The Security Crisis in Western Sudan
A Case Study of Armed Robbery and Tribal Conflicts
In Darfur Region From A Political Perspective

By

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Mudi
ABSTRACT

This research deals with the security crisis in Western Sudan. Historically this remote part of the country, bordering Chad and Central African Republic, has been the scene of tribal conflicts and other related disturbances. But the escalation of violence, particularly armed robbery, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s has reached crisis dimension. A solution to this dangerous phenomenon still remains elusive. The situation has become even more explosive with the intrusion of regional conflicts (the civil war in Chad and the related Libyan-Chadian disputes into the area).

The implication of these conflicts has complicated the security situation in Darfur region and furthermore stood as strong linkage between the regional conflicts in the western part of the African continent and the security crisis in western Sudan. Moreover it has opened the door for the interplay of many competing influences both regionally and internationally, which tended to impede any genuine efforts for resolving the situation of conflict and civil strife.

This study examines the external and internal factors of the conflict, in addition to the international intervention in the regional conflicts.

The study also examines other internal factors in the security problem, such as the ethnic diversity and the differences amongst the tribes of the region, especially those of Chadian origin.

Factors like famine, drought and desertification, in addition to the lack of facilities available to the local authorities have also contributed to the situation in the region.

The study consists of the introduction, two parts comprising three chapters in part one and five chapters in part two, the conclusion and the relevant tables, graphs and maps.

The introduction deals with the historical background of Darfur region, the tribal structure of Darfur, the ecology of the region, the western boundaries, the impact of Islam in the region, the administrative system since the Fur Sultanates up to the post-independence period, the native administration under the Condominium rule and after independence and finally the social and economic development in Darfur. The survey on these various dimensions was purposely made to give adequate knowledge of the region and the different
elements that would affect, in one way or another, its security situation.

In part one, chapter one deals with the internal factors of the security crisis in Darfur showing in brief the background for both northern and southern Darfur provinces in economic activities, such as animal wealth, agriculture and industry and also the modern administrative structure of the region through which certain roles affecting the security of the region have been played.

Chapter two examines the security problems of the region, in particular the armed robbery phenomenon; analysing its aspects within the Sudan criminal law of 1974 and 1983. The main factors in the spread of armed robbery are also referred to, in addition to statistics of armed robbery incidents from 1983 to 1988.

Chapter three deals with the second main issue which is the tribal conflicts. The historical relations of tribes of the region, is examined showing examples of tribal conflicts according to their relevance to the security situation.

The Chapter also deals with the main aspects of the various tribal conferences held to resolve tribal conflicts, particularly the 1989 conference and its resolutions.

Chapter four in part two is devoted to the external factor of the security crisis which is the Chadian question before and after the independence of Chad in 1960 and the formation of the political parties and the different opposition groups.

Chapter five is concerned with the successive transitional governments and their role, or the lack of it, in the question of stability in the Chadian society and the impact of the security problem in western Sudan.

In chapter six, the regional intervention in Chad is discussed with special emphasis on Libya, Sudan and Egypt.

The role of the Organization of African Unity in the Chadian question is also examined. The international intervention is dealt with in chapter seven indicating the role of France, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the conflict in Chad in its two dimensions; the civil war in Chad and the Chadian - Libyan conflict. Related to this is the repercussion of these issues on the security problem in Darfur which is analyzed in chapter eight.

The conclusion examines the various steps for conflict resolution in the light of the findings of the research.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
PART 1.

CHAPTER 1:  
The internal factors in the security crisis  
CHAPTER 2:  
The security problems of Darfur Region  
CHAPTER 3:  
Tribal relations in Darfur  

PART 2.

CHAPTER 4:  
The external factors of security crisis  
CHAPTER 5:  
The first and second transitional governments of Chad  
CHAPTER 6:  
Regional intervention in Chad  
CHAPTER 7:  
International intervention in Chad  
CHAPTER 8:  
The security problem in Darfur  

CONCLUSION  

(III)
INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND :-

The history of Darfur exhibits a characteristic nature, that has never been seen elsewhere. Darfur - the home of Fur - is a vast region in Western Sudan extending approximately between latitudes 10°N to 20°N and from longitudes 22°E to 27°E, forming a rectangle 450 miles long and 350 miles broad, and enclosing an area of over 140,000 square miles. Its distinct natural frontiers and special identity may explain its long history of independence. Geography and climate have well defined its northern, eastern and southern limits; the Libyan desert in the north, the broad sand hills in the east and the hard movement of the animal-owning tribes beyond Bahr El Arab in the south. Only to the west the frontiers of Darfur have been decided by "political events, rather than by factors of soil, vegetation and climate". In the west, Darfur was surrounded by Libya, Chad and Central African Republic.

There are no written records for the early history of Darfur, but according to local narrative it is agreed that there have been three successive dynasties; the Daju, the Tunjur and the Keira Fur. However, it was not known "who the Daju or the Tunjur were, or what period each dynasty covered". The earliest Fur Sultan was Suliman Solong (1596 -1637). He welded the tribes together into one political kingdom. Ali Dinar was the last Sultan, before his rule Darfur was a Turco-Egyptian territory after the destruction of the Keira Sultanate by El Zubair Basha in 1874. The spark of the Mahdist revolution in 1881

2. Ibid p.3
urged the tribes in Darfur to attack the Turco-Egyptian centres, even before the arrival of the Mahdist armies to end that rule. A new era under the Mahdist rule then emerged. It was only after the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest in 1898 that Ali Dinar had found his chance to establish his rule over Darfur.

The Fur, though naming themselves Keira or Korjora or Masabaat, were the original inhabitants of the region.\(^1\) The strong rule of the Fur Sultans was attributed to their commercial contacts with the neighbouring countries. The trade along Darb-Al-Arba'in, the route from Darfur to Egypt and the trade via Fezzan in Libya had a certain significance that the Sultans were provided with the means to enforce their will and leadership.\(^2\) This long distance trade was monopolized by the Sultans because it was beyond the resources of local communities.\(^3\)

The Tribal Structure of Darfur:

Darfur region incorporates over eighty tribal groups. The main sedentary indigenous tribes are the Fur, Masalit, Daju, Tunjur and Gimiri. Nomadic and seminomadic tribes are the Zaghibawa, Bdeyat, Meidob who are the most numerous and powerful among the Baggaro tribes in south-eastern Darfur, the Habbania, Taalsha and Basal Halba.

The residence distribution of the tribes in the region is illustrated in the table below.

The table presents the tribes distribution in the main areas of Darfur region: South Darfur, West Darfur, El-Fasher and its outskirts, North Darfur and East Darfur. Among the main tribes we mentioned, we notice the existence of one particular tribe in more than one area, for example, the Fur is found in all areas of the region except in East Darfur.

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3. Ibid.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sect No</th>
<th>SOUTH DARFUR</th>
<th>WEST DARFUR</th>
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<th>NORTH DARFUR</th>
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<td>Bani Atta</td>
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Many of the region's tribes came across the western borders from different African countries. The Zaghawa were settled in French Equatorial Africa (independent Chad and Central African Republic).\(^1\) The Beledyat have been described as an exaggerated form of the Zaghawa, for they are darker, wilder, more independent and more treacherous.\(^2\) It is too hard to accept this argument, because Theobald did not provide.

1. Theobald op. cit, p. 9
2. Ibid, p. 10.
the necessary evidence, yet we can examine this hypothesis in the light of the evaluation of the security crisis in the region. The great majority of the tribes live in the desert of the Ennedi region of Chad north-west of the Sudan border, but they spill over into the extreme north-west of the Sudan.1

The Ecology of Darfur:

Historically, the movement of the tribes within the region has always been determined by the search for water sources and fertile land which have come to diminish during the last few decades. The reason behind the spread of desert conditions south of the Sahara is a phenomenon of ecological imbalance which is known as desertification. 2 It has been caused by the rapid increase of human and animal population and the simultaneous occurrence of a long drought phase beginning in 1968.3 Drought and desertification have contributed to the already existing food crisis in most of the African countries. Famine crisis has hit both Chad and Sudan, specially its Western part where the impact of famine is manifested in more inability to meet the increasing need for food and in more dependence on food aid and international charity, which has opened the door for foreign intervention.

Famine has also contributed to the increase of refugees and displaced persons in the African continent. Sudan in its western part of Darfur, has received an infiltration of refugees from Chad. However, famine has not been the only reason, but also civil war in Chad which was still compelling its population to take refuge in Sudan. This situation has produced greater food shortage in the region of Darfur which was already suffering from a decline of productivity. Under these circumstances, security of the region was instable.

1. Theobald op. cit. p.10
2. Fouad N. Ibrahim, Ecological Imbalance in the Republic of the Sudan with Reference to Desertification in Darfur, 1984, (University of Bayreuth) F.R. Germany, p.185.
Since a long time, the need for water sources for both nomadic and sedentary tribes has been a cause for disputes. These disputes have emphasised ethnicity over most of the different tribes of the region. Ethnicity, as it may be argued, refers to a rather complex combination of racial, cultural and historical characteristics which is well materialized in Darfur region hence it is the host of a great number of different tribes. Language also has its effect on ethnic divisions and this is seen in the level of local societies the thing which led to their being divided into separate entities. This fragmentation created a good environment for small disputes to accelerate.

The Western Boundaries of the Region:

The tendency of some non-Sudanese tribes, especially those of Chadian origin, to infiltrate and resettle in the Sudanese border areas has constantly caused conflicts between them and the Sudanese tribes of the region. Both Sudan and Chad have recognised the boundaries between them as inherited from the colonial rule before independence of Sudan in 1956 and Chad in 1960. The boundaries are delimited according to the Anglo-French Protocol of 1924.\(^1\)

However, disputes were always arising as a result of the vagueness of most of that protocol clauses.\(^2\) Many disputes arose concerning the strip of the border in Aniata area between the Daju tribe of Goz Beida in Chad and Masalit tribe of Geneina in Sudan.\(^3\) Meetings to discuss the disputes were held since the 1960s between the local administrators of the two districts concerned, but the Chadians stressed that the disputed area of Aniata was Chadian territory. The Chadian claim was not accepted by the Sudanese authorities and thus no decision was reached about fixing the boundaries.\(^4\)

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2. Ibid. p.666.
3. Ibid. p.666
4. Archives of the International Boundaries Department (Ministry of Interior).
The boundary dispute between Sudan and Central African is found in the area of Um Dafog.⁴ The protocol of Republic 1924 described the boundary as running from Jebel Yarra in north-west direction to the east of the road which passes from Um Dafog to Lake Tisi. Although it is thus described, infiltrations from both countries always take place.²

The boundaries between Sudan and Libya were delimited by three straightline segments; the meridian 250 east, the parallel 200 north and the meridian 240 east.² The area adjoining the boundary is uninhabited. However, this situation made the Sudanese-Libyan boundary, as Dr. Bukhart El Gaali argued, stable and no possibility of dispute over it is in sight. But, in accordance with the contemporary trends in international relations, we can argue that this area particularly may witness a boundary dispute as being part of the dilemma triangle of Chad-Libya-Western Sudan.

The Impact of Islam in the Region:—

Historically, Islam has existed in the region for more than three centuries.⁴ The Fur Sultans have developed contacts with the Turks and Islamic Sufi movement in Libya (the Sanusia) as well as Egypt.⁵ Also ancient Kingdoms of Waddai and Bagirmai in French Equatorial Africa where Islam was dominant, have had relations with Darfur.⁶ Furthermore, the region was a west-east track of African muslims towards Mecca for pilgrimages.⁷ Darfur tribes have participated in the Mahdi’s successful campaign "culminating in the seizure of Khartoum and the death of General Gordon in 1885."⁸

When the Mahdi died, he was succeeded by his key aide the Khalifa Abdullahi, who was a "Darfuri of the Taisha section of the Faggara

1. Archives of the International Boundary's Department (Ministry of Interior).
2. Ibid.
7. Ibid. p. 207.
8. Ibid. p. 207.
nomads.” 1 This interplay has contributed to the Islamic fundamentalism of Darfur population. It has been manifested in the ruling structure of the Fur and the Masalit Sultanes and also in their struggle against the French troops coming from French Equatorial Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian armies. 2 The revolution of Abdalla El Suhini (one of the Masalit religious men) at Nyala in 1921 was a product of the politico-religious sentiment resulting from the intention of the Anglo-Egyptian armies to invade Dar Masalit. 3 Dar Masalit, far west of Darfur on the border between Sudan and Chad is the tribal home of the Masalit people, most of whom live on the Sudanese side of the border. El Geneina is the political and economic centre of Dar Masalit. Many intruders from the west and east used to settle partly in Dar Masalit because of the rich agricultural land and water sources in Wadi Kaga and Wadi Azum. Dar Masalit was allied to the Fur Sultanate a century or more before. 4

Tributes were paid in return for protection. Later, Dar Masalit acquired its own independent Sultanate. Many wars have taken place between the Masalit and other tribes; They fought against the Fur, the Daju and Tama of Waddai region in Chad. They also fought against the French and defeated them in the battle of Deroti, few miles from El Geneina in 1910. The religious sentiment of the Masalit is deep. This Islamic sentiment made Darfur a sensitive frontier region. Further, tribal loyalty and allegiance posed many problems for central governments to extend their influence over such a remote part of the country.

The Administrative System:

The administrative system of Darfur has varied during the different reigns in the region. The system of Ali Dinar was, though on a less elaborate scale, similar to that of Khalifa Abdullahi in the Sudan during the period of its independence from 1885 to 1898. The organization of the army, the systems of taxation and of justice were

2. Darfur Province op. cit., p. 17.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
broadly the same. Ali Dinar, as Warburg argued, exercised an 
essentially personal rule, despotic, sometimes cruel but, surprisingly, 
effective.¹ During Ali Dinar's rule over the independent Darfur, the 
ew Sirdar and Government General of the Sudan after Kitchener was 
Wingate, Slatin's most intimate friend among the British officers. 
Shortly after Slatin's second arrival to Sudan, Wingate asked him to 
rejoin the Sudan Government service. He was appointed as 
Inspector-General on 29th September 1900.² 

Slatin as the last Governor of Darfur in the Turco-Egyptian 
Sudan, was regarded by Wingate as the greatest living authority on 
his history and was entrusted with all its administration problems. 
The principles underlaying the relationship between Sudan and 
Darfur were laid down by Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-
General in Cairo, in March 1900 when he vetoed Wingate's 
suggestion that the British flag should be hoisted in Darfur.³ 
Cromer insisted that the administration of Darfur from Khartoum 
would be costly, useless and inefficient, and that Ali Dinar should be 
left in peace. However, Slatin's first aim was to establish cordial 
relations with Darfur which he hoped to achieve by visiting the 
region. Ali Dinar thought differently and wrote to Wingate not to 
send Slatin. In fact, no senior official was allowed into Darfur 
during Ali Dinar's reign. Communications with Darfur were 
carried by messengers and were conducted by Slatin. His basic 
policy was not to interfere in Darfur's internal affairs. The Arab 
tribes of Darfur, such as the Maalila and Rizaigat, who were 
constantly harassed by the Fur army, were driven back across the 
borders whenever they sought refuge in other parts of the Sudan. 
Slatin only agreed to write to Ali Dinar advising him to adopt a 
more lenient tribal policy. Yet concurrently he ordered the Darfur 
tribes to obey their Sultan. 

Ali Dinar was paying a yearly tribute to the Sudan government 
and was, in Slatin's view, immune from any interference in his 
internal affairs. Darfur affairs were thus conducted by Slatin 
without

2. Ibid. p. 46. 
3. Ibid. p. 51.
undue interference by Wingate or by other British officers. However, the advance of the French through the western frontier of Darfur urged the Sudan government to put an end to Ali Dinar's rule in 1916 and to incorporate the region within the Sudan central government.

Native Administration Under the Condominium Rule :-

The population of the Sudan at the time of the condominium rule was a tribal one. The British authorities since then, realized that the reconstruction of the country depended on the pacification of the tribes regarding their loyalty to the new regime. In fact no attempt was made to give any power to tribal chiefs so as not to create national leadership to wage another Mahdist war against the Anglo-Egyptian government. Eventually, the indirect rule was imposed by granting tribal chiefs some sort of administrative and judicial powers. Certain incidents urged the government to develop the indirect rule into native administration. They were the expulsion of the Egyptian civil servants in 1924 and the world depression of 1929-33.

However, the native administration was repugnant to the educated core of the nationalist movement in the Sudan for many reasons. As advocates of national unity, they wanted to strengthen the allegiance of the Sudanese to their country not to their various tribes and localities. Native administration was aimed at protecting and reviving tribal bonds. It was made particularly to reduce the role of the educated class in the administration. Further, the real power was in the hands of the Governors and District Commissioners not the Nazirs, Sheikhs and Chiefs.

2. Ibid., p. 52.
3. Ibid., p. 137.
When the local government was established in 1937 by the legislation of the Local Governments Ordinance, the Municipalities, Townships and Rural Areas were not independent from the authority of Governors and District commissioners who had power to provide local services and to make and execute laws of local applications. The native administration in the countryside was continued under the Local Government Ordinance but on territorial basis rather than tribal one.

Native administration was helpful for central authority to keep security in the rural areas. In a vast region like Darfur where people can resort to individual action whenever they lose their temper, the presence of a strong native administration capable of using its influence and authority to restrain tempers was necessary. Any local breakdown of peace could easily develop into tribal war and the power at the disposal of central authority would not help enforcing law without native administration. On the other hand, the tribal affiliation was in favour of native administrators rather than central government, accordingly tribal allegiance was stronger than national aspiration. Security, taxation, judicial work and other social duties were successfully dealt with by native administration.

Native Administration After Independence:

After independence, native administration faced many problems ranging from abolishing it to splitting native courts from administration. Some people called for autonomous position outside the tribal framework. Others regarded local autocrats as countering the national movement which would be failing its duty if the masses were left for native authorities to molest and exploit. Thus the liquidation of native administration was thought of and many steps have been made in this direction by legislating many ordinances of local government as an alternative.

However, the final liquidation of native administration was desired by the May regime of 1969. People's, Town and Rural Councils were established according to the People's Local Government.

Act of 1971. Darfur had been divided into three district councils: south-west, eastern and north-west Darfur. Town councils were established in Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina. Rural Councils were in west, east, south, north Darfur and Dar Musulit far west of the region. Anyhow, it was too hard for these institutions to substitute native administration because the old faces have also shown up in the people’s councils. Practically it was not easy to ignore traditional tribal forces.

Social and Economic Development in Darfur:

The colonial Policy of directing education to produce only junior Sudanese officials has brought a problem of manpower in both technical and professional fields. This has affected the efforts for upholding genuine development in the different regions of the country. Furthermore, the Sudanization programme had not implied plans for broad technical and professional training which would have initiated remarkable systems of a developing society.

The succeeding national governments however achieved some sort of national development plans to improve economic and social well being of the population but this development was imbalanced. Some regions, particularly Darfur, were seen to be neglected in both economic and social fields in comparison with other regions of the country.

The major hazard of this uneven development is that it may reveal a growing sentiment of isolationism over the hard pressed population of the region from the nation-state body. Under such sentiment, associated with the spectre of Darfur’s long standing history of independence, the current instability of the region would lead to a drastic change in the existent structure of the region.

3. Ibid. p. 4.
PART 1
CHAPTER 1
THE INTERNAL FACTORS OF THE SECURITY CRISIS

Background:

In order to come closer to an understanding of Darfur region’s security problems, we ought to have a background about the administrative structure of the region. Darfur region is divided into two provinces according to article (e) of section 4 of the Regional Government Act 1980 which denotes that Darfur region comprises the Provinces of Northern and Southern Darfur.

The distribution of economic activities and development projects as illustrated in the records of the regional government in El Fasher comes as follows:

Northern Darfur Province:

Economic Activities.

1. Animal Wealth:
   The province is rich in animal wealth which includes cattle, sheep, goats and camels. However, the numbers of this animal wealth are decreasing due to armed robberies and tribal conflicts in the province as we shall see later in the tables.

2. Agriculture:
   Agriculture plays a secondary role in the economy of the province due to small cultivable land and scarce rain. Durra and oil seeds are the main crops produced in the province. The province witnessed the formation of mechanized agriculture especially in Kutum where there is an office to handle agricultural aspects. The Agricultural Bank has also a branch in the province. In the absence of sufficient government schemes the regional authorities agreed on establishing a scheme in the outskirts of El Fasher at Sag El Niam. This scheme is financed by the Libyans for the production of vegetables and fruits. But after three years of its establishment it is not yet producing. The paradox is that the management of the
Libyan while the farmers and workhands are locals.

3. Industry:

Industry is of a minor role in the economy of the province due to the nomadic nature of the inhabitants, therefore, industry only concentrates on oil mills, soap factories and tanneries.

Southern Darfur Province :

Economic Activities.

1- Animal Wealth:

Like Northern Darfur this province has also the following items of animal wealth: Cattle, sheep, camels and goats. Due to the fertile land of the province and the availability of water supply the animal wealth in this province is much more greater than that of Northern Darfur and a number of abattoirs are found through the province.

2- Agriculture:

Agriculture is concentrated around the area of Jebel Marra which is the most fertile land of the whole region where it is taken care of by the sedentary farmers of the Fur tribe. Fruits, vegetables and Durra are grown by traditional means. According to the hard nature of the mountain and the lack of flat lands, the camel is very essential in the agricultural operations. On the other hand, the camel is also a useful means of transportation for the armed groups in the area and therefore, it has become in itself a target for robberies, and this in turn has affected the agricultural production.

Studies have been carried out for testing the soil of Khor Teggan and El Dijen for growing suitable crops but no genuine efforts were offered to follow up these studies. Tobacco is grown in many areas of the province, especially Zalingei.

Administrative Structure of the Region :

As we have seen, Darfur region incorporates the two provinces of Northern and Southern Darfur, for each province there is a commissioner and administrative council. The head of the regional authority is the governor. The region has also a government which
has normally been consisted of few ministers. The governor and the regional government are appointed by the president or head of state according to the Regional Government Act of 1980. Section (11) of this Act which reads:

11. "(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the first Governor of the Region for a transitional period not to exceed eighteen months from the date of his appointment.

(2) After the expiration of the transitional period the president of the Republic shall appoint the Governor of the Region from the three candidates selected by a common meeting between: the Regional People's Assembly and the Regional Conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union.

(3) The President of the Republic shall by regulations passed by him prescribe the manner of the holding of the common meeting and the procedure of its conduct."

The responsibilities of the governor of the region are set out in section (16) of the Act which reads:

16 (1) The Governor of the region shall be responsible to the President of the Republic, and to the Regional People's Assembly for the good administration of the region. However, this section should be amended due to the political institutions.

The relation between the central and the regional government was unclear. In 1989, the former president Nimeiri appointed El Tayeb El Mardi a governor for Darfur region. This appointment was faced by a great deal of rejection from the region's population since the appointed governor was not from the region. However, it might have been a mistake of Nimeiri that he responded to the pressure.

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1. All these sections have to be amended after the abolition of the Political institutions of the May regime.
substituting El Mardi by one of the region’s tribesmen who was Ahmed Ibrahim Dereig (from the Fur tribe). It was not a long time when Dereig felt that he cannot go further as governor, since his policies were always rejected by the central government. At the end he left Sudan without submitting his resignation to the President. Apparently, this could exemplify the relation between the central and regional government, but other people argue that the Regional People’s Assembly which was a combination of different opinions, orientations and allegiances was behind the failure of Dereig’s government. The regional government in Darfur was to pave the way for the government by strengthening its social ties and economic capabilities. The Zaghawa activated the practice of smuggling of arms between Sudan, Chad and Libya since they have origins in these three countries.¹ The Maheria (North Rizaiqat) adopted armed robbery as a means of wealth accumulation. The Fur tended to use arms defending themselves and their wealth,² Naturally this race for wealth and tribal affiliation would lead to tribal conflicts and this what has exactly happened in the region.

¹ Internal Security Archives (Ministry of Interiors).
² Ibid.
CHAPTER 2

THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF DARFUR REGION

Armed Robbery:

Although the major security problems resulted from regional conflicts, the civil war in Chad and the Chadian-Libyan conflict, there were also some internal contributions to this security problems such as the ethnic diversity and the differences amongst the tribes of the region especially those of Chadian origin who had been accused of helping the foreign military groups in their criminal activities.

The basic security problem was armed robbery. Dr. Abd El Nabi Ahmed former governor of the region declared that armed robbery phenomenon was not a native one. It has not existed in the region before the outbreak of the civil war in Chad, but there were certain forms of armed conflict amongst the different tribal groups in the region as a matter of tribal and customary habits. So, many tribes knew how to use arms before the civil war of Chad.1

In the eyes of the law, however, it does not make any difference whether robbery is for tribal or any other reasons since the legal sanctions are the same. The Criminal Law did not define armed robbery as a particular crime, but the various circumstances of committing robbery or brigandage were prescribed and penalized according to law. Robbery is defined as comprising theft or extortion. According to section 332 of the Penal Code Act 1974; theft or in committing the theft or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender for that end voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint.2

The second case of robbery is that when extortion is robbery. The same mentioned above section of the Act defines this case as:

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"Extortion" is 'robbery' if the offender at the time of committing the extortion is in the presence of the person put in fear and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or to some other persons and by so putting in fear includes the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted. "As an explanation for this situation, the offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant death; or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint.1

Brigandage is a specific crime of robbery because the number of offenders is five or more. If the number of offenders is less than five the crime is considered as robbery. Section 333 of the Penal Code 1974 indicated that:

"When five or more persons jointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery or where the number of persons jointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt amount to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding is said to commit brigandage".2

The voluntary causing of hurt in committing robbery, the brigandage with murder and the robbery or brigandage with attempt to cause death or grieve hurt are illegal acts constituting crimes according to the 1974 Act. Also the attempt and the preparation to commit brigandage are crimes in the eyes of the law. Furthermore, whoever belongs to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of committing brigandage, this belonging is considered as a crime, as well as the assembling for the purpose of committing brigandage.

The criminal law of 1983 "Sharia Laws" implied the same features of the different forms of robbery and brigandage, but these features were incorporated in section 336 that deals with the "Haraaba" which is derived from a certain verse of

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2. Sudan Penal Code 1974. (It has been substituted by the Penal Code of 1983).
the Holy Koran. From a legal view point 'Haraaka' is similar to brigandage, therefore, to armed robbery when it is committed by five or more persons carrying arms. However, the difference is that the "Haraaka" offender is subject to punishments with execution, crucifixion, cross amputation or exile, while the punishments in 1974 Act range from two to fourteen years except in the case of brigandage with murder where the punishment is death.

Anyhow the outcome of this analysis is that armed robbery as a specific crime was not provisioned for in the criminal law, therefore, every case should be dealt with according to its legal description. Finally, we can clearly observe that the term "armed robbery" tends to emphasize the nature of the robbery and brigandage especially when arms are used, rather than finding a new description to them. The criminal law made all the necessary measures for combatting and punishing robbery and brigandage, but armed robbery as a phenomenon affecting the security of the region requires the collaboration of many different authorities in order to enforce extra measures.

As we can observe that those robberies due to tribal habits, which were often done for gaining cattle or as proof of manhood were defined according to law as robbery crimes whatever the motives were.

However, after the escalation of the civil war in Chad, the context is totally different. Armed robbery increased and became a phenomenon seriously affecting the security of the region particularly since the late 1970's and early 1980's. Dr. Ali H. Tag Eldin former member of the Head of State stated in Al-ayam daily that, there were armed groups attacking both the Sudanese and Chadian citizens in the border villages and the Chadian government is accusing the Islamic Legion of Libya, of these armed robbery activities hence accusing the Sudan of being a sanctuary for these forces.  

Armed Robbery in South Darfur :-

Most basically, armed groups came from north Darfur to commit robberies in south Darfur. The southern province of the region is richer in both animal wealth and agriculture. Other reasons behind the spread of armed robbery in the south are the tribal armed forces of the Dinka, Rizigaat and Miseria infiltrating the area of Bahr El Arab and causing many conflicts. The Rizigaat and Miseria formed a coalition to confront the Dinka who were accused by the two tribes of robbing their cattle. They also claimed that the arms of the Dinka were preserved since the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 as private ownership.¹

Groups Involved in Armed Robbery :-

1. Bediyat Tribes :-

This tribe is of a Chadian origin. It inhabits the north-western sector of the Sudanese borders and it was originally armed by the previous Chadian President Francois Tombalbaye in order to assist him in the elimination of his opposition, the FRÖLINAT which was lead by Hissene Habré in the late sixties and early seventies.² The apparent tradition of this tribe is that young men gain respect of the tribe by committing various forms of robberies and owning good types of arms.³ This practice has apparently become some sort of a ritual of initiation to manhood.

2. Maheria Tribe (North Rizigaat):-

This is a nomadic tribe. It constantly tended to clash with small settled tribes who mainly depended on agriculture. These small tribes were the victims of armed robberies of the Maheria whose tribesmen are well equipped with modern arms. The purpose of armed robbery stimulated other tribes thus it increased and spread throughout the whole region especially the border villages and the roads linking the region’s towns.

². Interior Security Department Archives (Ministry of Interior) (After the abolition of State security authority in 1985, many security units and departments emerged dividing the State security archives and records according to their jurisdiction).
³. Ibid.

-19-
It is important to realize that during the transitional period after the April 1985 Uprising in Sudan, the quantity and quality of arms circulating among the tribes of the west of Sudan, greatly increased. Although there was no material evidence indicating a deliberate government policy to arm the tribes of the region, people regard the proliferation of arms as a result of "arming the tribes". This tended to help the spread of armed robbery in Darfur region. However, those were parts of the internal factors of armed robbery, but the most important factor was an external one which was the presence of foreign military factions in the region.

Main Factors in the Spread of Armed Robbery :

The local authorities failed to contain the problem of armed robbery in the region. This failure can be attributed to the following factors:

1. Police stations are often located far from the areas where armed robbery occurs hence investigation procedures are very slow.
2. The lack of modern crime prevention methods, poor facilities and equipments of the local police force.
3. The lack of special forces to combat armed robbery since the available forces are already engaged in other types of police activities.
4. The local police force has received traditional training while the armed robbery groups are highly trained in the use of arms and military tactics since they were part of the foreign military factions.
5. Moreover, the armed groups posses modern weapons which are not available to the police forces or the joint forces (Army and Police Forces). The most remarkable significance in this respect is manifested in the memorandum raised to the Minister of Interior by the Police Director General: That "Policemen in Darfur are frustrated and have lost confidence in themselves because of the government failure to secure the facilities needed to perform their duties in defending the people. Any attempt to do that in the light of lack of facilities is suicidal".

1. Memorandum of Police Director General Faisal M. Khalil to Minister of Interior on 28th July 1986 (Ministry of Interior).
6. Some local tribes of Chadian origin tended to cooperate and protect the armed groups in case of police raids.

Other Factors:

1. The high poverty rate in the region made some tribal groups turn to committing crimes as a means of livelihood.
2. The low level of education made some people easily swayed to commit crimes.
3. The migration from small villages to urban areas due to economic reasons and also due to drought and desertification, has reduced the number of youth who might have been able to confront armed groups.
4. The punishments imposed by law for committing armed robbery are not severe enough to deter people from such crimes.

However, the foreign forces presence in Darfur, the situation of the region as a battle ground for the regional conflicts; the Chadian civil war, the Chadian-Libyan dispute and the movements of the Libyan supported forces, all these factors constitute issues which should be investigated if the current drift into violence and the break up of law and order are to be halted.

Statistics of the Armed Robbery:

The Table of the armed robbery crimes in Darfur region (Table 2) contains the total number of armed robberies during the years 1983-1988. We observe that there is an obvious increase in most of the table columns. In comparison between the reported incidents in 1983 and 1988 the figures are almost doubled; they were 109 in 1983, but reached 202 in 1988. There was also an increase in the number of injured people. The most important thing to be observed is the great increase in stolen property especially camels. Compared with 250 stolen camels in 1983 they were increasing respectively
until they reached 5903 in 1988. The table also shows that the numbers of dead persons in 1988 is unprecedented. The increase in the rate of crimes and injured and killed persons was significantly great. Table 2 shows that the rate of armed robbery is annually increasing up to 1988. However it could be argued that any support given to the police forces in the region and the improvement of their working and living conditions may improve combating armed robbery crimes. Another observation is that the increase in armed robbery crimes from 1983 to 1988 has also been characterized by changes in the nature of the crimes committed which are different from the traditional crimes in the region and has assumed an alien nature. Some cases might illustrate this new development in the nature of crimes and their impact on the traditional way of life. 1 On the 18th of August 1987 a group of 33 persons including one woman was captured after confrontation with a Nyalap police force composed of 9 officers and 80 soldiers. During this fierce confrontation the police seargent Adam Ishag was killed and four other policemen were seriously injured. A variety of highly sophisticated weapons and machine-guns were found in the possession of this gang. The gang was continuously attacking the rural districts of Khor Laota, Khazzen Gedeid and Tabaldat Um Gad in the suburbs of Nyalap. This incident significantly indicated the nature of armed conflict in the area: Firstly, it was the first time a woman is seen participating actively as a member of an armed robbery group. Secondly armed robbery groups which used to avoid facing the police forces were confronting it in this case.

According to a senior police source, 2 armed robbery in the region has had a strong impact on agricultural projects since these projects depended on camels in the agricultural operations due to the nature of the land. However, the possession of camels became a target for the armed robbery hence the farmers began to get rid of their camels. The loss endured by the farmers is estimated to be 12 million pounds beside 950 of the farmers and the agricultural workers were killed. The type of crime and the increasing activity

1. These incidents have been quoted from south Darfur police head quarters files during my field visit to the area in Sep. 1988 and March 1989.
2. Brigadier Eltayeb Abdul Rahman Mukhtar, Director of South Darfur Police.
of the armed bandits might even have seriously affected the judicial system, thus tending to encourage crime rather than curbing it as Brigadier Mukhtar pointed out. The neutrality of the judiciary was in doubt among the people of the region because of the lenient punishments for groups charged with armed robberies. The judges themselves explained that insufficient evidence was often introduced to courts. It is believed among some of the region’s citizens that the judiciary was influenced by the Zaghawa tribe, as Brigadier Mukhtar also argued, due to their financial position in the region especially their charity project of 30 million pounds which is directed to serve and protect the interests of the Zaghawa tribesmen. The important aspect of the bias of the judiciary, as police source argued, was illustrated in the Nyala riot which was due to rising prices and increasing rate of armed robbery when the only government building to be burned down was the judiciary building.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Reported Incidents</th>
<th>No. of Killed People</th>
<th>No. of Injured People</th>
<th>Total of Robberies</th>
<th>Cash Money</th>
<th>No. of Recovered Cash</th>
<th>Important Notice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>43063000</td>
<td>-313,392,000</td>
<td>The recovered amounts of money include what has been recovered from armed robberies plus other crimes such as normal thefts, betrayals, criminal, ownership.....etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>83719000</td>
<td>260,473,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>260,925000</td>
<td>1,598,583,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1463</td>
<td>79950150</td>
<td>1,372,267,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1759</td>
<td>241097</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>3903</td>
<td>457245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>10,209</td>
<td>234,235,342</td>
<td>3,236,313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHEEP ROBBERIES
(1983 - 1988)

NUMBERS OF SHEEP

YEARS

-26-
KILLED PEOPLE

(1983 - 1988)

NUMBER OF KILLED PEOPLE

YEARS

-27-
CAMELS ROBBERIES
(1983 - 1988)

NUMBER OF CAMELS
(THOUSANDS)
COWS ROBBERIES
(1983 - 1988)

NUMBERS OF COWS

YEARS
RECOVERED CASH MONEY
(1983 - 1987)

AMOUNT RECOVERED (IN L.S.)
MILLIONS

YEARS

1.2
1.4
1.6
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
During October 1987 the house of the Fur Shertaye (Tribal Chief) Adam Ahmedaye was attacked by a group of 50 persons. They killed his wife and son since he was not in the house during the attack. This attack was a result of an alleged accusation that the Shertaye was cooperating with the authorities in identifying elements of Chadian origin believed to be involved in armed robbery. The attack was a clear act of personal vendetta, and was carried out by a force of 50 persons with modern weapons.  

In October 1987 an armed group of 5 members attacked the police station of Shangel Tobaya, 50Km south of El Fasher. During the attack there was only one policeman who was killed and all the weapons of the police station were taken by the gang. On the 17th of October 1987, some armed forces of Bedayat tribe killed 17 persons and burned 37 houses in Fann village near Kuma. The vice-Governor of Darfur argued that "This accident was a result of the Chadian war."  

The situation of the security crimes cannot be viewed separately from the situation of the police force in the region. The police force in Darfur was not sufficient for combating the various activities of armed robbery. The region is quite vast without being linked with any sort of modern system of communications. The police headquarters of Darfur distributed the available force in the most important areas of the region while other areas were still in need of being supplied with police forces.

In North Darfur province the distribution of the police force, until 1988, is indicated in the following (Table 3):

Table 3 illustrates the distribution of the permanent and temporary police divisions and stations in North Darfur. There is no fixed administrative standard for the figures of the working policemen in these divisions and stations, but, generally the division is consisted of 300 - 500 policemen, the station is consisted of 10 - 20 policemen, while the temporary station, especially in Darfur, is

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1. Al-Ayan (Khartoum 12th October 987).
2. Ibid
consisted of 2,500 policemen. We observed that only 6 divisions were found in north Darfur in addition to 38 permanent stations and 28 temporary ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNS</th>
<th>NO. OF POLICE DIVISIONS</th>
<th>PERMANENT STATIONS</th>
<th>TEMPORARY STATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. El Fasher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. El Geneina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Karum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Um Kaddada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Medni</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In south Darfur the distribution was as follows (Table 4):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNS</th>
<th>NO. OF POLICE DIVISIONS</th>
<th>PERMANENT STATIONS</th>
<th>TEMPORARY STATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nyala</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Zalingei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Garsola</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. El Djen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. El Algham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The security crisis of the region at last urged both the central and regional governments to hold a conference to discuss the problem and to try to find solutions.
Darfur Regional Security Conference was held in El Fasher in the beginning of 1988.

**Darfur Regional Security Conference:**

The conference was held on the 5th of January 1988 in El Fasher (the capital of the region) to discuss the deteriorating security situation. A member of the former council of state and the former Prime Minister attended the conference accompanied by former ministers of Energy, Health, Industry, Finance, Education, Social Welfare and Culture & Information as well as the former General Commander of the army and the Director General of the police. Other participants were from the regional government and some intellectuals from the region. The former Prime Minister addressed the conference and declared that he was looking forward to the conference making suggestions on how the government should tackle the security problems in the region.

The conference was divided into three committees to discuss the following matters:

1. Tribal or native administration with the view of reintroducing the native administration system in the region.
2. The armed robbery phenomenon that had spread throughout the region and the means of combating it.
3. The development of the natural resources of the region.

Dr. Ali H. Tag El Din, member of the former council of the head of state argued that the security of Darfur could not be viewed in isolation of the security of the whole country; it was a problem to be tackled with due care and seriousness. He claimed that there were internal factors behind the spread of armed robbery; namely the drought and desertification and the abolishment of native administration without any sort of viable alternative. There were also external factors resulting from regional conflicts. He emphasised that the Sudanese foreign policy towards neighbouring countries was based on good neighbourliness.
In his paper at the conference Dr. Abdel Nabi A. Ahmed the former governor of the region, stated that the region has to be supplied with modern telecommunications so as to facilitate security services among the whole region.

The paper of the commissioner for refugees dealt with the problems of the refugees in the region, and their impact on the security and observed that there was an intelligence network being used by the Chadian refugees which should be controlled by the security units of the region.

The paper of the security authorities argued that the political and economic activities of the Chadian elements in Darfur such as the Zaghawa tribe, in addition to the presence of the Libyan and Libyan supported troops has contributed to the state of insecurity in the region and originated a strong Chadian intelligence activity which has been followed later by an equivalent Chadian military presence so as to counter act the Libyan movements in the bordering areas.

The conference has come to a failure one year later. None of its recommendations or resolutions were evidently seen to be emphasizing stability or state of security in the region. The data shown in table 2 for the years 1987-88 could simply justify this argument, for the apparent increase in most of the table figures regarding reported armed robbery incidents, killed people, injured people, stolen property.

The failure of the conference, thus, could be attributed to the lack of seriousness of both the central and local authorities towards solving the region's long-standing problems in the hot atmosphere of many divisive elements of poverty, ethnic diversity, border infiltration and the continuity of both the Chadian strife and the Chadian-Libyan conflict as too strong elements for the conference to solve.

CHAPTER 3

TRIBAL RELATIONS IN DARFUR

Sudan, like many of the tribal societies in Africa faced the problem of tribalism which was never solved. "In the International Encyclopedia of Social Science (168 Vo. 16, p. 146) the word tribe is taken to denote a primary aggregate of people living in a primitive or barbarous condition under a headman or chief. 1 Certain modifications should be made and some variables should be introduced so as to make such a definition hold for certain societies, and the aspects like kinship, language and territorial boundaries are some of these variables. 2 In the case of Darfur tribal structure, the paradox is that the region is a big primary aggregate comprising different tribes which are motivated by different aspirations, orientations and private interests. Tribalism as we shall see in this study, stands as one of the most important motors of conflict in Darfur region to the extent that tribal conflicts became the most prevalent phenomenon affecting the security of the region.

The term "tribalism" conjures up an image of the evil effects of colonial heritage which the African leaders seek to avoid. It is a term fraught with emotion, evoking the Balkan model of ethnic fragmentation and consequent dependence upon external forces and powers which ultimately embroiled the great powers in global wars. 3

Political and economic dependence through such "balkanisation" is the greatest fear of African leaderships. For them balkanisation is a continuation of the colonial policy of "divide and rule" through which colonial powers achieved its political and economic goals in Africa.

Only through, unity and territorial integrity, can African states
1. Sudan Journal of Economic & Social Studies. Vol.2 No.1 1977, an article on "Tribal Elite".
escape the neocolonial net and achieve parity of status with their European mentors. 1

For a long time, there were conflicts between the sedentary and nomadic tribes over grazing and water sources, but these conflicts were always containable. “Deiya” and compensations were paid for dead and injured persons of the conflicting tribes every season without escalating the conflict. Tribal peace conferences were held to settle this type of conflict. The most apparent manifestation for the peaceful living of the different tribes of the region was shown in their loyalty to the Fur rule of Ali Dinar. His army commanders were from various different tribes; the Zaghawa, the Mesekea, the Dadunga, the Bani Halba etc. Most of the region’s tribes were coexisting peacefully since that time except those minor frictions over water and cultivated land.

The Regional Government Act of 1980 has been perceived by the people of the region as a means by which the region was to be governed by its own people. In a multi-tribal region like Darfur, this perception has originated a great deal of conflicts among the settled and sedentary tribes. Major tribes have had deep conflicts between each other which were different from the traditional ones. The conflicts this time were affected by political ambition; each tribe wanted to have a share in the ruling of the region. The conflicts were largely over the area of the tribe; the settled tribes wanted to increase its area while the sedentary tribes aimed for areas to settle in: the Rizaigat and the Fur, the Gimir and the Fallata, the Bani Halba and the Gimir etc. The most prevalent conflict was that of the Fur and the Arabs. The Arabs here refers to an aggregation of many tribes of Arab origin such as the Bani Hatta, Rizaigat, Malaysia, Habbanit, Tanimba etc.

The Fur who were the original inhabitants of the region, were known as peaceful sedentary groups scattering in many areas of the region but particularly dwelling the area of Jebel Marra. They depend on vegetables and fruits agriculture on and around the Jebel. The new tendency of the Arab and the non-Arab tribes to settle in the Fur land urged the Fur to carry up arms to defend their land. Historically, they were peaceful people who were not used to carrying arms, but in order to face the Arabs who were already well:

trained in the use of arms, they established their own militia. Nevertheless, the Fur suffered more casualties because they did not come yet to the standard of the Arabs training and efficiency. We shall see later how much they suffered from tribal conflicts.

Many questions may arise about the benefit of these conflicts, and what was the role of the regional government towards ending them? Who is behind arming the tribes of the region? All these are questions we shall attempt to find answers for.

From another angle, the tribal conflicts in Darfur have resulted from the struggle for power. This power was essentially needed for securing their basic needs. Since these needs became very rare unless people aggregate and settle, it would not be easy for them to be offered services or needs. Co-operative societies would only recognize people settled in rural towns and villages in the process of food stuff and basic needs supply. This competition arouse conflicts between many tribes: between the Taakisha and the Salamat in Rahaid El Birdi, the Maheria and Bani Halba in the area where the Bani Halba settled (in south Darfur), the Fallata and Gimir in Katera, and the Dinka and Rizaigut in the bordering area between South Darfur and Baahr El Ghazal province.

Examples For The Tribal Conflicts:

1. The Taakisha and The Salamat:

The core of this conflict was the demand of the Salamat to separate from the Taakisha administration. Though they lived in the same area with the Taakisha (Dar Taakisha), they did not regard the Taakisha Nazir. Fearing the establishment of separate tribal entity, the Taakisha did not agree to the Salamat demand. Thus, the conflict between them emerged causing many casualties from both sides. At last the conflict was solved during the period of Dereig as Governor. However, the Salamat were given "Omooda" (less than Nazira) and El Bashir Musa Abdel Malek became the Salamat Omda. Recently, the Salamat resorted to increase their numbers by urging their tribesmen to come from Chad and resettle in Darfur so as to gain many Omoodas.
accompany the Nuerin in their trips which were primarily for local authorities. These tracks are called the Marnhil.

3. The Fallata and The Gimir:
The Fallata live in the rural areas of Tulus in south Darfur while the Gimir live in the area of Kateela which is neighbouring Tulus. During Nimiri’s ruling period a redistribution for the Rural Councils was made, thus conflicts between the two neighbouring tribes emerged. That redistribution was perceived by the two tribes as giving the right for both of them to move their cattle everywhere within the area, while in the past, it was traditionally recognized that the Fallata were within the area of Tulus and the Gimir within the area of Kateela. Although conflict resolution was reached, both tribes lost men and property as a result of this conflict.

4. The Dinka and the Rizaigat:

The long standing conflicts between the Dinka and the Rizaigat were over water and grazing because the Rizaigat seasonally advance towards the Dinka lands in Bahr El Ghazal province particularly at the end of the rainy season. This has become a major source of friction. The infiltration of arms in the hands of the Rizaigat was a product of the Chadian problem while the emergence of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA) in 1983 resulted in the influx of arms in the hands of the Dinka. The rebel movement in the south became a new element in the escalation of the conflicts between the two tribes because the Rizaigat regarded the whole Dinka tribesmen as rebels since John Garang (SPLM’s leader) is a Dinka. Accordingly, they established their own military equipped with modern arms. Safaha area in the far south of Darfur became a tension area constantly bothering the security authorities.
The acceleration of tension reached a very catastrophic extent in March 1987 when several hundreds of the displaced Dinka were burned to death by the Rizaiqat at El Diel in south Darfur. This incident took place in the wake of several joint raids of the army and the Rizaiqat in Safala. Tens of Rizaiqat were killed. A ceremony held in the church of the Dinka in El Diel coincided with the Safala incident and the Rizaiqat perceived this ceremony as a celebration for the death of their tribe members. The aggrieved Rizaiqat of El Diel assembled and attacked the Dinka in the railway station where they had been gathered for transportation to Nyala. The report of south Darfur police headquarters mentioned that the figure of the victims was 182 while many eye witnesses who refused to mention their names declared that the victims were approximately ranging from 500 to 700.1 A fact finding committee was established but no further steps were made.2

The Conflict Between The Arabs and Fur :-

The new trend in the conflict between the Arabs and Fur has emerged in the beginning of 1988 as a phenomenon which is completely different from the traditional conflicts of the past.

Many reported incidents corroborate this assumption. In a report written by an officer from Darfur security unit dated 16th March 1988 about his tour around Jebel Marra area, he mentioned that many Fur villages have been burned in Nertiti, Gol, Garsila and Mily in south Darfur by the Arabs.3 The Arabs who carried out those raids are different kinds from the Maheria tribe which originally came from Chad. The report observed that the Arabs have settled in these areas for more than twenty years in a peaceful manner, but this attitude has been changed lately. Many arms from Ibn Omer forces (a Chadian opposition military faction) have been found in their hands. The most surprising revelation of this report

1. South Darfur Police Headquarter's archives.
2. This incident received international attention when two University of Khartoum lecturers published a controversial account of the massacre. See Ushar and S. Baldo.
3. Darfur Security Unit (Internal Security Department), Ministry of Interior.
was a letter found in one of the Arab villages which was about to be sent to their people in Libya declaring that war has begun between them and the Fur and urging their people in Libya to come and join them. Finally the report observed that the Fur were complaining from organized infiltration of arms to the hands of the Arabs while there was no presence of police forces in the conflict areas.¹

This serious report reflects obviously the catastrophic situation in the Fur areas and how they have been subject of regular raids by the Arabs. They conceived this matter as an organized attempt for restructuring the economic and social life of the region. This can be understood as a means for change of the classic powers governing the region or as serving foreign strategy supporting Arab tribes for dominance over the region, or for both purposes. One of the most serious implications of this situation is the emergence of the Fur militia on the conflict theatre as a reaction for the continuous attacks on the Fur. No doubt this will deepen the conflict rather than providing a solution for it. Furthermore, it will open the door for more politicization of the conflict as being a tool for serving internal and external policies.

On my visit to the region in March 1989, I found that a few tribes of Arab origin were in conflict with the Fur; the Rizalgar, the Maheria and part of the Bani Halba, Hotia, Salamat and Taalba tribes in south Darfur. There were some tribes which benefited from this situation by selling arms and training for all conflicting parties, who were the Zaghawa and the Badis. Under such circumstance, there was no sign that war would come to an end. As Sudan Times daily reported, a leaflet has been distributed in Khartoum by a clandestine youth group called “Darfur Rescue Front” urging the Fur “wherever they are” to rise up and "liberate" their region.² The Newspaper also reported that the Rizalgar accused the former governor of Darfur Ahmed Ibrahim Dereig - a Fur - of being behind the unrest, but Dereig who left the Sudan in 1984 denied this allegation.³

The Fur really suffered from these attacks which were evidently

¹ Darfur Security Unit (Internal Security Department), (Ministry of Interior).
² Sudan Times daily (Khartoum), issue No. 675, 11/12/1988.
³ Ibid.
directed towards them. The difficulty in tracing and capturing the offenders was that they masked their faces so as not to be identified by any witnesses, then hid their arms after committing crimes. Moreover, reporting the crime to the competent authorities was often done after a sufficient time has passed and therefore enabled the offenders to escape from the scene of the crime. Generally the following cases could throw more light on the situation in Darfur region.

On the 27th of August 1988, the Arabs attacked several villages south west of Kas in south Darfur, killing ten of the Fur, robbing cash money amounting to twelve thousand pounds and other personal effects and burning eighteen huts.

In the village of Arata south west of Nyala, a clash took place between the Fur and some of the Arabs from the Salamat and Bani Halba tribes on the 9th of November 1988. Over forty persons were killed from both parties, huts were burned and also the school and the dispensary of the village. More than two thousands of cattle and sheep were robbed by the Arabs. The case was reported at Ed El Ghanaum police station, but as a matter of investigations no further steps were made due to the above mentioned reasons. The continuous decrease of the police forces due to the military operations in the region has enhanced the increase of illegal activities, especially in Jebel Marra areas, the traditional residence of the Fur tribe. The advanced armament of the military groups contributed to the army and police forces failure in controlling security in the area. On January 31st 1989, the officer in charge of Kas police division submitted a report to his headquarters in Nyala declaring that a clash took place in Tauruma area of Jebel Marra between a joint force of army and police comprising fifteen soldiers and an armed group of eight persons. Thirteen soldiers were killed; twelve army soldiers and one policeman. The two Landcruisers of the joint force were destroyed and arms were captured. There were no more cars at Kas police station to send reinforcements to the battle ground, therefore, there was no hope of catching any of the bandits. The report mentioned that one of the surviving soldiers said that the gang members were dressed in Chadian army uniform. However, this fact may indicate the involvement of the Chadian army in illegal activities in the region, or the involvement of any other
group related to the Chadian army. On the other hand, in the absence of concrete evidence, the uniforms could also have been stolen, captured or bought from the Chadians. The series of burning and killing among the Fur villages and people seem to continue. On February 13th 1989, the director of South Darfur police headquarters informed the region’s police headquarters that an armed group of ten persons dressed in black uniforms ambushed a commercial convoy north east of Nertity in the outskirts of Zahangi. They stopped four lorries and killed the passengers then burned them and their belongings inside the lorries. The casualties were forty men and women and the material losses were estimated at over a million pounds. This incident caused anger and bitterness among the Fur because the deceased were Fur. Since the offenders were riding canoes all efforts which were made for tracing them failed.

As a consequence of these continuous conflicts, the Fur began to change the situation from waiting for the Arabs attacks to initiating raids over the Arab villages near Jebel Marra area.

However it is well known to the region’s people that the tribal conflicts would lead to more deterioration of the security situation. Many of the people I met in the region agreed upon the serious situation which resulted from these conflicts. Abbas El Amin, a lawyer in Nyala regarded the central government as responsible for this deterioration since it did not pay attention to the region’s problems earlier. Furthermore he observed that although the region comprises many tribes, ethnicity did not appear as a phenomenon affecting national unity until recently. Ethnicity emerged as a result of the contradicting interests of the diverse tribes in the region. Hassan Omer, who is also a lawyer in Nyala argued that the lapse of the state sovereignty was the reason for all the security crises in the region. Adam Kabor, an official of the West Savannah Development Corporation argued that certain Sudanese political parties officially acknowledged tribalism in their partisan maneuver among the people of the region therefore tribal conflicts were emphasised.

The rising voices of the region’s people were only belatedly listened to. Many submissions were raised in the latest Constituent
Assembly and eventually a ministerial committee was established to speed up the process of finding a solution for the security problems of the region. During my visits to the region some accusations of partisan involvement in Darfur tribal conflicts were voiced. However, no material evidence could be found, but it was not difficult to observe the partisan struggle of both the abolished Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the region. The region is traditionally perceived as Umma sphere of influence, but the recent problems opened the door for the DUP to search for influence too. This tended to complicate the situation rather than solve it, and the ministerial committee was not believed to be able to solve the problems of the region. Nevertheless, the formation of the investigation committee for the tribal conflicts in Jebel Marra was the most successful step in solving the region's crisis. The committee worked very hard since the beginning of 1988, listening to the conflicting tribes and evaluating the testimonies and evidences introduced. After more than one year of continuous work a tribal reconciliation conference was held on the 15th of April 1989. The conflicting tribal representatives (227 from the Arabs and 109 from the Fur) discussed their problems and the role of the central and local authorities. Other participants were from the former native administration figures from Blue Nile and Kordofan provinces and from Khartoum. Many committees were established from within the conference; a committee for assessment of the losses resulting from conflicts, another committee for administrative and security affairs, the third was for grazing lands and Marahil (cattle tracks) and the fourth was for compensations. The conference discussed the new trend of some of the Arab tribes to resettle in areas which were not theirs. The accusations of the partisan involvement was also discussed in the same manner. At last the conference ended its sessions on the 8th of July 1989 and the final communiqué comprised specific resolutions and recommendations as follows:

A/ The Resolutions:

1. The submission of the losses assessment committee’s recommendations to the political leadership.
2. The committee of administrative and security affairs recommended the following measures:
   a) The abolition of the Arabs and Fur militias and any other tribal military organizations.
   b) Deportation of all aliens staying illegally in the area.
   c) Facilitation of the agreed upon cattle tracks (Marabil) under suitable security measures.
   d) Eviction of any groups occupying villages or farms and resettlement of the original inhabitants and farm owners.
   e) Abolition of any illegal organizations in the region.
   f) Revision of the voluntary organizations activities.
   g) Enforcement of laws punishing burning of grazing lands, closing cattle tracks and cutting trees.
   h) In case of violating this agreement the government and the security authorities would maintain the necessary measures against the persons or groups doing so.
   i) Prohibition of grazing in the villages unless an agreement over that happens in accordance with local custom.

B. The Recommendations:

1. The government should draft a co-existence charter for the region's tribes.
2. The Ajaweed council (mediators) would request the competent authorities to release both the accused and convicted persons in tribal conflicts.
3. The government should establish more police stations in the region equipped with modern facilities.
4. Assignment of judicial authority to native administration figures.
5. Appealing to the judiciary in the region to postpone tribal conflict trials until the end of the tribal reconciliation conference.
6. Increasing the number of judges in the region.
7. The continuity of the Fur administration.
8. The establishment of new administrations.
9. Both parties (Arabs and Fur) should cease criminal activities.
10. Without offending neutrality of the security authorities, the conference recommended the increase of penalties for tribal conflict offenders.

11. Imposing tough measures over public servants who get involved in sedition between conflicting parties.

The conference ended its sessions on the 8th of July 1989 and the recommendations were submitted to the National Salvation Council President and Prime Minister who issued, according to the letter of the Presidency Affairs Minister dated on the 22nd July 1989, the following resolutions:

1. The government should pay one third of the total losses expense which amounted to 11 million pounds.

2. Appointment of 30 guards equipped with modern weapons, for native administration Nazirs.

3. speeding up steps for assigning judicial authority to native administration elements.

4. Drilling wells in the recommended areas in Darfur region.

5. Revision of the previous studies for resettlement of the nomads on short, middle and long terms.

6. Maintaining all possible procedures for implementation of the conference resolutions on the regional level.

Furthermore, a follow-up committee was agreed upon for following the practical procedures to enhance the success of the conference resolutions and recommendations.

-47-
Chad is one of the least developed countries of the African continent with an area of 1,284,000 square kilometers, surrounded by six countries: Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, Central African Republic, Cameroon and Libya. The country, made up of vast stretches of desert and with no access to the sea, provides a classic case of economic underdevelopment.

Chad's total population was relatively small compared with its land area; estimated at 5,168,000 in 1985. The population is concentrated in the southern part of the country. The level of literacy was very low; it was almost confined to the Christian southerners whom France depended on in its administration of the country during the colonial period. Chad was a French colony during the period of 1900-1960.

Western type of education was recognized by the French administration as one of the important agents for change. The French educational policy was geared to the formation of an administrative elite, but the policy discriminated against the northerners. The southerners adopted Christianity and dominated high level posts of the state after independence while at the same time the Muslim tribes rejected Christian religion and education. The North was predominantly Muslim while the South was Christian. Most of the northern tribes were pastoralists. Arabic was the language of trade and it has dominated local languages through its use by tribes of Arab origin. (The local languages were the Xoromba, Ouedi, Teda, Daza, Djonkor.) Ethnic differences are deeply rooted and unity is far from being realized.

* The last census of Chad's population in 1989, as estimated by Ashag Alawat newspaper of 5th December 1990 was 5,714,000.


3. Ibid, p. 128.
The south was more heavily populated in a smaller area and its inhabitants are settled farmers.

The French discriminated in the policy between the south and north of Chad, between non-Muslims and Muslims, the rich minority and the poor majority. These policies resulted in a continuous conflict among the Chadians since the independence of Chad. The national regimes which came after independence, especially the regime of François Tombalbaye failed to settle this conflict. Tombalbaye ignored the rights and demands of the northern majority and rested the political and economic powers in the hands of the southern minority.

The power struggle triggered off rebellion amongst the northern tribes. The "Front de la Libération Nationale du Chad" (FROLINAT) was formed in Sudan in 1966. The regime's reaction towards this movement was extremely oppressive and as a result the rebellion was widespread throughout the Chadian region. Moreover, the Libyan intervention in Chad in 1973 and the occupation of the Aozou strip was also an element of escalation.

Economically and socially Chad was linked, for centuries, to the power centres of Libya 1, but the Libyans were accused by Chad of complicity in the internal affairs and they always claimed to have sovereignty over the Aozou strip; a region of 14,000 square kilometers in the extreme north of Chad beyond the Tibesti mountains, believed to be rich in uranium, petroleum and manganese. It was occupied by Libya in 1973 and the Libyan claim on Aozou was by virtue of a treaty signed between France and Italy in 1935 but was not ratified by the French parliament. It was not considered also due to the peace treaty of 1947. The Libyan Intervention in Chad was existing in different forms. It is one of the main sources of the civil war there, therefore its implication on the security crisis of Darfur is manifested in the splinter groups roaming the region of Darfur.

11th 1960. During this period there were many national governments which have failed to emphasise national unity of the country because of the French domination over the political life in Chad and the long period of colonisation which negatively affected the Chadian political movement negatively. There were many political parties in Chad which were: 2

1- The Social Chadian Movement (AST) which was established in 1945 by Arabi El Goni.
2- The Progressive Chadian Party (PPT) established in 1947 by Gabriel Lizzite (a Wes: Indian of French nationality living in Chad).
3- Independent Democratic Union of Chad (UDIT) established in 1952 by Jan Paist.
4- The African Social Movement (MSA) established in 1953 by Ahmed Gallam Allai.
5- The Independent Rural Chadian Alliance (GIRT) established in 1958 by Sahofba.

The promulgation of the French constitutional law originated the Organisation of the French African League and also gave rise to the self government of Chad. The struggle of the national political factions for establishing an adequate type of government passed through a very hard process because of the divirsed aspirations of the northern Muslims and the pro-French Christian southerners. Two themes were revolving at that time regarding the political future of the Franco-phone states which were the joining of the French African League or the ultimate independence without keeping relations with France. However, Chad opted for being inside the League as an independent state.

2. Ibid.
Chad passed through three stages for establishing its constitutional institutions: The temporary governments, the local legislative elections and the transitional governments. During this process four governments were established during a period not exceeding four months which came consecutively as follows: 1

2. The government of Saholba February 11th 1959.

In the general elections which took place after independence in November 1960, the majority voted for the pro-Arab and Muslim parties under the leadership of Ahmed Gulam Allah, 2 and when he formed his government the main objectives of that government was to establish strong ties with the Arab world. However, France was disturbed by this change and intervened. The national government was overthrown and Francois Tombalbaye became the President and Prime Minister of Chad.

At last Tombalbaye succeeded in eliminating his opponents benefiting from his political experience gained from his leader Lizzie who was later declared as person non grata while he was attending a conference in Israel in 1961. 3 This Tombalbaye presided over the first government after independence on the 11th of August 1960.

During the first five years of Tombalbaye regime, Chad witnessed a reasonable degree of political and economical stability. But the regime began to exert a certain policy against the wishes of the Muslim tribes of the north. The government decided to ban all political parties with the exception of "parties Progressive Tchadien" (PTT). 4 The establishment of the single political party was accepted in the south but in the north opposition aroused. Thus violence broke out in 1963 in the capital Forte Lamy (now N'djamena).

In 1964 Tombalbaye imposed a national tax so as to speed up the socio-economic development, but this tax placed extra burden on the poor peasants who were already suffering from taxes previously imposed.

This policy led to unrest in so many regions in 1965-66. The opposition from (FROLINAT), which was established in Nyala in south Darfur in 1966 by Ibrahim Abacha, was behind the expansion of the rebellion amongst the Chadians of the north. Due to the divisions within FROLINAT there were so many military factions which could be classified as follows:

1. The North Armed Forces (FAN) led by Habré.
2. The Chadian Armed forces (FAT) led by Kamougue.
3. The People's National Armed Forces (FAP) led by Goukouni.
5. The Volcano Forces led by Abdelaye Adam Damaa.
6. The Original FROLINAT led by Dr. Aba Siddig.
7. The Basic FROLINAT led by Hajjare Senoussi.
8. The Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR) led by Asyl Ahmed who was succeeded by Sheikh Ibn Omer.
9. The People's Liberation Front led by Mohamed Aba Saeed.
10. The Western Armed Forces (FAD) led by Misa Madafa.
11. The United Democratic Front (CDF) led by Fasho Balma.

The rebellion broke out once more in 1967 as the Salamat and finally the Toubous mutinied in Aozou in the Tibesti region. The situation was deteriorating and the regime could not succeed to bring stability of the country. The regime of Tombalbaye was overthrown after a military take-over in 1975 which was organized by young officers who accused Tombalbaye of pursuing disastrous economic policies and adopting oppressive measures against his potential opponents.

General Felix Malloum, who had been under detention since 1973 was released and became President of the Supreme Military Council. As a result of the reconciliation initiated by the new regime, several groups put down arms. However, there were some groups still causing trouble to the government of Malloum. Habre, the leader of FROLINAT was replaced by Goukouni, the son of the Derde, a customary chief among the Teda (known in Arabic as Go- naan) of the Toubou in the Tébisti. Habre formed the North Armed Forces (FAN) a new splinter of FROLINAT. Goukouni received support from Libya and France after the release of a French hostage who was captured by the rebels in North Chad in 1977. The Libyan aid enabled Goukouni to threaten the regime of Malloum by attacking many areas in Chad.

In 1978 an agreement was signed in Khartoum between President Malloum and Habre for securing a cease-fire and forming a government including FROLINAT, which had by that time resolved its internal differences under the leadership of Goukouni Ouedi. Eventually FROLINAT demanded the French troops withdraw from Chad which was not agreed upon by Malloum, thus the cease-fire was declared void by FROLINAT. France intervened to halt FROLINAT advance towards N'Djamena and all efforts for national unity were frustrated.

Many of the negotiations which were made were supported by Sudan, Libya and Niger and an agreement was reached by Malloum and Habre. Malloum remained President and Habre became Prime Minister, but they could not cooperate since Habre refused to integrate his forces (FAN) in the national army. The presence of both armies in the capital N'Djamena caused frequent confrontations. After an agreement signed between the commander of the French troops and Goukouni, the forces of the latter entered the capital and the situation of Malloum's government became precarious.

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3. The People's National Armed Forces (FAP) led by Goukouni.
5. The Volcano Forces led by Abdolaye Adam Danan.
6. The Original FROLINAT led by Dr. Abu Siddig.
7. The Basic FROLINAT led by Hadjaro Senouzi.
8. The Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR) led by Asyl Ahmed who was succeeded by Sheikh Idris Omer.
9. The People's Liberation Front led by Mohamed Aba Saced.
10. The Western Armed Forces (FAD) led by Musa Madeba.
11. The United Democratic Front (CND) led by Fasho Balam.

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¹ External Security Dept. Archives (Ministry of Interior).
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CHAPTER 6

The First and Second Transitional Governments (GUNT) in Chad

A conference was held in March 1979 attended by representatives from neighbouring countries: Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Sudan and four groups from the Chadian military factions; FAT (Maitoumi), FAP (Goukouni), FAN (Habre) and MPLT a splinter group from Goukouni's forces led by Abu Bakr A. Rahman.

They came to an agreement which resulted in the formation of a transitional government (GUNT). Five new factions led by Mohamed Abba, Ahmed Asyl, Abu Siddig, Abdolaye Adam Damun and Jadirou Senoussi tried to join the GUNT but they were refused by both Goukouni and Habre.\(^1\) Goukouni and Habre agreed with FAT represented by Lt. Colonel Abdel Gadir Kamougue (a southern military leader). The Presidency went to Ltol Mohamed Shawa (a member of the third army). Kamougue became vice-President but in practice the government was in the hands of Goukouni and Habre.

The first GUNT failed to solve the problems of Chad because the southerners were alleging that the role assigned to them was inferior.

In the second GUNT Goukouni was made President with three state ministers; Habre, Mohamed Abba and Asyl, but it was also a failure as the first.

Numerous events led to fights between FAP and FAN. FAT under Kamougue attempted to attack FAN in 1980 at N'djamena but failed. Habre by that time was dismissed from his post as a minister as a result of the continuous difference. As a treaty was signed between Libya and Goukouni, Habre's forces were losing militarily.

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\(^1\) Arthur Banks, *Raid*, p.93.
After Goukouni's meeting with the then elected French President Mitterrand, France asked Chad to demand the departure of the Libyan troops and to request a peace keeping African forces.\textsuperscript{1} With the departure of the Libyan troops Habre found his opportunity to step forward and capture some important towns. In subsequent months PAN gained ground and initially entered N'djamena in June 1982. Goukouni fled to Cameroon, afterwards to Agiers and Ka-mougue also left Chad. However the situation in Chad reverted to instability. In addition to that, the Libyan intervention and the regional and international intrusion contributed to this instability.

The instability of the situation in Chad could be attributed to the tribal structure which was and still is playing an important role in the political life of the country. Coalitions were always made to prop certain regimes due to tribal affiliation. The Chadian tribes are distributed to various origins, Arabs, Negroids and other Africans. So as to understand the complexity of the Chadian society we shall classify the different categories of the tribes as follows:

1. The Sara, Boungo and Bagirmi.
2. The Moundang, Toubouri and M'Bouna.
3. The Chado-Hamatec tribes.
4. The group of the Toubou, the Karenbo and the Zagawara.
5. The Maba tribes group.
6. The Tama group.
7. The Daju tribes group.
8. The Mimi tribe.
9. The Boua tribes.
10. The Banda tribes.
11. The Fallata tribes.
12. The Arab tribes.

\textsuperscript{1} International Affairs, Winter 1981-82, London, p.33.
Most of these tribes have kins and clans within the particular group. The Arab tribes of Chad infiltrated Sudan for search of water and grazing. They are the Salamat, Bakria, Bani Halba, Bani Salim, Bani Hilal and Turgum.1 Other non-Arab tribes like Zaghawa, Bedaiyat, Daza and Teda (known also as Goran) from the Toubou group and like the Masalit, Tama, Daju and Fallata. If we refer to Table 1 of the tribes in Darfur, the Chadian tribal structure is almost the same and this similarity has had its contribution to the security crisis in Darfur since the tribesmen tend to help the relatives to escape or harbour them after the commission of armed robbery or tribal conflicts. There was another similarity, though in a more elaborate scale, between Sudan and Chad which was the discriminative policy of the British in Sudan and the French in Chad. The French imposed two separate administrations in the country and the favoured part was the south while the Sara was their favoured tribe.

The vast desert region of Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) in the north of Chad was a very rich area of animal wealth but it was neglected by the French. "There were few or no schools, health centres and government-proved wells in most parts of the region".2 This negligence continued after independence especially during Tum-balbaye regime when the Libyan occupation of the Aozou strip was forgotten in exchange for Libyan support to Chad.3

Tribalism is still having a major role of the political life in Chad. Although Libyan troops withdrew from most of the Chadian territories and Ibn Omer forces have been incorporated into the Chadian army after the Baghdad Accord of November 1988, the problems resulted due to tribal affiliations still exist. National reconciliation was hardly approached because before signing the Accord more than two thousand elements of Ibn Omer forces infiltrated western Sudan in mid 1988 and stationed in El Wakhem area near the Sudanese-Libyan border. Ibn Omer himself was expelled from Libya. It was said that, it was a trick designed by the Libyans to overthrow

1. El Madi, op.cit, p.81.
3. Ibid., p.93.
Habre but the signing of the Accord put end to this rumour and Ibn Omer was appointed Foreign Minister in Habre's government. However this did not please the old comrades-in-arms of Habre and therefore national reconciliation brought disintegration rather than national unity.

The coup attempt of April 1989 raised doubts about the policy of national reconciliation which Habre maintained. The major figures involved in this attempt were the close confidants of Habre; Hassan Jamous the military leader who was behind the victories against Libya in 1986-87, Idris Deby the army commander during the 1982 reconquest of power and Habre's security and military advisor and Mohamed Ibrahim into the Minister of Interior. According to the reconciliation policy many former rebels of the various military factions were appointed ministers in Habre's government. Kamougue became Minister of Agriculture, another southerner Jibril Djogo took the Transport and Guerina took charge of mines and energy. The CDR members Mohamed Senoussi Khatir and Jibril Greinsky and another military group leader (CODO) Mbailemdana were ministers too in Habre's cabinet. Sharing key posts and responsibilities was not favourable to the old guard; Deby, Jamous and Itoo. As tribalism plays a great role in political life, the multi-tribal coalition supporting Habre is a Teda (Goraan) while Jamous and Itoo are Zaghawa. Itoo was arrested in the wake of the failed coup d'etat while Jamous and Deby were said to be inside the Sudanese border either on their way to Libya or joining an opposition Guerilla enclave. However, Al Awsat newspaper reported that Jamous was killed in the wake of the coup attempt and Deby secretly met the former Prime Minister Sadig El Mahdi on May 1989 at Khartoum. The fact of Deby's meeting with El Mahdi was emphasised by Brigadier El Tayeb A. Mukhtar, Director of Darfur police who accompanied Deby to Khartoum by the police aircraft as he said in the same article. Deby met other Sudanese officials but Brigadier El Tayeb

2. Ibid., p.2.
3. Ibid., p.3.
4. Ashraeq Al Awsat Newspaper, issue No. 3969, 10/10/89.
5. Ibid.
did not know what they have discussed. The most serious in what Brigadier El Tayeb stated to the newspaper is that six thousand splinter elements from the Chadian army who infiltrated after the April coup attempt still remained in Darfur. Sadiq El Mahdi’s government was preparing this force to take over the Chadian regime as Brigadier El Tayeb stated and this situation urged the Chadians to assemble their forces in the Sudanese borders.

However, the new regime in the Sudan demanded the expulsion of this force but this which has not happened yet. The implication of this situation strongly shows the shallow tribal coalitions in Chad, therefore the fragile political structure. this situation could make national unity remain as a far distant target. Although Chad and Libya signed a peace treaty in August 1989 the inconsistency of the Libyan foreign policy on one hand and the instability of the Chadian political structure on the other hand would not bring peace in Chad.
CHAPTER 3

Regional Intervention in Chad

The conflict amongst Chadian factions and between some of them and the Libyan forces opened the door for the interplay of many competing influences, both regionally and internationally. These influences tended to impede any genuine efforts for resolving the situation of conflict and civil strife. The interest of the other countries in Chad aggravated a situation which was already serious and complex.

Libya:

Libyan efforts aimed to regain Aozou strip after its seizure by the Chadian forces supported by the French and American aid. Besides the economic interest which Libya was trying to secure in Chad, especially Aozou, the intervention was perceived by the Libyans as a barrier to the presence of Israel and imperialist powers in the African continent. The former President Francois Tombalbaye has signed a treaty with the Libyans in 1973 which enabled them to put their hands in Aozou. Since that time relations between Libya and Chad have not been good. The Libyan military intervention was taking various forms; attacking Chadian towns and helping Chadian rebels (Gouktato’s forces, Sheikl Ibn Omer troops) and mercenary groups (Islamic Legion). For these reasons Chad refused to condemn the United States for its action against Libya early in 1986 when “It engaged in a skirmish in the Gulf of Sirte during a US navalexercise, or for the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi”, when a meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers in Fez, Morocco, passed a motion of support for Libya against actual or potential US aggressions, Radio Chad commented that N’djamena could never associate itself with any such criticism of US policy since Libya “is an enemy of Chad” whose troops are occupying “a good part of our national territory.”


-59-
At first Sudan was supporting Hissene Habre in his struggle against Libya. It was also believed to be the channel for the French, American and Egyptian aid for Habre during the Nimeri regime. As the Libyan intentions in Chad were obvious to the French, France backed Habre more strongly, encouraged by the Reagan Administration and by the Saudis.  

Sudanese support for Habre was a sort of an indirect struggle between Nimeri, the President of Sudan at that time (1969-1985) and Colonel Gaddafi. The political differences between Nimeri and Gaddafi were overwhelming. Gaddafi was seeking unity between Libya and the Sudan but Nimeri refused his request. Afterwards Libya was accusing Nimeri of being Pro-imperialist. He was also accused of supporting the Libyan opposition. For more emphasis on this issue we quote here what has been mentioned in Woodward's Veil about the secret meeting between Nimeri and Dr. Mohammed Yousef Magariaf (leader of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya) in Washington in December 1983, "Nimeri contempt for Gaddafi was well known and his support of the anti-Gaddafi exile opposition was widely suspected, but in the meeting, according to the secret source report, Nimeri promised that he would increase assistance in the form of training facilities, weapons, ammunition and travel facilitation in the form of Sudanese Passports and other documents."  

When Habre presided over Chad, the Sudanese aid continued and also the flow of foreign support through Sudan. That was the policy of the Sudan under Nimeri's regime until the end of that regime by the uprising of April 1985. A great shift took place in the Sudanese foreign policy since that time particularly towards the Chadian-Libyan question. During the Transitional Government which had come after Nimeri's removal, Sudan's policy became more friendly towards Libya, while suspending any sort of support to the Chadian government. Moreover, the western part of the Sudan was believed to be a theatre for Libyan military operations, without the

approval of the Sudanese government. The Chadians accused the Sudanese authorities of complicity with the Libyans-Sudan denied and sometimes ignored these accusations.

In the light of the Libyan presence it was done with the approval of the Sudanese government, it could be argued that Sudan has apparently been biased towards Libya.

Sadig El Mahdi, the former Sudanese Prime Minister declared that Aozou strip was within Libyan territory.¹ This statement aroused the resentment of Chad and the displeasure of the United States without contributing to the easing of the conflict. Sadig El Mahdi’s statement was a diplomatic blunder. It could, however, be explained by the fact that at that time, Sudan was expecting important oil shipments from Libya. In any case Sadig El Mahdi seemed to back down from his position in subsequent statements.

At the same time, the region of Darfur witnessed some suspicious movements of the Libyans under the pretext of helping the local Sudanese authorities in combating the drought and desertification in the region. It was almost an incursion into the region.

Egypt:

The Libyan intervention in Chad was condemned by the Egyptians, so Egypt backed Habré’s regime politically and economically.² Moreover they provided limited military aid to Chad but indirectly. Egypt’s position in the Chadian conflict was governed by its strained relations with Libya.

The Egyptian role was played by proxy through the Sudan during Nimeri’s rule. With the overthrow of Nimeri the possibilities for Egyptian action in the conflict were reduced.³ Nevertheless the Egyptians continued to coordinate their policy towards Chad with the French and the Americans.⁴

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¹. Al Ayan (Khartoum, issue No. 6123)
⁴. Ibid.
From another angle, this coordination was somehow limited, because the Egyptians did not agree with the American measures towards Libya as being legitimate target for reprisals from naval guns and carrier planes of the United States Sixth Fleet.1 The Egyptians saw such target as counter-productive since the attacks would force Egypt and other pro-American Arab into a deeply embarrassing position.2

2. ibid.
The Role of The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

In the 1990 the OAU was about to complete three decades of its existence as an African continental organization. However, the OAU has failed to come to terms with the vital problems affecting the future of the continent. The majority of the African countries obtained their political independence, but they are still seriously handicapped by their underdevelopment conditions. The economic and social conditions of most African countries are indeed abysmal.¹

Although over 10 per cent of the world’s total population lives in the fifty countries of Africa, her share in the world industrial output is less than one per cent.² Of the thirty one poorest countries of the world twenty are African.³ The continent has the world’s lowest per capita income, with only ten states including oil producing countries exceeding 300 dollars per annum.⁴

If we refer to the purposes of the OAU as stated in article 11(1) of its Charter we see that they are:

a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states.
b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve better life of the peoples of Africa.
c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.
d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

e) To promote international cooperation having due regard to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

However, many problems faced the OAU since its formation in 1963 which weakened its role to achieve the above mentioned goals. One of these problems, for instance is the declining spirit of Pan-

². Ibid, p.49.
³. Ibid, p.50.
⁴. Ibid, p.51.
Africanism which had led in the past to the formation of the OAU states from regional and foreign policy to domestic affairs. For instance, at the Kampala summit of the OAU in 1975, the then Nigerian President General Gowon was forced to make an embarrassing exit from the conference when informed of the overthrow of his regime in Lagos.2

The civil strife in Chad 1977-81 which has been discussed by the OAU in 1981 suggesting a creation of a peace-keeping force is still ongoing.3

The ideological conflict between the radical and the conservative states has also contributed to the weakness of the OAU, because it made the cooperation between the capitalist and socialist oriented countries almost impossible which consequently affected the regional economic system. Furthermore the border disputes among most of the Organization members was a real problem to the Organization, so it failed to solve many of those disputes. For example Libya is still occupying Aozou strip.4

Efforts at mediation by the OAU intensified as the conflict escalated, and on 11 September 1987 a cease-fire took effect. In November Chad claimed that FANT forces clashed with members of Gaddafi's Islamic Legion near the Sudanese border. The presence of the Islamic Legion troops in the Darfur region of the Sudan led to

1. Domenico Mazzeno, op. cit., p.50.
2. Ibid., p.51.
3. Ibid., p.51.
deterioration of relations between Sudan and Chad in 1987-88. It was also claimed that Libyan aircraft were repeatedly violating Chadian airspace.\footnote{\textit{The Europa World Year Book}, Vol. 1, England, p.668}

In November 1987, the UN General Assembly refused to debate the question of the sovereignty of Azazou region concluding that the resolution of the dispute was the responsibility of the OAU. A meeting between the heads of states of the two countries; Chad and Libya, was proposed by the OAU and was scheduled for 24 May 1988 after having been postponed several times.\footnote{Ibid, p.668.} On the eve of the summit it was announced that Gaddafi would not be attending, in protest at Chad’s treatment of Libyan prisoners of war.\footnote{Ibid, p.668.} On 25, in a speech delivered in Tripoli to commemorate the 25th anniversary of foundation of the OAU, Gaddafi announced that he was willing to recognize Habre’s regime, but Habre reacted with caution, while announcing that Chad would restore diplomatic relations with Libya which were severed since 1982.\footnote{Ibid, p.669.}

Relations between Chad and Libya deteriorated again in June 1989 when Chad accused Gaddafi of preparing with the complicity of El Sadig El Mahdi’s government a further military offensive against Chad. Habre warned that a pre-emptive strike by his forces several thousands of whom were reported to have been deployed in the bordering areas between Chad and Darfur region in Western Sudan where it was alleged that Sudanese and Libyan troops were gathering in preparation for an assault.\footnote{Ibid, p.669.}
CHAPTER 7

International Intervention

cophone states as a Gau Vist historical policy. Inspite of the parti-
san competition between the right-wing (the Neo-Gau Vist and the
liberals) and the socialists, there was always a cohabitation between
them towards the Francophone states for their vital importance for
France as sphere of influence (Although France was no longer colon-
isng these countries, there was and still remained strongties, and
there is still existed a great amount of dependence in both military
and economic fields as well.

The Chadian issue remained the most difficult problem facing
France in Africa. That is because of the direct intervention of Lib-

3. Ibid, pA 149.
4. Ibid, pA 150.
5. Ibid, pA 150.

Y. Gaddaffi also described the French speaking
African countries as "puppets" and "shame to Africa" adding that the very word Francophone, the link between those countries and France is colonialism. A great deal of resentment took place in those African countries as a result of the Libyan leader's statements.

However, the serious fighting in north Chad between Chadian and Libyan stopped, while the Libyans were claiming that the troops involved, belonged to the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) under its new leader El Sheikh Ibn Omer after Goukouni's dispute with the Libyan authorities and his departure to Algiers. The Libyan forces began to receive a series of defeats from the Chadian army in early 1987, because of the great external military support for Habré's army.

In any case, it is clear that the external struggle has been consistently manipulated by external intervention which militated against any possibility of achieving stability and national unity. So we ought to analyze the role played by external intervention in the conflict.

France:

Former French President Giscard d'Estaing had cut his losses in Chad by withdrawing French forces in May 1980 leaving in power a regime financed by the Organization of African Unity and dominated by the Libyan-backed Goukouni Ouedraogo. D'Estaing's successor President Mitterrand tried to reestablish France's presence in Chad without challenging the Libyans. When Habré returned to power in 1982, with American support (according to France's suspicious) France resumed aiding Chad, presumably with the hope that Libya might limit its response if France could limit Habré's dependence on the United States. But this hope was disappointed when Goukouni

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
It seemed that as if there was a secret deal between Habre and the French to protect his regime. The regal groups opposing him were regrouped in Bardai near the Libyan borders under Goukouni's leadership. In May 1983 they advanced to the south with Libyan aid of 2,000 troops and several Mig fighters. They captured the northern capital, Faya-Largeau. In June 24th, Habre called for international support and received aid from Egypt, Sudan and U.S.A. without direct involvement.

France perceived Chad, as we said before as a barrier to the spread of Islamic ideology in the region, and also the spread of the communist influence from the neighboring countries. For these reasons, France maintained a policy of intervention in Chad. In a sense, this was a continuation of France's colonial policy of assimilation which was carried out through personal assimilation of administered people and the political, economic and cultural assimilation of technology into the colonized state. The process of assimilation in Chad was by means of exerting and concentrating the western Christian ideology amongst the tribes of southern Chad, especially the Sara tribes.

After the independence of Chad and until May 1980 France had a huge military base in the capital Ndjamena which served to monitor developments within the country as well as its previous colonies.

1. Foreign Affairs 1984, p.16.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Author Banks, op.cit.
7. Ibid.

-68-
promised arms and economic assistance if Goukouni accepted the French advise and Gaddafi ordered his forces to withdraw. Almost immediately Habre’s forces advanced into Eastern Chad and without the deployment of the Organization of African Unity forces that had been promised; Goukouni’s position began to deteriorate, and this situation consequently affected the pro-Libyan Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) which was beginning to dissolve by the middle of 1986. A meeting was arranged by the Senegalese President Abdou Diouf in March 1986, for the different Chadian factions, but Goukouni did not attend. Therefore the fight resumed again between Libyan backed Goukouni’s forces and Habre’s army. Goukouni’s forces were withdrawn from their home land in the Tibesti because of the heavy military American and French supply to Habre, while the other factions of the Gant were fighting each other.

By 1987 Goukouni and his FAP faction which was the strongest among the GUNT were apparently incapable of threatening Habre’s army anymore. Although Azoua strip was and is still in the hands of the Libyans, the rest of the important positions south of the 16th parallel; which were seized by Goukouni, had been regained by the

2. Internal Security Department Archives (Ministry of Interior).
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

-69-
Chadian army.\(^1\)

It was not only the foreign, particularly the French, supply, that helped in recovering strategic Chadian positions, but the Libyan bombing of many Chadian areas such as Arada, Kouba-Oulanga and Fada in north Chad, had given France a pretext to attack the Libyan forces and the military equipments based on those areas.\(^2\) Also American Red eye missiles had been used by the Chadian army for eradicating both the Libyans and the remaining of the Chadian opposition forces. Eventually France began to launch regular air strikes on the opposition gatherings in the Tibesti in north Chad, south of the 16th parallel, having also air cover to the advancing Chadian army.

It is thus quiet evident that Habré was totally dependent on the French for protecting his regime. Having many military bases in Fada, Faya-Largeau, Abeche and Ndjamena, France's military existence is associated connected with Habré's remaining in power. But the paradox of this huge existence is that the coup d'état of April 1989 been conducted by the most close aides of Habré, Idris Déby, who was Habré's advisor for military and security affairs, Hassan Jamous, who was the commander of the Chadian army and Mohamed Ibrahim Itno, Habré's Minister of Interior. Déby took refuge in Sudan, according to Sudanese intelligence sources, Itno to Cameroon while Jamous was said to have been killed in the attempted coup. According to the ethnic structure of the Chadian society, the conciliation between Habré and El Sheikh Ibn Omer in November 1988 and his joining Habré's cabinet as Foreign Minister could be the reason for the attempted coup. However, a question shall rise here about the extent of the French protection for Habré in the light of the unattained national unity and the rise and fall of the tribal coalitions.

The United States of America:

During 1981 the U.S administration demonstrated that it regarded its policy in Africa as a projection of its power struggle with...
The immediate objective of the U.S. was to break the monopoly of international relations with Africa and that it might regard political stability in Africa as the maintenance of status quo which was a disadvantage.\textsuperscript{2} It must be recognized that the 'Linkage' theme in American relations with Third World countries severely limited the Administration's ability to developing situations in Africa and gave rise to inconsistencies and occasional absurdities, all of which weakened the US potential for constructive engagements.\textsuperscript{3}

The American-Libyan strained relation was a strong determinant to the American policy towards Chad which was warmly appreciated by the Chadian government. Chad was one of the few countries which applauded the American raid on Tripoli in April 1986 because of the shared hatred of Gaddafi.\textsuperscript{4}

Moreover, material aid had been offered to Habre since 1983,\textsuperscript{5} in both forms military and non-military economic aid. The latter was carried out by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and The Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE). The visit of Habre to Washington in June 1987 cemented the relations between America and Chad.\textsuperscript{6}

In the light of these findings we can regard the main objective of the American Administration in this part of the African continent as follows:

1- The security of the pro-American regimes in the continent, such

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Ibid.
  \item Ibid.
  \item Ibid.
  \item Colin Legum, op.cit. pB.194.
\end{enumerate}
as Sudan under Nimiri and Egypt under Sadat.

2. Containing the expansion of the Soviet influence in the African continent, but this objective was becoming less effective due to the international new trend of consensus which put an end to the cold war policy between the West and East since the presidency of Gorbachev over the Soviet Union in 1985.


Moreover, the strained relation between Libya and USA made the latter close to the Chadian regime. The American Administration considered Gaddafi intervention in Chad as an action which helped increase the cost for the Libyans of their adventure there. This means that the Libyan adventure in Chad will cost them a lot. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) had covert operations in Chad, so as to support Habre’s efforts to gain power from the Transitional Government for National Union (GUNT). It involved across-the-board support money, political support and technical assistance.¹

In his book “the Secret Wars of the CIA” Bob Woodward mentioned a sort of intelligence assistance operation undertaken by the CIA to prop the position of Habre; “Habre had come to power the previous year after receiving covert CIA paramilitary assistance as part of one of the early Reagan Administration’s findings designed to bloody Gaddafi’s nose”.²

Friendly leadership in Chad was a key to keeping Gaddafi boxed in.³

The Former Soviet Union:

Although there was no actual intervention by the Soviets in Chad, they tried in the past to expand their presence in the continent, which was already happening in Libya and Ethiopia, by forming a connection to Chad through Libya. Therefore, by such policy the

2. Ibid, p.310.
3. Ibid, p.311.
Soviets could be in position to secure to some extent, southern frontline in the African continent, hence minimizing the available economic, political and military opportunities exposed for West Europe and U.S.A. That was a part of the cold war policy.¹

It was also said about the former Soviet Union's priorities that; the Third World was not a high priority item within Soviet foreign policy. Issues closer to home: Europe, China, border security and issues central to the Soviet-American military relationship were and long have been of far greater importance to Soviet leaders.²

When Gorbachev succeeded Shemenko as General Secretary in March 1985, he made clear that his foreign policy would largely be determined by his domestic economy priorities. The basic objective in solving the Soviet Union's economic problems means reduction in Moscow's commitment to support Third World countries with economic aid.³

The Soviet activity in the sphere of foreign economic contracts, as Gorbachev declared, must be tied up more closely with the new tasks. This new trend should be a large-scale forward-looking approach to mutually advantageous economic relations. It was quite obvious that, after the end of the cold war era, neither the countries of socialist orientation, nor the national liberation movements in the Third World would expect Soviet aid unless it was a sort of mutual economic benefit.

This trend could be realized in the way the former Soviet Union had reacted towards the US raid on Libya in 1986 which was as strong as the Libyans hoped for. However the differences over policy between the former Soviet Union and Libya might have initiated an atmosphere of mutual suspicions.

². Ibid.
CHAPTER 8

The Security Problem in Darfur

Chad’s longstanding instability contributed to the security crisis of Darfur region in western Sudan since the independance of Chad in 1960. The ethnic diversity has played a continuous role in destabilising regimes and coalitions. The relation between the poor Muslim north and the educated rich south was another element for the divisive situation in Chad. National unity was just a hope that had never been achieved. However, the period between 1960-79 was relatively stable, because the struggle between the two rivals Goukouni and Habre was not highly escalated as it happened later.

Habre’s opposition status has changed since his expulsion by Goukouni 18 months before his victorious return to N’Djamena in June 1982. Goukouni collapsing situation could be dated from Libyan’s belated recognition that its original support for him was ill-judged and that Libyan ambitions in Saharan Africa could only be realized through some mechanism that ensured Libyan sovereignty over Chad. When Goukouni called for the departure of Libyan military troops to be substituted by the OAU forces to separate the Chadian military factions, which was agreed upon by the Libyans, it was an opportunity for Habre to take north Chad advancing towards the capital which he had seized three months after the Libyans departue. This transformation urged Habre to seek support from the various military opposition factions so as to put an end for this longstanding fighting and to inspire prospects for national reconciliation. The discussions included prominent Chadian figures such as Dr. Aba Siddig, Elsheikh Ibn Omer, Ahmed Acyl and Abdel Gader Kamougue. Habre was fearing the attacks of Acyl’s pro-Libyan forces in north Chad after their withdrawal from N’Djamena, but those fears were reduced by the death of Acyl in an accident in July 1982.

Another threat to Habre’s situation was the silence of Abdel Gader Kamougue who was Goukouni’s vice-president before Habre’s
arrival to N'djamena and who had fled to Cameroon. Harbre was particularly worried that Kamouge’s silence would encourage separatist sentiments in the south and also encourage diehard opposition. Furthermore, it could provide a breeding ground for super-power intervention. We can also argue that well educated, trained and experienced southerners to run the civil service personnel, without Kamouge’s approval to join Harbre, the latter could not depend on them. However, interested parties in solving the problem of national reconciliation in Chad, like Sudan, Gabon, France and the OAU were encouraging discussions over this matter.

Different sorts of problems were facing Chad and affecting the security situation. There were the urgent needs in every sector of the Chadian economy and particularly the crippling needs in the health sector. The little medical services available were those which had been conducted by the NGOs; the International Red Cross, Medicins Sans Frontieres and so on, in the absence of a government health budget since 1979.

Under such a situation, it seems too hard for Harbre to deal with the country’s internal and external problems, unless assistance from the international community could be provided and national reconciliation could be reached, to help his reconstruction efforts.

The Libyan threat for Harbre regime was another problem, because the Libyans were occupying Aozou strip since 1973 and that was the reason behind Libya’s open military intervention and the gathering of Libyan forces and mercenaries, near the Chad-Libya-Sudan juncture. Harbre alleged that Libya was using its abundant financial resources to recruit mercenaries and send them into Chad. He also affirmed his country’s determination to recover the Aozou strip.

About Chad’s relations with Sudan, Harbre performed an interview to the Sudan News Agency SUNA, the strong historical and social ties binding the two nations and expressed his appreciation of the Sudan’s endeavours to boost the stability of Chad. At that time the ruling regime in the Sudan was the Transitional Military Council. Harbre said that civil war had ruined the Chadian economy and its infrastructure, and that his government had laid down the principles.
for developing the Agricultural, industrial, communication and road sectors. Habre said that his government was keen about negotiations with Libya to reach a solution, but the Libyans were assuming a hardline.¹

According to Habre the preconditions that Libya was imposing implied the annexation of Chad to Libya or concluding a military cooperation pact that leads to the same result. He said that his hand was stretched to the opposition either inside or outside Chad and he further proclaimed that the National Union for Independence and Revolution, the ruling party in Chad constitutes the best framework for uniting the people of Chad around the principles of unity, sovereignty and development.²

However, all those hopes were frustrated by the elusive national unity inside Chad on the one hand and the continual threats of the Libyans and the Chadian opposition on the other. The Sudan, particularly during the rule of Sadig El Mahdi could be held responsible for exploiting the ethnic diversity of the Chadians which affected the ruling coalitions based on tribal balances. It was so clear that the Chadian opposition led by Adoum Togoi who succeeded Ibn Omer over the CDR after Ibn Omer’s agreement with Habre in 1988, was trying with Libyan support to re-build an anti-Habre alliance which is said to move from Sudanese territories. In this regard he approached his Zaghawa colleagues Jamous and Deby.³ A report indicated that Deby and Jamous had reached the Sudanese borders after failure of the coup attempted in April 1989 and had joined the guerilla nucleus being formed by Hassan Fadoul, Jamous’s brother-in-law with Libyan aid.⁴ Anyhow, whether Deby, because Jamous later died affected by his wounds, joined Adoum, or Fadoul or established his own guerilla nucleus, Sudan has become a threat for Habre’s regime stability being a host for various anti-Habre Libyan-backed military factions.

Eventually, Deby’s forces held territories in eastern Chad and it was evident that they attacked the Chadian army moving from their five main bases in Darfur into eastern Chad in area populated by the Zaghawa, Ouaddai Arabs and the Hadjarai all of whom favour Deby and oppose Habre’s government.

² Ibid., p.2.
³ Ibid., p.2.
⁴ Ibid., p.3.

-76-
press conference that he had agreed to the airlift, while the Libyan authorities called it piracy and that the soldiers had been taken against their will. All these incidents fairly match with the argument that the United States has been playing a certain role in this respect. At the end we can argue that, although it is premature to predict the direction of Deby's internal or foreign policy, the issue of national unity is too important to be neglected, in such a country of multi-ethnic diversity as Chad.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the available data about the security problems of Darfur apparently leads to a certain conclusion, that all these problems are products of both external and internal factors which are discussed in this research. Naturally, there are some other factors like famine, drought and desertification, in addition to lack of facilities available to the local authorities in the Region. However, the conflict between Chad and Libya remains the strongest factor. Moreover, this conflict has never been seriously tackled by the political leadership in Khartoum until it began to spill over the whole region. Furthermore, the continuous food supply from Libya to Darfur Region and the agricultural schemes which were made there facilitated adequate coverage for Libyan intelligence activities in the region which would probably affect the national unity of the whole country in the light of the complete negligence of the Central Government to the Region. The Sudanese identity may be in question for many people in the Region when they think of the major source of their basic needs. This debate would be in favour of Libya. Part of the intelligence activities, the economic dependency on the Libyan aid would lead to some sort of assimilation over the region’s citizens into the Libyan influence. Any referendum on this matter may be in favour of Libya in due time. Sag El Naiam agricultural scheme (80 miles near El Fashir) was purposely made by the Libyans to supply North Darfur with vegetables, while its production since its establishment in 1986 can hardly, suffice the workers of the scheme. It is said there that the scheme is a coverage of espionage activity, however, there is no evidence for that, but the volume of expenditure and staff in view of low production made it so controversial. Brigadier El Tayeb A. Mukhtar argued that Sag El Naiam agricultural mission is an intelligence mission.

Many questions regarding the Libyan persistent interference in Darfur Region may arise: it could be argued that Darfur is thought to be a source of Petroleum and other minerals which the Libyans might have information about. The Libyan wealth is increasingly utilized in major schemes and political and military activities
and that would decrease this wealth. This argument may be connected with the Libyan insistence to keep the rich Aozou strip in Northern Chad in hand. From another angle we cannot analyze the Libyan interference in Darfur that the Libyan intend to extend their geographical territory because Libya is too vast for the few million citizens, unless the dramatic dream of the African Islamic "Gamalhira" of the Libyan leader is still existent. Another analysis that could be argued, is that Libyan interference in Darfur could ease the Libyan military control over Chad and this may be the most adequate analysis among the other possibilities. 

Khartoum is to be blamed for its negligence of one of the hottest issues affecting the national security of the country. Both external and internal levels are important in our search for stability in the Region, especially after the coup attempt of April 1989 in Chad, because it affected both in Chad and in Western Sudan. In Chad, old coalitions broke down while new coalitions emerged. Consequently, in Western Sudan, these Chadian changes resulted in more infiltration of the supporters of one coup attempt after another who found their final resort in the Sudanese territories. It is a new ground for military and diplomatic dispute. Chad now, is demanding eviction of the current crop of infiltrators accusing them of attacking the Chadian border villages from Sudan. The contradictory statements of the political leaders during the former elected government in 1986 and their lack of a consensus of views and attitudes on one hand and the silence of the Military Council For National Salvation toward finding a solution to this matter on the other hand, also tended to complicate the situation. The adoption of a coordinated policy and the application of joint solution has accordingly become elusive.

The geographical location of the region and its vast size is not an acceptable justification for the Government's failure in combating the armed robbery phenomenon. Under the circumstances any accusation of the Government's responsibility for the deteriorating security of the region can be justified and accepted by some of the people of the region. Consequently, this is bound to create a feeling of hostility among the people of Darfur toward the Central Government; furthermore, this hostility is also manifested in the increasing rates of crimes and in the explosion of tribal conflicts throughout the
It is imperative for the government to pay attention to the
rather than a tribal one. People should recognize the various differences amongst the Sudanese as a positive characteristic rather than a divisive element to the national unity. If unity could be realized in the presence and recognition of tribal diversity, stability would be achieved. If we refer to the tribal conflicts in Darfur we shall find that the search for wealth and power which is maintained on tribal basis is the major incentive for most of the tribal frictions. Central and local authorities must tackle these problems with great deal of wisdom because it is almost impossible to give every one what he or she wants. Many of the things people want do not sufficiently exist to satisfy everybody. Finding compromises would be the only way possible.

On the external level, the Central Government has to deal with the security problem of Western Sudan within the Sudan-Chad-Libya triangle regionally and with the concerned countries internationally. It can be argued that all states have organizational relations but the nature of the relations between any two states emerge from the national interest they both hold. An array of conflict resolution techniques is necessarily needed but the most important issue is the interest and skill of the disputants. In the case of Western Sudan security problem it seems that diplomacy is the adequate instrument for conflict resolution regarding the involved parties Libya and Chad and also the other concerned states. It can also be argued that the persuasive power of diplomacy may need to be supported by other means of persuasion or compulsion, but if we realize the new international trend of consensus and the intention to end all sorts of war by proxy, it is probable that this problem can be solved through diplomacy.

It may be premature to predict how this problem would be solved, but unless reasonable measures are taken locally and active
diplomacy is conducted, any solution to this crisis would not be
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