egypt during this phase. These issues were the granting by Egypt of asylum to the ousted president Numeiri, the Integration Charter and the Defence Pact. In addition to these issues, normalization of relations with Libya and Iran were viewed with suspicion in Cairo.

When the army took power on the sixth of April 1985, Numeiri was in Cairo on his way home from a visit to the United States. The Egyptian authorities succeeded in convincing him to stay in Cairo rather than go back to the Sudan, since then the ex-President continued to live in Egypt as a political refugee. Worried that he may be used by the Egyptian government as a means of pressure on the Sudan, a strong popular campaign was staged to ask for Numeiri's return to be prosecuted for political crimes during his sixteen years rule. The Egyptian government was adamant in its refusal to hand over the ex-President and demonstrations, spearheaded by leftist and communist elements, attacked the Egyptian embassy in Khartoum and burned the Egyptian national flag.

The issue of Numeiri's return continued to be a thorn in the side of Sudanese-Egyptian relations during the democratic rule.
However, the elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi did not press very hard for his return. For instance, at the end of his visit to Egypt in February 1987, Sadiq al-Mahdi was reported to have said that the return of Numeiri is popular demand and it has been discussed during the visit. But, the issue was not raised as a precondition for development of relations between the two neighbours, and during the same visit the Prime Minister signed with his Egyptian counterpart the 'Brotherhood Charter' as an alternative to the 'Integration Charter' concluded between Sudan and Egypt during Numeiri's time.

The Integration Charter was yet another issue that raised some controversy in Sudanese-Egyptian relations. There was a general consensus among Sudanese political forces after 1985 that the Integration Charter was signed by the ex-President without consulting the Sudanese people and that it will have to be reviewed. Another accusation against the Charter was that it served only the purposes of the regime and was not built on the principle of equality in relations between the two countries. The Brotherhood Charter that was meant to replace the Integration Charter was based on three pillars:

(a) Philosophically, the theory is built on equality between the two sides. The natural relationship between any two countries should always be built on this principle.

(b) Economically, the two countries were linked by mutual interests that have their origin in the long history of cooperation
developed through a long history of contact. This is reflected in cultural and ethnic admixture and a strong sense of unity.

Although the Brotherhood Charter was adopted by the coalition government as a whole, it clearly carries the fingerprints of Prime Sadiq al-Mahdi and his party.

The abrogation of the Defence Pact was another story. It was one of the conditions by the SPLM/SPLA for any progress in the peace process. The articles of the pact itself stipulate that its duration is twenty-five years and that it will be automatically renewed for a further period of five years unless one of the two sides notifies the other about its intention to abrogate the pact one whole year before the end of its duration. A lot of talk about the abrogation of the pact was heard during this phase but no practical steps were taken until mid-1989. The Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi was of the opinion that the conclusion of the Brotherhood Charter leads automatically to the abrogation of the pact. However, there seems to be no legal basis for the opinion held by the Prime Minister.

As a result of the acceptance by the government of the peace initiative signed between the SPLM and the DUC, mutual understanding was reached with Egypt to abrogate the Defence Pact just in time for the government side to announce that in the meetings
with the SPLM in Addis Ababa, 10 - 12 June 1989. Nevertheless, this was not good enough and in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the meetings the SPLM demanded that the abrogation of the pact should be confirmed by the Constituent Assembly. This, of course, was not to be because of the coup d'état on the 30th of June 1989, and the pact is still legally binding.

Normalization of relations with Iran proved to be another controversial issue on which the two coalition parties had some political differences. The Prime Minister and his party favoured closer ties with Iran, while the DUP saw that such close links would harm Sudan's relations with the Arab world, particularly Iraq and the Gulf countries. Attempts by the Prime Minister to court Iran were viewed with discomfort in the DUP. On the other hand, in its eagerness to win Arab friends in its war with Iraq, the Iranian government responded positively to overtures by the Prime Minister. Sadiq al-Mahdi's visit to Iran in December 1986 was a great success; 70 million dollars of interest on Iranian debts were written off and easy terms for the repayment of the debts themselves were agreed upon. However, this visit was counter-balanced by a visit of Muhammad (uman al-Mirghani, the leader of the DUP, to Baghdad in December 1987. As an outcome of this visit Iraqi transport planes made 21 journeys to Khartoum in which they transported 1500 tons of military equipment to help the Sudanese army to liberate the town of al-Kurruk that was occupied by the SPLA in November 1987.
The differences in views between the two coalition partners regarding the Iraq-Iran war were so intense that contradicting statements were issued by leading figures in the two parties. For instance, at the time when the Prime Minister was trying to mediate between Iraq and Iran, the Chairman of HSC announced that peace can only be achieved by supporting Iraq in accordance with the Arab League's Joint Defence Agreement.\textsuperscript{89} To address the problem of contradicting views on foreign policy issues, the Prime Minister decided in October 1987 to form a ministerial committee under his chairmanship to evaluate foreign policy and try to co-ordinate positions of different political parties.

On the African front, two issues dominated Sudanese foreign policy during this phase. The civil war in Chad and the conflict between Chad and its northern neighbour Libya spilled over the borders of the Sudan and presented difficult challenges for Sudanese foreign policy decision-makers. On the other hand, developments of the war problem in southern Sudan were inseparable from troubles in diplomatic relations between Sudan and its African neighbours.

Relations with Chad kept fluctuating during this phase partly because of the civil war in Chad and partly because of suspicions held by the government of Chad toward the development of close Libyan-Sudanese relations. The Sudanese government had been trying throughout the period from 1986 to 1989 to mediate, on the one hand between the fighting factions inside Chad and on the other
between Chad and Libya, albeit with limited success. In February 1987, Dr. Ali Hassan Taj-al-Din member of the HSC shuttled between N'djamena and Tripoli as a part of the Sudanese mediation between Chad and Libya. Early in March a cease-fire was announced and on the 9th of that month delegations from the two countries met in Khartoum. Contacts were also established with other African countries such as Algeria, Cameroun and Nigeria to give weight to mediation efforts. Moreover, a special envoy of the Prime Minister was appointed, but no real success was made.

Late in March 1987, only a few weeks after the meeting in Khartoum between delegates from Chad and Libya, Libyan forces attacked Chad territories from inside Sudan. Authorities in Sudan were indignant and the Prime Minister described the Libyan attitude as 'deceptive'. The incident was contained immediately but matters did not improve very much between Sudan and Chad. Early in 1988, Sudan-Chad relations deteriorated even further when dissident forces from Chad entered Sudanese territories and were later accused by the Sudanese government of inciting troubles in Darfur. The matter was finally settled in December 1988 when an agreement was reached between the government in Chad and the dissident forces. However, this tranquility did not continue for long since in April 1989 an attempted coup d'état was aborted in Chad and once again a large number of dissident forces and refugees entered Sudan. Clashes across the borders continued and many Sudanese nationals lost their lives.
Three main reasons were behind the instability in relations between the Sudan and Chad. These reasons could be cited as follows:

(a) The conflict between Libya and the government of President Hissene Habre, and the repeated attempts by Libya to use Sudanese territories to supply its allies inside Chad;

(b) the conflict between different political and ethnic factions inside Chad and the inevitable spill of this conflict over the Sudanese borders;

(c) the existence of the same ethnic groups across international borders between Chad and the Sudan. This is yet another proof of the link between ethnicity and foreign policy in the Sudan. Moreover, the Sudanese region closest to Chad, Darfur, is itself suffering from ethnic conflict and the existence of the dissident forces from Chad helps only to escalate tensions.

Relations with Ethiopia during this phase were largely influenced by the attitude of that country toward the war problem in southern Sudan. The SPLM/ SPLA has its headquarters in Addis Ababa, operates a radio station from Ethiopian territories, and maintains camps for military training close to the Sudanese-Ethiopian borders. Accusations and counter-accusations were a common feature of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations at the time. Nevertheless, there were many instances when attempts were made to normalize relations. Realizing the mutual harm they can inflict on each other, the two countries have always left a room for
dialogue and peaceful coexistence.

On the second anniversary of the April uprising, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi put forward an initiative for normalization of relations between the two countries. The initiative included five points:

1) Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other;

2) Upholding of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others;

3) Declaration of the Red Sea as a nuclear-free zone;

4) Agreement with Nile Basin countries about the proper exploitation of the Nile waters;

5) Resumption of meetings of the Joint Ministerial Committee.

Apparently, Ethiopia did not show much enthusiasm toward the Prime Minister's initiative. In spite of the fact that mutual visits at high level took place and that an Egyptian mediation was in process, no tangible results were achieved.

The most serious incident between the two countries took place at the end of 1987. In November of that year the SPLA was able to occupy the town of al-Kuruk in south-eastern Sudan after artillery shelling across the border from Ethiopia. The Ethiopian authorities denied any connection with the incident but the Sudanese side insisted on its accusation: and an official complaint was made to the OAU. However, the matter was contained immediately through Egyptian mediation and a meeting was held.
between Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in Kampala in early December. The last six months of the democratic rule were relatively tranquil on the Ethiopian-Sudanese foreign relations front.

The Karmuk incident had some other repercussions regarding Sudan's Afro-Arab policy. The town was liberated at the end of December with heavy assistance from Iraq. Seeking support from Iraq to repel an attack by the SPLA, supported by Ethiopia, left the impression that claims by some circles that the conflict is a racial one may, after all, have some foundation. There is, of course, nothing new in this fact since Sudanese governments have always received assistance from Arab countries in their fight against the rebels. But, in an attempt to score some points at the domestic political front, the DUP treated the matter with a lot of fanfare and propaganda.*

The African policy of the Sudanese government during this phase cannot be described as successful, and that was mainly because of the war problem in southern Sudan. Relations between Sudan and its African neighbours went through some very difficult times. Uganda, for example, accused Sudan now and then of harbouring dissident Ugandan elements. On the other hand, Sudanese-Kenyan relations reached a low ebb in November 1988 when Prime Minister

*For instance, on January 2nd, 1988 Sayyid Muhammad Usman al-Mirghani, leader of the DUP, gave a reception in the honour of the Iraqi pilots who flew in military material used in the liberation of al-Karmuk.
Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi accused President Arap Moi of corruption in an interview with the American Cable News Network (CNN). Relations between the two countries deteriorated even further in March 1988 when the Kenyan authorities expelled two Sudanese diplomats including the Charge d'Affaires, Sudan retaliated by expelling two Kenyan diplomats from Khartoum. The fact that the SPLM has maintained a relief office in Nairobi was behind these developments.

At the end of May 1989, Sudan had troubles in its relations with another African neighbour. The Central African Republic severed diplomatic relations with the Sudan over an incident involving a CAR's presidential flight through Sudanese airspace. During this phase also, the SPLM was able to achieve many diplomatic victories in Africa and Dr. John Garang was treated to a red carpet welcome in many African capitals including Nairobi, Kampala, Kinshasa, Lusaka and Harare.

Commenting on the failure of Sudanese candidates for senior posts in the OAU and other regional organizations in Africa, the Foreign Minister said in an interview, after attending the OAU Summit in August 1987, that Sudanese foreign policy in Africa is not clear; that the Sudan has declared its adherence to principles of non-alignment and good neighbourliness; but no practical steps were taken to put these policies in practice. The Foreign Minister said also that Sudan's identification with African issues was not strong enough and that many African leaders view Sudan as an
Arab rather than an African country.\textsuperscript{93}

On the 30th of March a coup d'état took place, putting an end to the third democratic era and ushering the military in Sudanese politics for the third time since independence. The Revolution for National Salvation started with reiterating the basic principles of Sudanese foreign policy, but it will be only presumptuous to talk about its policies with any certainty at this early stage.

Summary

In this chapter we dealt with the subject matter of this study. We discussed in some detail the Sudanese foreign policy in both Africa and the Arab world since independence in 1956. We divided the thirty-three years between 1956 and 1989 into four separate phases.

Except for short intervals of ideological radicalism we found that Sudanese foreign policy is generally moderate and sometimes conservative in nature. In the course of discussion we tried to explore the link between the multi-ethnic nature of the country and its foreign policy.

We discussed the development of relations between Sudan and its African neighbours under conditions of peace and war in southern Sudan. We tried as much as possible to put these developments in perspective by discussing international and regional environments in which these policies were operated.
In the Arab world a lot of attention was paid to relations with Egypt, one of the major determinants of Sudanese foreign policy. Since the subject matter of the study is identity conflict and foreign policy we concentrated on issues of integration and Arab unity, being a major source of controversy in the Sudan and is directly connected with conflict between Arabism and Africanism.


4) *al-Ayam*, June 30th, 1955

5) *al-Ayam*, September 16th, 1954

6) SNA, Dept/R 8/1/4. Translated from Arabic by the author.

7) Ibid.


9) *al-Ayam*, December 2nd, 1964

10) SNA, South 1/13/125

11) Ibid.


13) *al-Ayam*, December 3rd, 1954

14) *al-Ayam*, December 23rd, 1964

15) *al-Ayam*, February 26th, 1963

16) Howell & Hamid, *op. cit.*

18) Ibid. 


20) Howell & Hamid, op. cit. 

21) Vigilant, August 23rd, 1966. Vigilant is a Sudanese English daily edited by Mr. Bona Malwal, later appointed as Minister of Culture and Information during Nimeiri's rule. 

22) Vigilant, August 25th, and September 15th, 1966 

23) Vigilant, October 13th, 1966 


26) Vigilant, November 16th, 1966 

27) al-Ayam, April 6th and 14th, 1966 

28) Quoted in Vigilant, April 7th, 1966 

29) *New York Times*, August 9th, 1965 


31) *Arab Report & Record (ARR)*, 16 - 3) April 1969 

32) Howell & Hamid, op. cit. 


34) al-Ayam, May 7th, 1971 

35) Quoted in S.A. Baynard, op. cit. 

36) A.M. Abdel Wahab Bob in his daily column in *al-Siyassa*, Sudanese daily, April 9th, 1987 

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38) Ibid.
41) ARF, 1 - 15 September 1969
42) ARF, 16 - 31 January 1970
43) ARF, 15 -28 February 1970
44) Record Of Arab World, April, May, June 1971
48) Sudan's Foreign Policy (1973), the annual report presented by the Foreign Minister to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the People's Assembly (Parliament)
50) Sudan's Foreign Policy, op. cit.
51) M.A.M. Toha, op. cit.
52) Y. Tandon, op. cit.
53) Sudan's Foreign Policy, op. cit.
54) Ibid.
55) al-Sahafa, March 3rd, 1973
56) SNA, Dept/R 8/5/21 a lecture by Dr. Mansour Khalid under the title, "the Decision Making Process in Foreign Policy: Sudan a Case Study"
57) S.A. Baynard, op. cit.
58) al-Ayam, September 21st, 1972
59) al-Sahafa, September 21st, 1972
60) al-Ayam, September 22nd, 1972
61) al-Ayam, September 24th, 1972
62) Ibid.
63) al-Sahafa, September 27th, 1972
64) S.A. Baynard, op. cit.
65) al-Ayam, March 5th, 1973
66) al-Ayam, March 6th, 1973
67) Quoted in al-Ayam, March 7th, 1973
68) S.A. Baynard, op. cit.
69) For full texts of the basic documents of the economic and political integration between Sudan and Egypt, kindly refer to al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya, No. 51, January 1978
71) Ibid.
72) An address by the Sudanese Vice-President al-Rasheed al-Tahir at the joint meeting of Sudanese and Egyptian Parliamentarians, Cairo, October 26th, 1977

74) Programme for Political and Economic Integration between Egypt and the Sudan, al-Siyassa al-Dawliya, 51, Jan. 1978

75) Address by Egyptian Prime Minister Maimoud Salim at the joint meeting of Sudanese and Egyptian Parliamentarians, Cairo, October 25th, 1977

76) Africa, February 1984, p. 6


79) L.L. Mawut, op. cit.

80) From a letter by Dr. John Garang to the Prime Minister Dr. al-Gizouli Dafaala, September 1st, 1985.

81) See for example the Koka Dam Declaration of March 24th, 1986 signed between the SPLM and the NANN, the Addis Ababa, Kampala and Nairobi Declarations signed between the SPLM and the Sudanese African Parties between July and September 1987, and the agreement between the SPLM and the DUT signed in November 1988

82) M.O. Beshir, "Historical Roots and the Present Situation of Integration," al-Siyassa al-Dawliya 51, January 1978


84) Dr. Garang to Dr. Dafaala, op. cit.

86) A report to the Constituent Assembly by the Prime Minister about his visit to Egypt, February 24th, 1987


88) Address by the Prime Minister in the Constituent Assembly April 22nd, 1987

89) Address by the Chairman of the NSC in a meeting with the Sudanese Popular Committee for Solidarity with Iraq, September 9th, 1987

90) A statement by the Prime Minister in the Constituent Assembly, March 23rd, 1987

91) Address by the Prime Minister on the 6th of April 1987

92) A statement by the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 30th, 1989

93) Interview with the Foreign Minister al-Midan, August 17th, 1987

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The multi-ethnic nature of the Sudan is directly linked to, and has influenced the country's foreign policy toward Africa and the Arab world in many ways:

1) The domination of the decision-making process by the northern and central Sudanese who are culturally Arab and Muslim influenced the content of Sudan's foreign policy. Despite the insistence by consecutive Sudanese governments since independence that Sudan is an African country, little more than lip-service was in fact given to African causes. The only period that saw an active systematic African policy was the first years after the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement in the early '70s. Sudanese diplomatic representation is still heavily biased toward the Arab world, reflecting the biases of the decision-making elite. While Sudan maintains embassies in 16 Arab countries, its embassies in non-Arab African countries are no more than nine (six of these embassies are in countries that share borders with the Sudan). By 1989 Sudanese diplomatic position in Africa was so weak that the new government of the Revolution of National Salvation declared 1990 as the 'Year of Africa' in the Sudan.

2) Despite the bias toward the Arab world, lack of consensus regarding the identity of the country made it very difficult for any Sudanese government to take wide steps to achieve the goal of Arab unity without alienating a large part of the population.
There are, of course, other reasons for the failure of Sudanese governments to take such steps, and there is a school of thought inside the country that argues that the existence of identity conflict is in fact one of the most important reasons for closer links between Sudan and the Arab world. However, so long as the central government in Khartoum is not ready to allow the secession of the south, any steps toward Arab or Muslim unity will be carefully calculated so that they do not offend the minority in southern Sudan.

3) The war problem in southern Sudan proved to be the country's soft belly. The instability in the region led to many forms of intervention by international and regional powers. The most serious is the intervention by Israel and Ethiopia. The two countries, whether separately or in concert, have always meddled in the affairs of Sudan by giving assistance to the rebels. This attitude, especially by Ethiopia, has sometimes led to retaliation or threats to retaliate by the Sudan.

However, international and regional intervention has not always been negative. For example, when the government and the rebels show their readiness to negotiate, many mediators offer their services. Moreover, the tremendous effort to repatriate refugees and rehabilitate the region after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was a model case of regional and international cooperation.
4) The ethnic map between Sudan and its neighbours is so complicated that there is a number of common tribal groups that straddle over international borders. Conflict, either in Sudan or in neighbouring countries, tend always to spill over borders in form of refugees and armed rebels. This has always been an important factor in increasing tensions between the Sudan and its neighbours, particularly Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad.

Ethnic diversity and identity conflict will remain to be an important determinant of Sudanese foreign policy for a long time. However, its impact should not necessarily be negative. If the Sudanese were able to reach a national consensus on their similarities and differences, ethnic diversity can prove to be one of their largest assets.
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